THE JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY
1955 - 1963

DD/I STAFF STUDY

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Of the dozen or so Communist parties which back or lean toward the Chinese party in the Sino-Soviet dispute, the Japanese Communist party is in some respects of special interest. It is the only such party operating in a major developed country; the positions it has taken have been unusually costly to it in its national environment; and, despite its leanings, it thinks of itself as a potential mediator in the dispute. This paper traces the evolution of Japanese Communist attitudes toward the dispute, particularly in terms of the pre-existing ideological differences in the party which have done much to shape those attitudes. Some effort is made to assess the party as an internal threat, and to place in perspective its role in the anti-treaty demonstrations of 1960.

The writer, John Taylor, has benefited from comments and source material provided by OCI, Biographic Register, and several officers of the D/D. He himself, however, is responsible for the paper as a whole. Comments on this paper will be welcome, and may be made to the writer or to the Chief or Deputy Chief of the Research Staff.
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THE JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY, 1955 - 1963

Summary

The early 1960s have proven to be critical years in the erratic course of the Japanese Communist party. In 1960, it interrupted a long series of domestic failures by participating in a broad leftist front which achieved the overthrow of the Kishi government and the cancellation of President Eisenhower's visit to Japan. Subsequently, it has taken advantage of the Sino-Soviet dispute to assert a degree of independence of Moscow, while reasserting its own brand of militant anti-Americanism. Under pressure from middle-level, China-trained cadres the party has taken an increasingly pro-Peiping stance in the Sino-Soviet dispute, and its professed nonalignment in the dispute does not bear scrutiny.

Japan after surrender posed both opportunities and problems to the JCP. On one hand it enjoyed--along with other parties--a freedom from police harassment unheard of before the war. In addition, the Occupation gave birth to a burgeoning labor movement in which Communist slogans could be expected to have considerable appeal. On the other hand, grass-roots anti-Communism in Japan had been nourished by wartime propaganda, by JCP demands for the deposition of the Emperor, and by Russia's eleventh-hour entry on the Allied side in the war. Any doubt as to where the party's loyalty lay was quickly dispelled when the JCP defended Russia's territorial acquisitions from Japan.

In the late 1940s the party found itself in competition with the Occupation--whose land reform program undercut JCP prospects in the countryside--and the rapidly-growing Socialist party, which was as Marxist as the JCP without any of the latter's foreign associations. Nonetheless the party enjoyed some success in organizing labor union affiliates and in infiltrating those of the Socialists. In the Lower House elections of 1949, the party gained 10 percent of the popular vote--its best election showing to date.
Although the JCP's fortunes began to wane in the last half of 1949, the most damaging blow came from abroad. In January 1950, the Cominform journal rebuked the JCP for its gradualist policies, which were then out of line with the revolutionary tactics of other Asian Communist parties. In May 1960, just before the Korean war began, the party decided that the "main blow" must be directed at the Occupation. The Cominform criticism, reflected in this decision, launched the JCP on two disastrous years of hit-and-run terrorism which cost the party almost all of its popular support, without achieving the presumed goal of disrupting the UN war effort in Korea. Instances of Communist violence prompted General MacArthur to purge the party leadership from public office in June 1950, and from that time until mid-1955 the party in effect was underground.

In this period, the JCP was divided on the theoretical base for its strategy; whether Japan's special status as a "semi-occupied" country called for a domestic revolution or for a prior struggle to eliminate the American presence, particularly U.S. bases. Party leaders decreed a two-revolution strategy in which the party would first unite with other leftist elements in a "democratic" revolution (a revolution which was to be one facet of the "main blow" directed against the Occupation), and only after this goal was achieved would seek a "socialist" revolution. This strategy--based on an equation of the U.S. presence with the main enemy, "international capitalism," and prescribing a two-stage revolution--has been the party line since 1952, or about the time that systematic terrorism was abandoned. The resultant emphasis on anti-Americanism has served as a bond between the JCP and Peiping. Domestically, however, it has tended to estrange the party from other leftist elements which, although themselves anti-Western, are oriented toward a program of domestic reform. Even within the JCP, a minority within party headquarters has argued that a two-revolutionary strategy which dates from before World War II is obsolete; that the San Francisco treaty restored Japanese sovereignty, American bases notwithstanding; and that the degree of industrialization in Japan has made it an advanced capitalist country and hence ripe for revolution.
The JCP, when it surfaced in 1955, was little more than a minor appendage to the Japanese left. It benefited however, from the susceptibility of the Marxian Socialists to "joint struggles" on various international issues, and from its influence in the headquarters of the leading labor federation, Sohyo. Various leftist groups, such as the council for the prohibition of nuclear weapons, Gensulkyo, went through alternating cycles of cooperation and non-cooperation with the JCP. Japanese socialists showed none of the aversion of their European counterparts to united front activities with the Communists.

Nevertheless, the JCP as of 1955 was a frustrated and ineffective organization. Its numbers were small and its influence slight, particularly when compared with the Socialist party. The JCP was internally confused over its proper function in a "semi-occupied" country; internationally, its liaison with the Communist movement had been demonstrated to be poor to nonexistent. The party was sufficiently harassed within Japan that it had not had a chance to assess its role in the era after Stalin. In short, it had shown a singular inability to "creatively adapt" its policies to postwar Japan.

The depth of feeling on the question of strategy did not become apparent until 1961. A secondary trend within the party, meanwhile, was a desire for greater independence. The revelation of Stalin's crimes at the 20th CPSU Congress, along with the Soviet intervention in Hungary, damaged the JCP domestically and may have turned it away from the USSR. An article in a party journal in October 1956 gave an unusual public airing of a minor JCP official's "long-felt indignation" at the party's "blind obedience to a foreign power."

In mid-1958, the JCP's relations with China—which had always been friendly—were given positive impetus with the return of JCP cadres from training in China. As the JCP came to regard the faction led by Shojiro Kasuga as constituting its own "revisionist" threat, Peiping's attacks on Titoism came to have special meaning to the Japanese. JCP organs remained silent on issues which divided Moscow and Peiping, however, and the party continued to receive assistance from both.
Domestically, the high point for the JCP came in 1960, when it participated in a broad leftist coalition whose street demonstrations forced cancellation of President Eisenhower's scheduled visit, and so discredited Premier Kishi as to force his resignation. The coalition failed in its main objective—the blocking of a revised Japan-U.S. security treaty—but the JCP played a considerable role in assuring that the demonstrations were turned against the United States as well as against the Kishi government.

The party's euphoria over the events of 1960 was short-lived. The Japanese reaction to the anti-treaty riots was one of national embarrassment, and other participants in the coalition made a show of dissociating themselves from the JCP, the one group which viewed the riots with undisguised delight. In the Lower House elections of 1960 the JCP won only three percent of the popular vote, at a time when its leaders hoped for great things. Moreover, in a party prone to introspection, the partial success of the anti-treaty campaign inspired questions and doubts. Most cadres agreed that the demonstrations had been an example of "peaceful" tactics at their best. From this judgment, some argued that the party should forget about an attempt at violent revolution, while others contended that the party had erred in not switching to violent methods when the anti-treaty demonstrations were at their peak.

At the Bucharest conference of Communist parties in June 1960, the Japanese were a center of attraction. There the JCP delegation failed to line up with the Moscow-oriented satellites in attacking the Chinese, but otherwise maintained an appearance of neutrality. The story was much the same at the Moscow conference in November. In his one address, Japanese delegate Hakamada implicitly urged the Chinese and Soviets to resolve their difficulties, but unlike the Vietnamese delegation, appears to have made no effort at mediation.

The multiparty statement produced by the conference contained a section which may have been sought by the Japanese. It noted that "in some non-European, developed capitalist nations which are under the political, economic and military domination of U.S. imperialism, the working class
and the people direct the main blow against U.S. imperialist domination, and also against monopoly capital..." (emphasis added). The JCP leadership sought to use this endorsement of its long-standing strategy to put down the most serious internal dissension since World War II.

As early as 1958, a faction led by Central Committee member Shojiro Kasuga had openly challenged the party's two-revolutions strategy. Kasuga minimized the significance of the U.S. presence in Japan, observing in one instance that "even under complete military occupation, the people in Okinawa succeeded in electing a Communist as Mayor of Naha by an overwhelming majority of votes." Kasuga was less than specific concerning his own program, but appeared to believe that the JCP was capable of controlling a united front against Kishi, and of converting a "democratic" revolution into a one-stage "Socialist" revolution. The crowning embarrassment to Miyamoto and Nosaka came at the Seventh Party Congress, in July 1958, when Kasuga mustered sufficient support to defeat a draft platform which embodied the two-revolution strategy.

Armed with its mandate from the Moscow conference, the JCP leadership scheduled a new party congress for 1961. Once again Kasuga proved intransigent, and on the eve of the conference announced his resignation from the JCP. His defection triggered the purge of four central committee members and some 340 other cadres, the bulk of whom--in addition to favoring a single-revolution strategy--were oriented towards Moscow rather than Peiping. Although the purge stemmed from issues peculiar to the JCP, a result was the weakening of pro-Soviet sentiment within the party.

On the issue of Albania, the JCP from the time of the Moscow conference of 1960 followed a line partial to Peiping. It echoed Chinese criticism of Yugoslavia, did not join the Soviets in attacking Albania, and continued to send fraternal greetings to the Albanians on appropriate anniversaries. Although pro-Peiping sentiment was on the upswing within the JCP, its attitude toward Albania appears to have stemmed in part from a preoccupation with revisionism as exemplified by Kasuga, and by a wish to define better the line--sometimes blurred--which separated the JCP from
other groups on Japan's Marxist left. JCP policy also reflected awareness within the party of its status as a member of the Asian minority within the international Communist movement, an awareness which led the party to support Peiping in opposition to the principle of majority rule at international conferences.

Although represented only by proxy on the JCP central committee, the young-Turk China-trained faction received positions at the Eighth Party Congress which enhanced its influence. According to [ ], these pro-Peiping cadres demonstrated marked impatience with Secretary General Miyamoto. JCP publications--on which pro-Peiping cadres were strongly represented--began to show pro-Chinese and anti-Soviet bias. In January 1962, the party's bimonthly World Political Data devoted most of an issue to the question of Albania and included, in material supporting Albania, Hoxha's November 1961 attack on Khrushchev. Also in January 1962, an attempt by the Soviet embassy to distribute copies of a journal criticizing China was frustrated by local JCP officials.

At the time of the Cuban missile crisis, the JCP echoed Peiping's charges against the USSR in a slightly milder vein. An editorial in Red Flag charged with respect to the Kennedy-Khrushchev negotiations that "the imperialists' promise to maintain peace is worthless." A second Red Flag article charged the USSR with "condoning" the instigation of war by the U.S. In December 1962 a JCP organ took formal notice of the Sino-Soviet dispute for the first time when Red Flag printed both Khrushchev's foreign policy speech to the Supreme Soviet and a Chinese article attacking it. But whereas Red Flag printed Peiping's rebuttal in its entirety, it deleted from Khrushchev's speech most of his criticism of China.

Although the attitude of the JCP was hardly neutral, the party sought to remain nominally nonaligned. JCP cadres were warned, for the record, not to take sides in the Sino-Soviet dispute. At its plenum in February 1963, the party sought a more positive role as a "nonaligned" party in the international movement, and attempted to assume the role of mediator which it had let slip away in 1960. The party
announced, "we propose that open discussion...of a specific party...be stopped, and that all parties in harmony make positive efforts to hold talks or an international conference to settle differences of opinion."

The JCP's call for international solidarity appears to have been regarded in both Moscow and Peiping as a show of independence by the Japanese. During 1963, Japan became a propaganda battleground in the Sino-Soviet dispute: at stake was not only the JCP but the largest industrial proletariat in Free Asia. The USSR brought pressure to bear on leftist bookstores not to handle Chinese periodicals. Peiping retaliated, offering its publications to Japanese outlets at bargain rates.

The most dramatic confrontation was at the ninth Genshikyo conference at Hiroshima, where name-calling between Soviet and Chinese delegates prompted a walkout by non-Communist delegates and left the anti-bomb organization badly shaken. The JCP joined the Chinese there in ridiculing the July test ban agreement, to the detriment of the JCP's domestic prospects in a country where pacifism is a byword. Even under provocation, Soviet delegates sought to maintain correct relations with the JCP, and spurned overtures from followers of Shojiro Kasuga. Soviet policy towards the JCP continues to be one of forbearance, stemming from Moscow's desire to isolate China within the international Communist movement.

In November 1963, Red Flag featured an extended dialogue concerning the Sino-Soviet dispute which was notable for its pro-Chinese bias.

Q. It is said that one of the two parties in the dispute wants peace and the other war. Is this correct?

A:.....Some people contend that the CCP wants war. It is a well-known fact, however, that the government and people of China are persistently struggling for peace in Asia and the rest of the world. The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence were first proposed by the CPR Government.
Q: What is the JCP attitude toward the ideological dispute?

A: The question is often asked which side the JCP supports—the CPSU or the CCP. However, this method of questioning is not good. Behind this question there is hidden an evil intent—to denounce the JCP for "being subordinate to either the CPSU or the CCP." All Communist parties are independent and equal fraternal parties. The JCP decides its own attitude from the theoretical and practical standpoint.

Q: ... What is the course of the present confusion in the dispute?

A: There can be differences of opinion among Communist parties just as among brothers. There are rules on how to settle differences of opinion among Communist parties. The Moscow statement, which was adopted unanimously by 81 Communist parties the world over in November 1960, stated, "Communist and workers' parties of the nations should hold conferences, if necessary... and reach agreement on joint action in the struggle aimed at the common target. When any one party has a doubt as to the policy of another fraternal party, the leaders of the former should propose talks with the other party to iron out the difference."

It is regrettable that this rule has been broken and that the dispute has come out in the open.... At the congresses of a number of Communist parties, the Albanian Workers Party and the CCP were openly criticized. This is unreasonable, too.

The Red Flag dialogue may have been prompted by criticism of the party from Peiping. Interestingly enough, the Chinese have evidenced something less than complete satisfaction
with the course being pursued by the JCP. In conversation with a JCP central committeeman in October 1963, a senior Chinese Communist official had taken exception to his characterization of the JCP as "friendly to the CCP" in the Sino-Soviet dispute. The Chinese charged that the JCP had "not yet declared itself" in the dispute, and pointedly asked if there were "problems" within the party. In view of such pressure on the JCP to declare itself irrevocably for Peiping, the party's nominal "nonalignment" may represent a genuine desire to maintain a degree of independence of both Moscow and Peiping.

It remains true, however, that the JCP has been propelled by a combination of factors—including its militant anti-Americanism, preoccupation with revisionism, and the rise of a vigorous China-trained faction—to a position sympathetic to China in the Sino-Soviet dispute. The party's new-found sense of independence, together with the fact that it continues to receive financial support from Moscow as well as Peiping, has thus far led the party not to burn its bridges to Moscow.

Domestically, prospects for the JCP are not promising. Its association with Peiping's high-risk international policies is damaging to the party, and constrasts with the Socialists' espousal of Moscow's coexistence line. Continuation of the present moderate trend within the JSP could benefit the Communists, however, by leaving the JCP in sole possession of the far left on Japan's political spectrum. Although popular support for the party remains small (it received 4 percent of the popular vote in the 1963 elections), and its relations with other elements of the far left are poor, the "united front" of 1960 could be restored if a dramatic issue arises.

Internationally the party's veteran leaders will probably attempt to keep the JCP nominally nonaligned, and to deal with sensitive intrabloc issues only when forced to do so. They may seek a role in mediating the Sino-Soviet dispute should an opportunity present itself. The party's cautiously pro-Peiping program may not satisfy younger pro-China elements, however, and the Miyamoto-Nosaka group appears under increasing pressure to commit itself more completely to Peiping. In the absence of an effective pro-Soviet faction within the party, any reorientation will almost certainly be in the direction of Peiping.
I. SETTING THE STAGE

A. A "Lovable Communist Party"

Philosophical Marxism has commanded a following in Japan since before World War I. Japan's first Socialist party was formed in 1906, and the Japanese Communist party, which celebrated its forty-first "birthday" in July 1963, is one of the oldest in Asia. Because of the high degree of industrialization in Japan, some Comintern planners of the 1920s saw Japan as the Asian country most likely to follow the model of the Russian revolution.

The JCP, however, was beset from the first by problems stemming both from the situation in Japan and the nature of the party's direction from abroad. Until the end of World War II the party was under continuous police harassment. There was no organized labor movement in Japan for it to infiltrate, nor any discernible peasant unrest. In the absence of opportunities for direct action, the party was long confined to a handful of hardy intellectuals. Even so, it made sufficient converts that in March 1928 the police launched a campaign to destroy the party entirely. The initial round-up of some 1,500 party suspects was followed by other arrests, and by 1929 the party was little more than a shell.

It was during the 1930s that the party's difficulties were first compounded by inept foreign guidance. From 1927 to 1931 the party operated on the basis of sporadic Comintern directives which generally originated with Nikolai Bukharin. These looked to an early proletarian revolution in Japan, and called for the destruction of the Imperial institution. Following the purge of Bukharin in 1929, the Comintern issued an even more revolutionary directive, drafted in consultation with JCP leader Jokishi Kazama. In that year Kazama, as chairman of the Central Committee, set forth a new thesis as a guide for the party. Whereas Bukharin had characterized Japanese capitalism as merely on a "rising curve," the 1931 Thesis concluded that capitalism in Japan had reached the final stage, the domination of monopoly capital, and called for an immediate proletarian revolution.

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Even as the 1931 Thesis was explained to cadres in Japan, it was being revised. Anxious to counter the military threat to China, the Comintern set to revising the 1931 Thesis that it might take greater account of Japanese militarism. The possibility of a successful proletarian revolution was discarded. Instead the JCP was reminded that political repression at home and military aggression abroad were different sides of the same coin; that as a result of the Sino-Japanese war an "extremely complex" situation had developed; and, most important, that the revolutionary struggle at home would now have to be secondary to a popular front against Japanese imperialism. Destruction of the emperor system was characterized as "the very first of our revolutionary tasks" in Japan.

The 1932 Thesis gave the JCP a taste of what was to come. As a sudden switch in the Moscow line, it encouraged a new element of insecurity into a group already sensitive to questions of ideological correctness. As a rationalization of Soviet interests, it encouraged intellectualization in a party already prone to scholastic inbreeding. In the 1930s, the imperialist character of Japanese militarism could be discerned without difficulty, and the premise of the 1932 Thesis was accepted without question by the JCP. Probably few cadres suspected that the 1932 Thesis would continue to be the main guide for the party when the Japanese militarism of the 1930s had given way to the Allied occupation of the late 1940s.

A gradual awareness within the Comintern of the limited capabilities of the JCP may have caused the party to be placed on the Comintern's back burner in the late 1930s. In any case, no comprehensive guidance was forthcoming between the 1932 Thesis and the May Thesis of 1950. The party was not without value to the Soviet Union; hard-core cadres staffed the highly successful spy ring of Richard Sorge during World War II. But it all but ceased to exist as a party until V-J Day.

On October 4, 1945, SCAP Order No. 93 was passed to the postwar Japanese government. Entitled "Removal of Restrictions on Political, Civil and Religious Liberties," it directed the release of all persons imprisoned on other
than criminal charges. Under the order some 200 Communists
were released, including several who would shortly achieve
prominence: Kyuichi Tokuda, Yoshio Shiga, Kenji Miyamoto
and Satomi Hakamada.

