Intelligence Report

THE COMMITTED CHURCH AND CHANGE
IN LATIN AMERICA

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THE COMMITTED CHURCH AND CHANGE IN LATIN AMERICA

MEMORANDUM TO RECIPIENTS

After centuries as a major force for conservatism and status quoism in Latin America, the Catholic Church has become a breeding ground for a wide range of socio-political action groups ranging across the spectrum from extreme radicals to extreme reactionaries. Rather than tranquility and order, new radical Church factions espouse revolutionary change; they demonstrate and disrupt with such vigor that in some instances they have all but upset delicately balanced political and social systems. And the outlook is for continued and increased pressures from the radical and leftwing Church groups riding on the crest of a growing demand for social and political change throughout Latin America.

This study analyzes the forces for change, the factional alignments taking shape within the Church and between Church and non-Church groups, and evaluates the impact on Latin American social and political structures. It also includes a section speculating on the outlook for the future.

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Chief, D_________________Staff
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THE COMMITTED CHURCH AND CHANGE IN LATIN AMERICA

I. Background and Current Situation

The traditional role of the Roman Catholic Church in Latin America was to defend the established order of things and to resist unwelcome innovations. During the long colonial period the Church served the Spanish and Portuguese kings in many ways: pacifying the aborigines, ministering to the sick and unfortunate, organizing schools, inculcating the acceptance of constituted authority, and ferreting out the purveyors of unorthodox views and creeds. In the troubled late Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries the Spanish monarchs, as the principal "Defenders of the Faith," were able to drive a hard bargain with the Papacy. Thus there was never any real question as to who held the reins in the Church-State relationship in the New World, and the dominance of the State was maintained throughout the colonial period. In the second half of the Eighteenth Century the Portuguese and Spanish rulers provided a convincing example of that domination by peremptorily expelling the Papacy's own elite corps, the Society of Jesus, from their possessions.

In the early Nineteenth Century some of the lower clergy and even a few bishops supported the movements for independence in Spanish America. In the main, however, the influence of the Church was preponderantly on the royalist side, a situation which caused bitterness in Church-State relationships once independence was won. While anti-clerical measures taken by several of the new governments (as in Chile and Argentina in the 1820s) were later amended when more conservative forces came to power, in other countries (such as Colombia, Mexico, Guatemala and Ecuador) anti-clericalism continued to be one of the principal themes of liberal political forces. When they came to power, one of their first actions was to circumscribe the role of the Catholic Church in their societies.
Later, as liberal regimes were replaced by conservatives, as, for example, in Mexico under Porfirio Díaz, in Colombia under Rafael Núñez, and in Ecuador under Gabriel García Moreno, the Church recouped its losses and fashioned new alliances with its benefactors. Moreover, as anti-clericalism became a sine qua non of liberal political programs, the conservatives and the Church became even more closely aligned and dependent upon each other. Since the military leaders either tended to come from upper-class backgrounds, or to be absorbed by upper-class interests, a trilateral relationship usually developed in which Church, military and upper class leaders (the latter predominantly large landowners), cooperated to mutual advantage.

In much of the area, and particularly in Colombia and Mexico, the proper role of the Catholic Church continued to be an inflammatory issue well into the Twentieth Century. By mid-century, however, anti-clericalism had largely lost its appeal since an increasing number of liberal and Church leaders were bridging what had once been a veritable abyss between them. The movement toward an accommodation was facilitated by the realization that they had more in common with each other than with extremists—mostly on the left—who were demanding the destruction of the very fabric of the societies with which the liberals, as well as the Church, were identified.

Despite the emergence of more moderate leaders among the bishops in several countries, the Roman Catholic Church was still basically conservative in social, economic and political—as well as doctrinal—matters. As a result, at mid-century the Church was still mainly oriented along lines stressing those portions of the papal encyclicals Rerum novarum (1891) and Quadragesimo anno (1931), which defended the rights of private property and condemned Socialism, but playing down the concern for the working man, and the admonitions as to the responsibilities of property owners, which were also expressed in those papal encyclicals.

Since the mid-1950s, the Roman Catholic Church in Latin America has been reoriented from its traditional role as a major bastion of the status quo to become one of the principal proponents of change in the area. Not
all the hierarchy, and by no means all the lower clergy and the laity, however, march to the same drummer. If anything the Latin American Church is more divided now than at any time in the last four centuries. But the decision to bring the Church into accord with the modern world and into the service of the masses has been taken. Despite foot dragging by many, and diehard resistance by a few, the Church is moving forward much more rapidly than appeared possible less than a decade ago.

The key questions in regard to this new course are the pace of change, and the tactics and instrumentalities to be used. At present the numbers of individuals and groups committed to limited change by legal and non-violent means are substantially larger than those urging much more extensive and rapid change by such means. The partisans of radical change by violent means still constitute a relatively small, extremely provocative minority which concentrates on destruction of the present order with little, if any, attention to what would then be installed in its place. The trend in their fervor is to fanaticism, and they view their goals as justifying any means to attain it.

At the other extreme, an equally vocal and similarly small minority seeks to roll back, to block, or at least to water down and to delay, any meaningful change in the status quo. Although fewer in number than the Radicals, they have long-standing ties with powerful economic, political and social forces in many, but not all, of their societies. Their allies provide funds and political power to back up the Reactionaries in their use of the pulpit and Scripture in defense of a status quo that over the years has demonstrated remarkable staying powers. The ranks of the Reactionary bishops are thinning, however, as they die off and their positions are filled by more moderate individuals including some Progressives. This raises the possibility that the outlook of the hierarchy in a specific country might be reoriented rather dramatically, and within a relatively short span of time, by the death or incapacitation of a few key Reactionary or Uncommitted bishops.
As yet the Radicals have not been able to find allies as powerful as those of the Reactionaries. The Radicals' potential for disruptive action would increase greatly if the Progressives too became convinced that meaningful change could only be obtained by violence. Even then, however, such tactics would not have much chance of bringing about the changes they seek unless a sizeable share of the uncommitted majority were won over to support them, or there was a serious failing out among the defenders of the status quo.

The Radicals are willing to align with anyone and to use any means to destroy the established order. This raises the noise level and increases the likelihood of violence, especially in societies where the political framework is fragile. Most of the Moscow-aligned Communists in Latin America, however, are much more conservative than are the Radicals. Although eager to maintain a dialogue with Catholics, and to exploit the disruptive capabilities of the Radicals, they have not been so eager to risk the consequences of direct involvement with the Radical Catholics.

In recent years the Progressives have gained the support of some key members of the hierarchy. Only in Chile, however, is a national episcopacy solidly committed to carrying out a definite program of basic reforms. In several countries the Progressives have had success in winning acceptance of the idea of reform, with the national organization of bishops approving reform programs. Once they are back in their own dioceses and away from the national and international spotlight, however, many of the bishops who voted for reform do little or nothing to make it a reality. While such bishops may not oppose the emphasis of the Progressives on social justice and personal freedom, they clearly do not give it a similar priority.

The Chilean case has been exceptional in that the Progressives had at hand a political instrument--the Christian Democratic Party--to take up their program and to carry out many of its provisions by winning control of the Executive Branch of Government (1964) and electing a majority in one House of Congress and a plurality in
the other (1965). Now, however, the Christian Democrats have lost their majority in the Chamber of Deputies (1969), are wracked by serious internal party factionalism, and face the prospect that they may lose the presidency in 1970.

Elsewhere in Latin America the Progressives have scant prospect of finding a similar political instrument. Where a constitutional system is a reality, it is either: controlled by the conservative forces of the society, as in Colombia; is still under the watchful eye of a conservative military establishment, as in Venezuela where a Christian Democratic Administration has just come to power but does not have a majority in Congress; or is struggling to survive the economic consequences of overly ambitious social welfare programs, as in Uruguay. In most of the area, there is no political group both interested in and capable of carrying out the structural reforms the Progressives are demanding to rectify widespread social injustices.

Thus, the Progressives are likely to become frustrated by their inability to secure the kind of change they are convinced is necessary. They have tended to become so estranged from the military leaders that only in exceptional cases—perhaps Peru—is there any chance of a lasting alliance with the one element in most Latin American societies that has the power to carry out far-reaching changes.

In sum, the Church is caught up not only in the changes that are taking place in Latin American societies but also in its own internal struggle between the forces pressing for and opposing change. The only certainty is that the Church will become more rather than less involved in the changes that are occurring.
II. The Forces for Change

Latin America was less directly involved in World War II than was much of the rest of the world. Nevertheless, the area's economies and social and political institutions were affected. In the larger countries the restriction of imports encouraged industrial development which, in turn, swelled the flow of migrants from the countryside to the metropolitan and other urban centers. The Allied triumph over the Axis dictatorships gave an impetus to liberal and socialistic political movements while weakening the prestige and influence of the political right. These changes also caused strains in the traditional alliances of large landowners, military and Church leaders that still existed in much of the area. In countries as different as Guatemala and Argentina, for example, the military and organized labor combined to obtain power and to introduce social, economic and political reforms. It is true that most of the Latin American societies were not so dramatically affected as in those two countries, and in Guatemala the conservatives returned to power within a decade. Nevertheless, the pace of change was clearly stepped up and its scope significantly widened during the decade of the 1940s.

The response of the Roman Catholic Church to the changes introduced or amplified during the 1940s varied widely from country to country. Some members of the hierarchy adapted to the increased importance of organized labor, but there were few, if any, who went as far in this respect as did the Cardinal Archbishop of Santiago, Chile, whose services as a mediator in labor-management disputes were sought by even the Marxist leaders of the country's labor unions.

Perhaps the most notable shift, however, was in the relationships of the Church with the dictatorial governments. There was increasing evidence that some bishops, as well as the lower clergy, were growing restive over the Church's relationships with dictators such as Perón, whose preemption of charitable activities in Argentina and fostering of a cult of worshipers of Evita Perón and of himself was anathema to the Church
in general; Rojas Pinilla, whose efforts to ape Perón by building a popular labor base threatened the Church's own well-established influence over organized labor in Colombia; and Pérez Jiménez, whose efforts to still the criticisms of his police state in a Catholic newspaper were rebuffed by the usually amenable Archbishop of Caracas. Meanwhile, in Cuba a Catholic bishop even gave sanctuary to a youthful opponent of the Batista dictatorship, one Fidel Castro. Thus the traditional pattern of the Church accepting and even supporting military dictatorships was breaking down and preparing the way for a closer identification of the Church with human rights and civil liberties.

Some of the major problems that have confronted the Church, since mid-century, were created or intensified by the upsurge in migration from the countryside to urban areas that accompanied the development of industry, particularly in the larger countries of the area. The arriving migrants put heavy strains on old and newly-created urban parishes which were becoming woefully understaffed as a result of the decline in the number of priests being trained in the Latin American seminaries.

In part, at least, the reduction in the ranks of seminarians was due to the counter appeal of populist and other leftist political groups, which were often hostile to the Church, and to the opening up of more attractive vocational opportunities in the fields of industry and commerce. At the same time ordained priests, as well as seminarians, have been leaving their vocations to be married. The upshot of these and other factors, such as the continuing rise in the annual rate of increase in population, has been fewer priests trying to minister to larger numbers of increasingly indifferent Catholics.

