CURRENT INTELLIGENCE STAFF STUDY

THE NEW STAGE OF THE SINO-SOVET DISPUTE
(October 1961 - January 1962)

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THE NEW STAGE OF THE SINO-SOVIEI DISPUTE
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This is a working paper, our first systematic survey since spring 1961 of the Sino-Soviet dispute. This paper discusses the stage initiated by Khrushchev's new offensive at the 22nd CPSU Congress in October 1961, examines the forms of pressure on the Chinese still available to Khrushchev, and speculates on the possibility of a Sino-Soviet break in the next year or so.

We have had profitable discussions, on many of the matters considered in this paper, with a number of other analysts.

None of our colleagues should be held responsible, however, for our conclusions, which are controversial.

The Sino-Soviet Studies Group would welcome further comment on this paper, addressed in this instance to the coordinator of the group
THE NEW STAGE OF THE SINO-SOVET DISPUTE

Summary and Conclusions

I. THE BACKGROUND

A. The "Personality Cult"............................2
B. World Communist Strategy.......................3
C. Chinese Programs and Soviet Aid...............5
D. Authority & Discipline in the Movement.........6
E. Soviet-Albanian Relations.....................7

II. DEVELOPMENTS AT THE 22ND CPSU CONGRESS
    (October 1961)

A. The "Personality Cult" Again..................11
B. Soviet Strategy Reaffirmed....................13
C. Chinese Programs Criticized, Soviet Aid
   Brandished.....................................16
D. Soviet Authority in Movement Reasserted.....18

III. TO THE BREAK WITH ALBANIA (November 1961)....26

A. Soviet-Albanian Polemics.......................26
B. Chinese Support of Albania....................30
C. Soviet Warnings to China.....................34

IV. PRESSURE AND RESISTANCE (December 1961)........37

A. Soviet Pressure on Albania...................37
B. Polemics on Strategy................................41
C. Authority and Discipline......................45

V. CONTINUED DETERIORATION (January 1962).........52

A. Renewed Sino-Albanian Counter-Offensives.....52
B. Stronger Soviet Warnings to China............60

VI. PROSPECTS........................................67

A. Definitions of a "Break"......................67
B. Soviet Pressure on Albania...................70
C. Political Pressure on China..................72
D. Economic Pressure on China...................75
E. Military Pressure on China...................78
F. Pro-Soviet Forces in the Chinese Leadership..81
G. The Prospects for a Break....................86
THE NEW STAGE OF THE SINO-SOVIEI DISPUTE

Summary and Conclusions

In using the 22nd CPSU Congress in October 1961 primarily to renew the deStalinization campaign in the USSR and to extend this campaign to the entire world Communist movement, Khrushchev was breaking the uneasy truce with the Chinese party reached at the Moscow conference of the 81 parties in November 1960. Through the "antiparty group" and the Albanian leadership, Khrushchev attacked the Chinese along four main lines: the "personality cult," world Communist strategy, the building of socialism, and authority and discipline in the movement.

Despite the apparent Sino-Soviet agreement at the Moscow conference not to engage in polemics on the course of deStalinization in the USSR and the question of just which parties were still practitioners of the "personality cult," as of October 1961 the Soviet and Chinese parties clearly remained in serious disagreement on this matter. It was obvious that the concept of the "cult" stood ready to serve the leadership of either party in a fresh attack on the other.

Similarly, in discussing the mishmash of Soviet and Chinese positions on world Communist strategy presented in the equivocal declaration of the November 1960 conference, Moscow and Peiping during 1961 had reaffirmed all of their conflicting views. Although these differences had not usually been stated polemically in 1961, the Soviet party had continued to favor an opportunistic strategy of softening Western resistance by peaceful gestures while exploiting indigenous political movements in non-Communist countries primarily by non-military means, whereas the Chinese party had continued to advocate a more militant revolutionary program for the world movement on all fronts, particularly in the underdeveloped areas. Moscow contended that the bloc should not accept serious risks of world war, while Peiping argued that a more militant program would not increase the existing risk. Moscow spoke of the danger of expansion of local wars and implied a need for caution in supporting "liberation" wars and popular uprisings, whereas Peiping minimized the dangers of local wars and called for
much stronger support of liberation wars. Moscow held that "peaceful coexistence" should be the general line of bloc foreign policy, while the Chinese held that this concept was retarding the world revolution; as part of this, Moscow endorsed, and Peiping criticized, the idea of negotiations with the West. As regards both colonial areas and independent countries, Moscow minimized and Peiping emphasized the importance of armed struggle and other forms of violence; whereas Moscow emphasized, and Peiping minimized, the importance of cooperation with bourgeois nationalist forces there. As for specific foreign policies, Peiping had been pleased by the militant features of Soviet policy during 1961--e.g., Soviet statements on Berlin and the Soviet resumption of nuclear testing, but had been very cool to the Kennedy-Khrushchev meeting and the Soviet emphasis on disarmament, anxious about a Soviet rapprochement with the United States and Yugoslavia, irritated by Soviet relations with India, and concerned that Khrushchev might not stand firm on Berlin.

As of October 1961, there also continued to be important differences between Soviet and Chinese positions on building socialism and Communism. Moscow had continued to criticize Chinese domestic programs and the Chinese aim of economic autarky, while Peiping had defended its programs and spoken of need for economic independence to ensure political independence. The USSR as of October 1961 had not moved to restore the program of economic, military, and scientific aid which had existed prior to the withdrawal of the Soviet technicians in mid-1960. Further, in 1961 Moscow had cut back shipments of military goods and had apparently discontinued the special preference given China in trade relations; Chinese imports from the USSR had dropped, scientific cooperation had been greatly reduced, and Soviet aid to military research had been drastically reduced or halted.

Throughout 1961, the most offensive feature of Chinese behavior had clearly remained that of Peiping's challenge to Soviet authority in the world Communist movement. The challenge had been most dramatically illustrated in Albania, but it was also evident in Sino-Soviet relations with the small Asian Communist states and the Communist parties of non-bloc Asian states. The Soviet party had continued in 1961 to insist on its right to make generalizations for the movement, it had reaffirmed its favor for the principle of majority rule, it had warned of the dangers of nationalism in the bloc, and
it had hinted at the possible expulsion from the bloc of states continuing to defy Soviet authority. It had been apparent that the forthcoming 22nd congress would be used in part for fresh affirmations of Soviet authority, although it was not foreseen that these would be as spectacular as they turned out to be.

As for Albania, Soviet-Albanian relations since mid-1960 had deteriorated along the same general lines as had the Sino-Soviet relationship, but as of October 1961 were worse. Throughout 1961, it had been the Soviet camp's practice to condemn Albania explicitly and openly instead of China, while intending the criticism to apply to both; and the USSR had taken several political, economic, and military measures against Albania. Throughout 1961 the Albanian regime had belligerently reaffirmed pro-Chinese positions, and had been acquiring the status of a Chinese dependent; by October, Albania seemed a member of the bloc largely through its ties with Peiping.

In attacking the "antiparty group" and the Albanian leaders in his reports and speeches to the 22nd congress, Khrushchev was aiming primarily at the leadership of the Chinese party, the only significant challenger for leadership of the world movement. His charges against both of his overt targets were roughly the same as the charges that the Soviet party had made repeatedly against the Chinese privately, in party letters and in international Communist meetings, or had made publicly (sometimes in very harsh terms) without naming the Chinese. In making these fresh attacks and in warning the Chinese by name on the limited issue of supporting Albania, Khrushchev was giving the Chinese yet another chance to retreat while at the same time seeking to persuade them that this would be their last chance before the Soviet adoption of extreme measures.

Khrushchev in his central committee report (17 October) used the concept of the "personality cult" to describe the fundamental error of his left-wing domestic and foreign opponents—the error responsible for their other errors; and he declared that the Soviet party could not yield on such a "principled question" to the Albanian leaders or "anyone else."

In reaffirming propositions on world Communist strategy disputed, or given a different emphasis, by the Chinese, Khrushchev was particularly emphatic in insisting that the Soviet interpretation of the concept of "peaceful coexistence" was sufficiently militant and that only "hopeless dogmatists"
thought otherwise. With respect to specific foreign policy goals which had given Peiping concern, Khrushchev was hardly reassuring: he described disarmament as Moscow's most important foreign policy goal, he withdrew the deadline (of the end of 1961) for a German peace treaty, he spoke of further cooperation with India, he ascribed great significance to relations with the United States, and he was in part conciliatory toward Yugoslavia.

Khrushchev also reaffirmed Soviet propositions on the building of socialism and Communism in individual countries and in the bloc as a whole. He and others emphasized the importance of Soviet aid to other members of the bloc. In private meetings during the congress, he reportedly ridiculed Chinese programs.

As for questions of authority and discipline, Khrushchev in his first report asserted that the Soviet party had been seeking and continued to seek means of resolving its differences with the Albanian party. He concluded his attack on the Albanian leaders—an attack which at this point in the congress was still restrained—with a call for them to "abandon their mistaken views" and return to the path of unity and cooperation.

Chou En-lai, probably uncomfortable in his role, responded in one way or another to each of the main lines of Khrushchev's attack. In his 19 October speech, Chou did not mention the "personality cult," but he made the Chinese point sharply two days later by placing a wreath inscribed to Stalin the "great Marxist-Leninist." Chou in his 19 October speech did not take up questions of strategy systematically, but he implied throughout that Soviet strategy was insufficiently militant, particularly toward the United States and in support of revolutionary struggles everywhere. Chou praised the general course of Soviet foreign policy but spoke sharply about conciliatory gestures to the U.S. With respect to building socialism and Communism, Chou praised the Soviet party's draft program and made only a minimal defense of Chinese principles and programs (about which he personally had shown reservations), and he also expressed gratitude for past Soviet support of Chinese programs; however, he reaffirmed the principle of self-reliance for China.
The most important part of Chou's speech related to authority and discipline in the movement. He clearly expressed Peiping's displeasure that Khrushchev had brought the Soviet-Albanian (and therefore the Soviet-Chinese) dispute to this new stage. Reaffirming the Chinese view that differences between parties should be resolved by consultations, and thus implicitly reiterating the Chinese rejection of the principle of majority rule in the movement, Chou condemned the public censure of the Albanian party leaders as being contrary to a "serious Marxist-Leninist attitude."

The day after Chou's speech, the central committee of the Albanian party (not represented at the congress) issued an incendiary statement which concentrated its attack on Khrushchev personally. The statement presented the dispute as one between Khrushchev and "his group" on one hand and the Albanian party and other Soviet leaders on the other, and it asserted that the Albanian party had support in the struggle.

Stung by Chou's criticism, by the Albanian statement, and by the Chinese act of homage to Stalin, Khrushchev in his summary speech (27 October) reviewed the deterioration in the Soviet-Albanian relationship, spoke of attacks on the Soviet party from both "overt and concealed enemies of Communism," and commented sarcastically on Chinese "anxiety" over bloc unity, inviting the Chinese to implement their hope by intervening with the Albanian leaders. He then made this invitation meaningless by calling publicly for the overthrow of the Albanian leaders. The following day, Kozlov directly contradicted Chou—who had ostentatiously left the congress on 23 October—by describing the airing of the Soviet-Albanian dispute as precisely a "correct, serious Marxist-Leninist approach"; and on the same day the congress voted unanimously to remove Stalin's body from the mausoleum.

By the end of the congress, 44 of the other Communist parties represented at the congress—in addition to the CPSU and the CCP—had echoed various parts of the Soviet charges against the Albanian leaders, while none had supported Chou in criticizing the Soviet party for its action; although 21 additional parties which had spoken had failed to second the Soviet attacks and 13 had not spoken, most of these 34 parties were also Soviet supporters, as they later made clear. If the matter of condemning Albania had been brought to a vote at a conference following the congress, the Chinese camp would
probably have consisted only of the same handful of parties which had supported the Chinese at the Moscow conference of the 81 parties in November 1960. However, perhaps because the Chinese handful would have included four of the 12 bloc parties (China, Albania, North Korea, and North Vietnam) and several parties of non-Communist Asian states, and a vote would have shown publicly the seriousness of the split in the bloc and movement, the congress was not followed by such a conference. Subsequently, Soviet and friendly commentators presented the 22nd Congress as having been in effect an international Communist conference, so that no new conference was necessary.

In the five weeks between the close of the 22nd congress (31 October) and the break in Soviet-Albanian diplomatic relations (3 December), events moved rapidly along the lines foreshadowed by the congress.

The most important of the speeches on October Revolution Day (7 November) and the Albanian party anniversary (8 November) was made by Hoxha. He accused Khrushchev personally of slander, blackmail, and blockade. He echoed Chinese positions on the "cult" and on questions of strategy and foreign policy, among other things accusing Khrushchev of cowardice in withdrawing his German treaty deadline. He further charged Khrushchev with being "afraid" to convolve another international Communist conference because he (Khrushchev) would again fail to mass the parties solidly behind his positions. And he concluded that Khrushchev would fail in his campaign against Albania, in view of Chinese and other support.

Chinese comment, which had been cautious in the first few days after the congress, in early November moved to a new stage of asserting just those things about the Albanian party which Khrushchev and other Soviet spokesmen had denied: its correct leadership, its fidelity to Marxism-Leninism, its adherence to the multiparty agreements of 1957 and 1960, and its concern for the "unity" of the movement.

Moscow on 25 November took the first step in breaking diplomatic relations with Albania. It informed the Albanian charge that the Soviet ambassador (already absent) would be recalled, and it demanded the recall of the Albanian ambassador.
While increasing its pressure on Albania, Moscow in the last two weeks of November lightly underlined its point that it was willing to take severe measures against China as well. The Soviet press reprinted several foreign Communist criticisms of the Chinese party—still on the single issue of supporting Albania—which publicly named the Chinese as offenders. The Soviet press also foreshadowed the logical next step of criticizing the Chinese by name on other issues—by reprinting foreign Communist comment to the effect that other parts of the world Communist movement besides the Albanian party (but the Chinese were not yet named) were guilty of supporting the "antiparty group" in the USSR, of following dogmatic and foolish policies in economic development, and of "dangerous and adventurous" opposition to "peaceful coexistence." (One Eastern European leader apparently took prematurely the step of charging the Chinese by name with offenses other than that of supporting Albania: his reported statement in a speech that the Chinese party as well as the Albanian had practised and indeed had intensified the "personality cult" did not appear in press versions of the speech.) In addition to keeping the Chinese conscious that Moscow at any time might attack them on a wide front, bloc comment in this period referred often to the importance of bloc aid in overcoming the economic difficulties of individual states, and to the importance of Soviet military protection for all bloc states.

The Chinese reiterated their praise of the Albanian party in commentaries on Albania's liberation anniversary in late November, and implied their agreement with the Albanian line on Khrushchev's lack of support in his own party as well as in the movement. At the same time, a Chinese Communist leader reportedly asserted, for the first time, that the Chinese believed that Khrushchev would eventually be overthrown. At month's end, Mao and other Chinese leaders hailed the "glorious" Albanian party and directly contradicted Soviet assertions that the Albanian leaders were "isolated."

Peiping chose the 1 December anniversary of the 81-party declaration for its most important pronouncement since the congress—a Chinese version of that declaration, reaffirming Chinese positions on matters both of strategy and of authority and discipline, and putting the Chinese on record—before the anticipated Soviet-Albanian break—as favoring another multiparty conference of the November 1960 type before any further action was taken against Albania.
On 2 December Pravda answered Hoxha's 7 November speech, defending Khrushchev against the charge of practising the "personality cult" himself, and defending the Soviet party against the charge of violating the December 1960 agreement on holding multiparty conferences if necessary to resolve disputes; it insisted that Albanian efforts to destroy the "unity" of the bloc had made necessary the public attacks on the Albanian leaders. The Soviet party newspaper treated Albania as having already "isolated" itself in the movement—thus foreshadowing the diplomatic break which came the next day.

On 3 December, Moscow broke diplomatic relations with Albania, stating that it would recall all Soviet diplomatic and trade personnel and demanding that Tirana recall all such personnel. However, developments in December did not move as rapidly as might have been expected after this action.

In early December, the Soviet press systematically defended Moscow's action, and prepared the ground for the expulsion of Albania from the Warsaw Pact and CEMA. However, at the CEMA meeting in mid-December, at which neither Albania nor China was represented, no public action was taken against Albania. Moreover, although three of the Eastern European states followed Moscow in withdrawing their ambassadors from Tirana, none followed Moscow in breaking relations with Tirana, and there apparently remained a significant amount of trade between these states and Albania.

On 6 December Pravda published a comparatively dignified Soviet version of the declaration of the 81 Communist parties which had been issued a year earlier—in effect a reply to the Chinese version of 1 December. Pravda was mainly concerned with denying the charge that the Soviet party was renouncing the struggle with the West, although it continued to evade the hard question of support for revolutionary forces. Chinese pronouncements kept the pressure on Moscow on this point, insisting that revolutions must not be subordinated to "peace" efforts. Khrushchev publicly retorted, at the WFTU congress in Moscow in mid-December, that those who could not understand his strategy—which included an interest in negotiations with the West—should "clear their brains."

Soviet and Chinese representatives clashed directly at this WFTU meeting, at an Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization meeting in Gaza at the same time, and at the
World Peace Council meeting in Stockholm the following week. At the AAPSO meeting, the Chinese challenged Soviet authority on matters of both procedure and substance; and this challenge, for the first known time in a world Communist front, was successful. At the WFTU meeting, the Chinese delegation issued a separate statement on one of the principal items on the agenda, a statement emphasizing American perfidy and the need for "unremitting struggle" for liberation. And at the WPC meeting, Soviet and Chinese representatives clashed on the question of whether the "peace" movement should be used primarily to support Soviet propaganda positions on disarmament or primarily to support the "liberation" movement; the Chinese delegates strongly attacked Soviet overtures to the United States, going so far as to return to the extremely offensive formulation of 1960 that it was wrong to "beg for peace from imperialism," and they insisted that the primary task was not to achieve disarmament but rather the very opposite—to strengthen the military forces of revolutionary movements; and the Chinese unsuccessfully attacked the Soviet proposal to make disarmament the theme of the next WPC meeting.

In several commentaries published during these mid-December meetings of the fronts, the Soviet party ignored the Chinese call for unanimity in the movement to be reached through consultations continued as long as necessary (in effect a call for veto power in the movement), and denied that the Albanian party had any significant support in the movement—although Moscow's reluctance to convene another multiparty meeting in itself showed that the Albanians did indeed have significant support. Such Soviet commentaries spoke of the responsibility of every party to the entire movement, of the "universal" recognition of the Soviet party as the "vanguard" of the movement, and of the unconditional obligation of all parties, whether large or small, to proletarian internationalism (all of these being indirect ways of reaffirming Soviet authority and Soviet favor for the principle of majority rule).

In late December, the Soviet party moved a bit further forward in criticizing the Chinese by reprinting additional foreign Communist comments on the obstructive attitude of the Chinese party (named) in the dispute with Albania, and, in particular, by reprinting an article by Kadar calculated to infuriate the Chinese. Kadar took the line of denying that the Chinese (not named) were effectively militant: summing up Chinese positions on strategy, Kadar described these (rather unjustly) as
"nothing but a leftist and adventurous policy of pseudo-radicalism and mere abuse of the imperialists, which will do them no harm." In this article published by Pravda on 26 December, Mao Tse-tung's 68th birthday, Kadar also observed that leftism, in addition to being the infantile disorder described by Lenin, could also be a "senile" disorder. (This was probably not a random insult: there is some medical, as well as inferential, evidence for the judgment that Mao's capacity for disciplined and sustained thought has been substantially reduced in recent years).

Two days later, a pro-Peiping Hong Kong newspaper with Chinese Communist advisers attacked Khrushchev by name for practicing the "personality cult." At month's end, Moscow took another step by conceding that the Albanian "degenerates" indeed had their protectors, i.e. were not isolated as had been contended previously; the commentary argued comically that both the Albanians and their protectors were in "complete isolation."

During January 1961 the Sino-Soviet relationship continued to move toward a showdown, although still not as rapidly as might have been expected. Soviet pronouncements in January culminated in indirect threats to break relations with the Chinese party and to withdraw the Soviet military protection of China.

The Chinese party's intention to persist in defiance of Moscow was clearly reflected in the party newspaper's New Year editorial: this acknowledged that certain events which "grieved" Communists had taken place in the camp, it went on to urge the Chinese line of "revolutionary struggle" as in the interests of the "revolutionary people" who constituted 90 percent of the world; it attributed anti-Chinese sentiment among imperialists and revisionists precisely to this Chinese revolutionary line; it predicted an increase in anti-Chinese activity; and in this long survey of the world scene which did not once mention the USSR, it linked the Chinese fate with that of all revolutionary peoples. On the same day, the Chinese party's theoretical journal again denounced those who put issues of war and peace before the issue of the anti-imperialist and anti-colonial struggle, and who gave (as the Soviet party program gave) primacy to domestic construction rather than to the support of oppressed nations.

In the same period, Chinese leaders returned to the theme of relying on one's own efforts for domestic development, and for the first time specified that problems of "national defense" as well as economic construction could be solved in this way.
Moscow soon commented ironically (without naming China) on China's prospects for going it alone.

On 9 January the Albanian party stated openly and in detail the Chinese case against Khrushchev (although not naming the Chinese as their authority) for his attitude toward the "personality cult," for revising fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism with respect to both world Communist strategy and relations between the parties, and for imposing sanctions which reduced the economic and military capabilities of faithful Communist states; while predicting further such actions by Khrushchev, it contended that Khrushchev had been unable to induce his Eastern European followers to break with Tirana. In mid-January Peiping and Tirana announced the successful conclusion, without details, of their talks on economic cooperation in 1962; and at their banquet Chou En-lai made the strongest statement yet in praise of the Albanian party.

In the last two weeks of January Moscow issued additional warnings—including some stronger warnings—to Peiping. Soviet media asserted that Moscow could not be silent about deviations in "other parties" (but specified only the Albanian); reprinted additional foreign Communist criticisms of the Chinese attitude, one of these naming the Chinese; criticized by implication Chinese practice of the "personality cult"; insisted on the need for "absolute respect" by every party for the decisions of multiparty conferences; and denounced critics of Soviet strategy, especially the Soviet use of "peaceful coexistence," for divisive actions, adventurism and anti-Soviet activity—bringing this charge too to a new level by twice describing as "enemies" those who opposed the Soviet line. The strongest warning—of a possible Soviet break with the Chinese party—came in Pravda on 18 January, which presented Lenin's struggle with the Mensheviks and their supporters as providing an example for other parties of an "irreconcilable revolutionary struggle against opportunism going as far as a complete organizational break." As a postscript to this warning, Soviet Defense Minister Malinovsky was quoted on 24 January to the effect—in a new discriminating formula—that the USSR had sufficient strength to defend those socialist countries "friendly to us." (This formula was twice repeated in the following two weeks.)

There are various forms of pressure still available to Moscow in its effort to force the Chinese leadership to retreat or to effect a change of leadership. These include: indirect
pressure through Albania; additional political pressure; additional economic pressure; and additional pressure on the Chinese military establishment.

As for Soviet pressure on China through Albania, Moscow has used up almost all of its political and economic pressure already, without bringing Hoxha down. The USSR could accomplish this by military action, and might manage it through inciting military action by others or through a Soviet-supported coup, but in either event the Chinese would probably be even more bitterly intransigent.

As for political pressure in China, the mere surfacing of the dispute—in the sense of publicly criticizing the Chinese by name on the entire list of issues—would not force a Chinese retreat. Neither would representations by other parties of the movement. A further decline in Soviet consultation and cooperation with Peiping in specific foreign policies would also be an insignificant pressure. The only significant political pressure is that presented by the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, with its Soviet commitment to China’s defense. We think that an official Soviet threat to withdraw from this treaty would shock the Chinese party and perhaps do much to impel a challenge to Mao’s leadership, but we do not believe that it would force the present leadership to retreat.

