THE SHOWDOWN ON SOVIET AUTHORITY
IN THE "MOVEMENT"
(ESAU XXVII)
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THE SHOWDOWN ON SOVIET AUTHORITY IN THE "MOVEMENT"

This is a working paper of the DD/I Research Staff. In its main body, the paper offers (a) an account of developments in the Sino-Soviet relationship from October 1964 (the time of Khrushchev's fall) through January 1965, centered on the Soviet party's plans to assert its authority in meetings of the Communist parties, and (b) a speculation on the prospects for any such meetings and for Sino-Soviet negotiations before or after them. In an annex, the paper traces the development of the dispute, centered on this same issue of Soviet authority as expressed in meetings of the parties, from the meetings of 1960 to the week of Khrushchev's fall. There is a five-page summary for the reader who requires only the essentials. And there is, for the first time, an index.

While there is doubt as to whether the preparatory meeting (for a conference of all the parties) now scheduled for 1 March will actually convene on that date, this paper is meant to be useful whether that particular meeting is held or not. That is, it considers the issues which will arise in any such meetings whenever held or in bilateral Sino-Soviet negotiations whenever held.

Throughout the preparation of this paper, we have had good counsel from several of our colleagues in DD/I components—OCI, ONE, and ORR—and from officers of the DD/P. We are particularly indebted to of OCI and Messrs. of ONE, and to None of our colleagues should be regarded, however, as assenting to every one of the interpretations and predictions in the paper. The DD/I/RS would welcome further comment, addressed to either the Chief or Deputy Chief of the staff, at
THE SHOWDOWN ON SOVIET AUTHORITY IN THE "MOVEMENT"

Summary and Conclusions

After a year of a "de facto break" between the Soviet and Chinese parties, in August 1964 the Soviet party publicly committed itself to a preparatory meeting in December 1964 for a world Communist conference in 1965, a meeting which if held would formalize the split in the movement. When Khrushchev was ousted in October, one of the charges against him was that of mismanaging the dispute (mishandling both the Chinese and the parties of the Soviet camp). It was assumed that his successors would make some tactical change, if only to return to the earlier policy of temporizing rather than moving bravely ahead to a break. The new leaders soon implied a possible willingness to retreat from the December meeting, but at the same time they indicated that they were not prepared to surrender on the larger matters in dispute.

In early November, on the eve of Sino-Soviet exploratory talks in Moscow, the Chinese party publicly reaffirmed that its demand was for a Soviet surrender on the issues in dispute, although this could be undertaken by stages. In the talks, lasting through the week of 9-13 November, the Chinese were intransigent, reportedly (a) demanding a radical change in Soviet policies—especially toward the United States—as the price for a cessation of polemics, (b) declining to attend either the December preparatory meeting or a postponed meeting, and (c) failing even to agree to a resumption of full-scale Sino-Soviet talks. A week later, the Chinese publicly gave the new Soviet leaders what was in effect an ultimatum—that the new leaders must either abandon Khrushchev's policies or face fresh polemical attacks by Peiping.

The Soviet party in late November, still playing for time, privately proposed to the other parties that the preparatory meeting scheduled for 15 December be
postponed to 1 March. The Chinese reportedly rejected this proposal out of hand (Chinese conditions could not be met simply by assigning a new date), but this was not confirmed by the Chinese themselves. The Chinese may have withheld a categorical rejection, either on the chance that the meeting would shape up in a way which could be best exploited by their participation, or in order to issue it in a public statement shortly before the meeting.

On 12 December, the Soviet party publicly committed itself to a preparatory meeting on 1 March. The Chinese continued to withhold direct comment, but in late December they publicized the rejection of the meeting by one of the pro-Chinese parties, and in effect told their followers that they did not intend to take part and that the parties of their camp should not take part.

In early January, the Soviet party was reported to be still trying to arrange a resumption of full-scale talks with the Chinese, and the harsh Soviet commentaries on President Johnson's State of the Union message at that time were consistent with such an effort. Other Soviet pronouncements, however, made clear that the new Soviet leaders were still not prepared to go as far in this direction—a harder line toward the United States—as Peiping wished. In mid-January, Chinese pronouncements on issues in the dispute indicated that Peiping was still intransigent.

In any case, another showdown was ahead on the matter of the 1 March preparatory meeting. In not holding the meeting as originally scheduled for December, the Soviet party had been defeated in the first showdown. The Soviet party's problems, in moving toward the re-scheduled meeting, seemed much the same, and a degree worse.

In response to current Soviet overtures for full-scale talks, Peiping is probably demanding a revocation of the 1 March meeting. The Soviet party is probably unwilling to do this as an explicit condition. Thus we doubt that such talks are now under way or, even if the
CPSU soon decides to postpone the meeting for other reasons, will get under way before 1 March.

A good case can be made for the proposition that the Soviet party--fearing a resumption of Chinese polemics, under pressure from other parties, and calculating that a meeting will not add appreciably to recognition of Soviet authority--will retreat from the 1 March meeting. (The Chinese seem likely to encourage this by making a definitive statement shortly before 1 March.) A good case can also be made, however, for the view that the Soviet party--for the sake of its claim to any degree of authority in any kind of a movement--will hold the meeting on schedule. It seems a toss-up. There is a chance of a meeting which opens on schedule but closes in just a day or two, on the ground that the time is not yet ripe; the apparent plan, however, if the meeting is held at all, is for a prolonged meeting, of several sessions, with intervals between them for coordination with all parties.

If the meeting is indeed held, its most important event will probably be its convening, in formalizing the split in the movement. Of the 26 parties invited to the December meeting, only 18 or 19 would be expected to attend. The six parties of the Chinese camp might conceivably show up at the last moment, but seem much more likely to stand on principle and boycott a meeting; Moscow might be able to induce the North Vietnamese to break ranks, but this seems doubtful. The Rumanians would probably be absent, and so might the Cubans. Some other parties might be newly invited.

The Soviet party has not committed itself to any fixed objectives in a preparatory meeting (beyond that of getting other parties to attend it), and is free to pursue a hard, a moderate, or a soft line. There is an outside chance that Moscow would try briefly for a hard combination--such as formal majority rule, a detailed common program described as a "general line," the excommunication of the Chinese party, and the establishment of some new central organization for the "movement"; and there is a better chance that it would try seriously for
a moderate combination such as de facto majority rule, a broadbrush general line, a harsh condemnation of the Chinese party, and the formation of a standing committee to act for the parties between conferences. But Moscow has been encouraging the parties to believe that it would settle for a soft combination, and this seems all that it would be likely to get: discussions prolonged until agreement was reached, and, at the end of several sessions, a document expressing a minimal agreement on a few basic propositions and either impersonally condemning Chinese offenses (e.g. polemics and factionalism) or gently criticizing Peiping itself, with no provision for any new central organ or for disciplinary action by conferences. As for a subsequent conference, there seems only an even chance that a preparatory meeting could agree to have one at a definite date. If so, the likely date would be 1966, with an invitation list of from 88 to (possibly) more than 100 parties.

Judged by the standards of 1960, a preparatory meeting held in the near future would probably be a failure, in that it would not speak for the "movement" and would not produce a document even as useful as the 1960 statement. By the standards of 1961-64, however, if the meeting were to reach any agreements, it might be regarded as a limited success. That is, it would be speaking for a movement--speaking for the large majority of Communist parties, and expressing some sense of a concerted progression toward a common goal, a sense which has been missing in the Soviet camp.

If the Soviet party does go ahead with a preparatory meeting, the Chinese party might sponsor a counter-meeting, in which it could assemble upwards of 45 "parties" (including recognized parties, splinter parties, and purported parties). However, Peiping would probably wish to increase its holdings along these lines before sponsoring such a meeting.

If Moscow retreats from the 1 March meeting (not just postponing it to another date, but cancelling it without rescheduling it), the Chinese might then agree to a resumption of full-scale Sino-Soviet talks. Should the Russians still be interested in getting the Chinese
to attend a meeting, it is doubtful that the two parties could reach agreement on the terms of Chinese participation in an early meeting. Moreover, even if Moscow were to give up the thought of meetings and try simply to reach an agreement on a cessation of polemics, the Chinese would probably reaffirm that their price for a cessation is a radical change in Communist strategy, particularly in Soviet policy toward the United States. The Chinese would probably also make extreme demands with respect to relations among Communist states and parties.

In sum, the best that Moscow would seem able to do, in negotiations with the Chinese on any combination of matters, is to buy time at a ruinous price, i.e. to gain a temporary cessation of Chinese polemical attacks at a cost which could not be long supported. Moreover, even if Moscow were willing to try to pay this price, the Chinese would not abandon their efforts to increase their holdings among the Communist parties; in this area of the dispute, Moscow can only hope to reduce the rate of accretion to the Chinese camp and make an occasional recovery.

If Moscow retreats from a preparatory meeting and conference, it will presumably give greater attention to bilateral and regional meetings which do not speak for any "movement." Even this minimal assertion of Soviet authority—seeking endorsement of Soviet positions in these small meetings—would probably not check the growth of neutralism or the calls for "autonomy." Here too, Moscow can only hope to slow the rate of loss.

The "movement" in the classical sense is clearly finished. Moscow must decide now whether to give up even the concept of a movement. Whatever Moscow's decision, it must accept some further losses.
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THE SHOWDOWN ON SOVIET AUTHORITY IN THE "MOVEMENT"

For more than a year before Khrushchev's fall, there had been an open break--some say, "de facto break"--between the Soviet and Chinese parties; since July 1963, following the failure of the Sino-Soviet talks in Moscow, the two parties had been publicly denouncing each other, by name, on the full range of issues in their dispute. And for about eight months there had been an open split in the world Communist movement; in February 1964 the Chinese party had publicly proclaimed and justified such a split, and had offered itself as the center of the "true" movement. In August 1964 the Soviet party had committed itself to a showdown on the issue of Soviet authority, in either the movement (all of the parties) or a movement (the Soviet camp): it had publicly scheduled, for mid-December 1964, a preparatory meeting for a conference of Communist parties in mid-1965, it had invited 25 other parties (including the Chinese party and five other parties of the Chinese camp) to the December meeting, and it had declared flatly that the meeting would proceed even if some of the invited parties did not attend. There was inescapably to be a showdown: for the Soviet party, whether it would hold the meeting on schedule; for the Chinese party, whether it would stand firm in its refusal to take part in any meeting except on its own terms; for the other invited parties of both camps, whether to attend the meeting; and for all other parties, whether to go on record in approving or disapproving the Soviet party's plans. The Chinese party seemed confident that Moscow could only lose: it could either retreat from the meeting, thus failing to assert even the minimal degree of authority in the movement entailed in holding the meeting at all, or it could proceed with a meeting which would formalize the split in the movement and would also demonstrate (in the course of the meeting) how little authority the Soviet party still possessed with the parties of its own camp. This paper traces developments from Khrushchev's fall through the Soviet loss of the first showdown (in December) to Moscow's reluctant movement toward another showdown (the meeting scheduled for 1 March), and goes on to speculate about a showdown at that time or later.
The Chinese Communists were probably as surprised as almost all other observers (including ourselves) by the Soviet announcement on 15 October of the removal of Khrushchev as first secretary and premier on the transparently false grounds of "advanced age and deteriorating health."

The Chinese had been doing their best for several years to bring Khrushchev down. They had been denouncing his policies since 1960 and him personally since mid-1963, they had repeatedly rebuffed his overtures, they had publicly and privately invited other Soviet leaders to detach themselves from him, and they had publicly predicted his eventual overthrow. However, while they may have been encouraged by the apparent decline in his strength after the failure of his missile base venture in Cuba in autumn 1962 (a failure which the Chinese alone treated as an unmitigated disaster for the bloc), they had seen him recover in the spring of 1963 and had also seen the shelving of Kozlov, whom they had seemed to regard as the most friendly—or least hostile—of active Soviet leaders: and while they may have been encouraged again in early 1964 by the handling of the Soviet party letter to other parties asking for coordinated action against the Chinese (the letter was sent out two days before the meeting of the Soviet party plenum which was to consider the very subject taken up in the letter, suggesting Khrushchev's wish to present the party with an accomplished fact rather than to open the way for debate), they had seen Khrushchev in recent months move toward a showdown with the Chinese without apparent interference from his comrades.*

*It was not until late September and early October that there were any signs of second thoughts in the Soviet leadership about the coming showdown (the preparatory meeting scheduled for December); these signs were faint, and in any case did not make clear whether these second thoughts, if operating at all, were those of Khrushchev or of other leaders opposed to Khrushchev's plans.
Presumably owing to this impression of the solidarity of Soviet leaders, Chinese comment in that period had specified that Khrushchev was "especially" guilty but had said again and again that Peiping's differences were not simply with Khrushchev but with "Soviet party leaders," with "you" (all of you), with "leading comrades of the CPSU," and with "the revisionist Khrushchev clique."

The Chinese, like Western observers, had to try to assess the importance of the Sino-Soviet dispute in Khrushchev's fall. The bulk of the reports agreed that the dispute was one important item in the charges, and these reports were credible. That is, Khrushchev could be made to look responsible for much of the steady decline in Soviet authority in the bloc and movement since 1956, and those seeking to bring him down—for whatever combination of reasons—would be expected to exploit this opportunity. Broken down, the charge of mismanagement of the dispute seemed to be that Khrushchev was not handling properly either the Chinese camp or the parties of his own camp. As for the Chinese, Khrushchev's conduct of the dispute had been undignified and erratic, and (so the argument went) had provoked the Chinese into harder positions than they would otherwise have taken. As for the parties of the Soviet camp, even if it were conceded that the Chinese were so intransigent and outrageous that a showdown was necessary, Khrushchev had not got his forces into a good position for a showdown, too many important parties were reluctant or opposed. Thus a change of tactics—in some direction—was necessary.