Even the more sedentary members of the Latin American hierarchy recognized the need to take steps to reverse the situation confronting them. When their efforts to attract more seminarians had little success, the Latin American bishops turned to other parts of the world, particularly North America and Western Europe, for assistance.
Since the Communist takeover of mainland China was closing down that traditional area of missionary activity, the Maryknoll nuns and priests, and some members of other religious orders, were diverted to Latin America. The closing of China to missionary activity, however, also brought the diversion to Latin America of Protestant missionaries, including the Pentacostal groups, in increasingly larger numbers. The vigor with which the various Protestant missionary groups competed for souls indicated that the virtual monopoly the Catholics had had for centuries was drawing to a close—a point underscored by the increase in the number of converts to Protestantism.

By the 1960's the Latin American bishops were seeking more help. The North American and Western European bishops responded by stepping up their financial contributions and urging laymen, and secular as well as regular clergy (members of religious orders and monastic communities), to volunteer for service in Latin America. Pope John XXIII, perhaps the most widely admired of the modern heads of the Church, gave his blessing to the cause and millions of dollars of outside funds and thousands of foreign Catholic laymen and priests were sent to the area. As a result, at least 25 percent of the clergy in the area are foreigners, and in some countries, such as Brazil, Peru, Bolivia, Guatemala, Venezuela, Haiti and the Dominican Republic, the percentage is much higher. In Brazil, whose population of about 90,000,000 is predominantly Roman Catholic, at least nominally, foreigners constitute over 40 percent of the Catholic clergy; in Bolivia, the percentage rises to about 70 percent. The impact, both upon the Latin American churches and the foreign Catholics involved, has had far-reaching implications for both the countries and the individuals involved.

The foreign Catholics, whether laymen or priests, and particularly the younger priests going to Latin America for the first time, have often undergone cultural shock from the conditions existing in urban slums and rural villages. Unlike most of the older local clergy and laity, who tend to accept such conditions as "God's Will," or who have been overawed by the strength of the forces
supporting the status quo, the visitors react by trying to find ways and means to change the conditions they encounter. In some cases these reactions have been kept under control by transfer to other assignments where such attitudes are less contagious or conspicuous. In a few cases, particularly in recent months, the national authorities have intervened to deport foreign priests and deacons whose actions are regarded as disrupting public order. While the local bishops also have such authority, they have used it only in exceptional cases. Their need for personnel is so pressing that even the more reactionary bishops are willing to go a long way with a foreign priest before removing him and risking the displeasure of his foreign sponsors and local supporters.

There were, of course, members of the Latin American clergy and the hierarchy, who were concerned with the material as well as the spiritual welfare of their people and critical of the status quo. In the late 1950s and early 1960s the encyclicals and other pronouncements of Pope John XXIII encouraged such priests and bishops by urging that measures be taken to bring the Roman Catholic Church into a closer relationship with the needs and problems of the modern world. John XXIII also provided the advocates of change, among the bishops, with an opportunity to do something about it by convoking the Church's Twenty-First Ecumenical Council, the first since Vatican I of 1869-1870. The opening message of the assembled bishops, which reflected the Pope's preoccupation with peace and social justice, set the tone of the sessions that followed. Vatican II, meeting in four separate sessions (October-December 1962, September-December 1963, September-November 1964, and September-December 1965), promulgated 16 texts* which have become the Magna Carta

*1. Dogmatic Constitution of the Church: 16,200 words;
2. Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation: 2,996 words;
3. Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy: 7,806 words;
4. Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World: 23,335 words;
5. Decree on the Instruments of Social Communication, 2,225 words;
(footnote continued on page 10)
of the forces for change within the Roman Catholic Church. At the same time the ecumenical spirit of John XXIII, which permeates the documents of Vatican II and has facilitated closer cooperation of Catholics and non-Catholics seeking change, has been maintained by his successor Paul VI (elected 21 June 1963).

The documents produced by Vatican II cover a variety of topics and the advocates of change can find support in some part of all of them. The document that has been most used for that purpose, however, is the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, better known as Gaudium et Spes from the initial words of the Latin text. The immediate impetus for preparing this key text came from Leon-Joseph Cardinal Suenens, Archbishop of Malines, Belgium, during the last days of the first session (December 1962). Cardinal Suenens' concern over the future course of the Council, and particularly just how the Church viewed its relationship with the world today, was echoed by other progressive leaders such as Cardinal Montini, then Archbishop of Milan and who, as Paul VI, would be in charge of implementing the recommendations of the Council.

(footnote continued from page 9)

6. Decree on Ecumenism: 4,790 words;
7. Decree on Eastern Catholic Churches: 1,806 words;
8. Decree on the Bishops' Pastoral Office in the Church: 5,982 words;
9. Decree on Priestly Formation: 2,987 words;
10. Decree on the Appropriate Renewal of the Religious Life: 2,189 words;
11. Decree on the Apostolate of the Laity: 7,016 words;
12. Decree on the Ministry and Life of Priests: 7,896 words;
13. Decree on the Church's Missionary Activity: 9,870 words;
14. Declaration on Christian Education: 2,604 words;
15. Declaration on the Relationship of the Church to Non-Christian Religions: 1,117 words;
Although the Pastoral Constitution reflects the influence of ideas and attitudes developed in recent decades, particularly among European intellectuals, it is primarily a synthesis of Catholic thinking from many sources. The impact of the papal encyclicals and other statements of the previous three-quarters of a century, particularly those of John XXIII in Mater et Magister (May 1961) and Pacem en Terris (April 1963), are evident in the stress on the necessity for the Church to take up, and to identify itself with, the cause of social justice.

The concern for the material welfare of man comes through clearly in the Pastoral Constitution's criticism of the social and economic inequalities in both advanced and less-advanced countries (Chapter III, Socio-Economic Life). It defined the fundamental purpose of economic development as not a mere multiplication of products but the service of all men everywhere. It also warned that "if a person is in extreme necessity, he has the right to take from the riches of others what he himself needs. Since there are so many people in this world afflicted with the hunger, this Sacred Council urges all, both individuals and governments, to remember the saying of the Fathers: 'Feed the man dying of hunger, because if you have not fed him you have killed him.'" (Article 69).

The text's emphasis upon the improvement in the material condition of mankind was accompanied by the admonition to those who exercise political authority that such authority "... whether in the community as such or in institutions representing the state, must always be exercised within the limits of morality and on behalf of the dynamically conceived common good, according to a juridical order enjoying legal status." (Article 74). Defense against any abuse of this authority is lawful provided that the limits imposed by natural law and the gospel are observed. While this is in line with established Catholic political principles, the text went further in declaring that "It is in full accord with human nature that juridical-political structures should, with ever better success and without discrimination, afford their citizens the chance to participate freely.
and actively in establishing the constitutional bases of a political community, governing the state, determining the scope and purpose of various institutions, and choosing leaders." (Article 75).

For many Catholics, and particularly for the younger and more progressive-minded ones, Vatican II marks the beginning of a new era in the history of their Church. Conversely, of course, for the traditionalists—and particularly for the reactionaries—it has opened a veritable "Pandora's box" which they are trying to close up again. It is for these reasons that the terms "pre-conciliar" and "post-conciliar" are frequently used in referring to the antagonists and protagonists, respectively, of change in the Catholic Church.

Although John XXIII's successor, Pope Paul VI, has resisted innovations in matters of faith and morals and has opposed radical changes in Church ritual, he too has encouraged the progressive elements in the Church to undertake the wide range of reforms needed to make social justice—a redistribution of goods and services to benefit the impoverished masses—more of a reality and less an empty phrase. In fact, in his encyclical, Populorum Progressio (March 1967), Paul VI has extended the Church's preoccupation with achieving social justice in a national context to focus it on the need for social justice in a global setting, warning that "the hour for action has now sounded. At stake are the survival of so many innocent children and, for so many families overcome by misery, the access to conditions fit for human beings; at stake are the peace of the world and the future of civilization. It is time for all men and all peoples to face up to their responsibilities." (Article 80).

That Encyclical's emphasis upon the Church's concern with the development of peoples, particularly the development of those striving to escape from hunger, misery, endemic diseases and ignorance, and of those who are looking for a wider share in the benefits of civilization and a more active improvement of their human qualities, gave further encouragement to those bishops,
priests and lay members of the Church pressing for more rapid progress in behalf of social justice. At the same time, and despite the Pope's clear warnings as to the dangers of too rapid change and to the often counterproductive effect of violence, the more impatient and radical reformers have seized on those portions of the text that lent support to their views. For example, to justify the use of violence to secure radical changes, they have taken out of context such anguished phrases as:

"There are certainly situations whose injustice cries to heaven. When whole populations destitute of necessities live in a state of dependence barring them from all initiative and responsibility, and all opportunity to advance culturally and share in social and political life, recourse to violence, as a means to right these wrongs to human dignity, is a grave temptation." (Paragraph 30)

Paul VI made it clear that his description of the yawning gap between the wealthy few and the poverty-striken masses in the developing countries reflected his personal contact, with the problems pressing on Latin America and Africa, during trips he had made in 1960 and 1962. His criticism of widespread illiteracy, of inequitable systems of land holding, and of international trade, of an exploitative capitalism that over-emphasized profits without a corresponding sense of social obligation and failed to prevent the flight of profits abroad, were eagerly welcomed by Latin American critics of the established order as particularly applicable to most of the area. And in his call to action, the Pope minced no words:

"We want to be clearly understood: the present situation must be faced with courage and the injustices linked with it must be fought against and overcome. Development demands bold transformation, innovations that go deep. Urgent reforms should be undertaken without delay. It is for each one to take his share in them with generosity, particularly those whose education, position and opportunities afford them wide scope for action." (Paragraph 32)
In view of the criticism in some quarters that this
Encyclical was "warmed-over Marxism" it is worth noting
that in his critique of the defects of laissez-faire
capitalism, Paul VI not only was reflecting his own
experiences; he was also firmly in the tradition of his
predecessors, Leo XIII, Pius XI, Pius XII and John XXIII,
all of whom had condemned the exploitative nature and lack
of social consciousness in economic liberalism. This
does not mean that the Church rejected private ownership.
In fact, Paul VI specifically exhorted governments to
associate private initiative with development. What it
does mean is clearly stated in Paul VI's own words.
"The recent Council (Vatican II) reminded us of this:
'God intended the earth and all that it contains for the
use of every human being and people. Thus, as all men
follow justice and unite in charity, created goods should
abound for them on a reasonable basis.' All other rights
whatsoever, including those of property and of free
commerce, are to be subordinated to this principle."
(Paragraph 22)

While Populorum Progressio was largely ignored,
when not bitterly attacked, by the area's more reactionary
forces, such approval from the top was quickly exploited
by the post-conciliar groups working to persuade those
who had been lukewarm or indifferent to proposals for
reform to accept and even to support them. One of the
instruments they have used for spreading the post-conciliar
tenets has been the Latin American Bishops' Conference
(Consejo Episcopal Latinoamericano, CELAM) authorized
by Pius XII, in 1955, to coordinate the Church's activities
in Latin America.

