Intelligence Report

THE DISINTEGRATION OF

JAPANESE COMMUNIST RELATIONS WITH PEKING

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JAPANESE COMMUNIST RELATIONS WITH PEKING

This is a working paper of the DD/I Research Staff, another in the series of ESAU studies that deal with certain key Communist parties in the context of the Sino-Soviet dispute. It reviews the major developments in the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) during the past two years, during which time the JCP has become involved in a bitter controversy with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). It does so, not only in the interests of documenting the deterioration in JCP-CCP relations but also in presenting a case study of Mao Tse-tung's tactics in dealing with foreign Communist parties under his new policy of rejecting a working relationship with anyone who is not completely submissive to him. In his quarrel with the JCP, Mao has now broken with a party which only two years ago was one of his staunchest allies against the CPSU.

We have had many useful comments on this paper from OCI, but we alone bear responsibility for the conclusions reached in the paper. The DDI/RS would welcome additional comment, addressed to Helen-Louise Hunter, who wrote the paper, or to the Chief or Deputy Chief of the Staff, all at...
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THE DISINTEGRATION OF JAPANESE COMMUNIST RELATIONS WITH PEKING

Summary and Conclusions

In less than two years, the Japanese Communist Party has moved from a position of strong support of the Chinese in the Sino-Soviet dispute to a new assertion of its independence from both the Chinese and the Soviets as the result of a bitter quarrel with the Chinese which has already reached the point where there is apparently no longer any direct communication between the two parties. The only thing left for the JCP and the CCP to do to make their de facto break in relations complete would be to attack one another by name in public. In private, they have long since dropped all pretense, and each is naming the other party in secret indoctrination sessions which are part of the efforts of both parties to prepare for an all-out struggle. Both in public and private, they have said things about each other that all but rule out a reconciliation in the foreseeable future.

Differences between the JCP and the CCP first arose in the winter of 1964-65, though they were not to become serious for a year or so. In connection with its attacks on the new Soviet leadership's decision to go ahead with Khrushchev's plan for a "preparatory" meeting of Communist parties in Moscow in March 1965, the JCP raised an old issue that was suddenly to become a major point in the Sino-Soviet dispute in 1965 and 1966--the matter of joint action of the international Communist movement against "imperialism." When the JCP was pressing for joint action in 1963, what it had meant was Soviet commitment to the policy of all-out anti-U.S. struggle long demanded by the Chinese; in the context of that time, the JCP call for joint action was a definite anti-Soviet and pro-Chinese move. When it began to endorse the idea of joint action again, however--early in 1965--the Soviets and the Chinese had both changed their positions. In a major break with
Khrushchev policy, the new Soviet leaders were now trying to reassert their influence with the North Vietnamese, to which end they began to provide substantial military and political support in the war against the U.S.; the joint action line on Vietnam now served their purposes for several reasons. As Soviet policy under Brezhnev and Kosygin gradually began to meet Communist China's earlier demand for anti-imperialist action, at least in Vietnam, Mao Tse-tung reacted by adopting an even more extreme position. He was unwilling to cooperate with the "modern revisionists," or to admit that they were in fact opposing "imperialism" in Vietnam; there could be no joint action with the USSR on Vietnam; or anything else. As the subject of joint action in Vietnam became more and more a matter of debate in the world Communist movement, the diverging views of the JCP and the CCP became more and more apparent. By April 1965, the JCP's position was clearly becoming a source of increasing embarrassment to the CCP. In a noteworthy break with their usual practice of reprinting major Akahata (the JCP organ) editorials in full, the Chinese published only a summary version of an editorial of 13 April endorsing joint action; all of the references to joint action in the JCP article were deleted. Another subject on which the JCP and CCP were beginning to have different views around the middle of 1965 was the vital question--to the JCP--of the proper tactics of the JCP on the domestic scene. In keeping with the policy decided at the Eighth Party Congress in July 1961 and restated at the Ninth Congress in November 1964--that it should become a mass party rather than an exclusive revolutionary party--the JCP was pursuing a moderate line with little public mention of armed revolution or violence. In this regard, it was following a policy that was much more in keeping with the Soviet line on so-called "peaceful transition" to power than the Chinese line on armed struggle and domestic violence. The Chinese may have had a special interest in the JCP's developing some capacity for illegal, sabotage-type activities, because of the possibility (as they saw it) of a war between the U.S. and China and the probability that Japan would support the U.S. in such an event. Possibly for this reason, they were particularly concerned about the need
for the JCP to create a covert apparatus that would be trained and ready to engage at some later date in specific acts of violence similar to but exceeding the scope of JCP activities during the Korean War. On the other hand, the Chinese would have encouraged any good Communist party at least to prepare itself along these lines, whether or not there was any prospect of the country's becoming involved in a war with China. It is known that the Chinese were in fact pushing this line on the JCP in 1965. Liu Shao-chi, Chou En-lai, and Chen Yi are all reported to have raised the subject of a JCP "resistance movement" in separate conversations with two highly-placed JCP officials who visited China in August. Although the Japanese tried to terminate the discussions by saying that the JCP had not reached the stage where it could even think about such a question, the Chinese pursued the subject relentlessly.

In their over-all pro-Chinese orientation in the world Communist dispute but their preference for Soviet gradualist tactics as the way to power at home, the JCP and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) were strikingly similar. The parallel between the two parties was to be important to the JCP after the Indonesian coup of September 1965. Probably more than anything else, the coup was responsible for the JCP's rethinking of its entire relationship with the CCP. Whether it was true or not, most JCP leaders apparently believed that the CCP was the power behind the scenes. After years of patient tactics, owing little to Maoist precept, the PKI had seemed close to taking power; suddenly, its leaders had apparently been persuaded by Mao to risk all and lose all in a return to violence.

Taking the view that the PKI was guilty of left-wing adventurism in carrying out a coup on Chinese advice without adequate preparations, Miyamoto and other leaders of the JCP saw the Indonesian coup as a timely warning of the danger of following the Communist Chinese line blindly. Although they had always professed to follow an independent line in the world Communist movement, they had obviously become increasingly subservient to Communist China and the JCP had become closely identified with the
CCP in the public mind. After the Indonesian coup, the JCP leaders apparently decided that it was not in the best interests of the JCP to be so closely identified with Peking. Beginning around November-December 1965, the need for the JCP to adopt an independent line was being discussed as the major topic of party meetings around the country. Miyamoto was reported to be taking the lead in advocating a firm, independent course without reliance on any foreign party.

In February 1966, the largest and most important delegation that the JCP has ever sent abroad left on a two-month trip to Communist China, North Vietnam, and North Korea. Led by Miyamoto, the delegation included three other members of the Presidium and three members of the Central Committee. Its visit in Communist China was probably the turning point in the JCP's dispute with Peking. Whereas before the trip there were differences between the two parties, after the trip there was a new emotional intensity about the quarrel that gave it an impetus of its own.

As for the purpose of Miyamoto's trip, the JCP leader was primarily concerned to point out JCP disagreement with one major Chinese policy: the policy of denouncing all Soviet aid to North Vietnam. In his paranoid state of mind, Mao no doubt viewed Miyamoto's trip to China to discuss the subject of joint Soviet action with the CCP as a definite anti-China move. But Miyamoto probably did not see it that way. It seems that he really thought there might be some flexibility in the Chinese position and that he might have some influence with the Chinese in getting Peking to participate in a coordinated Communist effort in North Vietnam. In this, he was, of course, naive.

From the point of view of the JCP, Miyamoto's visit to China was a complete failure. The JCP plea for "unity of action" was virtually ignored. If the delegation had hoped to find the Chinese at least understanding of, though of course not happy about, the JCP's new-felt need to dissociate itself from total identity with the CCP, it found instead a completely intractable
Chinese leadership which was not prepared to tolerate any dissent, which demanded total support and which drew a clear line between those foreign Communists who were subservient allies and those who were independent enemies. Miyamoto and other leaders of the JCP were clearly shocked and outraged by the Chinese treatment of the JCP delegation in Peking, particularly the high-handed pressure tactics of the Chinese in getting the JCP finally to abandon its plan to attend the Soviet Party Congress at the end of March.

In contrast to its experiences in China, the JCP delegation found a good deal of support for its views in North Vietnam and North Korea, particularly the latter. If anything, the North Koreans were ahead of the Japanese in their anti-Chinese thinking, and they probably did more to encourage the JCP in its new independent stance than anyone else. Without doubt, the JCP found it easier to contemplate a marked deterioration in relations with the CCP in the knowledge that it had a friend and ally at its side. There has definitely been a mutually reinforcing effect in the growing disputes between North Korea and Communist China and the JCP and China.

The fourth plenum of the JCP central committee, which met on 28-29 April 1966 and heard Miyamoto's report on his trip to China, was a crucial one in the history of the JCP. Miyamoto's policies came under strong attack from the extreme pro-Chinese left wing of the party, but in a showdown, the Miyamoto forces won a substantial victory. The effect of Miyamoto's victory at the plenum was that the JCP leadership was no longer restrained in expressing its true feelings about the Chinese; in that sense, it was the turning point in the JCP's conduct of its quarrel with Peking. The plenum was also the turning point in its handling of the opposition within the JCP; a decision was made at the plenum to take firm action against the extreme left-wing elements in the party, as the leadership had done in the case of the anti-party "revisionists" in 1964.

In May, the JCP began to make indirect references to the CCP in the party press. On 11 May Akahata published
for the first time an article criticizing "dogmatist and sectarian views" in the international Communist movement. As of late May, Akahata had stopped carrying all important articles from the Chinese press, including People's Daily, and had begun to use foreign dispatches of Soviet affiliation, which had not been published in the past. In another highly significant development, Akahata stopped listing the daily broadcast schedules of Radio Peking. By then, almost all JCP publications had dropped the advertisements of Mao's writings, then on sale in Japan. In retaliation, Chinese Communist media stopped reprinting all Akahata articles, which until May 1966 had appeared regularly in People's Daily several times a week.

At approximately the same time that the North Korean party did, the JCP began a major briefing program for all party members on current relations with Communist China and the new independent line of the JCP in July-August 1966. There probably was some agreement or understanding between the JCP and the North Koreans on steps to be taken to prepare for an open dispute with the CCP.

In August, JCP party headquarters issued two party orders that were the subject of discussion at party meetings in August and September. In the first, the leadership banned the display of pictures of any Communist leader except Marx, Engels, and Sen Katayama, one of the JCP founders; although the instruction did not explicitly ban the display of Mao's picture, the purpose of the order was clearly that. In the second party order, the JCP imposed certain requirements and restrictions on travel to Communist China. In support of these anti-China measures taken within the party, the JCP stepped up its propaganda campaign around August. During that one month, there were several major articles in Akahata attacking Communist China. Without mentioning China by name, they used the strongest phrases in criticizing indirectly Chinese policy on Vietnam.

Miyamoto may have surprised his pro-Chinese opponents within the party, as well as the Chinese, with the swiftness and the severity of his action against the leading dissidents. It must have come as a shock to the Chinese.
and their supporters in the JCP that Miyamoto so soon decided to use the most severe form of organizational discipline—expulsion from the party—as a warning to others who might be attracted to the opposition. The timely crack-down on the opposition within the party was certainly a blow to Chinese hopes of subverting a significant number of party members away from Miyamoto's influence. A total of 98 pro-Peking party members are reported to have been purged during 1966.

After the expulsion of the pro-Chinese elements from the JCP, Communist China took a new and serious step, which was primarily punitive and clearly indicative of Peking's view that the JCP was now in the enemy camp. On 6 September, the CCP abruptly cut off trade with the Japan-China Trade Promotion Association and its member firms which were closely associated with the JCP and a major source of revenue for the party. Many of the trading forms which now control Japanese trade with China are owned and controlled by left-wing socialists who are sympathetic to China; thus, the left-wing of the JSP, rather than the JCP, is now the main beneficiary of trade between China and Japan. There can be no doubt that China's action was a financial blow to the JCP. The party mounted a major propaganda attack against Peking's obvious attempt to squeeze trading firms close to the JCP out of Japan's trade with China, but it was a losing fight.

According to one report, all financial assistance to the JCP from China, which must have accounted for 25 percent of the total income of the party headquarters as a minimum estimate, had completely stopped by September. As a result, the JCP was reportedly encountering serious financial difficulties. But, while for the present the Chinese may make things difficult financially for the JCP, their economic sanctions are not likely to force the JCP to surrender.

The Chinese, for their part, now seem prepared to write off the JCP under its present leadership, and they are now primarily concerned to work through groups outside the party which they hope will influence a change within
the party. The Chinese have been instrumental in setting up several new pro-Chinese front organizations that have been organized in opposition to JCP-controlled front organizations in various fields. The first indication that the Chinese might openly support a splinter Communist party in Japan came in November, when the first 13 pro-Chinese party members who were expelled from the JCP left for China. According to [underline], they are involved in Chinese planning for a nationwide organization to promote a pro-China line in Japan.

Apparently, there are some elements in the JCP—including Miyamoto—who are quite prepared to risk an open break with the CCP at any time now. There are apparently no longer any direct personal contacts between the JCP and the CCP, and although it is possible for communication to be retained through interparty letters, there is no evidence that such letters have been exchanged since Miyamoto's return from China. If, as is likely, the continuing deterioration of relations brings an exchange of direct public attacks between the two parties in 1967, this will only formalize a de facto rupture of relations that has already occurred.
THE DISINTEGRATION OF
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1964: Crisis in JCP-CPSU Relations

Exactly two years ago, the JCP was engaged in an open, bitter fight with the Soviet Communist party. Both sides were direct in naming the other party in the violent polemics that became public in July 1964 and continued unabated through the summer and into the fall, up to the time of Khrushchev's ouster in October 1964.

The major turning point in JCP-CPSU relations had been the signing of the test ban treaty in July 1963; a JCP Presidium statement of 3 August had withheld support for the treaty in defiance of Moscow. The first direct public attack on the JCP to appear in Soviet media was an article in Pravda on 25 August deplores the position taken by "some JCP members" on this issue.

