Intelligence Report

Kim Il-Sung's New Military Adventurism

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KIM IL-SUNG'S NEW MILITARY ADVENTURISM

MEMORANDUM TO RECipients

"Trouble from North Korea" is the message of this review and analysis of Kim Il-sung's motivations and foreign policies.

There seems to be no challenge to Kim's leadership. During the past two years, he has brought into positions of authority a number of military figures who share his increasingly militant and adventurous policies toward South Korea and the United States.

The combination of Kim's ego-mania, revolutionary fervor, and nationalistic self-assertion, point to continued probing and infiltration of South Korea. Despite initial personnel losses, he clearly intends to continue his efforts to establish territorial bases in South Korea, in the manner of Ho Chi Minh in South Vietnam, as a step towards an eventual take over of all Korea. Meanwhile, he will continue efforts—even at considerable risk—to harass and to embarrass the United States.

This study was produced solely by the Special Research Staff. The research analyst in charge was Arthur A. Cohen.

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# KIM IL-SUNG'S NEW MILITARY ADVENTURISM

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KIM IL-SUNG'S NEW MILITARY ADVENTURISM

Summary and Conclusions

Kim Il-sung has always held Stalin's militant view of the U.S., and he has accepted Mao's strategy on how to wage the global struggle against Washington. After the Korean war, he was cautious, and like Mao, he avoided use of his own forces in situations of direct confrontation with U.S. troops, while encouraging others (like Ho) to be bold in committing units to fight the Americans. But as Soviet military aid provided by the post-Khrushchev leadership improved his regime's capability to resist conventional air attacks, and as the U.S. became increasingly committed in Vietnam, Kim's caution gave way to a new willingness to risk, at least, small-scale clashes with U.S. troops. U.S. airstrikes in mid-July 1966 against targets in the vicinity of Hanoi and Haiphong spurred him to reconsider acting on a provocative Chinese challenge to open a second front in Korea.

In August 1966, Kim apparently believed that the U.S. was too heavily committed in Vietnam and that its forces were too thin in Korea to retaliate against his regime if Pyongyang were to adopt an adventurist policy of harassment in the DMZ. The concept of meeting escalation of the air war over North Vietnam with escalation elsewhere appeared as an important new idea in Pyongyang's propaganda in August. In October, Kim added the concept of engaging U.S. forces directly "on every front." In mid-October, immediately following a party conference which featured the elevation in the hierarchy of military professionals, harassment by North Korean armed personnel of U.S. and ROK forces in the DMZ was initiated. It was intended primarily to be a diversionary policy to assist Ho's effort. Kim's aim was to tie down ROK troops, thereby limiting the number which could be sent to Vietnam and creating the menacing specter of a new Korean war at a
time when the U.S. was overextended (in Kim's view) in Vietnam. In addition, his political aim was to take some form of action which would be interpreted internationally as Pyongyang's long-delayed riposte to Seoul's dispatch of an effective fighting force to Vietnam.

Regarding the more intangible but no less important psychological factor, in 1966 Kim increasingly viewed himself as an ultra-revolutionary who was willing to take greater risks than either Moscow or Peking in creating a direct confrontation with "imperialist" armed forces. Since the start of the year he had been developing a close relationship with Castro based on a common anti-Mao grievance and a common desire to "push" the international revolution. Castro was delighted to have such an ally—an independent-minded leader of a small Communist country resisting the pressures of the two big Communist powers. In April 1966, he praised Kim as "one of the most distinguished, brilliant, and heroic socialist leaders in the world today." The Kim-Castro relationship intensified Kim's egotistic, nationalistic, and revolutionary tendencies and further stimulated his military adventurism.

The evidence suggests that Kim acted on his own volition rather than on the consequences of an internal power struggle in the North Korean leadership. He was not forced by a group of disgruntled leaders, more radical than himself, to adopt an adventuristic policy; several subsequent defenses of it were made by Kim personally. There is no evidence that there are other leaders who are more belligerently anti-American than Kim or more adventurist. He is, in fact, more adventurist than Mao, and he has publicly derided the practice of "only talking big" about confronting the U.S. in a military situation.

An important aspect of Kim's militant and adventurist attitude is his compulsion to build the North into a fortress which can resist any outside attack of a conventional nature, which can manufacture some categories of its own armaments, and which can shelter important production facilities underground. This fortress-state
mentality accentuates his confidence that he can engage in adventuristic military actions with impunity. Since 1962, he has promoted a policy of high-priority emphasis on military construction.

There is some evidence that in the fall of 1966 doubts had been raised within the North Korean leadership regarding Kim's extreme emphasis on military construction at the expense of the national economy. Kim responded to this criticism at the October 1966 party conference by warning against "deviations" from his military-minded policies and the dangers of being affected by "a peaceful mood." At the same conference, he promoted men who were active in the military field and in arms-negotiations with Moscow, moving the defense minister up to full membership in the political committee and elevating three others to alternate membership. In addition, he promoted Choe Hyon—chairman of the party's Military Affairs Committee—to full membership. Thereafter, Choe's rise was spectacular, and his current ranking as fifth man in the hierarchy's order of precedence suggests that he had made his way upward primarily as a loyal defender of Kim's views.

By making these promotions, Kim introduced into the political committee the kind of expertise necessary for guiding stepped-up defense programs and preparing for any military contingencies along the DMZ. He also buttressed the already existing martial spirit in higher party councils, relying on the newly-promoted generals to ensure that militancy was not diluted by what Kim had derided as a pacifist mood. Finally, he improved his dominance over the political committee, acquiring more support from the military professionals for suppressing, and eventually purging, those men who had presumed to raise questions about the wisdom of his policies.

As a dispute between military-minded and civilian-oriented men developed within the leadership following the October 1966 party conference, Kim and his supporters guarded against outside interference. There is no evidence that the Soviets tried to intervene. Their relationship
with Kim was gradually improving, inasmuch as they required his political support against the Chinese; he, in turn, was dependent on them for various categories of military hardware. There is some evidence that the Chinese tried to intervene in January and February 1967 by floating rumors about a Kim-led coup and the rise of his new "revisionist" leadership, but Peking apparently had no real assets to use in the effort to cause trouble for Kim. The feeble effort, mostly in the form of anti-Kim Red Guard posters put up in the Chinese capital, was ineffective and aroused Kim to reaffirm his determination never again to allow North Koreans in any way to be flunkeys of the Chinese Communists.

The fourth-ranked North Korean leader, Pak Kum-chol, and his civilian-oriented faction were attacked and removed from their party posts at the 15th party plenum in April 1967. Pak reportedly had opposed Kim's policy of forced-draft defense construction and war preparations. He had complained that they were a tremendous drain on the civilian economy and that the high-speed production movement—-the Korean hybrid of Stalin's Stakhanovite and Mao's Leap Forward programs—was making the people suffer too much. The newly-promoted military professionals took a leading role in criticizing Pak and defending Kim.

The other major leader purged with Pak was Yi Hyo-sun, who was denounced for the poor showing over the years of his Liaison Department's anti-ROK operations. It is not clear whether Yi had in fact refused to obey Kim's October 1966 order to step-up the entire subversive effort against the South or had fallen because Kim required a scapegoat for the previous low-boil policy. There is some marginal evidence that Kim had to argue against men who believed that an intensified southern effort would fritter away valuable agent assets, and Yi may have been one of those men. In any case, Kim's view of October 1966 that "a positive struggle" must be waged against Seoul, even at a high cost, prevailed. This view reflected Kim's highly subjective ("revolutionary") proclivity to engage in wishful thinking regarding the feasibility of accumulating
subversive assets despite the ROK counterintelligence capability. It also reflected his determined attempt to copy the model of using highly-trained infiltrators to subvert the non-Communist half of a divided country—the model established by Ho in Vietnam.

In the course of complaining about the poor showing thus far of the southern effort, Kim in February and March 1967 referred to the importance of Ho's model for the building of a strong party apparatus in the South, for assassinating high-level government officials, and for establishing effective guerrilla warfare tactics.

In addition to the harassment policy in the DMZ, the use of armed groups of North Korean army officers to conduct raids well below the DMZ, starting in May-June 1967, clearly was Kim's policy. Allowing for euphemistic language, North Korean media attributed it to him; in his own statements in the fall of 1967, Kim defended it. The probability that Kim had met earlier with some inner-party opposition to stepping up the southern effort could explain his compulsion to demonstrate that armed struggle was on the rise everywhere in South Korea. This compulsion seems to have been a major factor in Kim's decision to dispatch a 31-man armed team to try to assassinate President Pak on 21 January 1968. Immediately after the attempt, Pyongyang media referred for the first time to the advent of an "armed guerrilla struggle" in the South. Kim may also have had the illusory hope of exploiting among the populace the loss of government prestige which would have resulted from a successful assassination attempt. He is reported to have said at an earlier date that the assassination of high-government officials in South Vietnam had driven a wedge between the populace and Saigon, enabling the Viet Cong to improve their subversive assets.

Kim's adventurism in seizing the Pueblo on 23 January seems to have been the result of objective and subjective factors in his thinking. There is no way to determine which factors were most important in Kim's decision. It can only be conjectured that the subjective factor provided the unique, personal context in which Kim viewed the degree
of risk, and that this personal context allowed for a smaller margin of safety than Moscow and Peking believed to be prudent.

On the one hand, he probably calculated that Washington would not use nuclear weapons to launch a retaliatory attack against the North. He apparently was willing to risk provoking a conventional attack—the most probable form of retaliation, if it came—because he was confident of resisting and surviving it. At the same time, he apparently believed that Washington might well be deterred from any military action both because of the existence of his defense treaties with Moscow and Peking and because of U.S. reluctance to become involved in a second war in Asia. (Once the seizure had been accomplished, preserving the lives of the crew became an additional deterrent against U.S. attack, but this could not have entered into his initial calculations.)