Although the more extreme proponents of change
have had their proposals toned down by the need to reach
a consensus, CELAM, through its various commissions, its
special conferences and the two Assemblies of the Latin
American Roman Catholic Episcopate (1955 and 1968), has
become the principal agent in formulating and promoting
the new role of the Church in Latin America. CELAM's
12 departments are organized to deal with social and
economic as well as religious aspects of Latin American
society. Although some of the bishops heading each of the departments are less zealous than others in urging change, CELAM has responded to the leadership of its progressive bishops. That was apparent during its Second Assembly at Medellin, Colombia, in 1968, when the conservatives succeeded in moderating the tone of the resolutions adopted but were able to make only a relatively few substantive changes. Even with the broad generalizations adopted to enable their recommendations to be used in the diverse situations confronting the Church in Latin America, the message of Medellin comes through loud and clear: "Get on with the task of putting into practice the precepts of Vatican II and Populorum Progressio."

Despite the footdragging and shrill propaganda efforts of a vocal reactionary minority, the Latin American Catholic Church is being brought into the second half of the Twentieth Century much more rapidly than seemed possible a decade ago. A key factor in that process is the pervasive influence of the Vatican. Despite Paul VI's traditional position on theological matters, he has been innovative on social, economic and political issues. Although his pronouncements on birth control disappointed those aware of and concerned with the population explosion in Latin America, and his strictures against the use of violence have alienated some extremists, the Pope has continued to press forward on his twin goals of peace and social justice. Few, if any, of the Vatican's recent appointments to key episcopal posts in Latin America have been opponents of change; many have been the most effective leaders of the post-conciliar trend in the Church.

The regular clergy, the members of the religious orders, have also played an important role in the changes that have taken place within the Latin American Church. Both the native and foreign members, and particularly the younger ones, have provided leadership for reform movements in many of the countries where such movements are active. When serving as worker priests in urban slums, carrying out pastoral duties in remote rural areas, teaching in Catholic schools, preparing seminarians for
the priesthood, and when engaged in a multitude of other activities, the Maryknollers, Jesuits, Dominicans, Franciscans, Oblates and members of other religious orders have initiated and fostered the concept of a Committed Church dedicated to the service of the masses.

The members of the regular clergy have training, financial resources, contacts in the Vatican and influence in the local hierarchies that are not available to the secular diocesan clergy. As a result the regular clergy tend to be the leaders, particularly in the initial stages, of reform movements in the Church. Moreover, the numerous research centers organized and maintained by the Church have carried out basic research to provide data demonstrating the extremely inequitable distribution of land, income, housing, caloric consumption and educational facilities. One of these centers, the Centro para el Desarrollo Económico y Social de America Latina (DESAL), in Santiago, Chile, founded in 1960 by Father Roger Vekemans, a Belgian sociologist and Jesuit priest, has also worked closely with the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) before and since the PDC won the presidential election in 1964.

The change in the role of the Jesuits in Latin America is particularly significant. Members of the Order, which was organized to serve the papacy in the Counter-Reformation and was regarded for centuries as a powerful, elite force aligned with the ruling groups and opposing change, have openly declared the necessity for abandoning their previous role and devoting themselves to the service of the masses. Again this decision has been taken by the younger Jesuits and receives little active support from many of the older members of the Society of Jesus. Similar reactions are taking place in the other religious orders, in effect creating a generation gap in the attitudes towards change within the Church itself. While the older clergymen continue to stress their traditional duties, those carried out largely within the Church such as presiding at baptisms, marriages, funeral services, hearing confessions and saying masses requested by parishioners, the younger clerics are involving themselves in the daily lives, and the trials and tribulations of the masses, sometimes working side by side and living in the slums with them.
Although initially the foreign priests tended to be the principal instigators of the changes emphasizing the direct involvement of the priest with the problems and aspirations of the people in his parish, the native clergymen have not only become involved but are taking over the leadership of movements for reform and change within the Church and the society. A particularly striking change is the willingness of native as well as foreign priests to work closely with leaders and representatives of Protestant and Jewish groups. While some such cooperation had existed before John XXIII came to the papacy, it has clearly increased as a result of his emphasis upon the ecumenical spirit which was carried forward by Vatican II and Paul VI. In countries such as Argentina, where rightist, pro-clerical elements have been active in the government since mid-1966, the Protestant groups tend to be wary of Catholic overtures and cooperation has been limited. On the other hand, there has been considerably more cooperation between Catholics and Protestants in Chile, where Protestant groups have been able to operate so freely that there are now about 1,000,000 Protestants out of a total population of less than 10,000,000. In Brazil, the antagonistic attitude of the military regime towards Catholics and Protestants opposed to the status quo also tends to foster the ecumenical spirit among such groups.

In summary, the Roman Catholic Church in Latin America is being subjected to a wide range of pressures for change. In general, the younger clergy and laity are the more active and the most impatient proponents of change, but they are supported by middle-aged and even some elderly Catholics as well. Some of the tensions within the Church in Latin America are similar to those the Church is experiencing elsewhere in the world, and particularly in Western Europe and North America. The Church in each Latin American country is also affected by the tensions within those societies caused by a variety of economic, political and social factors. The actions of various elements, within the Church itself, some of which are demanding change while others are trying to delay or block it, are further unsettling influences in nearly all the Latin American societies. In some instances the Protestant radicals, particularly those from the evangelical groups, are as critical in their attacks upon their societies as the most radical Catholics have been. The organization Iglesia y Sociedad, based in Montevideo, Uruguay, for example, is vehemently anti-capitalist and anti-US, and ready to make common cause with any group with a similar orientation.
III. Present Alignments in the Church

Any attempt to divide the members of the Catholic hierarchy, clergy and laity into such categories as liberals, moderates or conservatives, is complicated by the tendency of many of the individuals involved to be vigorously liberal on one issue, noncommittal on another and quite conservative on a third, particularly where doctrinal matters are concerned. Since the terms liberal, moderate and conservative are all vulnerable to a wide range of interpretation, they will be avoided whenever possible. The typology that follows was selected for convenience primarily in discussing attitudes towards social, educational, economic and political reforms and is by no means definitive. It provides for three main groupings: Reactionaries, the Uncommitted, and the Committed, with the latter group subdivided into Progressives and Radicals.

A. The Reactionaries

The Reactionaries constitute only a relatively small minority in the Church but it is a noisy one which exploits to the hilt the reverence of many Roman Catholics for tradition. The Reactionaries give the pronouncements of Vatican II and the papal encyclicals of the past decade, except Humanae Vitae (Paul VI's views on birth control), as little publicity as possible. They frequently denounce all proponents of reform as radicals, if not Communists, and include Catholic priests and bishops as well as laymen in the latter category. The Reactionaries tend to resent the presence within their countries of foreign missionaries, whether Protestant or Catholic, particularly when the missionaries appear to be fostering such pernicious ideas as the necessity for making changes in the status quo. They look back to the days of the tri-partite alliance of Church, military and large landholders as a Golden Age. They are quick to welcome the leaders of conservative
military coups, as in Brazil (1964) and Argentina (1966), with whom they are in full agreement as to the dangers posed by the agents and dupes of international Communism.

The Reactionaries have been able to recruit a limited following among younger age groups but their principal strength lies in their entrenched positions on the upper levels of the hierarchy and their close connections with the most conservative political and economic elements of their societies. Their major weakness, over the longer run, is that while they still have allies in the Curia Romana (the members of the papal court and other high officials of the Church in Rome), the main current in the Church is running against them. In recent years the appointments to key positions in the Latin American churches have included very few, if any, Reactionaries and their ranks are gradually being thinned by death and incapacitation.

Among the more prominent reactionaries are such Brazilian bishops as Dom Antônio de Castro Mayer, of Campos, and Dom Geraldo de Proença Sigaud, of Diamantina, who were two of the authors of a book, published in 1960, which rejected all aspects of agrarian reform as "socialistic" and denounced socialism as irreconcilable with true Christianity. These two bishops are prominent in the current revival of the Brazilian Society for the Defense of Traditions, Family and Property (TFP), which was founded in São Paulo, in the late 1940s, and receives financial support from businessmen interested in suppressing reformist influences in the Brazilian Church. The leaders of the TFP have ties with similar organizations in Argentina and Chile. At times, Dom Jaime de Barros Câmara, the aged Cardinal Archbishop of Rio de Janeiro, seems to be closely identified with the views of the Reactionaries, particularly with their fears of Communist influence. In the last year or so, however, he has been somewhat less active in opposing many of the changes proposed by less radical members of the Brazilian episcopacy.

In Argentina two aging Cardinals, Antonio Caggiano, Archbishop of Buenos Aires, and Nicolás Pasolino, Archbishop of Santa Fe, frequently have been close to the
Reactionaries in their reluctance to accept changes in the status quo. At times, and particularly in recent months, Archbishop Caggiano has shown an awareness of the need for the Church to associate itself with public opinion on such issues as elections and representative government. In the interior, Archbishop Alfonso María Buteler of Mendoza is even less amenable to change than are the country's Cardinals, whose influence has been diminished by the appointment of more flexible bishops as coadjutors to handle all substantive functions for them. In Colombia the former Archbishop of Bogotá, Luis Cardinal Concha Córdoba, and the Archbishop of Manizales, Arturo Duque Villegas, are reactionaries who have had recurrent difficulties with the reformist elements among the priests under their jurisdictions. As in Argentina, the Papacy appointed a more flexible bishop, in this case, Aníbal Muñoz Duque, as Apostolic Administrator for the aged Cardinal. Recently when the Cardinal went into semi-retirement, Muñoz Duque was named Archbishop of Bogotá and is now the effective head of the Church in Colombia.

A larger proportion of the hierarchy and clergy in both Argentina and Colombia are natives than is the case in most other Latin American countries. Many of the native priests, particularly in rural areas in Latin America, tend to be more closely aligned with local opponents of change in the status quo than do their counterparts in the urban areas. Thus both countries have a larger proportion of priests and bishops, who are more in sympathy with the reactionaries than with the proponents of change, than one finds in the other major Latin American countries. In both countries, however, native as well as foreign priests are exerting pressure on their bishops to put into practice the precepts of Vatican II and other post-Conciliar documents. Although both Archbishop Juan Carlos Aramburo, the Coadjutor Archbishop of Buenos Aires, and Archbishop Muñoz Duque of Bogotá, are much more receptive to change than are Cardinals Caggiano and Concha, they are not moving nearly as rapidly as the more radical priests desire.

Chile is an interesting case in that it was the scene of some of the area's most bitter Church-State struggles in the last century and anti-clericalism was
still a potent force in the first few decades of this century. It is also the country in Latin America where --except for Cuba--the Communist Party is most firmly established and has the most favorable prospects for coming to power by constitutional means.

In Brazil, Argentina, Colombia and other Latin American countries opposition to weak and disorganized Communist movements is a principal stock in trade of Reactionaries. In Chile, however, anti-Communism is not a major preoccupation with the bishops, none of whom is openly a Reactionary. There are, nevertheless, some members of the laity and lower clergy in Chile, who are as reactionary as their counterparts elsewhere in the area.