It was the test ban issue that set off the sequence of events that eventually led to the formation of a rival pro-Soviet Communist organization in Japan. When Shiga and Suzuki, two JCP Presidium members who were also members of the Japanese Diet, voted in favor of Japanese ratification of the treaty, they were expelled from the JCP; a few months later, after other of their supporters had also been ousted from the party, they announced the formation of a new organization, composed of these anti-party elements, which was now openly opposed to the JCP. It was the Soviets' support of the organizational challenge to the JCP posed by Shiga and his followers that was Moscow's unforgivable sin from the point of view of the JCP leaders. In the subsequent JCP-CPSU polemic in the summer of 1964, the CPSU was reviled most of all for its "subversive activities" against the JCP; the CPSU stand on the test ban treaty and the basic issue of
peaceful coexistence was attacked on a much less emotional and more routine basis.

The JCP received the news of Khrushchev's fall with obvious pleasure; the party organ immediately hailed it as a victory for JCP views. The party leaders may actually have had some hope that the new Soviet leadership would "cease its unreasonable subversive activities against our party--activities which have impaired relations between our two fraternal parties." In effect, they made this a condition to any improvement in JCP-CPSU relations.

The first indication that the CPSU would continue to support the Japanese Communist dissidents, if in a more discreet way, came almost immediately, with Shiga's trip to Moscow in early November (ostensibly to seek the facts behind Khrushchev's removal but really to get the assurance of the new Soviet leaders of continuing CPSU support). The Soviets are known to have given Shiga financial, as well as moral, support, but they apparently refused to sanction his plans to organize a political party in opposition to the JCP. They reportedly told him that his plans were "premature," that he should call his organization a "Group," not a "Party." The Soviet preference was against the formalization of a splinter Communist party in Japan and for the more informal arrangement of a pro-Soviet group of dissident Communists working

*After his return from Moscow, Shiga nevertheless announced his intention to form a new political party. From July-December 1964, his organization had been known as the "Society of Friends of the Voice of Japan." After that, its organization was made a little more formal and it was sometimes referred to as the Japanese Communist Party (Voice of Japan), but the CPSU has never officially recognized it as a Communist party, much less the Communist Party of Japan. It has run candidates for election to political office like other political parties in Japan, but in other ways it has not acted like a true political party. In fact, it is neither fish nor fowl.

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outside the party to bring pressure on the JCP to modify its pro-Chinese orientation.

Apparently Shiga thought that the new Soviet leadership might abandon him as a gesture of conciliation toward the JCP. His worst fears had not been realized, but on the other hand he had not received the all-out Soviet support that he would probably have gotten from Khrushchev. The new Soviet leadership was not prepared to make an irrevocable break with the JCP by officially recognizing Shiga and his followers as the legitimate Communist party of Japan. But they were prepared to risk alienating the JCP by supporting Shiga's pro-Soviet activities until such time as the JCP could be influenced away from its pro-Chinese stand.

The Ninth Party Congress of the JCP, held from 24 to 30 November 1964, drew the hard conclusion that the ouster of Khrushchev had not meant any real concession on the part of the CPSU to the JCP. In his report to the Congress on behalf of the Party's Central Committee, General Secretary Kenji Miyamoto advanced four conditions that the Soviet Union would have to meet if it wished to see unity restored to the world Communist movement: it would have to (1) disavow the nuclear test ban treaty, (2) drop present plans for an international Communist conference, (3) completely abandon the "revisionist" line, and (4) abandon the pro-Soviet faction of Japanese Communists. Miyamoto indicated that the JCP thought it unlikely that the CPSU would meet these conditions.

On the other hand, he gave an optimistic report on the JCP on the domestic scene, citing in particular the growth in party membership. He said that the main goal of the JCP should continue to be that of building a strong mass Party,* that the JCP program should be a

*Miyamoto's statement of domestic policy for the JCP was essentially a restatement of the policy decided at the 8th Party Congress in July 1961. At that time, a vigorous membership drive was started, and JCP strength grew from some 88,000 in 1961 to 197,000 in 1966.
legal one,* and it should include a more flexible attitude toward united action with other leftist parties, particularly the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP).** In other words, he set forth as the main task of the JCP a "democratic" revolution against "Japanese imperialism" and "monopoly capital," rather than a "socialist" revolution to attain total national power for the JCP by violent struggle.

We have no reporting on whatever opposition there may have been within the party to Miyamoto's program for the party except for one report which says:

The only element expressing views short of unanimity with the JCP leadership

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*Miyamoto had long been a leading advocate of the peaceful revolutionary tactics espoused by the Soviets and an opponent of violent, armed revolutionary tactics. He was almost completely inactive during the period of the party's "military adventurism" (1951-54) when JCP tactics were characterized by physical attacks on the police with Molotov cocktails, etc. He rose to power in the party after 1955, when the JCP leadership realized the mistake of its militant policy of the preceding years and made an abrupt about-face. In 1958 he assumed his present post as Secretary-General as "a man who has never soiled his hands" in the "extreme leftist adventurism" of previous years.

**In April 1964 the JCP had followed Chinese advice in deciding not to support a general strike that was being organized by Sohyo, the socialist labor organization. The Soviets attacked the JCP decision. Later, after the party had suffered for its refusal to support the strike, the JCP admitted that its decision had been foolish. Apparently, the incident had a profound effect on Miyamoto and the JCP leadership in changing their mind in favor of more united action with the JSP. The ultimate objective of joint action with the Socialists was to be the formation of a united front to oppose the renewal of the Japan-American Security Treaty.
was the delegation of the Yamaguchi Prefectural Committee of the JCP.*
This delegation proposed statements of identity of views with the Chinese Communist Party in stronger terms than that ultimately adopted by the Congress. . . .
Ultimately the Yamaguchi delegation joined in the unanimous approval of the Congress' resolutions.

Presumably the Yamaguchi delegation's criticism of the draft program centered on the "revolutionary tactics" to be adopted in promoting the "Japanese revolution" at home (although we have no information on the precise nature of its criticisms).**

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*The Yamaguchi Prefectural Committee had long been known throughout the JCP for its dogmatic position in support of the Chinese Communist line. It was known, for instance, that it assigned Chinese publications such as Red Flag and People's Daily as required study material for Party members under its jurisdiction (while it rejected certain materials distributed by JCP headquarters for party training) and that it listened to Radio Peking closely for political guidance. It was also known to have failed to follow certain Party Headquarters directives, such as the one on massive recruitment.

**Although we have no other specific information on the opposition to Miyamoto at the time of the Ninth Party Congress in November 1964, there were other elements within the party, besides the Yamaguchi Prefectural Committee, that are known to have favored a more militant line domestically. In 1955, when the JCP suddenly recanted the "reckless" policy of violence that the party had been following for several years, the leaders of the militant line, such as Shigeo Saida, were harshly criticized and forced to resign their various party posts; they were not expelled from the party, however. In the years after 1955, Shida and some members of his faction eventually (footnote continued on page 6)
Apparently, as a concession to the militants within the party, the JCP leadership did take certain steps to improve the covert organization of the party in late December 1964. At a meeting of the JCP Central Committee it was decided that the structure of the JCP cells throughout Japan should be reorganized so that the maximum size of any cell would be 10 members. In part, this change was prompted by the desire to strengthen JCP covert cells, especially those in enterprises. (As an example, one cell of 50 members was broken down into three or four overt cells and one or two clandestine cells.) Another organizational change was the creation of a new, covert Local Organization Committee to control all covert party organizations and activities. Although this represented a start in the direction of an organized covert party apparatus, it was not to be pushed at any risk to the major goal of building a strong mass party. Thus, although it was a concession of sorts to the militants in the party, it was not nearly enough to satisfy them or, as we shall see later, not nearly enough to satisfy the Chinese.

(Footnote continued from page 5)

left the party, but others remained in the party, waiting for a chance to strike back. In 1964, various groups of the Shida Faction—such as the Osaka group and the groups in Hokkaido and Ehime—began open activities against the party leadership such as the publication of their own, anti-JCP publications. In September 1965, these groups were finally merged under the name of the Liberation Front. The Front's program is a reiteration of the JCP's own 1951 program, characterized by militancy. The JCP first referred to the opposition of the Liberation Front in public in the 11 May 1966 Akahata editorial, which called the Front a "provocative group which is distributing slanderous leaflets against our party while flaunting extreme leftist adventurism in a sycophantish manner."
In summary, there were certain extreme elements within the party, but as of year-end 1964 the overwhelming majority of JCP party members were united behind the leadership of Chairman Sanzo Nosaka and Secretary-General Mikyamoto. Under their leadership, the JCP was a strongly pro-Chinese party in the context of the Sino-Soviet dispute, in the select company of Albania, the Indonesian Communist party, the New Zealand Communist party, North Korea, and the pro-Chinese splinter Communist parties such as the ones in Australia and Belgium. Yet in spite of its extreme pro-Chinese orientation in the world Communist dispute, it had adopted a domestic program that was much more in keeping with the Soviet line on "democratic" revolution than the Chinese line on armed struggle and domestic violence. In this regard, it was similar to the Indonesian Communist party (PKI). This parallel between the JCP and the PKI was to have a real significance in 1965 and 1966, when both parties—for different reasons and in a different way—were to experience a profound shock and undergo tremendous changes.

1965: Soviet Overtures Rejected

JCP-CPSU relations did not improve significantly during 1965, although the new lines of Soviet foreign policy, which became clearer around the middle of the year, were reflected in several Soviet moves to create a conciliatory atmosphere in dealing with the JCP. For one thing, the new Soviet leadership did not continue the violent polemical attacks on the JCP that Khrushchev had initiated. For another, it was obviously concerned not to antagonize the JCP needlessly in its contacts with the Japanese dissidents. For instance, leaders of the Voice of Japan (VOJ) were invited to pro-Soviet front meetings in their capacity as leaders in the literary or labor field, etc., rather than as political figures. In May, the CPSU and the VOJ are reported to have agreed to suspend contact for a time in order to avoid further exacerbation of relations between the CPSU and the JCP. In line with this policy, the Soviet press ceased carrying VOJ newspaper articles.
The Soviets made other concessions to the JCP in the international front movement, at a time when JCP delegates at the front meetings could be counted on to follow the Communist Chinese. The final decision of the World Peace Council (WPC) at the Helsinki Congress in July 1965 to permit only the JCP to nominate WCP members from Japan was a great disappointment to the pro-Soviet, anti-JCP Japanese in the peace movement. In another move to "preserve unity" in the Japanese peace movement, the Soviets announced that they would not send an official Soviet delegation to the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP)-sponsored Gensuikin conference, which was being held in Tokyo in August 1965 in direct competition with the JCP-sponsored Gensuikyo conference.* They reportedly told their supporters in the Japanese peace movement that they positively supported Gensuikin policy on the problems of peace, but this did not mean they could simply disregard Gensuikyo; most of all they wanted to see the two organizations reunited. The Gensuikin conference was reported to have suffered serious financial difficulties as a result of lack of support from the Soviets and the WPC.** Similarly,

*A row at the 9th annual World Conference Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs, sponsored by the JCP-led Council Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (Gensuikyo), in 1963 had prompted the Socialists' decision to convene a rival gathering in 1964 (Gensuikin). The Soviets had been instrumental in the Socialists' decision to sponsor a rival conference and had heavily subsidized the financial costs of the first Gensuikin conference. Moscow sent delegations to both conferences in 1964 but walked out of the Gensuikyo affair, charging Peking with diverting it into an anti-Soviet channel.

Although they made a public announcement that they would not attend either the Gensuikyo or the Gensuikin conference in 1965, the Soviets were in fact represented at the latter conference by several Soviet delegates who claimed to be representing international front organizations.

**Gensuikin's leaders were particularly bitter about this in view of the fact that the CCP contributed fully half of Gensuikyo's conference expenses.
the Japan-Soviet Book Center, founded in October 1964 by pro-Soviet Japanese Communists to replace the JCP-run Nauka Bookstore as the primary outlet for Soviet publications in Japan and financed by the Soviet Embassy, was having financial trouble in October 1965, primarily because the Soviets were no longer honoring their agreement to give the Book Center a monopoly in Russian books and were again providing books to the Nauka Bookstore. Kozo Kameyama, a leading dissident Communist and manager of the Soviet-subsidized Japan-Soviet Book Center, was reported to have been poorly welcomed by the Soviets when he visited Moscow in November 1965 to solicit increased Soviet help for the Center. In this and other ways, the post-Khrushchev leadership backed off from Khrushchev's policy of giving all-out support to pro-Soviet Japanese Communist dissidents in a new effort to rebuild CPSU influence with the JCP.

On the whole, Soviet policy toward Shiga and the JCP during 1965 was marked by vacillation, uncertainty, and compromise. This was especially true in the international front movement. Sometimes the JCP, sometimes Shiga, and sometimes both groups were invited to Soviet-controlled front meetings. There was no consistent Soviet line. On the one hand, the new Soviet leaders had acted to avert the final break with the JCP that Khrushchev had been heading toward. But the momentum of events was such that they had found it difficult to move in any other direction towards improving relations with the JCP. They found themselves in an equally difficult position with Shiga. They were clearly reluctant, if not unable, to abandon him; but so long as they supported him, any real improvement in JCP-CPSU relations was ruled out. Their best hope lay in the re-unification of the Japanese Communist movement, and they were already beginning to pressure Shiga in this direction in 1965.

From the point of view of the JCP, the efforts of the CPSU during 1965 to dissociate itself from Shiga's Voice of Japan organization were not convincing. Through the summer and into the fall the JCP took advantage of every possible occasion to denounce the CPSU—for signing the nuclear test ban treaty, for convening the "schismatic"
international conference of Communist parties in Moscow in March 1965, but most of all for "intervening in the internal affairs of the JCP" and for trying to undermine the Japanese peace movement and other JCP-controlled organizations; "these activities have been intensified and have become even more blatant since Khrushchev's downfall." (Akahata, 22 June 1965)

Initial JCP-CCP Differences on "United Action"

In connection with its attacks on the new Soviet leadership's decision to go ahead with Khrushchev's plan for a "preliminary meeting" of Communist parties in Moscow in March 1965, the JCP raised an old issue that was suddenly to become a major point in the Sino-Soviet dispute in 1965 and 1966--and was eventually to involve the JCP in a violent controversy with the CCP. Indeed, one can properly date the beginning of the deterioration in relations between the JCP and the CCP from the time--early in 1965--that the issue of Sino-Soviet cooperation on Vietnam began to emerge as the definitive test of Soviet and Chinese attitudes toward "united anti-imperialist struggle."