The party received its first postwar guidance follow-
ing the arrival from Yenan of Sanzo Nosaka in January 1946.
As the "roving ambassador" of Japanese Communism and a recog-
nized protege of Mao Tse-tung, Nosaka was accorded a hero's
welcome by the JCP. Although Tokuda was named Secretary
General and nominal head of the JCP, party tactics were the
special province of Nosaka. In reference to a remark of
Nosaka's, the period from 1945 to mid-1950 is often referred
to as that of the "lovable Communist Party."

Although Nosaka is less active in JCP councils today,
he remains the party's dominant figure of the postwar period.
When permitted to do so, he demonstrated a tactical flexi-
bility not unlike that of Mao, under possibly more difficult
conditions. Even after it became apparent that the Emperor
enjoyed considerable popularity in postwar Japan, the JCP
remained committed to his destruction. Under Nosaka's
guidance, however, party spokesmen made a fine distinction
between the "odious Emperor system" and the person of
Emperor Hirohito. Most of all, Nosaka sought to associate
the JCP with the concept of "peaceful" revolution.

Nosaka's gradualism gained formal endorsement at
the Fifth Party Congress in February 1946. At the congress
Nosaka read a draft declaration, stating that the objective
of the JCP was a bourgeois democratic revolution by peace-
ful means, followed by the establishment of a "Socialist"
government. There was no attack on the occupation, although
in 1949--long after the USSR dissociated itself from SCAP--
Nosaka would cautiously characterize Japan as under "inter-
national control." Among the party's intermediate objec-
tives were the reduction of land rents and the redistri-
bution of land; nationalization of the property of war
criminals; and the enactment of minimum wage and hour legis-
lation. In the April elections for the Diet, Tokuda, Nosaka
and three other party members were elected to the Lower
House. The 2,135,000 votes polled by the JCP represented
about 4% of the total vote cast.
Japan after surrender posed both opportunities and problems to the JCP. On one hand, the Communists, along with other political movements, enjoyed a degree of freedom unheard of before. In addition, the Allied occupation was encouraging the trade union movement, an area in which the party correctly estimated that its slogans should have a special appeal. On the other hand, two generations of Japanese had been brought up to fear and oppose the Communists. Anti-Communist sentiment was nourished by wartime propaganda, the historical hostility of Japan for Russia, the anti-Emperor emphasis of the party program, and by the USSR's eleventh-hour entry on the Allied side of the war. Any doubts as to where the party's sympathies lay were dispelled by its defense of Russia's territorial acquisitions after the war at Japan's expense.

In certain areas of its program, the JCP found itself in competition with the occupying authorities. A program of land redistribution, for instance, was developed and put into practice by SCAP without the benefit of advice from the JCP. MacArthur "stole" another plank of the Nosaka platform in his dismantling of Japan's financial-industrial combines, the Zaibatsu.

A second problem to the JCP was the Socialist Party. The JSP was just as Marxist as the JCP. Moreover, the Socialists had no dogmatic preconceptions concerning the Emperor, and were not vulnerable on the charge of subservience to the USSR. The JSP quickly emerged as the main opposition to the conservative coalition which has ruled Japan under various names for all except a few months since the war.

The JCP's most conspicuous gains during the postwar years were in the field of labor. In little more than a year, Japan's largest labor federation—the National Congress of Industrial Unions (Sanbetsu)—was Communist-dominated, and calling on its member unions for a "strike offensive." Its call for a general strike met with a mixed reaction among union members, for the economy was still prostrate from the war and food shortages frequent. The immediate issue was settled when SCAP forbade any strike—the first in a series of checks to the burgeoning
leftist-labor movement. But Communist infiltration into
the labor movement continued at a rate which caused concern
to the Socialists, as well as to SCAP.

As the party struggled to establish itself on the
local scene, its attitude towards the Occupation was one
of cautious hostility. Caution was dictated both by the
fact that the USSR was a member of the Allied Council, and
by the fact that neither Marx nor Lenin had defined the
historical role of a postwar occupation in the transition
to Socialism. Nosaka, pressing for his peaceful revolution,
at first contended that it could be brought about under the
conditions of military occupation. In January 1948, the
central committee issued an appeal for a national democratic
front, serving notice that it was prepared to cooperate
with all parties and groups desirous of "saving the nation."

It is worth noting that the unusual position of the
JCP, operating as it did under the Allied occupation, seemed
to be recognized by Moscow. The formation of the Cominform
in October 1947 had inaugurated a militant trend within the
world Communist movement, particularly in Asia; in Burma,
Indonesia and Indochina local parties sought to seize power
by force. The rallying cry, however, was anti-colonialism,
and there appears to have been some question as to whether
directives applicable to most parties were valid for the
JCP. The fact that the party was left to shift for itself
until 1950 certainly suggests that Nosaka's gradualist
policies had at least the Cominform's tacit blessing.

In January 1949, the JCP reached a political peak
by winning 35 Diet seats (out of 466) in elections for the
Lower House, and gaining almost 10% of the popular vote.
In retrospect, JCP fortunes in the labor field were on a
decline; indeed, the party's election showing stemmed more
from leftist disillusionment with the Socialists than from
enthusiasm for the Communists. Nevertheless, the party in
January 1949 was a force to be reckoned with. Total party
membership was estimated by SCAP at around 150,000, and
Communist-dominated unions--despite considerable pressure
from anti-Communist elements--remained influential. Return-
ing prisoners from China showed the effect of Nosaka's teach-
ings, and often staged pro-Communist demonstrations at dock-
side.
The final months of 1949 were marked by a significant decline in Communist fortunes in the labor arena. In the aftermath of several instances of Communist-instigated violence, anti-Communist elements gained control of the railway workers' union, and gained a position by which they could challenge Communist domination of Sanbetsu. At the peak of Communist labor successes in 1948, some persons estimated the number of workers in Communist-dominated unions at as many as five million. By the end of 1949, following numerous instances of sabotage and terrorism, the figure was less than two million.

These setbacks in the labor field were not offset by successes elsewhere. Although the JCP continued to have a large following among Koreans in Japan, it was frustrated in the countryside. Not only were Japanese farmers generally conservative in outlook, but times were better on the farms than in the cities, and most farmers appeared satisfied with the SCAP-sponsored land sale program. Few were impressed when central committee member Yojiro Konno reported in December 1948 that the party had succeeded in producing in one northern prefecture "a red and mature apple where only a green apple existed before."

By the end of 1949, the JCP was unique among Asian parties for its lack of militancy as well as conspicuous for its lack of success. At the WFTU conference in Peiping (November-December 1949), Liu Shao-chi observed that "The fighters of the national liberation wars in Vietnam, Burma, Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines are acting entirely correctly." Nothing was said of the Japanese.

In his speech Liu went on to underscore the militant international line:

The imperialists are disturbing peace and suppressing the national independence movements of the colonies and semi-colonies by armed force. In view of this, it is wholly justifiable for the colonial and semi-colonial peoples to conduct armed struggles against the imperialist armed attacks and for their national independence.
But the Japanese Communists, at whom Liu's remarks may have been in part directed, were not there: they had been denied exit visas by General MacArthur, and the JCP was unrepresented. While this incident would not appear of itself to be an insurmountable communications bar, somewhere along the line the JCP missed out on the word. The blow fell on 6 January 1950, when the Cominform journal printed a scathing denunciation of Nosaka and his policies in an authoritative editorial signed "Observer." After noting "the failure of the predatory plans of the American imperialists in China and Korea," the article indicated that only in Japan had the enemy achieved significant successes, citing the number of bases in Japan and Okinawa being used by U.S. aircraft. Charging that the Japanese economy had been subverted by "American capitalists," the article concluded that it was imperative for Japan's workers to have a clear program of action. The JCP should be leading "democratic forces" in a struggle for "the independence of Japan" and the withdrawal of American troops.

But did the JCP understand the need for such a program? It did not:

Thus, for instance, Nosaka, one of the leading figures in the Japanese Communist party, analyzing Japan's external and internal political situation, endeavored to prove that all the necessary conditions are at hand in postwar Japan for effecting the peaceful transition to Socialism, even under conditions of the occupation regime, and further alleged that "this is the naturalization of Marxism-Leninism on Japanese soil."

As for the occupation army, this army, in the opinion of Nosaka, far from hindering the aims of the Japanese Communist party will, on the contrary, in pursuing its mission, facilitate the democratisation of Japan...
Nosaka's attempt to invent a "new" theory...is nothing more than a Japanese variation of the anti-Marxist and anti-Socialist "theory" of the peaceful growing over of reaction to democracy, of imperialism into Socialism, a "theory" which was exposed long ago and which is alien to the working class.*

According to the Cominform, the JCP should "rally the working people" to expose the colonizing plans of the U.S. imperialists, agitate for the conclusion of a "just" peace treaty, and demand the withdrawal of U.S. troops. Only in passing did the article allude to the "treacherous, anti-people's role of Japanese reaction."

B. How Many Revolutions?

The months which followed the Cominform blast saw an end to the relative harmony which had characterized the central committee under the Tokuda-Nosaka leadership. So long as party policies were acceptable to the Cominform, differences within the JCP could be submerged. But once the party came under fire--even though it became apparent that there would be no major leadership changes--party discussions revealed differences concerning strategy under the Allied occupation.

To a party already prone to intellectualization, the problem of how to evaluate the American presence in Japan in terms of orthodox Marxism-Leninism was a serious one. By any normal criteria, Japan was an "advanced" capitalist country and therefore "imperialist." But where, in the defeated nation, were the symptoms of imperialism? Even if this hurdle were surmounted, there was the matter

*Cominform Journal, 6 January 1950.
of the American presence, i.e., U.S. imperialism. Was Japan subject to two forms of imperialism, and if so, at which should the main blow be struck?

The level of Japan's economic development suggested that the time was ripe for a domestic revolution, and this appears to have been the eventual goal of Nosaka. Soviet policy, however, demanded an offensive against the U.S. enemy, and party theory was to be shaped to this end. Four months after the attack on Nosaka in the Cominform journal, the JCP circulated to the cadres its instruction that the "main blow" was to be delivered against the U.S. occupation. One month after the circulation of this "May Thesis" came the Communist assault on South Korea.

The May (1950) Thesis represents a milestone in any study of the JCP, in that it was the first definitive statement on strategy since the 1932 Thesis. Far from upsetting the latter, however, the May Thesis sought to apply it to a situation concerning which it had little relevance: postwar Japan. The meat of the May Thesis was the emphasis on Japan's subservience to the U.S. Japan was characterized as an important base of operations for forces seeking to bring the Far East under the domination of monopoly capital.

The Thesis conceded certain changes in the Japanese domestic situation: military defeat had weakened the Emperor institution, and had diminished the influence of the landowners. Neither of these had been totally neutralized, however, while the third element in Japan's reactionary trio, monopoly capitalism, had actually increased in influence at the expense of the other two. Postwar Japan was compared to a troika in which the horses--the Emperor, the Landlords and Monopoly Capitalism--were all in harness, spurred on by International Monopoly Capital. "It is not advisable," the Thesis warned, "to watch only the driver. On the other hand, we should not look only at the horses."

Such an unhelpful metaphor was symptomatic of the party's confusion. Out of this diagnosis, however, came a call for revolution. Its aim would be, in order of priority, the freeing of Japan from the grip of international monopoly capital, and the simultaneous destruction
of the "feudal remnants" of Japanese society, and with them the power of monopoly capitalism. (As will be shown, "international monopoly capital" was said to be exemplified by the U.S. presence, and the effort against it was thus consistent and concurrent with the "main blow" directed against the Occupation.) The Thesis acknowledged that there could be no elimination of foreign influence without a domestic revolution, and concluded, as had Nosaka, that this must be achieved by means of a popular front. This democratic revolution would, in turn, be transformed by means unspecified into a "socialist" revolution.

The immediate significance of the May Thesis lay in the area of tactics. Although the call to violence was not spelled out, the Thesis was ominously lacking in references to Nosaka's "peaceful" revolution. Any doubt that the party was embarked on a more radical course was removed following the initiation of terrorist attacks on U.S. servicemen in May and June, and the subsequent publication of the New Program (see below). Although the violent tactics ushered in by the May Thesis would be short-lived, the strategy it laid down—in defining the main enemy as international capitalism as exemplified by the U.S. presence, and calling for a popular front aimed at a two-stage revolution—continues to be the party line today.

The combined effect of the May Thesis and the earlier Cominform criticism was to launch the JCP on two abortive years of hit-and-run terrorism which had no effect on the U.S. occupation or the use of Japan as a UN base in the Korean War. This 1950-52 "Molotov cocktail period" so discredited the JCP, however, that it lost all 35 seats in the Lower House, and its popular vote dropped from nearly 10% to less than one percent. From June 1950 until mid-1955, the party was underground. Although it was never formally outlawed, countermeasures by the Occupation and then by the Yoshida government were such that party leaders, fearful of arrest, left the overt JCP apparatus in the hands of acknowledged second-stringers for five years.

In August 1951, a new policy statement by Secretary General Tokuda was circulated to the party cells. Tokuda is believed to have spent most of 1950-51 in Peiping; he
died there in 1953, without having publicly appeared in Japan since going underground. In elaborating his "New Program," Tokuda touched upon all the shibboleths which had marked party pronouncements since the war: the American imperialists, Japanese monopoly capital, the Yoshida government, and in a somewhat milder vein, the Emperor. The secretary general devoted a long section to the agricultural question, in effect denying that the SCAP land redistribution program had achieved any useful result. The New Program was even more militant than the May Thesis, which it was designed to implement, in that it specifically criticized the theory of peaceful revolution:

It would be a serious mistake to think that a new national-liberation democratic government will arise of its own volition without difficulties, in a peaceful way.... No, the peaceful way of liberation and democratic transformation of Japan is the way of deception....

It is necessary to overthrow the "liberal" reactionary Yoshida government, pave the way for a new national liberation democratic government, and, in this way, prepare the conditions for the liquidation of the occupation regime.

There is no other way.*

A number of factors may have been behind publication of the New Program. For one thing, the May Thesis had never been circulated in other than draft form, and the retreat underground precluded the discussion meetings which would have preceded its final ratification. Moreover, although the May Thesis had sounded the death knell for Nosaka's "lovable Communist Party," and had pointed the finger at American imperialism, it was ambiguous on the subject of

*Cominform Journal, 23 November 1951.
peaceful revolution and was therefore still a subject of controversy among the cadres.

The New Program, like the 1950 attack on Nosaka, first saw light in the Cominform journal. To a greater extent than previous pronouncements, however, the New Program showed signs of having been drafted in Peiping:

For the first time Japan was described, as was China before 1949, as a "semi-colonial dependent country"... As was the case with China, the principal enemy is described as "American imperialism." The "reactionary system" at home is linked to this foreign enemy as its "junior partner." Both must be fought, but "American imperialism" is viewed as the dominating element in a hostile combination and as the more important target. The Japanese Communist formula for victory is described as a "united democratic front of national liberation" on the pattern of Communist China's "people's democratic united front."*

Although the criticism of Nosaka in January 1950 probably originated in Moscow, the New Program may have been born in Peiping. In addition to certain reflections of Chinese terminology, the New Program was a plausible if abortive attempt to reduce Allied pressure on Chinese forces in Korea.

Internationally, however, the JCP was once again out of step with other Asian parties. In June 1951, both Moscow and Peiping had indicated willingness to seek a truce in Korea. Later in the year, the Indian and Indonesian Communists shifted to united front tactics. Although

the New Program called for a "united democratic front of national liberation," the interpretation given this phrase by the Japanese was a demand for greater militancy, and the party sought to correct the shortcomings first aired in the Cominform journal.

C. The Tokuda Thesis: Farewell to the Molotov Cocktail

The JCP operated under the "New Program" for less than a year. During this period the party cadres—operating virtually without leadership—dissipated their assets in isolated instances of violence. In July 1952, the party admitted defeat in another article by Tokuda, his last major pronouncement. In an article ostensibly to commemorate the party's 30th anniversary, Tokuda dwelt at length on the modest successes of yesteryear, and then came to the point:

However, along with these successes two types of opportunism came to the fore during this period. One... underestimated the reactionary essence of the American occupation regime and claimed that there was a possibility for the victory of the revolution by peaceful means through Parliament.

This paragraph conceded that Nosaka had been in error, and emphasized that the party did not question the Cominform's 1950 criticism. But Tokuda went on to discuss more recent errors:

The other type of opportunism... contended that power in Japan was wholly and completely in the hands of the U.S. imperialists, that the Yoshida government and other organs of central or local rule were nothing more than the mechanical tools of American imperialism. Consequently, they held that the main task of the party at the moment was struggle only against the U.S. occupation troops...
Party's shortcomings include, for example, the holding of some strikes and demonstrations without taking into account the actual demands and strivings of the workers and peasants, but only the desires of the leadership. Then, concentrating all efforts on strikes and demonstrations, the leaders frequently pay insufficient attention to such forms of struggle as elections to the Parliament and to the local authorities.*

The last Molotov cocktail was thrown in August 1952, though not until November of the following year did the party concede the failure of its terrorist tactics. Significantly, however, the shift back to a gradualist tactical line was not accompanied by any strategic reassessment. The party's emphasis on anti-U.S. propaganda, and on the need for a popular front, was unchanged. Moreover, while the failure of the Molotov cocktail period served to discredit more militant elements, no changes were forthcoming in the top leadership. It is possible that Tokuda and Nosaka had opposed the adoption of terrorist tactics, and therefore had been vindicated by events.

On September 8, 1951, Japan signed the San Francisco peace treaty, which terminated the Occupation and returned Japan to the status of a sovereign nation. The reaction of the JCP to the treaty was characteristically unlike that of the populace; the Communists denounced the treaty as illegal because of the absence of the USSR and China, and the treaty's provision for U.S. bases in Japan. When the Yoshida government subsequently recognized Nationalist China, the party was apoplectic.

Not the least important repercussion of the treaty was the dissension which it sowed among JCP terrorists. Although there had been differences concerning tactics in

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*Cominform Journal, 4 July 1952.
the 1950-52 period, there appears to have been no questioning of the basic strategy laid down by the May Thesis. The Molotov cocktail period, however, had demonstrated the difficulty of taking effective action against the U.S. presence in Japan. At the same time, the restoration of sovereignty--in which numerous SCAP anti-Communist directives were allowed to lapse--appeared to promise opportunities for fruitful domestic agitation. In terms of doctrine, the treaty made less plausible the party's insistence that international monopoly capital was still in the driver's seat; the JCP's insistence that the presence of U.S. base made Japan "semi-occupied" in time wore thin.

Aggressive elements within the party probably favored an early effort to overthrow the Yoshida government. But the "creative adaptation" of Marxism-Leninism was never a strong point of the JCP. In contrast with the Socialists--who could be as anti-American as the Communists when they chose, but preferred to concentrate on domestic issues--the JCP remained firmly anchored to the anti-U.S. two-revolution line. Although elements of the Japanese left demonstrated a willingness to unite with the Communists for certain "struggles," the secondary priority which the JCP accorded domestic issues became an obstacle to the popular front for which the party was presumably striving.

As the JCP came to occupy a small but recognizable niche on the Far Left, the nature of its influence became more evident. The party's numbers remained small, and relatively static; in 1955 it was generally credited with fewer than 50,000 card-carrying members, about a third of whom were in the Tokyo area. Its influence in the countryside was negligible, but the concentration of cadres in industrial areas greatly heightened their nuisance value.