As for economic pressure on China, Khrushchev in mid-1960 took the most damaging measure available by withdrawing the technicians. There is no evidence that Mao is now or soon will be prepared to abandon his positions in the dispute in the hope of inducing Moscow to restore the level of aid which existed before mid-1960. There seems almost no chance that the anticipated food crisis in the spring will force Peiping to turn to Moscow for aid. Only the area of Sino-Soviet and Sino-Soviet trade appears at all promising for Moscow, in that a cessation of this trade would mean fairly serious short-run dislocations while Peiping attempted to develop other sources of supply; such sources appear to be available, however, for the most important items, so a cessation of Sino-bloc trade would not force the Chinese to accommodate, it would simply turn them more to the West.

As for military pressure, we see no chance of the use of Soviet military force against China. The USSR has used up most of its pressure against the Chinese military establishment, in the withdrawals of technicians and advisers and the drastic reduction in military shipments and aid to research. Soviet economic
sanctions which could further affect the military—e.g. cutting off petroleum products—would, as noted above, be countered by purchases in the West. The complete cessation of military deliveries and aid to research would now be a relatively insignificant additional blow. The repudiation of the Sino-Soviet treaty would probably give additional encouragement to Chinese military leaders to challenge the dominant leaders, but, as noted above, we do not think that it would be effectual against the dominant leaders themselves.

As for the question of a challenge to the dominant leaders of the Chinese party, it should be remembered that there has already been one challenge—that of Peng Te-huai and others, in 1959—since the Sino-Soviet dispute has developed. We think that there are other pro-Soviet and anti-Mao forces who have kept their counsel and who may be better prepared when the next opportunity presents—possibly this year. This may coincide with another dramatic development in Sino-Soviet relations, such as a break in economic relations or a Soviet threat to repudiate the Sino-Soviet treaty, or a break between the parties. However, while there is a possibility that Mao can be brought down, we think it more likely that Mao and his most important lieutenants will stand together successfully against their opponents—regardless of Soviet pressure—until Mao retires or dies. He may, of course, retire or die in the next year or two, which would present pro-Soviet forces with another opportunity.

Both the Soviet and Chinese parties may, as many observ- ers believe, be content with an indefinite prolongation of the present state of the relationship—of disunity short of a break in either party or party-and-state relations. However, we think that Khrushchev would not have launched and pressed on with this new offensive since October 1961 if he had meant the relationship to continue indefinitely in that uneasy state. Thus we believe that Khrushchev does intend to exert some combination of the remaining pressures available to him. Although we recognize the possibility that he has already concluded (as we have) that he cannot force a Chinese retreat and that he might as well break with the Chinese party right now, we lean to the view that he will exert most of these pressures before breaking. There are several points in that process at which a break between the parties might come.

If the Soviets were to use military force against the Alban- ian leaders, that action would probably force a break between
the Soviet and Chinese parties right there. Soviet sponsorship of a successful coup, a less clear-cut affair, might not lead to a break.

If Moscow were to criticize the Chinese publicly, by name, on the full range of issues in the dispute, Moscow might be able to run through the entire list without forcing a break between the parties, unless it were to attack Mao personally. The latter action would probably soon lead to a break.

In the economic and military relationships, Moscow could probably go through all the rest of the stages in reducing its support of Peiping without provoking a break between the parties—short of ceasing support entirely. A complete cessation of support would be in effect an embargo, and might soon be followed by a break.

A Soviet threat to repudiate the Sino-Soviet treaty would probably not force a break between the parties. The Chinese instead would probably challenge Moscow to repudiate the treaty publicly. We doubt that Moscow would do this; if it did, that action would almost certainly mean a break.

If Khrushchev were to directly intervene in Chinese party affairs—by conspiring with anti-Mao forces or authorizing them to speak for him—Mao would certainly break.

Should Khrushchev exert some combination of these various pressures (short of breaking party or party-and-state relations) and still fail (as we think he will fail) to force the dominant Chinese leaders to retreat or to effect a change in the Chinese leadership, and should the Chinese party not have broken relations with the Soviet party at some point in this process, Khrushchev himself might then decide that the only significant pressure remaining to him is that of making the break himself.

The various possibilities for a Sino-Soviet break as we define it—a break in either party or party-and-state relations—seem to us to add up to the probability of a break in the next year or so, if no large new factor is introduced. Such a factor would be a change in the leadership of either party—a change that, regardless of which leaders were to succeed either Khrushchev or Mao, would probably serve to deter or at least delay a break while the leaders of one party explored the attitudes of the new leaders of the other.
With Moscow still reprinting rather than originating criticism of the Chinese by name, and still issuing only indirect warnings to China of the consequences of continued defiance, the Soviet party seems to be marking time before the exertion of one of the forms of pressure discussed above. We do not know what Moscow is waiting for: conceivably, for the results of a Chinese party plenum or of a conference in Peiping of pro-Chinese parties, both of which are rumored (in mid-February) to be scheduled for the near future.

As noted above, a Sino-Soviet break could come at any time, but we think that it will take some months for Khrushchev to work through the process of exerting a pressure, evaluating the response, choosing another pressure, and so on. Whatever the pace, if there is no change in the leadership of either the Soviet or the Chinese party before mid-1963, we think that a Sino-Soviet break as we have defined it—a break in either party or party-and-state relations—before that time is more likely than not.
THE NEW STAGE OF THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE

Instead of using the 22nd Congress of the Soviet party primarily to celebrate the achievements of the USSR and to rejoice in its prospects, as had been generally expected, Khrushchev used the congress primarily to renew the de-Stalinization campaign in the USSR and to extend this campaign to the entire world Communist movement. His plan was to link and discredit all those, within the USSR and without, who had opposed his attack on Stalin at the 20th CPSU Congress in 1956, who had not accepted the changes in strategy for the world Communist movement which Khrushchev had introduced then and later, who had been "building socialism" along unorthodox lines and with special claims for these innovations, and--of greatest importance—who had rejected his propositions on authority and discipline in the world Communist movement.

Khrushchev's attacks on the Soviet "antiparty group" and on the Albanian leaders were of course genuinely aimed at those targets among others, but there was little doubt that the Chinese party was his most important target, as the only significant challenger for leadership of the movement. In directing this attack, Khrushchev was breaking the uneasy truce reached at the Moscow conference of the 81 parties in November 1960. Khrushchev's charges against the Albanian leaders, and some of his charges against members of the "antiparty group," were roughly the same as the charges that the Soviet party repeatedly had made against the Chinese privately, in party letters and in international Communist meetings, or had made publicly without naming the Chinese. In making these fresh attacks, and in warning the Chinese by name on the limited issue of supporting Albania, Khrushchev seemed to be giving the Chinese yet another chance to retreat while at the same time seeking to persuade them that this would be their last chance before the Soviet adoption of extreme measures. This paper is concerned with developments in this new stage of the dispute—which has extended from October 1961 through January 1962 into February.
I. THE BACKGROUND

It may be useful to recapitulate developments in the first nine months of 1961, in four categories—the "personality cult," world Communist strategy, the building of "socialism" and the role of Soviet aid, and authority and discipline in the movement—and to outline the deterioration of the Soviet-Albanian relationship in 1961 in a fifth section.

A. The "Personality Cult"

As of October 1961, the Soviet and Chinese parties remained in serious disagreement about the "personality cult." The Chinese early in 1956 had made clear their feeling that Khrushchev's extreme denigration of Stalin was both unjust and stupid, giving aid and comfort to enemies of Communism and encouraging indiscipline in the movement itself. By the end of 1956, the Soviet and Chinese parties had reached a measure of agreement in alike describing Stalin as one whose merits had been on balance weightier than his faults, but within this agreement there was still a great difference.

In the free-swinging private exchanges in the Sino-Soviet dispute in 1960, the concept of the "personality cult" had not been one of the principal categories of discussion. However, it had clearly been an extremely sensitive issue: the Chinese asserted that the beginning of the deterioration of the Sino-Soviet relationship was Khrushchev's attack on Stalin in 1956; the Soviets rebuked them for bringing up this issue again; Khrushchev implied strongly that the "personality cult" was being practiced in China, and said that Mao was as vain and as isolated from reality as Stalin had been; the Chinese implied just as strongly that it was Khrushchev who was practicing the "cult" and expressly denied that the concept was in any way applicable to Mao; and so on.

In the 6 December 1960 declaration, the Soviets had succeeded in inserting the observation that one factor in the good health of the world Communist movement had been the "overcoming of the harmful consequences of the cult of the individual," a formulation which in effect endorsed the de-Stalinization campaign; and the declaration had also included an injunction that it was the duty of Communist parties to prevent the emergence of such a cult—a more ambiguous passage, as it would permit either Khrushchev or Mao to attack the other. In commenting on the declaration then and in early 1961, both Moscow and Peiping had ignored the passages on the "cult," and it looked as though there was at least a tacit agreement not to engage in further polemics on this matter. It was obvious, however, that the concept stood ready to serve either party in a fresh attack.
As of October 1961, there remained significant disagreement between the Soviet and Chinese views as to the proper strategy for the world Communist movement, although during 1961 these differences were not being stated polemically. The Soviet party continued to favor an opportunistic strategy of softening Western resistance by peaceful gestures while exploiting indigenous political movements in non-Communist countries primarily by non-military means, whereas the Chinese party advocated a more militant revolutionary program for the world movement on all fronts, particularly in the underdeveloped areas. Moscow contended that bloc strength was such that the West was probably deterred from world war, but that the West was still militarily strong, and, because the consequences of world war would be disastrous for all of the developed countries, that the bloc itself should not accept serious risks of world war; while Peiping contended that the balance of power and world political trends favored a more militant program, that such a program would not increase the existing risk of world war, and that Moscow in any case exaggerated the consequences of world war. The Soviet party had continued to argue that the West was increasingly deterred from local wars (small-scale wars between states) as well as world war, and it continued to hold that local wars were dangerous for the bloc as well as the West, because such wars might easily expand, and that the bloc's aims should be to deter or halt them; while the Chinese party argued that local wars (by definition, initiated by Western forces) could be contained and should be fought, using local forces and if necessary bloc forces. Moscow held that the bloc should support "liberation" wars and "popular uprisings" (in both colonial areas and independent states) but should be wary of action which carried a high risk of Western intervention, while Peiping held that the bloc should give much greater encouragement and stronger material support to such anti-colonial and civil wars, which would not significantly increase the risk of larger wars.

*As various observers have noted, and as Khrushchev himself had pointed out in 1960, the Chinese party's strategy was more Trotskyist than Stalinist.
Further, the Soviet party contended that "peaceful coexistence" should be the "general line" of bloc foreign policy and that Moscow could be trusted to interpret this concept with sufficient militancy, while the Chinese party contended that the Soviet presentation of this concept was retarding the world revolution, particularly in the underdeveloped areas. As a part of this, Moscow held that negotiations with the West could be fruitful, whereas Peiping held that there was little to gain and perhaps much to lose from negotiations and that Moscow had been too conciliatory in its approaches to the West, again with the result of discouraging revolutionary movements.

Further, the Soviet party contended that "armed struggle" was of declining importance as a means of attaining independence in colonial areas, and that Communist parties should plan on protracted cooperation with the bourgeoisie there; while the Chinese party contended that armed struggle was still of first importance in colonial areas and that Communist parties there should attempt to seize leadership in the early stages of the revolution where possible, an attempt which would be facilitated by armed struggle. As for the newly-independent countries, Moscow held that their bourgeois nationalist leaders were pursuing aims compatible with Communist interests, that bloc aid was important in ensuring the neutrality and eventual seduction of these countries, and that "national democracy" (as in Cuba) was the proper middle-run objective; whereas Peiping held that Moscow exaggerated the importance of the neutral states and of bloc aid to them, that "national democracy" was too modest an objective, that more pressure should be put on bourgeois nationalist leaders, and the Communist parties in the newly-independent countries could achieve power finally only by violence. Similarly, Moscow held that Communist parties in the West faced difficult conditions and should pursue "democratic" (as distinct from "socialist") goals for some time, while Peiping held that more militant offensives should be conducted in the West, and that even civil wars there as well as in the newly-independent countries might be a realistic early objective.

There is an unconfirmed report that the Chinese reiterated privately, before the 22nd congress, some of their charges against Soviet strategy, including softness,
revisionism, sacrifice of the Communist parties in underdeveloped areas, and lack of support for Chinese objectives such as recovering Taiwan.

As for the actual conduct of foreign policy, as distinct from pronouncements on strategy, there had continued to be generally effective cooperation between Moscow and Peiping in 1961, perhaps better cooperation than in the previous three years. Khrushchev's initiatives after spring 1960 had undercut much of the Chinese criticism of Soviet policy by the time of the Moscow conference of the 81 parties in November. Following the conference, the Chinese had apparently agreed to refrain from open attacks on the Soviet conduct of foreign policy, including Khrushchev's personal contacts with Western leaders. Certain features of Soviet policy during 1961—in particular Khrushchev's militant statements on Berlin and the Soviet decision to resume nuclear weapons tests—had seemed to please the Chinese very much. However, the Chinese had clearly been cool to the Kennedy-Khrushchev meeting and to the Soviet emphasis on disarmament, they had continued to indicate anxiety about a Soviet rapprochement with both the United States and Yugoslavia and irritation over Soviet relations with India, and they had made clear that they regarded Khrushchev's Berlin policy as an important test of Soviet professions of sufficient militancy in leading the world revolution.

C. Chinese Programs and Soviet Aid

As of October 1961, there continued to be important differences between Soviet and Chinese propositions on building socialism and Communism. Despite the substantial Chinese retreats in the actual policies pursued under the general line, the "leap forward," and the commune program, and in the Chinese claims for these innovations, the Soviet party during 1961 had continued to attack them, implying that China's economic difficulties resulted primarily from these departures from the Soviet model. The Chinese party, on the defensive, continued to insist on the great achievements of their domestic policies and to reject any criticism of them as ignorant dogmatism. Moscow had also continued to criticize the Chinese aim of economic autarky; the Soviets spoke of the need for better coordination of bloc economies and for international specialization of labor, whereas Peiping spoke of the need to attain economic independence in order to ensure political independence.
Owing to Chinese dissents and departures from Soviet positions on world Communist strategy and on building socialism and Communism, and in particular the continuing Chinese challenge to Soviet authority in the world Communist movement, the USSR as of October 1961 had not moved to restore the program of Soviet economic, military, and scientific aid to Peking which had existed prior to the withdrawal of the Soviet technicians in summer 1960. In withdrawing the technicians, Moscow had taken the strongest single measure available—doing serious damage to the Chinese industrial program, especially in the fields of military industry (including missile production) and atomic energy. In late 1960 or early 1961, the USSR had begun to cut back shipments of military goods to China, an additional blow both to military industry and the current effectiveness of the armed forces; very few such shipments had come in 1961. Further, the USSR during 1961 had apparently discontinued the special preference given the Chinese in trade relations—e.g. transportation priority and leeway in meeting short-term obligations. Chinese imports from the USSR in 1961, though still substantial, had dropped to two-thirds of the 1960 level and less than three-fifths of the 1959 level.* Sino-Soviet scientific cooperation had apparently continued, but at a greatly reduced level, and Soviet aid to military research had been drastically reduced if not halted. In the face of all this, the Chinese in 1961 had continued to affirm their determination to depend on their own resources to whatever extent necessary. The Chinese had also been conducting trade probes in the West—inquiring about various types of manufactured goods, industrial equipment (including complete plants), petroleum products, and transport aircraft. Moscow had continued to imply (in comment on the dangers of "nationalism") that additional pressure could be brought against China and other deviants if necessary.

D. Authority and Discipline in the Movement

Throughout 1961, that feature of Chinese behavior most offensive to Moscow clearly remained that of the Chinese challenge to Soviet authority in the world Communist movement. Owing to Chinese intransigence, the Moscow conference of

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*For all of 1961, Chinese imports from the USSR totaled $550 million, as against $817 million in 1960 and $955 million in 1959.
November 1960 had not affirmed the authoritative character of unilateral Soviet pronouncements and had not established the principle of majority rule in the movement. While the declaration emerging from the conference had enjoined all the parties to be faithful to positions "jointly worked out" at conferences, and in the interim to take up their problems with one another in bilateral talks, such agreement on principles clearly could not prevent sharply differing interpretations of "jointly worked out" positions and could not ensure the success of either bilateral talks or full-dress conferences. Early in 1961, the Soviet and Chinese parties had indeed begun to offer very different interpretations of the "jointly worked out" positions taken in the declaration, and the Chinese party at that time had made a decision to give "all-out" support to its only all-out supporter, Albania, in this challenge to Moscow. In subsequent months, the Sino-Soviet competition for influence in the movement had been most dramatically illustrated in Albania, but it had also been evident in Sino-Soviet relations with the small Asian Communist states (Outer Mongolia, North Korea, North Vietnam) and the Communist parties of the nonbloc Asian states. The Soviet party had continued in 1961 to insist on its right to develop Marxism-Leninism and to make generalizations for the entire movement, to reaffirm its favor for the principle of majority rule in the movement, to warn of the dangers of "nationalism" in the bloc, and to hint at the possible expulsion from the bloc of states which continued to defy Soviet authority. It was apparent that the forthcoming 22nd Congress of the Soviet party would be used in part for fresh affirmations of Soviet authority, although it was not foreseen that these renewed assertions of authority would be as spectacular as they turned out to be.

E. Soviet-Albanian Relations

Soviet-Albanian relations since mid-1960 had deteriorated along the same general lines as had the Sino-Soviet relationship, but more rapidly, and as of October 1961 were worse. While the Bucharest conference of June 1960 had been convened by Moscow primarily to deal with the Chinese challenge and the principal disputants at the conference were the Soviet and Chinese parties, the Albanian party had played
an important role as Peiping's only all-out supporter.* Immediately thereafter, the Albanian leaders had smothered a coup against them which was apparently supported by Moscow—a venture not yet carried so far in the Sino-Soviet relationship. Moreover, Moscow and its followers had begun to reduce their trade and aid commitment to Albania.

According to Khrushchev, the Albanian party in August 1960 had twice rejected Soviet bids for bilateral talks; while Khrushchev in October 1960, according to the Albanians, had stated that he would treat Albania like Yugoslavia. At the Moscow conference of Communist parties in November 1960, the Albanian delegation had again been Peiping's only all-out supporter; and Hoxha had denounced Khrushchev in spectacular terms; according to Khrushchev, Hoxha and Shehu at this conference had rejected for a third time a bid for a bilateral meeting and had then agreed but had "wrecked" the meeting (which may have immediately preceded their early departure from the conference), and shortly thereafter had again rejected a bilateral meeting.

In any case, following the Moscow conference, Ulbricht had publicly criticized Albanian behavior at the conference, thus beginning the Soviet camp's practice of condemning Albania explicitly and openly instead of China, while intending its criticism to apply to both. Hoxha had soon replied that he would not bow on matters of principle.

By the end of 1960, Soviet and perhaps Eastern European credits to Albania had been canceled, and Moscow had begun to demand Albanian repayment of earlier Soviet credits beginning in 1961, instead of 1970. Also by the end of 1960, Chinese had reportedly purchased more than 100,000 tons of wheat for Albania, more than had come from the USSR in 1959.

Throughout 1961, Albania had been acquiring the status of a Chinese dependent. The USSR in January (according to Tirana), had withdrawn a group of its technicians, implying that it might withdraw others. At the Albanian

*There had already been some evidence that the Albanians were hostile to the Warsaw Pact proposal—of spring 1960—for a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans. Hoxha in fall 1960 openly denounced the idea.
party congress in February, Hoxha had belligerently reaffirmed pro-Chinese positions and had announced that there had been a coup attempt (without directly accusing Moscow of supporting it). According to the Albanians, Khrushchev in March 1961 had declared that the USSR would stop all aid to Albania and informed Tirana of this by letter in April, noting that the previous level of aid was reserved for "friends and true brothers." In April, the Chinese had agreed to provide Albania with economic aid totaling $125 million, about the same sum which had been promised but withdrawn by the USSR and some of the Eastern European states.

In late April, a Soviet note had charged that Albania had forced the first group of technicians to leave and that in consequence all technicians would be withdrawn; most of them were in fact withdrawn in the following week. In May, a show-trial of "spies and traitors" had been held in Albania, which was in fact an anti-Soviet demonstration. This had immediately been followed by evacuation of the important Soviet submarine base at Valona, the mutual expulsion of Soviet and Albanian military attaches, the expulsion or withdrawal of some Soviet military advisers, the sending home of some or all of the Albanian students (both civilian and military) in the USSR and other Eastern European states, the withdrawal of some of the Eastern European technicians from Albania, a considerable decline in Soviet trade with Albania, and a number of Albanian trade probes in Western Europe.

Subsequently, there had been evidence of an influx of Chinese military advisers, economic technicians (possibly hundreds) into Albania, the withdrawal of the remainder of the Soviet technicians (although some Eastern European technicians remained as of early October), the continued import of much Chinese grain by Albania despite Chinese shortages, and, in all, the emergence of China as virtually the only source of foreign economic aid to Albania. In the same period, Albania had attacked Soviet policy on Germany at a Warsaw Pact meeting (August); the USSR had sent no representatives to the ceremonies throughout Soviet-Albanian Friendship Month (September); and the Albanian press (alone in the bloc) had failed to publish in full the Soviet party's draft program.

By October, Albania had seemed a member of the bloc largely through its ties with the Chinese, as its membership
in the Warsaw Pact and CEMA was nominal. On 1 October, Hoxha had publicly denounced plots against Albania and had declared that he would never submit. Shortly thereafter, the Albanian party press had gone so far as to state that Albanian "friendship" with the USSR would be based on both "proletarian internationalism" and "principles of peaceful coexistence"—the latter being the formula for relations with non-Communist states, including hostile states.
II. DEVELOPMENTS AT THE 22ND CPSU CONGRESS

The principal Soviet speakers at the 22nd CPSU Congress in October 1961, notably Khrushchev himself, attacked Khrushchev's domestic and foreign opponents in the Communist movement (apart from the Yugoslavs) as the surviving manifestations of the "personality cult," this concept serving to describe the fundamental error which was responsible for their other errors. Khrushchev and others also discussed at length the related questions of world Communist strategy, principles of building socialism and Communism, and, of greatest importance, authority and discipline in the movement. We outline below, in these categories, the developments at the congress.

A. The "Personality Cult" Again

In his central committee report of 17 October (the principal address of the congress), Khrushchev answered at length the rhetorical question of whether it had been necessary (in 1956) to attack Stalin and Stalinism "so sharply and openly." It had been absolutely necessary, he said, in the interest of good relations between the party and the people, of Soviet economic development, and of the Soviet position in the world. Khrushchev then reviewed in familiar terms his persistence in this course of deStalinization against the opposition of the "antiparty group" and his triumph over this group and Zhukov in 1957. He then brought the offensive against the Chinese to a new stage by asserting that his course of deStalinization "did not receive proper understanding" from the Albanian leaders, although, he said, this had not become clear until 1960. What he did not say was that the Chinese had openly opposed deStalinization from the start; he did not have to say it, as his audience knew at once that he was attacking the Chinese through the Albanians. The Albanian deviation, he went on, had been very clear since mid-1960; the reference was to Albanian behavior at the Bucharest conference in June 1960, a conference which was convened primarily to isolate and discipline the Chinese, who were defended strongly by the Albanians and who did not retreat. The Albanian and Chinese leaders' opposition to deStalinization, Khrushchev continued, was due to the fact that they themselves employed the methods of the "personality cult." The line of the 20th CPSU Congress (the deStalinization congress of 1956), Khrushchev said, was a Leninist line,
and "we cannot yield on such a principled question to the Albanian leaders or to anyone else" (a clear reference to the Chinese). Reports differ as to whether Khrushchev forewarned any other parties of his intention to make this attack—the first open denunciation of another bloc party by name since the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform in 1948.

