CURRENT INTELLIGENCE STAFF STUDY

THE CHINESE COMMUNIST IMPACT ON EAST GERMANY
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The Chinese Communist Impact on East Germany

This is a working paper issued under the aegis of the Sino-Soviet Studies Group, which is a merger of the CAESAR, POLO and ESAU groups. The terms CAESAR, POLO and ESAU will be retained to designate papers which emphasize, respectively, problems relating to the Soviet leadership, problems relating to the Chinese leadership, and aspects of the Sino-Soviet relationship.

The Sino-Soviet Studies Group would welcome either written or oral comment on this paper, addressed to Donald S. Zagoria, the responsible analyst, or to W. P. Southard, the acting coordinator of the group. It would also like to acknowledge the valuable suggestions of OCI analysts, in the preparation of this paper.
THE CHINESE COMMUNIST IMPACT ON EAST GERMANY

Summary

The East German party leadership has shown considerable sympathy for many of the ideas, programs, and policies of the Chinese Communist party that are viewed either with reserve or disapproval by Moscow. Other satellite parties have also from time to time shown sympathy for one or more of these Chinese policies, but none has shown a greater over-all affinity to Peiping.

It is extreme to suggest, as some Western journalists have done, the existence of a "Peiping-Pankow axis" directed against Khrushchev. The realities of geography and East German political, economic, and military dependence on Moscow make any coalition with Peiping against Khrushchev unthinkable. Yet the East German (GDR) leaders, confronted with many problems similar to those faced by the Chinese, share with Peiping certain attitudes regarding domestic as well as foreign policy.

The East German leadership has demonstrated in its public statements a much greater respect for Mao personally and for Mao's thought than have the Russians. While Moscow seems to make a low evaluation of the ideological aspects of the Chinese "general line" of socialist construction, the East German party (SED) leaders seem to have genuine admiration for the way in which they believe the Chinese Communist party (CCP) has engendered throughout its party and populace a dynamic socialist spirit which they themselves have been seeking to cultivate in East Germany. The East Germans believe there is much in the Chinese Communist program, Chinese methods of mass mobilization, and the Chinese manipulation of ideology that can be adapted to local use.

For such reasons, East German leaders and mass media have been considerably more enthusiastic than Moscow in their plaudits for the Chinese "leap forward" and the Chinese communes. They have referred to Chinese "miracles" of development, made invidious comparisons between Chinese and Soviet rates of development, cited Chinese rather than Soviet experience as a justification for speeding up the rate of advance in their own country, and suggested that the Chinese leap could be an
"example" for other bloc countries. East German leaders and media have consistently praised the communes, though invariably excluding their "mechanical" application in the GDR. Unlike the Russians, they have described the communes as of great international importance, as an "enrichment" of Marxism-Leninism, as the "foremost" of many Chinese achievements, and specifically as an example for other Asian peoples. While few East German leaders want to go so far as to copy the communes, there was and still is a belief that much in the rationale and spirit behind the commune program can be applied in their own country.

At least four programs now operating in East Germany bear similarities to Chinese practice and are said to have been inspired by Peiping. These include: the requirement that army officers spend one month each year performing the duties of enlisted men; the requirement that white-collar functionaries spend one month in industrial production; the current drive to establish a close relationship between East German intellectuals and manual workers; and the development of socialist communal groups (arbeitgemeinschaften) throughout East German society.

In foreign policy, the East German leaders share many of Peiping's reservations about Khrushchev's detente tactics. Both countries have at times stressed that their respective positions on the periphery of the bloc makes vigilance against the West particularly important, thus insinuating that Russia's rear-line position permits it the luxury of a relaxed international posture which China and East Germany cannot afford. Both countries have generally been more militant in their foreign policy propaganda than have the Russians, and both have often and promptly supported the more extreme views of the other.

China was the only bloc country to endorse fully and independently Ulbricht's recent threat to ask the USSR for rocket weapons. Peiping even went beyond Ulbricht's threat and called the GDR request not only justified but "necessary." Peiping also has given unique support to East Germany's persistent demands to be represented at the forthcoming summit talks. For its part, East Germany supported Peiping for more than one month in the Sino-Indian border dispute, despite Moscow's avowed neutrality and despite its own long-standing interest in securing Indian recognition.
East Germany also took a position much closer to Peiping than to Moscow on the Algerian crisis; the GDR has been the only bloc country directly to endorse the CPR's stand that it will not be bound by any international disarmament agreement reached without its formal participation; and the GDR has, at times, offered stronger support than Moscow for Peiping's right to Taiwan.

Despite this demonstrated affinity between East German and Chinese foreign policy views, East German propaganda has been slowly accommodating itself in recent months to Khrushchev's policy of detente.

In the final analysis, the Chinese capacity and willingness to adopt more extreme positions than Moscow in foreign and domestic policy give the more Stalinist satellite leaders such as Ulbricht an opportunity to play off the Chinese against the Russians in the hope of exercising greater leverage on Khrushchev's policies. Moreover, as Peiping becomes increasingly polarized within the bloc as the exhorter of a more militant foreign policy and a more "fundamentalist" and coercive domestic policy, it may be expanding its influence with like-minded satellite elites. This will undoubtedly be a cause of continuing concern for Moscow.
THE CHINESE COMMUNIST IMPACT ON EAST GERMANY

Introduction

Even before 1958, there were perceptible Chinese Communist efforts to influence the views and policies of East European bloc parties. However, Peiping's aims in 1956 and 1957 had been directed largely to healing the gap between Moscow on the one side and Warsaw and Budapest on the other. While more sympathetic than Moscow to the emerging Gomulka regime in Poland, Peiping took an uncompromising attitude against Nagy's attempt to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact. In Peiping's definitive statement of 29 December 1956, the most emphatic of all self-assertions of the CCP as a source of guidance on intrabloc relations for all bloc members, Peiping warned against both "great nation chauvinism" (of the USSR) and excessive nationalism (in Eastern Europe). In sending Chou En-lai to Moscow, Warsaw, and Budapest in early 1957, Peiping hoped to use its prestige to prevent any further deterioration in intrabloc relations.

Again at the Communist summit conference in Moscow in November 1957, Peiping co-authored the 12-party declaration that placed heavy emphasis on Soviet leadership of the bloc and the need for bloc unity. It was Mao himself who said that the bloc needed a leader and that that leader had to be the USSR.

Since 1958, however, Peiping's influence in Eastern Europe has been largely divisive. The CCP probably has not consciously worked to undermine Soviet leadership of the bloc; yet it has sought to spread its views and practices throughout the bloc, even when it was clearly aware that those views and practices were not approved by the Russians. From the very inception of the Chinese "general line of socialist construction" in May 1958--the parent of the "great leap" and the communes--Peiping journals have claimed that this line is "significant" for other fraternal bloc states. Recently, in connection with the tenth anniversary of the CPR, Liu Shao-chi himself announced to the Communist world, in the international journal Problems of Peace and Socialism, that Chinese experience "is to a certain extent of international significance."
Peiping has sought not only to spread its "general line" of socialist construction but also to influence the European bloc parties against Yugoslav doctrines and practices. Since the spring of 1958, Peiping has generally taken a tougher attitude than Moscow toward the Yugoslavs, apparently in the hope of preventing a bloc-Yugoslav rapprochement. In June 1959, three days after a Soviet-Albanian communique called for improved bloc-Yugoslav relations, Peiping ignored those aspects of the communique calling for an improvement in relations with Yugoslavia, and stressed instead the need for a continuing struggle against revisionism. At the recent Warsaw Pact meeting, the Chinese delegate was alone in denouncing the Yugoslavs as "renegades." Peiping evidently fears that a bloc-Yugoslav rapprochement would weaken bloc unity and lead to pressures for liberalization.