There was no evidence, however, that Khrushchev's successors had any real plan of their own, which they believed Khrushchev to have been frustrating, either for resolving the Sino-Soviet dispute (or even improving the relationship, beyond inducing a temporary reduction or cessation of polemics) or for restoring Soviet authority with the parties of the Soviet camp (both for itself and for the use of these parties against the Chinese camp if a showdown proved to be necessary). Most Western observers thought that the change in tactics would amount to little more than buying time, in other words would be a return to the
earlier policy of temporizing rather than moving bravely ahead to a complete break.

The first reports of private Chinese reactions to Khrushchev's fall indicated that the Chinese gave much greater importance to themselves as a factor than did other observers. They were said to believe that the deterioration of the Sino-Soviet relationship was genuinely the central issue on which Khrushchev had been brought down, and, consequently, that their position would be very strong in negotiations with the new leaders.

Whether one believed that the new Soviet leaders had a radical new plan or believed instead that they had in mind only a change of tactics, it seemed likely that there would be some change in the Soviet position with respect to the preparatory meeting—scheduled for 15 December—for a world Communist conference. It had seemed clear that Khrushchev was headed for another failure at that meeting: a boycott of the meeting by the parties of the Chinese camp and at least one of the parties (Romania's) of the Soviet camp (thus an absolute denial of Soviet authority by those parties, a denial of Moscow's authority even to convene a meeting); and a failure to gain appreciably greater recognition of Soviet authority even by the parties of the Soviet camp which chose to attend—a failure to gain such recognition in terms of some combination of things that Moscow had seemed to favor, such as an agreement on a meaningful "general line," the establishment of some kind of new central organization for the movement, and the acceptance of majority rule in the operation of future conferences of the parties.

The anticipated change in the Soviet position on the preparatory meeting was an offer—as part of an agreement on the resumption of full-scale bilateral talks—to reopen discussion on the terms of Chinese participation in the meeting, an offer which would entail a postponement of the meeting. Such a tactical change would have the advantages of (a) being consistent with the charge that Khrushchev had badly mishandled the dispute, (b) providing an opportunity to determine whether Khrushchev's
removal had made any appreciable difference in Chinese terms (both for participation in the meeting and for an improvement in Sino-Soviet relations generally), and (c) demonstrating to the parties of the Soviet camp that the Soviet party had indeed done all that it could reasonably be asked to do.

At the same time, the new Soviet leaders could not let it appear—even if it were true—that Khrushchev's handling of the Chinese was a large factor in his downfall. To do so would be to weaken further the already weak Soviet position. The Soviet party would have to try to find some way of improving the relationship without at the same time encouraging the Chinese to believe that the new leaders would accept the previous Chinese terms for a substantial improvement—namely, a Soviet surrender.*

Early Maneuvering: Peiping tactfully reported the fall of Khrushchev without comment. And, while the Chinese press soon reprinted an Albanian attack on the "renegades" of "Khrushchev's group," the Chinese leaders sent a cordial if noncommittal message of congratulations to the new Soviet leaders and withheld polemical comment.

*Some observers have speculated that the timing of Khrushchev's fall was related to the Chinese explosion (the following day) of a nuclear device—i.e., that Khrushchev's comrades had moved quickly, so that the removal would not appear to be a response to the feat; whether this speculation occurred to Peiping or not, the feat could be expected to strengthen Chinese confidence. Some other observers offered the more spectacular conjecture that Khrushchev's comrades were heading off a Khrushchev ultimatum to the Chinese to close down their nuclear development program or suffer its destruction by Soviet or Soviet-American action; this conjecture, which shortly appeared in the Western press, would also be expected to strengthen Peiping's belief that it could make large demands on the new leaders.
on issues in the dispute. Peiping seemed clearly to be waiting for the new leaders to make an overture.*

Pravda on 17 October confirmed that Khrushchev had indeed been pushed. The party newspaper condemned both the style of his leadership and the results of it, both his failure to coordinate his policy decisions and the failures of too many of his initiatives.

This first Soviet comment in effect sketched the limits of a possible accommodation with the Chinese. It reaffirmed in its first paragraph the validity of the "general line" formulated by the Soviet party at its congresses of 1956, 1959 and 1961; and, with respect to particular matters of Communist strategy, it went on to reaffirm the Soviet party's favor for "peaceful coexistence," for the settlement of disputes through negotiations, and for improved relations with "all countries." In other words, the new leaders were not prepared to make a radical change with respect to the central issue on matters of strategy--the USSR's policies toward the United States.

*Neither Brezhnev nor Kosygin had been closely associated with Khrushchev in his clashes with the Chinese. Brezhnev had been cordial in his role as the principal escort for a group of Chinese leaders in their tour of the USSR in November 1960; neither had taken part in the bitter exchanges with the Chinese at multiparty conferences or (so far as we know) in bilateral talks; and both had been evasive or restrained in their comment on issues in the dispute. Peiping had only once criticized Brezhnev by name (in March 1964, in a footnote), and Brezhnev had only once criticized the Chinese by name (in September 1964, for "splitting" activities); and neither the Chinese nor Kosygin had found occasion to criticize the other by name. However, both Brezhnev and Kosygin (especially Brezhnev) had been publicly associated with most of Khrushchev's positions; there was no reason to assume that Peiping excluded either man--as it had apparently excluded Kozlov--from its various formulations (see above) denouncing the Soviet leaders collectively.
There were some passages of the Pravda editorial which seemed to imply a willingness to seek a new basis for accommodation with respect to relations between Communist states and parties. As for the states, the editorial spoke of measures taken for the security of the "entire socialist community," and of the Soviet "duty" to develop its economic and other relationships with the rest of the bloc. Such passages suggested that Moscow was prepared—to exchange for Chinese concessions—to restore Soviet aid to Chinese programs of economic and military development and to make a more meaningful instrument of the Sino-Soviet treaty. As for the parties, Pravda spoke of the importance of "unity," called for a conference of "all" the parties (i.e., including the Chinese camp), and did not speak of the preparatory meeting scheduled for December (the meeting which would formalize a complete split).* This treatment implied a possible willingness to give the Chinese a victory in the showdown called by Khrushchev (the preparatory meeting), while undertaking negotiations on the terms for Chinese participation in a postponed meeting and conference.

Brezhnev on 19 October, in his first speech as first secretary, spoke on similar lines. The Chinese could conclude that this was the considered position of the new leadership.

Chinese behavior at the meeting of the WFTU General Council in Budapest, 19-24 October, was presumably intended to serve as a partial reply to the Soviet statements of 17 and 19 October. The Chinese delegate is said to have made a polemical speech recapitulating Chinese positions in the dispute, and the Chinese, with their customary supporters (Albania, North Korea, North Vietnam, Indonesia) voted against the resolution appealing for the "unity" of trade union forces. Perhaps of special interest, the delegations of Rumania, Cuba, and Italy—key parties of the Soviet camp, with respect to the scheduled preparatory

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*According to our records, this was the first time in 1964 that any voice of the Soviet party had called for a conference of "all" the parties.
meeting for a conference—all abstained from voting on the resolution. At the same time, the parties apparently avoided an open split at the WIDF meeting in Sofia 20-25 October. And in reporting the disagreeable WFTU meeting, Moscow refrained from criticizing the Chinese.*

In late October, Soviet and Chinese officials were both stating privately a tougher attitude than they were adopting publicly. Several Soviet sources said privately that the Soviet party, rather than altering its plans for the December meeting, intended to proceed straightforward. It seemed apparent however, that the new leaders would not really choose to tie their hands in this way, and therefore likely that the Russians were saying this in order not to give away a negotiable asset in advance of any Sino-Soviet talks.** Similarly, some Soviet sources were encouraging the view that the new leaders had already decided that there was nothing to gain from further talks with the Chinese on any matter; while the record of Sino-Soviet negotiations would have justified such a conclusion, it seemed clear—for the reasons stated above—that the new leaders could not afford to refuse to undertake new talks. The Chinese for their part were saying privately that they did not make any distinction between Khrushchev and those who overthrew him, and that they would not compromise with his successors any more than with him. In fact, however, the Chinese continued to refrain from polemics, thus giving the successors time to make clear whether there were any grounds for a distinction between Khrushchev and themselves: and Peiping reportedly informed

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*Subsequently, there was an unconfirmed report that the Soviet party on 26 October had written the CCP expressing the hope of improving relations with Peiping.

**Another observer has interpreted these statements, instead, as the genuine views of a faction in the CPSU leadership (perhaps led by Suslov and Ponomarev) which desired an early showdown with the Chinese.
its supporters that it could not yet judge whether there would be an improvement in Sino-Soviet relations.*

While the Russians and Chinese were feeling each other out in these first days after Khrushchev's fall, the Soviet position—with respect to restoring its authority in the world movement—was being weakened by the surprisingly strong reactions to the fall by the parties of the Soviet camp. Rather than accepting the implicit Soviet invitation to denounce Khrushchev, several of the parties in both Eastern and Western Europe ostentatiously dissociated themselves from the Soviet party's action and publicly praised Khrushchev's past services, and several of them demanded an explanation. A number of these parties dispatched delegations to Moscow to receive such explanations.**

These responses from the Soviet camp parties were in effect a request—if not a warning—to the Soviet leaders not to go on to denounce Khrushchev by name, and they may indeed have headed off such an action. It was ironical that, just as Khrushchev did not fully foresee the consequences of his attack on Stalin at the 20th CPSU congress in 1956, so the new leaders evidently did not expect this response to their removal of Khrushchev. They thus made themselves vulnerable to some of the very charges they had made against Khrushchev's leadership.

*Within the Chinese camp, apart from the Chinese themselves, there appeared to be very different expectations. The Albanians, at one extreme, seemed to expect nothing from the new Soviet leaders. The North Vietnamese seemed to be looking hopefully toward Moscow, but without confidence. The Indonesians seemed to expect radical changes.

**For a thorough account of this phenomenon, see ESASU-XXVII, "The Effects of Khrushchev's Fall on the Soviet Party's Position in the World Communist Movement."
Tougher Public Statements: Pravda on 1 November took a tougher line—or, at least, a line more explicitly tough—on issues in the Sino-Soviet dispute. The editorial spelled out the Soviet position—in terms which Peiping had strongly attacked in the past—on such matters as the nature of Soviet society, the inadmissibility of world war and the prospects for averting it, and the value of "peaceful coexistence" (the "only alternative") and of "relaxing international tension" (the test-ban treaty was given as an illustration of "positive results"). As for relations among the parties, the editorial again stated the Soviet party's favor for a conference of "all" the parties, again failing to mention the preparatory meeting and thus again suggesting a willingness to compromise on this limited issue. However, whereas the 17 October editorial had confined its attack to "all forms of opportunism," this 1 November editorial added "chauvinism and petty-bourgeois adventurism" and specified that opportunism included dogmatism—terms with which the Soviet party had long condemned Chinese positions.

The Chinese, who had meanwhile offered to send a delegation to the October Revolution ceremonies (7 November) in Moscow, continued to withhold direct fire, but the Albanian party replied for them on the same date. The Albanian party newspaper treated the fall of Khrushchev as the "failure of the political and ideological course of modern revisionism, as formulated at the 20th and 22nd CPSU congresses" (the formulations which the new Soviet leaders had repeatedly endorsed). While Khrushchev was the "principal" revisionist, the editorial continued (echoing Peiping), his fall did not mean the disappearance of his "ideological, economic, and organizational political line." For Marxist-Leninists, the newspaper went on (anticipating a Chinese position), the struggle against "Khrushchevian revisionism" would end when his line was "liquidated"; and, without the liquidation of his line, there could be no return to "Leninist norms of relations" among Communist states and parties. In other words, the Chinese camp would demand precisely those fundamental and extensive changes in Soviet policies—still amounting to a Soviet surrender to the Chinese—which the new Soviet leaders had stated clearly that they would not make.
The Chinese then spoke in their own persons in a People's Daily editorial of 6 November, after printing the Pravda editorials of 17 October and 1 November.* The party newspaper reviewed Peiping's first principles in familiar terms, including the principle of "reaching unanimity through consultation." It hailed the removal of Khrushchev as a "very good thing," and, making essentially the point the Albanians had made, warned that "anyone" who proceeded counter to "Leninism" (declared Chinese principles) would meet the same fate. The deterioration of the Sino-Soviet relationship, the editorial said, was not the fault of the Chinese party or people, nor of the Soviet people (i.e., it was the fault of the Soviet party alone). The editorial concluded that Sino-Soviet differences were temporary and could "be gradually resolved," on the basis of fundamental Marxist-Leninist (Chinese) principles. In other words, the Chinese demand was still for a Soviet surrender, although the surrender could be made by stages, e.g. in negotiations protracted until the Soviet party gave in on each specific point.

Liu Ning-i on the same day underlined the CCP's central point with respect to Communist strategy, the need to recognize the "immediate burning task" of concentrating "all efforts on opposing the main enemy--U.S. imperialism." In this connection, Liu rejected the view that President Johnson's election victory had any hopeful aspect (as some Soviet commentaries had said). On the same day, Chou En-lai in Moscow symbolized the Chinese attitude by again visiting Stalin's grave.