In his speech of 19 October, Chou En-lai did not mention the "personality cult." He made the Chinese point on this matter two days later, in a marvellously Chinese way, by placing a wreath for Stalin (as well as one for Lenin) on the Lenin-Stalin mausoleum. The wreath for Stalin was inscribed, as Khrushchev himself had described Stalin late in 1956, to Stalin the "great Marxist-Leninist."*

In the speeches that followed, many of the Russian and foreign delegates reiterated and embroidered the theme that the Albanian leaders were practitioners of the "personality cult." It was Khrushchev again, in his summary speech of 27 October, who made the strongest attack. He gave much detail on the errors of the Albanian leaders, asserted again that these errors stemmed from their adherence to the "personality cult," and observed that "Everything vicious that existed in our country during the period of the personality cult is being manifested in the worst form" in the Albanian party. He went on to speak at length about Stalin's viciousness and about the collusion in this of the antiparty group, and was at pains to show that the deference given himself at the congress should not be regarded as evidence of yet another personality cult.

On the following day Fro1 Kozlov, Khrushchev's apparent choice as his successor, had much to say about the "personality cult" as exemplified by the antiparty group and the Albanian leaders. On the same day, the congress replied to Chou En-lai's act of homage to Stalin on 21 October; the congress (Russians only) voted unanimously to remove Stalin's body from the Lenin-Stalin mausoleum, which was soon done.

*We think that Richard Lowenthal was right, in his lecture of 18 December 1961 to Radio Free Europe analysts in Munich, to emphasize the importance of this Chinese act of homage to Stalin. Lowenthal may even have been right in regarding Khrushchev's much more violent speech of 27 October, and the removal of Stalin's body from the mausoleum, as "unplanned, surprising, sudden," actions taken entirely in response to Chou's gesture.
In the same period, i.e., Peng Chen, the senior Chinese delegate remaining after Chun En-lai's departure on 23 October, is credibly reported to have attacked the entire course of de-Stalinization in private talks with other delegates. Peng is said to have contended that Stalin had been and remained the symbol of world Communism, that Khrushchev was destroying the Stalin image, and that this could only harm the movement. He reportedly went on to say that the Chinese party still stood for Sino-Soviet friendship but "there is a limit."

B. Soviet Strategy Reaffirmed

Khrushchev in his speeches of 17 and 18 October reaffirmed most of the propositions on world Communist strategy disputed, or given a different emphasis, by the Chinese. He contended again that bloc military "superiority" had deterred the West from war, that wars between states were no longer "inevitable," and that world war might become impossible even before the end of capitalism. While reaffirming that a world war would mean the end of capitalism, he conceded again that the West was "still strong" and he reaffirmed that a war would be a disaster for "all mankind." While giving more attention than usual to the possibility of Western initiation of world war and stating that bloc defenses must be perfected, he went on to imply that the West would probably continue to be deterred from such a venture. He again expressed confidence in a Communist victory in "peaceful competition."

Khrushchev reaffirmed "peaceful coexistence" as the "immutable basis" of Soviet foreign policy, and he reiterated the desirability of negotiations with the West. However, he did not, as in 1959, speak of mutual concessions in such negotiations but instead specified that coexistence did not entail concessions on "vital, important questions." He reaffirmed that the USSR would continue to "support" (by unspecified means) anti-colonial forces and newly-independent states. He reiterated that the latter, although often containing strong anti-Communist elements, were making a "valuable contribution" to bloc aims and continued to qualify for bloc aid. He reaffirmed that Communists in Western countries should work with non-Communist forces for limited objectives. He repeated that revolutionary forces everywhere in the non-Communist world could expect the "might" of the bloc to be used against Western attempts to suppress uprisings, thus leaving himself an opening to support Communist or pro-Communist forces in the newly-independent states.
In his speech of summation on 27 October, Khrushchev went out of his way to reject charges the Chinese were known to have made against his interpretation of "peaceful coexistence." He noted that "some...accuse us of simplifying or softening our assessment of the international atmosphere when we emphasize the need for peaceful coexistence in present conditions," and he went on to assert that only "hopeless dogmatists" of the Molotov /Chinese/ type contested his interpretation. Finally, the congress resolution of 31 October approved Khrushchev's 17 October report, both in general and with respect to his specific propositions on world Communist strategy.

Khrushchev and many other speakers attacked the "anti-party group," particularly Molotov, for holding positions on world Communist strategy known to be held by the Chinese or attributed by Moscow to the Chinese; and the speakers denounced the anti-party group in part in terms previously applied to the Chinese. Molotov, treated as the principal figure of the group and its ideologist on strategy, was described as a false Marxist, a hopeless dogmatist who had contributed only confusion in important questions of war and peace, domestic policies, and intrabloc relations. He was charged with the (Chinese) offenses of incorrectly assessing the balance of power, of believing war to be inevitable ("obtuse, factional obstinacy," a "putrid anti-Leninist line"), of equating "peaceful coexistence" with "cold war" (so does Khrushchev, but he does not envisage the same degree of tension), of favoring a reduction of economic and cultural contacts with the West and of

*At one point in this speech, Khrushchev seemed to be deriding the Chinese claim to be the leader of the militant forces in the world Communist movement. In discussing changes in the balance of power, Khrushchev observed that a tiger (the West) does not attack an elephant (the bloc) because the tiger knows that the elephant is stronger. He went on to note that Asian-African dignitaries "go tiger-hunting on elephants...because they know that this form of tiger-hunting is not dangerous." This passage may be read as a simple extension of the former passage, but may also be read—and probably was read in Peiping—as implying that the Chinese are able to adopt a fierce attitude toward the West only because the might of the USSR protects all Communist states from the "tiger." The Chinese are indeed vulnerable to the charge of being brave for other people—inciting the USSR and revolutionary movements everywhere without regard to consequences—while following a cautious policy themselves.
opposing meetings between bloc and Western leaders, and of not believing in the force of the Soviet example. He was said to have submitted a "dogmatic" article (rejected) on Lenin during the Lenin anniversary of April 1960 (the time when the Chinese made their comprehensive attack on Soviet strategy in a series of articles and speeches.) He was said also to have written a letter to the CPSIA central committee in October 1961 declaring the Soviet party's draft program as "anti-revolutionary," a program manifesting "pacifism and revisionism"; there is an unconfirmed report that the Chinese had made a similar criticism of the program (on which they did not comment publicly), just prior to Molotov's. One speaker (Kuusinen) went so far as to charge Molotov with attempting to conspire with the Chinese (not named): Molotov, he said, had been preparing a "sectarian platform," trying to "catch fish..., if not in domestic reservoirs, then perhaps in some foreign waters" (animation in the hall, laughter).

Chou En-lai in his 19 October speech did not take up questions of strategy systematically, and was content with implying rather than stating emphatically the Chinese dissent from some of them. The central implication throughout Chou's speech was that the Soviet party strategy was insufficiently militant, particularly in its policies toward the United States and with respect to support of revolutionary struggles. In this connection, in discussing areas of the non-Communist world in which things had been going well, Chou specified only countries in which anti-government forces had employed violence (Cuba, Laos, South Vietnam, South Korea, Algeria, the Congo, Angola, the Cameroons, Japan, and Brazil).

As for the specific foreign policies of the USSR which had given Peiping concern, the pronouncements of the 22nd Congress were hardly calculated to reassure the Chinese. Khrushchev described the "struggle" for complete disarmament as the USSR's "most important" foreign policy. He also said that the West showed some disposition to seek a solution on Germany, and he withdrew his deadline of the end of 1961 for a German treaty. He spoke of further cooperation with India, one of the "great powers of Asia" (he named Indonesia as the other). He ascribed "great significance" to relations with the Western powers, especially the United States, called for "normalizing" relations as the best way to avoid general war, and invoked Lenin in support of personal diplomacy. Further, while describing the Yugoslav Communists as "revisionist" and
"anti-Leninist" in his 17 October report, in his report the following day he spoke of the desire to develop and strengthen relations with Yugoslavia "along state lines" and said that in the struggle for peace "our position coincides with that of Yugoslavia in many ways." Similarly, Gromyko in his 25 October speech on foreign policy gave great praise to Khrushchev's personal diplomacy, spoke of the great importance of the Kennedy-Khrushchev meeting, stated that the Soviet party would "spare no effort in trying to find a common language with the Western powers" on a German settlement, and spoke of the great prospects for peace if the "two giants" (the USSR and the U.S.) were to join their efforts.

In discussing foreign policies in his 19 October speech, Chou En-lai had much praise for the general course of Soviet policy but spoke sharply about conciliatory gestures toward the United States. He reminded Khrushchev that the United States was the "most vicious enemy of peace," the "public enemy" of the world, and that (Mao's line) the Kennedy administration was even "more deceptive and adventurous" than its predecessor. Chou linked American imperialism and Yugoslav revisionism as the forces attempting to disrupt the unity of the world movement. He did not mention India among the non-Communist nations with which China had "friendly relations." Chou did not refer to the withdrawal of the 1961 deadline for a German treaty, but Chinese anxiety about this had been expressed in summer 1961 and the Chinese attitude was probably reflected in Hoxha's 7 November speech in which he accused Moscow of cowardice in delaying a Berlin settlement.

C. Chinese Programs Criticized, Soviet Aid Brandished

Khrushchev in his reports of 17 and 18 October also reaffirmed Soviet propositions on the building of socialism and Communism in individual countries and in the bloc as a whole. In his first report, he pointed to the Soviet model for "forms and methods of leadership" of the national economy, for the "maximum, rational employment" of resources, for the observance of "scientifically-based" balance between sectors of the economy. At another point, aiming at the rationale of the principal Chinese programs of recent years and at some of the claims for them which had been modified but not withdrawn, he observed that the principles of Communism must be implemented gradually, because "subjective desire alone is a small matter—it is necessary to proceed from objective
conditions and to take into consideration the laws of social development." Thus the transition to Communism could not occur in the absence of the conditions (absent in China) of a strong "material-technical base," a high level of education, and exhaustion of the possibilities of the socialist stage of development. Further, the party would continue to rely on the principle of material incentive, "Lenin's principle." Continuing to deride the Chinese, Khrushchev noted that "it is possible...to outline the loftiest rates of economic development," but if the workers were not both educated and materially interested the plans would fail. Any effort to "jump a stage," he said, "means to undo the cause of socialist and Communist construction." In his 18 October report on the draft program, a program presented as showing "what Communism is," he discussed these points in greater detail; and, in citing the "contributions" made by other bloc states to collective experience in building socialism, he failed to include any specifically Chinese contributions and by implication criticized programs regarded by the Chinese as contributions.

Khrushchev in his 17 October report observed that it was "becoming increasingly necessary to use wisely and most efficiently the advantages...of socialism as a world system, the international socialist division of labor, specialization and cooperation in production, coordination of national economic plans, and the possibilities of a world socialist market. He enlarged on this thesis in the 18 October report.

Khrushchev and other Soviet speakers discussed at several points the importance of Soviet aid to other members of the bloc. Kozlov observed that the Albanians /and Chinese/ had forgotten what bloc aid and support had meant to them.

Chou En-lai in his 19 October speech praised the prospects for Soviet society set forth in the draft program as a "powerful inspiration to all peoples," and he made only a minimal defense of Chinese principles and programs (which he personally had indicated reservations about). He noted briefly that the Chinese continued to hold high the three "red banners" of the general line, the leap forward, and the commune program. He conceded that in "struggling" to build a modern economy there would be "no lack of difficulties," and in this connection he reiterated the official contention that bad weather (rather than mismanagement) was primarily responsible for the troubles in agriculture. At one
point he spoke of Chinese gratitude for Soviet aid (the importance of which he personally had often emphasized), but at another point he offered Peiping's official view that the Chinese could attain their goals by the "industrious work of our own hands."

During the congress, Khrushchev reportedly ridiculed Chinese domestic programs in private meetings with other delegations, including several of those from parties which on balance were supporters of Peiping. Some members of these delegations reportedly protested Khrushchev's action as improper in the absence of the Chinese.

D. Soviet Authority in the Movement Reasserted

Khrushchev in his 17 October report asserted that the Soviet party had been seeking and continued to seek means of resolving the differences with the Albanian party. After asserting that the Soviet party "cannot yield" in the dispute "to the Albanian leaders or to anyone else," Khrushchev concluded his attack on the Albanian leaders—an attack which at this point in the congress was still restrained—with a call for them to "abandon their mistaken views and return to the path of unity and close cooperation" with the bloc and the "entire international Communist movement."

The Soviet speakers in the next two days did not discuss Moscow's grievances against Albania; Khrushchev was presumably waiting to see what line Chou En-lai would take (there was no Albanian delegation). In a 19 October speech in which, as noted above, he lightly reaffirmed Chinese positions on matters in dispute with the Soviet party but strongly suggested that the Chinese had not come to Moscow seeking or expecting a public fight, Chou expressed the Chinese party's displeasure that Khrushchev had brought the Soviet-Albanian struggle to this new stage. Specifying that the Chinese conception of the socialist camp included Albania, Chou said:

We hold that if a dispute or difference unfortunately arises between fraternal parties or fraternal countries, it should be resolved patiently in a spirit of proletarian internationalism and on the principles of
equality and unanimity through consultations. And public, onesided censure of any fraternal party does not help unity and is not helpful in resolving problems. To lay bare a dispute between fraternal parties or fraternal countries in the face of the enemy cannot be regarded as a serious Marxist-Leninist attitude...

Chou pointed out that the enemy--U. S. imperialism and the Yugoslav revisionists--was attempting "by every means" to disrupt the unity of the Communists and their friends; as Khrushchev had said about Yugoslav revisionism, the Soviet attack on Albania was playing into the enemy's hands.

In his formula on "equality and unanimity through consultations", Chou was reaffirming the positions the Chinese had taken in the lengthy discussions of authority and discipline at the Moscow conference a year earlier--that the parties did not stand in a father-son relationship, that no party could impose its opinions on another party, that the movement could not operate by majority rule, and that consequently unity could be achieved only by prolonging consultations until an agreement was reached in bilateral talks or, failing this, until unanimity was achieved in multi-party meetings. These positions, if accepted, would permit any party to persist indefinitely in opposition to the Soviet party, and would give any party a veto power in the world Communist conferences.*

*In subsequent private meetings with other delegates, Peng Chen is credibly reported to have defended Albanian behavior in much these terms. He reportedly said the Soviet approach to the Albanians in bilateral talks was that of master to servant and had included threats, that the Albanians had been right in refusing to give in to this, that the Chinese hoped that other parties would take note of the Albanian example, that Peiping wanted no party to dominate another, and that the Albanians should be given a chance to plead their own case at the congress. Both Chou and Peng were attacking Khrushchev at a vulnerable point--dictation to other parties.
Each of the four important speakers who followed Chou on 19 October added to Khrushchev's charges against the Albanians (and Chinese), thus making clear that Khrushchev had arranged for a sustained assault even prior to the publication of the incendiary Albanian central committee statement of 20 October; and each accused the Albanians of flouting established authority. Gomulka made explicit the charge that the Albanian leaders (all except one of the speakers during the congress confined the attack to the leaders) had forsaken proletarian internationalism; Thorez specified that the Albanian course was "sectarian and adventurous"; Brezhnev emphasized the point that the Soviet party had "done everything" possible to restore the relationship; and Voronov observed that the proceedings of the congress would serve as a "serious new warning to all sorts of apostates from Marxism"—both "revisionists"/Yugoslavs/ and "dogmatists"/Chinese/.

In its central committee statement of 20 October, the Albanian party, again concentrating its attack on Khrushchev personally, presented the dispute as one between Khrushchev and his "group" and the Albanian party as a whole plus other Soviet leaders. The statement denounced Khrushchev personally for violating the provisions of the November 1960 Moscow conference (in airing the dispute after bilateral talks had failed, rather than submitting it to another world Communist conference). The statement asserted that the Albanian party had tried to resolve the dispute by the agreed procedure, and it noted that the party had "sympathetically received" Chou En-lai's 19 October speech. However, the Albanian statement went on, even after Chou's "principled statement," the "attacks and slanders" had continued. It was the Albanian intention, the statement said, to make known to the world the "whole truth," which would "unmask" Khrushchev and "his group." The statement foresaw a long hard struggle, but, it said, "We will win because we are not alone."

In the speeches of the following week—20 October through 26 October, leading up to Khrushchev's call on 27 October for the overthrow of the Albanian leadership—each of the charges made against the Albanians in the first three days of the congress was reiterated by several speakers.*

*The general propositions in the complete case were that the Albanian leaders had forsaken Marxism–Leninism and proletarian internationalism and were instead exhibiting dogmatism, sectarianism, nationalism, adventurism and depravity.

(Continued at bottom of next page)
Also, several speakers echoed Khrushchev's 17 October positions that the Soviet party and world movement could not yield on the matters of principle in dispute with Albania (and China), and echoed too his call for Albania to return to the path of "unity." Several also replied to Chou En-lai's 19 October speech, contending that the Soviet party had done everything possible, that it was Albanian and not Soviet actions which were delighting the imperialists, and that the dispute could not be concealed even if this were "not to the liking of some." Several speakers also warned of the possible expulsion of Albania and perhaps even China (not named) from the bloc. It was not said that Albania was already regarded as outside the bloc; it was said, for example, that Albania was becoming isolated, that Albanian policy could lead to a breaking away from the camp and to its isolation in the movement, and that both revisionism /Yugoslaviant/ and dogmatism /Chinese as well as Albanian/ could lead countries out of the camp.

The Chinese were of course aware that these attacks were directed at them too. There is a credible report that

(Cont'd) The specific charges were that the Albanian leaders had come to disapprove the proceedings of the 20th CPSU congress in 1956 (which had attacked Stalin and laid down the theses of the non-inevitability of war, the need for peaceful coexistence, and the increasing possibilities for peaceful accession to power by Communist parties); that they had attacked the line of that congress and continued to practice the "personality cult;" that they had violated the decisions of the November 1957 and November 1960 Moscow conferences of the parties and of the Warsaw Pact countries (only Ulbricht made the latter charge); that in doing these things they had shamelessly presented themselves as the only true Marxists; that they had hypocritically professed friendship with the USSR while slandering the Soviet party and refusing to publish (in full) its draft program, mistreating and expelling Soviet personnel, and stopping Soviet publications; and that they had practiced terrorism in Albania, inter alia repressing and arresting friends of the USSR. All of these offenses against truth, unity, and justice, the charges declared, were harming the cause of socialist construction in Albania and were harming the world Communist cause, especially since they were being exploited by the imperialist enemy.
Peng Chen in this period, briefing another party's delegation, said that the attacks on Albania were the "same thing" as attacks on China and that the Chinese party could withstand all of the pressures that the Soviet party--Khrushchev in particular--wanted to apply.

On 27 October Khrushchev brought the dispute with Albania (and China) to another new stage by calling clearly for the overthrow of the Albanian leadership. (He had made clear in his heated exchanges with the Chinese during 1960 that he would also like to see the overthrow of Mao Tse-tung and his most influential lieutenants, but he had never stated or even implied this publicly.) In this speech, Khrushchev reviewed the deterioration in the Soviet-Albanian relationship, gave some detail in support of his contention that the Soviet party had done "everything in its power" to restore a good relationship, referred bitterly to attacks on the Soviet party from both "overt and concealed enemies of Communism," insisted that the Soviet party had to tell the "whole truth" about the Albanian leadership in order not to appear cowardly (another warning to the Chinese) and then addressed a sarcastic paragraph to the "anxiety" expressed by Chou En-lai about airing the dispute. (Chou had left the congress on 23 October, reportedly having tried and failed to secure a Soviet invitation to the Albanian party to send a delegation to the congress to state the Albanian case; Chou did not return.) Khrushchev said:

We share the anxiety of our Chinese friends for the cohesion of the bloc and appreciate their concern for the strengthening of unity. If the Chinese comrades wish to apply their efforts to normalizing relations between the Albanian party and the fraternal parties, there is hardly anyone who could make a better contribution to the solution of this problem than the Chinese comrades.*

*Kozlov on 28 October directly contradicted Chou, stating that the airing of the dispute was precisely the "correct, serious Marxist-Leninist approach."
Khrushchev went on in this speech to reiterate his denunciation of the Albanian leaders for various offenses earlier ascribed to the Chinese privately: for proclaiming a "special position," for being unreconstructed Stalinists, for manifesting Stalinism in its "worst form," for purging party leaders who had adhered to Khrushchev's (instead of Chinese) positions, and so on. He then made meaningless his invitation to the Chinese to intercede with Albania. He said:

...to put an end to the cult of personality for Shehu, Hoxha, and others would mean in essence to renounce their commanding posts in the party and state, and this they do not intend to do. But we are confident that a time will come when the Albanian Communists and the Albanian people will have their say, and then the Albanian leaders will have to answer...

The resolution adopted by the congress on 31 October returned to the more moderate position of Khrushchev's 17 October report, namely that Albanian leaders must abandon their erroneous views and return to the path of unity, rather than that they should be overthrown. But Khrushchev had made his point: he would not be content with anything less than the heads of those who had defied and denounced him.

Following Khrushchev's speech of 17 October and Chou's speech of 19 October, the 78 other Communist party delegations to the congress had been in effect invited to line up with one or the other. By the end of the 26 October session, the last day of speeches by foreign delegates, 65 of them had spoken. Of these, 44 delegations had echoed various portions of the Soviet charges against the Albanian leadership, while none, apart from the Chinese and the absent Albanians, had criticized the USSR for attacking the Albanian leaders. However, 21 of them had failed to second the Soviet attacks; of bloc parties, North Korea and North Vietnam; of parties of Asian non-bloc states, Indonesia, India, Japan, Burma, and Malaya (in other words, all of those that spoke except Ceylon); of Commonwealth parties, Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and Canada; of Scandinavian parties, Norway,
Denmark, Sweden and Iceland; of Western European parties, Belgium and Switzerland; of the African parties, Algeria; and of Latin American parties, Martinique, Guadeloupe, and the Dominican Republic.

This tally was to a degree misleading, as 12 of the last 14 parties named above (not Iceland and Switzerland) had supported the Soviet position—either strongly or on balance—at the Moscow conference of parties a year before, and most of them would be expected to line up with Moscow again if the matter were put to a vote (at an international Communist conference, say in the form of a statement censuring the Albanian leaders); most of them did in fact indicate their support of the Soviet party in subsequent statements. Moreover, there were several delegations from very pro-Soviet parties among the 13 delegations which did not speak. The Soviet camp at the congress probably totalled no fewer than 62 of the 80 parties, as had been the case at the Moscow conference.

The Chinese camp did not clearly consist of anyone other than China, in that a mere abstention from criticism of Albania did not make the abstainer necessarily a Chinese supporter. Nevertheless, among the abstainers, if those who had reportedly supported the Chinese on questions of authority and discipline at the Moscow conference in 1960 could be regarded as Chinese supporters again, who would line up with the Chinese if the matter were put to a vote, the Chinese camp would total at least seven to nine parties; those of China, Albania (absent), North Korea, North Vietnam, Indonesia, Burma, and Malaya, among those who spoke, and probably Thailand and Laos, among those who did not speak. Also among the abstainers were the delegations of at least four parties known to be split—India, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan; and some of the parties which seconded the Soviet attack were believed to be split (Ceylon, Chile, Peru, Panama, Venezuela), as well as some of those which did not speak (Paraguay, San Marino).*

Although numerically the Chinese camp was a small minority, it was clearly a significant minority. It included four of the 12 bloc parties, and of the non-bloc parties it

*Subsequent pronouncements by several of these parties made clear that most of the Asian parties were indeed Chinese supporters, and suggested that some others (even in Western Europe) had pro-Chinese factions.
included or threatened to include virtually all of the Asian parties, thus presenting again to Moscow the threat of an eventual Asian bloc dominated by and responsive to Peiping.