In 1963 the JCP had pressed for an alternative to the kind of Soviet-run conference that Khrushchev was planning which would formalize the split in the world Communist movement. The JCP instead wanted an international conference whose agenda and date would be unanimously agreed upon, and which would agree upon specific forms of "united action" against imperialism. In practice, what the JCP meant was Soviet commitment to policies of all-out anti-United States struggle long demanded by the Chinese. Because Khrushchev had no intention of doing this, and because Khrushchev in any case was maneuvering for a totally different kind of international conference--one that would isolate the Chinese in the world Communist movement, the JCP's call for joint action was a definite anti-Soviet and pro-Chinese move. The Chinese, the North Vietnamese, and the North Koreans all strongly supported the idea.
When the JCP began to endorse the idea of joint action again—in the winter of 1964-1965—as part of its effort to persuade the new Soviet leadership not to convene the March "preparatory" meeting of Communist parties, the subject of joint action in Vietnam was about to become a major issue of controversy between the CPSU and the CCP. In a major break with Khrushchev policy, the new Soviet leaders were now trying to reassert their influence with the North Vietnamese, to which end they were providing substantial military and political support in the war against the U.S. The joint action line on Vietnam now served their purposes in that it (1) enhanced their standing with the North Vietnamese (2) undercut Chinese arguments that the USSR was not rendering effective support in the "anti-imperialist struggle" in Vietnam, and (3) allowed them to pose as the real defenders of unity in the world Communist movement. The Chinese by then were also in the process of changing their position on joint action. As Soviet foreign policy under Brezhnev and Kosygin gradually began to meet Communist China's earlier demand for joint action, at least in Vietnam, Mao Tsetung reacted by adopting an even more extreme position. Now he was no longer willing to cooperate with the "modern revisionists" on anything. There could be no joint action with the USSR on Vietnam, or anything else.

As the subject of joint action in Vietnam became more and more a matter of public debate in the world Communist movement, the diverging views of the JCP and the CCP became more and more apparent. No doubt, the JCP's position was becoming a source of increasing embarrassment and anger to the CCP. In a noteworthy break with their usual practice of reprinting major Akahata editorials in full, the Chinese published only a summary version of the Akahata editorial of 13 April 1965; all of the references to joint action, which was a major theme in the article, were deleted. Three weeks earlier, the CCP had publicly attacked the concept of joint action for the first time in its commentary on the communiqué of the March meeting. The communiqué had specifically called for an international conference on joint action in Vietnam, the first public Soviet endorsement of a proposal the JCP had long favored.
Differences on JCP Domestic Policy

There was apparently another subject on which the JCP and the CCP were beginning to have different views around the middle of 1965, and that was the vital question (to the JCP) of the proper tactics of the JCP on the domestic scene. In keeping with the policy decided at the Eighth Party Congress in July 1961 and restated at the Ninth Congress in November 1964 that it should become a mass party rather than an exclusive revolutionary party, the JCP was carrying on a vigorous membership drive in 1965.* Miyamoto was obviously pleased with the party's expansion, and he must have realized that an important reason, if not the major reason for it, was the fact that the JCP was pursuing a moderate line with little public mention of armed revolution or violence.

As mentioned earlier, there was apparently some opposition within the JCP to Miyamoto's line on a mass organization for the JCP. In the only good report we have of differences within the party as of September 1965 it is stated that the following three points were at issue: (1) the anti-American campaign of the JCP, (2) the campaign to protest "aggression" in Vietnam, and (3) the establishment of a JCP covert apparatus in important government and industrial offices. The latter point was precisely what the Chinese were urging.

Although we know of only one instance in 1965 when the Chinese applied direct pressure on the JCP on this

*From July 1961 to September 1965 JCP strength increased from some 88,000 to 147,000 members; membership in JCP-dominated front organizations more than kept pace with party growth. Apparently, the goal of the membership drive "was 300,000 by the next Party Congress" (October 1966). It seems most unlikely that this goal was met, as party membership as of August 1966 was reported to have been 197,000.
very point, presumably there were other contacts on the same subject. On this one occasion, Liu Shao-chi, Chou En-lai, and Chen Yi are all reported to have raised the subject of a JCP "resistance movement" in separate conversations with two highly-placed JCP officials who visited China in August. Liu reportedly asked Satomi Hakamada, a member of the presidium and secretariat of the Central Committee of the JCP, and Ichiryo Sunama, a member of the Central Committee and Secretariat, what military role the JCP was prepared to assume in the event that Japan supported the U.S. in a war between China and the U.S. Liu said categorically that the JCP should start a resistance movement:

Should war (between the US and China) erupt, we are not asking that the JCP start an armed revolution in cadence with China. We request that you consider making preparations for a resistance movement by uniting the democratic forces in Japan.

When the Japanese tried to terminate the discussion by saying that the JCP had not reached the stage where it could even think about such a question, Liu pursued the subject:

If the US and China were at war and Japan supported the US, will the JCP, which should take the lead, remain within its present struggle setup and just look on?

Finally the JCP officials said they would have to confer with other JCP leaders; Liu, obviously displeased, requested that an immediate study be made as to whether or not this question could be considered by the JCP as an actual problem and not as a theoretical question.*

*The question of conducting a study on military problems from the standpoint of the JCP was brought up at a meeting of JCP leaders after Hakamada and Sunama’s return to Japan. Some of the JCP officials attending the meeting were in favor of a research group studying the question; others remained silent.
Chou En-lai also told the Japanese in August that China was seriously thinking about the possibility of war between China and the U.S. and felt that the JCP should be thinking along these lines too. He said that among all the parties friendly to China the CCP trusted the JCP most and expected the most from it. He was quite direct in offering financial assistance to the JCP as a way of pressuring it towards the Chinese line on an illegal, revolutionary struggle in Japan. The premier told Hakamada and Sunama that if the JCP wanted anything from Communist China, he would make every effort to comply with the request.

The visiting JCP officials had an interview with Mao, who may also have tried to pressure them into supporting the use of some kinds of violence, illegal action, sabotage, etc., in the revolutionary struggle in Japan. Several months later Mao was alleged to have used his own personal influence with Miyamoto in an even more blatant attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of the JCP.

It may be that the Chinese really had a special interest in the JCP's developing some capacity for illegal, paramilitary-type activities, because of the real possibility (to them) of a war between the U.S. and China and the probability of Japan's supporting the U.S. in such an event. For this reason, they may have been particularly concerned about the need for the JCP to start preparing for some kind of a resistance movement. On the other hand, the Chinese would have encouraged any good Communist party along these lines, whether there was any prospect of the country's becoming involved in a war with China or not. Thus, they may have deliberately exaggerated their concern about a war with the U.S. and Japan in order to present a compelling reason for the JCP to begin to do something about establishing a covert apparatus within the JCP. The real calculation of the Chinese leaders seems to have been that a U.S.-China war would not erupt because Peking was careful to avoid moves which would provoke Washington to attack the mainland.

The term that the Chinese used to denote the kind of action that they would like the JCP to be prepared to
undertake in the event of a U.S.-China war--namely, a "resistance-type movement"--is an ambiguous term, which encompasses a wide range of activities from demonstrations to guerrilla warfare. In view of the past history of the JCP, what the term would bring to mind to JCP cadres would probably be the kind of illegal activities--strikes, violent demonstrations, etc.--that the party engaged in during the Korean War. This is evidently what Shida, the pro-Chinese militant who left the party in the early 1950's after the JCP's disastrous experiment with these tactics, was advocating in 1965 and 1966, in opposition to the domestic line of the JCP. It would seem that this too was what the Chinese meant by the term "resistance-type movement." So what they were urging the JCP to do in the present seems to have been to establish a covert apparatus that would be trained and ready to engage at some later date in specific acts of violence, probably on a much larger scale than that carried out during the Korean War. Since the Indonesian coup and the deterioration in relations between the JCP and the CCP, however, the JCP has implied that the Chinese actually meant that the JCP should prepare for an armed uprising. Whether this is an accurate description of what Liu said or at least what the Japanese thought he meant or whether it is a disingenuous ex-post facto reading of the Chinese leader's statement can not be definitely determined.

The Indonesian Coup: A Lesson for the JCP

It was probably the Indonesian coup of September 30, 1965 that had the greatest impact on the JCP in sparking a complete rethinking by the party of its whole relationship with the CCP. The coup clearly came as a great shock to the JCP. Whether it was true or not, most JCP leaders apparently believed that the CCP was the power behind the scenes. After years of patient tactics, owing little to Maoist precept, the PKI had seemed on the verge of taking over the Indonesian government; suddenly, its leaders had apparently been persuaded by Mao to risk all and lose all in a return to violence. The role of the
Chinese in the affair must have seemed all the more real to the JCP in view of the fact that only a few weeks before the coup Communist China's leaders had—as it seemed to the JCP—been urging much the same thing on the JCP.*

Taking the view that the PKI was guilty of left-wing adventurism in carrying out a coup on Chinese advice without adequate preparations, Miyamoto and other leaders of the JCP saw the Indonesian coup as a timely warning of the danger of following the Communist Chinese line blindly. Although they had always professed to follow an independent line in the world Communist movement, they had obviously become increasingly subservient to Communist China and the JCP had become closely identified with the CCP in the public mind. After the Indonesian coup, the

*As noted above, the Chinese do not seem to have been urging the JCP to undertake any such military action as the Indonesian coup. However, the JCP would probably have seen this as the logical extension of the Chinese argument that the JCP begin to make preparations for a resistance-type movement. There is no doubt that the JCP, and other Communist parties as well, believed that the CCP had been involved in the Indonesian coup. The North Korean party, for example, had this to say about the affair in its secret directive to party members living in Japan:

The Korean Labor Party (KLP) views the PKI failure as an important lesson. The PKI over-estimated its strength, purely on the basis of its large membership, and ventured into ultra-left adventurism. The PKI's own insufficient capability was further weakened by interference from China. A move toward the extreme left, when made without an accurate analysis of the conditions confronting the party, could lead a nation to its ruin.
JCP leaders apparently decided that it was not in the best interests of the JCP to be so closely identified with Peking. The coup had been a timely reminder to them of the dangers of relying too much on outside advice and outside support, no matter how friendly or how powerful the advising party might be. Even Communist China could be wrong, and, in some cases, as apparently in the case of the Indonesian coup, its bad advice could all but wreck another Communist party.*

According to[______________], the need for the JCP to adopt an independent line was being discussed at party meetings during November and December 1965. Miyamoto was reported to be taking the lead in advocating a firm, independent course without reliance on any foreign party.

The Russians appear to have been among the first to appreciate the anti-CCP impact of the Indonesian coup on the JCP and to have sensed the change in thinking in the Japanese party. They were quick to take advantage of it in order to hasten the JCP shift to a more assertive independent position. Around December, they appear to have taken several initiatives to restore communications with the JCP and this time, in contrast to occasions

*Apparently, the Indonesian coup was interpreted differently by the militants within the party who were opposed to Miyamoto's line on a strong mass party. Whereas to Miyamoto the Indonesian coup illustrated the great danger in accepting outside advice on the crucial question of the proper tactics of the JCP on the domestic scene, the militants saw the failure of the Indonesian coup as a lesson that it is not the expansion of party membership but the development of a combatant party structure which makes a party strong. They argued that it was better to have a small revolutionary party with fighting power than a large, overt party which might give the appearance of strength but (like the PKI) not really be strong when it comes to a showdown.
earlier in the year, the JCP was more responsive to their overtures. After his visit to China in September and October, Satomi Hakamada went on to North Korea where he is reported to have held discussions with unidentified Soviets; as far as is known, this was the first CPSU-JCP contact, other than in party correspondence, in over a year. There is an unconfirmed report that the Soviets, acting through the Russian Embassy in Tokyo, proposed to the JCP on 18 November that friendly relations between the two parties be re-established. The JCP, after a conference held on this matter, is reported to have agreed to accept the Soviet proposal if the Soviets would guarantee in writing that no future attacks would be launched against the JCP.

By mid-November, the Soviets were apparently sufficiently convinced of a real change in JCP thinking that they began to take soundings on the possibility of the JCP attending an international Communist conference to be held in conjunction with the 23rd Soviet Party Congress scheduled for late March 1966. A senior official of the Soviet Embassy in Tokyo was reported to have made the following remarks on 26 November:

If the opening of the World Communist Party Conference might be helpful in solving the Vietnam issue, such a conference will be held in the spring of next year.

The Soviet Union is putting out feelers to the world's Communist Parties, and only Communist China is proving hostile. North Vietnam and North Korea agree to the Conference if it will improve North Vietnam's image.* The Indonesian

*The Soviets almost certainly had no definite assurances from North Vietnam and North Korea as early as November 1965 that they would attend a world Communist party conference in the spring. The above statement by the Soviet official to the effect that North Vietnam and North Korea had agreed to attend was apparently part of the Soviet line to enlist the JCP behind the Soviet effort to convene such a conference.
Communist Party has remained silent. The matter that will pose the most serious problem is the attitude of the JCP. The Soviet Union has sent Kharin, former Secretary-General of the Japan-Soviet Society, to negotiate with the JCP. Until a conclusion is reached, acting Ambassador Rozanov is scheduled to remain in Moscow to continue discussions with the Party Central Committee...

The USSR has detected a subtle change in the attitude of the JCP leaders following the attempted coup in Indonesia. Leaders of the Japan-Soviet Society and the Japan Peace Committee, formerly the most vociferous anti-Soviet groups, have begun to take a more cautious attitude toward the USSR. The fact that Ogata Shoji and Inoue Tadao are beginning to advocate the unification of the Japan-Soviet friendship groups is also an encouraging sign. The Soviet Union, however, still does not trust Hakamada, Mitsuhiro Kaneku, and Yoshitaro Hirano.