Speaking in Moscow several hours later, Brezhnev again rejected the Chinese demand for radical changes in

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*Peiping had also taken notice that the Soviet press had printed on 30 October an article which criticized the pro-Chinese Japanese party and praised Yoshio Shiga, leader of the pro-Soviet forces outside that party. The Japanese party journal explicitly, and the Chinese implicitly, warned Moscow not to try to make use of Shiga's group.
Soviet policy. In other words, he refused to concede that Khrushchev had been a "revisionist."

Beginning by welcoming guests from "socialist countries" and specifying Yugoslavia as one of these, Brezhnev again affirmed the USSR's adherence to "peaceful coexistence," insisted that this contributed to the "liberation struggle," stated the Soviet intention to work for relaxation of tensions and for arms control agreements, praised the test-ban agreement, spoke of the Soviet desire for good relations and cooperation with "all" states (citing the United States first among the "capitalist" powers), reaffirmed the non-inevitability of world war, and insisted (which Peiping the previous day had denied) that the U.S. election results were a favorable sign. Several of these points were stated in a way less offensive to Peiping than they might have been, and Brezhnev condemned various U.S. policies, but the burden was unmistakable—that the new Soviet leaders were not prepared, at least at this time, to make significant changes in Khrushchev's policies toward the United States.*

Brezhnev was somewhat more forthcoming, as he had been in his 19 October speech, with respect to relations between Communist states and parties. He placed the task of strengthening bloc relations (a "sacred duty") first among Moscow's tasks, spoke of safeguarding the security of "socialist countries" once in qualified terms,

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*Brezhnev's proclaimed devotion to these soft concepts and soft policies—peaceful coexistence, relaxation of tensions, good relations and cooperation, etc.—need not be taken at face value; obviously, hostile and very ambitious initiatives can be taken within the limits of these concepts, such as Khrushchev's missile base venture in Cuba. The point is that the Sino-Soviet dispute about the proper attitude to adopt toward the United States has been conducted in terms of these concepts, and in putting them forward again Brezhnev was sending the Chinese a clear message—that the policy advocated by Peiping was still regarded as dangerous, simplistic, and unprofitable.
once flatly), and went on to speak of the need to "pro-
gress step by step toward cohesion" of the world Com-
munist movement. He spoke, as had Khrushchev's spokes-
men, of world Communist conferences as the best method
of achieving such cohesion, and said that the time for
such a conference was "obviously ripe"; but again he
failed to speak of the preparatory meeting scheduled for
mid-December. Although in these formulations Brezhnev
placed himself in agreement with the Chinese call for
a gradual resolution of differences, he did not imply that
the Soviet party intended to make a step-by-step surrender,
and it was a fair assumption that in undertaking and per-
sisting in any protracted negotiations the Soviet party
would be aiming at reducing Chinese polemics and at buying
time, rather than expecting to achieve a resolution of
differences on acceptable terms.

At a Kremlin reception that evening, Malinovsky
made an impromptu speech which contained anti-American
passages. The Soviet leaders moved quickly to reduce the
impact of this speech, first by personal reassurances
and then by deleting those passages from the published
version of the speech.

Speaking on 7 November in Peiping, Peng Chen, who
had been prominent in Chinese clashes with Soviet leaders
since 1960, in effect replied to the burden of Brezhnev's
speech, along the line taken by Liu Ning-i the previous
day. Reaffirming that "U.S. imperialism is the most
ferocious enemy of the peoples of the whole world," Peng
again denied that President Johnson's victory had any hope-
ful aspect, and declared flatly that the "demarcation
line between those who want revolution and those who
do not is whether or not they oppose U.S. imperialism." In
other words, Soviet policy toward the United States was

*It was not and is not clear why Brezhnev again com-
mitted himself to a world Communist conference--it seems
gratuitously--when it was possible that he would eventu-
ally have to back away from such a conference.
to be the test of the new Soviet leaders, and there was no way to evade this test.

The Albanian party, obviously worried about Chou's presence in Moscow (which it did not report, and which was in fact a compromise of Chinese support of the Albanians, who had not been invited), struck again at the new Soviet leaders on 7 November. The party newspaper, immediately following Chou's trip to Stalin's grave, praised Stalin's record at length and specified that the "most important" of the steps necessary to liquidate the line of the revisionists was to restore to its rightful place the "person and work" of Stalin. Another such step, it said, was a Soviet break with Yugoslavia.

The Sino-Soviet Talks: Brezhnev is said to have had a two-hour meeting with Chou on 9 November, and these talks apparently continued in the next few days.* On 11 November the press reported that the two parties had agreed to postpone the December meeting and to resume the full-scale Sino-Soviet talks, an agreement which would presumably entail a continued restraint in Soviet and Chinese pronouncements. This report was credible (at least to us), as the Soviet party was known to desire a cessation of polemics and the date of the meeting was believed to be regarded by Moscow as a negotiable asset, while the Chinese party was believed to desire a postponement of the meeting and to desire (or at least to be agreeable to) prolonged talks in which the plans for the meeting and all other issues in the Sino-Soviet dispute would be

*Peiping on 13 November identified the Soviet leaders taking part in the talks as Brezhnev, Kosygin, Mikoyan, Podgorny, Andropov, Ponomarev, and Gromyko. Suslov was apparently held out of the talks as a conciliatory gesture, in view of his much-publicized anti-Chinese report of February 1964 to the party plenum. Suslov is reported to have attempted to make the Chinese believe that his hand was forced by Khrushchev, an assertion which, in the light of earlier reports that Suslov hoped for an accommodation with the Chinese, may be true; however, another observer places Suslov among the leaders of those who want a complete break with Peiping.
discussed. However, the report was not confirmed, and the probability that it was false—or at least premature—was suggested immediately by Peiping's resumption on the same day of the Russian-language broadcasting of the tough People's Daily editorial of 6 November.

The fragmentary reporting available on the talks indicates that the Soviet party opened, for the record, with proposals for a cessation of polemics and for Chinese participation in the preparatory meeting scheduled for 15 December, and that the Chinese (of course) rejected these proposals.

In discussion of the first proposal, the Chinese reportedly took a self-righteous and intransigent position, much like the behavior of the Chinese delegation in the Sino-Soviet talks of July 1963. Chou is said to have demanded, as the price of a cessation of polemics, a radical change in Soviet policies—the very policies repeatedly reaffirmed by Soviet spokesmen in the weeks following Khrushchev's ouster—and in particular a change in the basic foreign policy (policy toward the United States); the Soviet delegation is said to have (of course) rejected this demand, stating that other parties would not permit such a reversal even if Moscow were willing. In discussion of the second proposal, Chou is said to have rejected also a revised proposal—for a postponement of the 15 December meeting in exchange for a Chinese agreement to attend a postponed meeting; this rejection was also predictable, as the Chinese would not agree to participate unless assured that their terms were met.

The Russians in the Moscow talks apparently went on to propose a resumption of the full-scale Sino-Soviet talks suspended in July 1963, possibly specifying that the resumed talks would include a discussion of the terms of Chinese participation in a preparatory meeting for a conference. While the Chinese apparently did not flatly refuse to resume the talks, neither did they agree to resume them. The question seems to have been left open, in a discouraging atmosphere.
As for other issues discussed, some sources have said that the Russians pointed to their example in removing an old, sick, and incompetent leader, and invited the Chinese to follow it; and that Chou's delegation demanded that the USSR supply China with modern weapons, a demand which the Russians flatly rejected. Although other details have not been supplied, it seems likely, judging from the Red Flag editorial of 21 November (a week after Chou's return), that Chou's delegation--again, as the Chinese delegation is believed to have done in the July 1963 talks--reviewed the entire list of Chinese complaints against the Soviet party--from de-Stalinization and the theoretical innovations of 1956, on through the need for an uncompromising and unrelenting struggle against the United States (as reported above), and on down to the immediate issue of the need to grant the Chinese demand for unanimity (Chinese veto power) at every step in the preparations for a conference of all the parties.*

The announcements on 13 November on the conclusion of the talks implied that no agreement whatever had been reached. The Soviet announcement spoke of the "frank, comradely atmosphere" of the talks--a locution which, as Soviet officials privately confirmed, meant that no important agreement had been reached--while the Chinese announcement was not even that polite, noting simply that the delegations had "held meetings."

The apparent failure of the two parties to reach even a modest agreement--a temporary cessation of polemics,

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*We have thought of this Chinese demand as the one most likely to cause an early breakdown--if there was one--of any Sino-Soviet talks on the terms for Chinese participation in the preparatory meeting and the conference. This is because no compromise is possible between unanimity on one hand and majority rule on the other; it is either/or. Nevertheless we have seen a possibility that the Soviet leaders would accede to the Chinese demand for unanimity in order to buy time, or that the Chinese would obtain--and settle for--a Soviet de facto acceptance of the principle.
a postponement of the December preparatory meeting, and
a scheduling of full-scale talks—was somewhat surprising
(at least to us). The Russians seem to have made less
of an effort than expected; and the Chinese seem to have
been just as tough with the new leaders as if there had
been no change at all in the Soviet leadership.

With respect to the Russians, we had expected a
greater Soviet effort to make the Chinese believe—which
might even be true—that there was room for mutually pro-
fitable cooperation against the United States in specific
respects and areas (e.g., Vietnam, the Congo, Cuba) with-
out alarming the United States by a change in basic con-
cepts. It is conceivable that the Soviets did anticipate,
and indeed desired, an early Chinese rejection of Soviet
proposals and an early end to the talks, but an engagement
so brief would not seem to answer all Soviet purposes.
That is, it would not seem to give the necessary weight
to the charge that Khrushchev had mishandled the dispute,
or to provide sufficient evidence (even to the new Soviet
leaders) that the removal of Khrushchev had made no sub-
stantial difference, or to constitute an adequate demon-
stration to the Soviet camp that Moscow had made a serious
effort.

As for the Chinese, it was not altogether clear
why Chou did not agree to full-scale Sino-Soviet talks
in exchange for a postponement of the preparatory meet-
ing, as the postponement would be regarded as a Chinese
victory and the full-scale talks would seem useful to
Peiping both as a means of patient exploration of points
of weakness and as a means of deterring the Soviet party
from remedial action while Peiping steadily eroded Soviet
authority in the movement. With regard to the postpone-
ment, however, Chou may have calculated that he would
not have to give anything to get this, as the Russians
already had a good reason (the anticipated refractoriness
of the parties of their own camp) for wanting to postpone
the meeting; and he may, indeed, have heard and believed
a report of the time that the Russians had already decided
(before his arrival) to postpone the meeting. A surmise
as to Chou's thinking about the bilateral talks is compli-
cated by the fact that we cannot be sure that the Soviets
offered these talks without conditions; however, with regard
to the full-scale talks, we seem to have been wrong in thinking that the Chinese would see a need for protracted exploration: Chou in Moscow seems simply to have stated final Chinese positions (as Red Flag was to do a week later), to have sought a surrender in principle in advance of full-scale talks, apparently in the belief or hope (as Red Flag was to suggest) that the new leaders would either give in or be displaced by those who would.

On 13 November, the day the talks ended, People's Daily and Pravda exchanged contrary views on the policy to be adopted toward the United States. The Chinese party newspaper again insisted on the "repulsive and vicious" nature of President Johnson, who would, it said, "carry out the policies of aggression and war more intensely and viciously" than before; and no one must entertain any "illusions" about this. Pravda, reviewing the USSR's fidelity to "Lenin's" policy of "peaceful coexistence" and to "revolutionary humanism" (a concept which infuriates Peiping), asserted forthrightly that Soviet foreign policy remained "firm and unchanged," defended it in the same objectionable terms as before, and went on to assert—in flat contradiction to Peiping—that the U.S. elections had "strengthened the positions of the more moderate circles."

*On the same day, the Albanian party published a long account of Togliatti's position which, while generally acute and worth reading as a leftist analysis of the challenge to the Soviet party from the right, is relevant here mainly as another example of Albanian pressure on the Chinese party not to compromise in any respect with the new Soviet leaders. In arguing that Togliatti was opposed to a complete split in the movement because he recognized that such a split would strengthen the Marxist-Leninists (Chinese camp) in the struggle, the Albanians were expressing their own hope that the preparatory meeting scheduled for 15 December would go ahead as scheduled, in order to formalize the split and thus bind the Chinese more tightly to the Albanians. The Chinese, however, had indicated a different hope—of the postponement of the December meeting. But the Albanians were correctly expressing the Chinese belief that there could not possibly be "unity" among the "revisionists," that "their differences are insoluble."
The Chinese delegation returned to Peiping on 14 November, to be met by Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-chi and other members of the inner circle, an action meant to convey—as on previous occasions—strong approval by all of the Chinese leaders of the line that Chou had taken in Moscow. On the same day, Moscow demonstrated its own strong disapproval of Chou's (the Chinese) line by releasing a number of the World Marxist Review—withheld since 24 October—which contained articles sharply critical of the Chinese party by name, and which had a supplement criticizing the Chinese nuclear test. The Chinese reportedly returned at once to the newsstands the articles and booklets attacking Khrushchev's policies which they had removed while Chou's delegation was in Moscow. (And on 20 November, Peiping took note of the anti-Chinese material released on 14 November.)