Just as the Soviet party had not called for a vote at the Moscow conference a year earlier—a vote which would have formalized and made public the split in the movement—so the 22nd Congress was not followed by a conference of the parties at which the Soviet-Albanian issue could have been submitted to a vote. There were reports that the Chinese during the congress had pressed for a conference, and that the Soviets had blocked this or that negotiations had foundered on the issue of Albanian representation: the latter may be true, because, as noted earlier, Khrushchev had reportedly rejected a Chinese request during the congress for an Albanian delegation to attend the congress itself. Subsequently, Soviet and friendly commentators presented the 22nd Congress as having been in effect an international Communist conference, so that no new conference was necessary.
III. TO THE BREAK WITH ALBANIA (November 1961)

In the five weeks between the close of the 22nd CPSU Congress (31 October) and the break in Soviet-Albanian diplomatic relations (taken as 3 December) events moved rapidly along the lines foreshadowed by the congress. These developments are discussed below in terms of Soviet-Albanian polemics and related actions, Peiping's support of Albania, and Soviet warnings to China itself.

A. Soviet-Albanian Polemics

The Albanian party came out fighting with a 1 November editorial describing Khrushchev as a liar, slanderer, bully, and anti-Marxist intriguer, and noting that Chou En-lai had "openly opposed" Khrushchev's action at the congress. Peiping's People's Daily reprinted this, as it had the Albanian statement on 20 October, Khrushchev's 27 October summary speech, the 28 October resolution on removing Stalin's body from the mausoleum, and an Albanian editorial of the same date on the Marxist-Leninist basis of Albanian foreign policy. In such material, Peiping for the first time printed attacks on Khrushchev by other party leaders.

There were sharp Soviet-Albanian exchanges in Peiping itself during the celebrations of the Soviets' October revolution anniversary (7 November) and the Albanian party anniversary (8 November). Soviet Ambassador Chervonenko, speaking at a rally, denounced the Albanian party for persisting in Stalinism and for trying to split the world movement; the Albanians reportedly walked out. On 8 November, the Albanian ambassador, at another rally, insisted on the Albanian party's fidelity to Marxism-Leninism and to the 1957 and 1960 declarations of the parties, cited Albanian efforts to strengthen the unity of the movement, and argued that it was those who were attempting to eject the Albanian party from the world movement--for disagreeing with the decisions of a Soviet party congress--who were the real splitters of the movement.

The most important of the speeches on these occasions was made by Hoxha in Tirana, addressing himself on 7 November to both anniversaries and to questions of strategy, authority and discipline, and state relations. Identifying his enemies as imperialism, Tito, and Khrushchev, Hoxha accused Khrushchev...
personally of slander, blackmail, and "blockade," and he contrasted this with Stalin's role as friend and protector of Albania. Hoxha insisted that Stalin's merits had outweighed his weaknesses (precisely the Chinese position); he charged (correctly) that Khrushchev was using the issue of Stalinism to bring down people he disliked; and he said that Khrushchev himself was flagrantly guilty of building a "cult of personality" (his own).

As for questions of strategy, Hoxha rejected the Soviet party's positions with terms and arguments used by the Chinese party in attacking Soviet positions (often distorting them in order to do so). Hoxha observed that it was the revisionist practice to cite new conditions in order to justify an "opportunist" point of view and to describe any opposition as "dogmatic, sectarian, or adventurist"; indeed, he said, Khrushchev, on the pretext of combatting dogmatism, was corrupting Marxism-Leninism and departing from fundamental principles (precisely the Chinese charge). The Soviet presentation of the balance of power, he said, encouraged "reformist and pacifist" illusions and weakened the struggle against imperialism. He criticized the "incorrect" and "harmful" view that imperialism was deterred from wars, and said that in trying to avert wars one should emphasize the power of the bloc and the struggle of peoples, not the "good intentions" of the West. It was not Albania which was afraid of imperialism, he went on, but those (Khrushchev) who had delayed a German settlement.* He also criticized Khrushchev personally for trying to make "peaceful coexistence" the general line of bloc foreign policy, for overemphasizing the possibility of peaceful accession to power by Communist parties, and for conciliating Yugoslavia.

*The Soviet party on 30 January 1962 answered this charge. A commentator argued that the issue was not "fear" or absence of it, but the need to find a solution; he described the Albanian attitude as "adventurism."
As for questions of authority and discipline, Hoxha again made the charges against Khrushchev that the Chinese had made or were prepared to make. It was true, Hoxha said, that the Albanian party dissented from the decisions of the 20th CPSU congress (as outlined above), but it was free to do so, because decisions of one party could not be binding on other parties (the Chinese position). In attacking the Albanian party publicly, he went on, Khrushchev was violating the principles of the December 1960 declaration (which had called for international conferences if bilateral talks had failed). Because Khrushchev had failed (as he had) at the Bucharest conference of June 1960 and again at the Moscow conference of November 1960 in massing the parties solidly (against the Chinese and Albanians), he was "afraid" of another conference and had used his party congress to sabotage such a conference.

Hoxha also reviewed the steps Khrushchev had taken in state-to-state relations: i.e. the withdrawal of credits and specialists, the demand for early repayment of old credits (thus greatly reducing trade), the rescission of scholarships of Albanian students in the USSR, the adoption of unspecified military measures, and the slander of Albania in the press. Hoxha stated the other Eastern Europe states had cooperated in this effort to isolate Albania politically, economically, and militarily. Finally, Hoxha said (correctly), Khrushchev had gone so far as to call openly for the overthrow of the Albanian leadership.

Hoxha concluded with an expression of confidence that Khrushchev would fail. He had claimed earlier in the speech to have friends who "had not left and will not leave us in the lurch," and he specified these at the end as the Soviet and Chinese "people" and other friendly peoples.

Shortly thereafter, the Albanian embassy in Moscow began to circulate to other missions—including those of countries with which Albania did not have diplomatic relations—a packet of Albanian statements on the dispute. Two of the items were the central committee statement of 20 October and Hoxha's 7 November speech. According to credible Soviet charges, the Albanians also sent such material to the central committees of the Soviet party organizations in the republics (presumably as part of their effort to bring Khrushchev down), and they also were intensifying their use of Albanian students in the USSR to conduct "anti-Soviet propaganda."
Hoxha in his 7 November speech said virtually everything there was to say, from the Sino-Albanian point of view, and other Albanian pronouncements, between 7 November and the receipt of the Soviet note of 3 December breaking off diplomatic relations with Albania, added almost nothing. One point made in Hoxha's speech, that Khrushchev was a "horned devil" for encouraging Greece in its quarrel with Albania, was expanded by another spokesman on 25 November, who asserted that Khrushchev was encouraging the "imperialist wolves" to attack Albania. This same spokesman pointed to the Chinese party as the "shining example for Communists of the whole world...," with which party the Albanians would march together through "any storm or tempest."

On 21 November Pravda asserted that the "international Communist movement" (i.e., a majority of the parties) had "decisively condemned" the Albanian leaders, but that the latter had not only failed to heed this criticism but had actually "deepened their errors," slandering the Soviet party and others and attempting to conceal their splitting activities. On 25 November a Soviet deputy foreign minister summoned the Albanian chargé in Moscow and made two statements to him. One of these noted that the work of the Soviet ambassador and other Soviet diplomats in Tirana had been obstructed, that the embassy itself was "isolated," that the Albanians had demanded a reduction of the embassy staff by almost two-thirds, and that in consequence the USSR would recall its ambassador (who had actually been back in Moscow since mid-August). The other statement protested the actions of the Albanian embassy in Moscow in circulating the anti-Soviet material noted above and in using Albanian students for such purposes, and it demanded the recall of the Albanian ambassador.

On 27 November Pravda reiterated a number of the Soviet charges (summed up as "deceit, fraud, adventurism and crude violation of the principles of proletarian internationalism"), as did Izvestiya on 29 November. The Soviet press reversed its previous treatment of Yugoslav and Albanian National Days—both on 29 November—by commenting in a friendly manner on Yugoslavia and in an unfriendly way on Albania.

On 2 December (one day before the date of the Soviet note closing the Soviet embassy in Tirana), Pravda replied to Hoxha's 7 November speech. Evidently stung by Hoxha's charge that Khrushchev had built his own "personality cult," Pravda
defended the "historic service...of Comrade Khrushchev personally" in restoring Leninist methods and spirit in the Soviet party and in intrabloc relations. It reiterated that the "anti-party group" in the CPSU and the Albanian leaders alike wished to take a regressive course. Foreshadowing the break, the article treated Albania as having already "isolated" itself and as already having cut itself off from the Warsaw Pact and CEMA.

Taking up Hoxha's claim to be free to dissent from decisions of the 20th CPSU Soviet party congress, Pravda contended that "all" the parties had approved the results of that 1956 congress. (This was not quite true; although both the Chinese and Albanians had approved Khrushchev's report at that congress, the Chinese and others had soon criticized the handling of de-Stalinization and the Chinese even then had not approved one of the principal theses on strategy.) As for the charge of violation of the agreement on holding multiparty conferences to resolve disputes, Pravda evaded this by arguing that it had been necessary to make a public attack in the face of Albanian efforts to "undermine the unity of the socialist commonwealth." Pravda reiterated that the Albanian party had persistently rejected Soviet efforts to resolve the dispute, and it cited the Albanian editorial of 5 October which had gone so far as to state that Albanian relations with the USSR would henceforth be governed by the "principles of peaceful coexistence"—i.e., principles governing relations between states with "different social systems." Pravda went on to criticize Albanian behavior since the congress, in particular Hoxha's 7 November speech, full of "abuse" and containing the unprecedentedly "foul slander" that the USSR and Yugoslavia had conspired to provoke the uprising in Hungary in 1956. The Pravda article concluded with an expression of confidence that the bloc (presumably with a new Albanian leadership) would again emerge from its trials "even more monolithic."

B. Chinese Support of Albania

The Chinese party had begun to defend the Albanian party indirectly even during the 22nd congress, by printing Albanian statements (along with some of the attacks on the Albanian party) and through declarations by low-level spokesmen of solidarity with Albania. Through the first week after the congress, Chinese comment was cautious, noting simply that Albania was still a member of the "socialist camp" as the Chinese defined it, and emphasizing the need for "unity" in the camp and between the USSR and China.

- 30 -

SECRET
In comment on the Soviet and Albanian anniversaries on 7 and 8 November, Peiping moved into a new stage—of asserting just those things about the Albanian party which Khrushchev and other Soviet spokesmen had denied. After a warm-up editorial praising Stalin, People's Daily praised the 20-year record of the Albanian party, asserted that it has provided "correct leadership," described Hoxha as the "long-tested leader of the Albanian people," noted the fidelity of the Albanian party to Marxism-Leninism and the closeness of the party to the masses, specified that it had adhered to the November 1957 and December 1960 declarations of the parties, and stated that it had "resolutely safeguarded" friendship with the Soviet people and the "unity" of the world movement. China and Albania were said to be "linked in their hearts," and, in the same phrase used on other occasions to describe Sino-Soviet unity, it was said that Sino-Albanian unity could not be shaken by any force on earth. Many of these points were also made at a rally, and they were again in the Chinese party message to the Albanian party on the anniversary.*

The Chinese party rested for three weeks before making another important statement on Albania, content to print from time to time statements of other bloc leaders and free world Communist parties along with Albanian statements, giving the latter more space and highlighting them. On 17 November, an Albanian mission arrived in Peiping to discuss trade and economic relations in 1962; on the same day, People's Daily published the full text of Hoxha's 7 November speech. There was an unconfirmed report in this period that large portraits of Stalin were appearing again in Peiping, and that instructions had been issued for study of Stalin's works.

On 27-28 November, at rallies celebrating the anniversary of Albania's "liberation," Chinese spokesmen again praised

*Ten Communist parties in addition to the CCP sent messages to the Albanian party on this occasion: the parties of Australia, New Zealand, Belgium, and San Marino; and of North Korea, North Vietnam, Indonesia, Burma, Malaya, and Thailand. The Australian, Belgian, and San Marino parties later criticized the Albanian leaders, but the others all gave fresh indications of being in the Chinese camp in the dispute.
Albania's "loyalty" to Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, its adherence to multiparty declarations, its efforts to preserve the unity of the camp and the movement, and its contributions to "preserving the purity of Marxism-Leninism." At the same time, People's Daily assailed the Yugoslavs as "renegades" engaged in "treacherous dealings" and scheming to subvert and annex Albania—with the clear implication that Yugoslav support of Khrushchev's policy toward Albania in itself discredited that policy. The article observed also that the "modern revisionists" (not just Yugoslavia) were opposed by the great majority of peoples—reflecting the Albanian line on Khrushchev's lack of support.

Also on 28 November, Tao Chu, first secretary of the CCP's Central-South Bureau, who had been a delegate to the CPSU 22nd Congress in October, reportedly addressed a party-government meeting in Kwangtung on the subject of intrabloc relations. Tao is said to have forecast the Soviet-Albanian diplomatic break; to have charged that the USSR was trying to persuade the Yugoslavs to overthrow the Albanian leaders; to have said that Chou En-lai left the congress early after having tried and failed to moderate Khrushchev's attitude toward Albania; to have asserted that China would give large-scale economic support to Albania, and would respond openly to open Soviet attacks on China; to have said further that Peiping did not need any further Soviet economic "aid,"* and did not fear that the USSR would attack China militarily; and, in the first explicit assertion of a Chinese belief that there are significant anti-Khrushchev forces in the Soviet party, to have said that the conduct of other Soviet leaders at the congress (and other unspecified evidence) led to the conclusion that Khrushchev would eventually be overthrown.**

*However, Tao is also reported to have exhorted Hong Kong observers at this meeting to try to persuade their friends with technical and scientific training to return to Communist China, as otherwise it might be necessary to seek the return of Soviet technicians.

**The Chinese reportedly tried and failed to split other Soviet leaders from Khrushchev in talks before and during the Moscow conference of November 1960. Since then there have been some slight indications—notes in an FBID/RPB internal memo—of a Chinese hope that Kozlov can be split off.
On 29 November, Mao and other Chinese leaders, in a message on the Albanian anniversary, hailed the "glorious" Albanian party, described the Tirana regime as "worthy members of the great socialist family," and spoke of the Chinese and Albanians as "close brothers" struggling together against imperialism and "contemporary revisionism." On the same day, a Chinese speaker at a rally stated that the Albanians "are not isolated"—in direct contradiction to Soviet assertions. Mrs. Hoxha, at a rally in Tirana, said that Albania would show Khrushchev that Albania could live without Soviet aid; and Shehu boasted that Albania's friends had "guaranteed" all the foreign aid it would need.* There is a credible report that the Soviet chargé walked out of the Albanian National Day reception, followed by all the bloc delegations except the Chinese, North Koreans, and North Vietnamese.

Peiping chose the 1 December anniversary of the signing of the 81-party declaration in 1960 for its most important pronouncement since the congress—a "Chinese version" of the 1960 statement. As Soviet and Albanian editorials were soon to do, the People's Daily editorial again set out the essentials of the Chinese position on matters both of strategy and of authority and discipline. (The Chinese pronouncements on strategy can be outlined later, together with the Soviet and Albanian statement, but the Chinese statements on authority and discipline should be noted at this point.) Peiping certainly knew about the Soviet note of 25 November announcing the recall of the Soviet ambassador and demanding the recall of the Albanian ambassador, and Peiping's 1 December editorial was clearly designed to put the Chinese a record before the anticipated break in Soviet-Albanian relations, which came two days later.

Dealing with the Soviet attack on the Albanian party by first pointing out that it was the Yugoslavs (not the Albanians) who had been condemned by the 81 parties in 1960 for "betraying Marxism-Leninism," the editorial insisted that "revisionism remains the main danger," and it noted that the Yugoslavs were not the only revisionists. It stated that the

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*A large group of Albanian students (more than 100) reportedly left for Peiping at about this time to take up studies there.
1960 declaration had put "special emphasis" on the importance of unity and that it was the "supreme international duty" of every party to work for this. Reiterating that each party is "independent" and "equal" (so that none can impose its will on another), it asserted that reaching unanimity through "consultation" was the best method of resolving disputes and that the 1957 and 1960 multiparty conferences were the "best example" of this principle. The implication was clear: the Soviet party should have convened such a conference before attacking Albania, and it should call a conference before taking any further action such as ejecting Albania (or China) from the "socialist camp." The editorial concluded that "we must protect the unity of the socialist camp comprising 12 fraternal countries" i.e. including Albania.

C. Soviet Warnings to China

The developments in Soviet-Albanian relations between mid-October and 3 December were meant, of course, to convince the Chinese that the Soviet party was willing to take extreme measures against the Chinese as well as the Albanians; indeed, Soviet speakers at the congress had stated that the congress should serve as a serious "warning" to others who opposed Soviet positions. In taking these measures against the Albanians, the Soviet party set out a pattern of action which, it implied, it would follow with Peiping (perhaps in different order): the withdrawal from communication with the offending party (which was came before the 22nd congress); then the naming of names (Khrushchev's 17 October speech); then the detailed charges, with the warnings that persistence in misbehavior could lead to exclusion from the Soviet camp (the subsequent speeches, and pronouncements following the congress); then the break in diplomatic relations (3 December); and then—a process not not completed in this period—the severing of economic and military relationships and the formal exclusion of the offender from the camp.

Without having withdrawn from communications with the Chinese party, the Soviet party and its followers continued the process of naming names—i.e. publicly identifying the Chinese party as taking an unacceptable position—on 16 November. Pravda printed Togliatti's comments of 10 November that "we consider what the Albanian comrades are doing, partially supported by the Chinese comrades, is erroneous and incorrect"; and that the "exception taken by Comrade Chou En-Lai
to Comrade Khrushchev's critical remarks is unacceptable, because in this case public criticism was being exercised only after all these questions had been posed and discussed confidentially, without result."

The Soviet party continued in the next two weeks to encourage its Eastern European friends to criticize the Chinese by name, reprinting this criticism rather than originating criticism itself, on this single issue of supporting the Albanians. In order of appearance, Novotny said publicly that the Chinese "attitude" was wrong; Gomulka, in a lengthy defense of the "leading role" of the Soviet party, said publicly that it was only the Chinese who believed that the dispute should not have been publicized and that "it is difficult to agree with such a view"; Ulbricht said publicly that the Chinese instead should have given attention to the anti-Soviet utterances and violations of the Warsaw Treaty by the Albanian leaders; a Bulgarian central committee resolution said publicly that the Chinese had expressed a "certain support" of the Albanian leaders and that the Chinese should realize the damage that the Albanians and Chinese were doing to the world Communist cause; and Kadar said publicly that only the Chinese had opposed the majority view on policy toward Albania and that "almost everyone" had rejected the Chinese position.

Two pronouncement in Eastern European media, reprinted by Moscow, foreshadowed the logical next step in the application of Soviet pressure on China—identifying the Chinese with specific offenses similar to those committed by the Albanians (charges the Soviet party had long ago made against the Chinese privately). A Polish editorial of 20 November, commenting on Hoxha's 7 November speech, concluded that "These flowers from the Albanian garden show in what manner dogmatism—every form of dogmatism, not only Albanian dogmatism—opposes the principle of peaceful coexistence, and how dangerous and adventurous its practical conclusions are." Zhivkov on 28 November observed that the "complete unmasking" of the Soviet anti-party group was "all the more imperative" because elements of the world Communist movement "were taking under their protection, through the cult of Stalin, the most inveterate members of the anti-party group." Zhivkov went on to contend that there was a relationship between overcoming the "personality cult" and eliminating "subjectivism and administration by mere injunction" in economic planning and direction. These passages suggested that Moscow would, if
necessary, accuse the Chinese leadership directly of practicing the personality cult, of interfering in the Soviet party's internal affairs, and of following dogmatic and foolish policies in Chinese economic development.

One bloc leader may in fact have taken this further step—of publicly charging the Chinese (by name) with specific offenses—in this period. According to the Peiping People's Daily version (30 November) of a November speech by Czech politburo member Siroky, Siroky had said that the Chinese party as well as the Albanian party had practiced the personality cult and indeed had intensified it in recent years. This alleged specification of the Chinese was not included in the available Czech and Slovak editions of the party's paper. However, it is doubtful that the Chinese invented it, so it probably did appear in Siroky's speech as delivered. If so, it was probably deleted from the published version or later editions because—as all other material indicated—the Soviet camp was not yet ready for this advanced stage of the offensive.

Moscow and its friends also kept the Chinese conscious of the still important economic and military bonds with the Soviet camp which the Chinese were jeopardizing by their conduct. Several spokesmen, making a point often made during the 22nd congress, discussed the connection between successes in domestic construction and adherence to proletarian internationalism (supporting Soviet positions); and Pravda on 2 December observed that a "correct internationalist position" was the key to overcoming "difficulties"—such as the notorious Chinese "difficulties"—in building socialism at home, where-as "disregard of the common interest of the socialist commonwealth can result in a situation ruinous to socialism," which was "precisely what occurred" in Albania and could occur in China. Moreover, perhaps with an eye on the Sino-Soviet treaty of alliance, Gomulka contended that one reason the Soviet party deserved the "leading role" was "because the Soviet Union is the main factor in the security of all socialist countries..."
IV. PRESSURE AND RESISTANCE (December 1961)

The month of December 1961 was marked by increasing Soviet pressure on Albania, the return of the Chinese to the polemical tones and direct challenges of 1960, and sharper criticism of the Chinese by the USSR and its friends. These developments can be discussed most conveniently under the headings of Soviet pressure on Albania, Sino-Soviet exchanges on questions of strategy, and Sino-Soviet conflicts on questions of authority and discipline.

A. Soviet Pressure on Albania

On 3 December, a Soviet deputy foreign minister again summoned the Albanian charge in Moscow and again made a statement to him, reiterating and amplifying the charges contained in the two Soviet notes of 25 November, reaffirming that the USSR would recall its (absent) ambassador, adding that Moscow would also recall all other personnel of the embassy and the trade mission, and demanding the recall of all Albanian diplomats and trade representatives.*

The Albanian government protested these Soviet decisions in notes of 4 and 9 December. The first of these rejected Soviet charges and made similar charges against the USSR. The second reviewed at length the history of Soviet-Albanian "friendship," denounced the "anti-Marxist" views and actions of "Nikita Khrushchev and his group" in familiar terms, and enlarged on the earlier defense against Soviet charges and on the Albanian counter-charges. The Albanian party press editorialized at length along the same lines on 10 December; the editorial noted (correctly) that Khrushchev's actions had made clear what he really thought of "equality, independence, and non-interference" as principles governing the relations of Communist states, and it also noted (again correctly) that Khrushchev in so acting was deliberately warning and threatening "any other party which dares to contradict his points of view."