Secretary-General Miyamoto, Massayoshi Oka, and Tomio Nishizawa seem to be greatly shocked by Indonesia's experience. For this reason, the JCP will probably strengthen its position and pursue the line of Communist China less closely, preferring to expand Party influence and establish a united front. The Soviet Union welcomes such action.

There is still the possibility that the JCP will back the Chinese policy of opposing the World Communist Party Conference. The Soviet Union is therefore secretly working on the JCP, but with undetermined results.

It should be underlined that the Soviet official made these comments in November 1965, less than two months after the
Indonesian coup and well before the change in JCP thinking had been detected by the non-Communist world. His analysis of current attitudes in the JCP and his estimate of the future course of the JCP in the short run were later proven to be remarkably perceptive. In view of the change in thinking in the JCP, he regarded it as an open question whether the JCP would attend a world Communist conference or not.

In January 1966 the Soviet representatives in Tokyo were ordered to begin a program of collection of information on attitudes of the JCP in preparation for the 23rd Soviet Party Congress. TASS correspondent Drozdov is known to have instructed to write an assessment of the current JCP attitude toward the CPSU. Drozdov stated that the report would be used as part of the study material for the Congress which would take up the question of the JCP as a major subject. In another case, a Japanese employee of the TASS office in Tokyo was instructed to begin a concentrated program of collecting materials from the Japanese press on the activities and attitudes of the JCP for transmission to Moscow. The intensive Soviet intelligence collection effort on the JCP may well have been in anticipation of a major discussion of the JCP at the Soviet Party Congress, but it was probably also for the more immediate purpose of determining whether the JCP was likely or not to accept a Soviet invitation to the Congress and/or a world Communist conference held in conjunction with the Soviet Congress.

Miyamoto in China: A Futile Trip

When Miyamoto and his delegation of six other JCP
officials* left on their trip to Communist China, North Vietnam, and North Korea in early February 1966, the CPSU had not yet sent out the formal invitations to foreign Communist parties to the Soviet Party Congress. It is clear that the question of whether or not they would be invited was very much on the JCP leaders' minds. Apparently, they hoped they would be and, if so, they did plan to attend. According to one report the JCP delegation intended to discuss with the Chinese the desirability of trying to obtain an invitation to the Congress. The party leadership seems to have been most concerned that Shiga and his group of dissident Japanese Communists would be invited and the JCP would not; they feared that a Soviet invitation to the dissident group would add considerable prestige to the latter's cause.

Sometime in mid-January 1966 the JCP had received a report that a conference of European and Asiatic Communist parties—not a world Communist party conference—would be held in Moscow after the Soviet Party Congress to discuss the matter of Communist aid to North Vietnam. If there were any prospect of such a conference being held, it was the JCP plan to attend the conference—"if circumstances permitted (i.e. if the JCP was invited).

(At the conference) we planned to present a joint proposal with the parties of North Vietnam and North Korea calling for drastic amendments to the special report expected to be submitted by the Soviet Communist Party. We further intended to exert efforts towards drafting a policy to draw the Soviet

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*Miyamoto's delegation included three members of the Presidium of the Central Committee—Masayoshi Oka, the editor-in-chief of Akahata, Itaru Yoncharan and Korchito Kurahara—and three members of the Central Committee—Akira Kudo, Kuichiro Ueda, and Kenjiro Ueda. It was the largest and most important delegation that the JCP had ever sent abroad.
Union into the North Vietnam aid movement and thus strengthen this movement. In this way, we intended to essentially push the dispute surrounding the international Communist movement a step forward in the direction of unifying the Communist Bloc. (Miyamoto's secret report to the JCP Executive Council meeting on 5 April 1966)

A major purpose of Miyamoto's trip to China seems to have been to get Communist China's acquiescence in the JCP plan to attend the conference.* Before attending any such conference, however, Miyamoto was anxious to verify the actual extent of Soviet aid to North Vietnam. In his secret report on his trip to the JCP Executive Council, he explained:

Our plan was to visit both North Vietnam and North Korea to obtain a frank report from the Party leaders of these two countries on the extent of actual military and economic aid received from the Soviet Union. Our plan was to remain in these two countries until we got that frank report. It was also our plan to confirm with our own eyes the actual state of such aid.

As far as his trip to China was concerned, Miyamoto was primarily concerned to point out JCP disagreement with one major Chinese policy: the policy of denouncing all Soviet aid to North Vietnam. It was quite obvious at the time that the JCP was in disagreement with the CCP on this question, and it was assumed that the Japanese would try

*Actually, the conference was a dead letter by the time Miyamoto left Japan for China--because of North Vietnam's refusal to attend. It is somewhat surprising that Miyamoto did not know that, but apparently he had not yet been so informed. He learned it from the Chinese when he arrived in Shanghai.
to convince the Chinese of the need for a coordinated Communist effort in Vietnam. That was the main thrust of the 4 February Akahata editorial which set the key note for Miyamoto's journey. (In other regards, the editorial was strongly anti-Soviet.)*

In their paranoid state of mind, the Chinese leaders would probably have viewed Miyamoto's trip to China to discuss the subject of joint action with the CCP as a definite anti-China move.**

But Miyamoto probably did not see in that way. It seems that he really thought there was some flexibility in the Chinese position and he might have some influence with the Chinese in getting Peking to participate in some kind of a joint Communist effort in North Vietnam. In this, he was, of course, completely naive. Although he would have expected the Chinese to disagree with him and to resist many of his suggestions, he apparently did not anticipate anything like the hostility which the Chinese showed him. He seems to have been genuinely surprised and shocked at his reception in China.

According to (suppressed text), Miyamoto also intended to explain to the Chinese leaders the need felt by the JCP to disassociate itself from total identity with Chinese positions in the world Communist movement. In this regard, the delegation intended to point to the present precarious situation of the PKI to demonstrate the inappropriateness of the JCP following blindly Chinese tactics in all matters, even though the JCP continued to agree with most Chinese policies (especially toward the U.S.) and still rejected the "modern revisionism" of the CPSU.

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*As the definite statement of the JCP position on unity of action, the 4 February 1966 Akahata editorial is a major document on international Communist relations this year.

**Victor G. Wilcox, Secretary General of the Communist Party of New Zealand (CPNZ), was in Peking for ten days during early March, when the JCP delegation was also there. In his report to the CPNZ Political Committee on his talks with the Chinese, Wilcox said that the Chinese had said that they thought the CPSU was very cunning in its appeal for unity and they admitted that the Soviets had had some success in this respect. For instance, the JCP reaction had been very disturbing to Peking. The Chinese felt that the JCP delegation had, probably unwittingly, strengthened the pro-Soviet element in Hanoi by its trip to North Vietnam and that in visiting Korea it had again become the "unconscious agents of modern revisionism." This is a good indication of how the Chinese felt about the JCP as early as March 1966 and that (footnote continued on page 24)
Finally, the delegation was to register JCP objections to Communist China's insistence that the JCP recognize splinter pro-Chinese Communist parties in such countries as Belgium, France, and Italy, on the grounds that this was harmful to JCP relations with the majority Communist parties in these countries and also that it tended to establish the legality of splinter parties including pro-Soviet splinter groups such as Shiga's Voice of Japan.

The JCP delegation was in China a total of 35 days, from 9-17 February, 28 February-11 March, and 21 March-4 April; in between, it visited North Vietnam and North Korea. In Shanghai, where the delegation first arrived, Miyamoto had talks with Peng Chen and Liu Ning-i. It was they who informed Miyamoto that the European and Asiatic Nations' Party Conference would not be held in Moscow right after the Soviet Party Congress as Miyamoto had expected. Peng Chen is reported to have scoffed at the JCP's idea of going to Moscow to propose amendments and to try to draw the Soviet Union into a unified Communist effort in support of North Vietnam. He brushed aside the whole idea of joint Soviet-Chinese action to assist North Vietnam as "wishful thinking," and the subject was summarily dropped.

After its return from North Vietnam, the delegation continued its talks with the Chinese leaders. Except for Mao, all the top-ranking party leaders, including Liu Shao-chi, Chou En-lai, Teng Hsiao-ping, Tao Chu, Li Fu-chun, and Li Hsien-nien, participated in these meetings, which took place in Peking. (According to Miyamoto, these talks with the CCP Central Committee members took up at least five full days of the ten days he was in Peking.) Next, the JCP delegation went on to North Korea, where it stayed approximately 10 days.

While Miyamoto was in Pyongyang, the JCP received a telegram from the CPSU inviting it to the Soviet Party Congress; thus, when Miyamoto returned to Peking on 21 March, the question of whether the JCP would attend the Congress or not was a major issue. According to Miyamoto disclosed to the Chinese that the JCP had decided to send one senior party member accompanied by two or three others to Moscow. The Chinese were fiercely opposed. The ensuing conversations are reported to have become quite heated. On one occasion, they did indeed view the JCP delegation's trip to Communist China, North Vietnam, and North Korea as an "anti-China move."
when the JCP delegation implicitly criticized the CCP by saying "We oppose modern revisionism and opportunism but we also oppose doctrinalism and sectionalism," Teng is said to have rebutted: "The CCP has not fallen into doctrinalism." When the JCP explained the necessity of an international unified struggle by emphasizing that "the Soviet Union is indispensable in the struggle to support North Vietnam," the CCP retorted "Then you are able to compromise with the Shiga group?"--(i.e. then the JCP is willing to work with revisionists in Japan?)

The JCP was finally impelled to abandon its plan to attend the Soviet congress after encountering the determined opposition of the CCP leaders at these meetings. Miyamoto had the following to say in his secret report to the JCP Executive Council meeting:

We had considered sending a small delegation of two or three men headed by Oka to the Party Congress, but this idea was ultimately abandoned as the Chinese expressed opposition to it. As the European and Asiatic Nations' Party Conference in Moscow had been called off, the necessity of the three parties from Japan, North Vietnam and North Korea to submit a joint proposal for 'greater unified action to support North Vietnam' had naturally ceased. Consequently, there was no necessity for us to go all the way to Moscow to attend the controversial Soviet Party Congress.

The Chinese were obviously pleased with the success of their pressure tactics. During the 10 days that Miyamoto was in Peking in early March, they had accorded him a very low key reception for a man of his stature. Practically no information was made available on his activities at the time. When he returned to Peking after his visit to North Korea, there was also no word on his movements for several days. Suddenly JCP party headquarters in Tokyo announced that the JCP had declined
Moscow's invitation, and that night Miyamoto was given a banquet in Peking. The next day, on 26 March, the CCP staged a rally in Peking in honor of the visiting JCP delegation; Peng Chen spoke in elaborate praise of the JCP, noting in particular its refusal to attend the Soviet Congress.

If the Chinese had reason to be pleased with their immediate victory, they had cause to be concerned about the long-term effects on the JCP of their tactics in winning their point over the Japanese. It is now clear beyond a doubt that Miyamoto and other leaders of the JCP were shocked and outraged by the Chinese high-handed pressure tactics. Actually, they may not have been so unhappy about their final decision not to attend the Soviet Party Congress as they were about the circumstances surrounding that decision. (The party leadership does seem to have been divided on the issue of whether or not to attend.) But regardless of their thoughts or second-thoughts about whether the JCP should have been represented at the Congress, they definitely resented the Chinese pressure on the JCP on the matter. And they were terribly embarrassed that they were made to look like nothing more than puppets of the CCP in the eyes of the world. The question of JCP attendance at the Congress had gained international prominence after the Chinese had announced their decision (on 23 March) to boycott the meeting. (North Vietnam and North Korea had already said they would attend.) For three days, from the 23rd until the 25th, when the JCP finally announced its decision not to attend the Congress, Akahata made no reference to the Chinese boycott or to the JCP attitude toward the Congress. The party was obviously attempting to give an appearance of independence from the Chinese. But, of course, the whole episode gave just the opposite appearance, and the world press played it up in stories that pointed out the isolation of the Chinese and the Japanese in the world Communist movement. The JCP was particularly sensitive about the many articles appearing in the Japanese press that were remarkably accurate in their conjecture about what had actually happened during the JCP-CCP talks in Peking. The emphatic public denials by Miyamoto on his return to Japan that the JCP had been pressured by the CCP not to
attend the Soviet Congress—in fact a denial that the JCP had even discussed the matter of JCP attendance at the Congress with the Chinese—were a rather obvious and unconvincing effort by Miyamoto to dispel the notion that the JCP had yielded to CCP dictation in Peking.

After the rally in Peking on 26 March, Miyamoto spent his last several days in Peking working on the draft of a joint communiqué with the CCP. Under the circumstances, this was probably a very time-consuming business. Since Mao's approval was necessary before the release of the communiqué, Chou En-lai, Teng Hsiao-ping and apparently Miyamoto too (plus three other CC officials and three members of the JCP delegation) flew to Canton to obtain his approval.* In every respect, the Mao-Miyamoto meeting was the climax to the JCP-CCP talks which had been characterized by discord, high-handed pressure tactics on the part of the CCP, and JCP shock and dismay. According to [ ], Mao tried for two hours to convince the JCP leader that war between the Chinese and Americans was likely and that the JCP should

*There is conflicting evidence as to whether or not the JCP delegation met Mao during its visit to China. Apparently, the delegation as a formal body did not. Possibly the four members of the delegation (Miyamoto, Masayoshi, Oka, Koreto Kurahara, and Itaru Yonehara), who are reported to have gone to Canton with Chou, Teng, Chao An-po, Tao Chu, and Kang Sheng met Mao, or possibly only Oka and Miyamoto. The weight of the evidence is that Miyamoto, at least, did see Mao, and the account of the meeting given above is based on the several reports from different sources that describe such a meeting. The reports are vague as to the time and place of the meeting; they say only that it took place "between 28 March and 4 April at a health resort outside Canton." (Miyamoto is known to have gone to Canton at the end of his official visit to China for the purpose of visiting his polio-stricken son who was recuperating at a hot springs resort in Tsunghua near Canton.)
aid the Chinese by supplying information on military deployments in Japan and by preparing to resist the use of Japan by the U.S. as a base for war operations. In criticizing the JCP for its failure to use revolutionary tactics, Mao argued that demonstrations, such as those staged by the JCP, which are "completely sandwiched by the police" were utterly ineffective. He told Miyamoto that the JCP was spending too much effort and too much money on parliamentary politics in Japan. Miyamoto is reported to have responded that the situation in Japan was quite different from that in China. Then he is alleged to have countered with the "united front" proposal of the JCP for joint Soviet-Chinese Communist aid to North Vietnam, which Mao is reported to have rejected as out of the question on the grounds that no cooperation was possible with "revisionists." According to Mao then launched into a denunciation of the joint statement drawn up by Miyamoto and Chou, in the process of which he made some very sarcastic remarks to Miyamoto. It was the latter's feeling that the Chinese party leader vetoed the communiqué because he would not agree to Mao's demands that the JCP undertake illegal political activities.