B. The Uncommitted

The Uncommitted comprise the great bulk of the members of the Catholic Church in Latin America, both clergy and laity. They tend to oppose sharp breaks with the past and prefer that change--if it must come--come gradually with as little disruption as possible. They too have a high regard for tradition but that includes an inclination to accept papal recommendations and instructions with as good grace as possible--even when they are personally distasteful. Thus the uncommitted bishops tend to vote for changes they know the Papacy wants, and to go along with the recommendations of CELAM, even though they may do as little as possible to carry out those changes in their own dioceses. On the other hand, however, neither will they resist such changes to the bitter end. As the situation in their particular country and diocese changes, and as they come into closer contact with the leaders working for change, more of the Uncommitted move into the ranks of the Committed than join the Reactionaries. In general, the Uncommitted--bishops, lower clergy and laity--are still reserving final judgment on the changes taking place in the Church. Thus this group could either accelerate the pace of change or slow it down so much that the advocates of evolutionary change would be discredited and the arguments of the proponents of revolutionary violence as the only vehicle for change would be enhanced.
C. The Committed

The bishops, lower clergy and laity, who compose the Committed sector of the Roman Catholic Church in Latin America, agree on the need for change but hold a wide variety of views as to the kinds of change needed, the tactics to be used and the urgency with which change must be achieved. On some occasions the borderline between Progressives and Radicals is a shifting and even nebulous one. In general, however, the Progressives oppose the use of violence and try to work within the system to reform it, even though they acknowledge that, in some circumstances, violence may be justified. The Radicals, on the other hand, not only are ready to use violence; they are convinced that "the Establishment" will absorb non-violent efforts to reform it. In their view the system must be destroyed before meaningful change can be achieved. The Radicals are much more critical of the hierarchial structures of the Church and are demanding that the lower clergy, and laity as well, be consulted in appointments of bishops and other Church officials. They are also much more innovative than the Progressives usually are, particularly in challenging the hierarchy on appointments to bishoprics, and more insistent on the Church disposing of its material possessions and becoming a "Poor Church" as well as the "Church of the Poor."

1. The Progressives

The Progressives prefer to reform society, and the Church, by keeping the best of what is and replacing that which they consider outmoded. They tend to interpret "evolutionary," however, as really meaning token reforms carried out at a pace so slow as to be meaningless in terms of the situations and problems confronting them. Their preference is clearly for non-violent methods but they concede the necessity for resort to force when the non-violent way is closed. The Progressives emphasize the obligation of Roman Catholics to carry out the modernization of the Church and their own particular societies in the spirit of Vatican II and the papal
encyclicals of John XXIII and Paul VI. The numbers and influence of the Progressives vary sharply from country to country and even within a single country.

In Chile, for example, the bishops are more united in their support for the post-conciliar movement than is the episcopacy of any other Latin American country. The transformation of the Chilean episcopacy, from its traditional alliance with the Conservative Party, into a close working relationship with a reformist and victorious Christian Democratic Party caused many observers to think that the Chilean phenomenon could be readily duplicated elsewhere in the area. The relatively short time in which the change occurred is misleading, however, since it was the result of an unusual combination of dedicated effort and fortuitous circumstances. Nevertheless, the Chilean experience does illustrate what can occur under such conditions.

A key factor was the presence of a few, highly-educated, Jesuit priests, progressionists who for several decades had been stimulating an interest in reforming society among small groups of young, upper-class Catholics. By 1938 these groups broke with the Conservative Party leaders (who had rejected their proposals for reforms based on the papal encyclicals), and formed the Falange Nacional. The leaders of this movement, which had no connection with the Spanish Falange--it participated in a popular front government--and which eventually became the Christian Democratic Party, continued their close association with socially-minded Jesuits who provided the religious legitimation for their reform programs. At the same time, these Jesuits were arranging for young Chilean Jesuits to receive advanced training abroad in the social sciences as well as in theology.

By the late 1950s the various components began to fall into place. A journal, Mensaje (Message), had been founded and was attracting a growing audience throughout Latin America; in 1957 Roger Vekemans, a Belgian Jesuit and sociologist, founded the Center for Research and Social Action (CIAS); and in 1959 the CIAS and Mensaje were united to form the Centro Bellarmino. In the Church the
appointment of several younger and less traditionalistic bishops provided support for Manuel Larraín Errázuriz, Bishop of Talca and one of Latin America's most progressive churchmen. In 1961, the new archbishop of Santiago, Raúl Cardinal Silva Henríques, assumed his position as the country's Primate and used it to commit his fellow bishops to support of a wide range of social and economic reforms. The Jesuits at the Centro Bellarmino provided research studies, programs and advice for the Progressives and were the intellectual authors of a Pastoral Letter, issued by Archbishop Silva, which became a benchmark in Chilean history.

The Pastoral Letter, made public in September 1962, severely criticized the slow pace of reform and the complacency with which the wealthy viewed the existing widespread inequalities in the society. It warned that the social system had to be revised quickly to improve the lot of the millions of underprivileged Chileans: pointing out that in the cities over a third of the population were homeless and that while one-tenth of the population enjoyed more than half of the national income, a great part of the Chilean people suffered from malnutrition. While condemning the abuses of capitalism it also rejected the theories and practices of Communists, and forbade Catholics to collaborate with Communists.

Both the Right and the Left criticized the Pastoral Letter; in part, at least, because it seemed to place the Church firmly behind the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) whose leaders were known to hold similar views. When the Cardinal Archbishop refused to continue the Church's long and close association with the Conservative Party (which had required that its members be Roman Catholics), and the PDC adopted a program containing many of the ideas and much of the language of the Pastoral Letter, the last doubts as to the Archbishop's preferences vanished.

In 1963 the municipal elections held throughout the country revealed that the mood of the electorate was for change. The Christian Democratic Party, whose presidential candidate, Eduardo Frei, had run a poor third in
1958, emerged as the second largest party, only slightly behind the Radical Party. While the Marxist parties (the Socialists and Communists) also gained slightly, the conservatives (Liberal and Conservative Parties) were the principal losers. In 1964 the Christian Democratic candidate, Eduardo Frei, won the presidential election by a clear majority. In 1965 his party won majority control of the Chamber of Deputies and a plurality in the Senate that enabled Frei to begin enactment of an extensive program of social and economic reforms.

While the Church leaders were careful not to identify themselves directly with the Christian Democrats, their implicit support undoubtedly contributed to the massive electoral swing to the Christian Democratic Party as an alternative to the discredited Right and the Socialist-Communist electoral coalition (FRAP). In office the PDC leaders have continued their close relationship with the Jesuits in the Centro Bellarmino and with the other Progressive elements in the Church. The various institutes and centers associated with the Centro have provided a brain-trust and training center on which the Frei Administration has drawn for ideas, programs and personnel. Indeed, by 1969, when many of the reforms urged in the 1962 Pastoral Letter had been enacted by the Frei Administration, the leaders of Christian Democratic Party and of the Church were being criticized by younger party leaders and priests demanding that the pace of change be quickened and insisting than even more radical reforms were needed.

The Brazilian Progressives have also secured the commitment of the country's bishops to a far-reaching program of reforms. However, they not only do not have a political movement able to implement it, they also face determined resistance on the part of the military government and of a vocal minority of bishops, clergy and laity, bitterly opposed to their views. In other countries, such as Argentina, Colombia and Uruguay, the Progressives have wrested agreements by the hierarchy to get on with the implementation of the changes recommended at Medellin, but, the amount of implementation by the pre-conciliar types among the bishops remains to be seen.
In some places clashes have already occurred between pre-conciliar bishops and post-conciliar clergymen in their dioceses. The most publicized incident of this type occurred in Rosario, Argentina where some 28 priests refused to continue their pastoral duties under an archbishop whom they charged with opposing post-conciliar reforms. When Archbishop Bolatti went to Rome for support he waited for an audience with the Pope for several months before returning with a letter from Paul VI urging the priests to compose their difficulties with their archbishop so they could get on with their duties. When the priests declared they could not work with Bolatti and resigned, their cause was taken up by other priests and members of the laity. In turn, the Archbishop's supporters rallied to his side and the debate over it continues. In Trujillo, Peru, on the other hand, a pre-conciliar archbishop backed down when his diocesan clergy opposed his action in ordering reformist foreign priests out of his diocese. In these and other Latin American countries, progressive priests and bishops have combined to exert pressure on their hierarchies to support and to implement the resolutions that were approved by the CELAM at Medellin.

Probably the most dramatic and widely known figure among the Progressives is Dom Helder Pessoa Câmara, Archbishop of Olinda and Recife, whose brushes with the Brazilian military and with the Reactionaries among his fellow bishops have occupied headlines in Brazil and abroad. While Dom Helder is the idol of many of the Committed and is treated with respect by the Radicals, including non-Catholics as well, he probably has less influence among the Uncommitted, particularly the bishops in Brazil and elsewhere, than does Dom Eugênio Sales, Archbishop of Salvador and the Primate of Brazil. Dom Helder's forte is publicizing and demanding sweeping reforms, without advancing practical solutions for the problems he has raised, a tactic more likely to alienate the Uncommitted than to win them over. On the other hand, Dom Eugênio, who only a few years ago was a much less well known figure in the reform movement, has become particularly effective in securing the acceptance, by less reform-minded bishops in Brazil and other Latin American countries, of
the changes proposed by the Progressives. Since early 1969 his stature has been further enhanced by appointment to the College of Cardinals.

Dom Avelar Brandão Vilela, the Archbishop of Terezinha and President of CELAM for the 1968-1969 period, is another of the traditionalists on the Brazilian hierarchy who has become firmly committed to the Progressives and exercises a great deal of influence, in Brazil and abroad, while advocating change by evolutionary, non-violent methods. In recent months, and particularly since he too was appointed to the College of Cardinals, Dom Vicente Scherer, the Archbishop of Porto Alegre, has also become more closely identified with the Progressives. The new Cardinal's statement that in some cases violence may be necessary to secure reforms is in sharp contrast to his former views on that subject, and he has come out strongly in support of agrarian reform.

Juan Cardinal Landázuri Ricketts, Archbishop of Lima and Primate of Peru, is another example of the changes in attitudes that have been taking place within the Church during recent years. For centuries the hierarchy in Peru was closely aligned with the oligarchy in a society that even today retains many vestiges of the colonial period. Since Landázuri Ricketts was from a conservative upper class background, his appointment as archbishop, in 1954, signalled little prospect of change from the Church's past orientation. Nor was there much apparent change during the new archbishop's first years as the head of the Church in Peru. In the late 1950s and early 1960s he was careful to disassociate himself and the Church from the Peruvian Christian Democratic Movement's program which stressed radical reforms, including a sweeping redistribution of land, and had shrill anti-capitalist overtones. But since Vatican II a perceptible change has gradually taken place as the Archbishop has aligned himself with the advocates of reform, including a transfer, to the cleggy, in each of his archdiocese's 21 deaneries, of his powers to designate the deans who preside over each deanery. In Peru this is a sharp break with the past as has been the Archbishop's support for the agrarian reform decreed, in June 1969, by the military
government. Also, when the reactionary Archbishop of Trujillo, Carlos María Jurgens Byrne, dismissed three Spanish priests for being agitators, and encountered sharp resistance from other priests in his archdiocese, he received no support from Cardinal Landazuri and soon backed down. In fact, when the Papal Nuncio intervened in the matter to attack several Peruvian priests supporting the Trujillo rebels, the Cardinal made it clear that he, and not the diplomatic representative of the Vatican, was in charge of the Church in Peru. The controversy between the Nuncio and the priests is illustrative of how rapidly the Peruvian situation has changed. Only a few years ago the same Nuncio was one of the prime movers in getting the post-conciliar movement started.