*There had apparently been no party relations—in the sense of communications between the parties—since mid-October, when the Albanian party central committee had sent a message of greeting to the 22nd CPSU Congress.
Moscow broadcast on 10 December a summary of a Kommunist article (by its chief editor) which elaborated some of the Soviet charges against Hoxha, Shehu, "and other AWP leaders." The article pointed to the "disgraceful" speeches of Hoxha and Shehu on 7 November, noted that the imperialists were "prepared to welcome" these leaders into the fold, emphasized the importance to Albania of past Soviet aid, and again urged the Albanian party to correct the mistakes of (i.e. overthrow) its leaders. Another Moscow broadcast (to Albania) on the same day rejected Albanian charges that the USSR at its own initiative had stopped work on the Palace of Culture in Tirana and had withdrawn its technicians (described as "the best engineers, technicians, workers of high qualifications, scientific workers, and builders").

On 12 December Tirana retorted by flourishing the close relationship between the "illustrious Marxist-Leninist leaders, Comrades Mao Tse-tung and Enver Hoxha." The head of the Chinese youth delegation to Albania was quoted at length in praise of Albania's struggle against imperialism and "modern revisionism." On the same day, Czechoslovakia became the first of the Eastern European followers of Moscow to follow the Soviet action in recalling its ambassador from Tirana and demanding the recall of the Albanian ambassador; the embassies remained open, however.

Pravda struck again on 13 December, with an article on the Albanian leaders' "dangerous road." Giving a long list of Albanian offenses which were expressions of the "personality cult," and attacking Albanian (Chinese) positions on questions of strategy and discipline (to be discussed later), the article noted that the Albanian leaders had organized hostile propaganda against the bloc, had "provoked various incidents," and had "attempted to undermine the concerted actions of the socialist states in the Warsaw Treaty Organization, in the Council of Economic Mutual Aid, and in the international arena"—this latter charge laying the ground for possible expulsion of the Albanians from the Warsaw Pact and from CEMA. The article concluded with an expression of confidence—echoing Khrushchev's speech of 27 October—that the "time will come when Albanian Communists and the Albanian people will have their say, and the Albanian leaders will then have to assume responsibility for the harm they have caused to their country, their people, and the cause of building socialism in Albania."
There was a CEMA meeting in Warsaw from 12 to 15 December. After the meeting, Moscow announced that "Albania's representative did not come to this session." Moreover, although observers were identified from Outer Mongolia, North Korea, and North Vietnam, there was no Chinese observer. The session's communique swiped at the Albanians and Chinese by noting that the realization of the Soviet party program would further develop "international socialist division of labor, economic and scientific-technical cooperation, and trade, thereby increasing the might of the entire world system of socialism." The CEMA session took no public action against the Albanians, however, such as declaring Tirana to be no longer a member of CEMA. Similarly, Moscow did not convene any Warsaw Pact meeting to expel Albania. At least for the time being, the Soviet party preferred to take the position—as stated by a Polish spokesman after the CEMA meeting—that Albania, by not participating in such activities, was divorcing itself from the bloc.

On 15 December, Moscow announced the arrival there of a Chinese trade delegation, for talks which were to establish the "nomenclature and quantity" of trade in 1962. As the CEMA communique strongly implied, the results of these Sino-Soviet trade talks would almost certainly reflect Peiping's continued bad behavior.

On 18 December, East Germany followed the Czech lead by withdrawing its ambassador to Tirana and demanding the recall of the Albanian ambassador. Hungary took the same action on 20 December. None of the other four pro-Soviet Eastern European regimes had done so by the end of December, but all of their ambassadors were believed to be absent.

By 22 December, virtually all Soviet diplomatic personnel had left Tirana and all or almost all Albanian diplomatic personnel had left Moscow. On this date, Albanian deputy premier Kellezi arrived in Peiping to join the Albanian economic delegation that been there since mid-November.

On 25 December, Tirana again stood behind the Chinese to thumb its nose at Moscow. The Albanian finance minister stated publicly that it was "hopeless" for Khrushchev and its friends to try to force Albania to its knees, as the Albanian party was supported by the people and "internationally assisted by the Chinese People's Republic." On the following day, Peiping reported that a Sino-Albanian joint-stock shipping company had
been formed; the Albanian party press, commenting on this, hailed the "tremendous aid given us by our Chinese brothers to fulfill the third five-year plan and overcome and offset the imperialist and revisionist blockade..."

On 29 December, Moscow took another step toward declaring Albania to be out of the socialist camp. TASS reported a Paraguayan Communist party communique as having observed that the Albanian party leaders, by departing from the Moscow declaration of 1960, had (in TASS' language) "deliberately placed themselves outside of the world Communist movement" and were indeed "in opposition to it."

The USSR during December did not in fact exert all of the pressure on Albania that it could have exerted. There was still a little Soviet-Albanian trade, and trade continued between Albania and other Eastern European states on a pay-as-you-go basis, apparently in sufficient volume to be important to Albania.

Throughout the month, there were rumors that the USSR was planning to intervene militarily in Albania. Pretexts could easily be found for such intervention, e.g. Albanian violation of the unpublicized agreement governing Soviet use of the Valona naval base before the withdrawal in spring 1961, Albanian seizure of Soviet property (seizure of some vessels at Valona was rumored), or Albanian mistreatment of Soviet citizens in Albania. However, there were no military indicators of early Soviet military action of any kind. Similarly, rumors that the USSR planned to support a Yugoslav attempt to overthrow Hoxha were hotly denied by Belgrade.

At month's end, there were unconfirmed reports of a substantial reduction in the staff of the Chinese embassy in Moscow. It was confirmed that the Chinese embassy had dismissed several of its Soviet employees, presumably as a security measure. It was also reported that most of the possibly 1500 to 2000 Chinese students in the USSR were being withdrawn before the end of their academic year, a report which, if true, might explain the reported reduction in the embassy staff.
B. Polemics on Strategy

The Pravda editorial of 6 December was a comparatively dignified "Soviet version" of the 1960 declaration of the parties, just as the People's Daily editorial of 1 December had been a "Chinese version." Whereas the Chinese editorial had emphasized the possibility of world war and had contended that wars would end only with the end of imperialism, the Soviet editorial emphasized the prospects for deterring the West from world war and reiterated that world war might be made impossible even before the end of capitalism. Whereas Peiping had noted that the United States was preparing also for local wars, Moscow evaded the question of such wars. Whereas People's Daily had offered a militant interpretation of "peaceful coexistence," emphasizing that revolutions must be given the "fullest moral and material aid" and that peace would be secured by increasing the strength of the bloc and the liberation movement and encouraging revolutions everywhere, Pravda declared simply that the USSR was not renouncing struggle and it evaded the question of support for revolutionary forces.

People's Daily on 8 December responded to Soviet publicity given to President Kennedy's interview with Adzhubei. The Chinese newspaper, unlike Soviet commentators, denounced the U.S. position in toto. Reiterating that "revolutions" must not be subordinated to "peace," the article implied that the USSR was continuing to do just that and was thus doing precisely what the U.S. wished it to do. The article called for the socialist camp—which stretched from Tirana to Hanoi—and its followers to "teak off the peace mask" of the United States.** On the same day, Liu Chang-sheng, speaking to the

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*The Soviet complaint—that the Chinese distort Khrushchev's position on struggle—is valid. Moscow has not renounced struggle, it has simply been cautious, avoiding high risks.

**On 13 December the Albanian party press made some of the points about the Kennedy-Adzhubei interview which Peiping would have liked to make, and which the Chinese had indeed made privately during 1960 in denouncing some of Khrushchev's remarks about Eisenhower in 1959 and early 1960. Adzhubei's cordial remarks about the President were said by Tirana to be echoes of the praise which Khrushchev "showers on the leaders of imperialism"—a practice which was a "great evil," creating illusions about U.S. policy among "poorly informed people."
WFTU congress in Moscow, gave much detail on the preparations for large and small wars which the U.S. was making "under the cover of its peace mask."

Promptly on 9 December, in a speech to the WFTU congress, Khrushchev acknowledged that elements in the West (the "most zealous") were advocating war, but he went on to reiterate that it was necessary to "settle all unsolved international problems by negotiations." In this connection, the nature of imperialism had not changed but it was no longer able to impose its will by military means, a fact which "some people" (the Chinese) should "clear their brains" in order to understand. He reaffirmed his confidence that Soviet missiles were an effective deterrent. He said also that the "principal aim" of the Soviet foreign policy was to "free mankind from an annihilating world war."

Soviet and Chinese commentators on 10 December made some old points against each other. People's Daily, reaffirming that the Chinese party did indeed believe in Mao's dictum that all power grows out of the barrel of a gun, asserted again that the Chinese did not fear a world war (Khrushchev had said more than once that anyone in his right mind would fear it) and that in such a war the victorious camp would "build a beautiful new future on the debris of imperialism" (a formulation very offensive to Moscow). Reaffirming also the Chinese view on the primary importance of armed struggle in revolution, the newspaper stated that Mao's theories, strategy, and tactics were increasingly influential with peoples seeking liberation, especially those of the underdeveloped countries. The TASS summary of the Kommunist attack on Albania on that date made the points, inter alia, that the Albanians (Chinese) failed to recognize the changes in the balance of power, refused to accept "peaceful coexistence" as the general line of foreign policy, falsely accused the USSR of advocating only peaceful accession to power, resented bloc economic aid to underdeveloped countries of Asia and Africa, and could not understand the role of the neutral states in the struggle for peace.

On 13 December, the Chinese delegation at the WFTU meeting in Moscow issued a separate statement on the second item of the agenda, the "struggle against colonialism," an action which in itself suggested that there had been a clash on this question. According to the NCNA summary, the statement asserted that the Kennedy administration was hypocritical.
in its declared opposition to colonialism, that its "fine words are nothing but sheep's clothing on a wolf," that U.S. imperialism was the "most vicious enemy" of all people who wished to win and keep independence, and that it was necessary to conduct an "unremitting struggle" for liberation. On the same day, Peiping reported the conclusion of the Albanian delegation to the WFTU meeting that "only by mercilessly unmasking the U.S. policy of aggression can peace be safeguarded."

Pravda's 13 December article on the Albanians' "dangerous road," while not concerned primarily with questions of strategy, reaffirmed two important Soviet positions. Those who rejected "peaceful coexistence" as the general line of bloc foreign policy (The Chinese and their followers) were playing into the hands of the "most militant and adventurous" circles of imperialism, Pravda said, because there was no third choice between coexistence and world war. Similarly, those (the Chinese camp) who opposed Soviet policy on disarmament as contrary to the interests of the bloc had gone so far as to misrepresent that policy as calling for the unilateral disarmament of the bloc.

The Chinese launched another offensive against Soviet positions on strategy at the World Peace Council meeting in Stockholm, 16-20 December. There was clearly a dispute at the meeting between the Soviet camp and the Chinese camp as to whether the "peace" movement should be used primarily to support Soviet propaganda positions on disarmament or primarily to support the "liberation" movement.

Liao Cheng-chih, head of the Chinese delegation, spoke on 16 December.* Liao contended that the Kennedy-Adzhubei interview had revealed the United States' "frantic ambition for aggression against and enslavement of the whole world"; that peace-lovers and their friends could not cherish any illusions about this vicious enemy; that an emphasis on negotiations over "mass struggle" would be to disarm oneself against imperialism, and, indeed, the principal international problems could not be solved through negotiations "conducted by a few big nations"; that general disarmament was a worthy goal but a "long way off"; that the peace movement must rely on the masses, not a few leaders, and that it must not be a tool of the foreign policy

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* Liao at one point during the meeting is said to have walked out, reportedly in response to a remark by a Soviet delegate.
of "each and every country"; that it was "wrong and extremely harmful" to place the peace movement and the liberation movement in opposition or "to beg for peace from imperialism" (a formulation which infuriates the Russians); and that "words and deed which whitewash imperialism" were in the service of imperialism.

Liu Ning-i's speech at the WPC meeting on 18 December was even sharper. He described as "erroneous and most harmful" the view that disarmament is the "basic task" of the peace movement and that the liberation movement should be subordinated to it. For the oppressed nations,* Liu went on (warming to the favorite Chinese theme) the important issue is not disarmament but the reverse—the building and strengthening of their armed forces to defend themselves against the West. The oppressed nations would be liberated, Liu said, by their own struggles, not by a campaign for disarmament; and they must not be frightened by U.S. threats of war but must "dare to carry out revolutions." Finally, in discussing disarmament, the camp must constantly inform the world of the U.S. character as the "most ferocious enemy of peace!" (which Moscow had not done).

On 26 December, Pravda printed an article by Kadar which carried forward Khrushchev's tactic of denying that the Chinese are effectively militant. Summing up Albanian (Chinese) positions on strategy, Kadar asked what the Albanian (Chinese) leaders proposed: "Nothing but a leftist and adventurous policy of pseudo-radicalism and mere abuse of the imperialists, which will do them no harm." This was, of course, a distortion, as the Chinese are genuinely inciting revolutionaries everywhere to an "adventurist" policy aimed at doing the West as much harm as possible; but it is true that the Chinese themselves are cautious toward the West.

At month's end, Peiping gave some examples of the most valuable forms of "struggle." In a commentary on the "spectacular victories" of the liberation movement in Africa in 1961, Peiping cited: the "shining example" of the Algerians,

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*Both Soviet and Chinese spokesmen regard colonial areas and newly-independent countries alike as "oppressed nations." The question of bloc "support" for these nations relates to support of anti-colonial forces, of newly-independent nations against the West, and of Communist or pro-Communist forces within the newly-independent nations, e.g. Lumumba in the Congo.
entering their eighth year of "armed struggle"; military action against the French in the Cameroons; the "organized armed struggle" in Angola and Portuguese Guinea; the "large-scale armed revolt" in Northern Rhodesia; "demonstrations and strikes" against the British in other parts of Africa; the struggle of "Congolese nationalist forces"; the retaliation of Nkrumah against his actual and alleged opponents; the effort of Mali to build a military force; the struggle for removal of French forces from Mali, Morocco, and Tunisia; the formation of organizations dedicated primarily to the struggle against imperialism, colonialism, and neocolonialism; and so on. Such achievements promised "new and still greater victories."

C. Authority and Discipline

Questions of authority and discipline in the world Communist movement continued in December to be discussed in terms of adherence or non-adherence to the December 1960 declaration of the 81 parties, and of manifestations of revisionism, dogmatism, sectarianism, and nationalism.

As previously noted, the Chinese in their 1 December anniversary commentary on the 1960 declaration had insisted that "revisionism remains the main danger" and that the best method of resolving disputes among the parties was that of prolonging consultations until unanimity could be reached—thus putting the Chinese on record as favoring further meetings. The Soviet and Albanian editorials on the anniversary of the declaration—appearing on 6 December—also took up these questions.

The Albanian editorial asserted that the Albanian party had been "rigorously faithful" to the 1960 declaration, while Khrushchev had been "trampling on it" and indeed had described the declaration, before its publication, as a "document of compromise and of short life." The editorial went on to discuss the ways in which "Khrushchev and his group" had been responsible for a general revival of revisionism in the world Communist movement, and the ways in which Khrushchev had violated the principles expressed in the 1960 declaration on relationships among Communist parties. Khrushchev's real principles, the paper said, were Soviet party dictatorship and coercion.
The Pravda editorial of 6 December asserted that the Soviet party was not merely faithful to, but was indeed "bringing to life," the 1960 declaration. The editorial agreed with the Chinese that revisionism was still the main danger, but it immediately aimed this charge at the Soviet party's opponents, noting that revisionism and dogmatism, "superficially opposite manifestations," sometimes merged into one, which was "precisely" the case with the "present leaders" of the Albanian party/and the Chinese7. Emphasizing the responsibility of every party to the entire movement and the "universal" recognition of the Soviet party as the "vanguard" of the movement (an indirect way of reaffirming that minorities should accede to the Soviet-led majority), the editorial said not a word about the Chinese-emphasized point that unanimity should be reached through consultations. This was another indication that the Soviet party did not wish to convene another world Communist conference in which it would have little hope of inducing the Chinese-led minority to submit.

In the Kommunist article (previously cited) summarized by TASS on 10 December, Konstantinov derided the Albanians for pretending that their views were "widely supported in the world Communist movement." Konstantinov contended that the "movement" (no exceptions were cited) approved and supported the Soviet positions not accepted by Albania. He went on to accuse the Albanians of "nationalism...national narrowmindedness...egotism...dogmatism...sectarianism," and other offenses—all of these being charges that the Soviet party has made privately against the Chinese, for the same reasons.

The Chinese challenged Soviet authority directly in the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization executive committee meeting held in Gaza from 9 to 11 December. It is credibly reported that the Chinese delegation was responsible for the defeat of Soviet proposals relating to officers for the meeting, the admission to AAPSO of some of the pro-Soviet Eastern European states, the admission of a Yugoslav observer, the site of the next meeting, and other matters.* The conflict is said to have continued within the AAPSO delegation which attended the World Peace Council meeting later in the month; the Soviet member is said to have become so angry with

*These were the first reports of a successful Chinese stand against the Soviets in a front—significantly, in one mainly representing non-white underdeveloped countries.
the Chinese member that he took off his coat and offered to fight him. There is also an unconfirmed report that the Chinese, in private talks with other delegations at the AAPSO meeting, attempted to secure the removal of the USSR itself from AAPSO on the grounds that the Soviet Union was not genuinely an Asian country.

As noted previously, the Chinese delegation to the WFTU meeting in Moscow in early December issued a separate statement on one of the principal items on the agenda—a minority statement reflecting a clash with Soviet representatives.

The 13 December Pravda article (previously cited) on the Albanian leaders' "dangerous road" was based entirely on the proposition that the Albanians were acting against the "general line of the world Communist movement." The article denied that the Soviet party was attempting to impose its own positions on other parties, as witness that the Soviet party itself had proposed that the USSR not be described as the "head" of the movement. The positions taken by the Soviet party at its 20th congress (primarily those on the "personality cult," the non-inevitability of war, the need for peaceful co-existence, and the possibility of peaceful accession to power), the article pointed out, had been accepted by the 81 Communist parties in their declaration of 6 December 1960 as having "inaugurated a new stage in the international Communist movement and facilitated its further development on the basis of Marxism-Leninism." The Albanian party, the article went on, had repudiated its agreement with this position and both openly and secretly had been engaging in schismatic activity, "trying to find support" among the other Communist parties. The article did not concede that the Albanians already had support, or, more accurately, that it was the Chinese who had first challenged the Soviet positions and that the Albanians were supporting the Chinese. Indeed, the article, taking advantage of the fact that Chou En-lai at the 22nd CPSU congress had confined his criticism of Khrushchev's action to the surfacing of the dispute rather than discussing Khrushchev's charges, went on to quote Gomulka to the effect that "not one party disputed the essentially correct criticism" of the Albanian leaders.

The 13 December Pravda article, after giving examples of the "isolated" position of the Albanians on such questions as peaceful coexistence, disarmament, and the personality cult, repeated Khrushchev's charge that the Albanian leaders
"persistently demand special privileges for themselves," and then made its main points:

It is completely obvious that in the problem of fidelity to Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism there cannot be exceptions for any party. These principles are unconditionally obligatory for both large and small parties /underlining added/. . . . There cannot be any question about it.

This was a clear reflection of the Soviet charge against the Chinese, made several times in private exchanges during 1960, that Peiping demanded recognition of a special position in the movement.

The Soviets and Chinese again collided directly at the World Peace Council meeting in Stockholm, 16-20 December. Reflecting the polemical Chinese speeches of 16 and 18 December on negotiations and disarmament, the Chinese attacked a Soviet proposal to make disarmament the theme of the next WPC meeting (in mid-1962). The Soviet resolution was carried, however, by a vote of 153 to 27, with the Chinese delegation casting 18 of the dissenting votes. Presumably in the interest of undercutting the Chinese claim to be the principal friend and protector of revolutionaries in colonial countries, the WPC also adopted a resolution calling for "preparations" to be made for a conference on the national liberation movement at an unspecified date.

On 20 December, the Soviet party moved a bit forward toward openly criticizing the Chinese, in a Moscow radio commentary which quoted the Austrian party as having expressed "regret" that the Chinese continued to regard the policy of Hoxha and Shehu as a Leninist policy. On 22 December, Pravda printed an Iraqi party statement on the 22nd CPSU congress which criticized the "negative" attitude of Chou En-lai at the congress and argued that the Chinese party could contribute more than any other to returning the Albanians to the path of "unity."

The Kadar article (previously cited) published by Pravda on 26 December discussed among other things the relationship between the personality cult and nationalism, revisionism, dogmatism, and sectarianism. This being Mao
Tse-tung's 68th birthday, Kadar and Pravda offered Mao the following birthday greeting:

...Lenin called "leftism" an infantile disorder in Communism. We can, unfortunately, observe that this disorder appears in some people as a "senile disorder," and in combination with power it can assume a harmful and revolting character.*

On 28 December Liu Chang-sheng responded to the strongly implied Soviet charges since the 22nd congress that the Chinese as well as the Albanians were guilty of "schismatic" activity. Reporting in Peiping on the WFTU meeting, Liu said: "The Chinese workers and people, following the guidance of Mac Tse-tung, have consistently been doing only things beneficial to solidarity and not doing things disadvantageous to solidarity. This is our consistent position, and it can stand any test.**

*There is some medical evidence that Mao may be suffering from cerebral ischemia or (a smaller possibility) from senility-disorders which in the first case would reduce, and in the second would eliminate, his capacity for disciplined and sustained thought. There is also inferential evidence that Mao has deteriorated. As other observers have noted, Mao's decision--announced in December 1958--not to accept nomination for another term as chairman of the regime was plausibly presented by the Chinese at the time as motivated in part by a wish to have "more time for Marxist-Leninist theoretical work...", but in fact the regime has not published any substantial pronouncements by Mao made since that time, and none has been reported.

**On the same day, a Hong Kong Chinese newspaper which has consistently followed Peiping's line--and is known to have Chinese Communist advisors--attacked Khrushchev by name. It declared that "Khrushchev's cult of personality is to blame" for the split with Albania, and it went on to assert that Khrushchev was attempting to make himself the sole hero of the world Communist movement, making use of Stalin's achievements in building Soviet strength in order to advance his (Khrushchev's) own program. It is not known whether Peiping incited this attack. However, in the same week personnel of an institution in central China were reported to have spent the entire week in criticizing the USSR.
On 31 December, Moscow moved yet another step toward openly denouncing the Chinese. An Izvestiya article, on events in 1961, in discussing Albania observed that "the Albanian degenerates and those who protect them have found themselves in complete isolation." In other words, the Albanians were not isolated. The 13 December Pravda article, more logically, had not conceded that the Albanians had any protectors when it asserted that the Albanian party was isolated.

Throughout the month, there were reports and rumors of Soviet and Chinese communications to other parties designed to restore or disrupt "unity," depending on one's point of view. The Chinese party, in line with its public position on prolonging consultations, was said to have solicited support for another meeting between the Soviet and Albanian parties, together with the representatives of the Chinese party and a party from the Soviet camp. Similarly, a Yugoslav correspondent cited a rumor that the Chinese party had circulated a letter to other parties criticizing the unilateral Soviet action against Albania and calling for another conference of the 81 parties. The Soviet party for its part was said to have informed some friendly parties that its condemnation of the Albanian and Chinese parties extended also to those parties which supported them (the North Korean, North Vietnamese and Indonesian parties were allegedly specified), and to have asked the friendly parties to send to Moscow copies of any communications it might receive from parties of the Chinese camp.