Although it seems almost incredible that a national leader would veto a joint communiqué after it had been approved by his own officials at such a high level and that he would do it in such a display of arrogance and tactlessness in the presence of a foreign Communist party leader, the reports of Mao's behavior at his meeting with Miyamoto are plausible in view of what we know of Mao and his mood in late March of this year. Commenting on the way he treated Chou, Miyamoto reported that Mao reminded him of Stalin in his last days. One can imagine the effect on Miyamoto of Mao's launching into a tirade against JCP policies in the course of what should normally have been a final courtesy call on Mao for the formal signing of the joint communiqué. That Mao should have pressed the argument that the JCP should be prepared for a resistance type movement in the face of determined opposition from Miyamoto in earlier talks with Liu and Chou shows his contempt for any and all views but his own. As far as he was concerned, there would be no compromise; either
Miyamoto would agree to his policy for the JCP, or he would not sign any joint statement with the JCP. Also, the fact that he would argue so strongly for a program of illegal activities for the JCP at such an inopportune time, when the example of the Indonesian disaster was still fresh in everyone’s mind, is a good example of Mao’s fanaticism, his utter disregard of objective factors. Although he had just suffered a series of major foreign policy reversals in 1966--in the Congo, in Ghana, in Indonesia, in Cuba--he was not prepared to make any tactical concessions.

From the point of view of the JCP, Miyamoto’s visit to Communist China was a complete failure. The JCP plea for "unity of action" in Vietnam was virtually ignored; Miyamoto could have had little hope left that the CCP would ever agree to joint action with the CPSU.* If the delegation had hoped to find the Chinese at least understanding of, though of course not happy about, the JCP’s new felt need to dissociate itself from total identity with the CCP position, it found instead a completely intractible Chinese party leader who was not prepared to tolerate any dissent, who demanded total support and drew a clear line between those foreign Communists who were subservient allies and those who were independent opponents. In a masterpiece of understatement, Miyamoto concluded of his visit: "The outcome of our two-months' visit to the three nations differed somewhat from our initial expectations."

*Miyamoto had hoped that by obtaining joint communiqués with the North Vietnamese and the North Korcans endorsing joint action he could influence the Chinese to sign a communiqué with at least some kind of a compromise statement on unity of action in the international Communist movement; but he found the Chinese intransigent. Apparently, JCP Presidium member Korchito Kurahara stayed behind in Peking on Miyamoto’s instructions in the hope of a last minute change of heart on the part of the Chinese, but to no avail.
In contrast to its experiences in Communist China, however, the JCP delegation found a good deal of support for its views in North Vietnam and North Korea, particularly the latter. Although the North Vietnamese leaders were careful to avoid undue provocation of the Chinese (they did not mention "unity of action" in any of their speeches during the JCP delegation's visit, and the concept was not discussed in the VWP-JCP communiqué at the end of the visit), they referred to the 'Vietnamese-Japanese unity of minds,' which implied North Vietnamese agreement with the JCP on this and other positions that the Chinese opposed. In North Korea, the JCP delegation apparently found unreserved support for its position on "unity of action." If anything, the North Koreans were ahead of the Japanese in their anti-Chinese thinking, and they probably did more to encourage the JCP in its new independent stance than anyone else. It is impossible to exaggerate the importance of North Korean moral support and encouragement of the JCP at this time. Without doubt, the JCP found it easier to contemplate a marked deterioration in relations with the CCP in the knowledge that it had a friend and ally at its side. There has definitely been a mutually reinforcing effect in the growing disputes between North Korea and Communist China and the JCP and Communist China.

Spring-Summer 1966: The Widening Split

Miyamoto's trip to Communist China was probably the turning point in the JCP's dispute with Peking. Whereas before the trip there were differences between the two parties, after the trip there was a new emotional intensity about the quarrel that gave it an impetus of its own. Tempers on both sides were obviously high. Otherwise, the dispute would not have progressed as far and as quickly as it has. This last section of this paper will review the fast-moving events of the past six months during which time the JCP-CCP dispute has erupted into a bitter, public fight which has seen the CCP take definite anti-JCP actions in Japan and go so far toward a break in relations as to take no action to send a delegation to the JCP 10th Party Congress, which opened on 24 October.
The first public indication that the JCP had been under heavy CCP pressure while Miyamoto and his delegation were in China (aside from the circumstantial evidence of the JCP decision not to attend the Soviet Party Congress—which in itself suggested Chinese pressure) appeared in the Tokyo airport statement of party chairman Sanzo Nosaka welcoming Miyamoto and the delegation home (4 April). Nosaka remarked cryptically: "We believe that you have met with various difficulties." At his press conference on 5 April, Miyamoto appeared highly defensive about the reports appearing in the press about Chinese pressure on the JCP, particularly on the matter of JCP participation in the Soviet Party Congress. He felt it necessary to deny in public that the delegation had even discussed this matter with the Chinese. His ex-post facto rationalization that it was "obvious" and "self-evident" that JCP policy had been against attending the congress was unconvincing:

We have been following a policy of adhering to our independent policy no matter what happens... As regards the JCP attitude toward the 23rd CPSU Congress, there should have been no question, since our party's stand itself answers the question. Still, some reports speculated that China decided on its attitude towards the CPSU Congress and that we then followed it. At the Peking talks, however, this problem was not discussed at all.

...It was obvious that the JCP had absolutely no intention of attending the conference. This was self-evident even before our departure for China. The only remaining question was whether the CPSU would ask us to attend its congress or not. Even if the CPSU had asked us before our departure, we knew by that time that we would not send a delegation.

When Miyamoto reported on his mainland trip to the 4th plenum of the JCP central committee, which met on
April 28 and 29, there was no indication that he had lost status in the party because of the lack of success of his mission to China. Apparently, it was the view of the great majority of party members that he had done a good job in a very difficult situation, much as Chairman Nosaka said in his welcoming speech on 4 April:

During the past two months you...have had heart-to-heart talks with the fraternal parties of three countries regarding the important problems of the times, and you have flawlessly fulfilled the task assigned to you. We are exceedingly pleased with this, and at the same time we believe your achievements will turn out to be of great epoch-making significance in the future advance of our party and other democratic forces of Japan and also in the unity and the advance of the international Communist movement.

We believe that you have met with various difficulties, and we really appreciate the complete discharge of your assignments. We heartily welcome you home!

The plenum was crucial in the history of the JCP. Miyamoto's policies came under strong attack from the extreme pro-Chinese left wing of the party, but in a showdown, the Miyamoto forces apparently won a substantial victory.*

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*Although Miyamoto attempted to stress the positive aspects of his delegation's conversations with North Vietnamese and North Korean leaders, he was persistently queried by provincial Central Committee members on the reasons why there had been no final communiqué resulting from the delegation's discussions with the Chinese. Miyamoto gave as the reason for the absence of a final communiqué, the inability of the two sides to reach an agreement on questions of international Communist action in support of North Vietnam. (He was apparently careful not to play into the hands of the pro-Chinese forces within the party by telling of Mao's strong stand in favor of (footnote continued on page 33)
The effect of Miyamoto's victory at the plenum was that the JCP leadership was no longer restrained in expressing its true feelings towards the Chinese Communists. In that sense, the plenum was the turning point in the JCP's conduct of its quarrel with the CCP. It was also the turning point in its handling of the opposition within the party; apparently a decision was made at the plenum to take firm action against the extreme left-wing elements in the party as the leadership had done in the case of the anti-party "revisionist" Shiga group.

Two incidents following immediately upon the return of the Miyamoto delegation signaled a new assertion on the part of the JCP of "independence" from the Chinese. For the first time, the Japanese party refused to join the Chinese and their satellites at the New Zealand Party Congress.* Also, as noted in a very brief comment on the front page of the 7 April issue of Akahata, a JCP delegation attended an official social event at the Hungarian Embassy in Tokyo, the first official JCP attendance

*(footnote continued from page 32)*

more militant tactics for the JCP and his resistance to such a line.) In defending the position which the JCP delegation took on joint action in defiance of the Chinese, Miyamoto insisted that the delegation had not acted hastily or willfully, but had carefully based its stand on the decisions of the 9th Party Congress which had stressed the independent nature of the JCP.

*The JCP was first sounded out as to whether or not it planned to attend the New Zealand party congress by the Chinese in the course of the JCP-CCP discussions in Peking. Miyamoto is reported to have felt that attendance at the congress would give a false impression that the JCP was under the control of the Chinese; in addition, the JCP leadership felt that it would be tactically incorrect to be present at a meeting attended by the Belgian pro-Chinese splinter Communist party. (JCP attendance at the NZCP meeting would have amounted to tacit recognition of the Belgian dissident party and would have undermined JCP denunciation of the Soviet support of Japanese dissident Communist groups.)

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at a function of this type sponsored by a European satellite in many years.

The first phase of the JCP program to make its current position clear became apparent on 21 April in the speeches of JCP Presidium members Itaru Yonehara and Maysayoshi Oka, both members of the Miyamoto delegation to China, at a public meeting organized by the JCP. Neither left much doubt that the JCP leadership had decided to reject all attempts by the Chinese to control it. Each declared in turn, and with great emphasis, that Communism could advance in Japan only to the extent that it responded to purely Japanese conditions. Yonehara spelled out four internal enemies of the development of such a correct and efficacious JCP line—revisionism, dogmatism, opportunism, and "toadyism"—the last a term which was clearly explained to mean dependence of a Communist party on direction from any other "great power" Communist party. Oka, in an obvious reference to JCP-Chinese relations, said that neither the JCP nor any other Communist party should act like a chick under the wing of a mother hen.

In rejecting both the experiences and the advice of "great power" Communist parties as being binding on the JCP, Yonehara singled out three Communist nations whose success should be applauded and whose policies merited special study—North Korea, Rumania, and Cuba. As was well known, each had recently successfully defied a Communist great power. The praise which Yonehara heaped on North Korea was a natural consequence of the JCP's increasingly close relationship with the NKLP, which was considerably enhanced by Miyamoto's visit to Pyongyang. In May, the JCP took a major step toward improving relations with the second of these countries, when it sent a goodwill mission led by Presidium member Shoichi Kasuga to Bucharest for unusually lengthy talks with Rumanian party officials. In striking contrast to Chou En-lai's stormy visit to Rumania within a short period of the JCP delegation's visit there and the conspicuous absence of a joint RWP-CCP communiqué at the conclusion of Chou's talks with the Rumanians, the RWP and the JCP apparently found themselves in basic agreement in their desire for greater flexibility within the international Communist
movement, which would give individual parties more freedom to act in accordance with the realities in their own countries. At a time when Chinese relations with neutralist Communist parties like Cuba and Rumania were fast deteriorating—because of Mao's obsessive demand for total subservience—JCP ties with these parties were growing much stronger.

In May, the JCP began to make indirect references to the CCP in the party press. On 11 May Akahata published for the first time an article criticizing "dogmatist and sectarian views" in the international Communist movement and warning against overplaying the fight against revisionism to the point where effective opposition to "U.S. imperialism is virtually eliminated." Clearly reflecting JCP concern over Chinese pressure on the JCP to follow the CCP line, the editorial said that the previous expulsion of pro-Soviet elements in the party did not mean that struggle within the party against subservience to foreign parties was no longer necessary. It deplored the "trends of flunkyism and dogmatism (in the JCP) in the form of unconditionally revering the leadership of foreign parties, attaching greater importance to the publications of foreign comrade parties than to the classics of Marxism-Leninism or publications of our party and trying to judge our country's problems from such standards." The editorial revealed that the "anti-party dogmatist elements" had formed an opposition Communist party called the "JCP (Liberation Front)" and charged that the new party was "flaunting extreme left-wing adventurerist assertions with a subservient attitude" and "openly starting overt activities to disrupt our party, which it slanders as being 'revisionist.'"

As of 31 May, Akahata had stopped carrying all important articles taken from Chinese Communist papers, including People's Daily, and had begun to use foreign dispatches of Soviet affiliation, which were never published

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*For background information on the Liberation Front, see the footnote on pages 5-6.
in the past.* A new column, called "TASS Dispatch," was established. In another highly significant development, Akahata stopped listing the daily broadcast schedules from Radio Peking, Radio Hanoi, and Radio Pyongyang in June.** By then, almost all JCP publications had dropped the advertisements of Mao's writings, then on sale in Japan.*** In retaliation, Chinese Communist media stopped reprinting all Akahata articles; until May 1966, such items had appeared regularly in People's Daily several times a week.

On 10 June, Akahata published a second major article on the theme of the II May Akahata editorial attacking subservience to the views of any foreign party; this article went beyond the earlier editorial, however, in directly naming the Chinese party.**** It explicitly

*A review of Akahata's "Antenna" column, which carries short international news items credited to foreign press agencies, showed that in January the column devoted some 55% of its space to NCNA items, 35% to TASS, and 10% to KCNA. In the period 21 May to 20 June, these percentages had changed to 25% for NCNA, 35% for TASS, 20% for KCNA, and 20% for UPI.

**The JCP apparently included North Vietnam and North Korea in the blackout of radio schedules so as not to make it an obvious anti-China move. But the target was clearly Radio Peking.

***The second volume of Mao's Selected Works had only recently been translated into Japanese by a special committee formed by the central committee of the JCP; it had been on sale in Japan since 7 December. The fourth and first volumes, also translated by the committee, had been published earlier; the third volume was due off the press some time around May.