Peiping evidently has also sought to influence the East European elites toward a more militant position toward the United States. Many of these elites, already predisposed toward such a line, probably share Peiping's fear of a detente. Mao reportedly told Czech First Secretary Novotny last October that Khrushchev "betrays" Peiping when he "shakes hands with China's arch enemy," the United States. In addressing the Hungarian party congress in December, Chinese representative Tan Chen-lin took a much harder line than Khrushchev on foreign policy and, with Khrushchev's detente tactics evidently in mind, stressed the need to guard against "imperialist deception."

In January, Peiping played host to a visiting GDR government delegation, paid little attention to Khrushchev's efforts at detente, and warned of the dangers of US-inspired Japanese and German remilitarization. The Chinese delegate to the Warsaw Pact conference in February again offered warnings that the bloc should not be misled by US "peace gestures," and People's Daily on 6 February called those gestures "more vicious and sinister" than the crude aggressive tactics of the past.

Moscow has taken several steps since the fall of 1958 to head off Chinese influence in the bloc and to reassert its own ideological primacy. It has never endorsed Chinese evangelism. It speaks of China's "general line" only as a specific response to specific Chinese conditions.
The "extraordinary" Soviet 21st party congress in early 1959 was convoked by a central committee plenum on 5 September 1958, at a time when Chinese ideological pretensions were at their height. A Czech diplomat told a Western reporter that one of Khrushchev's principal purposes in convening the congress was to check the spread of Chinese theories in Eastern Europe. The plausibility of such a report is strengthened by the fact that Khrushchev did use the congress as a forum to correct "erroneous" Chinese views on the transition to Communism and to outline in considerably more detail than ever before the USSR's own views on the transition.

Since the congress, Khrushchev has in speeches in Eastern Europe and elsewhere implicitly criticized Chinese domestic and foreign policies. In a speech in Poland on 18 July he strongly implied that, on the basis of early Soviet experience, the commune was an unsuitable form for the building of Communism. On 31 October, in a speech to the Supreme Soviet, he left little doubt that he was referring to Mao when he gratuitously criticized Trotsky's "adventurist" foreign policy. In Hungary on 1 December, Khrushchev strongly denounced the old Stalinist Rakosi leadership of Hungary in terms which suggested that he was again pointing primarily at the current policies of the Chinese Communist party. Mistakes such as "ordering the masses about," "going too far ahead of the masses," "disregarding objective conditions," becoming "conceited," and distorting Marxist-Leninist teachings on the building of socialism and Communism, he warned, could be "exploited by the enemies of Communism, as was done in 1956." This appeared to be a warning both to the Chinese and to Stalinist elements elsewhere in the bloc that neo-Stalinist policies might lead to insurrection.

An even more patent Soviet attempt to head off Chinese ideological influence specifically in East Germany was the participation of Soviet Presidium member O. V. Kuusinen in an SED central committee theoretical conference on 30 January. Outlining the five "gigantic leaps" in the course of the 20th century, Kuusinen failed to include the Chinese "great leap."

He made numerous references to the works of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, but none to those of Mao. The rare appearance of such a high-ranking Soviet figure at a satellite central committee conference addressed exclusively to questions of

Khrushchev pointedly said that the lesson of the revolt in Hungary "cannot be ignored by other communist and workers parties."
theory lends credence to the possibility that the conference was largely intended to undercut Mao's prestige and reassert Soviet ideological primacy in East Germany.

The recent conference in Moscow of European bloc parties to "exchange" experience in agriculture—a conference which Peiping failed to attend—can also be viewed as a Soviet effort to insulate the bloc against Chinese practices.

One of the most significant trends since the emergence of Sino-Soviet differences on foreign policy, the Chinese communes, and other issues has been the absence of any uniform line on these issues elsewhere in the bloc. While some of the ten European and Asian satellites have at times echoed Chinese reservations about Khrushchev's detente tactics, others have hewed more faithfully to the soft Soviet line toward the West. While in their public pronouncements some of the satellites have been much more sympathetic to the Chinese communes than has Moscow, others have followed the Soviet pattern of almost total avoidance of the communes.* It is evident from this diffuse satellite reaction that the issues at dispute between Moscow and Peiping have also been the subject of controversy throughout the bloc.

Although some of the satellites—particularly North Korea, Albania, and East Germany—have from time to time shown considerable sympathy both for Chinese foreign and domestic policies, it would be extreme to suggest, as some Western journalists have done, the existence of a Peiping-Pankow or Peiping-Tirana axis. In choosing between policies at issue between Moscow and Peiping, the satellite elites, have in general leaned toward whichever policies seemed more in line with their local vested interests. Their

attitudes have been determined not by any inherent sympathy for Peiping or for Moscow but rather by a complex number of interrelated factors such as their own internal policies, their geographical position, the character and biases of their leaderships, their relations with the West, etc.

Peiping's militancy both in foreign and domestic policy attracts many of the Eastern European leaders to whom the Polish and Yugoslav patterns of socialism, the de-Stalinization campaign, and the recent Soviet efforts at detente represent a far greater threat to the stability of their own regimes than to that of the USSR itself. Many of these satellite leaders, like the Chinese, have never been enthusiastic about Khrushchev's de-Stalinization campaign and fear that a relaxation of international tension and more permissive internal policies will inevitably lead to domestic pressures for further liberalization.

With the Hungarian and Polish thaws and their aftermaths fresh in mind, these leaders fear that liberalization will ultimately undermine their ruling positions. Such fears are particularly pronounced in East Germany and North Korea, where a rival national government calls into question their very legitimacy, or in Albania, which is physically isolated from the bloc and menaced by the example on its very doorstep of a considerably more permissive type of Communism.

As a first step toward assessing Chinese influence on the bloc, this paper for several reasons focuses on East Germany. First, the East German party leadership in its public pronouncements has shown a much greater degree of sympathy than Moscow for wide-ranging Chinese programs and ideas. Second, [reinforces the conclusion that might be drawn from overt GDR material—that there is strong admiration for China among the top leaders and key functionaries of the East German Communist party, and that this admiration has already led to some friction with Moscow. According to First Secretary Ulbricht "feels closely bound to China and has made known his views to Khrushchev," while Premier Grotewohl, who headed a GDR delegation to Peiping in January 1959, "is especially friendly with several Chinese leaders."
A third reason for concentrating on Chinese - East German relations is that the number of East German cultural, economic, and political delegations which have gone to Peiping in recent years is larger than the number from any other East European bloc country. Since the beginning of 1959 alone, there have been four top-level GDR delegations in Peiping. Premier Grotewohl headed a government delegation in January 1959 which had been touring the Middle East and Asia; politburo member Herman Matern and People's Chamber President Johannes Dieckmann headed a parliamentary delegation in May 1959 which also had been touring the same area; Matern led the East German delegation in October 1959 to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the Communist regime; Vice Premier and politburo member Herman Rau led another GDR delegation in January 1960.

Numerous other high-level East German functionaries have spent extended periods of time in China since the proclamation of the Chinese "general line" in 1958. Kurt Gregor, a leading economist on the East German State Planning Commission, spent five weeks in China in the spring of 1959. Horst Sindermann, chief of the agitation and propaganda section of the central committee, visited China in the winter of 1958 and returned home to write a lengthy brochure on "China's Greal Leap" full of praise for Chinese methods in socialist construction. Sindermann's private report on the communes and other Chinese techniques reportedly set off a long series of talks within party circles about the relevance of such practices for East Germany.