Along with its regular membership, the party had virtual control over Chosen Soren, the primary organization of the 600,000-odd Koreans residing in Japan, most of whom were leftist-oriented. A second valuable affiliate was the teacher's union, by which the party was able to propagate the Marxist gospel throughout Japan. The splinter Farmer-Labor Party was a useful bridge between the JCP and the Left Socialists, and provided a cover for election campaigns in periods when the JCP label might do more harm than good.
Party control of these hard core affiliates was never successfully challenged. In other groups, however, there were alternating periods of ascendancy between the JCP and the Left Socialists. The usual pattern was for the Communists, in the name of the united front, to penetrate the leadership mechanism of a union or "struggle" group. Invariably the JCP faction sought, in heavy-handed fashion, to move the organization to a more radical course than non-Communist elements were prepared to tolerate. Eventually there would be a grass roots revolt, resulting in either the installation of less radical leadership and a consequent diminishing of Communist influence, or a split into "right" and "left" factions.

Such was the case with the Sohyo labor federation in the mid-1950s. Counting more than three million members, Sohyo was by far the largest and most influential of the Japanese labor unions. In the period from 1953-1955, the JCP enjoyed considerable success in infiltrating Sohyo headquarters and influencing it in the direction of a more strident anti-Americanism. By 1955, JCP influence had become so obvious that a grass-roots revolt of the membership turned out the pro-Communist leadership.

Thus the JCP of 1955 was a frustrated and ineffective organization. Its numbers were small and its influence slight, particularly when compared with its rival, the Socialist party. The JCP was internally confused over its proper function in a "semi-occupied" country; internationally, its liaison with the Communist movement had been demonstrated to be poor to nonexistent. The party was sufficiently harassed within Japan that it had not had a chance to assess its role in the era after Stalin. Moreover, it had shown a singular inability to "creatively adapt" its policies to postwar Japan.
II. THE PARTY REEMERGES

A. The Sixth Party Congress

In July 1955, the JCP held its first national congress since that of 1947. The interval was unusually long even by JCP standards, but the postponements were understandable. The party's leaders had been underground, the central committee had been troubled by factionalism, and the death of Tokuda in 1953 had posed a succession problem which had to be met in terms of the post-Stalin emphasis on collegial leadership.

A few months before the July conclave, the first of the party's real leaders emerged. Yoshio Shiga, who had once opposed Nosaka's gradualist line, appeared in public in February 1955. The timing of Shiga's surfacing was prompted in part by a desire that he run in the Lower House elections; he campaigned successfully for one of two seats captured by the Communists in the spring of 1955. But with Nosaka still underground, Shiga was also required to help launch the party congress.

The Sixth Party Congress was notable for its admission of past errors and for its reemphasis on legal activities. Red Flag published a lengthy recital of the party's mistakes in implementing the New Program: underestimation of the difficulties in creating a united front; resort to leftist adventurism; inability to capture the masses ideologically. Perhaps out of deference to the late Tokuda, the New Program was not rejected in its entirety.

The most significant activity of the congress was in the field of party organization. The Central Committee was reduced from 24 to 15, to be presided over by a seven-man Standing Committee. The most striking action was one of omission: although the congress provided for a First Secretary to preside over the Standing Committee, this top post was left vacant.
Much of the reorganization was the predictable aftermath of years of fruitless drift. It was, in addition, a Japanese effort to ape the USSR in its emphasis on collegial leadership. More drastic, however, was action the party took with regard to its paramilitary apparatus. Tended to confirm rumors that the party virtually dispensed with the Military Bureau--known by the code designation "Y Organization"--which had gone along so reluctantly with the JCP's return to legal action. Orders just prior to the congress called for the disbanding of "Y" cells, the destruction of all sensitive documents, and the disposal of weapons into the sea. While this action by no means took the party out of the business of covert operations, it effectively ruled out a return to Molotov cocktail tactics at any early date.

The Sixth Congress was also notable for its blurring of old factional distinctions. Since 1950 the party had been troubled by rivalry between the Tokuda-Nosaka "Mainstream" leadership and the more activist, Moscow-oriented "Internationalists" associated with Shiga and a rising "old pro," Kenji Miyamoto. Both groups were in agreement concerning the broad lines of JCP strategy, and the rivalry was to a considerable extent based on personalities. The Mainstreamers, however, were sensitive to the party's numerical weakness, and hopeful of salvaging something from their partially-successful infiltration of the Japanese left prior to 1950. The Internationalists, on the other hand, professed concern over the Cominform criticism, and argued that under Mainstream guidance the party was in danger of losing its identity and of becoming merely one more fragment of the Japanese left.

When the list of Presidium members was issued at the Sixth Congress, it was headed by the absent Nosaka, Shiga, and Miyamoto--the same three who, in slightly different order of seniority, run the party today. In a move to unify the top leadership, the Standing Committee was made to comprise four persons previously identified with the Mainstream, and three erstwhile Internationalists.

The Congress was reasonably successful in healing the old Mainstream-Internationalist factionalism. It managed, however, to open a Pandora's box in the area of
strategy and tactics. A hint of the change came when the platform implicitly rejected Tokuda's view that the SCAP land program was nothing but a fraud. The party statement conceded for the first time that the occupation had brought about a degree of land redistribution, and had "altered the relationship between the classes."

A revision in the party's definition of Japan's political status was to be fraught with consequences. Whereas the New Program had characterized the country as a "colonial dependency of the U.S." and called for a "revolution of national liberation," the 1955 platform designated Japan as an "advanced capitalist country under the partial occupation of the U.S." The democratic revolution which the party demanded must therefore be directed against "Japanese monopoly capitalism," the "subservient ally" of American imperialism.

These changes in doctrinal emphasis were in part a belated effort to recognize the facts of the Japanese domestic scene, in the interest of the JCP's united front program. By slightly watering down its emphasis on anti-Americanism, the party made itself more acceptable to the Socialists. Any favorable aspects of the reorientation, however, would be more than neutralized by the furor which it stirred within the party.

Notwithstanding the congress' emphasis on legal activity, at its close eight of the fifteen central committee members were still in hiding. Some may have been deterred from surfacing by criminal charges brought against them while underground. Gradually, however, they crawled out of the woodwork. Nosaka surfaced in August 1955; he was briefly arrested, then released.

In terms of individuals, the congress was notable for the stature gained by Miyamoto, who was widely rumored to have Soviet backing. According to the Soviet mission in Tokyo received orders from Moscow that Miyamoto was to run for the Diet, and was to be made a member of the JCP's Central Guidance Department. Although he lost his campaign for the Diet, Miyamoto emerged as a power in the Presidium.
B. The Debate on Strategy

The JCP had scarcely got its house in order when it was buffeted by trends in the international Communist movement. The events at the 20th Congress of the CPSU appear to have caught the JCP as much by surprise as had the Cominform attack six years earlier.

Superficially, the JCP would not appear to have been greatly affected by the meeting in Moscow. For a party very much out of power, the denigration of Stalin required no adjustment in the trappings of power or of the distribution of authority. Of the top three JCP leaders, only Shiga might be considered a Stalinist; his subsequent drop from No. 2 to No. 3 in the JCP hierarchy may have been a byproduct of deStalinization.

As for Nosaka, the emphasis at Moscow on peaceful revolution and the non-inevitability of war could be read as vindication of the "lovable Communist Party." Indeed, a JCP plenum in July 1955 had issued a statement which noted that "the inevitability of revolution by force" which had characterized the 1951 platform was "not applicable to Japan at the present time." The JCP went on to add that if certain conditions were favorable a peaceful "transition to revolution" was possible. These conditions were: assurance of "democratic" elections and the democratic operation of the Diet; a strengthening of the party and expansion of its apparatus; and a strengthening of "progressive" mass movements. The plenum had determined that, since the possibility of a peaceful revolution did exist, a party congress should be called to bury with full honors the New Program. For once, the JCP seemed in step with the international movement.

Nonetheless, the party's strategy came in for criticism on both tactical and theoretical grounds. Hardened ideologues feared that a strategy of "peaceful" revolution made the JCP hardly distinguishable from other leftist groups. Moreover, a "peaceful" strategy was not easily reconciled to the party's long-standing priority for ousting the Americans. In their frustration, a significant minority
within the party came to favor a single-stage domestic revolution. Some of these were remnants of the terrorist groups, while others were disturbed over the party's preoccupation with the U.S. as opposed to domestic reforms. Together, these strange bedfellows came to be associated with the strategy of a single-stage revolution which eventually would lead to the legal ouster of the U.S. bases.

The JCP Guidance Department contended that there must be a "democratic" revolution before there could be any hope of a successful Socialist revolution. Characteristically, this tactical issue was resolved on ideological and broad strategic grounds: as long as there was a strong U.S. presence in Japan (the party had explained as early as the May Thesis) a domestic revolution was doomed. The party's position in 1955 was that while U.S. control of Japan had changed "in substance and method" as a result of the peace treaty, it remained "essentially the same" despite the restoration of Japanese sovereignty.

Critics of the new platform--activists and theorists--were vocal. They argued that a two-stage revolution based on the 1932 Thesis was clearly obsolete; that with the signing of the peace treaty Japan had regained control of its affairs; and that the degree of industrialization in post-war Japan made it an "advanced" capitalist country and hence ripe for revolution.

The party leadership was not to be outgunned in the area of theory, however, and the argument grew heated. Spokesmen for Nosaka and Miyamoto contended in party organs that Japan was still dependent on the U.S. militarily and economically; that a "basic contradiction" existed between the present status and that desired by the Japanese people; that Japan occupied a key strategic role in U.S. military planning; and that the position of "reactionary forces" within Japan was subordinate to U.S. imperialism and therefore required a two-stage revolution.

While a doctrinaire Marxist might sympathize with the party in its search for a tidy and "correct" solution to its problems, the overall impression is one of barren scholasticism. There is none of Mao's "creative adaptation" of Marxism-Leninism in the interest of an effective
program. That the polemics actually disguised fundamental personal rifts was a widely held belief even in 1956. For instance, Shigeo Shida--one of the paramilitary leaders of the underground period--appears to have been motivated less by theoretical considerations than by smouldering discontent at the treatment accorded his goon squads since 1952.

The new factionalism was not limited to the Shida group. The party's eagerness to accommodate itself to the new Moscow line came in for disapproval among the cadres, particularly the younger ones. Among the criticisms were that the "pewar" leadership underestimated the difficulty of a peaceful revolution in a country garrisoned by U.S. troops; that the JCP had been badly treated by the Cominform over a period of years, and should chart an independent course; and that there was need for new blood among the leadership.

Adherents of this view never came to be recognized as a faction in the usual sense. The extent to which they influenced the party in its gradual move into Peiping's orbit is unclear. It is interesting to note, however, in view of the positions which they hold today, that Shoichi Kasuga and Yojiro Konno were linked as early as 1957 with those Young Turks who favored the evolution of Japan along more "national" lines.

Criticism of the party's subservience to Moscow increased following the Soviet intervention in Hungary in the fall of 1956. Although the JCP closed ranks for public purposes, the Soviet action in Hungary, together with the revelation of Stalin's crimes the previous February, stirred new doubts among the faithful. In an unusual display of dirty linen, Vanguard published in October an article by a minor party official in which he confessed to a "long-felt indignation" at the party's "blind obedience to a foreign power."

Stalin's cult of the individual had aggravated all the mistakes of the Japanese Communist party--such as a lack of independence, too much blind obedience to authority, dogmatism, bureaucratism and ultra-leftism.
The article went on to attack the editors of Red Flag for supporting Soviet territorial claims against Japan. "Why," the author asked, could the party not "ask for the return of the Kuriles instead of saying that the party does not mind giving up the islands?" The author closed with a plea for equality among Communist parties:

The Japanese Communist party must refuse to be led by the party of another country or by the parties of a number of other countries. The party of Japan must also refuse to organize a centralized relationship in international politics. What leads the party and revolution of Japan are the principles of Marxism-Leninism... The Japanese Communist party and the parties of the world must confirm that, in their relations based on Marxism, they have the right and duty to criticize each other freely.

The circumstances under which such flagrant criticism saw light in the party journal are unclear. It preceded by several months the "Hundred Flowers" experiment in Communist China, but was even more short-lived. Possible it was a brief manifestation of "national" Communist as espoused by Konno or Shoichi Kasuga. In any case, the last half of 1956 saw an opening of Pandora's box in terms of intra-party criticism. One immediate result was that the convening of a new party congress lost much of its charm to Nosaka.

The Seventh Party Congress had initially been scheduled for the fall of 1956. According to classification reports early in 1957, it was rescheduled for the summer of that year, in part because of the party's inability to agree on a program. When September 1957 came and went without a convention, there were rumors that the congress would take place the following February. The longer the party delayed, the more embarrassing things became, particularly as the question of Yugoslavia emerged as a major bone of contention between Moscow and Peiping. When the congress was finally held in July 1958, it went just as badly as the leaders had feared.
C. The Seventh Party Congress

The JCP took the first step towards its oft-delayed congress with the publication in September 1957 of a draft platform for discussion among the cadres. At this time the party congress was scheduled for February 1958; a measure of the storm aroused by the draft platform was its postponement once again, this time until July 1958.

Considering the controversy it aroused, the platform itself was not a sensational document. It contained little new, and in several areas merely reiterated policies laid down at the Sixth congress in 1955. Symbolically, however, the party's statement of principles loomed large: for the first time the New Program of 1951 was to be repealed in its entirety. The fact that a new and hopefully permanent chapter was to be added to the party's ideological lexicon lent heat to old controversies.

The most significant elements in the draft platform were the party's appraisal of Japan's political status, the designation of the primary enemy, and matters concerning the form of the revolution to be staged. In 1951 Japan had been defined as a "semi-colonial dependent country," in which the main task of the party was a revolution of national liberation, and whose main enemy was the U.S. In the new draft platform, as a concession to the San Francisco treaty, Japan was designated "an advanced capitalist nation under the partial occupation of the U.S."--the characterization first made in July 1955. The party's mission, therefore, was to lead a "national democratic revolution" against monopoly capitalism, the "subservient ally" of American imperialism.

The question of Japan's degree of national independence was a situation unique to Japan and the JCP. The question of whether there could be a peaceful revolution, however, had international overtones. Although the Shida faction was gone, there remained considerable difference
of opinion as to the practicality of peaceful revolution in Japan, and many cadres felt the less said about it the better.*

It soon became public knowledge that the Central Committee was divided on the subject of the draft platform. The December 1957 issue of Vanguard included a long article by Central Committee member Shojiro Kasuga, whose defection from the party in 1961 would bring to fruition the growing split over strategy. Kasuga noted that while the draft platform made no allowance for minority views, he had been given leave to set forth his views to party members. He then launched into a closely-reasoned attack on the "deep rooted errors and weaknesses" which he detected in the majority position.

The focus of my objections is closely related to the nature of the revolution in Japan.... Monopolistic capitalism is the central governing force of reactionary groups and controls the national power in Japan, which lost World War II, was under the occupation of American imperialism for a long time, and is still subservient to America in the military, political and economic fields. Under such circumstances Japanese monopolistic capitalists are supporting American policy on Japan and using this subservient condition to their own advantage. (Emphasis added)

*Shida's fate is not without some interest. His faction was denounced by name in July 1957, in a Central Committee statement which called on all cadres to promote party unity. A subsequent statement rebuked Shida for criticizing the party in non-Communist publications. Finally he was expelled from the party, not on ideological grounds but for misuse of funds and "extravagant merrymaking" in Tokyo nightspots -- a favorite JCP charge for discrediting wayward members.
Thus Kasuga conceded most of the premises of his opponents, though it is doubtful that he in fact considered Japanese capitalism "subservient" to the U.S. Even when writing under considerable restraint, however, Kasuga conveyed a feeling that monopolistic capitalism was much the more sinister of the party's two adversaries. Kasuga contended that much had been changed by the San Francisco treaty:

Japan is still under control of American imperialism because of the San Francisco system. However, if the people's unity is strong enough to establish a political united front, it is very likely that a government can be established which will be capable of reflecting and practicing the will of the people through democratic and legal methods.

The San Francisco system contains a contradiction in that America can neither continue to infringe on the sovereignty of Japan by resorting to force nor change the government from the legal point of view.

In support of his thesis, Kasuga pointed to the election of a Communist as mayor of Naha on Okinawa:

Even under complete military occupation, the people in Okinawa succeeded in electing Mr. Senaga as mayor of Naha by an overwhelming majority of votes. Mr. Senaga represents the People's Party which is demanding restoration of Okinawa to Japan and opposes the American occupation policies. Although the American authorities want to oppress and subjugate Mr. Senaga's government by force, they cannot do so because of their fear of the world public.
Kasuga was also critical of the insistence of the party leadership on two revolutions. In his opinion, the JCP should be strengthening the working class with a view towards seizing power through a single-stage, peaceful revolution. But as he looked into his crystal ball in December 1957, Kasuga was vague on this point.

After a series of united front governments take power in the struggles led by the working class against the American imperialists and monopolists, a revolutionary government will come to power, which will be national and democratic in nature, whether it be called a people's democratic government or a people's democratic revolution. Fundamentally, it will be a socialist government centered on the working class, aimed at achieving socialism. This will naturally be a socialist revolution.

The long-awaited congress finally was held between 21 July - 1 August 1958. Kasuga, however, had done his work well. To the intense frustration of Miyamoto and Nosaka, the draft platform fell short of the two-thirds majority required to put it into effect. The fact of its failure, moreover, brought criticism from the floor of the inability of the leadership to unite the party.

Having met to adopt a program, the party did some unimaginative improvising. Representatives of various Communist parties had met in Moscow in November 1957 to consider the implications of the deStalinization effort. The "Moscow Declaration" adopted by the assembled delegates had endorsed the possibility of "revolution by peaceful means," and had laid down certain rules concerning revolutions which were general rather than specific and permitted the JCP to avoid a stand on the nature of Japan's revolution, or the identity of the main enemy in Japan. The party was relieved to fall back on the Moscow formula, which decreed that a "proletarian revolution in one form or another" would result in the establishment of "one form or another of the dictatorship of the proletariat."
What few accomplishments there were at the Seventh Congress were in the field of party organization. The post of "first secretary"—established in 1955 but never filled—was abolished. Instead, the party provided for a Chairman of the Central Committee, and a Secretary General to head the party apparatus. The change was an obvious attempt to accommodate both Nosaka, who was named Chairman, and Miyamoto, who was made Secretary-General. Although Nosaka emerged with the more resounding title, Miyamoto inherited the title and some of the aura of the late Kyuichi Tokuda. If there was a "loser" in the reorganization it was Yoshio Shiga, who had organized the previous party conference in 1955 and who, on occasion, had been ranked ahead of Miyamoto within the ruling triumvirate.

D. The JCP and China

There is ample reason to believe that Peiping was influential within JCP councils well before the 1957-1958 period. The continuing influence of Nosaka, who freely acknowledged his debt to Mao, was in itself assurance that Chinese policies would always be accorded a respectful hearing within the JCP. Both Tokuda and Nosaka were believed to have spent time in China during the 1950-55 "underground" period, while neither is known to have visited the USSR at this time.

It was easy to underestimate the extent of Peiping's influence, partly because Soviet and Chinese policies for the party often coincided. Although the New Program may have been drafted in Peiping, a JCP effort to sabotage the UN war effort was in the interest of Russia as well as China. It is interesting that Moscow and Peiping appear to have coordinated their policies towards Japan without notable friction in the middle and late 1950s.

Although the party had been embarrassed at different times by both the Soviets and the Chinese, grass-roots resentment among the cadres seemed largely directed against the Soviets. Chinese claims to have "adapted" Marxism-Leninism to their own conditions made an impression within
the JCP, and led to demands—such as those in Vanguard—for more "creative" policies within the party. A factor in the JCP's turning toward Peiping may have been China's greater militancy towards the Japanese government and the U.S. Although the Soviet Union remained adamant on the question of Japan's lost territories—a sore point within the JCP—the peace treaty signed in 1955 on Moscow's initiative terminated the state of war between Japan and the USSR and restored diplomatic relations. The Soviets have remained as active as their Chinese brethren in attempting to estrange Japan from the U.S., but Soviet policies have been carried out since 1955 in an atmosphere of more correct relations. The USSR has never been particularly successful at winning friends in Japan, and this penchant for alienation gradually made inroads within the JCP.