On the other hand, the subjective factor—a marked craving for personal and nationalistic self-assertion—seems to have impelled Kim to defy the major "imperialist" enemy and, in the act, to upstage his two major allies. The obvious contrast between Pyongyang's boldness and Moscow's and Peking's caution regarding the matter of seizing U.S. naval vessels on the high seas was another way to upgrade the importance of North Korea in the global struggle against Washington. Partly as a consequence of the Pueblo seizure and partly because North Korean troops harass American forces in the DMZ, Kim actually believes himself to be the chief proponent and strategist of the anti-U.S. struggle. Assuming this pre-eminent role in October 1968, he propounded the view—similar to Castro's and Ho's—that small countries can effectively roll back the U.S. on every front, provided that they pool their strength and do not depend on big countries to supply the motivation for their individual revolutions.
The North Korean leaders continue to rule out a major direct attack along the front, insisting that they will attain their goal by means of the long-term southern subversive effort. In discussions with Japanese Communist leaders in early September 1968, Kim Il stated that Pyongyang had no intention of launching an attack against the South, but he went on to say that the Pak regime would be ousted by "guerrilla support" and a "general uprising" in the South. Thus, although a "March South" continues to be rejected by the North Korean leaders as a practical policy for eventual unification, they probably will continue to infiltrate armed teams to try to take hold with guerrilla bases in the countryside. They apparently are willing to live with a situation in which these provocative actions present an increasing danger of large-scale South Korean retaliation, initiated despite U.S. restraining efforts, and possibly leading, inadvertently, to an escalation of clashes in the DMZ.

The prospect is for continued sporadic harassment of U.S.-ROK forces in the DMZ and for further infiltration of armed groups with various missions, such as assassination of central and local government officials, establishment of guerrilla bases, and organization of a southern Communist party apparatus. Kim seems to believe that he missed two golden opportunities to exploit the government changes in 1960 and 1961, and he apparently hopes to have disciplined Communist personnel in place to capitalize on any future governmental crisis situation in the South. He hopes to be able to do what Ho had done in South Vietnam—e.g., to build up a political and military apparatus capable of exercising actual control over portions of South Korean territory and of presenting a growing challenge to Seoul's control over the South Korean population. He probably will not be deterred from working toward creating a revolutionary situation by the effectiveness of the ROK counterintelligence capability. His revolutionary callousness regarding future personnel losses ("sacrifices") was clearly indicated in his Castro-type statement of 8 October 1968: "To flinch before difficulties and to hesitate in revolution for fear of sacrifices is not an attitude befitting a revolutionary."
He also seems to believe that he can, with impunity, continue to hold the Pueblo's crew. So long as he retains them, he can continue to exploit his adventurist action among Communist militants everywhere for purposes of personal and national prestige. His price for releasing them almost certainly will continue to be something which can similarly be exploited—that is, an apology from Washington and a guarantee against future "intrusions" in Pyongyang-claimed waters.
KIM IL-SUNG'S NEW MILITARY ADVENTURISM

I. Policy Toward U.S. and ROK Forces in the DMZ

Prior to mid-October 1966, Kim's actual practice had been to avoid using North Korean military personnel to apply direct pressure on U.S. and ROK forces in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in support of Hanoi. He had remained cautious despite the fact that ROK troops had been dispatched to fight in South Vietnam. Pyongyang's offer to send "volunteers" whenever the Vietnamese Communists wanted them (North Korean government statement of 26 March 1965) had been a mere repetition of what the Chinese had just said—as a part of the effort to deter the U.S. from continuing the airstrikes against North Vietnam. In two interviews, on 19 April and 8 July, he had stated that the dispatch of ROK troops revealed Seoul to be an American "puppet," and while Pyongyang promised to provide the Vietnamese Communists with "sufficient quantities of arms and equipment to arm an equal number" of Viet Cong units (North Korean government statement of 8 July 1965), he avoided the matter of creating direct pressure on the U.S. In his speech to the KWP on 10 October 1965, after more ROK units had been dispatched, he stated only that the KWP would give "firm support and encouragement" to the Vietnamese Communists.

Like Mao, Kim in 1965 feared that any overt military action by his forces against U.S. forces might lead to unacceptable retaliation. He preferred to avoid military action in the DMZ at a time when Washington had already decided to deny Hanoi the one-sided privilege of retaining a revolutionary base in the North, immune from air retaliation, while it invaded the South. He concentrated his attention on further improving the North's defense capabilities, and the start of U.S. airstrikes against North Vietnam in February 1965 provided him with an opportunity to request Soviet military aid as a deterrent against possible attacks against Pyongyang.
During talks with Kosygin in Pyongyang immediately after the February air strikes, Kim reportedly argued that Washington's boldness in attacking North Vietnam might lead to similar attacks against North Korea and that his regime had to improve its defenses. He also complained that the USSR was sending advanced weapons to India and the UAR, the main thrust of his entire argument having been intended to prod the Soviet leaders to supply Pyongyang with a significant amount of military aid for improving its air and coastal defense systems. Kosygin reportedly agreed to supply military materiel, and his receptivity to Kim's request stemmed from the attitude of the post-Khrushchev Soviet leadership which had already decided to increase Moscow's influence in Pyongyang. The joint North Korean-Soviet communique of 14 February 1965 contained a pledge to strengthen the North's "defense capabilities," and significant inputs of Soviet military aid thereafter—particularly after the signing of the military aid agreement in May—were to bolster Kim's confidence in the ability of North Korea to deter, or effectively resist, any U.S.-ROK airstrikes of a conventional nature.

A. The Chinese Challenge to Open a Second Front

Between mid-1965 and mid-1966, the Chinese Communist leaders tried to impel the Japanese and Russian Communists to create as many points of direct military pressure on the U.S. as possible. In August 1965, the Chinese leaders reportedly had asked visiting Japanese Communist officials to start a resistance movement in Japan in order to assist Peking in the event of a Sino-American war. Although the Japanese refused, the Chinese (including Mao) reportedly repeated the demand in March 1966. Regarding the Russians, the Chinese in the fall of 1965 had begun to complain openly that Moscow had the capability to create trouble for the Americans in Europe but would not use this
capability.* These complaints were consistent with Mao's duplicitous attitude of remaining basically cautious on the matter of committing Chinese Communist forces to direct military clashes with U.S. forces while always having militant advice for others.

In January 1966, the Chinese reportedly turned their attention to the Koreans, challenging them to open a second front along the DMZ and to begin guerrilla warfare on a large scale in the South in order to relieve pressure on Communist forces in Vietnam. This challenge was reported by various sources, first by the Yugoslavs in Moscow in January 1966, and subsequently by the Czechs in the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea. A North Korean trade official also reported the challenge regarding action along the DMZ and at least one captured North Korean agent stated that the Chinese had demanded the launching of a major guerrilla warfare campaign in the South. Kim and his aides reportedly refused to comply.

Ever since Kosygin's February 1965 visit, relations with Moscow had been improving and frictions with Peking had been intensifying. The key element in Kim's thinking was his need of military materiel which the post-Khrushchev

*This concept of a European front was publicly stated by Foreign Minister Chen Yi in his interview of 30 December 1965 with an Akahata correspondent: "The Soviet Union is the largest European socialist country. If it really wanted to help the Vietnamese people, if it really wanted to support and help their struggle against U.S. aggression and for national salvation in an effective all-round way, it could have taken all kinds of measures in many fields to immobilize forces of the U.S. and constantly expose the U.S. plot of peace talks." What Chen failed to say was that China was the largest Asian "socialist" country and could have helped to immobilize the U.S. Seventh Fleet by controlled shelling of the offshore islands or by naval harassment of the Matsus in the Taiwan Strait.
Soviet leadership was now willing to supply. He was obsessed with the idea of improving national defenses, and in March 1965 he told an Asian diplomat that the Cuban missile base crisis of 1962 and the Tonkin Gulf incidents of 1964 had impelled Pyongyang to divert economic resources to defense purposes. His propagandists began to soft-pedal some of the more polemical anti-Soviet themes, and Kim himself increasingly adopted a position between the Soviets and the Chinese; in October 1965 he told a visiting Chilean leftist that Korea must take its "own" road in the Sino-Soviet dispute and "now" follows neither party. But his neutrality included new expressions of independence from Peking. In January 1966, he personally demonstrated his pique with Chinese methods of dictating policy to others by attending the Cuban embassy reception on 3 January at a time when Peking was applying pressure on Castro. In mid-March 1966, Kim told the visiting JCP delegation that it was necessary for the North Koreans to modernize their armed forces to be able to defend themselves against a future anticipated military attack by the ROK army. He went on to say that although the Chinese publicly promise support and aid, they do not deliver. Therefore, Kim said, North Korea is impelled to turn to the USSR for aid and intends to maintain a cooperative relationship with the Soviets henceforth.

It is probable that this strong upsurge of anti-Chinese sentiment and the clear determination no longer to support Peking in the dispute with Moscow reflected in part Kim's anger of the Chinese challenge regarding a second front in Korea. According to a former KWP cadre, Kim in early April 1966 (during the 13th plenum of the Central Committee) lectured his military officers above the rank of colonel for four hours on the need to begin a major anti-Chinese campaign.*

*Kim also used the 13th plenum to formally oust from his posts the fifth ranking member of the KWP hierarchy, Kim Chang-man; there is some evidence that he was in fact pro-Chinese, and it may be conjectured that Kim Chang-man had opposed the sharp swing away from Peking.
On 16 May, party leaders listened to a recording of this same lecture—designated the "16 May Instructions"—and then passed its salient points down to provincial party leaders for further dissemination in the country. The gist of the instructions reportedly was that while Moscow is revisionist, Peking is obsessed with "left-inclining adventurism"; the KWP rejects dictation from both parties, particularly current dictation from Peking.

B. Harassing the U.S. "On Every Front"

Thus, Maoist pressure in 1965 and early 1966 had not impelled Kim to begin harassment of U.S. and ROK forces in the DMZ. But U.S. airstrikes in mid-July against targets in the vicinity of Hanoi and Haiphong, which had been appraised by Ho Chi Minh as a "very serious step further in the escalation of the war" (statement of 17 July 1966), apparently spurred Kim to reconsider action in the DMZ. Two concepts began to appear in North Korean statements which reflected a desire to increase support for Hanoi.