A fourth and final reason for concentrating on East German - Chinese relations is that there is a similarity between many of the foreign and domestic problems facing both regimes and this similarity conditions their attitudes toward these problems. Both countries lie at the extremities of the bloc land mass, on the periphery of the camp, directly confronting American military power. From time to time Peiping has, in the presence of East German delegations, warned of the special need for wariness because of the GDR's position on the westernmost edge of the bloc. Neither country has diplomatic relations with the United States, and American policy has supported the isolation of both within the international community. Both must reckon with the existence of rival national governments, each in close geographic proximity and each closely allied to the United
States and protected by US military strength. Just as China regards Taiwan as a Western foothold on its own territory, so does the GDR regard the Western presence in Berlin.

There are similarities in internal problems as well. To match China's "great leap," East Germany has outlined an ambitious if not delusional plan to catch up to West Germany in per capita consumption by 1963. Like China, the East German regime has shown a preference for hard-line Stalinist measures in domestic policy. An SED central committee foreign affairs specialist reportedly has said that some of these similarities "do from time to time play a major role in our sympathies for China and, likewise, for the sympathies the Chinese feel toward us."

The first section of this paper examines those Chinese ideas, domestic policies, and practices which have elicited more sympathetic East German than Soviet comment, shows the divergence in that comment, and suggests some of the reasons for it. It then seeks to determine to what extent, if any, some current East German programs are influenced by Chinese examples. The second section discusses some of the similarities between Chinese and East German foreign policy lines--particularly those which diverge from Soviet positions.
I. THE INFLUENCE OF CHINESE IDEOLOGY ON EAST GERMANY'S DOMESTIC PROGRAMS

The Attraction of Maoist Ideology

The respect of the East German party leadership for Mao and Maoist doctrine is evident in the notable discrepancy between Soviet efforts--particularly since 1958--to minimize Mao's theoretical stature and the East German efforts to maximize it. Khrushchev's birthday telegram to Mao in December 1958 on the occasion of the latter's 65th birthday emphasized Mao's contributions not to Marxist theory but to the "consolidation of the mighty socialist camp." In the realm of theory, Khrushchev congratulated Mao only on "your faithfulness to the great ideas of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism." (emphasis supplied) In contrast, Ulbricht's telegram congratulated Mao personally for "valuably enriching" Marxism-Leninism and for "imparting to our party too invaluable knowledge for the cause of socialist construction." GDR President Pieck, in a separate telegram, also congratulated Mao for his "essential contribution to the enrichment of the science of Marxism-Leninism."

During the tenth anniversary of the Chinese Communist regime in October 1959, whereas Soviet leaders and media conspicuously avoided Mao's theoretical achievements, Ulbricht congratulated the Chinese leaders for maintaining the "purity" of and for "enriching" Marxism-Leninism. He went so far as to say that Khrushchev, in making his visit to the United States, had acted in consonance with a "Marxist finding" of Mao's.

'The logic of imperialism,' Comrade Mao Tse-tung wrote in 1949, 'is completely different from the logic of the people. Aggression and defeat, aggression and defeat again, and eventually destruction--that is the logic of imperialism and reaction throughout the whole world, and they can never escape this logic. The logic of the people, on the other hand, is: struggle and defeat, struggle and defeat again, and finally, struggle and victory. The people too, can never escape this logic.'
Comrade Khrushchev was acting under this Marxist finding when he made such an extraordinary contribution to international detente by his most important visit to the United States.

Ulbricht's statement is the only known case where any satellite spokesman has depicted a Soviet leader's action as a practical execution of a Maoist doctrinal formulation. It is likely that Ulbricht was attempting to reconcile divergent Soviet and Chinese foreign policy views by implying that Khrushchev's detente tactics were only temporary and but one stage in Mao's long-term "struggle" of the people against imperialism. Ulbricht could, however, have accomplished the same purpose by citing any one of numerous quotations from Marx, Lenin or Stalin on the long-term irreconcilability of the two camps. By quoting Mao on such a basic problem as the long-term struggle with the West, Ulbricht left the impression that it was Mao who provided the best long-range ideological framework in which to view Khrushchev's current tactics—an impression that could hardly have been welcomed by Khrushchev.

Ulbricht's public stress on the importance of Mao's ideological achievements can probably be attributed to several causes. First, it is an obvious bid for Chinese favor; second, it is probably a reflection of genuine respect for Mao's doctrinal achievements and for Mao personally. The death of Stalin and the ascendancy in the USSR of the highly pragmatic Khrushchev have left Mao as the Communist leader with the best claim to ideological pre-eminence. To some Communist leaders, particularly those such as Ulbricht who share the high Chinese evaluation of ideology both as an animating force and an explanation of reality, Mao is clearly held in much higher regard than Khrushchev.

Admiration for Chinese ideological innovations and Maoist doctrine exists not only at the top of the SED but extends into the ranks of SED activists as well. One group of SED cadres has praised the communes as the "boldest modern application of Marxism-Leninism." A Western reporter wrote in March 1959 that SED party members had "caught a bug from China that looks to be more contagious than Asiatic flu." He quoted one party activist as saying:
Mao isn't satisfied, as Khrushchev seems to be, with mere increases in tractor production and new steel mills. The Chinese attitude has more to do with human relations.

A young Communist philosophy instructor told him: "Don't you see? The Chinese have the Marxist morale that we lack. Khrushchev is just an economic pragmatist, but Mao is a thinker, a theorist. Our party and First Secretary Ulbricht acknowledge the importance of the Chinese ideas." Still another young Communist told him:

You can say what you like, but we need ideals, and the only place you can get them today is from Mao Tse-tung... not from Khrushchev.

Last winter an SED functionary asserted to another Western reporter, "Everyone is reading Mao." Disparaging Khrushchev's attempt to present himself as an ideologist at the Soviet 21st party congress, he declared that "the only truly revolutionary thinking" was being developed in China.

The Chinese Socialist Spirit

One of the basic differences between Soviet and Chinese outlooks can be found in their relative evaluations of the possibility of overcoming unfavorable conditions through the sheer force of Marxist ideas. The Chinese, because of their different revolutionary backgrounds, their earlier stage of revolutionary development, and the personal biases of their leadership, are evidently convinced that ideology can change basic human traits and can play a prominent if not paramount role in their headlong rush to industrialization. They reject the Soviet view that material rather than ideological incentives must be uppermost in fostering economic development. A recent Chinese evaluation of Maoist ideological "discoveries" implicitly accuses the Russians of "economism," an early Bolshevik heresy which placed more emphasis on economic than on political factors. The article claims that "superficial" emphasis on material incentives can only corrupt the will of the working class.
The Russians are more aware of the limits set by objective conditions, are relatively more realistic about human nature, and in general put more emphasis than the Chinese on rational economic planning, material incentives, and technology as indispensable for economic growth. In commenting on the Chinese "general line" of socialist construction—and its offspring, the "great leap" and the communes—Moscow has almost completely avoided the ideological aspects of the Chinese program. Whereas Peiping stresses its successful and indispensable efforts to arouse "socialist consciousness" and to create the new socialist man, Moscow has stressed the increasing number of machines available to the Chinese and the important role of its own technological, scientific, and economic aid.

While Moscow thus seems to have a low evaluation of the ideological aspects of the Chinese program, the SED leaders in contrast seem to have genuine admiration for the manner in which they believe that the CCP has engendered throughout the Chinese party and populace a dynamic socialist spirit which they themselves have been seeking to cultivate in East Germany.

In his October Revolution speech in 1958, Premier Grotewohl emphasized that the aroused "consciousness" of the Chinese masses made the free distribution of grain possible. Moscow not only has generally avoided discussions of this aroused "consciousness" but has consistently avoided discussions of the Chinese supply system as well, a subject that has been one of the most sensitive of all the discrepancies between Moscow and Peiping.