In contrast to the USSR, with its emphasis on diplomacy, China was revolutionary to the core. Certain of its policies were disturbing to the JCP, particularly Peiping's policy of using the JSP as its lever to increase Sino-Japanese trade. Nonetheless, Peiping managed to combine a fierce bellicosity on issues such as U.S. bases and the liberation of Taiwan with propaganda proposals which played on well-known Japanese sensibilities. China's new hard line appealed to the JCP, its soft line to Japanese of many political persuasions.

In 1954, Peiping saw fit to expand on Chou En-lai's "five principles" for peaceful coexistence, developed in concert with India's Nehru. In August of that year, Chou proposed a "peace pact" aimed at halting the fighting in Indo-China, which would then be extended to elsewhere in Asia. In July 1955 Chou enlarged on his plan, even allowing for U.S. participation. Peiping's initiatives at this time were warmly seconded by Moscow.

A second Chinese proposal which appealed to Japan was for an atom-free area in the Far East. In January 1958, Nehru had commented favorably on the Rapacki Plan for a nuclear-free belt in Europe, and supported the concept of a similar zone in Asia. The following month the Chinese endorsed Nehru's proposal, and in time made it their own.
Only in Japan could such transparent "peace" proposals have some impact when accompanied by sabre-rattling in the Taiwan Straits, strident propaganda against the Japan-U.S. security treaty, and the ever-present possibility of renewed fighting in Korea. The Chinese, however, skillfully posed as the injured party. In April 1957, Mao told a visiting Japanese Socialist delegation that China was prepared to conclude a nonaggression pact once Japan became "completely independent of the United States and when there is no possibility of Japan becoming militaristic again."

Peiping also sought to improve its trade relations with Japan, but with only qualified success. Even while protesting the absence of diplomatic relations, Peiping proved willing between 1952 and 1958 to consummate four agreements with private Japanese trading firms. The fourth agreement, signed in March 1958, included at China's insistence a provision for a Chinese trade mission in Japan which would enjoy semi-diplomatic status. The agreement, when approved by the Japanese government, brought a vigorous protest from Taipei and was generally regarded as a breakthrough for Peiping in its campaign for de facto recognition. The Chinese, however, could not stand prosperity. When in May 1958 a Japanese factory worker pulled down the Chinese Communist flag at the trade mission headquarters, Peiping seized upon the incident to sever all trade relations with the Japanese.

Inasmuch as Japan's trade with the Mainland comprised less than 1% of its total trade, the Japanese were able to take this action in stride. Peiping, however, warned that no improvement in relations would be forthcoming until Premier Kishi accepted China's "three principles"—i.e., end Japan's hostile attitude towards China; refrain from all "two Chinas" plots; and cease obstructing "normalized" Sino-Japanese relations. In the period following the rupture in trade relations, Kishi was the target of vituperation unusual even for Peiping. Kishi's participation in Japan's wartime government inspired Chinese references to "this bloody-handed executioner."
All this was heady stuff to the JCP, especially when compared with the USSR's more remote attitude. At the Seventh Party Congress it was agreed that a major target for united front efforts in Japan would be the projected revision of the Japan - U.S. security treaty. Although the Soviets were of course opposed to the treaty, China's propaganda tirades were the more militant. And while both Peiping and Moscow had called for the "neutralization" of Japan, the Chinese took a more anti-U.S. line than did the Soviets.

The summer of 1958 saw the appearance for the first time of a distinct "China faction" within the JCP. Its hard core comprised a group of 90-odd members who had returned from China during the first half of 1958, many of them on the Hakusan Maru. All had received several years' training in China, having left Japan during the 1950-1955 "underground" period, many at the urging of then-Secretary General Tokuda. Several of the repatriates found arrest warrants waiting for them at the dock, but most were nothing more than illegal emigrants.

The so-called Hakusan Maru group (later lumped with other pro-Chinese cadres as the "China policy group") was not overtly anti-Soviet, but came back strongly inoculated with the gospel according to Mao. As a group they were young, with the great majority in their twenties and thirties. In a moribund party such as the JCP, such a group could be expected to cut a wide swath. In acknowledgement of their zeal, cadres from the Hakusan Maru were sent to local party organizations in groups of two or three to "renovate the party atmosphere."

Within the JCP, the Hakusan Maru group came to be associated with Satomi Hakamada, a member of the Presidium who appears to have been a key liaison man between the JCP and Peiping. There is some evidence that the JCP Old Guard viewed the Hakusan Maru group with mixed feelings. According to one report, the Presidium was concerned that the repatriates were allegedly receiving instructions from Peiping, and was therefore "on guard" against them. To this day, the repatriates have only minor representation on the JCP Central Committee.
E. The Early Security Treaty Struggle

The emerging Sino-Soviet dispute was overshadowed within the JCP in 1959-1960 by the party's most successful period of united front activity. Although the JCP had periodically embarked on joint "struggle" efforts, cooperation with the Socialists had usually been shortlived, and the results uninspired. It was one thing to demonstrate against the U.S. as in the Bikini-test "Fortunate Dragon" incident. To achieve lasting results by such a protest was something else again.

Although this paper is not a manual of infiltration techniques, some analysis of the anti-treaty campaign is called for, if only because it represents a high spot in the party's postwar history. It is a paradox that the JCP of 1960--its numbers decimated, its foreign control exposed, and hampered by factionalism--could help topple a conservative government and publicly humiliate the United States.

Two measures approved at the Seventh Congress in mid-1958 were a membership drive, and a united front effort to oppose the Police Duties Bill--the latter being a measure under which the Japanese police would have received new powers in the areas of arrest-on-suspicion and detention for interrogation. The successful campaign against the bill was in some respects a preview of the more extensive campaign against the security treaty. There was virtually no popular support for the police bill, which brought back strong memories of police excesses in the prewar era. When 30,000 leftists demonstrated outside the Diet for 24 hours before the scheduled vote, the Kishi government had second thoughts, and withdrew the bill. The victory was small, but the precedent was ominous. With the police bill in mind, the Socialists and the Communists united to turn public opinion against the security treaty.

The Socialist party was in a period of crisis during 1959. In the local and Upper House elections of that year, the slow but perceptible trend towards the Socialists which had characterized postwar elections was reversed for the
first time. This setback aggravated dissension between the JSP's left and right wings, which had long been at odds over the party's far-left leadership. In October 1959, the minority right wing broke away to form the Democratic Socialist Party. In a parallel move within Sohyo, right wingers in control of some 800,000 of Sohyo's 3,500,000 members broke off to form a rival federation.

The conservative government of Premier Kishi thus appeared on firm ground as it sought to ratify in the Diet a modified version of the existing Japan-U.S. security treaty, a version worded to allow Japan a greater voice in the employment of U.S. forces stationed on its territory. In his own enthusiasm for the treaty, however, Kishi counted too much on his two-to-one Diet majority, while allowing insufficiently for popular misgivings such as those which had contributed to the defeat of the Police Duties Bill. While most Japanese favored their country's alliance with the U.S., pacifist sentiment was sufficiently strong to permit a leftist coalition to picture the treaty as one which would assure Japan's involvement in any new war.

The JCP devoted extensive planning to its part in the anti-treaty campaign. In March 1959, it joined the left Socialists in sponsoring the People's Council Against Revision of the Security Treaty (Kokumin Kaigi) from which much was to be heard in 1959-60. According to , a JCP directive of July 1959 called for the recruitment of Kokumin Kaigi members into the JCP.

In addition to the People's Council, the JCP was influential in two other mass groups. The first was Sohyo, in which Communist influence was once more on the rise. The number of card-carriers in Sohyo was small, perhaps no more than 20,000 out of over three million. The ability of the Communists to influence policy was considerable, however, in that they occupied--according to the U.S. Embassy--some 28% of the staff positions in Sohyo headquarters. Moreover, the federation was sufficiently anti-American even without prodding to make it a uniquely valuable ally of the JCP.
Much the same situation existed within the federation of university students, Zengakuren. The number of card-carriers within Zengakuren was estimated at 2,000 out of a total membership of 290,000. At its headquarters, however, some 40% of the leadership was either Communist or Communist-controlled. The situation was complicated by the fact that JCP members did not represent the "far left" within Zengakuren, which was by all odds the most radical of the major anti-treaty groups. In 1958 a "Trotskyite" faction had ousted the JCP-dominated leadership, in part because of the Communists' preoccupation with American imperialism as opposed to the ousting of "fascist" Kishi. In view of the key role played by Zengakuren in the events of 1960, it is ironic that Red Flag had spent much of the preceding year denouncing its leaders for leftist adventurism.

Of the three main anti-treaty groups, only Sohyo could be considered responsive to JCP direction in the literal sense of the word. Zengakuren was very much of a maverick, and the party initially had only observer status on the 13-man executive committee of the People's Council. Although JCP interests were usually protected by the representative of Sohyo or one of the other constituents, the anti-treaty movement was one of various leftist groups working in concert, and was never dominated by the JCP.

The initiative in staging demonstrations usually came from Zengakuren. The student group broke discipline within the People's Council when a student mob broke into the Diet on 27 November 1959, despite pleas for restraint from the JCP, the JSP and Sohyo. On 16 January 1960, 700 Zengakuren members staged a sit-down in the lobby of Haneda airport to protest the departure of the Japanese delegation to the U.S. to sign the treaty.

Fairly widespread disapproval of these Zengakuren excesses was overcome by a series of outside factors. First was the public announcement that President Eisenhower would visit Japan in June—a time when the ink would scarcely be dry on the new treaty, if it had been ratified at all. The timing of the Eisenhower visit, in the opinion of many Japanese reflected at minimum an insensitivity to Japan's new sense of independence.
A second factor was the U-2 incident, and the resulting collapse of the scheduled summit conference between Eisenhower and Khrushchev. The image of Eisenhower as a peacemaker changed overnight as a result of the U-2 affair, and his visit to Japan—which under other circumstances would have been welcomed by most Japanese—became the subject of serious controversy.

F. High Tide at Haneda

Even before the U-2, there was evidence that the anti-treaty campaign was receiving financial support from the Bloc. In April, reports indicated that of an estimated $20,000 budgeted for the anti-treaty struggle during April, approximately $6,000 came from the Japan-China Friendship Association. According to an industry group—the National Lacquer Supply Consultative Society—donated around $4,000 to Sohyo, "in gratitude" for Sohyo's having influenced Communist China to release lacquer to Japan in 1959. It appears likely that Soviet outlets in Japan, such as the embassy and the Japan-Soviet Friendship Society, were similarly channels for Bloc funds. Significantly, not all such funds were channeled through the JCP. As part of its campaign to cultivate the Japanese left in general, Peiping made contributions directly to the People's Council. Whether the Soviets also bypassed the JCP during this period is not known.

On 19 May, the Diet met in order to extend its session beyond the normal close, 26 May. The action was necessary in order to allow the Upper House the 30 days allowed by the Constitution to debate the treaty. At this juncture, Socialist legislators attempted to block action by physically confining the Speaker of the Lower House in his chambers. In the uproar which followed, police removed the Socialists bodily from the building. The Liberal-Democrats then enacted a 50-day extension and then, to preclude further Socialist obstructionism, approved the treaty itself by a 240-0 vote.
Press coverage of the incident tended to downplay the Socialists' provocation, but generally condemned Kishi's use of the police power to conduct Diet business. Even within the Liberal-Democratic Party, dissident elements used the incident as grounds to demand Kishi's resignation. Socialist and People's Council elements demonstrated almost daily outside Kishi's residence and the Diet, and the student snake dance became a familiar sight on the world's TV screens. A poll taken after the 19 May incident revealed that the Kishi government enjoyed the support of only 12% of the populace—the lowest mark ever received by a postwar premier.

The People's Council and its constituents, having stirred up a popular furor, now sought to achieve some tangible result. Kishi's refusal to resign virtually precluded any action to block the treaty, which under the Constitution would be ratified automatically at midnight on 19 June. This fact narrowed the targets to Kishi and Eisenhower. Ever conscious of priorities, the JCP directed its fire against the Eisenhower visit:

The people's enemy, the U.S. imperialists, withdraw from Asia! Let's protest against Eisenhower's visit to Japan through rallies and demonstrations... It is an indisputable fact that the U.S. imperialists are the enemy of the people of Asia. Without doubt, the struggle filled with the people's anger will develop into a turbulent struggle probing the responsibility of U.S. imperialism.*

An intimation of what might be faced by President Eisenhower came on 10 June, when the advance party headed by Press Secretary Hagerty was mobbed at Haneda airport. The bulk of the demonstrators were anti-Mainstream (i.e., pro-JCP) Zengakuren students; Yoshio Shiga directed operations on the scene. Alone among the incidents which took

place daily during June, the riot at the airport can be credited in large measure to the JCP.

The climax was reached on 15 June, when violence erupted in the area of the Diet. Thousands of students clashed with police in a demonstration which culminated in a mass urination on the Diet building. One student was killed, and over 400 injured. In contrast to the anti-American riot at the airport, the demonstration at the Diet was largely anti-Kishi and was spearheaded by the non-JCP faction of Zengakuren. For twenty-four hours Japan verged on anarchy. Then, on 16 June, the government asked for a postponement of the Eisenhower visit. Although demonstrations did not cease altogether, the announcement that Eisenhower would not be coming, together with the death of the student demonstrator, had a sobering effect.

Anti-Kishi demonstrations continued on a reduced scale until 23 June when, with the security treaty a fait accompli, the instruments of ratification were exchanged. On the same day Premier Kishi submitted his resignation.

The part played by the JCP in postponing the Eisenhower visit, and in ousting Kishi, was undoubtedly the zenith of the party's history. The JCP and its allies were unable to block ratification of the security treaty, but achieved their secondary objectives--the downfall of Kishi and cancellation of the Eisenhower visit—and managed simultaneously to discredit Japanese democracy in the eyes of the world.

Official U.S. statements sought to emphasize Communist involvement in the anti-treaty movement, and chided the Japanese for permitting a tiny minority to dictate foreign policy. The actual role played by the JCP, however, was more complex. At no time was the JCP in control of events during the climactic month of June. The leftist victory at that time stemmed from the weakness of parliamentary democracy in postwar Japan, together with a widespread belief that government authoritarianism and not any external military threat was the main threat to the new Japanese way of life. On a tactical level, the anti-treaty coalition
was assisted by Kishi's heavy-handed dealing with the Diet, propaganda and financial support from China and the USSR, public apprehension in the wake of the U-2 affair, and the singularly bad timing of the Eisenhower visit.

Where the Communists were most influential was in turning popular opposition to the treaty and to Kishi upon Eisenhower and the U.S. in general. Without Communist instigation, the airport demonstration—the immediate cause of the postponement of the President's visit—would probably not have taken place.

Neither the Socialists nor the Communists gained any stature from their anti-treaty campaign. In none of the monthly Asahi polls during 1960, for instance, did more than 1% of the respondents indicate that they "supported" the JCP. In the soul-searching which followed the treaty riots, the Socialists suffered a distinct drop in popularity, from 30% support in May to 25% in August. While the far left in Japan remains a threat to public order, the chance that it will again encounter conditions as favorable as those of 1960 appears remote.

It is worth recalling that in 1959, while the JCP was launching its most successful "struggle" to date, Khrushchev was seeking a detente with the West over Peiping's objections. That the anti-treaty campaign enjoyed Soviet as well as Chinese support has been noted; nonetheless, an incidental effect of the anti-treaty campaign may have been to strengthen the bond between the JCP and Peiping. Certainly the Chinese view of U.S. imperialism was closer to that of the JCP than was the Soviet view. Although evidence is lacking, it appears likely that many JCP cadres questioned how Khrushchev could desire a summit meeting with the initiator of the Japan-U.S. security treaty, as well as the U-2 overflights.

Apart from how JCP leaders viewed Khrushchev's behavior, they were probably grateful that the struggle at home had allowed them to remain aloof from the deepening Sino-Soviet rift. The party would continue to ignore the Sino-Soviet polemic, and its refusal to recognize in its publications the existence of Sino-Soviet differences would become more conspicuous in the absence of stirring campaigns on the domestic front.
III. THE PARTY SPLITS

A. The Morning After

Flushed with success after its victories in the summer of 1960, the JCP sought to follow up on its gains. There was to be a conference of Communist parties in Moscow in November, but the JCP appears to have given priority to Lower House elections scheduled for the same time. In a Central Committee plenum in August, the party decided to run a candidate in each of Japan's 108 electoral districts, and to aim for a popular vote of three million. Although party leaders were uncertain regarding the number of deputies it might elect, the figure five was bandied about. Inasmuch as the JCP had elected only one in the previous election, it clearly hoped to capitalize on what it regarded as a leftist trend in Japan.

Meanwhile, however, the leftist coalition which had operated so effectively in June was coming apart at the seams. In July Sohyo took a turn to the right, as its national convention resolved to support only Socialist candidates in the forthcoming elections. The resolution was aimed at the Communists, and reflected embarrassment at the extent to which Sohyo had been infiltrated by the JCP.

The Communists suffered a second setback in October, when, at the height of the Lower House campaign, JSP Chairman Inejiro Asanuma was assassinated by a right-wing extremist. The incident may have inspired a few sympathy votes for leftist candidates in the election itself; over the long term, however, the Communists would not find a socialist leader as responsive to manipulation or as independently anti-American.

In an effort to counter criticism of their role in the anti-treaty riots, the Socialists sought to dissociate their party from the JCP. On 6 November, relations between the two erstwhile allies reached a low when the Socialists charged the JCP with being "irresponsible." The Communists,
by contrast, were most unrepentant concerning the events of the past summer, and campaigned on all the old issues. Of 14 election slogans publicized in Red Flag, the first three related to international affairs:

1. Let us have the security treaty abrogated and have American forces withdraw from Japan. Let us make efforts to recover Okinawa and the Bonin Islands.

2. Let us promote Japan-Communist China diplomatic relations. We demand that Japan sign a peace treaty with the Soviet Union immediately.

3. Nuclearization and nuclear tests must not be allowed. Let us put total disarmament into practice. We are opposed to the revival of militarism. Let us defend the peace constitution.

When the ballots were counted, the JCP had slightly improved on its showing in 1958, but had fallen considerably short of expectations. The party’s percentage of the total vote rose slightly, from 2.6% to 2.9%, and it elected three members to the Lower House. As a parliamentary force, however, it was a pale shadow of the mobs which it had helped turn loose a few months before.

The aftermath of the security treaty campaign influenced the party’s view of the Sino-Soviet dispute. The Bucharest conference of Communist parties had immediately followed the cancellation of Eisenhower’s visit in June 1960, and the Japanese Communists were honored guests. In the debate over strategy between the Soviet and Chinese delegations, the Japanese steered a neutral course, and were probably happy to sign a closing communique which did nothing more than reaffirm the Moscow Declaration of 1957. By failing to join with the majority in attacking the Chinese position, however, it demonstrated a sympathy for the Chinese position. But the party sought to ignore the Sino-Soviet polemic at Bucharest; Chairman Miyamoto reportedly assured JCP cadres that there had been no discord at the conference.
As the background of the dispute gradually came to be common knowledge within the JCP, the dispute over strategy was given a characteristically Japanese twist. One central committee member, Takechiyo Uchino, reportedly contended that the anti-treaty struggle had demonstrated the feasibility of "peaceful" revolution, and urged that the party place full reliance on such methods. There appears to have been general agreement among the JCP leadership that the anti-treaty struggle had represented "peaceful" tactics at their best.