The bad feeling in which the Moscow talks ended was expressed immediately also in the meeting in Prague, 14-17 November, of the Executive Committee of the International Union of Students. Whereas the Soviet and Chinese delegations at the WIDF meeting of 20-24 October had apparently avoided an open conflict, the Chinese delegation at the IUS meeting denounced the Soviet draft along the lines taken by Liu Ming-i and Peng Chen in their 6-7 November speeches in Peiping, namely that the draft failed to emphasize that the main task was the concentration of forces to oppose the "main enemy," the United States, and that willingness to do this was the distinguishing feature of revolutionaries as opposed to capitulators. In reporting this IUS meeting later (1 December), Peiping Radio accused the USSR of "vicious" manipulation of the meeting.

The Chinese reported the changes in Soviet party central organs announced on 16 November, but did not comment. They were presumably not pleased to see the removal of Kozlov—of whom they had once seemed to have hopes—from the party presidium, although they may have been encouraged to believe—by the absence of any implication of disfavor—that Kozlov, if he recovered his health, could make a comeback. It is not known whether the Chinese
interpreted the other changes—as did most Western observers—as indicating a strengthening of Brezhnev's position; the Chinese were later (21 November) to suggest a belief that the position of the new leaders, whether strengthened or not, remained insecure.

The Chinese Ultimatum: On 21 November, the Chinese party published an editorial in Red Flag, "Why Khrushchev Fell," which was in effect an ultimatum to the new Soviet leaders, as well as a way of making clear to all of the parties of the movement just what was still involved in the dispute (with whatever Soviet leaders). This was a double issue of Red Flag, the party magazine; just as Moscow had withheld until Chou's departure the number of World Marxist Review criticizing the Chinese party by name, so Peiping had withheld the previous number of Red Flag pending receipt and discussion of Chou's report.

The Chinese offered this ultimatum to the new leaders in a format which would save a little face for them; namely, that of attributing the errors (as Peiping saw them) of Soviet policy to Khrushchev personally, rather than to "Khrushchev's revisionist group" (an earlier formulation which presumably included those of his lieutenants who are now the leaders). The Chinese editorial contended, however, that Khrushchev, who had "usurped" the leadership, had been brought down primarily by the "anti-revisionist struggle" of the Soviet people and "revolutionary people throughout the world"—that is, by forces outside the Soviet party. The main points of the Chinese indictment were these:

1) He had defamed Stalin, who embodied Marxism-Leninism, and he thus had given powerful weapons to anti-Communist forces. (The new leaders had reaffirmed Khrushchev's position on Stalin.)

2) He had sought cooperation with, and conciliated, the United States; and when caught out in an ill-planned ("adventurist") scheme (to a different end), the missile base venture, he had "docilely" withdrawn. (The new leaders had also made overtures to the U.S.)
(3) In fear of the U.S. and in order to frustrate Peiping, he had damaged the USSR's own military capabilities by concluding the limited test-ban treaty. (The new leaders had affirmed the value of the treaty.)

(4) Under the concept of "peaceful transition," he had demanded that Communist parties in capitalist countries take a parliamentary instead of a revolutionary road. (The new leaders had not implied any change in this emphasis.)

(5) Under the concept of "peaceful coexistence," and together with U.S. imperialism, he had sabotaged the "liberation movement"—as witness Soviet policy toward the Congo, Algeria, and Vietnam. (The new leaders had repeatedly affirmed "peaceful coexistence" and had been evasive about the question of material support for "liberation" struggles; possibly in response to Red Flag, they were soon to warn the U.S. about expanding the war in Vietnam and to state privately their intention to underwrite the supply of materiel to rebel forces in the Congo.)

(6) He had reversed the verdict on Tito and had treated Yugoslavia as a "socialist" country and as a friend. (The new leaders in several ways had reaffirmed a conciliatory policy toward Yugoslavia.)

(7) He had treated Albania as an enemy and had taken several steps to injure it. (The new leaders had reportedly extended a pro forma invitation to Albania to attend the October Revolution anniversary, but had otherwise ignored it.)

(8) He had hated the Chinese party as the great obstacle to "revisionism and capitulationism," and had attempted to subvert it and to injure it by breaking aid agreements, by provoking border incidents, and by backing India. (The new leaders had made no important concessions to the Chinese, and, while implying a willingness to restore the aid programs and to keep the border quiet, had not withdrawn their support of the Indians.)

(9) In the name of "mutual economic aid," he had made other bloc states dependent on the USSR and had
impeded their development. (The new leaders had reaffirmed the principles under which this had been done.)

(10) He had attacked other parties (of the Chinese camp) at the congresses of his own and other parties, had supported forces in those parties opposed to the leaderships, and had forced the expulsion of Marxist-Leninists (pro-Chinese) from some parties. (The new leaders were again releasing attacks on the Chinese party by other parties, and had received in Moscow the leader of the internal opposition to the pro-Chinese Japanese party.)

(11) He had "wantonly violated" (i.e. had refused to accept as a permanent procedure) the principle of "reaching unanimity through consultation," had called for an "illegal" conference of the parties, and had called and set a date for a preparatory meeting (15 December). (The new leaders may have set conditions for a resumption of full-scale Sino-Soviet talks and in any case had refused to surrender in advance, and had not agreed to postpone the meeting unless the Chinese too made some concession.)

(12) Finally, under the slogan of "state of the whole people" he had abolished the dictatorship of the proletariat, under the slogan of "party of the entire people" he had changed the party's organization, and under the rubric of "full-scale Communist construction" he had turned back toward capitalism. (The new leaders had reaffirmed the slogans and had expanded the "capitalistic" features, while reversing some of Khrushchev's organizational changes.)

In sum, declared Red Flag, Khrushchev had been in alliance with imperialism against socialism, with the United States against China, with reactionaries everywhere against the "liberation" movements and revolutions, and with Titoists and other renegades against Marxist-Leninists.

Red Flag at this point rejected scornfully the official explanation of Khrushchev's fall--it was "certainly not due to old age or ill health, nor...merely to mistakes in his method of work and style of leadership." His fall,
the journal said, was the result of his "revisionist" line and his many errors. Khrushchev had been "deserted by his own followers"—a locution which both made the point that the new leaders had been Khrushchevites and left open the question of whether they recognized the real nature of his errors.

Red Flag went on to argue that Khrushchev's fall had been inevitable, another illustration of the "general law" that overtakes those who proceed counter to Marxism-Leninism. Nevertheless, the editorial continued, Khrushchev's supporters—the United States, reactionaries, and "modern revisionists"—would not resign themselves and would attempt to have "Khrushchevism without Khrushchev" (a good description of the main lines of the policies affirmed by the new Soviet leaders). The editorial concluded that the representatives of various "ideological trends" come to power (i.e., the disposition of the new Soviet leaders was not entirely clear), and that "it is up to them" (the new Soviet leaders) to decide "what direction they will take"; but that, in any event, the Chinese were confident that "history" would develop in accordance with Marxist-Leninist laws (i.e., the new leaders will either proceed along Chinese lines or they too will be overthrown).

The Red Flag editorial seemed an ultimatum in both senses: a statement of final positions, and the offer of a last chance (presumably, to sue again for negotiations, and to agree in advance to a step-by-step surrender). The emphasis on the point that the Soviet decision was still to be made suggested in part that the Soviet party, while it had not agreed to postpone the preparatory meeting without getting what it regarded as an equivalent concession from the Chinese, had not quite declared that it would not postpone the meeting. While this judgment may be mistaken, and the Chinese editorial may have been trying to reverse a decision rather than to influence one not yet made or not yet known, it seemed likely that the Soviet party in fact had not committed itself (although it may have reached, and probably did reach, a private decision before Red Flag came out).
The threat in the Chinese ultimatum appeared to be primarily that of fresh polemical attacks. Underlying this threat was an apparent belief that Chinese attacks on Khrushchev had helped to overthrow him, and that the new Soviet leaders were so insecure in their positions that the Chinese attitude toward them could or might make the difference between their continued power and their early overthrow.* This latter belief—or hope—may have been based on an assessment that the new leaders had relied heavily, in the execution of the coup, on the Soviet armed forces and secret police, forces which might be more favorably disposed to the Chinese party than were Khrushchev's closer "followers." There is one report that Malinovsky had taken part in the talks with Chou's delegation and had encouraged the Chinese to believe that the Soviet Army had played an important role, although (according to the report) he apparently had not suggested that the army was pro-Chinese.

The Decision: On 21 November, People's Daily carried three pages of comments on Khrushchev's fall by other Communist parties. Those featured were the Indonesian party (which echoed the Chinese line on the reasons for the fall and on the need for "big changes"), the Japanese party (which emphasized the blow to the pro-Khrushchev forces led by Shiga), the pro-Chinese half of the Peruvian party, the Albanian party (the tough 1 November editorial, previously discussed), the pro-Chinese rival Communist party in Belgium (the most impressive of the European splinter parties), the pro-Chinese rival party in Australia, the pro-Chinese rival party in Ceylon (among the strongest of the splinter parties), and six parties of the Soviet camp (the French, Austrian, Danish, and Finnish parties, all of which were quoted as

*A Chinese leader said that Peiping regarded the current Soviet leadership as "weak," in the apparent sense of insecure; he did not go on, however, to suggest a belief that Chinese pressure could depose them.
expecting a continuity between Khrushchev's policies and those of the new leaders, and the Italian and British parties, both of which were quoted in illustration of the difficulties faced by the Soviet leaders in proceeding with plans for an anti-Chinese preparatory meeting and conference).

In late November, the Chinese party gave public reassurances to all of its allies that it would not make any deal with the Soviet party at their expense. On 23 November, Mao himself praised the fidelity of the Japanese party to Marxism-Leninism and its resolute opposition to revisionism (the "main danger"), and Peng Chen followed with a recapitulation of his 7 November remarks on the test of revolutionaries versus revisionists, asserting that pro-Soviet Shiga forces were doomed "no matter how many Khrushchevite revisionists may support them." (Peng went on to praise the Japanese party's opposition to the preparatory meeting scheduled for 15 December, a meeting, he said, which "is illegal in all respects.") On 27 November, Chinese leaders (less Mao) turned out for the 20th anniversary of the "liberation" of Albania, and similarly praised the staunchness of the Albanian party.

On 28 November, Hoxha, speaking in Tirana on the Albanian anniversary, attacked the "present leaders of the Soviet party and government" for their stated adherence to the main lines of Khrushchev's policies, and went on to attack those leaders by name ("Mikoyan, Kosygin, Brezhnev, Suslov, and others") for having taken an active part in attacking the Albanian party in the past. It was unclear, however, whether in attacking them by name he was again acting as an advance-man for Peiping (taking an action which Peiping planned to take later), or was instead urging Peiping to take this action and thus to burn its bridges. In going on to denounce the continued Soviet call (since Khrushchev's ouster) for an early conference of the Communist parties, and to call instead for a conference to prepare a Marxist-Leninist manifesto rather than a statement filled with "flexible formulas" which would make an "empty" proclamation of unity (as in 1960), Hoxha was clearly stating a Chinese position.
In the same period (late November), there were several reports to the effect that the Soviet party had decided to postpone the December meeting, and some of these reports specified the new date as 1 March. Although the Soviet party continued to evade the question in its public pronouncements, and some bloc sources asserted that no decision had been made, the new date was subsequently confirmed, and other information indicated that the Soviet party had in fact reached its decision no later than mid-November.

It was reported by the press (from Moscow and London) in early December that the Soviet party in late November had proposed that the preparatory meeting originally scheduled for 15 December be rescheduled for 1 March. This proposal presumably went to most of the parties in the form of a party letter; in the Chinese case, however, there was a later report that a Soviet delegation had come to Peiping bearing the proposal. At the same time, Ulbricht—in his 5 December speech to the SED congress—gave an indication of Soviet plans for the procedure of the meeting. He said that the preparatory committee would meet "several times," and that drafts and proposed amendments would be forwarded to the parties to consider between sessions*: in other words, that the committee at its first meeting would gather opinions on all of the practical arrangements to be made (setting a date for the conference, deciding on the invitation list, drafting a basic document or documents); that the committee would then coordinate the opinions and send the results to all interested parties; and that it would then, in another meeting or series of

*It was not clear from the press reports and Ulbricht’s remarks whether the Soviet party had adhered to its original proposal of a 26-party preparatory committee. One of the pro-Soviet parties had earlier publicly suggested the desirability of expanding the committee or of inviting other parties to take part in the proceedings, a proposal which might have been attractive to the Soviet party.
meetings, make the final decisions and put the draft document (or documents) into final form.