The concept that escalation of U.S. airstrikes should be responded to by escalation of assistance to North Vietnam was suggested in Kim's message of 18 July to Ho: Pyongyang was prepared to render "more active assistance" to Hanoi in every form, including volunteers. Increased support was linked to the escalation of U.S. airstrikes by Deputy Defense Minister O Chin-u when he stated in his Nodong Sinmun article of 26 July that "the more the U.S. imperialists escalate the war of aggression, the firmer the Korean people will stand on the side of the fraternal Vietnamese people, actively assisting their just struggle." The concept of meeting escalation with escalation was carried one step further in the important Nodong Sinmun article of 12 August:

Today, when the U.S. imperialists are expanding the war of aggression in Vietnam stage by stage, the struggle of the world's people should also be expanded stage by stage.
Kim Kwang-hyop repeated the formulation, using language suggesting that it reflected a KWP policy. Speaking to the North Vietnamese delegation in Pyongyang on 30 August, Kim stated that "we consider that inasmuch as the U.S. imperialists are escalating their war of aggression against Vietnam stage by stage, the struggle of the people of the world against the U.S. imperialists and to support the people of Vietnam should be likewise expanded stage by stage." (emphasis supplied)

Escalating support for Hanoi had two interrelated aspects, political and military. On the political level, reiteration of the desire to send "volunteers" probably was intended to counter the international impression that ROK troops dispatched to Vietnam had upstaged Kim Il-sung. Kim Il-sung and Kim Kwang-hyop, on 18 July and 30 August, respectively, publicly repeated the pledge to send "volunteers." (Kim Il-sung was to sustain this pledge in his report to the KWP conference of 5 October and to take the lead in demanding that the bloc send "international volunteers." ) On the military level, there was no indication that the North Vietnamese wanted or needed additional fighting men, and it is very likely that they turned down the North Korean offer made in mid-1966 to send a full division of KPA troops to Hanoi. However, North Korean fighter pilots integrated into North Vietnam's air defense system could provide a small increment of improvement to that system, and Hanoi was willing to accept an apparent offer by Kim to send them.

On 22 November 1966 between 14 and 19 Korean fighter pilots engaged in area familiarization flights.

The activity of these pilots began about one month after support for Hanoi was initiated in the form of a diversion along the Korean DMZ.

The second new concept in North Korean materials --namely, that of keeping the U.S. tied down "on every front"--was set forth by Kim in his report of 5 October to the KWP conference. It was a further refinement of
the idea of causing trouble for the U.S. "wherever it has set foot," inasmuch as it carried the connotation of a clash between opposing military forces. In his report of 5 October, Kim began by implicitly criticizing Moscow for not creating tension in Europe and for enabling the U.S. to concentrate its military effort in Asia. He then went on to say that the U.S. should be harassed "on every front":

The socialist countries should be especially vigilant over the fact that the U.S. imperialists, while refraining, insofar as possible, from worsening their relations with big countries, concentrate their aggression mainly on Vietnam and try to swallow up such divided or small countries as Korea, Cuba, and East Germany one by one. Attention should be directed at the same time to any possible maneuvers of the U.S. imperialists to ease the European situation or keep it in a stalemate temporarily in order to concentrate their efforts on aggression in Asia.

In such a case, the easing of tension on one front would by no means contribute to improving the general international climate, but, on the contrary, provide conditions for the imperialists to intensify aggression on another front. It, therefore, constitutes a greater threat to world peace and security.

In the present situation, the U.S. imperialists should be dealt blows and their forces should be dispersed to the maximum in Asia and Europe, Africa and Latin America, in all countries, big and small--in all parts and on every front in the world--and they should be bound hand and foot everywhere they are so that they may not run wild. Only in this way can we succeed in crushing the strategy of the U.S. imperialists to shatter the socialist countries and the
Kim's political aim seems to have been: to take some form of action which would be interpreted internationally as Pyongyang's long-delayed riposte to Seoul's dispatch of troops to Vietnam. Kim's military aim seems to have been: to tie down ROK troops, thereby limiting the number which could be sent to Vietnam, and create a diversion of U.S. forces along another front in Asia. In November 1966, the [Name of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission] concluded from his discussions with Communist officers in Panmunjom that action in the DMZ would indeed impede Seoul's dispatch of additional international revolutionary forces one by one by concentrating their forces on this or that area or country. (emphasis supplied)

In this way, Kim came close to stating publicly that not only Moscow, in Europe, but also Pe'ing and Pyongyang, in Asia, must harass U.S. forces in order to relieve military pressure which is concentrated "mainly on Vietnam."

KWP leaders undoubtedly indicated to this important party conference that a decision had been made to harass U.S.-ROK forces along the DMZ—a new Asian "front" in a small country. The conference ended on 12 October, and on 13 October the first of a series of incidents involving armed North Koreans and ROK troops took place in the area south of the DMZ at the sector guarded by the ROK 21st Division. On 2 November, a patrol of the U.S. 2nd Division was ambushed by North Korean military personnel south of the DMZ. The new policy was being implemented.

To sum up, the North Koreans apparently rejected a Chinese challenge of early January 1966 to open a second front along the DMZ and to begin guerrilla warfare in the South. But they reconsidered the matter after U.S. airstrikes hit areas near Hanoi and Haiphong in mid-July, and they began to comment in terms of responding to escalation with escalation in support. Kim seems to have decided on a policy of beginning controlled and small-scale clashes in the DMZ against both ROK and U.S. personnel.

Kim's political aim seems to have been: to take some form of action which would be interpreted internationally as Pyongyang's long-delayed riposte to Seoul's dispatch of troops to Vietnam. Kim's military aim seems to have been: to tie down ROK troops, thereby limiting the number which could be sent to Vietnam, and create a diversion of U.S. forces along another front in Asia.
troops and would maintain a menacing specter of a new Korean war at a time when the U.S. was "overextended" in Vietnam.

Regarding the more intangible but no less important psychological factor, in 1966 Kim increasingly viewed himself as a revolutionary willing to take greater risks than Mao in the form of a direct confrontation with U.S. armed forces. He had since the start of the year been developing a moral alliance with Castro based on a common anti-Mao grievance and a common desire to "push" the international revolution. Castro was delighted to have such an ally--another independent-minded leader of a small Communist country resisting the pressures of the two big Communist powers. In March 1966, he effusively praised Kim as an eminent revolutionary leader.* The Kim-Castro relationship intensified Kim's egoistic, nationalistic, and revolutionary tendencies and further stimulated his military adventurism.

Within the international Communist movement, the new policy of conducting deliberate attacks on U.S.-ROK forces in the DMZ enabled Kim to boast, in effect, that North Korea had taken the leading role in providing active support for Hanoi. In his 5 October report, Kim

*Castro said: "Kim Il-sung is one of the most distinguished, brilliant, and heroic socialist leaders in the world today, and his story...is one of the most splendid stories that a revolutionary has written in the cause of socialism." (Granma version of speech, 24 April 1966) By contrast, Castro ridiculed Mao for his "senility." (Speech of 13 March 1966)

Subsequently, President Dorticos indicated Castro's support for Kim's position on various issues in an implicit thrust at the Chinese and Russians: If anyone wants to know what Comrade Fidel Castro thinks about the basic problems of our times, ask Comrade Kim Il-sung. Then you will know that Comrade Fidel Castro thinks exactly the same as Comrade Kim Il-sung." (Speech of 27 October 1966 in Pyongyang)
contrasted his support by implication with that of Peking ("It is also wrong only to shout against U.S. imperialism instead of taking specific actions to stop its aggression.") and of Moscow ("The socialist nations, even if they maintain diplomatic relations with the imperialists, should not dissolve their anti-imperialist struggle therein or weaken it for that reason."). Another thinly veiled criticism turned back upon Peking itself the charge that Moscow had only provided "sham" support for Hanoi. "Actual struggle will reveal who is genuine and who is shamming in opposing U.S. imperialism and in supporting the Vietnamese people." That is, not only Moscow but also Peking was not doing everything it could to tie down U.S. forces.

The evidence suggests that Kim acted from the above-mentioned political, military, and psychological reasons and on his own initiative rather than on the consequences of an internal power struggle in the KWP. It does not suggest that he was forced, by a group of plotting and disgruntled radicals within the North Korean leadership, to adopt a policy which he opposed. Kim was the first KWP leader to go beyond the formulation that the U.S. should be tied down "wherever it has set foot" to use the idea of harassing the U.S. "on every front." The latter phrase has the implication of an active and direct confrontation of opposing military forces. Furthermore, Kim was later to defend the policy himself, declaring to a visiting Japanese leftist on 7 April 1967 that "U.S. provocations" in the DMZ would not develop into a war: "This is because the U.S. imperialists are heavily involved in Vietnam and the fighting is going against them there." Kim also continued to tout the policy as a far better display of real support for Hanoi than either Moscow or Peking was willing to make. He stated in the KWP theoretical organ Kulloja in an article printed on 10 August 1967 that:

We are opposed to the line of compromise with imperialism. At the same time, we cannot tolerate either the practice of only talking big of opposing imperialism. The latter is a line of compromise in an inverted form. It has nothing to do with a true struggle of opposition....
...it is vital to form the broadest, united anti-American front, completely isolate American imperialism, and deal blows at all places where it is extending its aggressive influence. Only by doing this is it possible to disperse and weaken to the maximum the force of U.S. imperialism and to defeat it with the decisively superior power of the people on every front.

Harassment in the DMZ as a policy was viewed by Kim not only as diversionary support for Hanoi but also as an important way to enhance his prestige as a revolutionary. The Cubans supported him on the latter point, republishing his Kulloja article in the first issue of the Havana-published Tricontinental on 12 August.