****This article is an exception to the general JCP policy still being followed of avoiding direct mention of the CCP in the public polemics at this stage of the JCP-CCP dispute. In the history of recent disputes between Communist parties, such as the Sino-Soviet dispute, it is not uncommon for there to be an occasional direct reference (footnote continued on page 37)
rejected the view attributed to the Chinese that the Sino-Soviet quarrel is between Marxism-Leninism and modern revisionism and the conclusion that Chinese policies must therefore be followed. While reaffirming the JCP view that modern revisionism is the main danger in the international Communist movement, it warned that "in recent months dogmatism has been strengthened in Communist and other movements both at home and abroad and it is adversely affecting the progress of the struggle against imperialism and modern revisionism." It pointedly cited the history of the CCP in the 1930's to substantiate the warning that "once dogmatism becomes predominant in a party it is as poisonous as revisionism" and that dogmatism and sectarianism can bring "even greater damage than revisionism to the revolutionary cause" in a country where it "poisons" the Communist leadership. As a final note, Akahata expressly rejected the notion that there is "the guiding center around which the international struggle should be organized"—a claim that was prevalent in Chinese propaganda at the time.

Although by June Akahata had brought its dispute with Peking out into the open with a direct attack on the CCP on international matters in dispute in the world Communist movement, it had not—and still has not—made any critical comment on internal developments in Communist China—meaning Mao's cultural revolution. All during this period, the Japanese party organ maintained complete silence on the subject of the great events that were shaking

(Footnote continued from page 36)

to the other party before the dispute has reached the stage of direct name calling on a general level. For instance, Khrushchev made an occasional direct reference to the Chinese in public in the fall of 1962, many months before the CPSU began to attack the CCP directly in all its major articles on the Sino-Soviet dispute. The JCP-CCP dispute has not reached this last stage, although it looks as though it will not be long before it does.
China. In June, after Peng Chen had been reported elsewhere to have been purged, not one line appeared on the subject. In mid-July, when the paper had still not printed a word about the purge, Massayoshi Oka, the editor of Akahata, gave the following belabored editorial explanation why Akahata was boycotting news about Communist China:

(Akahata) must be especially prudent in handling issues concerning the Communist and workers parties of other countries. There are occasions when it is not proper to give a full report on an incident or an issue concerning other parties. There are also occasions when giving an assessment of such an issue would be ill-timed. It is often not proper for Akahata to comment on policies of such parties, even though it may not approve of them.... Simply because the bourgeois press takes up (problems of Communist parties) it does not mean that Akahata, too, must offer unprincipled comments and criticism. If it did so, it would merely please the imperialist and reactionary forces and would not serve the interest of the international Communist movement at all.

Probably because a basic complaint of the JCP against the CCP was on the score of the CCP's interference in the internal affairs of the JCP (i.e. Chinese dictation of domestic policy for the JCP), the Japanese party did not want to appear guilty of the same thing—of passing judgment on domestic policy in Communist China. For this reason, the party leadership may have decided that it was best that Akahata make no critical comment on the cultural revolution. It was their apparent view that official silence on the subject would be interpreted as disapproval.

In private, however, JCP officials have expressed feelings of shock and revulsion at events going on in China. Koreto Kurahara, chief of the JCP cultural department and a member of the Miyamoto delegation to China is
reported to have made a scathing attack on Peking at a secret party meeting on 14 June. Among other things, he criticized the cultural revolution for its "penchant for drawing a clear line between good and bad in dealing with practically everything."

The Gensuikyo Conference Debacle

The annual spectacle of the ban-the-bomb conferences in Tokyo every August was particularly noteworthy this August because of what it revealed about the state of relations between the JCP and the CCP. A high-powered Chinese delegation led by Liu Ning-i was actually on its way to Japan to attend the JCP-sponsored Gensuikyo conference (it had reached Hong Kong) when the Japanese Government (GOJ) refused to grant Liu Ning-i a visa to enter Japan.* Among the loud cries of protest from the JSP

*With the object of preventing a large Chinese delegation from attending the Gensuikyo conference, the JCP had proposed that foreign delegations be limited to no more than three delegates. (The Chinese delegation had consistently numbered in the twenties in past years.) As a result of strong Chinese objection, however, a compromise solution which allowed for a Chinese delegation of seven delegates was finally agreed on. At first, it was announced that Tang Ming-chao, vice-chairman of the China Peace Committee, would head the Chinese delegation and Wu Hsueh-chien, vice-chairman of the China Afro-Asian Liaison Committee, would be the deputy-head; but in a last-minute change of plans, it was announced that Liu Ning-i would be the leader of the Chinese delegation. The sudden change in leaders to the much higher-ranking and more influential Liu Ning-i came as a shock to JCP leaders. They feared that the Chinese delegation, under Liu's leadership, would launch a spirited offensive at the conference to push the hard Chinese line.

Besides trying to limit the size of the Chinese delegation, the JCP took the initiative in preventing a large (footnote continued on page 40)
and other Japanese leftist groups--and of course from the CCP, the voice of the JCP was not heard at all. The JCP was obviously relieved that a powerful Chinese delegation led by Liu Ning-i would not be at the conference to dominate it. It is still surprising that the party did not issue some kind of a pro forma protest against the government's refusal to grant a visa to Liu Ning-i, so as not to appear in public as any less of a champion of Communist causes in Japan than the JSP and other leftist Japanese groups. But it is all the more revealing of its attitude toward the CCP that it would not even pretend in public to be upset that Communist China was not to be represented at the conference. The JCP's reaction to the government's decision to ban the Chinese from the conference was the occasion for the first public, though indirect, attack by the CCP on the JCP. In the course of an article in People's Daily on 28 July attacking the GOJ's refusal to admit Liu Ning-i, it was clear that the Chinese meant the JCP when they said:

There are those with false pretenses who have joined the conspiracy to prevent our comrades from visiting Japan.*

(number of other foreign delegations from attending the Gensuikyo conference. In the past, many of the foreign delegations had been financially supported and politically controlled by Peking, and in many cases were not even bona fide representatives of the countries and organizations they purported to represent. The JCP is reported to have wanted to end this practice and have Gensuikyo accept only genuine independent delegations from foreign mass organizations which would mean that only about 30 foreign delegates, compared with the usual number of about 200, would attend the conference. On this, the JCP seems to have been quite successful.

*On 30 July, Liu Ning-yi made a similar reference to the JCP in a public statement condemning the Japanese Government for its action in refusing him an entry visa (footnote continued on page 41)
On 30 July NCNA made clear who "those with false pretenses" were. In a brief item, it took note of the fact that the JCP had not protested the government of Japan's action although the leftist faction of the JSP had.

While the JCP made virtually no effort to have the Chinese attend the Gensuikyo conference, it made several significant concessions to the Soviets so that pro-Soviet organizations could be represented. Apparently, it was the JCP which got the Gensuikyo leadership to agree to send invitations to a number of pro-Soviet front organizations, on the understanding that they could not attend both the Gensuikyo and rival Gensuikin conferences.* At least one Soviet-controlled front organization--the World Federation of Scientific Workers--attended the Gensuikyo conference on this condition. (The Soviets themselves decided in favor of the Gensuikin conference.) The big excitement of the conference concerned the attendance of another Soviet-backed front organization--the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY). Apparently as a test case, the WFDY sent representatives to both conferences. In an ad hoc decision, about which there seems to have been much confusion and the JCP may have had second thoughts, the Gensuikyo leadership voted to admit

(Tootnote continued from page 41) to Japan. He mentioned that a "group selling dog meat disguised as mutton was helping the Sato government." (The phrase "selling dog meat disguised as mutton" is an old Chinese phrase indicating an action done under false pretenses.) JCP leaders were reportedly highly incensed over Liu's statement which they interpreted as meaning the JCP.

*This was not a new condition. Ever since the socialists had organized a rival Gensuikin conference which was held each year at the same time as the Gensuikyo conference, Gensuikyo had attached a condition to attendance of its conference; namely, non-attendance of the rival Gensuikin conference.
the WFDY delegate, who happened to be a Soviet national. With this decision, the delegations of 16 of the 20 foreign countries represented at the conference walked out, leaving only the Danish, French, Rumanian, and American delegates, plus the Japanese. It was clear that it was the Chinese who ordered the walk-out; the 16 delegations all consisted of radical, pro-Chinese elements in their various countries, some of them resident in Peking. After leaving the conference, most of the delegates went on to China, where they were honored with banquets and a huge Peking rally on 12 August.

The Chinese made a cause celebre of their withdrawal from the conference and used the occasion of the rally in their honor to launch new indirect attacks on the JCP. Liu Ning-i, speaking at the rally, said:

The admission of the WFDY delegate into the conference by certain leading members of Gensuikyo and of the Japanese delegation under the slogan of 'united action' was an error of line.

It is regrettable that certain leading members of Gensuikyo and of the Japanese delegation adopted a hostile attitude. (These) certain leading members of Gensuikyo and of the Japanese delegation sang the same tune with the Soviet revisionist clique, talking glibly about 'strengthening' the unity of 'all peace and democratic forces' and prating about 'united action.' This we absolutely cannot accept.

The JCP does not seem to have anticipated such a mass withdrawal from the conference; we have one report that it thought at best three or four delegations might withdraw if Gensuikyo decided to admit the WFDY delegate. According to the same report, some of the JCP leaders of Gensuikyo changed their minds and were in favor of reversing the already-announced decision to admit WFDY when they finally realized that the great majority of the foreign
delegates were really planning to leave; but the other Gensuikyo leaders felt the organization was committed to the decision its leaders had already announced. It is quite believable that the JCP did try at the last minute to prevent a crisis over the admission of the WFDY delegate, because, as it turned out, the mass walk-out meant the failure of the conference and a defeat for the JCP. The JCP had emphasized how important it was that the conference be a success—in order to demonstrate the united support of the many countries helping North Vietnam and also as a boost for the JCP at a time when it was leading the fight against the U.S. nuclear-powered submarine visits. One can imagine how bitter the JCP was that China had wrecked the conference and so embarrassed the JCP. On the other hand, the CCP knew that the JCP had failed to exert itself to try to get the Chinese admitted to Japan to attend the conference, whereas it had made several efforts to get the "revisionists" to attend. The whole affair had only worsened relations between the two estranged parties.

In retaliation, two weeks later, the JCP took steps to sabotage the forthcoming Second Japan-China Youth Festival, which was to open in Peking on 1 October. On 17 August NCNA reported that the festival was encountering opposition from the Democratic Youth League of Japan (MINSEIDO), a JCP affiliate. A spokesman for this group had announced at a reception for a visiting Chinese Communist youth delegation that his organization would not participate in the festival. (Originally, MINSEIDO had planned to send some 100 delegates to the festival.) Apparently, the JCP had advised all JCP front organizations to "refrain if possible from sending delegates to the meeting." The Japan-China Friendship Association (JCFA) is known to have had a violent dispute over the dispatching of a JCFA youth group to the festival. The JCP faction of the JCFA opposed the move, but the pro-Communist China faction favored it and was able to have it approved. The pro-CCP group is further reported to have demanded that the JCP group ignore the so-called "Five Points in Dealing with Communist China," a series of restrictions placed by the JCP on JCFA contacts with China.
The JCP instructions to its front organizations seem to have been part of an intensive, secret anti-China campaign that began around August. According to a high-level official of the JCP, at a meeting in August that a compromise between the JCP and the CCP was impossible and the JCP had already taken steps "for coordinated action with North Korea and North Vietnam in preparation for an open dispute." The reference to "coordinated action" with North Korea and North Vietnam is ambiguous. As noted earlier, the JCP had found the North Vietnamese and the North Koreans very much in agreement with the JCP on the need for an independent stand in the world Communist movement. There probably was some agreement of understanding between the three parties, especially between North Korea and the JCP, on steps to be taken to prepare for an open dispute with the CCP. At approximately the same time in July-August, both the North Korean party and the JCP began a major briefing program for all party members on current relations with Communist China and the new independent line of the North Korean and Japanese parties.* Just as they must have

*the substance of these secret briefings, very much the same points were stressed by both parties. Moreover, they both used examples from the other one's experiences with the Chinese to illustrate these main points. For instance, the secret North Korean party directive to the Chosen Soren (the pro-North Korean organization of Koreans in Japan) mentioned the following experience of the Japanese as an example of the Chinese trying to force their views on other Communist parties:

When the Japanese Communists visit Peking these days, the Chinese approach them individually in an attempt to convince them that the Japanese Communist Party must launch an armed uprising if it is to achieve its goal. The Japanese, many of whom are not conditioned mentally for such a task, return home taken aback. The Chinese method is completely Trotskyite, and Shigeo Shida and his supporters in the Japanese Communist Party are riding on Chinese coat tails. In this connection, it should be remembered that Peking is also responsible for the Indonesian debacle.
agreed on the nature and timing of a secret anti-China indoctrination program for their respective parties, the North Koreans and Japanese probably agreed to coordinate other moves in their anti-Chinese campaign, such as their first public attacks on the CCP. Reflecting their desire to publicize Pyongyang's support, JCP officials made a special point of the fact that the JCP was acting in concert with North Korea in briefing party members on the JCP dispute with China.

In the two available secret JCP party briefings, the major complaints against the CCP are its "meddling" in Japanese affairs--such as its "instigation of the 16 foreign delegations' walkout from the Gensuikyo conference" and "its insistence that armed revolution is necessary for the advancement of world Communism"--and its subversive activities in "recruiting pro-Chinese elements within Japanese mass organizations, such as the Japan-China Friendship Association." On a third count, China is attacked for its stand on joint action in Vietnam:

The JCP is fully confident of victory as long as the dispute is focused on the question of united action in support of North Vietnam, because it regards the burden of vindication to be on the shoulders of the Chinese Communists and the Soviets, with the JCP, North Korea, and North Vietnam in an unassailable position.

It is interesting to note that another major subject of the secret briefings is the Chinese cultural revolution, a subject the JCP has stayed away from in its public comment on the CCP:

The JCP has decided against making any public announcements of its views on the current revolution currently taking place in Communist China. But it is the JCP leadership's view that there is absolutely no relation between the cultural revolution and Marxist-Leninist doctrine, and that
the Chinese Communists' current inflexibility has forced them to implement the cultural revolution on a gigantic scale throughout China.