In December 1958, Paul Wandel, East Germany's ambassador to Communist China, wrote in the East German party monthly Einheit that the key to the Chinese successes was the fact that they had "sought and found" a solution to their immense tasks in over-all mobilization of the masses. There were enormous "spiritual forces" inherent in the masses, he wrote. Ideas could "turn into material force" if they got hold of the masses. The socialist consciousness of the masses was growing and "becoming a factor surpassing all expectations." This factor, Wandel wrote, "will rapidly develop the productive forces and the production relations."
This admiration for the Chinese effort to arouse revolutionary fervor in China was also expressed in subsequent articles in East German journals. Nothing like it has ever appeared in Soviet journals. To the pragmatic Khrushchev, the concept that revolutionary fervor can play such a prominent role in socialist construction is wishful thinking.

Throughout 1959, long after Soviet reservations about the Chinese "general line" were evident, the East Germans continued publicly to praise the manner in which the Chinese developed the "spirit and creative initiative of the masses," and they began privately to draw comparisons between Chinese successes and East German ambitions in this regard. An SED member in good standing with the top leadership told a Western reporter in March that East Germany hoped it could engender some of the "real socialist spirit" which promoted the commune movement. In the same month, Ulbricht told a Leipzig party conference that he had been impressed with the "tremendous popular initiative which has been unfolded (in China) under the guidance of the Communist party."

In June, politburo member Matern, reporting on the visit of an East German parliamentary delegation to Asia, told the People's Chamber that in China "it has become apparent that the initiative and spirit of the masses, especially of the youth, are among the most important factors in increasing the rate of socialist construction." A Neues Deutschland editor stated frankly to a Western reporter in August that Ulbricht "firmly believes that there is much in the rationale behind the Chinese Communist program which can be adapted to East Germany's particular circumstances." (emphasis supplied) Horst Sindermann, SED agitprop chief, reportedly told a satellite diplomat the same month that although he did not care for the extreme form of organization of the communes, he was impressed with the tremendous mass energy generated by the Chinese system, and that he wanted to harness the same type of energy among the East Germans because of his country's shortage of between 500,000 and 1,000,000 workers.

Not only the SED leaders but some Stalinist-oriented cadres also have been impressed with the methods employed by the Chinese Communists to spur the populace toward regime goals. According to...
fear on Chinese domestic policies as a return to discredited Stalinist tactics, and another which looks with approval on such neo-Stalinism. This latter group, which includes young enthusiastic activists and older cadres with Stalinist tendencies, is impressed by the speed of Chinese development, by the elan which it believes exists throughout the CCP, and by the vigorous exercise of the central leadership in mobilizing the masses.
The Chinese "Leap Forward"

The East German leaders, in contrast to the Russians, evidently believe that the example of the Chinese "leap forward"—particularly the techniques used to achieve that leap—can be of considerable value when adapted to East German conditions. This is borne out by the marked contrast between the cautious reserve displayed by Soviet media toward China's "great leap" and the enthusiastic plaudits for the leap in East German media.

During the CPR tenth anniversary celebrations in 1959, speeches by Khrushchev, Suslov, and Ignatov, the Pravda editorial of 2 October, and the Soviet party-state message to Peiping all failed to mention recent Chinese economic achievements or the leap forward, referring instead in the vaguest manner to Chinese achievements of the past decade as a whole. Khrushchev, who had never been reluctant to praise bloc economic progress, told his Chinese audience in October that it was not for him "a guest...to talk of your successes." A Soviet official recently told the [that the revised plan goals in China "are still too high."

East German leaders and mass media on the other hand, have been considerably more enthusiastic in their plaudits for the Chinese leap and the frenetic pace of Chinese economic development. They have referred to Chinese "miracles" of development, made invidious comparisons between Chinese and Soviet rates of development, cited Chinese rather than Soviet experience as justification for speeding up the rate of advance in their own country, and suggested that the Chinese leap could be an "example" for other bloc countries. None of these lines has ever been taken up in Soviet media.

In his article in Einheit in December 1958 Wandel became the first and only bloc spokesman ever to accept the heretical Chinese redefinition of "uninterrupted revolution," a concept used by the CCP to justify ideologically both the "great leap" and the communes. In the Chinese definition, the revolution is "uninterrupted" right up to the final triumph of Communism. No Soviet leader or Soviet publication has ever mentioned, let alone approved, this definition of the concept. In Soviet dogma, the concept is used to telescope the "bourgeois" and "socialist" revolutions, but the revolution ceases to be "uninterrupted" after the Communists seize power and begin to build socialism. From that
point on, according to Moscow, the revolution proceeds by "stages." Wandel implied that the CCP version of "uninterrupted revolution" was perfectly valid because it derived "from the classics of Marxism-Leninism," from China's "own abundant experience," and from the "theoretical evaluation of that experience by Comrade Mao."

Khrushchev implicitly criticized the Chinese concept of "uninterrupted revolution" at the Soviet 21st party congress when he condemned the skipping of revolutionary stages. Since that time, Peiping has watered down its theory of "uninterrupted revolution" by putting correlative stress on revolution by stages, but it has never abandoned the original concept.

Wandel's article also drew a parallel between the thinking of Ulbricht and Liu Shao-chi on the proper pace of economic development. Predicting that "new 'miracles' of a tempestuous development of socialism" were forthcoming in China, Wandel cited Liu Shao-chi's speech to the Chinese eighth party congress in 1956, rather than a Soviet pronouncement, as justification for an increased rate of advance in the GDR. Both Liu and Ulbricht, Wandel said, recognized that a faster pace of economic advance would not lead to unnecessary social tensions, as some critics contended, but was required by "objective requirements."

On many occasions in 1959, GDR officials have continued to praise the Chinese rate of development more enthusiastically than have their Russian counterparts. Dr. Manfred von Ardenne, reporting on his experiences as a member of Grotewohl's delegation to Peiping in January 1959, told a public meeting on his return that whereas Europeans during the last 25 years have been accustomed to speak of the American economic tempo, today one refers "only" to Communist China when thinking of an unusually rapid pace of development. A member of the East German parliamentary delegation which visited China in April wrote that "phenomena without parallel" were taking place in China.

In April, an East German plant foreman who had visited China in the spring told a meeting in Bitterfeld, attended by Ulbricht:
A government commission took me to the People's Republic of China, and I must say that I returned a changed man. These people are going forward with their work at a rocket pace. In China, the unity of will is so overwhelming that it borders almost on the miraculous.

The East Germans have gone so far as to make invidious comparisons between the rate of Chinese and Soviet progress and to deprecate the value of Soviet aid to Chinese development. In a pamphlet published sometime early in 1959 on "China's Great Leap," GDR agitprop chief Horst Sindermann wrote:

The industrialization of China--with Soviet aid to be sure, yet fully paid for by China--makes more rapid progress than that in the plagued Russia of the 1930s.

Sindermann's slighting reference to Soviet aid stands in marked contrast to the emphasis placed on that aid by the USSR as being a significant, if not indispensable, factor in Chinese progress. Although Sindermann's comparison was drawn between contemporary China and Russia of the 1930s, the drawing of such explicit comparisons between Chinese and Russian progress at any time is rare. Most other bloc countries--including the USSR--compare Chinese progress only with that made by the Western "imperialist" countries.