The prospect is for continued harassment in the DMZ. Kim and his aides will almost certainly vary the intensity of the small clashes as the occasion warrants, reducing it drastically at times of uncertainty—such as occurred in the period from late January to mid-April 1968 following the seizure of the Pueblo and at a time when they feared the U.S. might not be willing or able to restrain the ROK commanders from launching company-size attacks. They apparently are now more certain that they can sustain a policy of limited harassment with impunity in the DMZ.
II. Kim Rejects Criticism of His Military Construction Policy

While there is no evidence that Kim was forced to adopt military adventurism along the DMZ against his own desires, there is some evidence that within the KWP doubts were being raised regarding his extreme emphasis on military construction and defense building at the expense of the national economy. This extreme emphasis had first appeared as a policy in December 1962 after the Cuban missile crisis had exposed Castro's defenselessness and Khrushchev's unreliability, and after the Soviet leader began to invoke economic and military sanctions against Pyongyang.* It continued as a policy in the intervening years and was reaffirmed by Kim in his report of 5 October 1966 to the KWP conference.

In his report, Kim seemed to be arguing against critics who apparently were starting to question his emphasis on military construction, and he tried to justify his policy by attributing to U.S. and ROK forces an intention to begin a major war against the North. He warned against "deviations" from his policy, and insisted that "more effort" was required in military construction.

How to combine economic construction with the building up of national defense poses one of the fundamental questions on which depends the future of the building of socialism and Communism. We Communists should reject all manner of deviations which

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*The 16 December 1962 communique of the KWP's 5th plenum stated that North Korea's defense capabilities had to be improved "even if it causes certain restrictions to development of the national economy." The communique's endorsement marked the first time that Pyongyang had applied the concept of self-reliance--an old Maoist idea regarding economic construction--to the field of national defense.
may possibly appear in this respect and settle the matter in a correct way. It is wrong to neglect economic construction while putting stress only on defense building under the pretext that a war will reduce everything to ashes once it breaks out. So is it to fail to fully strengthen defense potential while putting stress only on economic construction, affected by a peaceful mood.

Today the aggressive acts of the U.S. imperialists are stepped up and their plot for war escalation is becoming more and more pronounced. The Pak Chong-hui clique in South Korea, on U.S. instructions, is not only making active preparations for a new war but has already joined the U.S. imperialists in the war of aggression in Vietnam. The situation has grown more tense and the danger of war is increasing in our country and all other areas of Asia.

In the prevailing situation we must continue to build socialist economy and along with this carry on the building of defense more energetically. We must build up our defenses rock-firm and get everything ready so that we may fight back the enemy's surprise attack at any moment.

True, this will require lots of manpower and material for national defense and will inevitably delay the economic development of our country in a certain measure. But we should direct more effort to strengthening our defense capabilities to complete the country's defense, though it may call for some readjustment of tempo in the development of national economy. (emphasis supplied)
The "readjustment" abovementioned was spelled out by the regime's third-ranking leader, Kim Il, in his report of 10 October on the progress of the economy. He defended Kim Il-sung's policy and indicated clearly that priority emphasis would continue to be placed on military construction to the detriment of economic development. The seven-year plan, scheduled to have been completed in 1967, was relegated to a secondary position; achievement of its goals was stretched out three years. Kim Il argued that the national economy could be advanced "only if we maintain an impregnable defense posture" and went on to say that

In this connection, we should readjust properly the economic development of the country and postpone the fulfillment of the seven-year plan for some time. What we propose is that while thoroughly carrying out the tasks set forth by the seven-year plan, we extend the time limit for their fulfillment in the interest of further strengthening our national defense capabilities. Proceeding from the present situation and the actual conditions in our country, the party Central Committee has decided to put off the fulfillment of the seven-year plan for three years and to bring up the matter for discussion at the party conference.

The conference subsequently approved the recommendation for postponement, which meant in effect that Kim Il-sung had sufficient support within the KWP to prevail over critics who preferred relatively more emphasis on the civilian economy and less on the military defense program.

A. Promoting the Military Professionals

Organizational developments at the conference suggest that Kim rewarded the generals--the active military professionals--who supported the policy of giving priority stress to defense construction. Some of the generals who
were promoted within the KWP also had been active in negotiations with Moscow over increased Soviet military aid ever since the visit of Kosygin in mid-February 1965. Defense Minister Kim Chang-pong, a KWP political committee alternate, was promoted to full membership. Deputy Defense Minister Choe Hyon, who had not even been an alternate in the political committee prior to the conference,* was valuated into full membership, skipping over the intermediate step of alternate. Regarding new alternates, three were active generals in the defense establishment: the Director of the KPA General Political Bureau Ho Pong-hak, the KPA Chief of Staff Choe Kwang, and Deputy Defense Minister O Chin-u. In short, important military professionals were moved into the political committee which prior to the conference had been opened to only one—Defense Minister Kim Chang-pong and even then only as an alternate.

Kim apparently was convinced that these generals were personally loyal to him and would be useful in defending and implementing his policy of militarizing the country. The very nature of their primary responsibilities made them more amenable to accepting the sustained emphasis on military construction and army modernization over civilian economic progress. By making these promotions, Kim brought into the political committee the kind of expertise necessary for guiding stepped-up defense programs and preparing for any military contingencies along the DMZ. In addition, he buttressed the already existing martial spirit in higher party councils by incorporating into the political committee men whose job it was to consider extensive war preparations a normal matter and whose militancy was not diluted by what Kim had derided as a "pacifist mood." Finally, Kim had stimulated the unique kind of devotion which stems from advancement in the

*Choe Hyon had been chairman of the party's Military Affairs Committee since December 1965 but had not been moved into the party's political committee until the party conference.
hierarchy, thereby improving his dominance over the political committee and acquiring more support for suppressing (and eventually purging) those men who had presumed to raise questions about the wisdom of his policies.

B. Purging Critics of Militarization

What may have begun as an inner-party discussion on the matter of pressing on with a priority effort to build North Korea into a military fortress in the fall of 1966 apparently hardened into a vigorous debate in the winter and finally emerged as a sharply polarized two-sided dispute in the spring of 1967. The critics were led by Pak Kum-chol, the fourth ranking member of the KWP presidium, and included Yi Hyo-sun, the fifth ranking member. On the other side of the issue, Kim apparently had the support of Choe Yong-kun and Kim Il--the second and third ranking members of the presidium--as well as Kim Kwang-hyop, the lowest and sixth ranking member. Beyond that, included among the next echelon supporters were the generals who had been newly appointed to the political committee.*

In January 1967, some Chinese leaders seemed to be concerned that Kim's view was prevailing in the dispute. They apparently feared that Kim's policy of stressing military construction would bind the North Koreans even closer to the Soviets, inasmuch as Moscow had a far greater capability to modernize the KPA and its air-defense forces.

*The presidium within the political committee was established on 12 October 1966 when it was decided to abolish Chinese-style posts in the party. Members of the new presidium--Kim Il-sung, Choe Yong-kun, Kim Il, Pak Kum-chol, Yi Hyo-sun, and Kim Kwang-hyop--represented the leadership inner circle. It was into the larger but still subordinate body, the political committee, that Kim had promoted his military experts.
than Peking. They began to explain, in semi-public materials, that Kim's move toward the Soviets had resulted from an internal coup. In Peking an item in the unsigned bulletin of Local News of 16 January 1967 claimed that the USSR and North Korea were both part of the same "headquarters," but North Korea was the minor partner; in addition, a right-wing "coup" had occurred and the Soviets were supporting the "new" regime. On 21 January, a Japanese newsman in Peking reported that a wall-poster put up by Red Guards had stated that Kim Kwang-hyop had been arrested—an obvious fabrication inasmuch as Kim Kwang-hyop continued to be active in his posts and to appear in public.

The North Korean leaders interpreted these Peking posters as deliberate slander by some Chinese leaders and as an effort to deepen splits within the Pyongyang hierarchy. That they believed the posters to have been officially inspired (rather than mere Red Guard excesses) was indicated by the formal KCNA statement issued on 26 January denying that a "coup" had taken place and warning Peking against any reiteration of such "false propaganda." The statement indicated sensitivity to the charge of disunity, insisting that the leaders of the party and government as well as the people and the KPA, were "firmly united in one ideology" under the party headed by Kim Il-sung. Chou En-lai tried to mollify Pyongyang and dissociate Peking from the posters: he told a meeting of Red Guards from Chekiang that the rumor of a coup was false, having been fabricated "in South Korea," and that Kim was still the premier. But this action of Chou's appears to have been wasted effort, and in early February other Chinese leaders permitted the Red Guards to resume their poster-slander of Kim—an indication that Chou had been overruled.

In early February, Sino-Korean frictions increased as Chinese embassy officers in Pyongyang refused to remove materials describing the Red Guard movement from the poster board in front of the embassy. In contrast to the 1966 acknowledgment of the anniversary of the KPA's founding, Peking did not send a message to Pyongyang from Lin Piao on 8 February. Kim Il-sung indicated his personal pique with Peking's interference when he told Vietnamese students
studying in North Korea that they should study the policies of the party of "their" own country, the "thought of Comrade Ho Chi Minh, and the ideas of the VWP....The VWP knows Vietnamese affairs better than anyone else." (Speech of 11 February 1967) Red Guard posters in Peking continued to denounce Kim's "revisionist leading clique." The North Koreans then proceeded to blockade the road in front of the Chinese embassy partly in retaliation for a mid-February Red Guard demonstration in front of the Korean embassy in Peking and partly because Red Guard materials were still being put up on a board outside the Chinese embassy in Pyongyang. On 28 February, a second KCNA statement was issued, demanding that the Chinese stop their "calumnies" and complaining that "apparently they also dislike the fact that we should defend our independent position, firmly opposing any subjugation."

The North Koreans were impelled to deny that a dispute was developing within the KWP leadership. Deputy Defense Minister O Chin-u (who was to be involved directly in the dispute) insisted in his speech of 7 February that "it is a foolish illusion to expect any crevice in our party and our revolutionary ranks." On 16 February, the North Korean ambassador in Djakarta also insisted that the KWP was not in the throes of a power struggle and that it "goes its own way" in relations with bloc countries. On 2 March, the KCNA representative in Algiers declared publicly that "the independent policy of our party is being attacked in China," referring to the decision to continue the program of Soviet-supported militarization taken at the October 1966 conference. On 7 March, Kulloja, the KWP theoretical journal, complained that "the big-power chauvinists, using the flunkeyists, cause splits in another country, meddle in its internal affairs, and try to realize their own egoistic ambition."