In August, JCP party headquarters issued two party orders that were the subject of discussion at party meetings in August and September. In the first, the leadership banned the display of pictures of any Communist leaders except Marx, Engels, and Sen Katayama, one of the JCP founders. Although the instruction did not explicitly ban the display of Mao's picture, the purpose of the order was clearly that. At party meetings, it was explicitly stated that all photographs of Mao should be taken down immediately, and "should any member question this, the explanation should be given that the party frowns upon the posting of anyone's photograph while they are still living as an indication that the Party does not idolize any mere mortal to the detriment of Party ideology and international communism." However, the real reason, it was explained, was that Mao was in error in thinking "his theory of communism is supreme." In late August and early September, pictures of Mao began to be taken down from the walls of JCP offices all over the country. In the second party order, the JCP imposed certain requirements and restrictions on travel to Communist China. Party members traveling there had to have previous permission from party headquarters and on their return to Japan they were given special "re-educational" lectures. The JCP was also known to be advising party members at this time not to listen to Peking Radio, not to read People's Daily, and not to subscribe to the Peking Review.

In support of these anti-China measures taken within the party, the JCP stepped up its propaganda campaign around August. During that month, there were several major articles in Akahata attacking Communist China. On 8 August, the paper issued a four-page manifesto on joint aid to North Vietnam. Without mentioning China by name, it used the strongest phrases in criticizing, indirectly, Chinese policy in Vietnam. Directing its attack at the stand taken by the pro-Peking faction within the JCP, Akahata labelled the Chinese refusal to align themselves with the Soviets in Vietnam as "radical, infantile sectarianism."
In August a diplomatic source in Peking was reported by the Japanese press to have made the following critical slur on the JCP in the course of an informal explanation of the CCP attitude toward the North Korean and Japanese parties:

After his return home from his tour last spring, JCP Secretary General Miyamoto said: 'No Chinese-made weapons were seen in North Vietnam.' He would not have been able to make such an unfounded report, unless he had some particular plot in mind.*

Both the JCP and North Korea are doing practically nothing that seems to be helping Vietnam. When did they become commentators? There is something they must do before they comment.

This was a good indicator of the real Chinese attitude toward the JCP and evidence that the Chinese were also attacking the JCP by name in private, though not yet in public.

JCP Purges in September

In September, the JCP-CCP dispute accelerated at an even more rapid pace. To begin with, there was the

*At the JCP April Central Committee plenum, Miyamoto is reported to have said that he was told that of total aid to North Vietnam, 60% was Chinese, 13% was Soviet, and the remainder came from the other Bloc countries. There is no evidence that he ever belittled Chinese military aid to Vietnam after his trip to China and North Vietnam.
purge of the Yamaguchi Prefectural Committee, the seat of the pro-Chinese opposition within the party. As noted earlier, the crucial decision to crack down on the opposition within the party was apparently taken at the Central Committee plenum in April. The 11 May Akahata editorial attacking "anti-party dogmatist elements" had been the opening shot of the attack on the Yamaguchi dissidents. All during the summer Miyamoto and the JCP leadership continued to take the initiative. On 3 July a major Akahata article attacked both the "anti-party revisionists" and the "anti-party dogmatists" for their "uncritical subserviance to the line of a foreign party." The article confirms other indications that there were two main points of controversy between the pro-Chinese faction within the party (and the Chinese), on the one hand, and the JCP, on the other. Under the heading 'True Proletarian Internationalism,' Akahata argued the JCP position against the Chinese on joint action in North Vietnam.

With US imperialism escalating the war of aggression in Vietnam, our party has persistently advocated the strengthening of the international unified activities and the united front to cope with it, and it has also warned relentlessly against dogmatism and sectarianism.

As its second major theme, Akahata discussed the "Basic Stand of the JCP on a Revolution in Japan." In support of its opening statement that

the onus of accomplishing the people's democratic revolution against imperialism and monopoly capital lies on ourselves; it cannot be achieved through reliance upon others,

Akahata then quoted the Moscow Statement of 1960:

Taking the international situation into consideration, each communist party decides on its prospects and tasks for
revolution in its country in accordance with the concrete historic and social conditions of the country.

This was a new use of the Moscow Statement in an anti-China context, where it had originally been used in an anti-Soviet context, as an argument against Soviet dictation of policy for the world Communist movement. Although the 3 July Akahata article does not explicitly accuse the CCP or the pro-Chinese faction of the JCP of advocating armed revolutionary tactics for the JCP, it is clear from the article's strong defense of the united front strategy of the JCP, which was the only policy specifically mentioned in the general argument against foreign dictation of policy, that the domestic party line on mass struggle was under attack. And the implication was clear that it was an attack from the CCP and the pro-Chinese "anti-party dogmatists" within the JCP.

Toward the end of August and into September, the JCP leadership took specific measures to counter subversive influence within the party. In the Yamaguchi Prefecture, where the anti-party group was the strongest, the Central Committee of the JCP apparently took the initiative in establishing a new local party newspaper, the Yamaguchi Minpo, which was responsive to JCP/CC guidance and acted as a counter-force to the Choshu Shimbun, the established party paper of the prefect which had practically become the organ of the anti-party group.*

*As a typical example of Choshu Shimbun editorial policy, the 21 August editorial urged the Japanese people to strengthen their friendship and solidarity with the Chinese people and smash all intrigues. It spoke admiringly of China's fight in the forefront of the international anti-U.S. front and it accused the USSR of cooperation with the U.S. to oppose China. A summary of the editorial was broadcast by NCNA on 23 August.
Despite the fact that Miyamoto and the JCP leadership were taking firm steps which seemed to be leading up to a purge of the dissident elements within the party, the Yamaguchi Prefectural Committee persisted in its open opposition to JCP policies, which was almost calculated to invite the strongest disciplinary action against it.* After the Gensuiro Conference, it openly defied the party leadership by publishing interviews with the pro-Chinese delegates who had withdrawn from the conference.

*Presumably, the dissidents within the JCP were acting on Chinese advice; in any case, their actions certainly met with full Chinese approval. As noted earlier, the CCP had indicated its support of the Yamaguchi Prefectural Committee's stand against the party leadership by reprinting Chosu Shimbun editorials while it conspicuously ignored JCP publications. The Chinese are also known to have encouraged pro-Chinese elements within the JCP with public statements such as the one made by a member of an official Chinese delegation visiting Japan in July 1966 that it was no disgrace to be purged from the party if one fights for something one believes to be correct. The Chinese official cited the example of Mao Tse-tung, who was alleged (falsely) to have been purged from the Communist Party in China on three occasions, but came out on top in the end because he was fighting for a just cause.

Chinese support and encouragement of the Yamaguchi Prefectural Committee is indicative of current Chinese thinking on the tactics to be followed by China's supporters around the world in their struggle against the so-called "revisionist" Communist parties. The Yamaguchi Committee had taken a principled stand against the party leadership and had refused to accept the will of the majority even at the risk of formal action against it (i.e. expulsion). In essence, this is the Chinese position in the Sino-Soviet dispute and it is what the Chinese have been telling their supporters everywhere—that there can be no compromise with "revisionism," that there must be an all-out fight to the end, that the lines must be clearly drawn, even to the point of an "organizational" split.

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to the embarrassment of the JCP. Articles on the conference in Choshu Shimbun made unfavorable revelations about the JCP role at the conference, such as the fact that Japanese delegates were instructed by the JCP not to applaud the message of greetings from Premier Chou En-lai. In late August, the prefectural committee is known to have disregarded specific orders from party headquarters, such as the one to remove Mao's picture. This latter action was apparently the pretext for the party's action in suspending 5 officials of the Yamaguchi Prefectural Committee on 5 September. A close associate of these five officials, Choji Harada, who was at the time a leading staff member of Akahata, was also suspended.* Later in the month, two other senior JCP members, both of them important officials of the Japanese-Chinese Friendship Association, had their party membership rights suspended; previously, JPC party members had been warned not to associate with the Friendship Association or the Afro-Asian Solidarity League because of the questionable loyalty of JCP members in these organizations.

Miyamoto may have surprised the Yamaguchi Prefectural Committee and the Chinese somewhat with the swiftness and the severity of his action against the Yamaguchi dissidents.** It may be that he felt some sense of urgency

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*Suspension of party membership is one step short of expulsion. Just as Shiga and his pro-Soviet followers were first suspended from the party in May 1964 and then officially expelled from the party at the 9th Party Congress in December 1964, the pro-Chinese faction was suspended from party membership in September and formally expelled from the party a month later at the 10th Party Congress; in all, 13 members were expelled from the party. All 13 were reported to have gone to Peking, some to work for Radio Peking and others to prepare for other anti-JCP activities in Japan.

**Few Communist parties have moved with such despatch and effectiveness in eliminating the opposition within the party as the JCP leadership under Miyamoto did. It must have come as a shock to the Chinese and their supporters in the JCP that Miyamoto decided to use the most (footnote continued on page 52)
about disposing of his chief opposition within the party before the opening of the 10th Party Congress scheduled for 24 October. This is not to suggest that he was not confident of his own power position within the party but that he was anxious to avoid a bitter controversy at the Congress, which would have been inevitable if the leaders of the pro-Chinese faction had attended.

Chinese Economic Sanctions Against The JCP

After the suspension of the pro-Chinese elements from the JCP, Communist China took a new and serious step, which was primarily punitive and clearly indicative of Peking's view that the JCP was now in the enemy camp. Just as it had done in the case of Cuba a few months earlier, Peking applied economic pressure in the most obvious show of displeasure with the JCP to date. On 6 September, the CCP abruptly cut off trade with the Japan-China Trade Promotion Association and its member firms which were closely associated with the JCP and were a severe form of organizational discipline against the dissidents within the party (i.e. expulsion from the party). It was a most effective warning to those who might be attracted to the opposition and a serious blow to Chinese hopes of subverting a significant number of party members away from Miyamoto's influence. As we shall see later, the JCP leadership has been remarkably successful in getting the mass support of the party for its new policy line; one reason has been the timely crack-down on the opposition within the party. We have one report that the Chinese were very disappointed that there was no strong wave of opposition to Miyamoto's new line for the party.
major source of revenue for the party.* A new group--the Chinese Association in Japan--was reported to have replaced the JCP-influenced Japan-China Trade Promotion Association; in September, this new group was apparently in the process of organizing 30 new firms--designated as "friendly firms"--to handle all future trade activities between the two countries.** There can be no doubt that China's action was

*According to a 1964 estimate, collections from JCP trading forms accounted for almost 10% of total income of the JCP party headquarters; another 25% consisted of foreign aid, presumably all of it Communist Chinese aid. In this case, Peking would have accounted for roughly one-third of the JCP total income.

**In the end, the Japan-China Trade Promotion Association appears to have capitulated to Peking's pressure. On 13 September, the standing directors of the Association voted to oust its JCP leaders who were labeled by Peking as "uncooperative." Whether the Chinese are now dealing with the Association again under its new leadership is unclear. In any case, the JCP would not profit from the trade, as there is no longer a close association between the trade association and the JCP. In this way, the Chinese have managed to squeeze JCP interests out of the Japan-China trade field; most of the trading firms which now control Japanese trade with China are owned and controlled by left-wing socialists who are sympathetic to China. Thus, the left-wing of the JSP, rather than the JCP, is now the main beneficiary of trade between China and Japan.

One of the most interesting consequences of the JCP-CCP dispute has been the replacement of the JCP by the left-wing of the Socialist Party as Communist China's main supporter in Japan. We have evidence that the Chinese are now giving the left-wing of the Socialist Party much of the financial support, some of which is derived from trade between China and Japan and the rest of which is given in the form of a direct subsidy, that they used to give to the JCP. This new Chinese support of the left-wing of the JSP may account in part for the latter's recent success in consolidating its control of the party (footnote continued on page 54)
a financial blow to the JCP. The party mounted a major propaganda attack against Peking's obvious attempt to squeeze trading firms close to the JCP out of Japan's trade with China, but it was a losing fight.

According to one unconfirmed report, all financial assistance to the JCP from China, which must certainly have accounted for 25% of the total income of the party headquarters as a minimum estimate, had completely stopped by September. As an example, Peking was reported to have donated $41,000 in 1964 and $39,000 in 1965 to the JCP-sponsored World Conference to Ban Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (Gensuikyo), but in 1966 it was reported to have made absolutely no contribution to the conference. As a result, the JCP was reportedly encountering serious financial difficulties. To cope with the situation, salaries of Presidium members and the headquarters staff had been cut, and, except for the absolutely necessary official parties, all social functions had been cancelled. In order to raise the $83,000 estimated as the necessary expenses for holding the 10th Party Congress, scheduled to begin on 24 October, the JCP was reported to have instructed its subordinate units to collect all back dues and payments-in-arrears for Akahata and other party publications and to cut down party expenditures to the bare minimum.

Although it is still too early to assess the full impact of the Chinese economic sanctions against the JCP,

(footnote continued from page 53)

power structure at the annual convention of the JSP, held from 6-9 December. (Pro-Peking party chairman Sasaki was elected to a third term, with the unexpected margin of 39 votes; his forces also captured all of the contested seats on the central executive committee, thus gaining an overwhelming majority.) Allegations by Sasaki's foes that Peking has been providing financial support to him failed to deter his supporters.
we can make a few general observations about the effect of similar action taken by the CPSU and the CCP against other Communist parties. In the circumstances in which Khrushchev resorted to economic reprisals against Communist parties which were resisting his will—the most notable examples being Communist China, Albania, North Korea, and the JCP—he was in a position to do them real harm, economically.* But in no case did he achieve his purpose in influencing them to his position. Rather, he solidified their opposition to him and made them all the more determined to resist his pressure. When for the first time, this year, the CCP faced a similar situation—when Cuba, North Korea, and the JCP all began about the same time to resist Chinese dictation of policy—Mao was, if anything, even quicker than Khrushchev to apply economic pressure on the errant parties. The effect has apparently been just the same as in the case of the Soviets. Although the Chinese may make things difficult for the JCP, financially, for the present, any economic lever they may have will not have the effect of forcing the JCP to surrender.**

*It is recognized that the case of the JCP is quite different from that of parties in power in the Bloc states. The latter have the resources of a whole country on which to draw in the event that foreign aid is withdrawn. In the case of Communist parties not in power, like the JCP, the party may be much more dependent on financial support from foreign Communist powers. The JCP seems quite prepared to defy the Chinese in spite of all the economic pressure the CCP can bring to bear on the party, however.