During the tenth anniversary celebrations of the CPR, East German media and leading spokesmen continued to praise the Chinese leap in terms that contrasted sharply with Soviet vagueness. Perhaps the most enthusiastic commentary appeared in the East Berlin journal Die Nation, which wrote in its October issue that the Chinese leap "far surpasses all previous ideas of the possibilities of a country's political, economic, scientific, and cultural development." Not content with this bold statement, the journal went on to draw a scarcely concealed, invidious comparison with the rate of growth in the USSR. In its very next sentence it wrote: "In a way, this is even true with regard to comparisons within the socialist camp." The journal then went on to make the unique contention that the Chinese leap could be an example to all bloc countries. All socialist countries, it said, had "of course" made "leaps." It continued:

However, the 'great leap' of the CPR can be regarded as an example also for these (leaps in socialist countries) and similar mass movements in the socialist countries.
In contrast to the restraint of Khrushchev and Suslov in discussing Chinese economic progress, Grotewohl intimated clearly that the Chinese were approaching parity with all the world's advanced countries, the USSR included.

China...in a few years time will have caught up with the most advanced countries economically and in fields of education and science.

On the same occasion, Wandel wrote of the "magnitude of the (Chinese) achievements" during the past ten years, despite the Korean war and other obstacles. His emphasis on Chinese successes in spite of difficulties contrasted with Soviet attempts to minimize the difficulties faced by the Chinese as compared with those faced by the USSR in the first ten years of its existence.
Sympathy for the Communes

Although more than 18 months have passed since the commune resolution was published, no Soviet Presidium member has ever referred favorably to the communes in a policy speech. Aside from one minor discussion in Literary Gazette a year ago, the Soviet central press has similarly avoided the subject. What little comment there has been has appeared at paragraph length in the more specialized Soviet journals such as Kommunist, Problems of Economics, and Sinology journals. During the tenth anniversary celebrations of Chinese Communist rule in October 1959, no mention was made of the communes by either Khrushchev, Suslov, the Pravda editorial of 2 October, or the Khrushchev-Voroshilov messages to the Chinese leadership.

East German leaders and East German media, on the other hand, have consistently lauded the communes, though invariably excluding their application in the GDR. On eight separate occasions since the fall of 1958, top-ranking East German leaders have praised the communes. In these statements and in other comment in East German media, the commune movement has been described as "of great international importance," an "enrichment" of Marxism-Leninism, an "extraordinary consolidation" of the worker-peasant alliance, the "foremost" of many Chinese achievements, and an example for other Asian peoples. None of these themes has ever been present in Soviet media.

In 1958, Premier Grotewohl became the first bloc leader of politburo rank to mention the communes in a public statement. Moreover, he picked the October Revolution anniversary—an occasion traditionally reserved for paens to the USSR. Although he noted that CPR accomplishments were made with Soviet help, Grotewohl devoted six paragraphs of his speech to praise of the communes and Chinese successes in general.

Ambassador Wandel's article in Einheit in December 1958 devoted much praise to the communes and argued for a proper understanding of the conditions which led to their formation. His sympathetic discussion contrasted sharply with the consistent avoidance of the communes by Soviet ambassadors to China. Soviet ambassador Yudin resorted to elaborate circumlocations in order not to mention them when he addressed the Soviet 21st party congress in February 1959.
Grotewohl again praised the communes in a speech in Peking on 24 January 1959. As head of a GDR government delegation, he told a mass rally that the "Chinese people are working with all their might in building socialism, and in this connection, the setting up of the people's communes is of tremendous importance." In the joint communiqué signed by Grotewohl at the conclusion of his visit, the East German delegation affirmed that it was "deeply impressed" by the communes and asserted that they would "greatly accelerate" the completion of socialist construction in China. Neither a Sino-North Korean communiqué in April nor a Sino-Hungarian communiqué in May mentioned the communes, probably because both delegations wished not to offend the Russians.

Soviet objections to the communes had become quite clear at the 21st party congress. Yet GDR politburo member Hermann Matern, reporting in June to the People's Chamber on the results of a parliamentary delegation's visit to China, dwelt at some length on the accomplishments of the communes. Public food supplies were well organized by the communes, he said, and the peasants could see the advantages offered. Dr. Johannes Dieckmann, president of the People's Chamber and co-leader of that delegation, told an East Berlin paper on 7 June that what impressed him most in China were the communes and the "spontaneous" friendship for the USSR.

During the celebrations in October 1959 of the tenth anniversary of the CPA, leading East German spokesmen—Grotewohl and Matern, but not Ulbricht—again offered praise for the communes; Soviet leaders, including Khrushchev, failed to mention them.

The "International Importance" of the Communes

East German leaders have not only praised the communes in general terms, but they and East German media have also said from time to time that the communes are of "international importance" and "enrich" Marxism-Leninism, a universality never attributed to them by the Russians. In the limited Soviet comment, the communes are always represented as a peculiarly Chinese response to specific Chinese conditions.
In December 1958 Einheit, Paul Wandel first claimed that the communes were "of great international importance," a phrase repeated verbatim in the January issue of Deutsche Aussenpolitik, the organ of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. During the October 1959 celebrations of the CPR's tenth anniversary, at the same time that Liu Shao-chi vigorously reaffirmed the idea that Chinese experience might have international significance, East German spokesmen and journals were quick to support those pretensions. Ambassador Wandel, writing in Einheit, argued that the communes "rank among the foremost of the most important (Chinese) achievements." Then, while not specifically referring to the communes but in a context that could hardly not include them, he said that "there were and are many things (in Chinese experience) which, supplementing the great experience of the Soviet Communist party, are of general international applicability."

East German leaders on the same occasion also supported the claims, implicit in Chinese media since the inception of the commune program, that the communes are of particular relevance for Asian countries. In publicly unveiling the communes, Chinese politburo member Chen Po-ta cited a Lenin quotation from 1920 to justify the contention that conditions in Asia were so dissimilar from those in Europe as to justify "special forms" in socialist construction. Wandel's article in Einheit quoted the same reference to support this view. Moreover, politburo member Matern, speaking at a Peiping rally, advanced the most explicit suggestion yet made by anyone--Chinese leaders included--to support the view that the communes were particularly relevant for Asia. The communes, Wandel said, would "increasingly become an attraction for the Asian people and for the millions of Asian peasant masses in particular."

The extravagant East German praise for the Chinese communes and their "international importance" does not stem from a belief that the communes can be imitated in East Germany or elsewhere in the bloc. East German media have specifically ruled out such a "mechanical" transfer. However, the East Germans do find in the communes--as they find in the entire Chinese general line of socialist construction--methods they believe can be adapted to local use.
It is quite likely that the Chinese commune program set off a long series of talks within the SED leadership on the extent to which the commune experience might be relevant to the GDR.

In December, a central committee member told a Western journalist that after Sindermann returned from Peiping in early 1959, "we had a long series of talks on his report." During the talks, many of the party members expressed fears that any attempts to experiment with communes in East Germany would be dangerous. Sindermann replied that, by praising the Chinese communes, he did not in any way mean that he was advocating communes in East Germany. What he was praising was the "Chinese action in solving their problem."

From such reports and from overt communications, it thus seems clear that many of the top East German leaders were—unlike the Russians—favorably impressed with the commune experiment. While it is probable that few wanted to go so far as to copy the communes in East Germany, there was and probably still is a belief that much in the rationale and spirit behind them can be applied there.

GDR's Efforts to Arouse "Socialist Consciousness"

Like the Chinese, Ulbricht and other top GDR leaders seem to be convinced that the arousing of revolutionary fervor can make a significant contribution to economic development. Since the SED's fifth party congress in July 1958, when Ulbricht first set forth the task of catching up to West Germany in per capita consumption by 1961, there has been a consistent emphasis in his pronouncements and in all East German media on the necessity to institute vigorous ideological programs and agitation designed to effect a basic change in the pattern of thinking of the East German population and to create the new "socialist man." This campaign, it will be noted, coincides with similar efforts in China inaugurated by the new "general line" in May 1958. Thus, both regimes in 1958, to a much greater extent than anywhere else in the bloc, began to place heavy emphasis on fostering a new social climate in which labor enthusiasm would be enhanced to a considerable degree not only by material incentives but by an aroused "socialist consciousness."
In a lengthy section of his report to the party congress, Ulbricht set this campaign in motion. He discussed the "profound socialist revolution of ideology and culture" which would lead to the "evolution of the new socialist consciousness." He then outlined ten "basic laws of socialist ethics," subsequently labeled the "Ten Commandments" of the new socialist morality. Among these were the following:

4—Thou shalt do good deeds for socialism, for socialism leads to a better life for all working people.