The reports cited above also agreed that the Chinese party had immediately rejected (in late November) the Soviet proposal for a preparatory meeting on 1 March, and there were good reasons for thinking these reports credible. Although the Soviet initiative was reported (by all sources) as a proposal of a new date rather than as an invitation to a meeting at a date already fixed by Moscow, and thus might seem to qualify as the "consultation" desired by Peiping rather than the unilateral action objected to, it was in fact a unilateral act by Chinese definition. For one thing, the Soviet party had apparently committed itself to the convening of the meeting, even if the date was not yet fixed; whereas the Chinese had insisted that not even the decision to convene a meeting could be made without Chinese agreement. For another thing, the Chinese had insisted that Sino-Soviet bilateral talks should precede the preparatory meeting, and, while the Soviets had offered in November to resume the talks, they may have attached conditions and in any case had declined to surrender in advance of the talks. To put this point in terms of the preparatory meeting and the conference, the Chinese had insisted (see their 28 July letter) that they would not attend any conference, or any preparatory meeting for it, which was called "for the purpose of splitting"; in their discussion of this point, they had made clear that any meeting which did not accept Chinese positions—with respect to all matters, e.g. date, participants, agenda, procedure, and substantive positions—was by definition one called "for the purpose of splitting."* Further, the proposed date was too early (even if the matter could be discussed at all outside of bilateral talks): the Chinese had proposed bilateral talks for May 1965 or later, and had declined to suggest a date

*It may be objected that this position is absurd. But it had in fact been the Chinese position, a position of complete intransigence.
for the preparatory meeting but had insisted that it follow the completion of the bilateral talks (themselves protracted) and had asserted that adequate preparations would require four or five years.*

Nevertheless, the reported Chinese rejection of the proposal was not confirmed by the Chinese themselves, in either public or private statements, and it is possible that the rejection was not absolute. That is, just as the Chinese in the Moscow talks in early November had not agreed to a resumption of full-scale Sino-Soviet talks but had apparently not stated a flat refusal either, the Chinese in late November may have declined to agree to the proposal but have left themselves an opening to attend, should the format turn out to be attractive. In this connection, the Soviet proposal of late November may have made explicit the format implied by Ulbricht in his 5 December speech: that the preparatory meeting would operate on the principle of unanimity, i.e. prolonged discussion in a series of meetings until agreement was reached. This would be a de facto Soviet acceptance of the Chinese demand for unanimity in the proceedings of the meeting itself, if not for unanimity in all preparations for a conference; and the Chinese may not have been ready in late November to reject this flatly. Alternatively, Peiping may have been saving its categorical rejection for a public statement a short time before the scheduled meeting.

If an Indonesian party statement (published by Peiping on 18 December) is to be believed, the Soviet party swiftly followed its late November proposal with a letter of 1 December issuing an actual invitation—presumably to all of the 26 parties—to a preparatory meeting now definitely scheduled for 1 March. There was

*It will be recalled that the Chinese had gone so far at one point (July 1964) as to assert not only that all arrangements must be agreed to by all parties but that all of the pro-Chinese splinter parties should take part in these preparations as well as in the conference itself.
another report to the same effect, and the Chinese in publicizing the Indonesian statement treated the 1 December letter as an invitation rather than as a proposal, but again the matter is not clear. The 1 December letter may not have differed from the proposals—which were not invitations—sent to some other parties a few days earlier, and the Chinese and Indonesians may have agreed to treat the letter as an outright invitation in order to give maximum weight to their charge of unilateral Soviet action.

Shortly after the Soviet party's dispatch of its late November proposals (and perhaps also of actual invitations), Pravda on 6 December took up the defense of one of the positions attacked by the Chinese in the 21 November Red Flag—the Soviet concept of the "state of the whole people." Pravda took the line that the critics of the concept were really Stalinists and did not understand Marxism–Leninism.

Speaking at the Yugoslav party congress on 7 December, Tito in effect invited the Soviet delegate to follow him in attacking the Chinese by name. Tito criticized the "pseudo-revolutionary and sectarian positions of the CCP leadership," derided "illusions" that the conflict with the Chinese camp could be resolved by "compromise," specified that Peiping aimed at nothing less than leadership of the movement, and took note (correctly) that the Red Flag editorial of 21 November had been an attack not only on Khrushchev but on his successors. The Soviet delegate, however, presumably in order not to provoke a fresh Chinese attack and perhaps also in order not to close the door to some kind of agreement with Peiping prior to the 1 March meeting, failed even to mention the Chinese; and the Soviet press omitted those portions of Tito's speech critical of the Chinese.

On 12 December, Pravda announced briefly that on the "basis of mutual consultations" aimed at "better preparation" for both the preparatory meeting and the world Communist conference, the "first session" of the preparatory meeting had been set for 1 March 1965. The newspaper did not remark that the preparatory meeting
had originally been scheduled to begin on 15 December, it did not give the number or names of the parties to be invited to the rescheduled meeting, and it did not offer even a tentative date for the subsequent conference.*

The Soviet and Chinese parties were thus repeating, in November and December, much of the scenario of July and August. In late July Moscow had received a Chinese letter publicly denying Soviet authority to make any arrangements without Chinese agreement and publicly rejecting Soviet terms for a preparatory meeting; immediately thereafter, Moscow had privately invited the parties of the preparatory committee to begin their work at a definite date (15 December); and on 10 August the Soviet party had publicly committed itself to this course. In November, the Chinese had publicly reiterated their denial of Soviet authority to make arrangements and had publicly implied that they would not take part in any meeting except on their terms; soon thereafter, the Soviet party had proposed a definite date (1 March) for a rescheduled meeting, which the Chinese did not accept, and soon after that the Russians may have sent out the actual invitations to a meeting on that date; and on 12

*The 12 December Pravda also carried an article by an Indian Communist leader (of the rightist party) which denounced the Indian "splitters" who have formed a pro-Chinese leftist Communist party, and which inter alia declared that the splitters would not have dared to split "if they were not instigated to do so from outside." Moscow Radio broadcast this passage, the first criticism of Chinese factional activity in the movement—even though the Chinese party is not named—to appear in Soviet media since Khrushchev's fall. The article—presumably with Soviet approval—also expressed the softest of the various lines Moscow had taken before Khrushchev's fall on its plans for a conference, namely that the meeting would not seek a condemnation or expulsion of any party but would serve as a medium for an exchange of experiences.
December the Soviet party had again publicly committed itself to a definite date.

There were two possible differences—one of them possibly important—between the scenario of July-August and the scenario of November-December. In the first place, in July the Chinese rejection of Soviet terms for a preparatory meeting and conference had been public and strong, although not yet categorical, while in November the Chinese response had not been made public and therefore may have been less strong. Secondly, in July the Soviet party had definitely sent out invitations to the preparatory meeting, while in December Moscow may not have done so. The first difference, if true, might prove to be important; the second did not seem of much importance, as the 12 December announcement in itself implied that, if invitations had not already been sent out, they soon would be.

Chinese Camp Responses. Peiping's first comment on the Pravda announcement of 12 December, although indirect, brought the November-December scenario closer to the point that the CCP's 28 July letter (publicly rejecting Soviet terms for the meetings) brought the July-August scenario, although the Chinese party in this case was not yet speaking in its own name. Peiping Radio said that the Indonesian Communist party had announced that "it will not take part in the divisive conference scheduled for 1 March 1965 in Moscow." Continuing, Peiping's account said that Aidit had given the Soviet ambassador a reply to a Soviet letter of 1 December in which the Soviet party had "invited" the Indonesian party to attend an "international conference" of Communist parties on 1 March, and that the Indonesian reply had stated that, "in view of the fact that adequate preparations have not been made...and that not all of the Communist and workers' parties of the socialist countries are going to take part, the PKI will not take part..." Thus the Chinese broadcast treated the letter as a definite invitation, implied strongly that the pro-Chinese parties of the bloc had already rejected the invitation, and treated the Indonesian party's refusal as categorical. Even assuming that this version of events was overstated, the Chinese at the least were
telling their followers, as they had in July, that they did not intend to take part and that their followers should not take part.*

*A knowledgeable observer of Sino-Soviet affairs has privately argued that Peiping's denunciation in the 21 November Red Flag of the earlier (and not yet withdrawn) Khrushchev plan for a December preparatory meeting had applied to Khrushchev's plan but would not necessarily apply to the plans of the new Soviet leaders, and, further, that the Soviet party would not have made the 12 December announcement of a new date for the preparatory meeting if Moscow had not had some indication from the Chinese that they would attend. Most of this argument strikes us as weak. Just as Khrushchev (in the formulations of Red Flag) had "wantonly violated" the principle of "reaching unanimity through consultation" in calling for an "illegal" conference and in setting a date for a preparatory meeting for it, the new Soviet leaders had also called for the conference, and had set a date for the preparatory meeting, without Chinese agreement. Moreover, the Soviet hand was forced in the 12 December announcement: Moscow had to say something prior to 15 December, the date originally set for the meeting. It is true that the Soviet party did not have to set a definite date in the 12 December announcement, but if it had failed to do so it would have given the Chinese a double victory: not only a postponement, but an indefinite postponement. Peiping's 18 December treatment of the Indonesian party statement is, we think, good evidence that the Chinese had not indicated that they would attend the rescheduled meeting. We agree with this observer, however, that the Chinese response may not have been categorical, just as in July, at the same point in the summer scenario, the Chinese rejection was not categorical; the Chinese had waited until late August to issue a categorical refusal to attend the December meeting. If the scenario were to be followed all the way, the Chinese would issue a public denunciation of the 12 December announcement within three or four weeks.

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On 29 December, the newspaper of the pro-Chinese Japanese Communist party carried an account of a speech made by its leader on 18 December—the same day that Peiping Radio had presented the Indonesian party as having categorically refused to attend the 1 March meeting—in which the Japanese party strongly implied that it too would refuse to attend the 1 March meeting but did not state this refusal categorically. Speaking of Pravda's 12 December announcement of the 1 March meeting, the Japanese Communist leader denounced the Soviet party for its "unfounded and unilateral" action in calling the meeting at all. Although he took note that the Soviet leaders "had gradually come to attach importance to the unification of current anti-imperialist activities" (the meaning is unclear), the Soviet party, he said, was still refusing to try to "unify completely the views of the Communist parties of socialist countries" before the opening of the meeting (in other words, had not reached a prior agreement on all important matters with the Chinese and others, as the Chinese camp had been demanding). Thus, he said, the attitude of the Japanese party toward the 1 March meeting was "quite clear" (presumably, that it would not attend). In failing to state this refusal explicitly, however, this spokesman seemed to be leaving an opening for the Japanese party to attend either the 1 March meeting or a meeting once again postponed, if the Soviet party, after talks with the Chinese and others, were to offer better terms.

Further Overtures For Sino-Soviet Talks

In early January, the Soviet party was reported to be still trying to arrange a resumption of full-scale bilateral talks with the Chinese party, hopefully prior to the preparatory meeting scheduled for 1 March. While there was no report that any agreement on a resumption of the talks had been reached, nevertheless the Chinese party as of early January still had not taken the last two steps of the July-August scenario: the issuance of (a) a public rejection of Soviet terms for a meeting and a public denunciation of Soviet plans (as in the
CCP's 28 July letter, and (b) a categorical public refusal to attend the meeting (as in the 30 August letter). This failure to take in December and early January the steps taken the previous July and August--steps logically deriving from Peiping's earlier positions--seemed to mean either that the Chinese wished to leave open the possibility of a resumption of the Sino-Soviet talks and of Chinese preparations in the preparatory meeting, or that Peiping planned to issue its definitive statement at a time when it would have a greater psychological impact (e.g., shortly before the meeting was scheduled to begin).*

Soviet commentaries of early January on President Johnson's State of the Union message (4 January) were consistent with an effort to entice the Chinese into negotiations, and may also have reflected a hope of influencing some of Peiping's allies (e.g., North Vietnam). In contrast to the tone of interpretations of the message by several (not all) Eastern European commentators, who emphasized "positive" features and took a generally optimistic view, Soviet commentaries consistently emphasized negative features and reached gloomy conclusions. Although there were features of the President's message that Moscow could not be expected in any case to approve (e.g., the Russians were naturally depressed by American "bridge-building" to bloc countries,

*There had been two good occasions for a harsh statement, if Peiping had been ready to make it. One was Chou En-lai's report to the National People's Congress on 21-22 December; according to the summary of his speech, Chou spoke only briefly about Sino-Soviet relations, reiterating that the deterioration had come about through "no fault of our own," noting that "as far as possible we maintain normal intercourse" (with the USSR), and failing to mention the meeting scheduled for 1 March. The second was the People's Daily editorial for New Year's Day; in this, Peiping contented itself with asserting its victories over "modern revisionism" (among other foes), including its contribution to dislodging Khrushchev, and did not otherwise refer to Sino-Soviet relations.
just as the Eastern European commentators were naturally cheered by it), the Soviet commentaries seemed to reflect a prior decision to give a harsh treatment to the message.

The most important of these commentaries was a Pravda article of 6 January on the "tactics of imperialism." The Western ruling classes, the article contended, were divided into forces which could be regarded as "'wild men' and 'ultras'" on one hand and "'moderate' and 'liberal'" on the other, but the important thing was that "the difference between these two lines appears to be merely tactical." The "circumspect tactic" had been increasingly employed in recent years, the article continued, but, even after the defeat of the frank "'wild men'" by Johnson forces coming to power "under the flag of moderation and flexibility," the struggle within the victorious camp continued, and caused the adoption of some policies--e.g. in the Congo and Vietnam--which "fully meet the demands of the 'wild men.'" The President's 4 January message, the article continued, contained hopeful "assurances" but also plainly stated a "reluctance to discontinue...military adventures and direct interference in the affairs of other countries, and thinly veiled claims to special U.S. rights in the entire world." While changes in the balance of power made infeasible an imperialist victory through world war, the West was now trying to change the character of socialist countries and to divide them ("'bridge-building'" meant the provision of much aid to bloc countries which seemed "most promising"), and in the underdeveloped countries was combining "bloody reprisals" with economic inducements, working with "local reaction" and attempting to divide the forces of the "liberation movement," etc. In a word, "imperialism's new strategy...in practice still lies very close to the policy of the 'madmen'..."

This Pravda article and others changed the emphasis of Brezhnev's 7 November speech--in which he had spoken, in the teeth of a Chinese denial, of U.S. election results as a favorable sign--and of Pravda's article on Soviet policy immediately following the Sino-Soviet talks of early November, in which the Soviet party newspaper had insisted--in flat contradiction to a Chinese pronouncement
on the same day—that the U.S. elections had "strengthened the positions of the more moderate circles."