The Chinese were right in their apparent conjecture that following the October 1966 party conference, Kim would sustain his ties with Moscow in order to receive more and better military aid. In mid-February, North Korean officials at the AAPSO meeting stated that the KPA would "soon" be receiving its equipment from the USSR rather than China. On 5 March, at the end of
Kim Il's visit to Moscow, a new Soviet-Korean joint communiqué announced agreement "on cooperation for further increasing the defense potential of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea." Between late 1966 and early 1967, the new acquisition of MIG-21s in the North Korean air defense inventory, mostly Fishbed F types.

The Chinese were also right in suspecting that an inner-KWP dispute was underway over the military build-up policy. At the April 1967 15th plenum, Kim Il-sung attacked the Pak Kum-chol faction and moved to purge its members. Information provided by [ ] who was briefed on the purge by KWP personnel--seems to be reliable and meshes well with [ ] as well as published materials in the regime's own journals.

At the 15th plenum, Pak was accused of opposing Kim's policy of bolstering national defense and pressing on with war preparations. He had complained that these preparations were a tremendous drain on the civilian economy. He also had complained that the entire North Korean populace was suffering from the program of forced-draft hard labor, and he was accused of deliberately ignoring Kim's 1966 order to expand the "chollima movement" of high-speed production, his justification for insubordination having been that "the people are suffering too much." Pak was accused of having alienated the populace from the party--a charge which reflected in fact popular antipathy to Kim's policies of exploiting the labor force, holding down consumer production, and imposing militia daily drill on civilians.*

*Pak Kum-chol's reported opposition to Kim's exploitation of the labor force under the policy of high-speed ("chollima") production is similar to one aspect of the opposition raised by the former Chinese defense minister Peng Te-huai in 1959 against Mao's leap forward and people's commune policies. Peng was to become a figure inspiring resistance in the Chinese party to Mao's internal policies, and Kim's awareness of this development may have provided an added incentive for him to purge Pak's followers and his "ideological influence" in the party and army.
According to the abovementioned source, General O Chin-u criticized Pak at the plenum for insubordination. When Pak asked his accuser "with whose support do you make such statements?", Kim reportedly interjected: "Certainly, General O is supported by the KWP, who else?" General Ho Pong-hak, also a new political committee alternate, reportedly joined General O in criticizing Pak.

Kim seemed to believe that the newly promoted military professionals would take the hardest line and provide the strongest support against the relatively more moderate and civilian-minded Pak faction. O Chin-u emerges as one of the most vigorous and active defenders of Kim's policies, and on occasions before and after the April 1967 plenum, General O had a leading role in the effort to rally officers within the KPA to Kim. Speaking on 7 February 1967 at the 19th anniversary of the founding of the KPA, General O declared that

In the future, too, our People's Army will defend with its very life the party Central Committee headed by Comrade Kim Il-sung, and remain faithful, with one mind and one will, to the party and the revolution, rallied firmly around it...

When the reactionary offensive of the enemy and the attacks of the opportunists of all hues were intensified and anti-party factional elements and obstinate dogmatists attacked our party with the backing of outside forces, our People's Army held aloft the slogan 'Let Us Defend with Our Lives the Party Central Committee Headed by Comrade Kim Il-sung;' and, together with all the people, resolutely defended the leading core of the party and its revolutionary tradition and dealt a powerful rebuff to the subversive machinations of the enemy and to attempts by interventionists and anti-party elements. (emphasis supplied)
The appeal to the army to "defend with its very life" the position of Kim was a new major theme. It was taken from Chinese appeals in the summer and fall of 1966 calling on Red Guards to defend Mao, but it was rethreaded to apply to the internal situation in early 1967 in North Korea at a time when Kim was concerned about opposition to his harsh policies.

It will be recalled that O Chin-u was denying Chinese claims that a revisionist-directed coup had taken place in the KWP and that any "crevice" could be found in party ranks. In addition, O Chin-u was warning army commanders against supporting any pro-Chinese "factional elements" within the party and army. Defense of Kim and unconditional devotion to his instructions became a new line of exhortation, which burgeoned into a campaign at the end of the 15th plenum in April 1967. Speaking immediately after the plenum on 25 April, General O, who had just then been promoted to be the Director of the General Political Bureau of the KPA (the job intended to ensure KPA loyalty to Kim), reminded army officers that they must model themselves on the anti-Japanese partisans led by Kim who had "defended the command of the revolution at the cost of their lives at any time and under any circumstances and resolutely upheld and implemented his orders and instructions."

According to Pak Kum-chol had established his own faction throughout the country by placing his followers and relatives in important positions, including posts in the KPA. The also reported that he had been told by KPA officers in mid-July 1967 that "many" KPA division-level commanders had been purged as members of Pak's faction. Kim Il, the third ranking leader, implicitly warned against Pak-type insubordination in his speech of 4 June 1967 when he declared that Kim's partisans had always "remained boundlessly faithful to him at all times...defended the command of the revolution headed by him...and unconditionally accepted any difficult and hard task when it was assigned them by the leader..."
Secondary charges made against Pak at the 15th plenum reportedly included his alleged downgrading of Kim's role as the most important Korean guerrilla leader. He is said to have responded to Kim's personal instructions to him (Pak) to publicize Kim's leading role in the anti-Japanese guerrilla fighting by stressing instead the activities of his own group (including Yi Hyo-sun) within Korea at a time when Kim was in fact outside the country, in Manchuria. Kim was thus vulnerable to the implication of Pak's emphasis on the importance of those men who had fought the Japanese on Korean territory—namely, that the really nationalistic guerrillas were in Pak's group and not mere puppets of the Russians and Chinese in Manchuria. O Chin-u tried to rebut the view that Kim was not the pre-eminent guerrilla leader in the 1930s in a eulogistic exaggeration of Kim's partisan activities. Kim, he insisted, had "founded" the guerrilla forces, and then he went on to say that

Around the turn of the 1930s...the Korean people longed for a wise leader who could confidently lead the national liberation struggle to victory...and urgently demanded that the whole nation come out as one in a decisive struggle against Japanese imperialism. At this juncture, Comrade Kim Il-sung, shouldering the destiny of the nation, came to the fore of the revolution and led the Korean people to victory.

Thereafter, the deliberately fostered image of Kim as the only major partisan leader was blown up into extreme personality-cult proportions. The propaganda insisted that Kim was the "only" man providing outstanding leadership and "skillfully" solving all the strategic and tactical problems of the guerrilla war. (Nodong Sinmun article of 3 June 1967)

An additional charge made against Pak concerned the matter of his prestige in the KWP as a revolutionary. Kim seemed to feel the need to disparage and eradicate the image of Pak as a veteran revolutionary untainted by bourgeois ideas. Pak was accused of encouraging a writer
to create a play (entitled "Sincere Heart") about the
faithfulness of Pak's wife at the time he was in the Seoul
prison during the Japanese occupation. Kim reportedly
criticized the play at the plenum as reactionary and
abusive of the revolutionary spirit because she had re-
mained faithful only to her husband instead of being loyal
to the revolution. This petty disparagement of a veteran
party official with a long revolutionary record is strik-
ingly similar to the charges which Mao has permitted his
lieutenants to use in blackening the image of important
members of the CCP apparatus. But Kim has added to Mao's
practice in one respect by portraying his own family
--father and mother as well as grandparents--as devoted
revolutionaries and by insisting that all Koreans study
their revolutionary activity. The campaign for studying
the family of Kim has been centered partly on the proper
attitude toward the revolution, and the bourgeois con-
cepts of faithfulness and love are deliberately downgraded.*
The campaign is also intended to demonstrate that Kim's
revolutionary activity started at a very early age--i.e.,
15 years, according to Kulloja on 30 March 1968. This
suggests that Pak's prestige as a veteran revolutionary
has been difficult for Kim to eradicate.

Other leaders reported to have been in Pak's faction
and purged as a result of the plenum were: Yi Hyo-sun,
the fifth ranking member of the party's presidium; Kim
To-man, Chief of the KWP Propaganda and Agitation Depart-
ment; Yim Chun-chu, an alternate of the KWP political
committee; Ko Hyok, Chief of the KWP Cultural Department;
and Ho Sok-son, Chief of the Science and School Educa-
tion Department. Yi was accused of being the most im-
portant supporter of Pak and was denounced for the poor

*The theoretical journal Kulloja on 30 March 1968 called
for the study of Kim's "revolutionary family" and the journal
on 30 April directed that North Korean women should "revo-
lutionize their homes" on the pattern established by Kim's
mother. A film biography of Kim's life includes a sequence
in which he betrays a personal friend in the name of the
higher interests of the Korean revolution.
showing of his KWP Liaison Department's anti-ROK operations. indicate that O Chin-u and Ho Pong-hak had the prominent role of criticizing Yi at the plenum.

The purge of Pak and Yi and their factional supporters was similar to the purge Mao was engaged in, inasmuch as they represented a relatively more pragmatic and civilian-oriented segment of the regime's leadership. Also as in the case of Mao's purge in China, Kim reportedly had to launch a major campaign to deny that his victims were more educated and rational men than were his own supporters. Finally, he had to eliminate traces of their early revolutionary activity within Korea.* He ordered the implementation of intensive "study courses" throughout the North to eradicate the "ideological influence of Pak Kum-chol and Yi Hyo-sun."

Simultaneously, Kim's personality cult was intensified as he prepared to attain a reaffirmation of loyalty to his policies of all party Central Committee members. Kim convened and presided over the 16th plenum (from 28 June to 3 July 1967), and Nodong Sinmun's 4 July account of the plenum stressed in particular the Central Committee's "unanimous" view of the "correctness" of Kim's line on building national defense and the economy in parallel. The account also suggested that Kim's victory over his opponents enabled him to continue the brutal work pace in all fields, inasmuch as the plenum agreed that the "chollima movement" should be "spurred on."