JCP strategy came in for debate at the 12th Plenum in August 1960. There Uchino was contradicted by party militants, who contended that while the transition to Socialist could be peaceful or violent, it would be a mistake to plan for only one type of struggle. They argued that had the party switched from "peaceful" to violent tactics at the climax of the anti-treaty campaign, the "revolution" might have succeeded. Thus in Japan the Sino-Soviet polemic intensified the internal debate on tactics. 

B. The Moscow Conference

If there was one dominant quality which characterized the JCP in the postwar period, it was insularity. The party appears never to have enjoyed close and continuous liaison with either Peiping or Moscow. The Cominform criticism of 1950 had come as a bolt from the blue. The Molotov cocktail period of 1951-52 ran counter to the policies of other Asian
parties. Although party officials periodically visited both Moscow and Peiping, contacts do not appear to have been sufficiently frequent or close for the JCP to be abreast of trends within the international Communist movement.

Related to this insularity, and contributing to it, was the JCP's preoccupation with Japan's unique status as a "semi-occupied" country. The party's intellectuals tended to focus on conditions within Japan rather than on the broader abstractions of Marxism-Leninism. Thus the JCP was far more interested in the correctness of its own anti-imperialism strategy than with those issues, such as the possibility of coexistence, which divided Moscow and Peiping.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the party had little to contribute at the Moscow Conference in 1960. The JCP had repeatedly endorsed the vaguely-worded Moscow Declaration of 1957 as a broad theoretical basis for its own program, and was content with the doctrinal status quo.

At the Moscow conference, the Japanese delegation--led by Satomi Hakamada--sought to avoid anything controversial. Although subsequent events have confirmed the JCP's then-submerged pro-Peiping bias, the Japanese delegation in 1960 behaved with great circumspection. The delegation is known to have offered only one speech--a string of platitudes devoted largely to recounting JCP "successes" at home.

In maintaining a posture of aloof neutrality, the party missed an opportunity to make a positive contribution to the conference. When an attempt was made to mediate Sino-Soviet differences, it was the Vietnamese delegation which took the lead without, as far as is known, any assistance from the Japanese. In retrospect, the JCP probably would have supported Peiping on the issue of majority rule, if pressed. In practice, however, Japanese endorsement of Peiping's refusal to be bound by a head count in matters of doctrine would be three years in coming. At the Moscow conference, the JCP lagged behind the parties of Burma, Indonesia, Malaya and North Korea in terms of support for the Chinese position.
Once agreed upon, the new Moscow Statement included a section probably solicited by the JCP. The statement noted that "in some non-European developed capitalist countries which are under political, economic and military domination of U.S. imperialism, the working class and the people direct the main blow against U.S. imperialist domination, and also against monopoly capital and the other domestic reactionary forces betraying the interests of the nation." The statement in effect gave official sanction to the JCP's policy of treating the U.S. as its main enemy. In retrospect, the implicit vote of confidence in the JCP leadership set the stage for a party split.

On 28 December 1960, with the conference done and the Japanese elections over, the JCP Central Committee issued a routine statement concerning the conference:

At present the strength and international influence of the Socialist system is rapidly increasing, the colonial system continues to collapse throughout the world, class struggles are achieving further development in the capitalist world, and the forces of socialism, national liberation, and peace preservation are becoming greatly superior to the forces of imperialism and the reactionaries.

By and large the resolution was pretty bland. In making no acknowledgement of the existence of differences within the Bloc, the JCP set a policy which it continued to follow until December 1962. The resolution indicated some relief that the previous Moscow Declaration was still in good repute:

The Moscow statement is an important platform for the international movements as a continuation of the Moscow Declaration of 1957. The Moscow statement confirmed that the Moscow Declaration of 1957 is still an active slogan for the international Communist movements, referring to the experiences of the struggle of Communist parties and working people throughout the world in the past three years.
C. The Kasuga Defection

At present, Japan is fundamentally controlled by American imperialism and Japanese monopoly capital, which is submissively allied with American imperialism. Although Japan is a highly developed capitalist state, it is virtually a dependency under the semi-occupation of American imperialism.

-Draft Platform, Eighth Party Congress, July 1961

In mid-1961, the key post of Chairman of the Central Control and Audit Committee was held by Shojiro Kasuga, a second-echelon leader who commanded a considerable following within the party. Kasuga had been a union organizer at the age of 20, and in 1924 was one of the select group chosen by Tokuda for study and training in the USSR. Upon returning to Japan he was jailed for eight years, after which he became a specialist in underground activity.

Kasuga's record as an activist did not make him immune from the penchant for destructive theorizing which was the bane of the JCP. As he advanced in the party hierarchy after the war, his interest in dogma increased. To a greater extent than most of his colleagues, he recognized the need to "creatively adapt" Marxism-Leninism to conditions in Japan, and not to dissipate the party's strength in futile battles against the Occupation.

It can be safely assumed that Kasuga's standing with the Miyamoto-Nosaka leadership was not enhanced when his criticism of the party platform caused it to be tabled at the Seventh Party Congress. When it became apparent that he might prove equally disruptive at the eighth congress, Kasuga achieved the status of a serious threat to discipline.

Kasuga's troubles began following the publication of an article in the August 1959 issue of Vanguard. Kasuga's treatise, titled "Let Us Do Our Utmost to Overcome Difficulties," was essentially a postmortem on the party's performance in the Upper House elections. Although it appeared
to dwell unduly on the evils of domestic capitalism vis-a-vis the threat of American imperialism, it accepted in general the strategic precepts of the JCP leadership. Elsewhere, however, it challenged the party's couéistic interpretation of the Japanese political scene.

Far from regarding the party's performance in the elections as a triumph as had its leaders, Kasuga discerned scant room for rejoicing. Rather, he regarded them as a "setback"—particularly in view of the high hopes which followed the withdrawal of the Police Duties Bill—and in one place used the word "defeat."* Contending that "not all party members were able to clearly understand the need for a showdown," Kasuga made his own position clear.

The democratic forces had it within their grasp to force a showdown with the Kishi government at the climax of the large-scale struggle against revision of the Police Duties Law last Autumn. Consequently the local and Upper House election returns came as a bad shock to the progressive camp.

Consternation within the party at this challenge to the leadership was underscored by a realization that more could be expected at the next party congress. Red Flag hastily published a statement that Kasuga's article had been retracted and "need not be discussed." There followed a self-criticism by Kasuga and by the luckless editor of Vanguard. Kasuga conceded that the article was not timely, in that the central committee was about "to review officially the election results. The editor of Vanguard admitted a "serious error" in that Kasuga's article had been published without sufficient study.

*It is difficult to dispute Kasuga's conclusion here, since the JCP lost in 1959 one of only two seats it held in the 250-man Upper House. It occupies four seats today.
For two years the Kasuga affair smouldered. Kasuga stayed out of sight and the party occupied itself with the security treaty campaign. It can be assumed, however, that if Kasuga felt that an opportunity to topple Kishi had been lost at the time of the Police Duties Bill, he felt equally frustrated at the time of the anti-treaty demonstrations.

On 8 July 1961, Kasuga called a press conference in Tokyo and announced his secession from the party "for which I have worked for nearly forty years," pledging a campaign to reform it from without. In his statement Kasuga confirmed that he had been consulted regarding the platform for the Eighth Party Congress, but that his objections had been overruled. Kasuga charged that the platform did not accurately mirror the Moscow Statement; that it emphasized the struggle against the U.S. at the expense of the anti-monopolist movement; and that it failed "to evaluate correctly" the successes and failures of past years.

The wrath of the party fell on Kasuga with a vengeance. To this day he remains the arch-villain among "revisionists.* After first conceding that Kasuga had indeed seceded from the party, the Presidium "expelled" him for good measure, amid charges of "malignant and treacherous activities" against the party. But the implication that Kasuga was an individual prima donna fell flat as the party launched a purge of lesser lights suspected of harboring sympathy for Kasuga's viewpoint. In this category were four central committee members, two alternate members, and 46 other cadres. A total of 300-odd members incurred some form of disciplinary action as a result of the Kasuga affair, and the number continues to rise.

*Inasmuch as Kasuga had criticized the party for not pressing sufficiently on the domestic scene, his designation as "revisionist" might be questioned. In emphasizing the capitalist enemy, however, Kasuga was close to the viewpoint of the Socialists. In any case, JCP references to "leftist adventurism" were usually reserved for those radical elements of Zengakuren who refused to acknowledge JCP leadership.
The Kasuga defection was the most serious schism to hit the JCP in the postwar period. The purge which followed served to entrench further the Peiping-oriented leadership, while nipping in the bud potential supporters of Moscow in the Moscow-Peiping debate. To this date there is no significant pro-Soviet faction within the JCP.

Notwithstanding the above, Kasuga's defection was not a reflection of the Sino-Soviet dispute. Although Kasuga professed to champion Soviet policies, his original defection stemmed from differences unique to the JCP. While he has criticized the Miyamoto-Nosaka leadership as "subservient" to Peiping, he has demonstrated no great interest in the issues of the Sino-Soviet dispute, and gives the impression of attempting to manufacture an issue where he only suspects that one exists.

There is an odor of opportunism in the charges of both Kasuga and his opponents. Kasuga, who advocated an early single-stage revolution, and whose career reflects a penchant for underground activities, is not entirely convincing in his self-cast role as defender of the "peaceful" Moscow line. Nor is he enough of a polemicist to rationalize his own program for Japan. A Red Flag article observed,

Kasuga says that "peaceful coexistence" is the strategy of world revolution, but where can we find such a foolish statement in the Moscow Statement? The Moscow Statement emphasizes that peaceful coexistence is one form of the class struggle....

Kasuga's activities since 1961 are an interesting reflection of the blurred ideological lines which define shades within the Japanese left. Following his secession from the JCP, Kasuga organized his own group, the Socialist Renovation Movement (Shakakuun), pledged to reform the JCP from without. Although his following was numerically small, Kasuga established a newspaper and magazine in competition with Red Flag and Vanguard, and in general made a thorough nuisance of himself.
In time differences arose within the Socialist Renovation Movement, largely over the question of whether the main enemy was Japanese monopoly capital or the Japanese Communist party. Eventually Kasuga and his entourage left the Socialist Renovation Movement to form a new, "non-political" organization, the United Socialist League. The latter group subsequently developed close ties with the JSP, and today is virtually an offshoot of the Socialist party.

D. The Eighth Party Congress

Indicative of the troubles which have beset the JCP is the infrequency with which it has been able to call party congresses. The Sixth Party Congress was held in 1947. Various circumstances—including the disappearance of the leaders underground—dictated the postponement of the Seventh Congress until eleven years later. Although this meeting had decreed that subsequent congresses would be held every two years, three years passed between the Seventh Congress and the convening of the Eighth in July 1961.

Two factors appear to have contributed to the postponement of the Eighth Congress. One, of course, was the Kasuga affair, which the leadership clearly wanted out of the way before any discussion of the party platform. A second factor may have been the membership drive which had been launched at the Seventh Congress. Although the drive to double the party's membership had been fairly successful, the party in 1961 was still short of the 90,000 figure which represented a two-fold increase.

With Kasuga out of the way, the congress itself was something of an anti-climax. It was not without interest, however, for its analysis of the world scene. Discussion of the Sino-Soviet split. It appears likely that discussion of this subject was prohibited by the leadership.
On the other hand, the faithful were given a full rundown on the state of the capitalist world by Secretary General Miyamoto. The JCP leader first made obeisance to the Moscow Statement, and gave an optimistic rundown on prospects for the Socialist camp. He then went onto characterize the revision of the security treaty, and the struggle against it, as "the most important political incident since the Seventh Party Congress." Despite the party's success in this campaign, its two enemies, American imperialism and domestic capitalism still held the upper hand.

In this connection, Miyamoto noted that the government benefitted from controlling more than two-thirds of the seats in the Lower House, and that the conservatives must be recognized as enjoying considerable popular support. He added that the government was supported by the Self Defense Forces, backed up by American arms; that the government controlled the "economic system" and the mass communications media.

Although nothing that Miyamoto said was really debatable, the tone of his pronouncement was in marked contrast with the party's usual bubbling optimism. It appears likely that this recitation of obstacles was prompted by Kasuga's insistence that Kishi could have been overthrown by anyone prepared to make the effort.

The JCP was conceded to suffer from organizational shortcomings. According to Miyamoto, little more than one-third of the working class had been organized; control of most labor unions had passed to the Socialists; and the JSP had adopted a policy of non-cooperation with the Communists.

Miyamoto was candid in admitting that the JCP did not have personnel required to assume leadership in "joint" struggles. He sought to refute an unnamed critic, who contended that since it had proved possible "to overpower completely 20,000 or 30,000 (sic.) policemen" in the anti-treaty demonstrations, there could have been a revolution "had competent revolutionaries been available." Miyamoto conceded that the anti-treaty struggle had produced a government crisis "of a type which had been known to cause
governments to collapse." He added, however, that "even if such demonstrators clashed with the police, and occupied the Diet premises for so many hours, or occupied the official residence of the Prime Minister, they themselves would have been suppressed and dispersed by the Self Defense Force for the U.S. military forces." In summation, Miyamoto observed that "it cannot be said that the revolutionary situation is now ripe."

It was pleasant, however, to have to curb excess zeal after years of having to rouse flagging spirits. Miyamoto added that, as a result of the anti-treaty struggle, "the time of the historic struggle set forth in the party's action program is much nearer." Nosaka's speech ended on a similarly hopeful note as he told the congress, "I think the time of the revolution will come much earlier than first expected."

The political report closed with a clarion call, which by dint of repetition was recognized as endorsement of the "correct course" being pursued by the party leadership. The cadres were urged to "develop the people's struggle against the control by American imperialism and Japanese monopoly capital; to rally all the people with the aim of independence, democracy, peace, neutrality, and the protection and elevation of the people's living standards; and to develop the concentrated efforts of the people into the national democratic united front."

One bit of routine business was quickly disposed of. The congress adopted unanimously the Draft Platform, in almost the identical form which had failed of endorsement in 1958. In the area of party organization, the central committee was significantly enlarged. The central committee confirmed at the previous congress had comprised 31 members and six alternate members. The increase in membership between 1958 and 1961, together with the circumstances surrounding Kasuga's defection, prompted the leadership to increase the central committee to 60, and to provide for 35 alternate members. Among those rewarded by selection as central committee members or alternates were cadres who had distinguished themselves in the anti-treaty campaign; members who had tilted with the Kasugists on matters of
strategy; successful doorbell-ringers in the membership drive; and personal supporters of Miyamoto and Nosaka. Two women were named to the Central Committee for the first time.

There is some evidence that the Eighth Congress brought about an influx of China-trained cadres on the secondary level. According to [appointments to 103 key Headquarters positions, including a newly-established Guidance Division, tended to favor recently-returned trainees who had been sent to Peiping by the late Secretary General Tokuda. A commentary on the JCP's stagnation at the top, however, was the fact that the presidium was unchanged at the Eighth Congress. The Old Guard remained in control.
IV. THE JCP AND THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE

A. A New Jolt From Moscow

The party's hopes of achieving its membership goal received a jolt following the Eighth Congress, when the JCP was once again the victim of a Soviet policy reversal. No country in the world was more sensitive than Japan on the issue of nuclear testing, and popular opinion was outraged by the Soviet announcement on 30 August 1961 that it would resume nuclear testing.

The Soviet announcement was particularly humiliating to Sanzo Nosaka. Only two weeks earlier, at the World Conference Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs, Nosaka had warmly endorsed a resolution which stated that "any country that is the first to resume nuclear testing is, regardless of the reason, the enemy of peace." When the USSR resumed testing, Nosaka was obliged to characterize the resolution as an "incorrect expression" which had been "inadvertently made."

Firstly, the Resolution was issued from a position that deviated from the class standpoint. The Soviet Union is a Socialist country that has in its social system not a single element that will cause war. Therefore, I think you will understand how great a mistake it is to regard the Soviet nuclear tests in the same light as the nuclear tests conducted by aggressive imperialism and to conclude indiscriminately that the Soviet Union is the enemy of peace.

Secondly, in writing this part of the Resolution, sufficient study was not made of the current serious international situation in which the suspension of nuclear testing cannot be materialized unless it is taken up as an integral part of general disarmament.
The Soviet action had strong repercussions within Gensuikyo, the Japan council for the Prohibition of Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs. Although Gensuikyo was heavily infiltrated by Communists, its pacifism was a genuine reflection of the outlook of many Japanese, and the directors were not impressed with Nosaka's logic. The JCP's influence within the Council was barely sufficient to head off a resolution condemning the USSR. The Soviet action damaged the party throughout Japan, however, and placed it severely on the defensive within Gensuikyo.

The testing debacle is of interest, in that it sets a recent date at which the JCP still reacted with Pavlovian subservience to a Soviet policy switch. To this date the JCP has never disputed the correctness of Soviet world leadership except in those instances when Peiping led the way.

B. The JCP and Albania

One instance of JCP recalcitrance was at the 22nd CPSU Congress in October 1961. The JCP delegation was everywhere a model of deportment; in the one speech by a JCP delegate, Nosaka was effusive in his praise for the CPSU. The paeans, however, were limited to praise of the CPSU's leadership of the Soviet people; the international movement was "led by the invincible teachings of Marxism-Leninism." His speech included a cautious appeal for unity within the Communist movement:

Dear comrades, we live in a time which opens before us the most shining prospects for the future. Yet the road to our common victory will be open only on the basis of the international unity of the forces of the Socialist camp, the national liberation movement, the international workers class, and all progressive forces, and also as a result of the struggle against the aggressive forces headed by American imperialism. (Applause) 

The indestructible cohesion of the Communists

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who stand in the front ranks of the struggle of all nations, is the main guarantee for this victory. (Applause)*

As for Albania, the JCP continued to be neutral in a manner which demonstrated sympathy for Peiping's view. Whereas Soviet organs had been attacking Albania for much of 1961, the Japanese delegation at Moscow did not join those parties in echoing Soviet strictures. This was no accident, for as recently as September the JCP had sent congratulations on the occasion of an Albanian party congress. At Moscow, Nosaka's message was muted but clear; the JCP was not picking a fight with anyone, but it regarded Albania as a member of the international Communist movement and would not join the CPSU in attacking the Albanians.

In December, the party spelled out the basis of its attitude towards Albania in an article in Red Flag. The result was a reiteration of the Moscow Statement.

All the Marxist-Leninist parties are independent and equal. Each party decides its own policy according to the concrete situation of its own country on the basis of the principles of Marxism-Leninism. If there should arise a problem for any party regarding the activities of its fraternal parties, its leadership should bring the matter to the attention of the leadership of the other. And if necessary, it should hold a conference to discuss it.

A second editorial on 29 December alluded to the Albanian problem, once again without mentioning names, and once again without going beyond the Moscow Statement.

In connection with the ways of settling inconsistencies possibly arising between fraternal parties, the Moscow Statement has stated as follows:

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*22nd CPSU Congress Proceedings, FBIS Vol. 11, No. 21

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"Whenever a problem arises within one party in connection with the activity of a fraternal party, the guidance division of that party will approach the guidance division of the other party with a proposal. If necessary, they will hold a conference to discuss the matter."

Concerning the way for settling common problems of an international scale, the Moscow Statement has also stated as follows:

"All Communist and Labor parties will hold a conference, whenever the need arises, to talk over urgent problems, exchange experiences, state the respective opinions and standpoints, unify views through consultations, and reach an agreement on a united action in the struggle aimed at a common target."