That Moscow would continue to refuse to go as far in this direction as Peiping wished, however, was indicated in the days immediately following. On 8, 9, and 10 January Moscow Radio broadcast to China, Vietnam, and Albania an article in the December Kommunist which again employed the tactic of denouncing Chinese positions in the Sino-Soviet dispute in the guise of attacking positions held by Lenin's leftist opponents. The article attributed to these opponents such recognizable features of the present Chinese line as an "absolutely different appraisal of the character and prospects of development

*The Albanian party at this time seemed to be taking the absence of Chinese polemics, and the appearance of greater militancy in Soviet statements about the U.S., as grounds for concern over the possibility of some Chinese agreement with the Russians at Tirana's expense. In an article of 6 January on "revolutionary Marxism-Leninism," the Albanian party newspaper denounced "Khrushchev's group" (not just Khrushchev, as Peiping's Red Flag had done on 21 November), went on to denounce the "present Soviet leaders" for having reassured the revisionists that the new leaders would follow Khrushchev's policies (Red Flag had not denounced them directly and had not presented their policies as fixed), warned the faithful everywhere not to fall into the trap of "'calm' and 'silence' which the Khrushchevite revisionists in power in the USSR strive to maintain," warned in particular against the "illusion" that the new Soviet leaders "can improve themselves," and called upon all revolutionaries to "follow in a consequential fashion and without vacillations the struggle of principle to unmask modern revisionism." The Albanians were clearly urging the Chinese to resume polemics (which Red Flag on 21 November had seemed to be threatening to do if the new Soviet leaders did not give in), to decline to negotiate with the Russians, and to burn their bridges.
of the world revolutionary movement," the demand for an "immediate organization of the revolution in other countries," favor for revolutionary wars in the West, "loud-mouth phrases" designed to push the USSR "to the disastrous path of war," accusations (against Lenin) of "opportunism and capitulationism before international imperialism," a rejection of "necessary compromise," and the conduct of factionalism. Lenin was quoted as declaring that "There are moments...which compel us to put the question in a pointblank manner...or else to inflict irreparable harm on the party..." and Stalin was criticized for seeking a "middle-of-the-road" position. The article concluded that "'leftist Communism' is /sic/ an ideology" which is neither original nor independent and that opposition to it (among other deviations)"constitutes /sic/ an essential prerequisite for further successes of the Communist movement."

Peiping's first commentary on the President's State of the Union message seemed more encouraging to those like the Albanians who desired a continuation of Chinese intransigence than to those like the new Soviet leaders who hoped for some agreement with the Chinese. A People's Daily commentary of 11 January on the "ferocious features of U.S. imperialism," a commentary much harsher than the harshest of the Soviet commentaries, distorted an Izvestiya article of 6 January to make it appear that there had been no change in the Soviet line. The Chinese article took out of context one passage in the Russian article--an article which had been almost entirely hostile to the President's message--to support the contention that there are "people" (the Russians) "who take Johnson's nebulous works of peace seriously," people who, indeed, "are attempting to lead the people of the world astray."

The same tone was adopted in Chen Yi's remarks to a Japanese visitor on 17 January, according to a Japanese press account of them. Chen reportedly said that the Chinese had "little faith" in the new Soviet leaders and were confident that "outstanding leaders would appear eventually." He implied that the new leaders, like Khrushchev, were afraid of American military power,
and, referring to Peiping's "repeated" urging of Khrushchev to return the Kuriles to Japan, implied that the new leaders should take this action. He reportedly added that the USSR had taken 1.5 million square kilometers of land from China. In other words, if this account is to be believed, Chen was indicating no change in Peiping's intransigence, was again demanding, like Red Flag in November, a Soviet surrender.

In any case, whatever the prospects for a resumption of the Sino-Soviet talks and for some agreement in them, another showdown was ahead on the matter of the 1 March preparatory meeting. In not holding the meeting as originally scheduled, the Soviet party had been defeated in the first showdown, a showdown Moscow itself had called for; and in rescheduling the meeting, the Soviet party had made inescapable another showdown. The second showdown might be less of a showdown, in one sense, in that the Soviet and Chinese parties, as of mid-January, had not repeated the charges that they had publicly hurled at each other prior to the first showdown: that the Soviet party would be responsible for the complete split in the movement if it went ahead and convened the meeting, and that the Chinese party would be responsible if it boycotted the meeting. But the second showdown would still be a showdown, as all parties knew the positions to which the two principals had committed themselves. Moreover, the second showdown would be more of a showdown for the new Soviet leaders, as Khrushchev had been primarily responsible for scheduling the first showdown, and they themselves had been responsible for scheduling the second. The Soviet party's problems, in moving toward the rescheduled meeting, seemed much the same as they had been when Moscow was moving toward the meeting as originally scheduled, and a degree worse.
For An Early Resumption of the Talks: In its reported overtures to Peiping for a resumption of full-scale Sino-Soviet talks, the Soviet party has presumably been contending that such a resumption is an urgent matter, inasmuch as the 1 March preparatory meeting is to discuss a range of questions—on Communist strategy, and on relations among Communist states and parties—which Peiping itself has repeatedly insisted should be the subject of prior Sino-Soviet talks. The Chinese have presumably replied (a) that such an argument is impudent, inasmuch as the Soviet party itself set the date asserted to be the reason for the urgency, (b) that the Chinese had repeatedly made clear that no action could be taken with regard to the preparatory meeting without prior Chinese agreement, (c) that the actions of the Soviet party in publicly committing itself to the 1 March date and sending out the invitations were inconsistent with the professed wish of the new Soviet leaders for a gradual resolution of Sino-Soviet differences, and, probably (d) that if the Soviet party is serious about new Sino-Soviet talks it must begin by revoking these actions, both as an earnest of its agreement to the principle of "unanimity through consultations," and in order to allow sufficient time for a full discussion of all the issues in the Sino-Soviet dispute.* A Chinese reply along these lines

*Some of the pro-Soviet parties informed by Moscow of the new arrangements have already made this point: that the Russians are not allowing enough time for the resolution of their dispute with Peiping. Another reason why a lot of time would have to be allowed is that, whereas in 1960 the parties of the Soviet camp were willing to go along with whatever agreements the Soviet party chose to reach with Peiping, the pro-Soviet parties and even the pro-Chinese parties are not so docile now; Sino-Soviet agreements would have to be coordinated with them.
would be a way of again making the point that the Soviet party must agree in advance to a surrender, an agreement symbolized by a humiliating revocation of actions it had just taken.

The hardening of the Soviet line toward the United States in recent weeks, and the related evidence of the possibility of a struggle for power among the new Soviet leaders,* might conceivably have introduced a new factor. That is, the Chinese may have been encouraged to believe that there is some prospect of fixing the new leaders in a hard line toward the United States or of the early ascendancy of a group which could be so fixed and which would favor an accommodation with the Chinese largely on Chinese terms; and Peiping might therefore have been given a fresh incentive for resuming the Sino-Soviet talks. However, we continue to think it probable that the Chinese have indeed been demanding a revocation of the 1 March meeting as a price for a resumption of the talks.

Similarly, the hardening of the Soviet line toward the U.S. might indicate a change in the Soviet attitude toward the 1 March meeting. That is, whereas in setting the 1 March date for the meeting and in inviting the other parties to attend it the Soviet party seemed to be sending a clear signal to Peiping that it was determined not to surrender and that it would go ahead with the

*A case can be made for the view (another observer has done so) that the line of a group around Kosygin--favoring a hard attitude toward the Chinese, a conciliatory one toward the United States--dominated Soviet policy through November and into December (say, until some time after the 12 December announcement of the 1 March meeting), and the line of a group around Brezhnev--soft toward the Chinese, hard (or anyhow, harder) toward the U.S.--gained strength in December and became dominant in January. The case is not persuasive, but Peiping might read the material the same way, and, if so, would want to find out more about it.
preparatory meeting as scheduled, Moscow might now be more willing to call off the meeting if the Chinese do insist on this as a condition for Sino-Soviet talks. Again, however, we think it probable that the Soviet party has not been willing to do this as an explicit condition for talks, because this would give the Chinese a great victory and would be a symbolical surrender-in-advance (of the talks). Thus we doubt that Sino-Soviet talks have been secretly under way, or are now under way, or will get under way before 1 March (although there may be continued contacts about the resumption of full-scale talks).

Nevertheless, Moscow may decide to call off the 1 March meeting for other stated reasons (which would also be genuine reasons). If Moscow were simply to postpone the meeting to another definite date (1 May has been rumored), it would not change the current situation, that of the Chinese refusal to recognize Moscow's right to call any meeting at any date without prior Chinese agreement, but a revocation of the 1 March meeting would be a de facto acceptance of Peiping's presumed conditions for a resumption of the talks, and the Chinese might then agree to them. (We will return to this question.)

For the Convening of the 1 March Meeting: A good case can be made for the proposition that the Soviet party will again postpone the preparatory meeting. The reasoning is: the new Soviet leaders apparently do not want to break with the Chinese party, the Chinese will probably not agree to attend the 1 March meeting, and Moscow therefore will probably not hold a meeting which would formalize a break and lead to a resumption of Chinese polemics, polemics which have heavily damaged the Soviet party in the past and which Moscow continues to fear greatly; and further, that, even if the new Soviet leaders have already concluded or soon do conclude that the Chinese cannot be kept quiet at an acceptable cost, their troubles with the parties of their own camp (especially the Eastern European parties, and the Italian and Cuban and British parties, of the 26 known members of the preparatory committee) have actually increased in recent months, there is an even smaller prospect than before for
gaining from these parties—at a preparatory meeting—a substantial degree of recognition of Soviet authority,* and most of the parties of both camps would either welcome another postponement or be content with it.

Moreover, the Chinese party seems likely to exploit all of these factors to try to force a retreat from the meeting, by issuing a definitive statement on the scheduled meeting just a short time—a few weeks, or even a few days—before 1 March. The Chinese statement, whether polemical like the Red Flag attack of 21 November (which may have contributed to the postponement of the meeting as originally scheduled in December) or restrained and reasonable, would be designed to exploit the shortness of the time remaining before the scheduled meeting—a time too short, that is, to allow either for successful Sino-Soviet talks before 1 March or for the other parties to work out a common position before that date, so that heavy pressure would be put on the Soviet party by the parties of the Soviet camp to call off the meeting. The Chinese statement in effect would present the wide span of parties in the Soviet camp with a last chance to avoid the complete split in the movement which most of them would prefer to avoid.

A good case can also be made for the proposition that the meeting will be held on schedule. This proposition would not be based on the occasional reports to this effect, as the Soviet party was making brave statements in private talks prior to postponing the December meeting, and would be expected to make them again right up to the day of the decision to postpone the meeting again. Moreover, the weight of these private remarks is cancelled by the public silence of the Soviet party about the 1 March meeting ever since it was announced

*In other words, Khrushchev was heading for another failure in the December meeting, and the new leaders are heading for an even worse failure.
(12 December),* a silence presumably kept in order to reduce the loss of face for the Soviet party if it were to postpone the meeting again.

The case for the meeting accepts most of the points made in the case against the meeting but gives greater weight to some other considerations. The main argument is that the new Soviet leaders already had, in early December, essentially the same evidence about the costs of either giving in to the Chinese or standing firm against them; and about the troubles in their own camp, that they have now; that they considered this evidence before publicly committing themselves (on 12 December) to the 1 March meeting, and that they would not have so committed themselves if they had not intended to go through with it (just as Khrushchev would not have publicly committed himself in early August to the December meeting if he had not been serious about it); and that nothing has happened or is likely to happen of sufficient importance to change their minds. On this calculation, the Soviet party will not agree prior to any Sino-Soviet talks to postpone the meeting, will not have made enough progress in any such talks by late February to justify a postponement of the meeting, and, if the Chinese party were to make a sudden

*Moscow has since (i.e. since early January) spoken publicly of its intention to hold the 1 March meeting. In a broadcast of 13 January, a Soviet political officer was quoted in defense of some long-standing Soviet positions--the ability to deter world war, the need for "peaceful coexistence" as the "only" correct principle, the existence of a "general line" of the movement, the damage done the cause by "dogmatism and sectarianism," etc.--and was further quoted as asserting that "most" of the parties of the movement favored an early conference and that "it is planned to call" the first session of the preparatory meeting on 1 March. The source was not, of course, as authoritative as a Soviet leader or an article in Pravda, and he did not assert that the meeting would definitely be held, merely that it is "planned."
bid for talks just a short time before the meeting, would attempt to schedule Sino-Soviet talks but would go ahead with the 1 March meeting concurrently, on the argument that it had obligations to all of the parties of the movement which it could not set aside for the convenience of one party.

In making a decision to go ahead with the 1 March meeting as planned, the new Soviet leaders, according to this case, would recognize the probability of Chinese polemics and the difficulty of managing the parties of their own camp at the meeting but would make the decision primarily for the sake of their claim to any degree of authority in a Communist movement which is to be in any meaningful way a movement, or even a camp within a movement, and secondarily in order to remove the Chinese obstacle to exploratory talks with the United States. As for the primary point, even if the Soviet leaders were to regard their public commitment to the 1 March meeting as having been a mistake, if they were to retreat again they would seem to be taking another step of the step-by-step surrender that the Chinese party has been demanding of them, and would seem to be assuring the pro-Soviet parties that membership in the Soviet camp entails no obligations at all. In other words, the Soviet party—according to this case—could afford to lose one showdown (the December meeting; and it did), but it cannot afford to lose a second showdown, if it desires to be a leader at all. (Moscow could mitigate this particular loss, of course, as it did the first time, by blaming a deposed leader for arranging the showdown; but this would require the ouster of at least one of the current leaders, e.g. Kosygin, and another change in the Soviet leadership, coming so soon, would mean an even larger loss of Soviet prestige.)