In other countries, such as Colombia, Mexico, Ecuador, Honduras, and Guatemala, the Progressives in the hierarchy are relatively few in number and are just beginning to make their influence felt. Yet there have been some striking changes within the Church, in certain countries, and in its relationship with the ruling groups in those countries. In Paraguay, for example, when a priest criticized the Stroessner dictatorship, several years ago, the Archbishop of Asunción rebuked the priest, sent him to Uruguay to rest, and indicated that the priest was suffering from mental instability. Over the last year or two, however, the Paraguayan episcopacy has become increasingly critical of the Stroessner dictatorship, resisting its efforts to secure the ouster of several Spanish Jesuits, insisting that political prisoners be given trials, and opposing Stroessner's maneuvers to control the administration of the Catholic University in Asunción. In April 1969, the Paraguayan Episcopal Conference expounded its views on Church-State relations, quoting excerpts from Gaudium et Spes, and from Populorum Progressio and other paper documents to support its insistence that "The Church cannot remain indifferent or insensitive" to the fate of Paraguayans.

An equally striking turnabout has occurred in Bolivia where, until the 1952 Revolution, the Church had been closely aligned with the "Rosca", the country's oligarchial group, which included tin mine owners and large land holders.
After that Revolution the Church was careful to avoid any conflict with the government and continued to be a classic example of an Uncommitted, if not Reactionary Church. In recent years, however, the Church has become involved in supporting the tin miners in their labor disputes. In large part this new orientation has resulted from the pressures applied on the hierarchy by the native clergy, as well as by the post-conciliar foreign priests who had been the leaders in promoting change. Even in Ecuador, pressure from the lower clergy has finally resulted in the opening of a dialogue between priests and bishops regarding renovation of the role of the Church in Ecuador.

In countries such as Nicaragua, where most members of the hierarchy are still very attentive to the wishes of the Somoza family, and Haiti, where the Church was weak even before Duvalier's totalitarian controls were imposed, the Church's commitment to change in the spirit of Vatican II is so feeble as to be virtually non-existent. Despite the presence of a few Progressive clerics, it is not much stronger in other parts of Central America and the Caribbean. While individual bishops and an increasing number of the lower clergy are demonstrating the post-conciliar spirit in these and other countries of the area, the Uncommitted and Reactionary elements are still in control.

The recent appointment of Marcos McGrath as Archbishop (and Primate) of Panama, puts one of Latin America's most Progressive bishops in charge there. The Church, however, traditionally has had relatively little influence in Panama. In Mexico, a Progressive minority secured approval, in 1968, for a Pastoral Letter that was thoroughly post-conciliar in tone and content. In spite of this, the Mexican Church must move very carefully because the Mexican Government is determined to maintain its posture as the custodian of revolutionary change and the dispenser of any benefits for the masses.
2. The Radicals

The Radicals are still a relatively small minority in the Church. Their importance is greater than their numbers indicate but is somewhat less than one might conclude from the attention their activities have attracted. While the intensity of their desire for change may vary sharply from issue to issue, the Radicals are virtually unanimous on the impossibility of securing basic reform by non-violent means and the necessity, therefore, of a root and branch destruction of the established system.

The major point of difference among the Radicals is over the tactics by which the establishment is to be brought down. Some urge resort to immediate violent action, e.g., guerrilla warfare, which involves leaving the priesthood. This was the course adopted by the Colombian revolutionary, who happened to be a priest, Camilo Torres. His death, which occurred in an engagement between his guerrilla comrades and government troops, has been converted into martyrdom by his admirers. Other Radicals, who also admire the Colombian priest turned guerrilla, advocate remaining within the Church and undermining the structure of the society by attacking its institutions from within. Strikes and mass demonstrations, neighborhood discussion, petitions, and passive resistance, and making the hitherto passive masses aware of their potential strength when united, are among the tactics being used to arouse support for moves against the status quo and the power structure.

One theme on which the Radicals and the Progressives agree is the necessity of arousing the lethargic masses from their apathy by making them aware of their own ability to bring about change. Thus the reformers have taken up conscientizacão, a process of making people aware politically and socially while teaching them to read, which was developed first in Brazil and has spread to other parts of the area. In the early 1960's it was taken up by militants in the Basic Education Movement (MEB), which was sponsored by the Brazilian Bishops Conference and the Goulart administration (1961-1964). Both the Radicals and the Progressives recognized the potential of such a
process in achieving a revolutionary transformation of society. When Goulart was overthrown by a military coup, Paulo Freire, the Brazilian educator who had pioneered conscientização, found the military regime too hostile to his ideas and went into exile in Chile. There, as a consultant to the United Nations, he continued to develop his method which was adopted, by the Frei Administration (1965), for its programs in training illiterates to read. Other governments have not been so receptive but Radicals and Progressives both support conscientização as invaluable in preparing the way for basic structural changes in their societies—whether by violent or non-violent means.

The Radicals who favor direct action now are easy to identify. They are represented in such organizations as the "Camilo Torres Revolutionary Movement," which has been organized in Colombia, Uruguay, and Argentina, and has clerical and lay adherents scattered throughout the hemisphere. Although they are willing to cooperate with other extremists, these Radicals are generally scornful of the orthodox Latin American Communist Party leaders, and look to the pro-Maoist and Castroite splinter movements on the extreme left as their kind of revolutionaries. However, when the orthodox Communists are willing to back guerrilla warfare tactics, as in Guatemala, Radical priests such as Thomas and Arthur Melville, the former Maryknoll missionaries, have cooperated with them. At present, the influence of this group is limited because their numbers are few and their chances of success appear too slim to attract many new recruits.

The failures of Camilo Torres and the ignominious end of Che Guevara's guerrilla campaign in Bolivia, have strengthened the case for opposing the system while remaining in it. This is what has been called the Fourth Man theme, weakening the fabric of the institutions of a society to cause it to disintegrate from within. The Radicals who favor this method receive much less publicity than a Camilo Torres or a Juan Carlos Zaffaroni (the Uruguayan ex-Jesuit who publicly approved violent tactics and went underground to escape arrest). Because they remain within the Church and retain access to both the Committed and the Uncommitted groups, the non-violent Radicals pose an even greater threat to the "Establishment" than
do the open advocates of violence who lack the numbers and means to achieve their goal.

Ivan Illich, the former Jesuit whose attacks on the role of the Church in Latin America have been condemned by Progressives as well as Reactionaries, is one of the most widely known of the Radicals who oppose direct action tactics as counterproductive. Illich's charismatic appeal, intellectual brilliance and zest for controversy tend to focus much more attention on him than on most other Radicals. The Center he established and directs at Cuernavaca, Mexico (Centro Intercultural de Documentación-CIDOC), has been one of the principal disseminators of revolutionary concepts among Catholic clergy and laity in Latin America. In late 1968, Illich was called to Rome to answer charges raised against him and was reprimanded for his activities. Subsequently Catholic bishops were instructed not to permit priests under their jurisdiction to be sent to the Center at Cuernavaca for training. Although Illich has left the priesthood he has avowed his determination to remain within the Church while continuing his efforts for radical change. The Center and Illich continue to attract Radicals and some Progressives to Cuernavaca for training in the philosophy and tactics of revolutionary change.

The borderline between the Radical priests and laity, who seek to bring about radical change from within, and many of the Progressives is often difficult, if not impossible to delineate. They share an antipathy towards the established order as precluding social justice. While the Progressive still thinks that some aspects of the society can be salvaged by reform, the Radical would destroy the present order of things even though he may have little or no idea of what would replace it.

While some exceptions, such as the ex-Jesuit Illich, the Radicals tend to be naive in their approach to economic and political questions, and seem to lack a sense of history. The impressive thing about them is the sincerity with which they devote themselves to serving the poor and unfortunate in their struggle for social justice. They have the zealous faith of the youthful participants in the Children's Crusade of medieval times and some of them may be equally as susceptible to exploitation and manipulation.
The various Radical priest movements such as the "Young Church" in Chile, the "Priests for the Third World Movement" in Argentina, the "Golconda Group" in Colombia, and the Peruvian organization called the National Office of Social Information (Oficina Nacional de Información Social--ONIS), are attracting support from some Progressives among the clergy and laity. These are Progressives who are growing impatient with the slow pace of change in their societies but are not prepared to join with the extremists in the Camilo Torres Movement. They tend to be most sympathetic to the Radical attacks on injustices in the society, and criticism of Reactionary and Uncommitted bishops. They are less receptive to actions such as those of the Young Church group in Chile involving the seizure of the Cathedral and the interruption of the ordination of a bishop. In general, it is the younger members of the clergy and of the laity who support the Radical movements.

These movements are still relatively small. In April 1969, the second annual assembly of the Argentine "Priests for the Third World" was attended by 80 delegates, from 27 dioceses, representing over 400 priests out of a total of some 4,500 in Argentina. In Colombia, Bishop Genardo Valencia Cano of Buenaventura, and the 49 priests who signed the Golconda Declaration criticizing the Colombian Church's ties with the "Establishment," probably have won recruits to their cause but the total of active members is not known. At any rate it is still a small portion of the more than 4,000 Catholic priests in Colombia. The "Young Church" in Chile now has about 150 active members, including laity, in a country with over 2,000 priests and over 6,000,000 nominal lay Catholics. The ONIS group in Peru, with some 200 or so of the country's approximately 2,000 priests, includes a large proportion of individuals who are closer to the Progressive than to the extreme Radical position. In each case the future of these groups depends heavily upon the course of reform in their countries. Elsewhere in the area similar groups are likely to be formed, if indeed this has not already occurred.
Thus far the Radicals have not set up an organization to coordinate their activities throughout the area. The Camilo Torres Movements tried to play that role but their efforts were circumscribed by official action limiting the travel of known members of the organizations. Furthermore, and perhaps even more important in their failure, many of the individuals involved in the Camilo Torres Movements were neither reputable nor did they have the charisma of the Colombian revolutionary-priest. There have been some international contacts as individual Radicals have travelled to neighboring countries but a well-organized and adequately-funded organization has not been established. There are indications, however, that the Radicals not only recognize the need for such an organization, but are also taking steps to establish one.