These developments between October 1966 and July 1967 suggest that Kim was confronted with a high-level opposition within the party which desired an end to his emphasis on building the North into a military fortress to the detriment of the immediate interests of the civilian

*According to Yi's guideline book for young people--Pioneer of Youth--which was a history of the Korean Communists who had fought the Japanese in Korea, was taken out of circulation on instructions from Kim.
He had sufficient support within the party to purge his pragmatic-minded critics, and some of the most vigorous expressions of this support was provided by military professionals who had been previously promoted to posts in the political committee. The purge served also as a clear warning to the Chinese that Kim's dominance of the KWP leadership could not be weakened by their slander campaign in early 1967. At the same time, it was a reminder to KWP and KPA officials that criticism of Kim's defense-oriented construction programs would be dangerous and the civilian economy would have to remain an appendage to the central policy of military construction.

The purge opened the way for three men to move into the inner circle of leaders around Kim. Two of these fast-rising men—Foreign Minister Pak Song-chol and Defense Minister Kim Chang-pong—had been moved up in the party hierarchy from candidate to full membership in the political committee in October 1966. Following the April 1967 purge, these two were further rewarded with the concurrent new post of deputy premiership when Kim formed his new cabinet in December 1967. They moved ahead even more spectacularly—that is, above five regular members of the political committee to the rankings of six and seven in the order of precedence—at the April 1968 plenum. The only man who was advanced to the inner circle at a faster pace was Choe Hyon, the chairman of the party's Military Affairs Committee and concurrently a deputy

*The Chinese may have lost their only remaining asset in the North Korean leadership when the former fifth ranking member of the hierarchy, Kim Chang-man, was taken out of circulation in November 1965 and dismissed from his posts at the 13th party plenum in April 1966. That he had been considered an important Korean amenable to Mao's policies is suggested by the complaint of a Red Guard publication on 12 October 1967 that he had been "relieved of his office." He was the only Korean purgee singled out for such a comment."
minister of defense. Choe valuted from outside the political committee to full membership in October 1966, skipping over the stage of candidate membership. Following the April 1967 purge, he was awarded the title of Hero of the Republic on his 60th birthday on 6 May 1967 and, more importantly, he was designated "an intimate comrade-in-arms of Comrade Kim Il-sung."* In April 1963, he moved up beyond both Foreign Minister Pak and Defense Minister Kim to the fifth ranking leadership position.

Kim Il-sung's inner circle in the party as of October 1968 was Choe Yong-kun, Kim Il, Kim Kwang-hyop, Choe Hyon, Pak Song-chol, and Kim Chang-pong. The rapid advance of the three abovementioned men, however, may have stimulated the jealousy (or even, animosity) of the political committee members who were passed over. It may also have created some concern among Choe Yong-kun, Kim Il, and Kim Kwang-hyop—the only men standing between the three fast-rising leaders and Kim himself.

*Choe was praised, among other things, for his "work of increasing the country's defense potential" and for remaining always "faithful" to the party and "strengthening the party organizationally and ideologically." (KCNA report of 6 May 1967)
III. Policy on Subverting the South

A. Avoiding Armed Clashes

Apart from the policy of harassment in the DMZ, the subversive effort against the South had continued for many years after the 1953 armistice as a long-term but low-boil program designed to establish agent nets with the goal of collecting intelligence and recruiting anti-Seoul Koreans. This policy was implemented under the deceptive rubric of "peaceful unification," which really meant any method of take-over in the South short of war. This is the real, revolutionary, and operative aspect of "peaceful unification." For example, on 21 February 1963, a North Korean official privately disparaged the idea of a peaceful revolution in Korea in the course of a briefing to propaganda chiefs of Chosen Soren: "Regarding revolution, our role is to create a subjective force, a core, in South Korea....Peaceful revolution is impossible....The revisionists have chosen peaceful co-existence as the basic policy for attaining the revolution. If they are right, when will Korea be unified? Never!....In the words of Stalin, what is needed is 'violence, violence, and more violence.'"

*Use of the propagandistic slogan, "peaceful unification," made Kim vulnerable to deliberately distorted charges by Peking that his is a Soviet-oriented advocate of peaceful transition to a Communist state in the South. A statement published on 12 October 1967 in a Chinese Communist publication declared the North Koreans under Kim to be advocates of "peaceful competition between South and North Korea." This Chinese black propaganda effort was partly responsible for Kim's angry assertion that "our position with regard to peaceful unification of the country never rules out the struggle against the U.S. imperialists; it has nothing in common with any 'compromise' with the enemy of the nation or with the theory on what is called 'peaceful transition' of the social system." (Speech of 7 September 1968)
The inoperative aspect of "peaceful unification" is contained in the long-standing propagandistic proposals for North-South negotiations and exchanges, for a national confederation, and for national elections. This line, with its occasional variations, is partly intended to deny the UN any justification for discussing the Korean issue, and it has been used to argue against the need for an American presence in the South. It is also partly intended to suggest to Washington that the North Korean army was not operating under a policy of preparing to "march South"—that is, under a policy of nonpeaceful unification, or all-out war.

The real question regarding Kim's anti-Seoul policy was whether he would continue to keep it at a low-boil, sending some agents South but avoiding armed clashes. Throughout 1965 and up to mid-October 1966, the policy seemed to be to continue as before. But behind-the-scenes, preparations in the North for an armed struggle program were underway since the spring of 1965.

B. Starting the "Armed Guerrilla Struggle"

Selection and training of highly qualified personnel for waging guerrilla warfare in the South reportedly was started in April when provincial-level combat training centers were established throughout the North. According to, the training courses at these centers were to be conducted for two years; all guerrilla team leaders were to be active army personnel, and the teams were to vary in size from three to 12 men. The guerrilla war in Vietnam was to provide the most relevant model for trainees. In early October 1965, Kim reportedly told a meeting of Communist provincial-level officials that the guerrilla warfare tactics used by the Viet Cong must be used by North Korean guerrilla teams.
in a protracted effort to conquer the South by 1970. By mid-March 1966, special training for a guerrilla attack on a ROK village was started.*

Parallel with this preparation, Kim was planning to step up the effort to establish in the South a reliable and disciplined apparatus of political cadres. His basic strategy regarding this agent-net seemed to be to have hard-core Communists in place in the South who would be capable of building assets and eventually transforming any anti-Seoul coup into a pro-Pyongyang seizure of power. On 30 September 1965, he told officials of Chosen Soren—the Pyongyang-directed federation of Koreans which infiltrates Communist agents into the South from Japan—that:

Had there been 50 hard-core Marxist-Leninists to properly plan and direct the riots, revolution in South Korea could have been accomplished in either April 1960 or May 1961 [when two Seoul governments were replaced in succession]....There are thousands of revolutionaries in South Korea, but less than 50 of them are indoctrinated thoroughly in Marxism-Leninism. The most vital task of Chosen Soren today is to infiltrate Marxist Leninists into South Korea to establish a party apparatus.

reported that, on that date, he and other trainees were given a mimeographed paper containing the layout of a ROK village, information on the ideological attitude of its ROK defenders (mostly army and police officers), and a sketch of the surrounding terrain. The paper also described the strength and weapons of the attacking guerrilla force, which was to include four platoons of 84 men, one reconnaissance platoon of 13 men, and an engineer squad of 8 men. The men were to be trained by a North Korean army unit and the mimeographed paper was to be handed on to other groups of trainees.
There is considerable evidence that Kim believed he had lost the golden opportunity to exploit the Seoul coups of 1960 and 1961, and ever since his speech of 11 September 1961, he has been working to establish an effective covert branch of the KWP in the South. He seemed to believe that not until such an apparatus is in place in the South could there be any feasible chance of a takeover. He told JCP leader Miyamoto in Pyongyang in mid-March 1966 that a revolution would depend on expansion of the party net.

Our party is now engaged in a task to covertly set up our party organization in South Korea. When this organization expands to our planned scale, a new change will occur and this will most likely lead to a revolution in Korea. We calculate that will be in late 1968 or early 1969.

As this training intensified, Kim personally participated in guiding its course. In April 1966, he directed that infiltration should be intensified and that disciplined cadres should be infiltrated as rapidly as possible. According to [inserted text], Kim told the Liaison Department of the KWP--the organization responsible for agent training and dispatch--that:

We must train leaders as rapidly as possible and dispatch them to the target areas in South Korea. As the old saying goes: To catch a tiger, one must go into the tiger's lair! A leader is a cadre who is ready to give up his life for the cause of the revolution and would not shudder with fear of death even on the scaffold and who can analyze situations precisely, can formulate tactics, and can organize and mobilize the masses.

It is said that Mao Tse-tung had only about 100 true leaders during the Long March days. If we only had 50 in South Korea, we could carry out the revolution. Even 20, well-trained, would be enough; three or four in
the Honam area, three or four in the Seoul area, and similar arrangements in other areas.

Therefore, we must infiltrate them this year or at the latest, next year.

Kim also visited one of the army units--identified by [as the "695th"]--which participated in the over-all training effort. In a speech to trainees in July 1966 at unit headquarters, Kim reportedly directed that "supervisory groups" staffed by KWP personnel, even including members of the KWP Liaison Department, should be sent South. These "supervisory groups" were to function as operational headquarters for agent nets in each southern province, and Kim's intention was to improve what he considered to be the loose nature of the agent net. Kim reportedly stated that agent nets should be organized in areas where key industrial establishments were concentrated, near U.S. and ROK military installations, in rural areas where the poor farmers have been exploited by (and hate) the "rich landowners," and in counties regarded as important administrative areas.*

The preparation, in parallel, for a guerrilla warfare effort and for an improved apparatus in the South reached a culminating point in October 1966. About two weeks before the policy of harassment began in the DMZ, Kim made the first North Korean policy statement implying sanction for some form of guerrilla warfare. In his report to the party conference on 5 October 1966, Kim

stated that his instructor at a Pyongyang safe-house had told him that the "supervisory groups" were needed at all levels in counties and provinces in order to coordinate the covert nets in the event of civil war in the South. His instructor went on to say that if there had been a "supervisory group" in the ROK at the time of the April 1960 student revolt, it might have been possible to turn the student uprising into a Communist revolution.
hinted that the entire range of subversive operations would be expanded and would include new "forms" of struggle.

The revolutionary movement in South Korea must be developed properly, combining diverse forms and ways of struggle: political and economic struggles, violent and legal, over a broad spectrum of situations to suit the subjective and objective circumstances obtaining, while guarding against the right ['overcautious'] and 'left' ['adventurous'] deviations.