5—Thou shalt act in the building of socialism in the spirit of mutual aid and comradely cooperation, respect the collective, and take heed of its criticism.

At the same congress, Premier Grotewohl said that the "step in human thinking from 'I' to 'we' must be taken everywhere." He attributed an 11-percent rise in productivity to a "more extensive application of our dialectical material conceptions."

The close connection in Ulbricht's thinking between ideological pressures and economic development was further illustrated at the fourth plenum of the SED central committee in January 1959. "The most important criterion" for speeding up the rate of economic development in East Germany, Ulbricht said, was the "development of a communal spirit" and a "quicker forming of socialist attitudes of mind." Elsewhere, he said, "the most important event of this period is the development of socialist man." Calling for a socialist revolution in all aspects of life (methods of work, education, culture), he urged the party to give special attention to "the education of socialist man and the arousing in him of an active socialist consciousness."

Since the January plenum, East German journals have been filled with articles detailing the need to create new selfless attitudes toward labor, "social responsibility," a new "socialist labor ethos," etc.

Ulbricht himself, in a speech in East Berlin on 7 June, laid heavy emphasis on "socialist morality." Quoting from Lenin's "The Great Beginning," Ulbricht said:
Communism begins where simple workers, unselfishly and working hard, worry about raising labor productivity, about the protection of every single pod of grain, coal, iron, or other products from which not the workers personally benefit nor those 'close to them' but the 'distant ones'—that is the whole society in its entirety.

In seeking to cultivate this new revolutionary fervor in the GDR, Ulbricht has been careful to pay obeisance to the Soviet emphasis on material incentives as the main prerequisite for increasing production. At the same time, East German journals have insisted—like the Chinese—that the principle of material incentives must be applied "in inseparable combination" with the "socialist education" of the workers. Moreover, they have urged egalitarian distribution of bonuses within labor brigades, a practice which Soviet journals have publicly criticized as "petit-bourgeois levelling." Einheit wrote in June:

A number of comrades see in this (equal dividing of bonuses) only a tendency toward equalitarianism which must be counteracted. But we are of a different opinion. Although we can still find tendencies toward equalitarianism today, we can see increasingly clear indications of the solidarity of feeling and community consciousness of the workers...The advanced workers know quite well how to distinguish between equalitarianism and community spirit.

This practice of encouraging workers to divide up bonus payments as a means of fostering a "community spirit" was identified by one SED editor as exemplary of the "vital significance" of the Chinese ideological objective. Moscow, although probably not enthusiastic over what it undoubtedly regards as premature egalitarianism, will probably not step in to restrain Ulbricht unless the GDR leader carries his campaign beyond its present limits. Much will depend on the extent to which this attempt to foster the new socialist man meets with population restiveness.
Specific East German Programs and Chinese Influence

As assistant editor of Neues Deutschland told an American correspondent in August 1959 that at least four different programs now operating in East Germany were "inspired by the Chinese Communist party and notably by Mao Tse-tung." These were: 1) the requirement that army officers in East Germany spend one month each year performing the duties of enlisted men; 2) the requirement that white-collar functionaries spend one month in industrial production; 3) the current drive to establish a close relationship between East German intellectuals and manual workers; and 4) the development of socialist labor brigades and communal groups (arbeitgemeinschaften) throughout East Germany society.

The first two programs, initiated by the SED's fourth plenum in January 1959, almost certainly owe their origins to Chinese experience. There are no parallel programs in the USSR, but almost exactly parallel programs were initiated in China in the fall of 1957.

The participation of top party and state leaders in physical labor is probably viewed by the East Germans as one of the "Chinese" means to encourage a "socialist spirit" among the populace. An East Berlin journal said in October 1959:

The creative, courageous thought and action of workers and peasants, as well as the readiness for socialist cooperation and socialist competition, were essentially promoted by participation of the leading cadres of the Chinese Communist party and the state apparatus in physical work and...by the acceptance of work on the lowest level in order to live, work, and eat with the masses.

Despite the SED editor's implication that Ulbricht had Moscow's consent to devise a bold program for East Germany, it seems unlikely that Moscow would be enthusiastic about either of these programs. In the first place, Moscow would probably not wish to encourage satellites to copy Chinese experience, no matter how insignificant the program copied might be. In the second place, Moscow probably doubts that such programs will have any appreciable
economic results. Czech First Secretary Novotny probably expressed the Soviet attitude toward the second program when he obliquely poked fun last spring at sending bureaucrats to work in industry or agriculture.

The drive to establish a closer link between technicians and intellectuals on the one hand and production workers on the other--listed as the third program inspired by Communist China--is common to all bloc countries. A basic criterion in Communist dogma for the advancement to Communism, a criterion as old as the Communist Manifesto itself, is the elimination of distinctions between mental and manual labor. Khrushchev's educational reform was specifically intended to serve this purpose. However, the manner in which this goal is sought in East Germany bears a resemblance to the manner in which it is sought in China. In East Germany, as in China, there is great stress on technicians and workers meeting in small circles or groups to discuss common industrial or agricultural problems, a phenomenon which has little parallel in the USSR. In China, this practice is part of the principle of the so-called "mass line." Red Flag on 1 November 1959 wrote, for example:

In order to carry out mass movements in factories and enterprises, the forces of the technical personnel and workers must be brought together. This is one of the most important lessons gained in the practical experience of last year's mass movement...important, key technical problems, research on new techniques, and important innovations and inventions very often cannot be tackled single-handed, or by several persons, by the technical personnel or the workers alone; instead, we must employ the method of pooling the efforts of leading personnel, technicians, and workers, and mobilizing the positive elements in all quarters concerned.

In East Germany, this same purpose is accomplished by the "socialist work group." In June, Einheit wrote:

Experience shows that wherever engineers, foremen, and workers engage in joint concrete discussions on the development of production and technical-scientific progress, the initiative of
the workers is unfolded to a great degree. On the basis of such discussions conducted by the collectives of blast furnaces, four and six... almost every shift collective formed socialist work groups which had set themselves the target of solving certain economic and technical tasks. The leadership provided by the particular blast furnace engineers constituted a great contribution here.

The brigades of socialist labor and the socialist work groups which have become prominent in East Germany since the fourth plenum in January 1959—the fourth program listed by the SED editor as deriving from Chinese experience—are clearly regarded by the East German leaders as a crucial part of their bold program to catch up with West Germany. Ulbricht told the fourth plenum that the most important criterion for speeding up the rate of economic development in East Germany was the "development of a communal spirit" and "socialist attitudes of mind." The socialist work groups, he said, would be one of the most important means of realizing this goal. In his report to the sixth plenum in September 1959, Ulbricht said the two movements were "the key to the solution of all important tasks in the new stage of our development."

The first of the two closely related movements, the "socialist labor brigade," has perceptible roots in past and present Soviet practice. This brigade has performed outstanding feats in socialist construction, increased productivity, cut costs, improved work organization, developed "socialist consciousness" and socialist modes of life, etc. The competition for the title represents in essence an attempt to utilize a worker's team spirit in order to spur productivity and efface "bourgeois" individualism.