There is a logical assumption that the various kinds of Communists and other extreme leftists are trying to penetrate the Committed sectors of the Catholic Church in Latin America. The example of Camilo Torres, the Colombian priest who put aside his cassock, went to the hills with pro-Castro guerrillas and was killed in a clash with government troops, is a dramatic example that such penetration is possible. In fact, some Radical priests may cooperate with extremists, including Communists, on projects of mutual interest and they may be naive in thinking that by cooperating with an individual Communist the latter may be converted—or reconverted—to the Church. They may identify with Castro in his defiance of the United States—the David and Goliath bit—and they may admire Camilo Torres for putting his life on the line when he believed that was necessary. But they tend to be little, if any, less suspicious of the Communists than they are of other political leaders. Such suspicions have not prevented a few Radicals from cooperating with Communists professing similar goals and some of them have been, and others probably will be, the victims of Communist manipulation. Despite the repeated charge by Reactionaries and others that such penetration is widespread, however, the hard evidence indicates that very few Committed priests have been subverted; perhaps because of their deep religious convictions and their widespread mistrust of political parties and ideologies.
Because reactionaries have been making such charges against virtually all reformers for many years, the accusation is often ineffective if not counterproductive. In short, anti-Communism has almost no appeal among those opposed to the maintenance of the status quo in Latin America.

Nor is there much enthusiasm for the private enterprise system among the area's masses. In their view, and in the opinions of labor leaders, student activists, intellectuals and others, the capitalistic system—as they know it—is exploitive, has incited but not satisfied their expectations, and is multiplying rather than decreasing social injustices. State socialism, on the other hand, appears to promise simple and quick solutions to the mounting problems that are confronting their societies. The fact that such a panacea is denounced by the "haves" of those societies and by foreign interests makes it even more appealing in countries swept up in a rising tide of nationalist fervor. In view of the naivete of the more idealistic reformers on economic matters and their rejection of capitalism, as a system that had been tried and found wanting, it is not surprising that they are ready to give state socialism a chance no matter who is sponsoring it. They reflect a similar disillusionment in other parts of the world, particularly in the lesser developed areas. Eight of the 15 bishops, who signed the "Message to the People of the Third World" (1967), which insisted on the need for something better than capitalism, were Latin Americans.* Speaking in London (13 April 1969),

*Archbishop Helder Câmara, of Olinda and Recife, Brazil
Archbishop João da Mota e Albuquerque, of Victoria, Brazil
Bishop Luís Gonzaga Fernandes, auxiliary of Victoria, Brazil
Bishop Georges Mercier, of Laghouat, Algeria
Bishop Michel Darmancier, of Wallis and Futuna, Oceania
Bishop Amand Hubert, of Heliopolis, Egypt
Bishop Angelo Cuniberti, of Florencia, Colombia
Bishop Severino Mariano de Aguiar, of Pesqueira, Brazil
(footnote continued on page
for example, Archbishop Helder Câmara, one of the seven Brazilian signers (the other Latin American was a Colombian), sharply criticized what he called the "exploitation" of the underdeveloped countries by the more developed ones. He also condemned the developed country's support of "institutionalized violence" (that is supplying arms to the military forces of the underdeveloped countries) to maintain the established order in their favor.

The suspicion with which the Radicals are regarded in some circles has also been fostered by the way in which the Communist press has publicized activities of the Radicals. El Siglo, the Communist daily in Santiago, Chile, for example, has given extensive publicity to the leaders of the Young Church in their campaign against the Church's leadership and institutions. In Brazil, Voz Operaria, the organ of the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB), has praised the Church's role in educating the masses and urged party militants to support the Church against the military government. An article in Peace, Freedom and Socialism (January 1968) hailed the role of the Church in Brazil in support of the masses and singled out several priests and a bishop for commendation.* And Fidel Castro has added his opinion by declaring: "When we see sectors of the clergy becoming revolutionary forces, how shall we resign ourselves to seeing sectors of Marxism become ecclesiastic forces?"

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Bishop Franx Franic, of Split, Yugoslavia
Bishop Francisco Austregesílo de M., of Afogados de Ingazeira, Brazil
Bishop Gregori Haddad, auxiliary of Beirut, Lebanon
Bishop Manuel Pereira da Costa, of Campina Grande, Brazil
Bishop Charles Joseph van Melckebeke, of Ningsia, China
Bishop Antônio Batista Fragoso, of Crateus, Brazil
Bishop Etienne Loosdregt, of Vientiane, Laos

*The bishop was Dom Jorge Marcos de Oliveira of Santo André, who is known as the "Worker Bishop" for his intervention in behalf of labor in his diocese.
Furthermore, the attempts by European Catholic and Communist intellectuals to initiate a dialogue has also occurred in Latin America, particularly in Chile. The Communists have been quick to seize on those portions of Church documents and proclamations which urge the establishment of world peace and, directly or by implication, condemn the capitalist system. These include the papal encyclicals, particularly *Pacem en Terris* and *Populorum Progressio*, the resolutions of Vatican II and of the CELAM meetings, and pastoral letters issued by the episcopates of individual countries. The Communists stress these points as evidence of common interests refuting the view that there is an unbridgeable gap between Christians and Marxists. The younger Catholic priests, who reflect the disdain of their generation for the established order and who regard their elders as having been brainwashed by a sterile anti-Communism, see no great danger in collaboration with Communists on a case-by-case basis. Some of these priests accept Marxist interpretations of the past as valid and Marxist designs for the future as more suitable for their under-developed and developing societies than capitalism as they know it.

This susceptibility to Marxist viewpoints, perhaps as a result of disillusionment with the way capitalism operates in their societies, is evident in priests with widely divergent backgrounds. Francisco de Araujo, formerly Prior of the Seminary of the Dominican Order in São Paulo, has concluded that it is not possible to humanize capitalism.* To the question "Is it possible to Humanize Socialism?", the Dominican's reply is: "I do not see why not.

*"There are in this regime vices which are deep-rooted and inhuman, such as the materialistic motivation for profit, the accumulation of material wealth, 'free competition,' which in turn believes in gigantic machinery for eliminating competition, stressing the game of violence by the strongest, the concentration of wealth in the hands of a few, etc., all of which makes the process of humanizing capitalism impossible." *Mensaje* (Santiago, Chile), July 1968, pp. 303-309.

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If we begin with the premise that Socialism is the socialization of the means of production, I fail to see why it would be unacceptable to a Christian, providing that this socialization can be effective. He pointed out that, while the errors and crimes of socialist regimes could not be justified, "Socialism appears as a way that is scientifically correct and morally valid for underdeveloped peoples." To the question as to whether a socialist revolution without ties with Soviet and Chinese imperialism was possible, Father Araújo replied in the affirmative declaring that he believed the destinies of the world depended on that possibility.*

*Ibid. The Dominican summed-up his view on Christian-Marxist cooperation as follows:

I firmly believe that the Church can and should survive in a socialist regime and that this possibility depends above all on the capacity and the leadership of the Christians. I will say more. The opportunity for Christians to become a propulsive force in history, at this time of the Twentieth Century, depends on the option to or not to accept the world socialization process. We do not ask that Marxists accept the spiritual principles of the Gospel against their deepest convictions. However, we have the right to demand that they respect our faith and our rejection of all forms of materialism.

A Christian can accept all that is scientific theory in the economic, political and social realities in Marxism. But a Christian can never accept Marxist ideology where it is in conflict with Gospel principles, such as the existence of a personal and creative God, the transcendental destiny of Man and history, and the right to worship Jesus Christ. A Christian could never be a materialist. There are, however, aspects in the Marxist humanitarianism which not only (footnote continued on page
Another priest, René García Lizarralde, a parish priest and one of the signers of the Golconda Document in Colombia, expressed a similar view in telling a group of students that a fundamental opening towards Marxism was necessary because Marxism provided the methodology needed by Christian revolutionaries. Father García also warned his student audience that while the means of production was not in the hands of the people, but manipulated in the interests of the few, it would be impossible for his listeners to find an authentic culture of their own.*

The Radicals, both clerics and laity, tend to react strongly against any indication of foreign influence in their country's economic and political as well as cultural affairs. At times this results in their being in accord with the Reactionaries on an issue such as birth-control, which both groups oppose as being a Yankee device to limit the numerical strength of the Latin Americans. On some occasions, such as the Peruvian Government's nationalization of the holdings of the International Petroleum Company, the Government's action has received support from all sectors of the Peruvian Church, including foreign missionaries from the United States. On an issue such as the Peruvian government's agrarian reform program, however, the reactions of the Uncommitted and the Reactionaries, who have close ties with members of the oligarchy affected by the reform, has been rather less enthusiastic.

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do not identify with materialism but are, in fact, Christian positions as well, such as the Marxist perspective on work as a transforming force in the world panorama. On the Christian side, there also exist practical materialisms which should be rejected in the name of the Gospel; for example, the lack of direction and dignity in the life of many.

*Conference given in the Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad Nacional on 11 April 1969.
The Radicals are particularly antagonistic towards capitalism, whether domestic or foreign. These feelings, however, are also shared by Progressives who, while emphasizing the need for economic development to alleviate the area's economic problems, continue to denounce the iniquities of the "capitalistic system" and urge a redistribution of income to favor the poor. They appear unmindful of the degree to which almost all the Latin American governments are dependent upon foreign financing to carry out any far-reaching economic development program. They appear equally oblivious to indications that such statements not only discourage potential foreign investment, but also hasten the flight of domestic capital to a safer haven abroad.

In sum, the Committed sector of the Latin American Church has become increasingly critical of and determined to change the institutions and patterns of living in the area's societies. While the members differ over tactics, including alliances with non-Catholic forces, they are agreed on the necessity for basic change. The proportion of individuals urging open resort to violence is still small. The concept that the injustices of the status quo are being maintained by institutionalized violence, and can only be changed by counter-violence, however, is gaining wider acceptance among Progressives as well as Radicals. For better or for worse, the Roman Catholic Church, once a bulwark against revolutionary change in Latin America, is becoming more and more committed to basic structural changes. Whether those changes will come by peaceful or by violent means, and when, remains to be seen; the only certainty is that there will be change.
IV. The Impact of the Committed Church on Church-State Relations

A. General

The changes in the Roman Catholic Church have caused reverberations in Church-State relations in much of Latin America. In some cases the impact of the Committed Church has been slight; for example, in Ecuador, Venezuela, Nicaragua and Honduras where the concept of a Committed Church is just beginning to win adherents and the established patterns of Church-State relations have not been significantly altered. In Cuba and Haiti, where the Catholic Church has long been weak, it appears to have become resigned to accepting the domination of dictators who have been in place for over a decade and who have made it clear that the Church either goes along with them or gets out completely. In other countries Church-State relations that had been harmonious have been subjected to increasing tension as a result of the changes in the attitudes of the Committed Church toward the societies its members serve.

B. Some Special Cases

Brazil

In Brazil Church-State relations have been severely strained, in recent years, by the arrest, alleged torture, imprisonment and deportation of post-conciliar priests committed to basic reforms and antagonistic to the military dictatorship that has ruled the country since early 1964. Until the post-conciliar reform movement began to gather momentum in Brazil, the Church for many years had had very little impact on politics, had usually cooperated closely with whatever government was in power, and generally had not been much concerned with economic, political or social problems. Possibly because the shift in the Church's role from non-involvement to a real commitment to change has come so quickly, some members of the military government have reacted by condemning the Committed Church as Communist-infiltrated and duped—a view
stoutly endorsed by reactionary clerics and laymen.