There is some marginal evidence that the issue of whether to step up the subversive effort against the South was debated among the North Korean leaders prior to the party conference. On one side of the issue, the argument apparently was that ROK security forces would effectively counter any intensified effort and the North would fritter away valuable agent assets. On the other side, the argument apparently was that intensification would somehow increase revolutionary assets in the South. Kim seemed to be stating the latter view when he argued polemically in his report to the party conference that:

If one wages an adventurous struggle without calculating correctly the balance of forces between oneself and the enemy, without making a serious appraisal of the situation, it will cause a grave loss to the preservation and accumulation of the revolutionary forces. On the other hand, if one does not wage a positive struggle, just waiting for a favorable situation because the revolutionary struggle is arduous, neither can the revolutionary forces be accumulated, nor can difficult phases be overcome in the course of revolution. (emphasis supplied)
This demand for a positive struggle was a new one in Kim's public statements of policy regarding the South. It reflected his privately stated decision to intensify the entire subversive effort. It also reflected his highly subjective and irrational ("revolutionary") proclivity to engage in wishful thinking regarding the feasibility of accumulating subversive assets despite the ROK counterintelligence capability.

This wishful thinking stemmed in part from Kim's attempt to copy the model which Ho Chi Minh had established in Vietnam. According to Kim in February 1967 contrasted Vietnam and Korea in the course of a speech given to officials engaged in the anti-ROK training programs. Kim complained that the KWP's Liaison Department had not attained good results in the South and asserted that its assets in the South should have developed into forces even stronger than the North Korean army. In Vietnam, he continued, the Viet Cong are stronger than the regular North Vietnamese army and are playing a much more important role in the liberation of South Vietnam. On the other hand, in Korea the Liaison Department (and, presumably, its agent apparatus in the South) is not as strong as the North Korean army. Kim's conclusion was that many more agents must be sent South, and among them must be staff members of the Liaison Department. Regarding the latter point, Kim obviously was alluding to the fact that high-level army and party officers were playing a major role in directing the Vietnamese Communist effort from within the South.

According to another Kim in March 1967 complained that the anti-ROK operation in 1966 had been unsuccessful and that it must be carried out more aggressively in 1967. He then referred to the Vietnam model and the policy of assassination which had helped in strengthening the Viet Cong apparatus:

When the National Liberation Front organized their underground espionage nets in South Vietnam, they killed high-ranking government officials and many civilians who supported the government. As a result, the people were
afraid to follow the South Vietnamese government's policy to eliminate the National Liberation Front, and North Vietnam has achieved its present strong underground espionage nets.

This appraisal of the revolutionary benefits of assassination may have entered into Kim's calculations regarding the dispatch of an armed group of KPA officers to try to murder President Pak on 21 January 1968.

Kim has also had his men copy North Vietnamese guerrilla warfare tactics. According to a reported directive of the army's General Political Bureau issued in March 1967, KPA officers were to be sent to Vietnam to study paramilitary tactics; in addition, all KPA personnel were to be given training in these tactics for future use in the South.

Responsibility for failure of the previous low-boil effort was attributed by Kim to Yi Hyo-sun. As head of the Liaison Department, Yi had been directly responsible for the entire anti-ROK operation. According to Kim, Kim criticized Yi at the April 1967 Central Committee plenum, complaining that because of his blunders, thousands of KWP agents had been "lost" in the South. Kim nevertheless insisted that the southern operation must be carried out boldly and that conservative attitudes must be eliminated. At the plenum, the charges against Yi reportedly included insubordination and footdragging; he had failed to comply with Kim's instructions to take a "positive" attitude and to use "aggressive" tactics. Yi was replaced by General Ho Pong-hak, who was transferred from his job as Director of the General Political Bureau of the army. As new chief of the Liaison Department, Ho in April 1967 reportedly told a new group of agent-trainees that in the future "supervisory groups" will guide and control all agent nets in the south at provincial and county level. The way had also been cleared at the plenum for the dispatch of "combat teams" to conduct guerrilla warfare.
Armed groups conducting terroristic actions began to operate in May. Four separate explosions completely demolished two U.S. army barracks just south of the DMZ on 22 May in a well-planned and rehearsed operation. On 3 June, the first group of KPA officers—i.e., "combat team"—landed to conduct guerrilla operations in an aggressive, military way. The North Koreans waited one month before commenting on this action, but when they did, they indicated that a new stage in their southern effort had started. On 11 July, a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman denied that these armed teams had come from the North, and he set forth the line that this was the "armed struggle" of the South Koreans themselves. That this was to be an entire new stage of anti-ROK operations was indicated by the distinction made by a North Korean official on 21 July to the effect that "alongside the massive political struggle, armed personnel are making their appearance and dealing blows" to U.S. and ROK forces. By late August, Chosen Soren officials began to conduct study sessions on the new requirement to learn the guerrilla warfare traditions of Kim Il-sung; they warned that critics of partisan-war tactics should not be allowed to impede the study of Kim's "thought."

The first acts of sabotage against ROK railroads since the end of the Korean war occurred on 5 September—when a ROK passenger train was partially derailed—and on 13 September—when a cargo train hauling military supplies lost two cars as a result of explosions set off by suspected "combat teams." The first use of heavy-caliber artillery to shell a ROK guardpost in the DMZ since the Korean war occurred in October.

The evidence suggests that the policy of using military-type "combat teams" to make armed forays well south of the DMZ was Kim's policy. Allowing for euphemistic language, North Korean media in effect attributed it to him. The Nodong Sinmun editorial of 5 October 1967 stressed that "the development of the situation in South Korea in the past year [since the party conference] all the more strikingly proves the correctness of the teachings of Comrade Kim Il-sung..." "The South Koreans... are waging mass struggles of all types and developing their struggles into armed struggles, a new active form of struggle." (emphasis supplied) In his own statements,
Kim supported the policy. In his speech of 11 November 1967, he stated that "at present the revolutionary struggle of the South Korean people has advanced one step farther than in the past. It is being waged in various forms and the struggle has become more diversified." He boasted, with some exaggeration, of the number of forces it was tying down when he declared on 16 December 1967 that

According to South Korean press reports, this year alone as many as 10 divisions or more of U.S. imperialist troops, South Korean puppet army and police forces, including a reserve division, were mobilized to stamp out the activities of armed groups of the South Korean revolutionaries and the mass revolutionary struggles taking place in succession all over South Korea. (emphasis supplied)

Kim's position was that not even such an array of forces could "dampen the indomitable revolutionary spirit of the South Korean people or block their sweeping revolutionary advance." Thus by late December 1967, he seemed more determined than ever before to prove that his new active policy against the South was the only correct policy and that it was being expanded into armed guerrilla warfare.

This compulsion to demonstrate that armed struggle was on the rise in the South seems to have been the major factor in Kim's decision to dispatch a 31-man "combat team" of North Korean army officers to try to assassinate President Pak on 21 January. Following his 16 December speech, Pyongyang media claimed that throughout 1967 "armed group actions" had been increasing everywhere in the South. (Minju Choson article of 29 December 1967 and Nodong Sinmun editorial of 1 January 1968)

The captured member of the 31-man team stated that the team—which had been receiving agent preparation for two years—had been given two weeks of intensive training on

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their special assassination mission immediately prior to the infiltration date of 19 January. That is, their training for the mission had taken place in the first week of January. Immediately following the unsuccessful attempt to blow up the presidential mansion on 21 January, a Pyongyang domestic service broadcast (22 January) attributed the action to a "small armed unit" and concluded that the struggle of the "South Korean people" was "gaining momentum daily." On 23 January, Pyongyang Radio referred to "armed guerrilla units" operating in the South, and on the 24th, a domestic service broadcast established the line that the attempt had been made by a South Korean "armed guerrilla unit" operating "in the heart of Seoul." Thereafter, North Korean propaganda referred to the advent of an "armed guerrilla struggle." In his letter of 4 February to KPA units on the eve of the 20th anniversary of the army, Kim obliquely referred to the assassination attempt as part of this new struggle.* Subsequent "combat team" forays well into the South have been described in similar terms.

Although the teams are easily traceable to North Korea by Washington and Seoul, Kim nevertheless has taken a leaf from the book of Ho Chi Minh, making it Pyongyang's policy to insist that they are indigenous forces of the South. This was the line taken by North Korean diplomats with Asian governments and by Pyongyang's newspapermen at Panmunjom. It was the line later relayed by Kim in personal instructions to the chairman of Chosen Soren for its propaganda in Japan. In his instructions reported by the chairman to top-level Chosen Soren officials on 27 June, Kim stated that propaganda should not depict the North as the active liberating force of the South Koreans.

*Kim said: "Recently, in particular, the armed guerrilla struggle of South Korean revolutionaries and patriotic people against U.S. imperialism and its stooges has been expanding and is being strengthened rapidly everywhere in South Korea."
We must draw a clear line between what we say among ourselves and what we tell outsiders. When speaking to outsiders, we must make it unmistakably clear that the South Korean revolution is the patriotic struggle of the South Korean people but that we stand ready to support them at any time.

If we carry on propaganda as in the past, our enemies will spur on their compatriots and expedite military expansion on the pretext that, 'North Korea is frantically preparing for war and the Communist invasion is imminent.' Also, the South Korean people will swallow such propaganda and follow the anti-Communist line.

When we were asked to claim the bodies of the guerrillas killed in the January armed guerrilla incident in South Korea, we flatly refused because the armed guerrillas were South Koreans engaged in patriotic liberation struggles.

This denial of a northern base for the dispatch of combat teams is similar to Ho's practice. In addition, Kim seems to believe that by exaggerating the scope of the North's operations in the South, he can create the impression among southerners that an armed struggle is in fact spreading throughout their region. He insisted in his instructions that "each and every incident related to the South Korean people's struggles should be given maximum attention and immediately reported." Evidence indicates that Pyongyang media has been doing just that.