The slant of articles in JCP publications did not go unnoticed, and was not viewed favorably by all cadres. As early as November 1961, a group of Red Flag reporters complained to the Editorial Committee that whereas the paper was stern on the subject of revisionism, it was "soft" on dogmatism; moreover, that undue deference was shown to NCNA material as opposed to that of TASS, and insufficient attention paid to the views of Red Flag staff members. The reporters in question received no satisfaction, and certain of those regarded as anti-Peiping were transferred from Tokyo to district offices. Although some observers detected an increase in the amount of TASS material reproduced in Red Flag, its policy of refusing to print criticism of China, while reproducing on a selective basis Peiping's criticism of the USSR, went unchanged.
C. Neutral for Peiping

The first tentative move toward open support for Peiping came early in 1962, in the New Year's issue of the party bi-monthly, World Political Data (Sekai Seiji Shiryo). In the January issue—devoted largely to the Albanian problem—the magazine included two vituperative pieces, originating with third parties, attacking the Soviet position, one of which was Hoxha's speech of 7 November 1961. Only the JCP followed Peiping's example in publishing Hoxha's attack, which in the Japanese organ followed three articles which presented the Soviet side of the dispute. The Japanese may have thought their presentation a balanced one, little realizing that they were once again in semi-isolation. Although the incident provides an insight as to where the JCP's sympathies lay, the party was not yet prepared to close ranks behind Peiping, or even to acknowledge the Sino-Soviet dispute as such. The May issue of Vanguard denied a charge by Shojiro Kasuga that the JCP was a member of the Peiping camp. Apart from this denial, however, the party chose not to discuss the subject.

In June 1962, the JCP sought to regain some of the ground which it lost when the USSR resumed nuclear testing. Nosaka made a show of forwarding to the chief executives of the U.S., the USSR, Britain and France a message urging a halt to nuclear testing. Khrushchev replied, writing that the USSR was prepared to conclude a test ban treaty "without waiting for an agreement on general and complete disarmament." The JCP made much of Khrushchev's letter, citing it as evidence of the Soviet Union's solicitude for peace.

Although the JCP came to grips with the Sino-Soviet dispute only gingerly, the summer of 1962 brought several articles in party publications which underscored the JCP's sympathy for the Peiping line. Articles friendly to the USSR also appeared, but when the subject matter treated involved questions of ideology they invariably reflected the Chinese viewpoint. In June and July, both Red Flag and Vanguard "reviewed" the fourth volume of Mao's works. Vanguard saw fit not only to endorse the "paper tiger" metaphor
which was so offensive to the Soviets, but emphasized the relevance of Mao's teachings to the JCP:

Once upon a time, comrade Liu Shao-chi said, "Historically it has been proven that revolution always succeeded and progressed whenever it was guided by comrade Mao Tsetung and his ideas. However, whenever it departed from Mao and his ideas, revolution always failed."

After applauding Liu's analysis as "complete and accurate," the reviewer asked rhetorically, what could the JCP learn from Mao's writings?

There are many things which we can learn from this book.... The first is, we must understand the true character of imperialism and the reactionary group. The second is, the basic methods on how to fight and win against imperialism and the reactionary group.... The third is, on Mao's theory on how to isolate imperialism and the reactionary group, establish a united front by assembling all available strength to aid the revolution.

With the ousting of Kasuga, there was no significant faction within the JCP which advocated the proscribed strategy of a single-stage revolution against Japan's conservative government. On the other hand, there was room for disagreement concerning the implementation of a two-stage revolution. Most cadres were agreed on the importance of enlisting Socialist support, but what if the Socialists continued to spurn an alliance? Much lip service was paid to the desirability of a "peaceful" revolution, but to what extent should violence be encouraged?

During 1962, Miyamoto had his 54th birthday, and Nosaka his 70th. Of the two, Nosaka was in better health; Miyamoto spent much of the year under treatment for an undisclosed ailment, and Satomi Hakamada served as Acting Secretary General. With Nosaka spending more of his time
at party headquarters in Tokyo, leadership was lacking in the hustings. A senior official has stated his belief that the summer of 1962 saw control pass from the veteran Miyamoto-Nosaka leadership to younger China-oriented cadres in party headquarters, some of whom were among the group which had returned from China in 1958 aboard the Hakusan Maru.

In the fall of 1962, party discipline was strained by efforts of this "China Policy Group" to line up the JCP behind Peiping in a more positive manner.* Available reports suggests that, when healthy, Miyamoto sought to keep a lid on the pro-Peiping faction. Hakamada, however, had drifted increasingly towards a pro-Peiping line. Evidence is lacking to establish a link between Miyamoto's absences and instances when JCP publications evidenced a pro-Peiping bias, but the Secretary General's health may have been a factor.

Less obvious than the cleavage resulting from the Sino-Soviet dispute, but still an acerbating influence within the party, was a division between those who favored peaceful tactics and those who felt that violence was inevitable, if not actually desirable. In 1962-63 this division was reflected in discussions concerning what to do about the JCP's covert apparatus. Reportedly, both the Miyamoto-Nosaka moderates and the more activist "China Policy Group" favored a strengthening of the covert wing, but from differing points of view. The moderates were said to fear that, as the party increased its membership, the possibility of repressive police measures would increase, and the party must be prepared once again to "go underground." JCP activists, on the other hand, viewed a strengthening of the covert apparatus as a prerequisite to revolutionary activity.

*Although reports have occasionally listed Nosaka as head of the "China Policy Group," the real leadership lies elsewhere. Among influential Central Committee men associated with it are Hakamada, Shoichi Kasuga, Yojiro Konno and Hayashi Inoue.
This "secondary" dispute concerning tactics is interesting, in that it is a recurring phenomenon in the postwar history of the party. Today, it cuts across the lines of the Sino-Soviet factionalism. Sanzo Nosaka, the disciple of Mao, continues to be the spokesman for the moderate wing. Yoshio Shiga, on the other hand, although generally associated with the Soviet "coexistence" line on international matters is a militant within the JCP whose acceptance of the restraints associated with a two-stage revolution appears half-hearted at best.

Although Nosaka appears to have been protected by his status as a party elder, the dispute over tactics swirled about Miyamoto. Cadres of the "China Policy Group" privately characterized the Secretary General as a "petit bourgeois opportunist," incapable of real revolutionary activity. In support of such charges Miyamoto's detractors charged him with having sought to minimize violence during the anti-treaty demonstrations, and with oversensitivity to public criticism of the party.

Meanwhile, trends in party publications confirmed that JCP "neutrality" in the Sino-Soviet dispute was more apparent than real. In mid-1962, party organs quoted articles from Soviet as well as from Chinese and Albanian publications. At the time of the Cuban crisis, however, the JCP supported China to the extent of echoing Peiping's line concerning the dangers in negotiating with the U.S. An editorial in Red Flag resembled Mainland publications in charging with respect to Cuba that "the imperialists' promise to maintain peace is worthless."

In the 14 November 1962 issue of Red Flag, a member of the Editorial Committee, Seiichi Ishida, recounted a history of the United States' "cruel aggression" against Cuba. The author contended that while the U.S. had succeeded in overthrowing the Guatamalan government in 1954, the new strength of the socialist camp made such a coup impossible in Cuba. Ishida, however, had no praise and some criticism for Soviet behavior in the Cuban crisis. After noting that it was "clearly an invasion of sovereign rights" for the U.S. to demand inspection rights at Cuban bases, the article charged the USSR with "condoning" the instigation of war by the U.S.
Despite efforts by the JCP leadership to ignore the Sino-Soviet dispute per se, it caused serious convulsions within the Japanese party. Attempts by JCP publications to appear neutral lost out to an insistence that they reflect "correct" Marxism-Leninism. On 13 December 1962, Red Flag took formal notice of the dispute for the first time, printing both Khrushchev's foreign policy speech to the Supreme Soviet and a People's Daily editorial attacking it. When in January Vanguard had printed Hoxha's attack on Khrushchev, it could still be argued that the issue had included a fair proportion of material presenting the Soviet side of the dispute. In December, however, Red Flag printed only the gist of Khrushchev's speech—deleting his criticism of China—while it ran Peiping's rebuttal in its entirety. Similarly, when the November edition of the World Marxist Review appeared with an article critical of China, the JCP did not publish a Japanese edition but belatedly issued a "November-December" edition which omitted the offensive article.

Gradually, the protection afforded Peiping from criticism in JCP organs was extended to material published under Soviet auspices. In January 1963, an attempt by the Soviet embassy to distribute an issue of Soviet Union Today which contained material critical of China was frustrated by local JCP officials. Although the obstructionism may not have been ordered by party headquarters, most regional groups appear to have either destroyed or hidden copies of the journal sent to them for distribution.

The winter of 1962-63 represented the most elaborate effort to date by the JCP to control the content of Marxist literature in Japan. Not content with censoring Khrushchev's speech, Red Flag openly criticized its "unilateral condemnation of certain fraternal parties." Although the JCP justified its actions on the grounds of fraternal propriety, its actions were viewed in Peiping with positive enthusiasm; People's Daily observed helpfully that other parties might find it useful to emulate the Japanese in putting out their own versions of the World Marxist Review.

In December 1962, Central Committee member Hakamada, standing in for Miyamoto, made a trip to Eastern Europe,
Moscow and Peiping. The ostensible purpose of the trip was to represent the JCP at the Bulgarian and Hungarian party congresses; it appears likely that Hakamada—who may now be the most influential member of the Presidium—was taking soundings on sentiment within satellite parties in preparation for the JCP's forthcoming plenary session. His trip afforded little satisfaction to Moscow. A Soviet press officer in Tokyo was quoted as saying that Hakamada had sided with the Soviets while in Moscow, and with the Chinese while in Peiping. As for Red Flag, it covered Hakamada's trip extensively while he was in Peiping, but ignored him while he was in Moscow.

The striking aspect of the late 1962-63 period was the effort by the JCP to maintain a posture of neutrality in the Sino-Soviet dispute even as its every action betrayed a pro-Peiping bias. On every issue concerning which the party took a stand—be it Albania, Cuba, India, or the conduct of fraternal dialogue—the Japanese took China's side. Yet Red Flag editorialized in January 1963 that all party members should take "an extremely discreet attitude" towards the Sino-Soviet dispute, and "by all means refrain from giving hasty opinions."

By early 1963, no more than eight members of the JCP's 60-man Central Committee appeared to support the Soviet rather than the Chinese position in the dispute. The group included the third-ranking member of the Presidium, Yoshio Shiga, and was not entirely without influence. What influence it had, however, appeared comparable to that of the House of Lords: it could delay events, but could not control them. In a party for which caution was a byword, the pro-Soviet group served as a brake on policy—one more group whose views had to be given a hearing before the party committed itself to a course of action.

D. The Fifth Plenum

A high spot of the JCP's Fifth Plenum in February 1963 was to be Hakamada's report on his trip. His comments, interesting reflection on the JCP itself.
Hakamada professed amazement at finding in Eastern European parties,* central committee members who "had not even read" the Moscow Declaration and who, while well versed in the problems of their own countries, knew little about those of other nations. Having thus congratulated the JCP as one which did its homework, Hakamada turned the meeting back to its chairman—unnamed, but probably Nosaka—who answered questions from the floor.

The JCP cannot regard the Yugoslav party as fraternal, Nosaka explained, because the YCP was branded as revisionist by the Moscow Declaration. Yugoslavia is not socialist, because it lacks a dictatorship of the proletariat and because leadership is not in the hands of the YCP. Albania, on the other hand, is internationally recognized as socialist, and is therefore accepted by the JCP as a fraternal party. With these remarks, Nosaka placed the JCP firmly alongside the CCP on a key issue.

The chairman went on. The recent omission of articles from the Japanese edition of World Marxist Review was not a matter for concern; the party was under no obligation to publish the full text of the journal and could select those articles which it wished to reproduce.

The tangible result of the Fifth Plenum was an 8,000-word resolution, designed to spell out the party's position in the Sino-Soviet dispute. The content is unremarkable, in that it represents no change of attitude on the part of the JCP. There is, however, an air of authority to the resolution usually lacking in JCP pronouncements. It appeared designed to project an image of "positive" neutrality as opposed to one of vacillation between Moscow and Peiping.

After an opening section which deplored the international effects of the Sino-Soviet dispute, the resolution defended the JCP's attitude in the dispute:

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*His trip had carried him to Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Hungary.
In order to slander our party by taking advantage of the ideological conflict in the international Communist movement, the U.S. and Japanese reactionary forces and their agents have started groundless rumors that our party is adopting an ambiguous attitude toward the conflict, that our party is hewing to the principles of a certain fraternal party, or that there is factional strife... among our party leaders.

Our party has not participated in any disputes in which one party openly criticized and denounced the other in the international Communist movement and has adopted a definite attitude toward safeguarding the unity of the international Communist party. This means that our party has faithfully followed the principle of the Moscow Statement...

The first condition for a resolution of the quarrel, according to the JCP, was for all parties to adhere punctually to the Moscow Statement and the Moscow Declaration. A second precondition was for all the fraternal parties to demonstrate patience and moderation. Finally, all parties must close ranks behind those of the USSR and China. Thus the resolution lauded both the CPSU and the CCP, concluding that "It is obvious that true unity of the international Communist movement and the people of the world is not possible if the governments and people of either of the two great countries...or their great Communist parties are excluded."

Only once did the resolution reflect the ideological bias which had prompted the JCP to support Peiping on most specific issues. After citing the dangers which beset the JCP on the local Japanese scene, the resolution concluded flatly that "the main danger to the Communist movement in Japan is revisionism." Nowhere is there a more interesting instance of the JCP's penchant for a priori reasoning: because there is a revisionist threat in Japan, there may also be a revisionist threat in the international movement.
The resolution concluded on an affirmative note. Stressing once more the importance of unity within the Communist movement, the JCP seized the initiative with uncharacteristic boldness:

As a first step to this end, we propose that open discussion at the party congress of a specific party, or in party organs...be stopped, and that all parties must in harmony make positive efforts to hold talks or an international conference to settle differences of opinion. Stop such contradictory activities as making accusations against other fraternal parties, while calling for the suspension of the interparty disputes!... If the party of a certain country violates /the Moscow Statement/, all other parties ought to cooperate and make effective efforts to stop it.

The JCP's venture into "positive neutralism" appears to have been fairly successful. By failing to name names, the resolution allowed the JCP to maintain its posture of nonalignment. Both Pravda and People's Daily quoted from it, with implicit approval.

The JCP was understandably pleased with its Fifth Plenum. At a subsequent meeting of the Tokyo Metropolitan Committee, the resolution was lauded as "unique," apparently in its effort to bring about a solution of the dispute. As for specific problems facing the Communist world, the cadres were told that the party would continue to support China in its border dispute with India, not because the JCP was "pro-Chinese" but because India was "a link in the American policy of containment."

At the same meeting, the Albanian party was criticized as having gone "too far," and its circulation of anti-Soviet literature was described as unjustified. The Tokyo group was told that the JCP would support Castro's "five demands," but that there would be no discussion as to whether the USSR's Cuban policy had been correct.
It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the JCP— at and subsequent to the Fifth Plenum—asserted a degree of independence remarkable for a party long subservient to foreign direction. According to a local JCP official, most of the backers of China within the JCP were veteran party members who sympathized with the CCP because it had "frequently" disobeyed Stalin, and had achieved its revolution by following its own policies. When such China sympathizers were reinforced by the younger "China Policy Group," the result was predictably a pro-Chinese orientation even though the party regarded itself as publicly nonaligned.

While the JCP's disavowals of bias in the Sino-Soviet dispute have a hollow ring, the pleas for bloc unity do not. The JCP is extremely knowledgeable concerning the effects of factionalism, and in February apparently decided to attempt a role in reuniting the international Communist movement. The party was certainly not "neutral," but it was trying to remain nonaligned.
V. NONALIGNMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE

A. An Ugly Duckling is Wooed

For the early months of 1963, the energies of the JCP were devoted to some extent to preparing for the April local elections. In them the party achieved modest gains; then as always the party had a few good vote-getters, who were generally at their best in exploiting local grievances, and at their worst when forced to run on the latest party line in the glare of national elections.

When commenting on the Sino-Soviet dispute, the party fell back on wishful thinking and the Moscow Statement. Disunity within the bloc was regularly blamed on "revisionists"—no names mentioned—a train of thought which usually led into a denunciation of Kasuga and his home-grown revisionists. In April, the party ran a question-and-answer column in Red Flag:

Q: I hear that antiparty revisionists /i.e., the Kasugists/ have asserted that Japanese organizations /Sic./ should express their respective opinions in the "international Communist dispute." What is the true meaning of their assertion?

A: By the words "their respective opinions" the revisionists mean that Japanese organizations should make it clear which side they support. The revisionists demand that the Japanese organizations support only one side and regard the other as an enemy. Needless to say, the revisionists are opposed to the unity of the international Communist movement. As is well known, however, the problem within the international Communist movement is being settled in the direction of unity, as sought by our own party.
The summer of 1963 saw the first efforts of the party to put into practice its new "positive nonalignment."* In June, a delegation representing the JCP-front Japan Peace Committee (Heiwa) visited Communist China on the invitation of its mainland counterpart. On the day after their arrival, the delegates were invited to a discussion at which Foreign Minister Chen Yi and other Chinese officials took turns in denouncing the CPSU and Khrushchev, emphasizing that the Asiatic races must unite in opposing the "revisionists." On returning to Japan, the head of the Japanese delegation commented that throughout its stay in China his delegation had been subjected to a barrage of anti-Soviet propaganda, to the exclusion of other business.

In Tokyo, the Peace Committee was asked by a JCP official not to make any statement about the Sino-Soviet dispute in connection with their trip. The muzzling of the Peace Committee delegation, together with the omission of any joint statement while it was at Peiping, represents the only known check to Peiping by a JCP-dominated group under the policy of "positive nonalignment."

In July, the JCP sent a member of the Presidium, Kureto Kurahara, to Hanoi, reportedly to consult with Ho Chi Minh concerning means of improving relations between China and the USSR. The JCP was said to regard North Vietnam's position in the Sino-Soviet dispute as similar to its own, i.e., sympathetic to Peiping but not openly critical of the USSR. Nothing is known to have come out of these discussions, but the incident is of interest as an example of the JCP's attempts to play a more active role in international affairs.

As examples of genuine nonalignment, however, JCP policies could not stand up to close inspection. As the

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*The term "positive nonalignment" is not one used by party spokesmen. It appears to be, however, a fair euphemism to describe the party's professed policy following the Fifth Plenum.
party came to be the object of a tug-of-war between Moscow and Peiping, the JCP's anti-Soviet proclivities came to be very galling to Soviet propaganda outlets in Japan.

During July, according to the Chinese achieved wide distribution in Japan of an unidentified CCP polemic directed against the USSR. The circulation of the Chinese letter among leftist circles in Japan prompted the Soviets to circulate a rebuttal. As with the article in World Marxist Review, however, JCP cadres refused to distribute the Soviet reply. As time went on, the Soviets demonstrated sensitivity to the seemingly close connections between Red Flag and People's Daily. According to TASS headquarters in Moscow once wired its Tokyo office demanding priority translations of Red Flag articles which had been reproduced almost simultaneously in People's Daily.

The issues of the Sino-Soviet dispute were not always reflected in lofty discussions of Marxist-Leninist ideology. The rise of the pro-Peiping faction within the JCP hierarchy involved the Japan Democratic Youth League, Minseido. The rise of the pro-Peiping faction within the JCP hierarchy involved the Japan Democratic Youth League, Minseido. The rise of the pro-Peiping faction within the JCP hierarchy involved the Japan Democratic Youth League, Minseido.