At the 22nd CPSU congress, one party, the Chinese, had criticized the Soviet attacks on Albania, and 34 other parties in attendance (the Albanian was absent) had failed to second the Soviet attacks; of the latter, 21 had spoken at the congress, 13 had not. Of the group of 21, by the end of December ten had gone on record as condemning the Albanians: the parties of the UK, Canada, and Australia (previously regarded as a possible Chinese supporter); the parties of Norway, Denmark and Sweden; the Belgian party; the Indian party; the Algerian party; and the party of Martinique. Of the group of 13, six had gone similarly on record: the parties of Luxembourg and San Marino, and of Nicaragua, Haiti, Guatemala, and Paraguay. Thus by the end of December, there were 60 parties
on record as supporting the Soviet party against the Albanians and only one on record (the Chinese) in support of the Albanians, with 18 of the parties represented at the 22nd congress yet to declare themselves explicitly. However, of the parties regarded as probable Chinese supporters, by the end of December most of them had again indicated in one way or another their inclination to the Chinese—North Vietnam, North Korea, Indonesia, Burma, Malaya, and Thailand, leaving only Laos of this group to be heard from—and they had been joined by the New Zealand and Japanese parties, previously regarded only as possible Chinese supporters. Most of the remaining 10 (the Irish Republic, Northern Ireland, and the Union of South Africa; Iceland and Switzerland; Pakistan and Laos; and Guadeloupe, the Dominican Republic, and Honduras) probably belonged to the Soviet camp.
CONTINUED DETERIORATION (January 1962)

During January 1962, the Sino-Soviet relationship continued to move toward a showdown. In the latter part of the month, Moscow went so far as to warn Peiping of a possible break in party relations and a possible withdrawal of the Soviet commitment to China's defense.

A. Renewed Sino-Albanian Counter-Offensives

The Chinese leadership's intention to persist in its defiance of the Soviet party was clearly reflected in Peiping's pronouncements surrounding New Year's Day 1962. The Albanian party counterattacked Moscow in much the same terms a week later, the difference again being mainly that Tirana named names and used more offensive language.

The New Year's editorial in People's Daily began by affirming the importance of taking a "long view." Even in the short view, prospects were "very favorable." Grain production in 1961 had been better than in 1960, owing primarily to the party's policies on the commune program (i.e., the virtual abandonment of the communes).* It had been established that China could move forward "at high speed" under favorable conditions and could also "stand the test of serious difficulties." The coming year would be another year of "adjustment" of the economy, building the foundation for a new "leap" sometime in the future.

As for the global struggle, the editorial continued, things had gone very well for the "people," whereas the U.S. enemy had discredited himself. The newspaper cited several examples (previously noted) of successful violence in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and reiterated that these areas were the "weakest links" in the imperialist camp.

Turning to the socialist camp and the world movement, the editorial noted that "certain events that cannot but grieve one have now occurred" in the camp and the movement. Such "temporary phenomena," however, should not divert people from two

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*The Bulgarian party press on the same day jeered at "'communes'" as an "equal distribution of poverty," whereas, it said, Communism envisages a system of incentives leading to abundance. It was not specified that these communes were Chinese, but there are no other communes going.
much more important perceptions: that imperialism, capitalism, and oppressed nations and peoples "still really exist"; and that this calls for "revolutionary struggle by the people...; there is no alternative." Continuing this effort to recall the USSR to its larger duties, the editorial noted that China's "general line" of foreign policy (as opposed to the USSR's general line of peaceful coexistence), called for strengthening the unity of the camp, supporting the revolutionary struggle everywhere, and coexisting while opposing imperialist policies—in that order. It was this general line, the newspaper observed, which conformed to the interests of the revolutionary people who accounted for 90 percent of the world's population.

"Precisely" because of this revolutionary line, the editorial continued, "imperialists, revisionists, and other reactionaries" were hostile to the Chinese party. In language similar to that used in summer 1960 after the USSR had withdrawn its technicians, the newspaper noted that such forces had repeatedly launched campaigns against China, and it warned that the "recent anti-China, anti-Communist and anti-people waves may develop along more frenzied lines." The Chinese, other Communists, and the (revolutionary) people of the world "should be fully prepared for this," in order to "resist it and beat it back." In this and other struggles, the Chinese people and the revolutionary peoples would "grow stronger through tempering." Concluding this long editorial which did not once mention the USSR, the newspaper asserted that the Chinese people would be united and would unite with the (revolutionary) people of the world.

Also on New Year's Day, Red Flag published an article on its favorite topic, the victories and prospects of the liberation movement. Recounting the successes in familiar terms, the article struck again at a Soviet position which Peiping had been assailing for more than two years—at those who "regard the issue of war and peace as the most important issue" and the "anti-imperialist and anticolonialist struggle" as secondary, and who thus put the latter "in opposition" to the struggle for peace. Attributing to President Kennedy a view which Peiping had earlier attributed to Khru-shchev and wished again to denounce him for holding, the article observed that in this view "the oppressed nations can jolly well wait until imperialism grants favors to them, thereby realizing their demand for independence by peaceful
means; struggle is unnecessary, let alone armed struggle." Again using the President as a stand-in for Khrushchev and again overstating the Soviet position taken in the Soviet party program and various commentaries, the article observed that in "Kennedy's" view, the "socialist countries should put up their shutters and look after their own construction, give no support to the revolutions of oppressed nations," and let them "never win freedom;" otherwise he would accuse them of "exporting revolution," or call them "diehards," or describe them as "bellicose," all of these being roughly the terms Khrushchev has used about the Chinese in attacking their positions on strategy. In contrast to the Soviet emphasis on the primary importance of Soviet domestic successes in advancing Communism abroad, "all real Marxist-Leninists," the article continued in language obviously not addressed to the President, have held that socialist countries must combine their domestic construction with their support of the oppressed nations; this, it said, was Lenin's way.* The article concluded that it was nevertheless true that peoples win liberation primarily through their own struggles.

Also on 1 January, Chen Yi gave a banquet in honor of all foreign technicians working in China. In toasting them, Chou En-lai went out of his way to express gratitude also to "all the foreign experts /primarily Soviets/ who worked in China in the past." Chen himself used the occasion, as had Chou in Moscow, to reaffirm China's ability to prosper by "relying on our own industrious hands." With the tactic noted above of denouncing the West while aiming at Khrushchev, Chen also observed that imperialism had recently been "sowing discord to undermine the unity of the socialist camp," unity which must be safeguarded.

On the following day, People's Daily used the third anniversary of Castro's triumph to hold up Cuba again as the "glorious example" for all Latin American countries and as an inspiration to oppressed peoples everywhere. While not recognizing Castro's claim that Cuba is a socialist country,
the newspaper contended that the Cuban revolution showed that all oppressed peoples can triumph "so long as they dare to launch revolution and are bold enough to take up arms against even the fiercest enemy." The editorial quoted with approval Castro's declaration—taken from Mao—that "a single spark can start a prairie fire." What most alarmed the U.S. about Cuba, the editorial went on, was that its successes had further demonstrated the correctness of the Chinese position that it was a revolutionary people, not the U.S., which was really powerful. The Cuban people, the editorial concluded, were following the (Chinese) line of despising the enemy strategically while taking it seriously in particular engagements, and the Cuban people could count on the Chinese as "their most reliable and faithful comrades-in-arms."

At another banquet—for Chinese scientists and technicians—on 5 January, Chinese leaders returned to the theme of relying on China's own efforts. Chen Yi, apparently the main speaker again, stated the position more modestly in one respect, in giving the formula as "relying mainly on our own efforts, in addition to international aid...." But he stated it more emphatically in another respect, expressing confidence that "all scientific and technical problems in China's economic construction and national defense can be solved"—the first time that national defense had been noted in this connection. This was all the more striking in that Chinese plans for the development of a modern military establishment depended so heavily on the Soviet scientists and technicians who were withdrawn. Chen admitted that the task of building a powerful China would be very hard, but he said that this was the aspiration of all Chinese and all "revolutionary people"—who, it was implied, could look to a powerful China for powerful assistance toward their liberation.

The Albanian party press stated the Chinese case against Khrushchev openly on 9 January. On the same day, Hoxha received a telegram from Mao wishing him new successes in his "struggle against imperialism and modern revisionism and in building socialism."

The long Zeri i Popullit article of 9 January began by noting that Soviet attacks on the Albanian party coincided with conciliatory Soviet gestures toward President Kennedy and Tito. The real issue, said the paper, was not Albanian
dogmatism but Soviet revisionism. Khrushchev and his group had revised the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism, and treated "opportunistically" questions of war and peace, the national liberation struggle, and means of access to power; moreover, they had "trampled" on principles of proletarian internationalism. Khrushchev's tactic, the article went on, was to describe as "anti-Marxist, nationalistic, dogmatic," or whatever any party or person which opposed this opportunistic course.

As for the endorsement of the importance of the 20th CPSU congress in the December 1960 Moscow declaration, the paper said in a new charge, the Soviet party at that Moscow conference had promised that this statement would not be used to impose the decisions of the 20th congress on other parties. Similarly hypocritical, the article continued, had been Khrushchev's abjuration of the formula that the socialist camp was "headed by the Soviet Union," as Khrushchev even without the formula continued to seek to dominate other parties. In the Albanian (Chinese) view, the paper said, the Soviet Union was indeed the "head" of the camp in the sense that its state was the oldest and its party the most experienced; but such experience did "not begin with the 20th congress," and the Albanian (Chinese) party looked to the earlier record. Moreover, by abdicating leadership in that sense, Khrushchev was encouraging revisionist and separatist forces, as expressed for example in the Italian party's advocacy of polycentrism.

As for the general question of which party feared the truth, the article continued, the Albanian party had printed the complete text of the CPSU program as soon as it had been adopted, whereas Khrushchev's group had not published Albanian materials. Who then was "afraid of the truth"?

As for the general question of "peaceful coexistence," it was "amazing" for Khrushchev to declare this concept to be the "general line" of bloc foreign policy. Following Peiping's line, the article observed that this concept did not point as a general line should to the principles governing relations among socialist states and to the need to support "powerfully and by all means" the liberation struggle. The Soviet formula, the newspaper contended, reflected the Soviet reluctance to extend such support.

Similarly, the article continued, Khrushchev contended that disarmament was the "most urgent task," on which other
objectives of the world movement—notably national liberation—depended. This meant (just as the Chinese had said at the WPC meeting in December), the subordination of the liberation struggle and other struggles—an act of "treason" to the movement. Disarmament (as the Chinese had said) was a long way off, and the oppressed peoples should not be asked to wait, but should take the road of struggle, a struggle which should be supported rather than retarded by the actions of the world movement.

Still discussing Moscow's wrong-headed emphasis on disarmament, and just as the Chinese party had privately protested against Soviet sanctions which reduced Chinese defense capabilities, the 9 January Albanian article protested similar Soviet action against Albania. Further, just as Peiping had retreated from an expressed interest in a nuclear-free zone in the Far East whenever it was suggested seriously, so the Albanian editorial denounced Soviet proposals for complete disarmament in the Balkans.

As for the Soviet position on the question of accession to power by Communist parties, the article continued, following a Chinese lead, the Soviet emphasis since the 20th CPSU congress had in fact been on the possibility of peaceful accession. This possibility had been "overrated," and this position "does not correspond to reality at all." In this connection, the newspaper went on, the Albanian party had been charged with wishing to export revolution, but all it really asked (like the Chinese) was "resolute support" for those making a revolution. The Soviet party was putting the question incorrectly, making the world-wide victory of socialism depend on coexistence and economic competition.

As for the dispute with the Soviet party over responsibility for the Hungarian "counter-revolution" in 1956, the paper went on (again reflecting a Chinese position), Khrushchev was indeed responsible in part for that event. The "counter-revolution" had been launched under the slogans of de-Stalinization supplied by Khrushchev; the actual content of de-Stalinization had softened up Easter Europe; and Khrushchev had been gulled by Tito and by anti-Communist forces in Hungary.

As for the "personality cult," the article continued, again agreeing completely with the Chinese position, the
Albanian party was opposed to any such cult but had never approved the conduct and course of de-Stalinization and Khrushchev's use of the concept of the cult to impose "revisionist" views on others. The attacks on Stalin, (as the Chinese had said from the beginning) had given ammunition to all enemies of socialism--for which Khrushchev's group must be held responsible. Moreover, the newspaper said (as the Chinese had often implied), Khrushchev had built a cult around himself to such a point that a piece of "stupidity" such as taking off his shoe (to pound with it) at the UN General Assembly was presented by his apologists (Adzhubei again) as a "magnificent example of a Marxist attitude."

The article went on to refute Soviet charges about Albanian persecution of pro-Soviet forces in Albania--charges which Khrushchev had also made, in less detail, against Peiping. The article counterattacked by charging that Soviet "protection" of Tito* and "Albanian traitors" only demonstrated that Khrushchev was a "traitor to Marxism-Leninism and an enemy of our party and people."

Referring only indirectly to Chinese support of Albania, the article observed that Khrushchev "tries to create the impression that the entire international Communist movement follows him in condemning our party." The paper expressed confidence that those parties which had followed the Soviet lead would eventually repent. In this connection, the article asserted, even Khrushchev's followers in other parties did not approve the Soviet initiative in breaking diplomatic relations with Albania. Although Khrushchev was preparing to take actions "still more ignoble," the article concluded, such a course would be "fatal" for him, as the "true Communists" in the world Communist movement would eventually prevail.

On 13 January, while Sino-Soviet talks on trade in 1962 were still going on, Peiping and Tirana announced the successful conclusion of their talks on economic cooperation.

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*On 17 January, Zeri I Popullit carried a long article on the Yugoslav enemies of Marxism-Leninism and Khrushchev's conciliatory attitude toward them, noting that this attitude was consistent with his "violent attacks" on the Marxist-Leninist Albanian party.
in 1962. The agreements and protocols said to have been signed related to new Chinese credits to Albania, the supply of Chinese equipment and technical assistance, trade and terms of payment in 1962, the use of credits in 1962, and scientific and technical cooperation. Possibly pending the outcome of the Sino-Soviet talks, details were not given.

At a banquet that evening for the Albanian delegation, Chou En-lai, the principal speaker, described the Albanian party in the following terms—worth quoting at length, because every assertion in the passage was clearly offensive to Moscow:

The glorious Albanian Workers Party is a stanch and militant Marxist-Leninist party, which has always held aloft the brilliant banner of Marxism-Leninism, remained loyal to the principles of proletarian internationalism, abided by the Moscow declaration /1957/ and the Moscow statement of the Communist and workers parties /1960/ ..., and worked to strengthen the great solidarity of the socialist camp and the international Communist movement. The Albanian Workers Party has firmly defended the purity of Marxism-Leninism against modern revisionism represented by the Tito clique of Yugoslavia, and it enjoys high prestige among the Chinese people and the working class throughout the world.

The head of the Albanian delegation, speaking on the same occasion, declared that Albania was "proud" to have such a friend as China, and observed that the Albanians were inspired by the Chinese struggle against "imperialism, Yugoslav Tito revisionism, and modern revisionism" (lest anyone suppose that Yugoslav revisionism was the only kind). On the following day, the Albanian press noted that the Albanian people had many friends in their struggle to build socialism—"in the first place," Chinese aid, which would permit Albania to fulfill its 1962 plan. Two days later the Albanian press, commenting on the friendship and aid of the "glorious" Chinese party, took note of Chinese successes in building socialism,

*It is of some interest that Chou, who is believed not to relish his role as an opponent of Soviet positions, confined revisionism to Yugoslavia in this passage. However, other Chinese spokesmen have sometimes done the same.
China's "great contribution" to strengthening the unity of the camp, the creative Chinese application of Marxism-Leninism, the Chinese example for oppressed peoples, and so on--and concluded grandly that "There is no slander and fabrication capable of darkening this reality."

B. Stronger Soviet Warnings to China

The Soviet party during January issued several public warnings to the Chinese party, without naming the Chinese. Some of these warnings were stronger than those ventured in 1961, and culminated in clear threats of a break in party relations.

Moscow Radio on 6 January, "in response to a listener's question" (Khrushchev's, perhaps), commented ironically on China's prospects--reiterated by Chinese leaders on 1 and 5 January--for going it alone. The commentary, on Soviet aid as serving socialist unity, again misquoted Liu Shao-chi as having said (1 July 1961) that China was "at present" receiving Soviet aid. The talks noted that more than 150 Chinese projects were built with Soviet aid during the first Chinese five-year plan (1953-57), and that "later an agreement was concluded" for the construction of 125 additional major industrial projects by 1967 (actually a total of 291, since 1953); the commentary refrained from mentioning what had happened to that agreement, i.e. the Soviets had walked off the job in 1960 with only about half of these 291 plants built and in operation. Recounting the Soviet aid (paltry aid, none of it in grants) to Peiping in its difficulties since that time, the talk cited the "deep gratitude" of the Chinese for this aid and asserted blandly that the USSR was "also ready to develop economic and scientific cooperation with the CPR in the future." As witness, the USSR was to give China scientific and technical data and documents in a number of fields. Thus "experience has shown" that the USSR had remained loyal to the ideals of proletarian internationalism." Experience had also shown, the commentary said, that the idea of "building socialism separately" from other socialist countries--i.e. going it alone--was "theoretically unsound..., wasteful economically..., reactionary in nature and dangerous politically...."

*This was the second time that this line had been related expressly to China; the first was in August 1960, after the withdrawal of the technicians.
The Ukrainian Pravda soon followed with an account of Soviet successes, a fresh denunciation of Molotov and others of the "anti-party group" (the announcement that Molotov would return to his Vienna post may have puzzled the Chinese as much as everyone else), asserted that the Soviet party could not be silent about deviations in "other parties" (the Albanians were specified, but not the Chinese), declared again that the Communists of the "entire world" rebuffed the Albanians, and, again citing an alleged Albanian demand for special treatment as a small party, reiterated that there could be no exceptions—"in loyalty to Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism—"for any party, be it large or small." The article spoke at some length of the primary importance of the Soviet example in enhancing Communist influence and of the greatly increased force of this example in the future, concluding that "one must be a hardened dogmatist like Molotov /or Mao/ to say after all this that our program is 'anti-revolutionary/....""  

On 12 January Pravda printed a criticism, appearing in a Paraguayan Communist party statement, of Chinese "inconsistency" on the question of the "unity" of the movement. Pravda also reported a Tunisian Communist party statement that every party was "duty-bound" to criticize the Albanian leaders.

A Moscow Radio commentary of 15 January observed that one of the important results of the 22nd CPSU congress was the "complete discrediting" of Stalin's personality cult and the "final ideological defeat" of the anti-party group of Molotov and others. In digs at the Chinese, the talk noted that one result of the personality cult was that after the 18th CPSU congress no congress was convened for almost 14 years (there were 17 years between the CCP's Sixth Congress and its Seventh, and 11 more years between the Seventh and the Eighth, and the CCP has held only one session of its Eighth Congress since 1956 instead of the five it should have held); that another result was the retardation of Soviet economic and cultural development (Khrushchev's derision of Chinese programs of recent years is well known); and that the 22nd CPSU congress returned to the question of the personality cult in part because there were "adherents" of the cult in the ranks of the world Communist movement (only the Albanians were named). The commentary asserted again that the proceedings of the 22nd Congress had the "unanimous support" of the other parties.

A Moscow Radio talk in Mandarin to China on 16 January spoke of the Albanian expressions of the personality cult.
The talk observed that "everyone who has a sound mind" (cf. earlier Soviet and Eastern European remarks about Mao's senility) must know to be wrong-headed the Albanian (Chinese) propositions on world Communist strategy. On the same day, Moscow Radio reviewed Soviet positions on the need for "absolute respect "from each party in the decisions of multiparty conferences and on the need to deny a "special" /minority/ position to any party.

On 17 January, retorting to the Chinese Red Flag article of 1 January and the Albanian Zeri I Popullit article of 9 January, Pravda carried a long article on "peaceful coexistence." Reaffirming that the "most urgent question of our time" is that of "war and peace," and linking this to the questions of East-West relations and the relation between building Communism in the USSR and formulating world Communist strategy, the article took note that the "Leninist" CPSU central committee had been attacked by "anti-party elements of all kinds and colors, from the open rightists to the ultraleftists." (This was apparently a reference to opposition from both left and right within the Soviet party, as the term "anti-party elements" would presumably not be used for foreign Communists; this impression is strengthened by the next sentence, which contended that on these issues revisionists, dogmatists, and sectarians--terms which would apply to both internal and external opponents--were attacking the world movement.)

Molotov contended, the article went on, that Lenin had nowhere spoken of peaceful coexistence. (Molotov was right, in that Lenin never used this term, which was Stalin's.) Lenin had spoken, the article said (correctly), of the need to exist together with capitalist states until the demise of the latter, and he had not envisaged this coexistence as merely an uninterrupted chain of military clashes. (Pravda ignored here the question of whether Lenin had advocated a more revolutionary program than Khrushchev is advocating; in our view, Molotov and the Chinese are more nearly right about Lenin's emphasis than is the Pravda article.) The article went on to speak of the work of the 22nd CPSU congress in purging Soviet foreign policy of "alien elements" reflecting the personality cult and opposed to peaceful coexistence, and in particular it defended Khrushchev's many visits to other countries.

The Albanian "pseudotheoreticians," the article continued, attacked peaceful coexistence as "'capitulation to imperialism.'" (Actually it was the Chinese who in 1960 had
introduced this line, contending that the essence of modern revisionism was capitulation in the name of peace.) Similarly, taking up another Chinese point echoed by the Albanians, the article rejected the charge that Soviet proposals for disarmament were "'contrary to the interests'" of the bloc. The pseudotheoreticians, the article said, used these "absurd inventions" to mask their own departures from Marxism-Leninism, their divisive actions, their adventurism in foreign policy, and their anti-Soviet activity.

Directly contradicting the Chinese, the article argued that the "main thing" was to prevent "war." The article reaffirmed the Soviet position that "mankind"--not just the West--would suffer terribly in a new world war. Citing Lenin on the prospects of socialism for ending "wars," and continuing the practice since the 20th CPSU congress of speaking of "wars" in general rather than world war only in this connection, the article reaffirmed that "wars are no longer inevitable." It pointed to the bloc's successes in containing, halting or deterring a number of imperialist-initiated-or-planned local wars since 1956. (Actually the Chinese had contended that such wars could be contained, and therefore should be fought; the Soviet emphasis had been on halting or deterring them, because they might expand.)

Again turning against the Chinese the Chinese charge that the Soviets were failing to take advantage of the new balance of power, the article reiterated it was the "dogmatists" who could not correctly calculate the balance of power. Twice describing these opponents of the Soviet line as "enemies"--thus bringing this charge too to a new level--the article contended that these enemies who asserted that they were not "afraid" of imperialism, the Chinese and Albanians, were in reality underestimating the influence of the bloc and thus were objectively overestimating the capabilities of imperialism.

Taking up the Sino-Albanian charge that the Soviet party was subordinating the world revolutionary struggle to the peace effort, and taking advantage of the fact that Peking and Tirana in their January articles had overstated their case, the Pravda article dismissed the "dogmatist" position that peaceful coexistence meant "abandoning the class struggle, losing revolutionary prospects, and so on." The article reiterated that it was simply the Soviet position not to create a
revolution artificially, that ripeness is all. The Leninist course, the article contended, was not to abandon the class struggle but instead to select those "deployment areas" for it which were in the interests of "all mankind." Because peaceful coexistence (the strength of the bloc has been more often cited in this connection) made it "very much more difficult" for imperialism to interfere with revolutions, the article said, obviously Soviet policy was to the advantage of revolutionary movements.

The article went on to reject the "bourgeois" view that the Soviet conception of peaceful coexistence is "cold war" (although it is). The concept of peaceful coexistence "excludes the resort to war as a means of policy," the article said, failing to specify that the Soviet line simply excludes world war, and that the line, while usually evading the question of Soviet support for other types of war, when necessary affirms the Soviet intention to intervene in some types of local wars and to support (by unspecified means) all "liberation" wars.