The Brazilian situation, which has some of the aspects of a classic tragedy, appears to be the most serious in the area. The principal leaders of the Church and of the military regime do not want a Church-State confrontation. Extremists on both sides, however, have sought to provoke one. Under the best of circumstances the contradictory goals of the Committed Church and the military government would be apt to cause serious friction: the Committed Church wants social justice and unfettered personal liberty given first priority; the military regime puts economic development first, with social justice to come later in what amounts to the classic "trickle down" thesis. It also tends to regard any serious social disturbance or attacks on the status quo as subversive and to use harsh, repressive measures to hold the line.

Under such conditions crisis after crisis has resulted as members of the Committed Church have pressed for changes now—not in some distant future. The more realistic leaders of the Committed Church are continuing to work for change while trying to avoid provoking the government unnecessarily. Thus, at the July 1969 meeting of the National Council of Brazilian Bishops (CNBB), a group of bishops agitating for an anti-government statement were defeated when Dom Agnelo Cardinal Rossi, Archbishop of São Paulo and President of the CNBB, strongly opposed any political statement. The Church leadership realizes that the Church is in too weak a position to provoke a confrontation with the government; nevertheless, they are determined that when a confrontation does come the onus for it will rest squarely on the government.

Argentina

The sharp divisions in the Argentine society are reflected in the Church and are affecting Church-State relations. The Reactionary and Uncommitted elements in the Church welcomed the military coup of June 1966 so ardently that leaders of the Committed Church issued
warnings against too close an alignment with the dictatorial regime. While the Church leaders then pulled back somewhat, they remained in much closer contact and cooperated more closely with President Juan Carlos Onganía than they had with his predecessor (Artur Illia, 1963-1966).

Over the last year, however, increasing strain has developed in Church-State relations as Committed priests and bishops have supported sugar workers and other groups in their conflicts with the Onganía regime. In early May 1969, even the Archbishop of Buenos Aires, Antonio Cardinal Caggiano, the Primate of Argentine who had been closely identified with the Onganía regime, publicly referred to it as "a temporary, de facto but legitimate government and I am confident that normalcy will return in the future, and that the political parties will be able to function again. The country must return to normalcy, that is, to a constitutional and democratic regime."

Those would be commonplace observations under other conditions but in view of the Cardinal's close association with a dictatorial regime that had banned all political parties and precluded any discussion of setting even a tentative, distant date for holding elections, his words confirmed that there had indeed been a change in Church-State relations. A few weeks later, when conflicts between university students and the administration exploded into violent anti-government demonstrations, priests were alleged to be involved and a few were arrested. When the new Minister of Interior, General (R.) Imaz appealed for public assistance in restoring order (on 30 June 1969), his specific reference to the government's need for the "total support of the Church" appears to have received a cool reception. The Executive Commission of the Argentine Bishops' Conference sent the Minister its views on Church-State relations on 4 July; as of mid-August those views had not been made public. Moreover, the Priests of the Third World Movement have been openly anti-government in their active support of the workers and students.
Even the less radical elements of the Committed Church have continued to criticize the government for its neglect of the nation's unfortunates and to support the 28 priests in the Rosario Archdiocese, who have resigned rather than serve under a pre-conciliar archbishop, Guillermo Bolatti. Lay members of Bolatti's archdiocese have supported the dissident priests by occupying parish churches, an action which has led to clashes with police sent to remove them. This kind of incident, if it spreads, can involve the national authorities of both church and state. Since the sympathies of the Onganía regime tend to be with the pre-conciliar bishops, the tensions in the society and the Church are likely to be exacerbated and cause a further deterioration in Church-State relations.

Peru

There are certain aspects of the present situation in Peruvian Church-State relations that make it particularly interesting and perhaps significant for the future. Until some three or four years ago the Peruvian Church was still one of the most reactionary in the larger Latin American countries. The majority of its bishops and priests are still pre-conciliar in attitude but a few bishops and a relatively small group of activist priests have secured approval of proposals for substantial reforms that are anathema to the country's oligarchs and reactionary churchmen. The Primate of the Peruvian Church, Juan Cardinal Landázuri Ricketts, Archbishop of Lima, has not only supported the changes in the clergy's attitude and provided an example of more austere living in line with the "Poor Church" concept; he has also accommodated to the revolutionary military regime which seized power on 3 October 1968.

Since the Peruvian Church has traditionally been closely aligned with the country's oligarchial groups, and those groups have also controlled the government, Church-State relations were seldom marred by the kind of tensions that developed in other Latin American countries. Indeed, the system of interdependence of State and Church has been described as "one of the most comprehensive and
absolute in Latin America."* A Reactionary Church and governments with scant concern for the welfare of the illiterate, downtrodden, Indian and mestizo masses tended to find little cause for disrupting their traditional harmonious relationship.

Against this background the balancing act Cardinal Landázuri has been carrying out assumes unusual significance. He has worked with the post-conciliar priests, now organized in ONIS, in getting their proposals accepted by the hierarchy which includes only a small nucleus of Progressive bishops. The Peruvian Primate has approved the wide ranging agrarian reform decreed by the Velasco government, which is opposed by the oligarchs with whom the Church--and Cardinal Landázuri--had long been aligned, and he has also rebuked that government for its repressive actions against university students protesting changes in university regulations. While the Cardinal probably has not moved as fast as the impatient ONIS group would prefer, he has gone much further to meet their demands than many of the Peruvian hierarchy and oligarchy have wanted him to.

Now the key question is whether the reform programs of the Committed Church and the military government will continue to be as compatible in other areas as they are on the nationalization of the International Petroleum Company, the defense of Peru's claim to sovereignty over the ocean for 200 miles from its shores, and the agrarian reform. There has been a built-in bias, among the members of the Committed Church, against the military; it is particularly strong among the Radicals, who are urging separation of Church and State. As of mid-1969

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the conflicts with the U.S. over the petroleum company and the 200-mile limit, and the agrarian reform had improved the image of the military regime as defenders of national sovereignty, an important point to the intensely nationalist Radicals. Nevertheless, the Radicals are likely to want additional reforms to come faster than the Valasco government deems possible or prudent. Continued close co-operation of Church and State would considerably facilitate the carrying out of long over-due basic reforms. Over time, however, the question of priorities—social justice or economic development—may become as sticky a point as it has been in Brazilian Church-State relations.

Bolivia

Before 1952 the generally Reactionary Bolivian hierarchy and lower clergy were closely allied with the so-called "ROSCA", the owners of the tin mines and large land holdings, who dominated the government and the economy. The 1952 Revolution carried out by the Nationalist Revolution Movement (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario-MNR) sharply disrupted the previous pattern of Church-State relations. Although the Church accepted the nationalization of the tin mines and the MRN's agrarian reforms with as good grace as possible, the Church was left in a considerably weakened role vis-à-vis the post-1952 governments. In recent years, however, a renovation of the Bolivian Church, initiated by foreign missionaries, has led to a much greater interest in improving the lot of the Indian masses. A few of the more progressive members of the hierarchy and a number of priests have supported the tin miners in their labor conflicts with the government-owned mining corporation, COMINBOL. In early 1968, when the negotiations between the workers and COMINBOL representatives reached an impasse, René Fernández Apaza, Bishop of Oruro, and Agustín López de Lamos, Bishop of Corocoro served as
arbiter and achieved a settlement.* This role, as inter-
venor for a group as hostile to recent Bolivian govern-
ments as the tin miners have been, is a delicate mission
for the Bolivian Church. In view of the very fragile
nature of what passes for political stability in Bolivia,
such a role is a particularly sensitive one and capable
of causing a sharp dislocation of the present modus
vivendi in Church-State relations. In view of the fer-
vor with which the Committed Church in Bolivia is pres-
sing for basic reforms in the Church, and in the Church's
attitude towards the injustices that are so deeply
imbedded in the Bolivian society, increased friction in
Church-State relations will be difficult, if not impos-
sible, to avoid.

Paraguay

Until the last year or so the leaders of the
Paraguayan Church had worked hand in glove with the
dictatorial regime of President Alfredo Stroessner (1964).
When a young priest was so rash as to criticize the
government's arbitrary actions, the aged archbishop of
Asunción, Juan José Aníbal Mena Porta, the Primate of
Paraguay, sent the critic abroad to avoid any breach in
Church-State relations. Now, however, a post-conciliar
group among the Paraguayan clergy, composed of foreign
missionaries and native priests, has succeeded in revers-
ing that compliant attitude. Even the Archbishop has
gone along with other bishops and the priests who have
denounced economic and social conditions in Paraguay and
called for the release or trial of political prisoners.

*When the agreement ending the conflict was signed the
late President René Barrientos is said to have warned the
Bishops that it had better be effective since it was
their's.
Although there are differences within the Church as to the pace and extent of change, there is virtually a united front in the Church as regards its criticism of the violation of human rights and the necessity for taking a stand on that issue.

In April 1969 the Paraguayan episcopate issued a pastoral letter describing its concern for the existent state of affairs in the society and stressed its determination to follow the orientation of Vatican II and the Medellin Conference. The bishops rejected the attempt of the present political leaders (read Stroessner) to exclude the Church from any participation in the process of change and to employ it as a pacifier to cover up differences within the country. They also rejected the efforts of opposition leaders to use the Church as a refuge against the regime and of extreme leftists to exploit the Church as a temporary ally. In emphasizing the Church's determination to avoid being used by Stroessner's opponents, the bishops probably were warning against the efforts of the Paraguayan Communists to secure the Church's cooperation; efforts which had resulted in exchanges of points of view between the Communists and a few members of the Committed Church.

C. Some Other Cases

In other countries, such as Mexico and Colombia, the emergence of churchmen committed to change seems to have roused the apprehensions of governments committed to economic development programs, which they do not want disrupted by any "share-the-wealth" campaign. Thus far Church-State relations have not been seriously affected since the leaders of the Mexican and Colombian hierarchies have been careful to avoid such conflict. In Colombia, where the Roman Catholic Church is the established Church, President Carlos Lleras Restrepo (1966-) has publicly warned the Radical priests that, while he too supports the reforms they seek, he will not permit the Radicals to disrupt the society and his economic development program. His warning underlined his administration's expulsion of a Spanish priest accused of...
meddling in domestic politics.

In Mexico, the hierarchy is committed to change but is wary of reviving the bitter anti-clericalism and even anti-religious fervor that marked the Mexican scene between 1910 and 1938. Since then a modus operandi has been developed to minimize Church-State clashes, under which the Mexican Church has carefully eschewed involvement in politics and has not publicized its activities in such sensitive areas as social welfare, and education. In recent months the Mexican press, which is readily responsive to official guidance, has given unusual prominence to the activities of the Archbishop of Mexico City, Miguel Cardinal Darío Miranda y Gómez, the Primate of the Mexican Church, who has not shown much enthusiasm for the concept of a Committed Church. While the activities of the Committed Churchmen have been given little publicity, El Día, a daily which often reflects the views of the Díaz Ordaz Administration, has emphasized the difficulties that could result from the Church becoming too involved in non-religious matters.