There have been similar movements at various periods in Soviet history. For example, during the first Five-Year Plan, the "udarniks," or shock brigades, performed feats of labor by exceptional physical exertion. Most recently, in November 1958, the Russians began heavy publicity for new "Communist labor brigades" designed to engender competition for raising labor productivity, mastering technology, raising Communist consciousness, etc.

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Socialist labor brigades have also been given increasing attention recently in Czechoslovakia. The "socialist labor brigade" movement in East Germany thus has as much if not more precedent in the USSR than in China.

However, the East Germans have carried the socialist brigade movement a step further than it has gone in the USSR. This is being done through the so-called "socialist work group,"* envisioned by the regime as a further development of the brigade movement and designed to spread socialist morality throughout the entire fabric of East German society. Ulbricht told the sixth plenum in September 1959 that some 16,000 such groups were already formed.

The socialist work group, according to SED sources, is designed to expand the brigade base by associating the wives and children of brigade members with activities related either to production or to public campaigns developed through the factory or agricultural unit. In essence, it is designed to draw entire family groups into joint social activities and to draw a closer link between family groups in residential neighborhoods and the actual production site. Thus, workers, along with wives, children and working companions, plan walks, recreational athletics, and theater visits in groups. Husbands, wives, and neighbors develop neighborhood discussion groups at night. Wives are encouraged to accompany their husbands to meetings at night at their places of employment.

A second and more advanced phase of the socialist work group is designed to establish a close relationship between specialists, technicians, and intellectuals on the one hand and production workers on the other. For example, an East German doctor might be induced to give up his private practice and accept employment as a medical officer in a polyclinic located on the premises of a large factory. He would still regard himself as an individual specialist, however, with little rapport with the problems of the workers and little interest in the development of socialism. If he could be drawn into neighborhood activities

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*Socialist work group is not an adequate translation for the German "arbeitgemeinschaften," which suggests communal or cooperative work. The German word carries the connotation of selfless group work carried out for the common good.

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(e.g., meetings with housewives to discuss local public health programs) or into meetings within the factory to discuss workers' health measures, the doctor would become an active member of a communal group and "unconsciously" become adjusted to the construction of socialism. Another example is that of the housewife who, by attending meetings in factories, might be induced to give up housework and become a factory worker herself. This would ideally set off a chain reaction, since other women would volunteer to care for the children of working mothers.

In short, the socialist work group is an attempt to draw the entire country into socialist modes of life, and in particular to bring mental and manual laborers closer together in the interests of the commonwealth. Although the Communist labor brigades in the USSR have somewhat similar functions, the socialist work group has no precise organizational parallel anywhere in the Communist world. To the extent that the program seeks to mobilize the entire population for socialist construction and makes an assault on the workers' free time and his individual family unit, it might be argued that it owes some of its inspiration to the Chinese communes.

Moscow probably is wary of such bold attempts to socialize the East German populace, but there has been no substantial discussion of these groups in Soviet media. When asked by an American correspondent if it would be fair to say that, as regards the development of these groups in East Germany, there has developed a kind of cat-and-mouse situation, an SED editor replied that such a description would be valid if one were to say that there were two cats (USSR and CPR) and one mouse (GDR).
II. THE INFLUENCE OF CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY

Peiping's reservations about Khrushchev's detente tactics have become increasingly clear. The question naturally arises as to what extent, if any, Peiping has sought to encourage other bloc parties to adopt a more militant foreign policy and to fail to cooperate in Soviet efforts to relax international tension.

There have been no reports to indicate that Chinese representatives in East Germany have deliberately sought to undermine Khrushchev's foreign policy. As pointed out earlier, however, the Chinese reportedly did tell Czech First Secretary Novotny that Khrushchev betrays Marxism-Leninism when he shakes hands with China's arch enemy, the United States. If the Chinese expressed such reservations directly to Novotny, there is little doubt that they expressed similar reservations to Ulbricht.

Moreover, articles written by Chinese spokesmen in East German journals, as well as speeches made by Chinese leaders before their East German counterparts, have stressed the common peril to China and East Germany of US imperialism, the special need of socialist countries on the periphery of the bloc to be wary, and the need for an "unremitting struggle" against the West. The Chinese have made a particular effort to stress to the East Germans that just as the US seeks to restore Japanese militarism as the bulwark of its aggressive plans in the Far East, so does it seek to restore West German imperialism as the focal point of its aggressive intentions in Europe. Moreover, in speeches to the East Germans as in propaganda elsewhere, the Chinese have kept to a bare minimum any discussions of the Soviet efforts to ease international tension.

The dichotomy between Chinese and Soviet statements to the East Germans on foreign policy was evident in the respective speeches of Soviet and Chinese delegates to the East German trade union congress in October 1959. The principal motif of the Soviet delegate was peaceful coexistence. He lauded Khrushchev's visit to the United States as a "new stage" in international relations and stressed the responsibility of the labor unions to promote international understanding. He did not mention West Berlin, and his only references to the United States were in
the context of the Khrushchev-Eisenhower talks and their importance to peace. The Chinese delegate, on the other hand, singled out the United States for attack, said that the GDR was a strong point in the struggle against American and West German aggression, and claimed that China had much in common with the GDR because both countries stood on the peripheries of the camp in its struggle against imperialist aggression.

In January 1960, during the visit to Peiping of an East German delegation headed by Deputy Premier Rau, the Chinese leaders continued to impress on their East German guests the need for vigilance and struggle against US-inspired Japanese and West German militarism and to deny that the United States is interested in peaceful coexistence. Li Hsien-nien, one of China's top leaders, told the East German delegation at a banquet given in its honor on 18 January, that the US ruling clique, under the guise of aspirations for peace, had not abandoned its policy of war and aggression. He then listed US aggressive policies and made a special notation of American persistence in keeping Germany divided and reviving West German militarism.

The East German reaction to the Sino-Soviet dispute over foreign policy tactics has been complex. On the one hand, it is apparent that the Chinese hard foreign-policy line has found a sympathetic response among the East German leaders, who are fearful that a relaxation of international tension will encourage domestic unrest and who are inclined, like the Chinese, toward Stalinist tactics toward the West. It is notable, for example, that although Khrushchev and Mao were evidently unable to agree on a joint communique in October 1959, the GDR government delegation in Peiping in January 1960 affirmed in a joint communique that the two parties "reached fully agreed views" after an "extensive" discussion of international questions of common interest.

The joint communique, while praising the Soviet proposal for general disarmament, made no reference to Khrushchev's visit to the United States or to Soviet efforts to achieve a detente. Moreover, the communique called for an "unremitting struggle" against actions which endanger peace—a term coined by the Chinese and employed recurrently since
last fall in a context which implicitly contradicts the spirit, if not the letter, of Khrushchev's detente policy. Even if it is contended—as is quite likely—that such phraseology was inserted in the joint communiqué at Chinese initiative, it was certainly not mandatory for the East German delegation to agree to it. Two months before, Ulbricht had signed a similarly pessimistic joint communiqué with the Czechs in which it was stated that the United States was "making every effort to prevent a successful holding of the summit conference...and to sabotage an understanding between the two camps...."

Moreover, there have been indications from the East German side that they, like the Chinese, believe that their geographic position on the edge of the camp in direct contact both with American military power and a rival national government does not permit the luxury of a relaxed international posture. On 1 March, the East German military attaché in Peiping linked the tasks of the Chinese Communist and the East German armies which he said were working for the "fulfillment of the common tasks of safeguarding the frontiers of the socialist camp on the Elbe River and Yellow Sea from any aggressor, whether West German or Japanese militarists and revanchists, led by the aggressive forces of US imperialism." As mentioned earlier, Ulbricht, in characterizing Khrushchev's visit to the United States, justified that visit in terms of the Maoist doctrine of struggle against an eternally hostile imperialism.