Going on to state a position offensive to the Chinese, the article contended that the essential opposition of East and West did not rule out "cooperation" between them in averting world war and in economic relations. The article concluded with a brief statement of specific Soviet foreign policy objectives relating to Berlin, the UN, and so on.

Pravda on 18 January (the day following the above article) carried an article by Pospelov which included a threat to break relations with the Chinese party. The subject was Lenin and the Prague conference of 1912, at which Lenin broke with the Mensheviks. Lenin's line on combining illegal and legal activity, Pospelov wrote, had been opposed by both the "rightwing liquidators" (Mensheviks and their supporters) and the "leftwing liquidators, life-service revolutionaries and sectarians" who scorned legal activity.

The importance of taking a stand against "liquidators" of both types, Pospelov wrote, was not always understood by Stalin. The previous year, he said, Stalin had described Lenin's "struggle against anti-party elements abroad as a 'tempest in a teapot.'" Almost certainly aiming at those who believed that Khrushchev was giving too much importance
to his quarrel with Mao, the article criticized Stalin's endorsement of the workers' "disdainful" view of "things happening abroad." On the same lines, the article went on to praise Lenin's practice of not slurring over the differences with his opponents but rather revealing them "in all their acuteness."

The Prague conference, Pospelov went on, decided to expel the "liquidators" from the party. This decision was opposed, he wrote, by all the "opportunist elements" of the movement, but the "revolutionary" elements defended it. (This neatly turned around the Chinese charge that the opportunist Khrushchev was expelling the revolutionaries, e.g. Molotov and the Albanian leaders.) The "defenders" of the "liquidators" had included "foreign groups," who were denied the use of the party's name because they had not subordinated themselves to the party's central committee.

"Since these opportunist groups failed to obey the decisions of the conference," Pospelov continued, "they thus placed themselves outside the party." (This is approximately what is said now about the Albanians.) Clearly aiming at the Chinese as well as the Albanians, this paragraph concluded:

The Bolsheviks furnished to other socialist parties an example of irreconcilable revolutionary struggle against opportunism going as far as a complete organizational break.

The Chinese party had got its strongest warning to date.

There were several postscripts to this warning in the remaining days of January. Probably in response to a Soviet request, a Belgian party leader in a 21 January article in an Austrian Communist paper denounced Chinese views expressed at the WPC meeting in December, and he emphasized that the Chinese views continued to deviate despite "patient efforts made within the Communist movement for months"; and on 25 January, a pro-Communist paper in Rome carried excerpts from Italian party leader Longo's criticism of the Chinese party -- at the November 1960 meeting of the parties -- for "spreading confusion, doubt, and uncertainty in the international movement." These two attacks on the Chinese by name were apparently not reprinted in Soviet media, however.

TASS on 24 January broadcast a long statement by Soviet Defense Minister Malinovsky commenting on recent statements
by U.S. Secretary of Defense McNamara. Inter alia, Malinovsky observed that the USSR had sufficient weapons to "defeat any potential enemy if he attacks us or those socialist countries friendly to us." Malinovsky did not go on to state which socialist countries were not regarded as friendly, but his remark presumably strengthened Chinese doubts as to whether the USSR would remain committed to Peiping's defense.

Finally, a Soviet broadcast to Communist China on 30 January indirectly reaffirmed the Soviet position on the principle of majority rule in the movement and on the importance of Soviet protection for other parties of the movement. Every party is "responsible" to the world Communist movement, the paper said, and every party is carrying out its program "under the protection" of the world movement.
VI. PROSPECTS

It remains to examine the forms of pressure still available to Moscow in its effort to force the Chinese leadership to retreat or to effect a change of leadership. Because the exertion of these pressures in one or another combination may include or lead to a Sino-Soviet break, we think it proper to begin by defining our usage of the word "break." We then consider the various forms of pressure and offer a view as to whether they could force the now dominant Chinese leaders to retreat. We then discuss the prospects for an accession to leadership by forces in the Chinese party which we believe to be pro-Soviet. And we conclude by offering an opinion on the prospects for a Sino-Soviet break.

A. Definitions of a "Break"

The words break, breach, rupture, rift, and split have all been used more or less accurately to describe a marked change for the worse in the special complex of relationships between Communist states. Whichever word one uses, it is obvious that there are meaningful degrees of change, just as there are meaningful degrees of deterioration in quarreling, sleeping in separate rooms, going home to mother, getting a legal separation, and being divorced, not to speak of arranging or undertaking the murder of the other party.

By some definitions, the USSR and Communist China have already broken, breached, ruptured, rived, split, or whatever. They have been bitterly at odds over the interpretation of fundamental points in the received doctrine, and each has accused the other of forsaking the doctrine. Both in bilateral talks and multiparty conferences the two parties have had heated exchanges and have failed to reach agreement on critical matters*; one party (the CPSU) has indirectly warned that it might go so far as to break off relations with the other party; and, while neither party has called publicly for the overthrow of the leaders of the other, each has privately stated or indicated its favor for purged leaders of the other party and each has made abundantly clear in private

*We ourselves described the world Communist movement as "split" after the November 1960 conference of the parties. Khrushchev avoided a vote, on the issue of majority rule, which would have formalized the split; and he dropped the issue of majority rule in order to get all parties to sign the 6 December declaration.
exchanges that it would like to see the principal leader of
the other party brought down. Similarly, they have maintained
diplomatic relations, but they have quarreled almost as bitterly
about state-to-state relations as about doctrine and party rela-
tions: the Chinese have protested the parsimony of Soviet
economic aid, and the USSR severely damaged the Chinese long-
range development program by withdrawing its technicians in
mid-1960; the Chinese have accused the USSR of chauvinism in
the military relationship, they have been unable to cooperate
in some proposed military projects, and Soviet military aid,
which has not included the provision of nuclear weapons, has
apparently been at a very low level since late 1960; Soviet
scientific aid has apparently been minimal since that time;
and there have even been border disputes and violations. The
most important agreement between the two states (formalizing
the critical relationship of common cause in peril), the Sino-
Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance (February 1950), is
still in force, but both parties have violated the spirit if
not the letter of it, and it has been increasingly uncertain
in what circumstances and to what degree the USSR would honor
its commitment to China's defense under the treaty. Finally,
neither Moscow nor Peiping has excluded the other from its
definition of the "socialist camp" (the symbol of that common
cause), and neither has encouraged the other Communist states
and parties to think of the two of them as having broken, but
one (Peiping) has insisted that the camp includes a member
(Albania) all but formally ejected by the other, and there
have already been the declarations and indications of alle-
giance by most of the parties--as well as splits in some of
them--which, in a more emphatic way and on a larger scale,
would follow a recognized Sino-Soviet break. Observers who
have recognized the degree to which there has been a break
between Moscow and Peiping have been properly impatient with
those who have minimized these deteriorating relationships
as "only a family quarrel," and they have sometimes pointed
out that many murders are committed by members of families
against other members of those families.

By strict definition, however, the word "break"
would be reserved for the cessation of a given relationship
(or of any part of a relationship) rather than for a deterio-
rating in it. In this usage, the ideological aspect presents
difficulties, although it is only in this aspect that Moscow
and Peiping, thus far, might be said to have broken: i.e.,
while both profess their allegiance to Marxism-Leninism and
both are (and will remain) recognizably Communist states
hostile to the non-Communist world, their disagreement in the
interpretation of the received doctrine is so fundamental that they can be said to have ceased to hold a common doctrine. However, we have preferred to speak of ideology as the language of their argument rather than its content, and to use the word "break" for more solid matters.

In this strict usage, a break in party relations would mean a cessation of communications and other intercourse between the parties, (i.e. no messages would be addressed from one party to the other and neither would be invited to any occasion sponsored by the other), notification to the other parties of the movement that the break had occurred, and public attacks by each party on the leadership of the other. Such a break might or might not entail an effort by either party, in a multiparty conference, to get a resolution condemning the other party (no party can really be expelled from the movement, as there is no international organ like the Comintern or even the Cominform to do it); and it might or might not entail a public call for the overthrow of the other party's leaders, as it has in the Albanian case, or an actual effort to overthrow them, as may have happened in Albania in 1960 and may again. A break in state relations would reasonably mean simply the closure of embassies and the withdrawal of diplomatic personnel, although it might include a statement expressly breaking relations.

Similarly, a break in economic relations would mean not only the cessation of credits (which might or might not include a demand for repayment of existing debts ahead of schedule), and not only the withdrawal or expulsion of advisors and technicians, but also the cessation of trade (which would amount to an embargo). A break in military relations similarly would mean the withdrawal or expulsion of all advisors and technicians and the cessation of supply of material. A break in scientific relations would mean the withdrawal or expulsion of all scientists and the cessation of supply of materials and documents. A break in an important agreement such as a treaty of friendship and alliance would mean notification, whether public or private, that one party to it no longer regards itself as bound by the agreement.

A break in economic, military, and scientific relations, or the repudiation of a treaty, might either precede or follow a break in party or state relations, or might not take place at all if there were a break only in party relations. Partly for this reason—the many possible patterns—a break in either party or party-and-state relations (with the government break following the party break) has been generally regarded as sufficient to justify the use of the world "break"
between two Communist entities; e.g., there was a break between the Soviet and Yugoslav parties—but not states—in 1948, and there was a break first in party and then in state relations between Moscow and Tirana in 1961. (The break in state relations is open to a quibble, in that the Soviet embassy in Tirana is in some sort of caretaker status, and communication between the two capitals is presumably possible, but the situation is reasonably described as a break.) We will follow this usage, taking a break to mean a break in either party or party-and-state relations. A break in this sense would be clearly recognized by the camp and the movement as a break, as has been the case in the break with Albania, with powerful consequences for the other parties—in the event of a Sino-Soviet break—in forcing declarations, splits, and purges.*

B. Soviet Pressure on Albania

It is important to Moscow to bring Hoxha down, as the Soviet party has publicly committed itself to the proposition that righteousness (the Soviet cause) will triumph in Albania, and a prolonged defiance will increasingly encourage other parties to defy Moscow, either in alliance with the Chinese or on their own. It is just as important to Peiping to keep Hoxha aloft, as he is the test of the effectiveness of Chinese support everywhere, even in areas where the Chinese have the advantage but have not been pressed by Soviet ultimatums to those parties, e.g. in the contiguous areas of North Korea and North Vietnam and in parties dominated by native Chinese such as the Malayan and Thai parties.

The Soviets have already exerted, without good result, almost all the political forms of pressure on Albania available to them. They have threatened the Albanian leaders and warned the Chinese against supporting them; they have lined up more than three-fourths of the parties of the world movement in condemnation of the Albanians; they have broken party and state relations with Tirana, and have induced others to reduce the level of their diplomatic representation; and they have appealed to the Albanian party and people to rise.

*Another observer has suggested the possibility of a recognizable "break" between the parties which need not include a break in any of the aspects of the relationship we have discussed. In his concept, a "break" could be regarded as a situation in which the competitive aspects of the relationship exceeded the cooperative ones. Aside from the problem of defining this point, we think that such a balance would be expressed in a party or party-and-state break.
The latter appeal may yet be answered, as Hoxha's defiance of Moscow probably does not have the support of the entire party or military establishment, and the people, although generally disposed to support Hoxha against Moscow, remain anti-Communist; however, pro-Soviet elements throughout Albania appear to have been cowed, at least for the time being. The Soviets may, of course, use up the remaining political pressures, by expelling Tirana from the Warsaw Pact and CEMA and inducing the Eastern European states to break their relations with Tirana, but these pressures, singly or in combination, are insignificant.*

Similarly, the Soviets have used up almost all of their economic pressure, in cancelling credits, withdrawing technicians, and reducing their own trade with Albania to almost nothing. They could still induce (or try to induce) the Eastern European states to cut off trade with Albania and to withdraw the rest of their technicians, but there is nothing they can do about the Chinese. The Chinese are able if they choose, and they appear determined, to provide sufficient credits and/or goods and services to keep the Albanians going. If Chinese aid should falter, the Albanians would probably try to find alternative sources in the West, and they might have good luck.

It is of course open to Moscow to bring Hoxha down by military action, either directly or through Yugoslavia, as there would be nothing that either Albania or China, militarily, could do about it. However, as for direct action, Albania is protected by both Yugoslavia and Greece, neither of which (probably) would be willing to afford passage to Soviet forces, (Yugoslavia is the more doubtful case); moreover, the Soviet posture in both world and international Communist affairs would be greatly damaged, and the action would almost certainly force the Chinese to break with Moscow, without the compensation of making Peiping appear responsible for the break. As for indirect military action, Tito's disavowals of any such intention are fairly credible, as a weak anti-Soviet Albania would seem somewhat less dangerous to him than a Soviet-controlled (and perhaps Soviet-occupied) Albania, although opinions differ on this point. A really wild possibility is a double-play in which the USSR would incite a Yugoslav invasion of Albania and would then intervene in "defense" of Albania, with the aim of wiping out both the Yugoslav and the Albanian opponents of

*The failure of the Eastern European states to follow Moscow in breaking relations with Tirana is puzzling. If Khrushchev has already tried and failed to induce them, his situation is awkward indeed; but this is hard to believe.
Khrushchev. But we do not believe that Khrushchev either could or would do this. In any event, indirect military action would have almost the same disadvantages as direct action, in that almost everyone would assume that the Soviets were behind it.

In sum, the Albanian leaders can probably survive, thus making ineffectual Moscow's warnings to Peiping through Albania. If the Albanian leaders should not survive, even if they were brought down in a coup which could not be attributed to Moscow or by a genuine revolt in the party or by the people, Peiping would still defy the Soviets. Indeed, since the Chinese would probably hold the Soviets responsible for the event whatever the real cause, the Chinese could be expected to be even more bitterly intransigent. It seems to be a situation in which Moscow, whatever it does, and whatever it might gain in other respects from bringing Hoxha down, cannot thereby face the Chinese to retreat.

C. Political Pressure on China

Khrushchev has completed the stage of publicly criticizing the Chinese by proxy (Albania); he has publicly criticized the Chinese by name on a limited issue (that of supporting Albania); he has begun the process (through others, thus far) of publicly criticizing the Chinese (not by name) on other issues in the dispute; and he has begun the process of indirectly warning the Chinese (not by name) of the consequences of their defiance. He might, of course, cover the remaining distance in a single step, updating and publishing the Soviet party letters of 1960 to the Chinese party, and perhaps breaking off relations with them at the same time.* Whether the process of identifying the Chinese as offenders on the entire list of issues is slow or fast, we would not expect the mere surfacing of the dispute to force a Chinese retreat, and Khrushchev almost certainly has made the same judgment. In making public his complete case against the Chinese, whether before a break or after, he would simply be putting the Soviet position in as favorable a light as possible for the rest of the world, Communist and non-Communist.

The Soviet party could also call another multiparty conference, of the type of November 1957 and November 1960, in which to seek a formal condemnation of the Albanian and Chinese parties. Moscow apparently does not want such a conference, however, because in a showdown several parties--and

*As part of this, Khrushchev might take further action against the "antiparty group," notably Molotov, expressly relating their offenses to encouragement by the Chinese.
perhaps not only the Asian parties which have already indi-
cated their leaning to Peiping—would probably refuse to
support the Soviet position, thus publicly splitting the
movement into two "camps." The Soviet party seems more like-
ly to continue to exert (and to increase) its pressure through
the individual parties responsive to it (more than three-
fourths of the parties), through the congresses of those par-
ties which include substantial numbers of foreign Communist
delegates, and through the world Communist front organiza-
tions—almost all of which the Soviet party dominates. This
combination of pressures too could not be expected to influ-
ence the Chinese significantly, and would be aimed instead
at "isolating" the Chinese, although it would be hard to
credibly "isolate" a party which has 18 million of the 40
million Communists of the world.

A more militant line in Soviet foreign policy might
be designed in part to pre-empt the Chinese position. How-
ever, this secondary gain was apparently envisaged in the
hardening of Soviet policy in the latter part of 1960 and the
eye part of 1961, and it was not forthcoming; while the
Chinese ceased polemics on matters of strategy, they persisted
in their offensive behavior in other respects. In any case,
the decision had apparently been made before the 22nd CPSU
Congress not to make concessions to the Chinese in foreign
policy, as witness the entire line of the congress and the
retreat on the Berlin deadline.* A more likely tactic would
seem to be a further decline—marked already—in consultation
and cooperation with Peiping in formulating specific policies,
and an even more perfunctory support of China's cause in inter-
national organizations, e.g. in support of Peiping's claim to
China's UN seat. These pressures too would be insignificant.

The only significant political pressure now avail-
able to Moscow seems to be presented by the Sino-Soviet Treaty
of Friendship and Alliance. Some observers believe that the
treaty is no longer of much value to Peiping, as the Chinese
discovered in 1958, during their venture in the Taiwan Strait,
that the treaty could not be used effectively in support of a
Chinese venture which Moscow did not approve. However, even
if it is accepted that Moscow declined to give Peiping the de-
gree of support which it wanted in that venture (we ourselves

*Pravda in late January 1962 seemed to be underlining
the point that Moscow would not be pushed to the left by the
Chinese; the party newspaper quoted both Togliatti and Castro
to the effect that world war must be avoided "at any cost"—
an extreme statement of the Soviet position.
have made the same point), the treaty was in fact cited by both Moscow and Peiping at that time in statements to the effect that the USSR would indeed protect China against attack (even if Peiping could not count on it in support of a high-risk Chinese venture). Some observers also believe that this function of the treaty--protecting Communist China against attack--is not of much value to Peiping, as Peiping does not really expect anyone--contrary to its propaganda--to make an unprovoked attack on it. It is true that Peiping deliberately exaggerates the hostility of the outside world, but we believe nevertheless that Peiping could not have confidence that it would not be attacked; it might well believe, in the absence of the Soviet commitment, that the Chinese Nationalists, with massive U.S. support, would attempt the liberation of the mainland which Taipei has been promising for years; and Peiping might also fear more aggressive action by India in the Sino-Indian border dispute. Beyond this, the Chinese appear to see a good possibility of world war at some time in the next few years, before they have any considerable capabilities in modern weapons, and the Chinese would wish to have an ally who regarded the defense of China as being its own interests. Finally, some observers believe that Moscow has already leaked away much of the pressure available in the Sino-Soviet treaty, by stimulating doubts among the Chinese as to whether in current circumstances the USSR would honor its commitment to China's defense either in local war or world war. However, there is a great deal of difference between having doubts about it and being told flatly that the USSR no longer regards itself as bound by the treaty, or even (less harshly) being told that the commitment to render "military and other assistance by all means at its disposal" in the event of hostilities will henceforth be interpreted in minimal terms.

It is sometimes said that the USSR could not repudiate the Sino-Soviet treaty without impelling a Sino-Soviet break on the spot, so that this would not be a form of pressure exerted short of a break, it would instead be part of a break.* Indeed, it is sometimes contended that Moscow could not afford not to defend China even in the event of a break,

*There are provisions in the treaty itself--relating to mutual consultation, respect for territorial integrity, and non-interference in internal affairs--which could be cited to justify a repudiation of the treaty.
as a dissident Communist regime would be preferable to an anti-Communist regime—which might result from Western action encouraged by the new Chinese vulnerability. Both points might well be correct, but the first point would not seem to apply to a private statement of repudiation, made for example in a Soviet party letter to the Chinese party—a letter enlarging on Malinovsky's remark of January 1962 about socialist states "friendly to us." And the second point—about obligatory defense—would be regarded even by the Chinese as conjectural, well short of an assurance.

Soviet action of this kind would shock the Chinese party and perhaps do much to impel a challenge to Mao's leadership (of which more later). However, we believe that it would not force the present Chinese leadership to back down.

D. Economic Pressure on China

Whereas Khrushchev has not yet exerted the most promising political pressure available to him—relating to the Sino-Soviet treaty—he long ago took the most damaging economic measure available, withdrawal of the technicians. Since then, he has in effect been exploiting the contradiction between, on one hand, Peiping's presentation of Communist China as a world power and as the equal of the USSR in the bloc, and, on the other hand, the real and continuing weaknesses of Peiping as an economic and military power.

The Chinese party has had more than 18 months to think about the first of the consequences of its defiance of Moscow—i.e. the indefinite postponement, perhaps for decades, of China's achievement of status as a modern industrial and military power. It is true that, assuming better weather than in the past three years, China's total output might double over the next ten years, entailing an average overall growth rate of 7 percent a year, with industry rising at an average rate of about 10 percent and agriculture about 3 percent.* However,

*Some observers believe that, without large-scale Soviet support, the Chinese margin of production over population increase will be so narrow that Peiping can never get really ahead.
even this optimistic prospect is a far more modest objective than the Chinese were pursuing—and the USSR was supporting—up to mid-1960. As we noted in POLO-XIV, this compulsory reduction of Chinese prospects for technological advance almost certainly has not been accepted without considerable resentment—by some Chinese leaders—of Mao's intransigence in the dispute, but there is no evidence that Mao is now or will soon be prepared to abandon his positions in the dispute, in the hope of inducing Moscow to restore the level of Soviet support which existed before mid-1960.*

As for the question of an economic "crisis" in Communist China which would give Moscow a new opportunity in the near future, we noted in POLO-XIV (November 1961) that the Soviet party might chose to put maximum pressure on Mao at a time of maximum Chinese weakness, i.e. just before or during an anticipated food crisis in Communist China in spring 1962. Even last fall, however, we did not expect the crisis to be the kind of disaster which would force the Chinese party to accede in order to survive, and since that time the scope of the anticipated crisis has been reduced in the estimates of most observers. There thus seems even less chance—virtually no chance—that the Chinese will have to turn to Moscow for large-scale credits (or an easing of the terms of repayment of long-term debts) in order to buy food to avert a disaster; and it may be, as some observers believe, that the Chinese have known this ever since last fall, when we did not. In any case, it is generally agreed that the Chinese have enough money to buy the amount of food they will need in the spring; they might be forced to cut back their purchases of something else, probably machinery and equipment, which would force some further postponement in their long-range development plans, but they seem to be prepared to accept this.

The economic measures remaining to the Soviet party relate to Chinese debts to the USSR; the training of Chinese

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*The Chinese leaders seem to believe—or at least they tell themselves—that a post-Khrushchev Soviet leadership will correct Khrushchev's errors, including his China policy; if they are right, they will not have lost decades, only the period from mid-1960 to the time of a change in Soviet policy, plus about a year to prepare to receive the new program of Soviet support.
graduate students in the USSR; the flow of technical information to China; and Sino-Soviet and Sino-Satellite trade.

It is open to Moscow to demand—contrary to existing agreements—the immediate repayment of Chinese debts to the USSR, totaling about $700 million (the short-term debt of $320 million, run up in 1958-60, was converted to a long-term debt, part of the $700 million total, only last April). This measure would have no effect, however, as the Chinese, citing the agreements, would simply refuse to pay, and the Soviet demand—an empty gesture—would presumably be made only if the USSR had already decided to break trade relations (and probably diplomatic relations as well).

As for the students, graduations have reduced the number of Chinese graduate students in the USSR—the great majority in technical and scientific fields—from an estimated 4,500 in the academic year 1959-60 to an estimated 1,500-2,000 in the academic year 1961-62.* The flow of technical information from the USSR, most of it economic, has also been reduced. The maintenance of even these reduced relationships is of some importance to Peking in terms of long-term development. However, these relationships do not present an important means of pressure now, because Peking has already taken heavier blows to its plans for long-range development, and the severance of these relationships would not have immediate and marked impact on the Chinese economy.