In Uruguay and Chile, where Church and State have been formally separated for several decades, two distinct situations have developed. In Uruguay the influence of the Church has long been almost negligible. State socialism is so far advanced—even if incompetently administered—that the Committed Church is largely deprived of the Nationalist theme of "foreign capitalist exploitation". When a real Radical, the ex-Jesuit Juan Carlos Zaffaroni, emerged to urge violent revolution he could rally very little support and was regarded as mentally unbalanced. Those Uruguayans with a preference for violence already had a much more attractive alternative—the Tupamaros Movement with its spectacular bank robberies and shoot-outs with the police. Furthermore, the pro-Castro groups and the Uruguayan Communist Party are much more influential among the Uruguayan youth and labor movements than the splintered Christian Democratic Movement and the Church are.
The Chilean Church, on the other hand, has broken off its traditional ties with the country's conservative landed oligarchy and is unofficially but closely aligned with the Christian Democratic Party which came to power in the 1964 elections. The Church-State relationship in Chile is so harmonious at present that any change is likely to be for the worse. A change in administration, in 1970, either to the Nationalists, who represent the conservative interests affected by the Church's support of agrarian reform and income redistribution, or to the far left Socialist-Communist coalition (FRAP), which is also bitterly anti-Christian Democratic, would almost certainly bring in its wake a deterioration in Church-State relations.

The pattern of Church-State relation in the Dominican Republic has also been affected by the post-conciliar trend in the Church. What had long been a Reactionary Church, closely aligned with the upper classes, is now undergoing a gradual transformation under the influence of reform-minded members of the clergy. The majority of the clergy and the bishops is still not committed to the kind of reform program that has been adopted by the Church in other Latin American countries. When the Balaguer administration refused to readmit two resident foreign missionaries who had left the country, however, the Dominican Church refused to accept the action and put such pressure on President Balaguer that he permitted the two missionaries to return.

As in Brazil, even those Dominican bishops and clergymen who had not supported the Committed Churchmen, rallied to their defense against arbitrary treatment by the national government. The concept of a Church committed to the welfare of the masses is still in its initial stages in the Dominican Republic but the political situation is so fragile that the government tends to regard any movement seeking change as potentially dangerous if not subversive and may overreact again. By providing an issue upon which the Uncommitted and Reactionary clergy felt impelled to unite with the members of the Committed Church, however, the govern-
ment has helped the latter to secure broader support for their earlier calls for more rapid social and economic reforms to aid the country's impoverished rural masses.

The Central American countries and Panama have been much less affected by the pressure for change within the Church. With some exceptions (notably Marcos McGrath, Archbishop of Panama, and, latterly, Luis Chávez y González, Archbishop of San Salvador), the hierarchies in these countries tend to the Uncommitted and Reactionary sectors of the Church, and have long been closely aligned with the ruling political and economic power structures. When a few foreign Radical priests and nuns step out of line in Guatemala, for example, they are sent out of the country. In some cases transfers to other duties elsewhere serves to quiet down priests whom the local establishment considers to be troublemakers.

Occasionally, however, as occurred in El Salvador during mid-1959, an archbishop will stand up for Committed priests who became involved with local and national authorities. In the El Salvador case, what had been an imbroglio between three priests and the municipal authorities, in Suchitoto, was taken up by the official party, the National Conciliatory Party (PCN), and the opposition Christian Democratic Party (PDC). When Archbishop Chávez y González refused to transfer the priests for their criticism of local officials and efforts in behalf of the campesinos in the area, the national government appears to have become concerned that the opposition PDC was trying to exploit the situation for its own benefit. Subsequently, the border conflict by July-August 1969, with Honduras, pushed the Suchitoto affair into the background. In view of the sensitivity of the Salvadoran government to any stirring up of the campesinos, however, the activities of the Committed priests are likely to lead to other such incidents and further strains in Church-State relations.
V. THE OUTLOOK

The role of the Committed Church in bringing about real basic change, the radical reforms needed to restructure most Latin American societies, will vary sharply from country to country. In much of the area the prospects for such changes over the shorter run of the next two or three years seem very dim indeed. The non-violent reform of the present systems, proposed by the Progressives, is likely to require a considerably longer period of time; the violent destruction of the system, advocated by many of the Radicals, is possible but not likely to occur--over the short run at least--because of the strength of the forces supporting the status quo.

The prospects, therefore, for the Latin American area in general, is continued and even widened public disorder as Radical priests and laity seek confrontations with both civil and Church authorities. Unless the Progressive forces can demonstrate the efficacy of non-violent tactics, a number of those now supporting such tactics are likely to become increasingly impatient with their lack of success and move over into the Radical camp.

If the Progressive forces in the Church are to succeed, they must first win over the bulk of those bishops and priests who are still Uncommitted. In Argentina, where a number of the Uncommitted and Reactionary bishops are well along in years, the death or retirement of a few key figures could result in the reorientation of the hierarchy in a relatively short time. The key factor would be the Papacy's criteria in choosing the new bishops--whether for commitment to economic and social change or for adherence to more traditional views on such matters as birth control, the role of the Curia Romana in administering the Church, and the position of the bishops vis-à-vis papal authority.

In any event, only when a Committed Church represents a clear majority of the Catholic hierarchy will it be able to make much progress in winning converts and support among the groups now resisting change. On present

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evidence this would appear to require a decade or more in most of the Latin American area. The more moderate Progressive leaders, however, are already under fire from their more impatient followers for lack of success in securing basic change. Such pressure will probably continue to increase. The danger for the Progressive leaders is that they will either be forced into a confrontation with the forces of an unsympathetic government before they are ready for it, or that in avoiding such a show down they will lose many of their followers to the ranks of the Radicals.

Thus far, a good deal of the impetus for change has come from members of the clergy who came to Latin America from North America and Western Europe. They have tended to be younger and much readier to break with tradition than were either their predecessors of 15 or 20 years ago, or the older members of the local clergy. In the United States, however, the dwindling number of seminarians, and the increasing number of priests renouncing their vows, has reduced the number of both regular and secular clergy. Unless this situation is reversed, and this appears unlikely over the foreseeable future, the numbers of priests being sent to Latin America will be sharply reduced.

A similar situation may be developing in Spain, the principal source of foreign priests for Spanish America. Furthermore, a change in the Spanish political scene might result not only in a reduction of the number of priests being sent abroad; it might also mean that more of the younger, Committed priests would be retained in Spain rather than sent out of the country, as now seems to be the case, to avoid clashes with the Franco regime. If fewer, and less Committed foreign priests are available for service, the Committed Church would lose valuable allies and perhaps would have to adopt much more radical positions to appeal to the younger generation of Latin Americans. In any event, the manpower problems facing the Church, in Brazil, for example, are causing Church leaders to make much wider use of laymen, and may force them to press hard for changes in
Church regulations that would permit the secular clergy, at least, to marry and remain in the priesthood. At the same time, the role of women, both nuns and laity, is likely to continue to grow and they too will become more involved in the activities of the Committed Church.

If the Committed Church becomes more radical, it is likely to lose the financial support of not only the national authorities—where there is still a degree of union between Church and State*—and the upper and upper-middle classes, but perhaps also the funds provided by the Church authorities in Western Europe. In that event, since the Church receives very little in the way of contributions from the lower and lower-middle class groups, the Church would be well on the way to becoming the "Poor Church" the Radicals are demanding. And while a "Poor Church" might indeed be closer to the masses, it would have fewer resources with which to continue—let alone expand—the services it now provides, and which most Latin American governments do not have the funds or personnel to assume.

In view of the residual strengths of the institutions and governments the Radicals are seeking to destroy, they are apt to be frustrated repeatedly and to become even more susceptible to the overtures of extreme leftists, including orthodox Communists as well as the Castroite and Maoist types. Almost certainly the Communist movements will continue and probably increase their efforts to penetrate the Radical Church groups and exploit their potential for creating tensions and divisions in the Church and society. In this regard the Communists' ability to provide an international network for transmitting communications, funds and supplies between widely separated areas, could be a useful bargaining point since the Radicals now lack such facilities.

*As in Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Haiti, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela.
The relationship of the Committed Church to a Latin American government is likely to be most tenuous in those countries under military dictatorships, or where the influence of the military leaders is an important factor in making and carrying out national policies. The emphasis of the Committed Church on personal freedom and social justice is usually on a collision course with a government dominated by military leaders whose first priorities are internal security and economic development. A possible exception might be a revolutionary military regime dedicated to carrying out the same kind of basic structural reforms that the Committed Church is seeking. If, for example, the Peruvian military dictatorship actually implements the agrarian reform it has decreed, and carries out other basic reforms, its relations with the Committed Church will be less strained. There would still remain, however, the problems inherent in such a regime's preoccupation with its own security and its tendency to overreact to criticism or opposition. If a military regime were able to combine basic structural reform with respect for personal liberties, and a commitment to social justice, the Committed Church would probably give such a regime its enthusiastic cooperation.

At present, however, the prospects for military regimes with that kind of orientation and program coming to power are rather slight. While the military leaders in the area have shown considerable interest in supporting economic development, only the military government in Peru, headed by General Velasco, has evinced much concern with basic structural reform. In most cases military governments will probably continue to view the Committed Church with suspicion and to regard its stress on social justice and personal liberties as divisive if not downright subversive. In Brazil, for example, where both Church and State leaders have sought to avoid a confrontation, Church-State relations would be likely to deteriorate still further if President Costa e Silva were replaced or succeeded by those military leaders urging a harder line towards all opponents or critics of the regime.
Under such conditions the activities of the Committed Church are likely to produce increasing tensions in the Latin American societies and in Church-State relations. In short, what had long been considered an institution devoted to the maintenance of the status quo, is now a force for change in an area that has demonstrated little capability for dealing with the economic and political instability and social tensions that already exist there. Over the longer run the Committed Church may succeed in reducing those tensions and contributing to greater economic and political stability. Over the shorter run, however, its commitment to social justice is likely to impede present economic development programs and thereby contribute to greater economic and political instability.

The tendency of some leaders of the Committed Church to favor state socialism, to denounce U.S. private investment as exploitative and to support nationalization of U.S. holdings, almost certainly will continue. As younger, even more nationalistic individuals assume leadership roles, the hostility towards U.S. investment is likely to grow and to be an increasingly abrasive factor in U.S.-Latin American relations. Even more moderate members of the Committed Church are bitterly critical of what they refer to as "the niggardly contributions" of U.S.-owned enterprises to social justice in Latin America, particularly when they compare those contributions with the profits allegedly being remitted to the United States.

Finally, one of the few things on which the Radicals, some Progressives, and the bulk of the Uncommitted and Reactionary clergymen and laity, can agree is that birth control (or family planning) programs are the tactics by which U.S. officials and private interests are seeking to keep Latin America from having a much larger population than the United States does. This is also one of the few things on which nationalists of both the extreme right and the extreme left can agree. Thus U.S. efforts to bring population increases in line with resources are likely to encounter a broad range of opposition with which much of the Committed Church will be aligned.