We regard these cases as having equal merit, with respect both to evidence and to reasoning from evidence. (If Moscow has not yet made its decision, the balance may be tipped by the missing evidence, replies from the invited parties in the next few weeks.) We think that no observer
should offer an estimate on this point with confidence, and we assess the chances for the meeting to be held on schedule as a toss-up.*

If the preparatory meeting is indeed held on schedule, the most important event of the meeting will probably be the convening of it on the first day. This is because several of the invited parties will probably not attend, and the meeting will thus formalize the split in the movement. The impact of this would be softened if the Chinese camp were to refrain—as Moscow would hope—from declaring publicly that the movement was now "openly split," but the fact would be apparent for all to see. Similarly, the impact would be reduced if the Soviet party could announce that talks with the Chinese party were being held or were in prospect, but all of the participants would be aware that the Chinese party had denied the right of the other parties to have the meeting without Chinese agreement.

If the meeting is held, we expect the participation of 18 or 19 of the 26 parties invited to the December meeting, the missing parties being six parties of the Chinese camp, probably the independent Rumanian party, and possibly the Cuban party. There may be some other parties in attendance, newly invited either as members of the committee or as participants in its work; Moscow's intentions in this regard are not at all clear.

*The nearest thing to a formula for avoiding both (a) a complete split, and (b) a humiliating reversal of its position by either Moscow or Peiping, would be a one-day session: that is, all of the invited parties would assemble in Moscow and then vote to dissolve or suspend the meeting, on the ground that the time is not ripe. This could be presented as meeting both the Soviet demand for recognition of the CPSU's right to call the committee together and the Chinese demand that no preparatory meeting be held at this time. While we would not expect the Chinese to make even this much of a concession, the assembled pro-Soviet parties may conceivably take this action anyway.
It is conceivable that the Chinese party and its followers would show up at the last minute, without any prior Sino-Soviet agreement, for the purpose of disrupting the meeting by exploiting the apparent format of continuing the discussions until agreement is reached; but it seems much more likely that the Chinese would stand on principle. Of the pro-Chinese parties, the North Vietnamese may be wavering, and there is an outside chance that Moscow could induce Hanoi to attend. To split the Chinese camp in this fashion would be a spectacular gain for the Russians, and might in itself tip the balance to a decision to hold the 1 March meeting on schedule; however, we think that the best Moscow could do is to induce Hanoi to be neutral. The Rumanian party too might finally be talked into attending, but we think the Rumanians would wish to emphasize their independence by staying away. The Cuban party has been opposed to the meeting and silent about it, and might decide not to attend. The British party has said publicly that it opposes a meeting without Chinese participation, and the Italian party has long been the leader of those opposed to or reluctant about a meeting; but we think that both would in the end decide to come. Some other recognized parties might attend as newly-invited parties, as one of the pro-Soviet parties has suggested. One of the original 26, the Japanese party, might be represented by a pro-Soviet splinter party.** There is an outside chance that some parties not previously recognized as Communist would be represented in some fashion, but we think that Moscow would prefer that these be kept out of the preparatory meeting.

*In the event of Chinese attendance, the Soviet party would probably try to reach a private agreement with its own followers to adopt and invoke the principle of majority rule to deal if necessary with Chinese intransigence.

**We think the Russians would do well not to invite any splinter parties, because it would legitimize the concept of splinter parties, and there are and will be many more of these parties in the Chinese camp than in the Soviet camp.
For the Work of a Meeting: The Soviet party has publicly defined the work of a preparatory committee as that of drawing up a list of those to be invited to the conference, fixing a precise date for it, and drafting its "basic documents."* Work on the latter should begin at once, possibly on the basis of a Soviet party draft presumed to be (as in 1960) in preparation.

If the meeting is held (on 1 March or later) and the Chinese party and its followers are not in attendance, the preparatory committee might act at once on the Italian party's earlier proposal that a new overture to the Chinese party be made by the committee itself. Moscow would probably not oppose such an overture, as it would permit other parties to get some useful fresh experience of Chinese intransigence. (A bid might be made to Peiping even if the Soviet party is already attempting to schedule Sino-Soviet talks.) If so, we think that the Chinese party would continue to refuse to attend, even though it would cost the Chinese less to accept an invitation from many parties than from the Soviet party alone.

In order to encourage the widest possible expressions of support for Soviet arrangements for the meeting and maximum participation in it, the Soviet party in the months prior to Khrushchev's fall was evasive about its position on some sensitive matters, and it has

*The main document would be the equivalent of the 1957 Declaration of the 12 bloc parties and the 1960 Statement of the 81 parties. Bringing these documents up to date has been defined by Moscow as the "main task" of a conference. We do not know what other possible documents Moscow has in mind: in 1957, there was a Peace Manifesto; in 1960, there was an Appeal to the People of the World, more militant in tone, giving more attention to the "struggles" necessary for peace. A second document this time might be similarly addressed to peace, or it might relate to the formation of some new organ of the movement.
still not clarified its position on most of these. In its definitive public statement (10 August) about the meeting as originally scheduled, it again failed to discuss the question of majority rule, thus encouraging a belief that discussion of all matters would be prolonged until agreement was reached, but it did not commit itself to this procedure; similarly, it again encouraged a belief that in the preparation of new "documents" it would demand little, perhaps little more than an agreement to disagree and to abstain from divisive activities such as polemics and factionalism, but it again indicated its hope of obtaining an endorsement of the existing "general line" and of updating it in a detailed common program; similarly, it again encouraged a belief that it would not seek at a conference—in any of the "documents"—the condemnation of any party or parties by name, but it left itself room to do so; and it half-promised that it would not seek the excommunication of any parties, but it undermined this assurance by hinting again that it might try to establish a new central organization for the parties of its camp (an even stronger and less welcome action). In sum, the Soviet party, while insisting on recognition of its authority on the immediate issue of convening the meeting and calling a date for it, was and is still staying loose in other respects: it was and is free, at the time of a meeting, (a) to take a hard line from the start, to call for a vote on the principle of majority rule (as it had not, in 1960) and then to apply that rule vigorously, accepting the loss of some parties and steering the others into a comprehensive endorsement of Soviet positions, including a detailed common program explicitly described as a "general line" (a concept it failed to impose in 1960), the excommunication of the Chinese party or even the entire Chinese camp, and perhaps even the establishment of a new Comintern; or (b) to take a moderate position, pressing the parties to respect the will of the majority (as it had in 1960) but not pressing for the adoption and application of majority rule, and, thus retaining all or almost all of the parties of its camp, to seek some such combination as a broadbrush "general line," a harsh condemnation of the Chinese party by name for those actions which are objectionable to almost all of the parties of the Soviet
camp (polemics and factionalism), and the establishment of some new international organization to act in some respects for the parties between conferences but without any disciplinary powers; or (c) to take a very soft (abjectly conciliatory) line, committing itself to discussions prolonged as long as necessary to reach unanimity (thus keeping all of the parties of its camp), and settling—as it had been encouraging others to believe that it would do—for a document expressing a minimal agreement (a highest-common-factor agreement), with an agreement to disagree in other respects and to abstain from polemics and factionalism, without an explicit condemnation of the Chinese party and with no provision for a new international organ.

The Soviet party has been making a soft approach to the 1 March meeting. The proposed format of the meeting—several sessions, with the proposals coordinated at each session to be circulated to all of the parties of the movement in the intervals—is very conciliatory, and seems in large part responsive to the Italian party's proposal for a series of regional meetings extending over a year, after which (in the Italian scheme) the parties would re-examine the need for a conference and a general line.* The first session might be occupied entirely with comparing the proposals of the various parties, and with arranging matters (as in 1960) so as to stake out a large area of agreement in the first session and to postpone consideration of questions which promise to be difficult. In the apparent Soviet conception, no final decisions are to be made until the final session of the preparatory meeting, so these questions of the need for a conference and a general line would remain open while the Soviet party explored the positions of the other parties; this

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*One observer has remarked, however, that the part of the Italian scheme dearest to the Italians' hearts was the proposal for regional meetings, in view of their advocacy of polycentrism and their wish to lead the Western European parties.
format could provide the Soviet party with a face-saving line of retreat from a conference, should it discover during the preparatory meeting that there is nothing to gain from having one.

The most disagreeable part of the Italian position has been its insistence on the need for autonomy, whereas the main justification for a conference of the parties—from the Soviet point of view—has been its usefulness as a vehicle for obtaining a meaningful degree of recognition of Soviet authority in the movement. Thus we expect some effort by the Soviet party, if it is firm enough to hold the meeting at all, to get something more along these lines than it would really settle for. The Russians might even make a brief effort—in the first session—to establish the principle of majority rule*—for this meeting and subsequent conferences—and on this basis to get approval of a Soviet draft document expressing the rest of the hard-line combination suggested above (a detailed program, excommunication, a tough new organ, etc.), but so few of the important parties would favor this combination that we think the Soviet party would not persist in it (if, indeed, Moscow were to propose it at all).

A better possibility, we think, is a serious Soviet effort to get some combination of the things set forth above, following the hard-line combination, as the moderate or 'first fallback' position: an agreement to respect the will of the majority (an unsatisfactory substitute

*We previously suggested the possibility of a secret agreement among the parties of the Soviet camp to adopt and invoke majority rule in the event of Chinese participation and obstructionism. We are speaking now, however, of the possibility of majority rule for the operation of a meeting without the Chinese.
for majority rule),* and then--in the draft document or

*There is an important--and perhaps not immediately apparent--difference between the hard principle of majority rule and the moderate request that the will of the majority be respected. Under majority rule, a principle which might be established either by agreement or by vote, disputed matters are brought to a vote, and the positions favored by the majority are expressed in the name of the entire organization or body (e.g. a conference of the parties), and are binding on all parties in that sense. Once given the concept of majority rule, the organization or body may go further and operate under the principle of "democratic centralism," in which the position favored by the majority of the body (e.g. a politburo) is absolutely binding, in that the body does not reveal that there was a minority vote, and the members of the minority are obliged to accept the position of the majority as if it were their own (and may not state their 'former' views publicly); or the organization or body may behave more liberally, in publicizing the fact and strength of the minority vote and in permitting members of the minority to express publicly their disagreement. (Because the Chinese party has refused to accept the principle of "democratic centralism" for the operations of any Communist body except an individual Communist party--and not even there, if the party is a pro-Soviet party, as witness the proliferation of pro-Chinese factions and splinter parties--since late 1961 the Soviet party has increasingly been employing majority rule in the more liberal sense in the front organizations, publicizing the fact and often the strength of the minority vote; the members of the minority have subsequently explained their positions publicly, and even some members of the majority, e.g. the Rumanians and the Italians, have sometimes publicly expressed their dissatisfaction with the results.) In contrast, the request for respect for the will of the majority, at least as this concept was employed by the Soviet party in 1960, is simply a request for the voluntary submission of the minority to the majority; if such submission is not forthcoming, the Soviet party (according to its 1960 usage) does not then call for a vote, but instead persists in a search for (footnote continued on page 52)
documents—an agreement on a set of basic propositions described as a "general line," a condemnation of the Chinese party by name, and the establishment of a standing committee to act for the parties between conferences (a committee empowered to examine the implementation of common agreements and to report to a conference, with the conference itself taking any necessary disciplinary action).*

For Soviet Gains in a Meeting: We doubt that the Soviet party would be able to get—in a preparatory meeting—all of even this moderate combination outlined above. While a majority of the 18 or 19 pro-Soviet parties (of the 26 known to be on the invitation list), and probably a majority of whatever additional parties take part in a meeting, would be expected to favor such a combination, there are

(footnote continued from page 51) unanimity, although not explicitly accepting this latter principle. In recent months, Moscow has been emphasizing that, in preparing for a conference of the parties, it has the support of the "majority" of parties for its course (an assertion which can be disputed), and it is possible that Moscow will actually try to establish the principle of majority rule in any forthcoming meetings; both the Soviet position in 1960 and the phrases used currently, however, suggest a more modest effort.

*There was a curious reference, in an article in the Finnish Communist party press in mid-December, to the actions of an "executive committee" in postponing the meeting scheduled for 15 December and rescheduling it for 1 March. The implication was that these actions were taken not by the Soviet party but by a standing committee, acting in the name of all of the parties, of much the type we suggest here. There is no confirmation of this, however, by any other source, and it is in conflict with the testimony of the Japanese party that, at the 1960 conference, proposals for the "establishment of a permanent international Communist organ" were rejected.
several parties which have been reluctant all along to
bind themselves to Soviet positions and (especially) to
establish a precedent and a procedure for disciplinary
actions, and since Khrushchev's fall many more parties
(including several of the 18 or 19) have indicated an inten-
tion to maintain a greater degree of independence of the
Soviet party.

We think that the largest number of the important
participating parties (most of the bloc parties, most of
the Western European parties) would probably favor a
softer combination, the one set forth above as the soft-
est or 'final fallback' position--prolonged discussion
looking toward minimal agreement, no explicit condemna-
tion, no new organ of any kind--and that a large minority
of the parties of the movement (to all of which the pro-
posals are apparently to be submitted) would also favor
it. Judging from the indications to date, the Soviet
party is not prepared to ride over a large minority, and
would compromise instead.