Of all the measures remaining, only the area of Sino-Soviet and Sino-Satellite trade appears at all promising for Moscow, in terms of immediate impact on the economy. Nearly 40 percent of Chinese foreign trade in 1961 was conducted with the USSR, and, while Sino-Satellite trade declined sharply in 1961 for the same reasons that Sino-Soviet trade fell off, nevertheless about 12 percent of China's trade was with the Eastern European states; moreover, many Satellite technicians have remained in China. The cessation of China's trade with either the USSR or the Satellites would

*It is not clear whether Moscow or Peiping took the initiative in restricting the Chinese students in the USSR to those present in autumn 1960; in any case, none appear to have been sent since that time.
mean short-run dislocations (much less serious with respect to the Satellite trade) while Peiping attempted to develop other sources of supply--especially for petroleum products, metals, and machinery and equipment which constitute the bulk of current imports from the USSR. This cessation of trade would also mean the complete cessation of the already greatly reduced flow of military items. Moreover, having spent a decade equipping new factories with Soviet equipment, China would have a hard time getting spare parts and replacement equipment elsewhere. The Chinese would also have to find new export markets for some of the minerals and consumer goods which constitute the bulk of Chinese exports to the USSR; and in Western markets there would be a problem of the quality of some of these goods. Finally, they would probably find it difficult to get as good prices and terms of credit from the West.

However, there are several Free World countries--Great Britain and Japan in particular--which are eager to replace the USSR as large-scale suppliers of petroleum products and machinery and equipment to Communist China. As the Sino-Soviet relationship has deteriorated, Peiping has already shown itself willing to turn increasingly to the West for these commodities. Contingency planning of this kind requires some change in the political demands which Peiping has made on these countries (notably Japan), but the Chinese seem willing to make these changes, which need not entail any change in the fundamental attitude of Peiping toward the non-Communist world. Moreover, the nature of current difficulties makes it easier for the Chinese to make the shift. The Chinese leadership currently is concerned with keeping the regime in power, not with expanding industries. The present retrenchment reduces the need to make substantial long-term trade commitments to either the bloc or the non-Communist world for machinery and equipment.

In sum, a stoppage of Sino-Soviet and Sino-Satellite trade would not force the Chinese to accommodate, it would simply induce them to turn more to the West. In view of the dislocations this would entail, such Soviet action would mean a further postponement of China's achievement of the status of a modern industrial and military power. However, since the present Chinese leadership was willing to accept the first--and heavy--blow in the withdrawal of the technicians in 1960, these leaders would almost certainly be able to accept this lesser additional blow. As we suggested earlier with respect to Soviet repudiation of the Sino-Soviet treaty, Soviet exertion
of the remaining economic pressures on Peiping* might encourage a challenge to Mao's leadership, but, in the absence of an unforeseen economic disaster in China, it could almost certainly not force the currently dominant leaders to surrender.

E. Military Pressure on China

By "military" pressure we mean Soviet pressure on the Chinese military establishment, and therefore on the Chinese leadership through the military establishment. We see no chance of the use of Soviet military force to impose Moscow's will on Peiping--something little Albania has better reason to fear--and at least one Chinese Communist leader has said privately that Peiping has no fear that this will happen. There may be additional border incidents, particularly along the undefined border and particularly after a break, but we do not see such incidents as a significant form of pressure to be exerted before a break. The issues with which we are concerned are those of Soviet support to the development of the Chinese military establishment and Soviet protection of these developing forces.

Although the Chinese Communists may have tried and failed to obtain nuclear weapons from the USSR in the winter of 1957-58, by early 1958 Chinese political and military leaders (including the then Minister of Defense Peng Teh-huai) were alike committed to the view that the task of first priority for China was to construct a solid industrial and scientific base, with a very important component of military industry. As that base developed, Peiping was to build up, at a fairly rapid pace, a modern military establishment with the most advanced weapons systems.

Along with the extensive Soviet support to the Chinese industrial and scientific programs as a whole, the USSR

*Some indication of whether the USSR will increase its economic pressure on China should come from the current Sino-Soviet talks on trade in 1962; a Chinese delegation has been in Moscow since mid-December, thus far (mid-February) with no publicity on the results of the talks.
up to mid-1960 was giving extremely valuable support—in the form of military goods, machinery and equipment, engineers, and large numbers of technicians—to Chinese military industry (possibly including missile production) and the Chinese atomic energy program. The USSR was also providing advisers to many components of the Chinese Communist armed forces, and it was assisting substantially in long-term military research. This Soviet support was given primarily to the building of strong conventional forces, but it was to lead also to the eventual acquisition of a respectable (if not massive) force of nuclear/rocket weapons. Chinese military theorists had been adding to the "base" of Mao's military teachings, as their conventional forces grew, looking toward a nuclear capability as well.

With the withdrawal of the Soviet technicians in mid-1960, the Chinese military establishment was hit hard, and it has suffered additional blows since that time: shipments of military goods from the USSR have fallen to a very low level, almost a level of token support; there has been a drastic reduction in Soviet aid to military research; the military advisers have apparently been withdrawn; and China's economic circumstances have been so hard that some of the troops have been short of food and equipment, which of course has affected their training. In the absence of the technicians, with only small deliveries of military goods, and under economic pressure, vital defense projects have been left uncompleted or have had only limited use, and the Chinese have probably been moving only slowly in building their weapons systems, both conventional and advanced.* For these and other reasons, important components of Chinese forces have been recognized by Peiping as being much less effective than they were expected to be by this time.

It is open to Moscow to cut off all support to the Chinese military establishment—to halt current shipments of military goods, to halt aid to research, and, as part of actions toward a break in trade relations, to halt shipments of

*We do not know at what speed the Chinese have been moving toward the explosion of a nuclear device, but there is quite a distance between this event and the acquisition of a nuclear weapons system.
machinery and equipment necessary to the military establishment and shipments of petroleum products, which the military must have in order to operate from day to day. However, as noted previously, the Chinese can turn to the West for everything except the military goods and aid to research. Just as we noted with respect to economic pressure on China, the dominant Chinese leaders, having absorbed the first and heavy blow to the military establishment in 1960 and additional blows since that time, could absorb the relatively insignificant blows now of a cessation of the small military deliveries and of aid to research (not an immediate pressure in any case), and of the dislocation entailed in a turn to Western sources.

As for the Soviet umbrella, Chinese Communist military doctrine has long foreseen an interim period (which would have existed even if Peiping had acquired some nuclear weapons) in which Chinese forces would enter combat with a major Western antagonist under unfavorable conditions and with inferior weapons. Chinese doctrine for this interim period has been a defensive doctrine, envisaging the defeat of the enemy in China, with tactics adapted to the limited capabilities of Chinese armed forces and the Chinese armaments industry. It has been a have-not, face-saving doctrine, under which Chinese military objectives have necessarily been limited, and it has been highly important to Peiping to have a powerful friend, the USSR, to assist the Chinese in local wars and to carry the fight to the enemy's homeland in general wars.

As noted earlier in discussion of the Sino-Soviet treaty, Peiping apparently found in mid-1958 that it could not count on Soviet support of a high-risk Chinese venture, and it has had reason since mid-1960 to doubt whether Moscow would honor its commitment in local or general war. By carrying this process further, i.e. by threatening to repudiate the treaty, Moscow could reasonably expect to give additional encouragement to Chinese military leaders to challenge the dominant leaders of the party, but, as noted earlier, it could not reasonably expect this threat to force a surrender by the dominant leaders themselves.

F. Pro-Soviet Forces in the Chinese Leadership

The burden of the foregoing discussion has been that the dominant leaders of the Chinese party would probably continue to stand firm against Moscow in the Sino-Soviet dispute even if the Soviet party were to exert maximum pressure against
Peiping by such means—whether singly or in combination—as bringing down the Albanian leaders, withholding assistance in a Chinese economic crisis, breaking off Soviet and Eastern European trade with China, stopping deliveries of military goods, and threatening to repudiate or actually repudiating the Sino-Soviet treaty. At the same time, we have expressed the view that some of these actions might well encourage a challenge to the dominant leaders by other forces in the Chinese leadership. The question is whether such a challenge could be successful.

As we argued at some length in POLO XIV-61, Mao Tse-tung has almost certainly lost favor with some of his lieutenants in the past four years for his radical domestic policies, for his continued preferment of the party-machine leaders around Liu Shao-chi over others whose reservations about domestic policies had proved to be well-founded, for certain of his extreme positions in the Sino-Soviet dispute, and for his aggressive conduct of that dispute. (Anti-Mao forces are not necessarily pro-Soviet, but we think they tend to be.) The first challenge made by these anti-Mao forces—the challenge led by Peng Te-huai and probably Chang Wen-tien at the politburo level, supported by several lesser figures, in the summer of 1959—was both premature and poorly organized. It led to a purge of the party, the government, and the military establishment, thus depriving the anti-Mao forces of a substantial part of their actual and potential strength. In summer 1960, when the Soviet party struck its heaviest blow against the Chinese party by withdrawing the technicians, the Chinese leaders apparently stood together against the Soviet party; although a few second-level figures have been missing since that time, there is no evidence of a significant challenge at that time to Mao and the party-machine leaders.

Nevertheless it is reasonable to believe, and POLO-XIV gave some of the evidence* for believing, that there remain some Chinese party leaders—mainly government figures,

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*It is only fair to admit that some of our colleagues think that the evidence is not impressive. It is true that not much of it is 'hard' evidence, but we do not expect much hard evidence until another challenge actually takes place; we had even less impressive evidence before the challenge of summer 1959.
economic specialists, and professional military men (as opposed to political officers)--with a different conception of Chinese national interests than the one dominant in recent years. In this conception, Chinese national interests would require an accommodation with the USSR in order to develop Communist China into a first-class power within the next 10 to 15 years (which was the goal before the USSR withdrew its support). This accommodation would require a retreat from the "personality cult" (the end of Mao's dictatorship), the withdrawal of advocacy of a world Communist strategy which is wrong-headed (in this view) and which Peiping itself has not the capabilities to pursue, a return to Soviet principles of economic development, and accession to majority rule in the world Communist movement (particularly since a powerful future China might command the majority). In other words, we think that there are other pro-Soviet and anti-Mao forces, beyond those who made their challenge in 1959, who have kept their counsel and who may be better prepared when the next opportunity presents.*

It is the latter consideration that enables us to argue that anti-Mao forces may make another challenge in 1962-63, despite their failure to do so at the time of the Soviet initiative in summer 1960. In our view, these forces had the same interest in 1960 as they had had in 1959, but they were no better prepared in 1960 than in 1959. The Soviet action in withdrawing the technicians seemed to come as a surprise to all hands and followed too closely the Chinese purge--so that, even if the issue of the technicians was a good one on which to challenge Mao, the necessary arrangements had not been made.

*We continue to regard Chou En-lai as one of these who would like to establish a more cordial and cooperative relationship with the USSR, despite Chou's leading role in recent months in stating Chinese positions offensive to the USSR. We do not agree with those who believe that Chou, who had appeared to be Khrushchev's favorite, has discredited himself with the Soviet party by his recent behavior; we think that Khrushchev can make due allowance for duress, having experienced much the same thing at Stalin's hands, and that Chou would still probably be the first choice as quarterback of a Soviet team in China.
As we argued in POLO-XIV, there seems to us little chance that Mao would quietly step down simply at request or as a result of a vote in the politburo, so the challengers would not act unless they had confidence (whether rightly or wrongly) that they could bring to bear superior military force. If there is to be an early challenge to Mao, in our view it will almost certainly come from those who since mid-1960 have been lining up their military support or who will be doing so in the period before the challenge is made.

The challenge, if it comes, will probably coincide with another dramatic issue, such as a virtual break in Sino-Soviet economic relations or a Soviet threat to withdraw from the Sino-Soviet treaty (or, of course, an actual break between the parties)—developments which would permit the anti-Mao forces to argue that there was no longer any hope under Mao's leadership for either the rapid development of China as an industrial and military power or even the defense of China.*

As we noted above, this argument, whether made in the politburo or in a smaller meeting with Mao, would be backed by a threat of military force.

We do not anticipate that Khrushchev will actually intervene in Chinese party affairs, in the sense of directly conspiring in a challenge to Mao by other leaders or even in the sense of authorizing them to promise a restoration of the Soviet program of support (as it existed before mid-1960) to a new Chinese leadership. But we think that he has already made this point by clear implication—that the fall of the dominant

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*In POLO-XIV we suggested the possibility of a challenge to Mao at the time of an anticipated food crisis in spring 1962, a crisis exacerbated by some such Soviet action as a threat to withdraw from the treaty. The estimated scope of the crisis has been reduced since the time of writing (early November), so the possibility of a challenge at that time and on that partial ground has likewise been reduced. However, Soviet actions themselves, even in the absence of a food crisis, would seem to present a suitable occasion if the anti-Mao forces are properly prepared. A Soviet denunciation of the Chinese party at next month's plenum might trigger a challenge.
Chinese leaders would be followed by a great improvement in Sino-Soviet relations—just as he has made it blatantly with respect to the Albanian leaders. And we think that he would be underlining the point by such an action as breaking trade relations or withdrawing from the treaty—that such an action would in effect be an invitation to anti-Mao forces in the Chinese leadership to make their challenge. If they did not, he could take the further step of breaking relations with the Chinese party, calculating in part that this step might be enough to provoke a successful challenge, or, if not, that still other Chinese leaders, over a longer term, would prepare a challenge.

In POLO-XIV we expressed our doubt that any group of challengers to Mao and the party-machine leaders could line up sufficient armed force to make a successful challenge. This belief has, if anything, been strengthened in the past few months, with evidence that Mao's man Lin Piao,* the Minister of Defense, has recovered his health sufficiently to be quite active and has taken over the party's military committee, and that Mao's man Lo Jui-ching, the Chief-of-Staff, has taken over supervision of the political department, perhaps from the purged Huang Ko-cheng's old post on the secretariat. Possibly relevant also is the death (9 February) of Li Ko-nung, a secret police figure who may have been close to Chou En-lai and may have been important in any plans to challenge Mao. Thus we reaffirm the conclusions of POLO-XIV: that there is a possibility that Mao will be brought down by assassination or in a coup, but that it is more likely that Mao and most of the party-machine leaders will stand together successfully against their opponents—regardless of Soviet pressure—until Mao retires or dies.**

*It is true that Peng Te-huai was also regarded as "Mao's man," only little less so than Lin Piao; we do not exclude the possibility that Lin will turn against Mao, we simply think this improbable.

**We have too little solid information on Mao's health to estimate the chances of his retirement or death in the next year or two. If he is indeed suffering from cerebral ischemia, he may well die in the next year or two; senility, however, would not hasten his death. Either disorder would presumably hasten his retirement. Either his retirement or his death should present the Soviet party and pro-Soviet forces in the Chinese leadership with another opportunity.
G. The Prospects For a Break

It has been evident, since at latest mid-1960, that there was little prospect of a genuine resolution of the Sino-Soviet dispute under the leaderships of Khrushchev and Mao. When forced to commit ourselves at six-month intervals, however, on the question of whether the dispute would lead to a break as we define it—a break in either party or party-and-state relations—in the next six months, most of us (not only in this small group, but in larger task forces) have each time agreed that the dispute probably would not lead to a break in that period. Thus far these estimates have been correct. In the past six months, however, the Sino-Soviet relationship has moved into a new stage which compels a new assessment of the prospects for a break.

As virtually all observers have pointed out, each party would have much to lose from a break, even if the other party could be made to look primarily responsible for it. For Khrushchev, a break would mean an issue to be exploited by his enemies at home (even if those of his opponents still in power were really no more pro-Chinese than he), the probable formation of an Asian Communist camp oriented to Peiping, the potential addition to this camp of a bloc of parties from other underdeveloped countries, additional challenges to the pro-Soviet leaderships of many parties of the movement, a blow to the concepts of the predominance of the "forces of socialism" and of Communism as the wave of the future, and increased obstacles to direct relations with the pro-Soviet forces in the Chinese party. As the leader of the weaker party, Mao would have even more to lose. A break would mean an issue to be exploited by his opponents at home, unfriendly relations (if any at all) with the great majority of the parties of the movement, additional action against pro-Chinese forces by the stronger pro-Soviet leaderships in many of the parties, the probable loss of China's military protector and its logical source of emergency aid in the event of an economic disaster, and, of course, the loss of any possibility of influencing the only strong member of the bloc to carry out the militant strategy Peiping advocates.

There may be an indefinite prolongation of the present state of the relationship—of disunity short of an open break. There could even be some increase in Soviet pressure on China.
without a break in this sense. In such a relationship, polemics on world Communist strategy would continue. Each party would withhold support from specific foreign and domestic policies of the other, while they would continue to cooperate in some areas of foreign policy* and the USSR would continue to give some small economic and military support (perhaps at an even lower level) to Chinese programs. Moscow would continue to encourage doubts as to the degree of its commitment under the Sino-Soviet treaty and to make clear to Peiping that it would not support the Chinese in any high-risk venture. The Soviets would try to bring down, and the Chinese to buoy up, the Albanian leaders, and the two parties would continue to compete vigorously for influence in the movement as a whole. And each party would continue to encourage indirectly a challenge to the dominant leaders of the other by opposition forces in the party. Many observers believe that both parties will be content with a prolongation of a relationship of this kind indefinitely, in preference to a break, in part because (they contend) each party believes that there is nothing much it can do just now to contribute to a change in the leadership of the other and each thinks that the leadership of the other party may be changed in the reasonably near future (a year or two) in any case. (In this connection, the Soviet party will probably have a better idea, after the Chinese party congress expected this year, of the line-up of forces in the Chinese party.)

However, we think that Khrushchev would not have launched and pressed on with this new offensive (at the 22nd CPSU Congress and subsequently) if he had meant the relationship to continue indefinitely in that uneasy state between an alliance and a break. Moreover, since he had had considerable experience of the dominant Chinese leaders, he could hardly have had confidence that they would give in to any combination of pressures available to him, so he must—at the least—have been prepared to accept a break. While we cannot judge what his estimate may be of the possibility of forcing a change in the Chinese leadership, he could reasonably estimate that he has some chance and that he might as well try it—calculating that the challengers to Mao might be prepared to move at the time

*Many of their foreign policy aims would still roughly coincide even in the event of a break.
of the next dramatic Soviet move short of a break, or, if not then, then after a break. If there were no challenge to Mao or if the challenge were made but were unsuccessful (as we think likely), Khrushchev after a break would at least have the consolations of gaining greater credibility in the non-Communist world for his proclaimed policies,* of freedom from political, economic, and military obligations to Peiping (in particular, freedom from any responsibility for Chinese ventures), of better discipline in the smaller camp and movement that remained, and of freedom to combat Chinese influence in the bloc and the movement openly and with all resources at his command.

The Chinese, ever since the Moscow Conference of the 81 parties in November 1960, have acted in accordance with the policy they are reliably reported to have adopted at a party meeting in January 1961: to launch no new offensives, but to give "all-out" support to Albania and to respond to every Soviet attack in kind. A Chinese Communist leader is said to have reaffirmed that policy recently in a private talk--to retaliate openly against any open attack on China.

As suggested above, we think that Khrushchev does intend to exert some combination of the remaining pressures available to him. We lean to the view that he will exert most of these pressures before breaking with the Chinese party, although we recognize the possibility--as another observer has suggested--that Khrushchev has already concluded (as we have) that he cannot force a Chinese retreat and that he might as well break now, and that the CPSU central committee plenum in March 1962 will approve some such action as the dispatch of a circular letter to the other parties stating the Soviet intention to break with the Chinese. If Khrushchev indeed chooses (as we think) to run through at least some of the remaining pressures

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*This seems to us quite an important gain. Both Western audiences and the neutrals would be more disposed to believe that Khrushchev genuinely favored "peaceful coexistence" if he were willing to break with the Chinese party in part on this issue. The Soviet party has already used this line to good effect, and a break would greatly increase the value of the line.
before breaking, trying to force the Chinese to retreat or to make the break, there are several points in that process at which a break—in party or party-and-state relations—might come.

If the Soviets were to use military force—directly or indirectly—against the Albanian leaders (which we think unlikely), that action would probably force the Chinese party to break with the Soviet party right there, even if no further action were taken against China itself. Soviet sponsorship of a successful coup would probably be a less clear-cut affair, and might not lead to a break with Peiping.

As for direct action against China, Moscow has gone through all stages of criticizing the Chinese except that of publicly criticizing the Chinese by name, through Soviet spokesmen, on the full range of issues in the dispute. The Soviet party might be able to run through the entire list this way without forcing a break, so long as it did not attack Mao's sacrosanct person. Although the Chinese might at first simply reply in kind to an attack on Mao personally, we think that exchanges of this kind would soon lead to a break between the parties.

In the economic and military relationships, we think that Moscow could probably go through all the rest of the stages in reducing its support of Peiping without provoking a break between the parties—short of breaking off economic relations entirely, which would mean ceasing all support to the military establishment as well. A complete cessation of Soviet support would be in effect an embargo, and might soon be followed by a break between both the parties and the states.

A Soviet threat to repudiate the Sino-Soviet treaty would probably not force a break between the parties. The Chinese instead would probably challenge Moscow to take the step of publicly repudiating the treaty. We doubt that Moscow would do this; if it did, that action in itself would almost certainly lead to an early break between both the parties and the states.

If Khrushchev, contrary to our expectation, should actually intervene in Chinese party affairs by conspiring with, or authorizing to speak for him, a group of Chinese leaders
 antagonistic to Mao, Mao would certainly break with Moscow.* As noted earlier, we think that Khrushchev has already made this point indirectly—that successful challengers to Mao could expect to be suitably rewarded.

Should Khrushchev exert some combination of these various pressures (short of a break in party or party-and-government relations) and still fail to force the dominant Chinese leaders to retreat (we think he will fail), still fail to force a change in the Chinese leadership (he has a chance, but we think he will fail), and should the Chinese party not have broken relations with the Soviet party at some point in this process, Khrushchev himself might decide (at any point in the process) that the only significant pressure remaining to him is that of making the break himself. We think that at that stage he would probably be animated primarily by the hope of imposing better discipline on the surviving Soviet camp and of yet provoking a successful challenge to Mao by other Chinese leaders.

The various possibilities for a Sino-Soviet break as we define it—a break in either party or party-and-state relations—seem to us to add up to the probability of a break at some time in the next year or so, if no large new factor is introduced. Such a factor would be a change in the leadership of either party—a change that, regardless of which leaders were to succeed either Khrushchev or Mao, would probably serve to deter or at least to delay a break while the leaders of one party explored the attitudes of the new leaders of the other.

With Moscow still reprinting rather than originating criticism of the Chinese by name, and still issuing only indirect warnings to China of the consequences of continued defiance, the Soviet party seems to be marking time before the exertion of one or another of the forms of pressure discussed above.

*Khrushchev has more than once spoken in defense of Peng Te-huai since the latter’s fall, but evidence is lacking that Peng was authorized (or even pretended to be authorized) to speak for Khrushchev in Peng’s challenge to Mao in 1959. Chinese intervention in the Soviet party could likewise be the reason—or pretext—for a break, at Soviet initiative.
We do not know what Moscow is waiting for: conceivably, for the results of a Chinese party plenum or of a conference in Peiping of pro-Chinese parties, both of which are rumored (in mid-February) to be scheduled for the near future. In the meantime, i.e., before taking some new action against the Chinese, Moscow may be making a fresh effort to swing Peiping's supporters to its side, as witness Ponomarev's trip to Hanoi (announced on 19 February).

As noted above, a Sino-Soviet break could come at any time, but we think that it will take some months for Khrushchev to work through the process of exerting a pressure, evaluating the response, choosing another pressure, and so on. Whatever the pace of the process in the direction of a break, if there is no change in the leadership of either the Soviet party or the Chinese party before mid-1963, we think that a Sino-Soviet break as we have defined it—a break in either party or party-and-state relations—before that time is more likely than not.