**In the long run, the Soviets might be expected to pick up the tab for the JCP if the Chinese cease altogether to make any financial contribution to the party. One wonders now if perhaps the North Koreans are not helping the JCP financially. The JCP would almost certainly prefer to get money from the North Korean party than from the Soviets and the Chinese, and North Korea has a vested interest in the JCP’s being able to maintain an independent position, without relying on either the CPSU or the CCP for financial assistance.
Because it would be embarrassing for the JCP to admit publicly that it gets financial assistance from Bloc countries, it is not likely to make a direct charge against the Chinese of economic reprisals against the JCP. No Communist party outside the Bloc has ever mentioned the subject of economic aid or economic pressure from Bloc countries in public. Bloc parties, however, have made such charges, both publicly and privately. The North Korean party was particularly strong in its criticism of Communist China's use of economic pressure in its July secret briefing detailing the party's grievances against Peking:

That the CCP interferes in the internal affairs of other countries is obvious from the circumstances which led to the deterioration of its relations with Havana. The Chinese applied economic pressure in a vain effort to bring the Cubans under their influence. They pretend that their differences with Cuba arose from trade problems, but the root cause was Peking's attempt to dominate the Communist movement in Latin America. The Korean Labor Party's attempts to caution the Chinese about their excesses in dealing with the Cubans went unheeded. That Cuba is not yielding an inch in its struggle against imperialism should be recognized.

The JCP has referred to Chinese economic pressure on the JCP indirectly in public, by attacking Chinese discrimination against JCP trading establishments, without mentioning the real reason for its concern about Peking's discrimination against these firms; namely, the Chinese subsidy of the JCP which comes from the profits of the trade. Although China is not mentioned by name, it is quite clear who is meant in passages such as the following one from the 13 September edition of Akahata:

Certain Japanese traders have been asked if they would be willing to support a
specific stand or view concerning the question of the anti-imperialist united action and united front and the question of the tactics for the Japanese revolution.* Also, in order to give absolute authority abroad as well as at home to the thought of a specific party leader and make its propaganda the basis of economic interchange, some of these Japanese traders have been pressured into cooperating in the propaganda activities, even if they cannot approve such thought, and others, who have set forth their independent views, have been unreasonably oppressed for being 'uncooperative' or 'unfriendly.' Under these circumstances, a number of Japanese trading firms which have struggled sincerely to promote and expand East-West trade in the past, despite various difficulties, are now being boycotted from trade.

Like the JCP (with one or two exceptions), the CCP has made only indirect attacks on the JCP in public; but it has implied things about the JCP that all but rule out a reconciliation in the foreseeable future. For instance, in the following selection from an NCNA report of a banquet given in Canton for visiting Japanese businessmen on 16 October, the Chinese obviously meant the JCP when they referred to the "new followers" of the "modern revisionists" in Japan:

There is indeed a handful of reactionaries in the world who do not like the friendship

*This is yet another indication that Peking was pushing a subversive line with JCP party members on two main issues: the issue of 'unity of action' of the Communist world against the 'imperialists' (especially in Vietnam) and the question of JCP domestic tactics.
between the Chinese and Japanese peoples and are trying by every means to prevent and sabotage the development of trade between the two peoples. They are the U.S. imperialists, the Sato government, the modern revisionists, and their old and new followers of every description. But no reactionary force can undermine the friendship between the Chinese and Japanese peoples. (emphasis added)*

There could be no sharper condemnation of the JCP than to lump it with the "US imperialists, the Sato government and the modern revisionists," the sworn enemies of the Chinese Communist regime.

As another example of the disparaging designations which the Chinese now use to refer to the JCP, the following quotes are taken from a recent NCNA attack (18 October) on JCP supporters in the Japan-China Friendship Association:

The joint statement of the Japan-China Friendship Association and the China-Japan Friendship Association is guidance for the future development of the friendship movement in the two countries, and a heavy blow at those who carry out anti-China and splittist activity.

Although there are now various kinds of obstructions in the Japan-China movement, we can surely make this movement advance along a correct orientation.

*Wherever it is clear from the context of a broadcast or speech that the JCP is meant, the circumlocution used in place of the direct naming of the JCP will be underlined.
The Japan-China friendship movement will certainly make progress, even though the handful of opponents exert their sabotaging and obstructive activities to the utmost; they are doomed to failure and will have to eat their own bitter fruit.

This last phrase is particularly noteworthy for its implication of an uncompromising CCP-JCP fight and its confident prediction of an ultimate CCP victory. It has the same ring as all the other CCP boasts of final victory over the "modern revisionists" in the current controversy in the world Communist movement; by implication, the JCP is now included among China's enemies.

Liao Cheng-chih, the president of the Chinese equivalent of the Japan-China Friendship Association has referred to the JCP in even more derogatory terms. In a public speech given at a rally in Peking on 5 October he spoke about "some people" who "talk glibly... about Sino-Japanese friendship, but in reality work hand-in-glove with U.S. imperialism, Soviet modern revisionism, and the Japanese reactionaries in vigorous opposition to Sino-Japanese friendship."

These people have in fact joined the ranks of opposition to Sino-Japanese friendship. There is nothing terrifying about this. They can only serve as miserable buffoons. Compared with the mighty torrent of Sino-Japanese friendship, they are like 'an ant that tries to shake a huge tree.' By their very actions they have shown themselves in their true colors to the Chinese and Japanese peoples, and placed themselves in opposition to the movement of Sino-Japanese friendship.

Chairman Mao has said, 'There are true friends and false friends, but one can see in practice clearly who are true friends and who are false ones.' Now the distinction between the groups which
defends Sino-Japanese friendship and the
groups which opposes Sino-Japanese friend-
ship is becoming increasingly clear. Far
from being a bad thing, this distinction
is a good thing. It will further benefit
the sound growth of the Sino-Japanese
friendship movement.

Mao himself has given the final authority to Chinese
caracterizations of the JCP. In his message of greetings
to the Albanian Party Congress on 2 November (which has
the stamp of his personal authorship), he contrasted the
steady loyalty of the Albanians with the false-hearted
support of certain other Communist parties; no doubt the
JCP was uppermost in his mind:

We are your true friends and comrades,
and you ours. You are not like those
false friends and doubledealers who
have 'honey on their lips and murder
in their hearts'; and neither are we.
Our militant revolutionary friendship
has stood the test of violent storms.

The Chinese, for their part, now seem prepared to
write off the JCP under its present leadership, Kang
Sheng, a member of the Standing Committee of the Polit-
buro and the 7th ranking official in the CCP, has best
stated this policy in his 2 November speech to the Albanian
Party Congress:

There is no middle road whatsoever in the
struggle between Marxism-Leninism and
modern revisionism. The only way is to
draw a clear line of demarcation between
ourselves and modern revisionism with
the leading clique of the CPSU as its
center and thoroughly to expose their
true features as renegades. Whoever is
intent on having united action with them
will inevitably take part in the anti-
China chorus of imperialism, modern revi-
sionism, and reaction and sink into the
morass of opposition to socialist China.
The statement is clearly directed at the JCP among others, as one of the strongest proponents of joint action in the international Communist movement. The message is clear that the CCP will not tolerate dissent of any kind, including any dissent of the JCP from Communist China's inflexible stand on 'unity of action' in the Communist world. The warning is also clear that if the JCP persists in its mistaken course, the CCP is prepared to treat it as an all-out enemy of the Chinese party. In the long run, the Chinese hold out the hope that the "adverse current" in the Japanese Communist party is only a "temporary phenomenon" after all, which implies that someday CCP-JCP relations could be re-established. But, for now, the CCP apparently considers the JCP beyond hope, and it is primarily concerned to work through groups outside the party which it hopes will influence a change within the party.

Chinese Organizational Activities

The first indication that the Chinese might openly support a splinter Communist party in Japan came in November, when all 13 of the former JCP members who were officially expelled from the party at the 10th Party Congress left for China. Some were reported to be working with Radio Peking, while others were reportedly engaged in other anti-JCP subversive activities. They were involved in the Chinese plan to organize the anti-JCP dissidents in Yamaguchi Prefecture. Consideration was apparently already being given to forming a nationwide organization to promote a pro-China line in Japan. It is likely that these anti-party elements who are now in China will take a leading role in the founding of a rival, pro-Chinese Communist party in Japan when Mao decides to make a final break with the JCP.

Another development that suggests that Mao may soon promote a splinter Communist party in Japan is the fact that the Chinese have been instrumental in setting up several new pro-Chinese front organizations in Japan in
opposition to JCP-controlled front organizations in various fields. So far a new Japan Journalist League, a Japan Committee for Afro-Asian People's Solidarity, a Japan-China Friendship Association (Orthodox), a new women's association (as yet unnamed), and a new pro-Peking news agency, the East News Company, have been established. As rival organizations to the JCP-controlled Japan Congress of Journalists, Japanese Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity, Japan-China Friendship Association, Japanese Women's Association, and Japan Press Service, these new groups have announced their affiliation with the pro-Chinese international front organizations, such as the Afro-Asian Journalists' Association, which are rival organizations of the Soviet-controlled international front organizations. In some cases, these new organizations have been founded by former members of the respective JCP-controlled front organizations who were expelled from these organizations. In most cases, however, the pro-Chinese members of the JCP front organizations seem to have taken the initiative in resigning, always after a bitter quarrel with the pro-JCP leadership of the organizations.* In every case, the JCP has been prompt to take disciplinary action; all the ringleaders of the splittist movement have subsequently been expelled from the party.

The Chinese hand in all this has been very clear. The new pro-Peking East News Company is reported to have received about $20,000 as the first year's Chinese subsidy

*In the case of the Japan Press Service (JPS), as many as one half of its employees are reported to have resigned their positions following a "bitter ideological quarrel among the members of the JCP in the JPS." Ten of these, including President Shigeo Sato, were promptly disciplined by the JCP and subsequently expelled from the party. The four leaders of the pro-CCP group in the Japanese Women's Association who have taken the lead in forming a new women's organization also seem to have taken the initiative in resigning from the JWA before they were expelled. No doubt, they have done this on Chinese advice.
for the venture.* The Chinese have, of course, lent moral support to the leaders of the new organizations by giving them and their organizations a big play in the Chinese press. In November, a Chinese trade union delegation visiting Japan made separate calls on the national headquarters of all four of the new pro-Chinese front organizations that had been established as of that date—the Japan-China Friendship Association (Orthodox), the Japanese Committee for Afro-Asian People's Solidarity, the Japan Journalists' League, and the East News Company. (The new women's association had not yet been organized.) It is obviously no coincidence that a Chinese women's delegation is due to arrive in Japan at the end of December, just in time for the founding ceremony of the new women's association, scheduled for early January. The Chinese will help name the new organization, it is reported. In all this, Mao is being quite open in his support of the organizational challenge to the JCP and its front organizations, much more so than the Soviets ever were. And if there is one unforgiveable sin from the point of view of the leaders of any Communist party, it is support for an organizational challenge to their leadership of the Communist movement in their country.

The JCP is apparently very well aware of the range of Chinese activities against the party—covert as well as overt. According to ____________, the party leadership has "positive proof" that the CCP is trying to organize the anti-JCP dissidents in Yamaguchi Prefecture into some kind of a rival party organization. Considering everything, the JCP now considers the pressure exerted by the CCP to be "many times stronger" than that exerted by the CPSU when the pro-Soviet dissidents were expelled...

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*The Chinese subsidy now being paid to Sato and his followers in the East News Company used to be paid to the Japan Press Service. For three years the CCP is reported to have paid about $1,400 monthly to the JPS. These payments were terminated at the end of July 1966, when the CCP cut off all or most of its financial support to the JCP and its mass organizations.
from the party in 1964. For another reason, too, the JCP leaders are probably much more concerned about the opposition of the "anti-party dogmatists" than they were about the opposition from the "anti-party revisionists;" that is, the fact that a "left-wing deviation" from the correct line for the party can bring disaster to the party (as it did in Indonesia) or other serious reprisals from non-Communist forces in the country, whereas "right-wing opportunism" at least does not threaten such serious consequences for the party.

Apparently, there are some elements in the JCP—including Miyamoto—who are quite prepared to risk an open break with the CCP at any time now. Reportedly, Miyamoto was incensed by a recent physical attack on an Akahata correspondent in Peking and by the cool treatment accorded the official JCP representative in Peking at the 1 October National Day celebrations.* Apparently, the pros and cons of initiating open confrontation with the CCP were discussed at a Presidium meeting in October, shortly after the above incidents, but the party leadership finally decided not to confront the CCP openly at that time. At the next Presidium meeting, Miyamoto again took the initiative in proposing that the party immediately withdraw the JCP and Akahata representatives from Peking; but once again Masayoshi Ōka is reported to have prevailed upon Miyamoto not to do this, on the grounds that such a decision would be likely to result in an open break with the CCP. In late November, however, Miyamoto had his way; at a meeting of the Central Committee on 22–24 November it was agreed that the official JCP representative in

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*Akahata on 1 and 9 October reported two separate incidents of physical violence against loyal JCP personnel in Peking committed by pro-Peking Japanese Communist students. Akahata on 3 October reported that the JCP representative in Peking, Sunama Kazuyoshi, was relegated to a seat among the ordinary foreign guests attending this year's National Day celebration, whereas a year ago he was accorded a position of honor on the main reviewing stand.
Peking, Sunama Kazuyoshi, and all other party members in China as JCP representatives would be recalled. They are expected back in Japan before the end of the year.

So far, the Chinese have not responded to this JCP act. But the dispute between the two parties has reached the point where each provocative act by one side occasions an even more serious act in reprisal. There are apparently no longer direct personal contacts between the JCP and the CCP, and although it is possible for communication to be retained through interparty letters, there is no evidence that such letters have been exchanged since Miyamoto's return from China. If, as is likely, the continuing deterioration of relations brings an exchange of direct public attacks between the two parties next year, this will only formalize a de facto rupture of relations that has already occurred.