By any standard, Minseido was one of the party's more successful affiliates. Its success in raising membership from some 3,000 in April 1959 to between 80,000 and 90,000 four years later had provided much of the impetus for the JCP's own membership drive. By common consent, much of the credit for Minseido's performance was due its secretary general, Minoru Maeda.

Maeda, however, was a Moscow-oriented activist of the Shiga school. In January 1963, at the League's national convention, Peiping-oriented elements supervised by Satomi Hakamada engineered Maeda's ouster on the grounds of "illness," and his replacement by their own man, Yoshio Tsuchiya. Apparently this explanation was unacceptable to a considerable segment of Minseido, for Maeda shortly became the target for a campaign of character assassination. He was charged with misuse of organizational funds, and with carrying on with female youth. Last but not least, he was accused of...
meeting with elements of Shojiro Kasuga's Socialist Reform Movement. Maeda did not seriously contest his own removal; whether the new management will be able to consolidate Minseido's membership gains remains to be seen.

The fact was, however, that factors of race, geography and ideological outlook had given rise to grassroots support for Peiping within the JCP. The most blatant example of the party's pro-Chinese bias came in connection with the anti-bomb Gensuikyo rally in Hiroshima last August at which, to the astonishment of assembled fellow-travelers, Soviet and Chinese speakers denounced one another from the podium. Soviet delegates to the convention were given virtually no assistance by the JCP; when the Soviets asked local party committees to help distribute pamphlets brought from Moscow, the cadres refused. Only a fraction of the Soviet material was distributed, and this reportedly through the Socialist Reform Movement of dissident Shojiro Kasuga. In contrast, pamphlets brought by the Chinese delegation were readily distributed by JCP prefectural committees.

B. The Test Ban Treaty

Though it is true that the differences in the international Communist movement may have arisen because of different working conditions, in the final analysis they arise because the principles of Marxism-Leninism are correctly interpreted by one party, while not correctly by another, because Marxism-Leninism is being correctly applied to the reality in one country, while not correctly in another.

--Speech by Sanzo Nosaka, June 1963.

The July 1963 agreement among the U.S., Britain and the USSR to ban nuclear testing except underground posed a difficult problem to the JCP. The agreement was widely hailed by the Japanese public, and the Ikeda government was an early signatory to the treaty. Considering the breast-
beating in which the JCP had indulged over the Bikini-test Fortunate Dragon incident, logic would appear to call for JCP approval of a treaty which would remove the threat of atmospheric testing.

By 1963 it was no longer unusual to find the JCP at odds with the USSR concerning issues on which the Japanese could count on support from Peiping. But in most such instances there had also been an element of JCP self-interest. The JCP felt a kinship for Albania as one small party to another; if the voice of Albania could be smothered in party councils, might not the JCP be next? The Japanese attitude on peaceful coexistence, too, was colored by circumstances peculiar to Japan. The continued U.S. military presence made it difficult for the JCP to accept a viewpoint on coexistence which was so totally at odds with the party's longstanding anti-U.S. strategy.

The JCP's opposition to the test ban treaty is not easy to rationalize on grounds of self-interest. Yet from the first the party treated the treaty as a Trojan horse, and loudly put ideological correctness ahead of any political considerations on the home front.

Even before the treaty was initialed on 25 July, JCP pronouncements displayed a remarkable indifference to Soviet sensibilities. A series of articles in Red Flag "discussed" the subjects of nuclear war and peaceful coexistence, ostensibly attacking Japanese revisionists but in effect lambasting the Soviet position on a test ban as "incorrect," "irresponsible," and "absurd." The clear implication was that for Khrushchev to participate in such a hoax was at best naive, at worst criminally negligent.

Once the treaty was initialed, JCP propaganda sought to undercut its impact on the Japanese people. Every effort was made to disparage the areas of agreement among the great powers. "If the contents of the treaty...are studied clearly," Red Flag editorialized on 29 July, "we can see why the Japanese people...have expressed a feeling of anxiety as well as some joy in receiving the news of the treaty signing." The JCP portrayed the test ban as freeing the U.S. for more relevant forms of testing:
Concerning the treaty, Kennedy said: "The United States had deliberately chosen to concentrate on more mobile and more efficient weapons, with lower but entirely sufficient yield. Thus our security is not impaired by the treaty I am discussing." This will particularly increase the danger of nuclear weapons being used in a localized war.

To distract attention from the treaty itself, the JCP dredged up time-tested red herrings:

The U.S. imperialists have converted Okinawa into the largest nuclear strategic base in Asia, and are increasing their war potential by introducing Mace B's and other types of nuclear weapons. They have deployed F-105D's in Japan in defiance of the opposition of the Japanese people and are now trying hard to get approval of the visits to Japan of atomic submarines. The nuclearized U.S. Seventh Fleet, which is based at Yokosuka, is constantly cruising around Asian waters.

The only hope for the world was to use the treaty as a springboard toward policies advocated by Communist China.

The nuclear test ban agreement will have positive significance if it is the first step toward a total ban on nuclear weapons including the prohibition of development and deployment of nuclear weapons or toward general disarmament... It is common knowledge that Communist China has consistently called for a total ban on nuclear weapons and the denuclearization of Asia and the Pacific area.
By August, Red Flag was stepping up its warnings, characterizing the test ban treaty as not only imperfect but "extremely dangerous." As time went on, however, there were hints that the cadres were concerned over this latest instance of the party's estranging itself from public opinion. Such concern was heightened following the anti-bomb conference at Hiroshima, where Chinese spokesmen were supported only by the JCP in their attacks on the treaty. In a key editorial on 22 October, Red Flag sought to answer those who contended that party policy was being dictated from Peiping.

The issue of the partial nuclear test ban is a Japanese domestic issue as well as an international one... It is only natural in view of its responsibility and duty that the Japan Communist Party should express its own independent view on this issue in conformity with its policy to promote world peace... (Emphasis added)

It is true that since the conclusion of the test ban treaty the relations between the Soviet Union and the United States have been eased, but at the same time, international tensions, particularly those in Asia, have increased....

Because of this reason and since the treaty fails to include underground testing and cannot fetter the nuclear war policy of U.S. imperialism, we cannot support the treaty at this time.

On the evidence, it is possible that the JCP arrived at its stand independently--i.e., without specific guidance from Peiping. Certainly the precedents for a pro-Peiping stand were there. Yet for the JCP to determine that its best interests would be served by supporting Peiping's views on the test ban is strange indeed. Three
factors appear to have contributed to the JCP stand in varying degrees: an unwillingness to take a stand which it associated—because Peiping did—with revisionism; preoccupation with American bases as the negation of "co-existence" as it affects Japan; and an apparent association by the JCP of its new-found "independence" with support for their Asian brethren on the Mainland. The assertion of independence by the JCP is itself probably more important than the merits of the party line.

C. The Chinese and the JCP

Although JCP policies in the Sino-Soviet dispute hardly qualified as true nonalignment, the party has clung to its rules of conduct with remarkable consistency. It continues to prohibit criticism of China or Albania in World Marxist Review; to attack the test ban treaty; to call for adherence to the Moscow Statement and Moscow Declaration; and to seek a role in the resolving of the dispute.

Questions concerning the propriety of articles in World Marxist Review did not cease with the "November-December" issue. Subsequent editions appeared on schedule for the first months of 1963, and Red Flag, in an article on 19 April, claimed vindication: a "responsible member" of the Editorial Board of the Communist journal allegedly had informed the JCP that translation of World Marxist Review required the concurrence of the local party concerned, and that future issues would not carry material critical of other fraternal parties.

Here was the type of neat and "correct" wrap-up dear to the heart of the JCP. The problem, however, was not laid to rest. In May, two articles were deleted from
the Japanese edition of the journal,* and at the Central Committee plenum in mid-May Nosaka protested that the articles in question were having a divisive effect on the world Communist movement. Thus the JCP could become the next in a series of pro-Chinese parties to suspend publication of the journal in their respective countries. On balance, however, the JCP will probably defer such action, which has been taken by the parties of China, Albania, Burma and North Korea, but not by North Vietnam—to whom the JCP seems to look as an example in such matters. The party continues to maintain a representative (central committee member Itaru Yonehara) on the board of World Marxist Review in Prague.

In the last half of 1963, Japan became a propaganda battleground in the Sino-Soviet dispute. At stake was not just the JCP, but the largest industrial proletariat in Free Asia. During July, several Tokyo bookstores which specialize in Marxist literature received a letter from the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade, stating that books being distributed by Communist China would interfere with the proper understanding of Communism, and urging the stores not to handle such books. Subsequently, a representative of the Chinese Foreign Language Press reportedly visited the same outlets, urging that they continue distribution of Peiping publications and in at least one instance offering cash incentives.

*It is not entirely clear why the JCP chose to make an issue of the two articles in question. One, by a Spanish Communist, was a labored yet noncontentious defense of Soviet policy in connection with the Cuban crisis, including the withdrawal of missiles. The second was a discourse on Communist strategy in the form of a review of the writings of Polish Premier Gomulka. Although both articles reflected Soviet views, neither was explicitly critical of China. Since articles implicitly critical of Peiping's views have appeared in other issues, the censorship of the May edition of Problems appears related to the JCP's newly discovered "independence."
When a Japanese ship, the Myojo Maru, went to North Korea in June 1963 it returned with a large number of pamphlets extolling China's position in the Sino-Soviet dispute. According to at about the same time a second Japanese ship which went from a Chinese to a Soviet port was searched by Soviet authorities and, when found to be carrying Chinese propaganda, was warned that if it continued to carry such material it would be refused entry.

In August 1963, the Chinese began publication of a Japanese-language version of the Peking Review, with plans for a wide circulation in Japan. To insure a wide circulation, the Chinese sent to Japan 100,000 free copies of the first four issues, dividing them among four major outlets--two of which had received, and apparently ignored, the Soviet letter requesting that they not handle Chinese material. The sale of these issues--even at the low price of around 5¢ each--represented a considerable windfall to the bookstores.

A curious aspect of this period is the glimpse one gets of the Chinese view of the JCP. For Sanzo Nosaka, the Chinese have affectionate memories: Nosaka's 70th birthday, in March 1962, brought an outpouring of extravagant praise from Peiping. Teng Hsiao-ping referred to Nosaka as the "outstanding fighter of the Japanese people and comrade-in-arms of the Chinese people." Under Nosaka, the JCP was "raising high the banner of Marxism-Leninism," and the party's course "was still the correct one."

A similar view was set forth in the mainland Red Flag in October 1962. The heroic struggles of the Japanese people were said to be closely linked to the "correct political line" of the JCP. The party line taken at the JCP's Eighth Party Congress was the correct one. The Chinese article damned the Kasugists, applauded the anti-security treaty campaign, and listed in proper order the JCP's anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist program.

In thus endorsing the ideological line followed by the JCP the Chinese were doing no more than the Japanese had done for them on issues in dispute with the USSR, such
as Albania and the issue of majority rule. In private, the Chinese were less enthusiastic over the JCP as an ally. Part of the problem appears to be one of personalities: the Chinese seem anxious that Nosaka's eventual successor be acceptable to them. According to the Chinese do not "trust" Miyamoto; moreover, they appear to share with the Soviets a distrust of Hakamada. The Chinese candidate to succeed Miyamoto is rumored to be a hitherto-obscure central committeeeman, Hayashi Inoue.

In June 1963, Sun Sheng-chuan, an official of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, told a Japanese leftist that the JCP lacked a "definite attitude" on the Sino-Soviet "problem." The Japanese, according to Sun, agreed with the Chinese when talking to them and with the Soviets when talking to them; he charged further that the JCP, which "used to put Chinese views into practice immediately," had changed its attitude and was stalling. Sun's alleged remarks were an unfair reflection on the JCP's pursuit of ideological purity; moreover, the JCP was as firmly in the Chinese corner at the time of Sun's remarks as it had been before or since. They were, however, illustrative of the pitfalls of nonalignment.

A portion of Peiping's impatience with the JCP probably stemmed from the party's domestic weakness. Support of the JCP on matters relative to the Sino-Soviet dispute was useful as far as it went, but on matters directly affecting Japan the Chinese still had to use the Socialists as part of their link to the Japanese proletariat. When JCP Central Committeeman Goro Sudo visited Peiping in September-October 1963, he reportedly had a "difficult" interview with the director of the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs, Chao An-po. When Sudo referred to the JCP as a party "friendly to the CCP," Chao replied that while Sudo might so claim, the JCP had not yet declared itself in the Sino-Soviet dispute, and he wondered if there were "problems" within the JCP. When, in response to a question, Sudo predicted gains for the JCP in the 1963 elections, Chao is said to have responded with a "contemptuous smile."
Such criticism must have been painful to the JCP, which had moved so far from its once-Pavlovian subservience to the CPSU. On 10 November, Red Flag published an extended "dialogue" on the Sino-Soviet dispute, in which the party underscored its sympathy for Peiping:

Q: Commercial newspapers write a great deal about the "Sino-Soviet dispute." What is the correct view on this issue?

A: The issue...involves not only the Soviet Union and China but parties of many countries.... This dispute centers on the fundamental problems concerning the strategy and tactics of the international Communist movement which have much to do with all Communist parties.

Q: It is said that one of the two parties in the dispute wants peace and the other war. Is this correct?

A: ...Some people contend that the CCP wants war. It is a well-known fact, however, that the government and people of China are persistently struggling for peace in Asia and the rest of the world. The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence were first proposed by the CPR Government.

Q: What is the JCP attitude toward the ideological dispute?

A: The question is often asked which side the JCP supports--the CPSU or the CCP. However, this method of questioning is not good.... Behind this question there is hidden an evil intent--to denounce the JCP for "being subordinate to either the CPSU or the CCP." All Communist parties are independent and equal fraternal parties.... The JCP
decides its own attitude from the theoretical and practical standpoint.

Q: .... What is the cause of the present confusion in the dispute?

A: There can be differences of opinion among Communist parties just as among brothers. There are rules on how to settle differences of opinion among Communist parties. The Moscow statement, which was adopted unanimously by 81 Communist parties the world over in November 1960, stated, "Communist and workers' parties of the nations should hold conferences, if necessary...and reach agreement on joint action in the struggle aimed at the common target. When any one party has a doubt as to the policy of another fraternal party, the leaders of the former should propose talks with the other party to iron out the difference."

It is regrettable that this rule has been broken and that the dispute has come out in the open.... At the congresses of a number of Communist parties, the Albanian Workers Party and the CCP were openly criticized. This is unreasonable, too.

Although Peiping would not be expected to indicate publicly dissatisfaction with the JCP, the fact that on at least two occasions Chinese officials had criticized the party as "nonaligned" sheds some light of the JCP attitude. Based on the stands it has taken on Sino-Soviet issues, the JCP's professed nonalignment does not stand up to scrutiny. Within the party, however, a policy of dealing with issues on their "merits," and of withholding blanket support for Peiping, may be regarded as a courageous and truly independent line.
D. The Soviets and the JCP

Meanwhile, where did the USSR stand in its relations with the once-subservient JCP? Considering the sanctimonious posture assumed by the Japanese, the Soviets showed considerable restraint. In part, the Soviet attitude was influenced by inattention; the USSR was interested in reducing Chinese influence throughout the Japanese left, not merely within the JCP. In March 1962, a senior Soviet diplomat reportedly told a group of Japanese Socialists that the USSR "strongly desired to isolate Communist China," and asked their assistance in trying to increase support for the USSR "within Japan."

The Soviets also sought to win back the JCP, but here their efforts were ineffective. Like the Chinese, the Soviets desired to assert ideological leadership over the entire Japanese left, not just the JCP. Conditions in Japan, however, made for a different approach. Through Soviet eyes, the JCP was far gone, but there was considerable support among Japan's Marxian socialists for Soviet views on coexistence. Understandably, the main Soviet emphasis was on cultivating the Socialists.

Like the Chinese, the Soviets took notice of Nosaka's 70th birthday anniversary. In contrast to the Chinese messages--brimming with nostalgic memories of Nosaka's days in Yenan--the message from the CPSU central committee was brief and quite matter-of-fact. After citing Nosaka as "a prominent figure of the international Communist and workers' movement," the Soviets wished him success in his struggle for "the cohesion and strengthening of the ranks of your party."

According to the JCP received in April 1962 a "harsh" letter from the Soviet embassy, inquiring as to the party's views on disarmament. The letter described the JCP's activities in support of disarmament as "not necessarily adequate"--an apparent reference to support for the Soviet position at the Geneva disarmament conference. In all likelihood, however, the embassy letter reflected general pique with the JCP, which was in
the process of putting out a Japanese edition of Volume IV of Mao’s Collected Works. When reviewed in Vanguard in June, Mao’s volume inspired JCP central committeeman Kuraji Anzai to observe that “Comrade Mao’s conclusion that imperialism is like a tiger in captivity is in complete accord with what Lenin once said.”

In July, the chief of the JCP’s united front department reportedly asked the assistance of the CPSU in persuading the Socialists to resume united front activities. (The Communists were indeed persona non grata to the Socialists; one suspects, however, that the JCP request was designed to chide the Soviets concerning their own overtures to the JSP.) The CPSU, in reply, agreed concerning the desirability of a united front, and stated that the request had been passed on to the Japanese socialists. The Soviets added that there had been no reply from the Socialists, and observed gratuitously that the Socialists apparently regarded the JCP as “organizationally weak.”

By 1963, however, the Soviets were making more of an effort to isolate the Chinese and, in furtherance of this end, to smooth ruffled feathers within the JCP. An interesting illustration of this policy in action took place at the Women’s International Democratic Federation in Moscow in June 1963. According to the Italian Communist the Italian delegation was upset when their Soviet hosts agreed to “extremist” language in the reports of the Japanese and Cuban delegations. At issue appeared to be the stridency of their anti-Americanism, which the Italians regarded as unnecessary and potentially divisive within the movement. When the Italians objected to acceptance of the Japanese and Cuban reports, CPSU central committee secretary Ponomarev set forth the Soviet attitude:

The leaders of the Chinese Communist party...are engaged in a continual action of provocation and of division in the world Communist movement. Our principal concern today is to isolate the Chinese.... We agree with you that the Japanese and Cuban reports are extremist and have no respect for the present historical situation, but we had both reports read and
approved because if they had been rejected...the Japanese and Cubans would have largely gone over to the Chinese side.

At the Ninth Gensuikyo conference in August 1963, the Soviets took an uncompromising stand toward the Chinese, and the repercussions of their polemic all but destroyed the anti-bomb group. The Soviet delegation, however, sought to avoid friction with the pro-Peiping delegations of Ceylon, North Korea and Japan. When representatives of Kasuga's Socialist Reform Movement approached the Soviet delegation, professing support and seeking assistance, they were politely but firmly rebuffed.

Soviet patience with the Japanese, however, had its limits. According to Maeda's pro-Chinese successor as head of Minseido, Yoshio Tsuchiya, returned unexpectedly from the USSR in mid-August 1963. According to Tsuchiya, he had been asked for his views on the Sino-Soviet dispute, and had replied with a forthright presentation of the Peiping position. As a result, he was unceremoniously asked by the Soviets to leave the country.

To date, both the Soviets and the Japanese Communists have avoided any suggestion that their relations are influenced to any degree by racial considerations. Ideologues that they are, JCP leaders are unlikely to acknowledge that their attitudes are the result of anything other than the careful and correct application of Marxism-Leninism. In its resolution at the Fifth Plenum in February 1963, however, the party associated itself with its Asian neighbors, observing that "the Communist party and people of Japan are joined in inseparable fraternal solidarity with the parties and peoples of China, Korea, Vietnam, Indonesia and other Asian countries, which will never change...."