The prospect is for continued infiltration of armed "combat teams" with various missions. Captured in the 21 January raid reported that Pyongyang has been training about 2,400 agents for special attacks on key targets in the South. In addition to the Blue House, his own team was also trained to attack and bomb the U.S. embassy and the ambassador's residence,
assassinate the ambassador and his family, attack ROK army headquarters, strike at the Seoul bridgehead, and hit the Seoul prison. The clandestine "South Korean Liberation Radio"--which was first heard on 31 March 1967--broadcast a commentary to the South on 17 March 1968 calling for the assassination of President Pak. Attacks on government officials in the future will be a constant threat and it is not likely that fear of ROK reprisal action will deter Kim and his aides from sustaining such a provocative policy. He hopes to be able to do what Ho had done in South Vietnam--e.g., to build up a political and military apparatus capable of exercising actual control over portions of South Korean territory and of presenting a growing challenge to Seoul's control over the South Korean population. His revolutionary callousness regarding future agent-personnel losses ("sacrifices") was clearly indicated in his Castro-type statement of 8 October 1968: "To flinch before difficulties and to hesitate in revolution for fear of sacrifices is not an attitude befitting a revolutionary."

The North Koreans almost certainly will continue to insist, as they have been insisting for many years, that unification will not be promoted by means of a major direct assault of KPA units along the front but rather by means of the southern subversive effort. In early September 1968, Kim Il told a visiting JCP leader that, on the matter of unification, Pyongyang had no intention of attacking the South. But Kim went on to say that the North is waiting for strengthened "guerrilla support" in the South and a "general uprising" to oust the Pak regime by force. He also said that without the support of the "South Korean people"--that is, significantly increased assets in the South--the North is helpless in its unification efforts; what is required is a "National Liberation Front" similar to the organization operating in South Vietnam. Kim concluded with the reminder that Pyongyang is maintaining military preparedness to support a "general uprising" in the South and annually allocates "30 percent" of its government budget for defense construction. Thus, although a "march South" continues to be rejected by the North Korean leaders as a practical policy for eventual unification, they apparently will
increase infiltration of guerrilla teams to try to take hold with bases in the countryside.

Their chances of establishing such bases are not good. The strong hostility of most South Koreans to Communism and to Kim is a significant contrast with the situation among South Vietnamese regarding their view of Communism and Ho.* ROK counterinsurgency efforts are improving, and while the coasts remain vulnerable to initial infiltration, conditions inland are more secure.

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*There is some evidence that Kim has been trying to improve his poor image among South Koreans. Following the 16th plenum, which ended on 3 July 1967, Pyongyang initiated a major propaganda campaign designed to depict Kim as the respected and beloved leader of all the "40 million Korean people"--the first time that such an all-inclusive claim was ever made. (Nodong Sinmun editorial of 5 July 1967) This campaign strongly suggests that Kim hopes to copy Ho's strategy of appealing for the loyalty of non-Communists in the South by using his name as a rallying symbol for anti-Seoul elements.
IV. Seizure of the Pueblo

A. Objective Factors in Kim's Calculation

In deciding to risk possible U.S. military retaliation by seizing the Pueblo on 23 January 1968, Kim and his aides probably calculated that Washington would not use nuclear weapons to attack the North. They were willing to risk provoking a conventional air attack (as the most probable form of retaliation, if it came) because they were confident they had a good chance of resisting and surviving it.

Kim's own view of "self-defense" was reaffirmed with considerable conviction in his speech of 16 December 1967. Kim said that Pyongyang could defend itself from an outside attack: "we strengthened our defense capabilities so that we are in a position to defend firmly the security of our fatherland and the socialist gains by our own forces even under today's complex situation." (emphasis supplied) His confidence probably was bolstered by improvements that were taking place in North Korea's air defense system.

The flight of two MIG-21s along the DMZ on the North Korean side on 9 January 1968 was the first report of their fighters performing such a counter-patrol and inspection flight close to the DMZ. By that time, basic MIG-21 pilot training (started in June 1966 with Soviet help) apparently had been completed. That the North Koreans were prepared, if necessary, to resist an air attack was indicated by their adamant refusal to release the crew unless their conditions were met by Washington.
Another important consideration probably was the North Koreans' calculation that Washington was deterred from launching an air attack because of the regime's defense treaties with Moscow and Peking. Kim had stated to a visiting Japanese leftist on 7 April 1967 that his disputes with these Communist allies would not impair the effectiveness of the treaties.

We have minor differences of opinion, but in the event of war, the three countries will unite to repel the invaders. Any aggression against North Korea will be considered aggression against the Soviet Union and China.

But he could not be certain that his allies would involve their forces directly against U.S. forces in a situation of conflict which they believed he had provoked. The Chinese leaders had shown considerable concern about the possibility of becoming involved, delaying their comment on the Pueblo seizure for five days and then issuing a non-committal statement. The Soviet leaders, too, were cautious and tried to defuse the situation, Kosygin stating that "in this situation the Soviet government is taking the necessary measures to prevent a new hotbed of war in Korea." (Speech of 14 February 1968 in Minsk) Kim's two big Communist allies (and certain other Communist countries) were not prepared to commit themselves to his defense in this crisis, and a Nodong Sinmun article on 6 March demanded that "anyone who treasures the interests of the revolution cannot but take a colder and tougher attitude toward U.S. imperialism."

Kim's doubts on the loyalty of the Soviets to their treaty commitment may have been reflected in a speech made by his friend, Castro, well after the crisis had subsided. The Cuban leader strongly implied on 23 August that Soviet commitments to Communist regimes on the periphery of the bloc were weaker than those in Moscow's immediate, European sphere of national security interest. He asked whether the Warsaw Pact divisions would be sent to North Vietnam in the event of an escalated U.S. attack,
or to North Korea or Cuba if they were to be subjected to "Yankee imperialist attacks."* Kim himself has been more indirect in publicly expressing his doubts, and in his article printed in the Havana-published Tricontinental on 8 October 1968, he stated that "It would be better certainly if big countries join small countries in fighting against U.S. imperialism." On balance, however, Kim's unwillingness to engage in open polemics with either the Russians or the Chinese strangely suggests that he believes the treaties have a deterrent effect on Washington.

B. Subjective Factors in Kim's Calculation

Kim probably believed that by seizing the Pueblo he would be upstaging Moscow and Peking and scoring a point regarding the importance of small countries in the world Communist movement. This attitude of personal and nationalistic self-assertion was reflected in his speech of 16 December 1967 when he warned North Koreans that "we have to wage the struggle against imperialism or right and 'left' opportunism strictly in accordance with our own judgment and conviction to conform to our actual conditions, and will allow no one to violate or insult the rights and dignity of our nation." Even the chauvinistic Chinese complained, shortly after this speech, that the

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*JCP leader Miyamoto indirectly criticized the caution and restraint displayed by both Moscow and Peking in their feeble support of Pyongyang in the Pueblo situation. Speaking in Pyongyang on 25 August 1968, Miyamoto praised Kim for having defended "the sovereignty of the country with great courage and composure at a time when some people of other countries not directly standing opposed to U.S. imperialism were fearing, instead of expressing indignation at, the provocation and illegal act of U.S. imperialism."
North Koreans were aggressively nationalistic. (Yao Wen-yuan speech of late December in Shanghai)* The appearance of the Pueblo in or near waters claimed by Pyongyang, and its continued operations—from 10 to 23 January—apparently tipped the balance between Kim's rational calculation (regarding avoidance of big risks when confronting U.S. forces) and irrational impulse (regarding national assertion) in favor of the latter.

Kim has extracted some personal political benefits from seizure of the ship. From his viewpoint, he has defied the major enemy and has upstaged his big Communist allies in the process. The obvious contrast between Pyongyang's boldness and Moscow's and Peking's caution regarding the matter of seizing U.S. naval vessels on the high seas and retaining their crews was alluded to privately by the director of Chosen Soren in Tokyo on 27 February 1968. He told a meeting of officials that "the North Korean People's Army seized the U.S. ship Pueblo—a feat neither the USSR nor China has been able to accomplish."

Kim is now stressing a new line—taken in part from Castro and Ho—on the major role of small countries in a revolutionary global struggle directed against the

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*Yao made an important distinction between the Korean party and other Communist parties, indicating the Chinese leaders' view that this ultra-nationalism was present on all levels of the KWP. He said that Peking's difficulty with the Cuban party was only with a small handful in the leadership while the bulk of the members had shown themselves to be "true revolutionaries." But he was much less sanguine about the rank and file of the North Korean party: not only was the leadership "revisionist, but the great majority of the party membership was aggressively nationalistic.
He now departs from his previous practice—which had been Mao's line—of giving equal importance to the role of big and small countries in the strategy. "It is particularly important that the peoples of small countries which are making revolution have a firm conviction of victory and pool their strength to deal a fatal blow to U.S. imperialism." (speech of 7 September 1968) Kim's view on the ability of small countries to deal fatal blows to the U.S. was praised as an important "revolutionary strategic line...newly put forth" by Kim. (Nodong Sinmun editorial of 1 October 1968) Kim actually believes himself to be the chief proponent and strategist of this anti-U.S. struggle. Acting in his role of self-appointed international strategist, he implicitly lectured leaders of small countries against relying on advice from Moscow and Peking: "it is too obvious that one cannot make revolution if he depends on big countries and sits idle; others cannot make revolution for him." (article in Tricontinental of 8 October 1968)

Kim is now boasting of the credibility of North Korea's deterrent power. The failure of Washington and Seoul to retaliate militarily to seizure of the Pueblo helped to increase his own confidence that:

Today in our country there has been set up a strong all-people defense system based on the monolithic political and ideological unity of the entire people and a powerful independent national economy. We have thus become capable of creditably repulsing all sorts of desperate maneuvers on the part of the imperialists and reliably defending the security of the country and the people. (emphasis supplied) (speech of 7 September 1968)

He seems to believe that he can, with impunity, continue to hold the Pueblo's crew. So long as he retains them, he can continue to exploit his adventurist action among Communist militants everywhere for purposes of personal and national prestige. His price for releasing them
almost certainly will continue to be something which can similarly be exploited—that is, an apology from Washington and a guarantee against future "intrusions" in P'yongyang-claimed waters.