On the other side of the coin, GDR propaganda, particularly in recent months, has—unlike Chinese propaganda—increasingly emphasized American sincerity in desiring peaceful coexistence and American realism in recognizing the need for negotiations. In January, East German propaganda spoke of "more realistic" US and British assessments of the world situation, saw "sections" of "American ruling groups" as cognizant of the "new world balance of power," and noted in Eisenhower's State of the Union message "a quite definite attempt, which cannot be overlooked, of realistically minded American politicians searching for new ways to overcome tensions and initiate a period of peaceful coexistence." The Chinese, on the other hand, evaluated the State of the Union message as being nothing more than a deceitful profession of peace designed to cover a strategy of aggression.
While the East Germans are thus beginning to moderate their foreign policy line toward the West, there have been many signs during the past year of reservations about Khrushchev's soft foreign-policy tactics in general and his handling of the Berlin problem in particular. Last October --- indicated that East German officials were discouraged and displeased by Khrushchev's visit to the United States because they felt that Khrushchev, in his Camp David conversations, needlessly gave away important political advantages on the West Berlin question. Leading SED circles allegedly felt that a solution to this problem had been postponed indefinitely and that it had been brought into the foreground only in order to promote the summit conference, after which, they felt, it would be relegated to the background.

According to Bulgarian Foreign Minister Lukanov, Ulbricht urged at the Moscow meeting of the Warsaw Pact countries the early conclusion of a separate peace treaty, but "some others"--including the Bulgarians--were in no hurry to sign such a treaty. For some time, GDR propaganda has been considerably more assertive than Moscow's on the need to settle the Berlin question in the immediate future. In October, for example, Ulbricht claimed that the Berlin problem was not "such a complicated matter at all," and warned that the "time bomb in West Berlin must be rendered harmless as early as possible."

It is thus likely that there has been some division among the Communist leaders over the tactical treatment of the Berlin problem. If Ulbricht is pressing for the earliest possible signing of a separate peace treaty, it is likely that he would have Chinese support.

Another possible indication of GDR reservations about Khrushchev's summity is the fact that, although the GDR has been insistent since last fall on its "right" to be represented at a summit conference, Moscow has not yet endorsed that right. Only the Chinese have directly supported the East German claims to representation at the summit. This support was given in a People's Daily editorial on 9 January and was included in the joint GDR-CPR communiqué signed in the same month.
Although Moscow will probably issue a pro forma call for East and West German participation at the very early stages of the summit meeting, it will probably not press the issue. The fact that Moscow has thus far not raised the question of German participation is an indication of its desire not to advance any preconditions that might jeopardize the meetings. The fact that both China and East Germany do not seem to have such qualms is a further indication of their joint desire for a tougher bloc policy toward the West.

Not only do both countries share the desire for tougher tactics toward the West, but both apparently do not wish to concede to Khrushchev the right to negotiate with the West on issues which affect their national interests. The Chinese have already made it clear that they will not abide by any international agreements to which they are not a party. Although the East Germans are scarcely in a position to issue a similar statement, they have recently made unprecedented and strident allusions to their "national interests," as if they were not confident that Khrushchev would adequately represent those interests at the summit.

Still another sign of the affinity between China and East Germany on foreign policy issues was reflected in the unique support the Chinese gave to Ulbricht's 26 January threat to ask the USSR for rocket weapons if West German armament continued. Of all the bloc countries, only China directly supported Ulbricht's threat. On 4 February, the very same day the Warsaw Pact communiqué was issued—with no mention of possible rocket weapons for East Germany—an editorial in People's Daily went beyond Ulbricht's original proposal, which merely threatened to ask for such weapons, and said that the GDR request was "not only fully justified but also necessary."

It is plausible that the East German threat was coordinated with the Russians who wanted to serve notice to the West of the possible consequences of West German nuclear armament but felt it impolitic to make such threatening gestures themselves prior to the summit. It is equally plausible that Ulbricht's threat was made without prior coordination with Moscow. In either event, the Chinese would have two reasons for seconding the Ulbricht proposal with such enthusiasm: first, such a policy of threats would be in accord with their calls for a firmer
policy toward the West; second, Soviet sharing of rocket weapons with the GDR would set a welcome precedent for Soviet sharing of such weapons with the Chinese.

Just as the CPR has offered support for the more extreme East German foreign policy positions, so have the East Germans offered unique support for tough Chinese positions. The GDR has been the only bloc country directly to endorse Peiping's stand, taken in January, that the CPR will not be bound by any international agreement on disarmament reached without its formal participation. The GDR has at times taken a much tougher stand than the Russians on the Chinese right to Taiwan. For example, in a congratulatory telegram to the CCP leaders on Chinese National Day in October, the SED offered strong support for the Chinese position, an endorsement absent from the comparable Soviet party-state message and from the speeches of Khrushchev and Suslov.

Perhaps the most blatant example of GDR support for the China's militant foreign policy—even at the expense of its own interests, not to speak of those of the USSR—came in the Sino-Indian border dispute. On 28 September, in an article written for the SED party organ Neues Deutschland, Premier Grotewohl laid the blame for the dispute on Indian aggression "without cause." This statement was clearly not a mistake, for almost a month later an East German radio commentator took the same line. And on 28 October, Neues Deutschland carried in full the text of a statement by Peiping's Foreign Ministry which gave the Chinese version of an Indian attack on what was "unmistakably Chinese territory."

These pro-Chinese statements came well after Moscow had indicated its neutral position on the dispute and its desire for a settlement. On 9 September, TASS had called the border dispute "deplorable," made no accusations of guilt, and asserted that "Soviet leading quarters" were confident that China and India would settle the "misunderstanding" through "friendly negotiation."

On 9 November, Grotewohl finally issued a statement which brought him closer into line with the official Soviet view. Whatever the reason for the East German reversal—Soviet pressure or a realization that their
position had undermined GDR-Indian relations or both—the East Germans had for nearly two months diverged from an important Soviet policy position and sided with China.

The GDR had not only risked antagonizing the Russians but had also risked losing considerable ground in India. Grotewohl himself had visited India in early 1959 to try to interest Nehru in the Soviet proposals for Berlin, and although the Indians were careful not to commit themselves nor to make any gesture which might have implied diplomatic recognition, the visit was not fruitless. The GDR trade missions in India stepped up their activities, partly as the result of an agreed increase in trade between the two countries, and GDR trade offices were permitted to fly the East German flag. Moreover, the GDR—anxious for Indian recognition—had scored an important gain earlier when it alone represented Germany at the international agricultural exhibition which opened in New Delhi in December.

The GDR thus had compelling reasons for not siding with the Chinese. The fact that it was willing to flout all these objectives is illustrative both of the East German desire to curry favor with Peiping and of its predilections for a tough bloc foreign policy.

The East German line on the recent Algerian crisis was also much closer to the Chinese than to the Soviet position. Moscow affirmed that De Gaulle was standing by his offer of self-determination to Algeria and "had no intention of giving in to the rebels' blackmail." It also urged talks at the "earliest possible time" in order to stop the "dirty war" through "conditions acceptable to both sides." Peiping contended that the differences between De Gaulle and the colonialists were merely over "tactics and methods," that De Gaulle intended to appease the rebels, and that if his present Algerian policy continued, war would also continue. The difference in the two countries' line over De Gaulle's offer of self-determination to the Algerians and a possible cease-fire has been apparent since last fall. The East German radio on 25 January took up the militant Peiping line: it contended that De Gaulle was a "demagogue" and that he seemed to be withdrawing his offer of self-determination; it stressed that the FLN was "intensifying" its attacks on the French, and, like Peiping, it made no reference to the need for peace talks.