In contrast to the Chinese, who appear unreasonably demanding of the JCP, the Soviet attitude towards the party seems to be one of bewilderment. Having ignored the party for years, the Soviets now appear uncertain as to their capabilities for bringing the Japanese back into the Moscow fold. The Soviets are seeking to expand their influence.
in a broad strata of Japanese society, not just in the JCP. The Soviet need for more information on the JCP, as a preliminary to effective action, may explain the report that the JCP in December 1963 postponed a scheduled central committee meeting, in part because of the discovery of Soviet embassy "spies," within JCP Headquarters.

E. Foreign Assistance

Information on party finances is confusing and often contradictory. That amount provided from abroad—i.e., by the USSR and China—has been estimated at various times to be nil, and at other times to be as much as $400,000 annually. In part confusion stems from the party's accounting system, which is complex even in tables which take no account of unvoucheded funds. A second element of confusion is the fluctuations in the amount of Sino-Soviet assistance; in a crucial year such as 1960 the party received far more assistance than in normal times. A third factor which promotes confusion is the practice of the Chinese in particular to support JCP fronts directly, including groups in which the JCP is not necessarily dominant.

estimates that total JCP income for 1961 was around $1,350,000. Of this amount, some 4% came from party dues, which except for the indigent are supposed to be one percent of a member's income. Another 18% came under two loose categories, "contributions" to party headquarters and "funds raised independently" by party headquarters. By far the largest amount came from the remaining category, party enterprises, which include the various JCP publications.
According to the JCP in 1957 was receiving some $200,000 annually from Communist China. According to the second report stated that the funds were channeled through Hong Kong under various cover arrangements.

One means by which Peiping forwards such funds is through the Japan-China Trade Promotion Association. The practice reportedly is for one or more officers of the Association to travel to Peiping, and there arrange a transaction in which the Chinese will make a purchase from a "progressive" Japanese firm. The terms will provide that a rebate be paid the Association by the Japanese trader—a kickback which is then passed on to JCP "treasurer" Satomi Hakamada.

If the amount of foreign assistance is estimated at between $300,000 and $400,000 annually, the party can be said to receive in the neighborhood of one quarter of its income from abroad. There is conflicting information, however, not only as to the amount of outside assistance received by the JCP but also the proportion provided by Moscow and Peiping respectively. It appears likely that Peiping provides at least half. It also appears likely that the USSR—as part of its campaign to cultivate "neutral" parties—continued to provide some support.

Soviet funding of the JCP, to the extent of 10-15% of its budget, is not likely to give the Soviets any significant leverage within the party. The JCP remains, despite periodic financial crises, reasonably self-sufficient. Punitive measures by the Soviets in the area of financial assistance, moreover, would only drive the party closer to China—a result which the CPSU has sought to avoid.

For the party of good Marxist-Leninists, the JCP has been plagued by more than its share of financial scandals. Party groups at various levels collect and disburse funds more or less independently, forwarding to party headquarters only that percentage of income required of them. Although auditing procedures have been tightened in recent years, till-tapping continues to take a toll. When a purge is publicized by the party, as in the cases of Shida and Kasuga, one charge inevitably is that the offender has used party funds to disport himself in Tokyo sin dens.
VI. PROSPECTS

A. Domestic

As a parliamentary party, in the traditional sense, the JCP has little importance today. Its five seats in the Lower House make it the smallest party in that body; the 4% of the popular vote which it polled in November 1963 was the smallest identifiable fragment of the leftist vote.*

JCP influence, however, is not limited to the party faithful alone. Within the Lower House, at least 14 and perhaps 30-odd Socialist deputies are sufficiently to the left as to be almost indistinguishable from the Communists. Marxism, moreover, is the prevailing philosophy not only of the radical Socialists but of the whole party, with its 144 seats in the Lower House. Thus the estrangement between the Communists and the Socialists is often more apparent than real. It is characteristic of their penchant for "joint" struggles that only weeks after a bout of name-calling at the most recent Hiroshima conference, Socialist and Communist demonstrators were staging cooperative demonstrations against U.S. nuclear submarines in Japanese port cities.

Long-term prospects for Japan's Marxist left are fairly bullish, notwithstanding the country's remarkable economic progress and the popular emulation of things American. Within the country there is widespread cynicism concerning the conservatives; close associations with big business, and the perennial factionalism of the Liberal Democratic Party has contributed to an image of cantankerous

*Although the JCP raised its number of seats from three to five, and its percentage of the popular vote from 3% to 4%, there was no general trend to the left. The Socialists just held their own, and the most significant gain was by the Democratic Socialists, who entered the elections with 14 seats and emerged with 23.
old age. Although the conservatives continue to control the Diet by a large margin, the last decade has been marked by a gradual trend to the left—in part the result of a steady influx of rural workers into the more radical environment of the cities.

The gradual leftist drift has been accompanied by a trend towards moderation with the JSP. Its union affiliate, Sohyo, has lately tended to emphasize economic rather than political struggles. The JSP, in turn, has concentrated more on demands for "structural reform"—the improvement of social and economic conditions within the context of Japan's mixed economy. Growing acceptance by the Socialists of what to a Communist would be a sinister brand of "revisionism," with its implicit downgrading of the class struggle and anti-imperialism, has largely isolated the JCP within Japan's broader Marxist movement. The socialists themselves are sensitive on this ideological issue, but claim to have borrowed the "structural reform" concept from the Italian Communists.

Within Sohyo, and to some extent the JSP, the anti-treaty excesses of 1960 brought a reaction against the Communists. Under new and "moderate" leadership, Sohyo since 1960 has spurned united action with the Communists, despite instances of local cooperation as in the demonstrations against U.S. nuclear submarines. In 1963 one of the JCP's stoutest bastions fell when a moderate faction gained control of the teachers union within Sohyo. The JCP remains the only political group which has in no way modified its extremism in the period since 1960.

Either of two trends in Japanese voting could prove advantageous to the JCP. Should further elections chip away at the two major parties to the advantage of smaller groups—the Communists, the Democratic Socialists and possibly the quasi-religious Soka Gakkai—the influence of splinter parties such as the JCP may increase. The Liberal-Democratic Party has long been recognized as more of a conservative coalition than a monolithic party, and the long-term trend in Japan may be away from its modified two-party system to some form of multi-party system.
More promising to the JCP, paradoxically, is the recent trend towards moderation within the Japanese left. In the past the Communists have suffered from the fact that the bulk of the far-left vote went to the Socialists. A trend toward the center within the Socialists would benefit the JCP if it left the latter party alone on the left, the logical repository for the vote of the lunatic fringe. In this connection, it is worth noting that 1963—a year in which the Socialists pursued a generally moderate line in both domestic and international affairs—the JCP registered gains. According to Japanese police, membership expanded by around 27,000 during 1963, and at the end of the year totaled around 130,000.

Elsewhere, all is not well with the JCP and its erstwhile collaborators. The estrangement between the JCP and Sohyo has been noted, along with the defection of the once-potent teachers' union. Zengakuren remains badly split, with the leadership under control of elements not responsive to the JCP. Genshūkyō has been seriously weakened by the disruptive Hiroshima conference; the Nagasaki and Hiroshima chapters reportedly have withdrawn from the organization, and non-Communist members of the executive committee have threatened to resign.

The JCP's espousal of the Peiping line in international affairs has certainly not helped the party domestically. Its support for the Chinese position at the Hiroshima conference was hardly calculated to arouse support among the pacifist Japanese. The party has sought to improve its image by careful phrasing of its support for Chinese policies. In its 10 November 1962 edition, Red Flag decried the suggestion that "one party" in the Sino-Soviet dispute wanted war, while the other did not. The JCP organ insisted that Communist China had been fighting steadfastly for peace in Asia and the world over; was China not the initiator of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence?

One qualification must be made concerning the JCP's unpromising domestic prospects. If the party is in poor shape now, it has known adversity before. Its relations with the non-Communist left are currently poor, but the
differences could be breached should an issue arise which offers broad appeal. If the JCP is little more than a nuisance, it is still a noisy nuisance. Frustration within the JSP at its poor election showing could make the Socialists more receptive to disruptive and possible violent political action which would benefit the JCP.

B. The JCP and the Socialist Camp

In contrast to the party's very limited potential on the Japanese domestic scene, the JCP could become a factor in negotiations within the Bloc parties. At the Moscow conference of 1960, the Japanese delegation allowed North Vietnam to take the initiative in seeking to resolve the impasse between the Chinese and the Soviets. Subsequent events suggest that the JCP has regretted its inactivity on this occasion; its mediation offer, stated during the Fifth Plenum and reflected in the mission to Hanoi in July 1963, indicate that the party is anxious to play a role in reuniting the international Communist movement.

Whether the party's ambitions on this score will assume concrete form is not clear. Should any Asian party assume the role of mediator, it would probably be that of North Vietnam or Indonesia--with North Vietnam the best bet because of the personal prestige of Ho Chi Minh. Nonetheless, the JCP's new awareness of its "independence," and its forced effort to appear nonaligned, suggest that the party hopes to atone for past failures by moving the CPSU back on the correct path of Marxism-Leninism.

The factors which influence thinking within the JCP are complex. The party's pro-China leaning, for instance, does not involve endorsement of Peiping's unwillingness to accept coexistence. The fiercest of the Japanese Marxists, by and large, are renegade Communists such as those in control of Zengakuren, whose desire for an early revolution were frustrated by the JCP's two-revolution, anti-U.S. program, and certain of the Kasugists. It is somewhat paradoxical that the latter are now the USSR's most vocal supporters in Japan, inasmuch as their espousal of the Soviet
line appears to stem less from conviction than from a desire
to berate the JCP on whatever charge it might be vulnerable.
The mere fact that the Kasugists are nominally pro-Soviet,
however, will tend to keep the JCP in Peiping's camp.

As for the JCP, its leaders continue to follow Peiping's line on some specific issues--such as the status of
Albania, and the test ban treaty--but to avoid comment on
others which are important in the Sino-Soviet split. The
Japanese, for instance, are not prone to philosophize on
whether socialism would survive a nuclear war. The JCP ap-
ppears not so much sold on the merits of China's position
in the intra-bloc dispute as in sympathy with Peiping's
anti-Americanism. The JCP, moreover, would like to follow
China's precedent in "adapting" Marxist doctrine to the
Japanese scene. Peiping, which has translated Nosaka's
writings into Chinese, has indulged the aspirations of
the JCP leadership for regional status to a greater degree
than has the CPSU.

The JCP's sympathy for the CCP stems from other fac-
tors also, including racial affinity, early revolutionary
associations and geographical proximity. These are intan-
gibles, and, except for Nosaka's oft-cited discipleship un-
der Mao, are difficult to evaluate.

It is characteristic of the JCP that its pursuit of
dogmatic perfection has led it far afield in terms of its
political objectives in Japan. Most Japanese disapprove
of nuclear testing by any power, yet the JCP felt compelled
to support China's socialist-bombs-are-different line at
the Hiroshima conference. By the same token, the party re-
 mains committed to the outward-looking, anti-U.S. doctrine
foisted on it by the USSR in 1950. Devotion to this doc-
trine has stimulated restiveness among party militants, un-
derscored the JCP's subservience to foreign direction, and
frustrated cadres who have no capability even to sabotage,
much less to eliminate, the U.S. presence in Japan.

It remains to be seen whether the newly critical out-
look within the party will inspire realistic and "creative"
goals for the party. Not since the days of the "lovable
Communist party" can the JCP be said to have used its limited
resources with a degree of sophistication. While subsequent failures can be attributed in part to misguided and unrealistic advice from both the USSR and China, the party itself has shown little flexibility. The JCP's failure to date to commit itself entirely to Chinese doctrines may reflect in part a wish to determine for itself the "correct" line in any given situation, and to have two founts of wisdom from which to draw.

Thus the genuine desire of the JCP leadership for a rapprochement within the international movement is somewhat neutralized by the fringe benefits which result when a party is wooed by two parties in a dispute. Particularly revealing in this context is the JCP's insistence that its stand on the test ban issue was based on its applicability to Japan; for as recently as 1961 the JCP had gone through an embarrassing policy switch in order to support the USSR's resumption of atmospheric testing. China having challenged the USSR on the very fundamentals of Communist doctrine, the JCP can bravely say that it will determine policy on the basis of local conditions.

The JCP remains anxious to play the role of mediator in the Sino-Soviet dispute. According to a non-Communist leftist, by the end of 1963 the party leadership was aware of the depth of anti-Soviet feeling in Peiping, and was convinced that any resolution of the dispute must start with concessions by Moscow. The party was said to be making "frantic efforts" in December to find grounds for a reconciliation, and had sent presidium member Katsumi Kikunami to Moscow to urge upon Khroushchev the importance of taking "direct action" to settle the dispute. Kikunami is known to have attended the World Peace Council meeting in Warsaw in November, and may have stopped in Moscow on his return.

The most recent JCP effort in this direction appears to be the despatch of a four-man delegation--headed by Satomi Hakamada--to Moscow in February 1964. Although little information is known of the Hakamada mission at this writing, speculation in the non-Communist Japanese press that it is engaged in a mediation effort probably has some basis in fact.
Neither the JCP in general, nor Hakamada in particular, is likely to impress the Soviets as a suitable mediator. In late September, Hakamada made his views clear in a lecture to a JCP group on the Sino-Soviet dispute. Hakamada reportedly characterized the JCP as not pro-Moscow, pro-Peiping or neutral, but as a self-governing "independent" party. He then went on to criticize the Soviets— and Khrushchev personally—on charges similar to those cited by the Chinese: discrimination against Asian parties, unfraternal behavior in withdrawing technicians from China, and failure to consult other parties on the test ban treaty.

There was also criticism of the Soviets outside the JCP conclave. A JCP spokesman was quoted in Red Flag in November 1963 as saying,

If an international conference of the Communist and workers' parties were held in the present situation, and if a majority opinion was forced to settle the dispute, the disunity of the international Communist movement might become more decisive. Granted that the rift in the international Communist movement... is a great loss to the cause of world peace, national liberation and revolution, "unity" not based on the Moscow Statement principle /i.e., equality of parties/ would be impossible among Communists. (Emphasis added)

Our party maintains that an international conference must be held only after necessary conditions are sufficiently provided through prior consultations between fraternal parties on the basis of Marxist-Leninist principles.

In opposing the principle of majority rule, and in effect supporting the principle of unanimity (veto power), the JCP has once again echoed the Peiping line. The party's stand was not surprising, however, for a party certain to be with the minority in any head count. An offer of good
offices by the JCP would probably receive respectful hearings from the parties of Albania, North Korea, North Vietnam, and possibly other Asian countries. The JCP, by the same token, could itself be influenced by parties favorably disposed toward Peiping—such as those of North Vietnam and Indonesia. The fact that the JCP remains nominally non-aligned suggests that, for the record, the party expects a resolution of the Sino-Soviet quarrel. Since the JCP did not explicitly acknowledge that the dispute existed until December 1962, however, the party's position is of little value in assessing prospects for a reconciliation.

Two other questions must be considered in connection with possible future developments within the JCP: the possibility that the party's pro-Peiping stance may lead to a new split, and the possibility that, with or without such a split, the party may move completely into Peiping's orbit.

Factions play an integral role in Japanese parties of all political shades. The bond of Marxist ideology makes them somewhat less controlling within the Japanese left, but the difference is one of degree. As for the JCP, its cell structure lends itself to the leader-henchman relationship which is at the root of factionalism in Japanese politics. Beneath the ideological veneer, the party probably has more than its share of factional cross currents stemming from personal friendships and enmities.

It terms of the Sino-Soviet dispute, however, the JCP is unusual in not having an active pro-Soviet faction. Although the nucleus for such a faction presumably exists, Soviet-oriented cadres are numerically few and notably docile. Of the 60-man central committee, eight have demonstrated—at one or more times since 1960—sympathy for the Soviet position in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Not since the purge of Shojiro Kasuga, however, has there been any "debate" in JCP journals of issues involved in the dispute. What pro-Soviet faction remains within the Central Committee is a subdued group. The majority of those who might today comprise a pro-Soviet faction were ousted following the Kasuga defection, and a new defection by pro-Soviet elements appears unlikely.
The most vocal minority within JCP headquarters is probably not the Moscow-oriented Central Committee group, but younger cadres who deplore the party's nominal non-alignment and would have the JCP support Peiping with the same ardor as does the North Korean Labor Party. Even though this "China Policy Group" is not yet strongly represented on the Central Committee,* the frequency with which the JCP has supported Peiping of late suggests that the "China faction" is making its influence felt.** The aging Miyamoto-Nosaka leadership can safely be listed among the moderates on the question of how far towards China the JCP should go. It is possible, however, that once the Old Guard is turned out to pasture, the JCP will drop any pretense of neutrality in the bloc dispute, while attempting to retain a degree of independence.

Some light is shed on the JCP position by the remarks of a senior pro-Soviet party official in the fall of 1963. In conversation with an officer of a leftist organization, he stated that there was "no unanimity of opinion" within the JCP concerning the stand which the party should take in the Sino-Soviet dispute, but added that since it would be "greatly disadvantageous" for the party to convey an impression of confusion there was much stress on an appearance of unity.

*Recent information suggests the following breakdown for the central committee: pro-Soviet, 8; pro-Chinese, 21; neutral or unknown, 31. The large number in the third group reflects various factors, including tight JCP security, the failure of party organs to discuss the Sino-Soviet dispute, and the preoccupation of the JCP with domestic problems to the frequent exclusion of international issues.

**In this connection, it is notable that North Vietnam did not criticize Khrushchev's actions in the Cuban crisis, whereas the JCP echoed in slightly subdued form Peiping's criticism of the USSR.
The JCP official confirmed that the party's position was influenced by conditions in Japan, noting that the JCP could not give the impression that it was compromising on issues connected with the U.S. It was therefore forced to sympathize "to some degree" with Communist China, which emphasized the anti-U.S. struggle. The source stated that the JCP Presidium had repeatedly debated Soviet policy toward the U.S. and had decided, though not unanimously, that it was "dissatisfied" with some aspects of that policy.*

The pro-Soviet official described Miyamoto—probably inaccurately—as "persistently opposed" to the "Chinese line." Miyamoto is recognized as an inveterate fence-straddler, but has never been regarded as anti-Peiping. The source stated that Nosaka dealt with controversial matters by asking, "Do you mean that you approve of American policies?" According to the source, Nosaka thus creates an atmosphere in which all are compelled to support the Chinese line.

Should Sino-Soviet relations reach a point where there is no hope for a reconciliation, e.g., should there be a break in diplomatic relations between Moscow and Peiping, the arguments in favor of nonalignment would become less convincing. There would probably be strong pressure for all-out support of China, countered by the argument that the maintenance of a degree of independence would be preferable to subservience to either the CCP or the CPSU. Least likely is any move to return to the Soviet orbit.

In public, however, the JCP continues to put the brightest face on the Sino-Soviet dispute, pointing out the opportunities for spiritual enrichment it offers the world Communist movement:

*The only members of the nine-man Presidium who are generally regarded as pro-Soviet are Yoshio Shiga and Koreto Kurahara. On a given issue, however, they might be joined by Miyamoto and possibly by two others not yet identified with either the pro-Soviet or pro-Chinese view.
The differences of opinion and polemics within the international Communist movement represent the process of raising the revolutionary movement in the world to unity at a higher level.

Surmounting the new ordeal, Marxism-Leninism and the international revolutionary movement will be more developed without fail. So long as our party fulfills the basic path of the party platform, adheres to Marxist-Leninist principles, and follows the spirit of the Moscow Declaration and the Moscow Statement, the revolutionary movement in Japan will advance and achieve victory, no matter what difficulty arises from time to time.*

*Red Flag, 10 November 1963.