If the meeting is held, the prospect seems to be
for the adoption of a mixture of moderate and soft posi-
tions, mostly soft, perhaps some such combination as: the
principle of prolonged discussion (expressed in the draft
document as an agreement to consider all opinions), and--
in the draft--a minimal agreement on a few basic proposi-
tions (e.g. ability to prevent war, need for peaceful
coexistence, support for liberation movements, coopera-
tion among bloc states, equality and independence of
parties), with no reference to a "general line"*; either
a strong condemnation of Chinese offenses (a selection

*Even an agreement on a few basic propositions will
be difficult, as there must be some kind of emphasis
in the statement of them; e.g., the Soviet party will
probably wish to avoid binding itself to any particular
line toward the U.S.
from the following: personality cult, dogmatism, nationalism, sectarianism, pseudorevolutionary leftism, polemicism, factionalism) without naming the Chinese party, or a comradely criticism (more in sorrow than in anger) of the Chinese party by name; and an agreement to carry out the agreements reached (much as in 1960) and to have further consultations and meetings and conferences, but with no provision for any kind of organ to act between conferences or for disciplinary action to be taken at conferences.*

If the Russians are unwilling to settle for the kind of mixture that a preparatory committee is willing to write into the draft document to be considered by the conference, they can follow the precedent of the 1960 preparatory meeting and conference: that is, they can bring to a conference, from a preparatory meeting, a frankly uncompleted draft, one in which critical questions on which agreement has not been reached have been left open, for consideration by the full conference. However, because the preparatory meeting this time--with its several sessions, and with its proposals to be considered by all the parties between sessions--is to be almost a de facto conference, the Russians would not seem to have much to gain in offering to the formal conference a position which

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*This is a very tentative assessment. The question is complex (and additionally complicated by the fact that we do not know what additional parties have been invited to the 1 March meeting), and is highly contingent: for example, the Soviet party might get a harsher mixture if the Chinese camp were to intensify its polemics with the Soviet camp before or during the meeting, or were to show up at the last minute to play a disruptive role, or were to advertise a counter-conference under Peiping's sponsorship. The matter would have to be recalculated during the meeting.

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the preparatory meeting—acting on the basis of opinions submitted by all the parties—had been unwilling to accept.*

As for a subsequent conference, just as we think that there is only an even chance that Moscow will hold a preparatory meeting, so we think that there is only an even chance that a preparatory meeting can agree to have a conference at a definite date. A meeting might conclude with an expression of favor in principle for a conference, but fail to set any date for it, which would permit the Soviet camp to have a conference if and when conditions seemed favorable. If a preparatory meeting can agree on a conference at a definite date, the likely date seems 1966, as the preparatory meeting itself would apparently be prolonged for some months, and some time would be needed after the last session for individual preparations for a conference. The invitation list would seem likely to include all of the 81 parties which attended the 1960 conference and seven additional recognized Communist parties, and might include a number of newly-qualified parties (parties not now recognized as Communist parties, such as the Socialist Workers and Farmers Party of Nigeria, the leftist government parties of Ghana and Guinea and Mali, a number of other leftist parties in Africa, and a few from Latin America and the Near and Middle East), and perhaps a few pro-Soviet splinter parties (none is yet formed): in all, an invitation list of from 88 to (possibly) more than 100 parties.**

*Some of the parties of both camps—and Peiping itself, quoting them—have been describing the 1 March meeting as a "conference" of the parties.

**The Soviet party under Khrushchev spoke in its 15 June 1964 letter of its wish to invite to the conference those parties which had arisen in recent years as the "recognized spokesmen of the working-class movement of their countries," a formulation which appeared to include parties not now recognized as Communist and even non-Communist parties; the Soviet party under its new leaders has not mentioned this, and may have had some second thoughts about it.
In sum, a preparatory meeting held in the near future, if judged by the standards of 1960, would probably be a failure. It would be unable to speak for the "movement" in the accepted sense of all of the recognized parties, whereas the 1960 meeting did so. It would probably be unable to produce a statement even as useful as the 1960 statement, in that in 1960 the Soviet camp managed to get its own positions into the document together with the Chinese positions (so that by extraction it could present its own program), whereas this time the positions would probably be so watered down in the process of circulation among all the parties of the camp as to be barely meaningful. And it might not be able even to agree to have a conference at a definite date.

If the meeting were to be held and were to reach any agreements, however, the new Soviet leaders might reasonably regard it as a limited success, if judged by the standards of 1961-64. That is, the meeting would be speaking for a movement in a meaningful sense--speaking for the large majority of the recognized Communist parties, which would be expressing some sense of a movement, of a concerted progression toward a common end. This sense of concert and progression has been missing in the Soviet camp since 1960. It is this need to make at least a start toward the restoration of Soviet authority (the CPSU as the leader of most other parties), and toward the restoration of the sense of movement forward, that makes us think that there is an even chance that Moscow will hold a preparatory meeting for a conference.*

For a Chinese-Sponsored Meeting: If the Soviet party does go ahead with the preparatory meeting on 1 March or soon thereafter, the Chinese party must decide whether to sponsor a counter-meeting of the pro-Chinese parties and splinter parties. Such a meeting; if held,

*To put this in negative terms: the new Soviet leaders might think it a worse failure, entailing a greater loss, to have no meeting than to have a modest meeting.
would almost certainly follow rather than precede the Soviet-sponsored meeting, as the Chinese party otherwise would be guilty—by its own definition—of "openly splitting" the movement. Once the split had been effected by the convocation of Moscow's meeting, the Chinese would be free to call together the "revolutionary" parties from which the "revisionists" had split.

In January 1964, the World Marxist Review publicly took note that there might be a conference of all elements of the Communist movement opposed to Moscow. In the next seven months there were several reports—some from Soviet and pro-Soviet sources, some from Chinese and pro-Chinese—of Chinese plans to convene such a meeting in Peiping, either later in 1964 or in 1965. In August, the Chinese were reported by some of their supporters to believe that their holdings were still not large enough to justify a conference. That the Chinese were considering such a conference, however, was indicated in late August by their reprinting of a resolution of the pro-Chinese New Zealand party which asserted that, if the Soviet-sponsored meeting then scheduled for December were held, there should be an exploration of the possibility of holding a meeting of the parties which held views similar to those of the New Zealand party (i.e., the Chinese camp). On 4 September, Khrushchev, in a speech in Prague in which he denounced Chinese subversive activity in the movement, declared that the Chinese were actively "preparing a meeting of the splinter groups." Shortly thereafter, on 28 September, Peiping originated an article on the First International which could be read as warning that, if the Soviet camp were to expel itself from the true Communist movement by calling the promised conference of the parties, the true believers would have a conference of their own. Since that time, there has been an absence of either private or public implications to this effect.

The Chinese could sponsor a preparatory meeting, and thereafter a conference, which in some respects would be a good show. In the bloc, in addition to the enormous Chinese party, there are the pro-Chinese parties of North Korea, North Vietnam, and Albania, and the splinter party...
in Belgium recognizes a rival Communist party in (i.e., for) Yugoslavia. (Rumania and Cuba, even if both decline to attend a Soviet-sponsored meeting, for the same reasons would probably refuse to attend one sponsored by Peiping.) In the non-Communist Far East, the pro-Chinese parties include the Indonesian party, the largest and most important outside the bloc, the fairly important Japanese party, and the small parties of Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Thailand; in addition, the Chinese have one wing of the party in Pakistan and also in Nepal, the large rival parties in India and Ceylon, and the small rival party in Australia. Elsewhere in the world, there are no pro-Chinese parties among the recognized Communist parties, but the Chinese could draw from a large number of splinter parties and groups. There are such parties and groups in Western Europe—in Austria, Belgium, Britain, Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, and West Germany (now recognized by the Albanian party), and there is one too in the United States; in Latin America—in Ecuador a rival party representing about half of the old party, in Peru a separate pro-Chinese organization about as strong as the pro-Soviet organization, and splinters in Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Paraguay; in the Near and Middle East—splinters in Lebanon and Syria; and in Africa—the marginal Communist parties of Malagasy, Mauritius, and Zanzibar, plus incipient splinters elsewhere and some pro-Communist figures in several African states.

The recognized Communist parties in the Chinese camp include more than half of the Communist party members in the world, and, as suggested above, the Chinese party (drawing in part on individuals who live in Peiping) could probably bring together the representatives of upwards of 45 "parties"—including recognized parties, splinter parties, and purported parties. Moreover, the representation from Europe and other predominantly white areas would reduce the force of the Soviet contention that the Chinese have split the movement along color lines.
Nevertheless, we think that the Chinese would not want to have such a meeting in the near future. It is not that they would be deterred by any concern for the fate of "the movement": while they speak of their desire for the "unity of the international Communist movement", in fact they have been at pains to destroy the concept of a single movement, to establish the concept of two movements (or two camps), one of "revisionists" around the Soviet party and one of "revolutionaries" around the Chinese party; and their calls for "unity" are always for unity on the "basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism" as Peiping interprets those concepts, i.e. for a surrender of the Soviet camp to the Chinese camp, of the false movement to the true movement.

We think that the Chinese would prefer to delay a meeting of the parties of their own camp for other reasons. The first of these is that such a meeting in the near future would be vulnerable to the charges of (a) being a meeting of a small minority of the recognized parties, and (b) being essentially a meeting of the Far Eastern parties; that is, no more than 13 recognized parties would take part, and all of these recognized parties, except the tiny Albanian party, would be Far Eastern parties, as would almost all of the strong splinter parties. Another reason is that a meeting now would alienate some parties for which the Chinese have hopes—the neutrals (e.g., Rumania, Cuba, Venezuela), and even some pro-Soviet parties—by forcing them to choose at this time. Yet another reason is that, for the Chinese as for the Russians, not all of the parties of their camp are docile parties—the Albanians, for example, are pushing the Chinese, the North Vietnamese are holding back, and the splinter parties have a variety of positions—and the Chinese would want to put on a much better show of "unity" than the Russians could. In other words, we would expect the Chinese to calculate still, as they were reported to calculate last summer, that they ought to increase their holdings—in terms of transfers to the Chinese camp of recognized Communist parties, the formation of additional splinter parties, and the growth to respectable strength of a larger number of splinter parties—before convening a meeting. The Chinese, as
they recognize, can make further gains of this kind even if Moscow improves its present situation with the parties of the Soviet camp. That is, the Soviet party may be able to restore some of its authority in a meaningful movement, but in the process some parties would be lost and a number of additional pro-Chinese factions and groups would be formed.

For the Sino-Soviet Dispute Without a Meeting:
Should the Soviet party decide to retreat from the 1 March meeting—for whatever combination of reasons such as reluctance to break with the Chinese, the wish to induce the Chinese not to resume polemical attacks, the response to pressure from the parties of the Soviet camp, the hope of deflections from the Chinese camp, or the simple calculation that a meeting now or in the near future would not achieve enough in the way of restoring Soviet authority to make it worth while—Moscow would still have the immediate and imperious problem of the Chinese challenge. We would expect Moscow to try again, as a first step, to get the Chinese into full-scale Sino-Soviet talks.

As noted previously, Moscow could solve nothing by postponing a preparatory meeting to another definite date; the postponement would carry the existing problems with it, in particular the Chinese demand that there be no meeting at any date without prior Chinese agreement. As noted, however, if Moscow should cancel the 1 March meeting without rescheduling it, in part as an investment in the atmosphere for Sino-Soviet talks, the Chinese might then agree to full-scale talks, in order to discover whether the insecure Soviet leaders were now prepared to surrender.

Should the Soviet party still be interested in getting the Chinese party (and its followers) to attend a preparatory meeting for a conference, we doubt that the two parties could reach agreement on the terms of Chinese participation in an early meeting. While the Soviet party has already compromised with respect to the format of a meeting, in its apparent de facto acceptance of the principle of prolonging discussions until agreement is
reached, and may be prepared to compromise substantially also on the questions of an invitation list and of the formulations in a draft document on matters of strategy and relations among parties, we think that the Chinese would still make excessive demands. These would be some combination of demands for a much later date, for a radically different composition of the preparatory committee (including some of the pro-Chinese splinter parties*), for an agenda and a draft document both heavily loaded in favor of Chinese positions, and for the explicit acceptance of the principle of unanimity. For the Soviet party to accept such demands would ensure that any preparatory meeting would be another Chinese triumph and another Soviet defeat, a worse defeat than not to have a meeting at all.

Moreover, even if the Soviet party were to give up all thought of a preparatory meeting and a subsequent conference, and were simply to try to reach some agreement on a cessation of polemics, we would expect the Chinese to reaffirm their position—that there can be no cessation of polemics without an agreement on the terms of stopping them. And the most important of the Chinese terms would again be a radical change in Communist strategy, and particularly in Soviet policy toward the United States—not just a change in formulations (although this would be included), not simply tougher talk, not a single convulsive effort to change the balance of power like the Cuban missile base venture of 1962, not an isolated effort in this or that area where the Russians would have a special interest in pre-empting or displacing the Chinese

*The Soviet party has almost certainly not invited any of these pro-Chinese splinter parties to the 1 March meeting in advance of any talks with the Chinese. Even if the Russians were willing to deal such a blow to pro-Soviet parties and factions everywhere, they would not want to give away a possible negotiable asset in advance; and, if the talks were to fall through after these parties had been invited, Moscow would be stuck with them.
(e.g. Vietnam), but a much more aggressive and sustained policy of pressure against U.S. positions all over the world. While the Soviet leaders may intend to persist in the harder line of December and early January, that line was nevertheless far short of the radical change of policy which the Chinese had been demanding (and continued to demand, in their own comment on the President's address), and we would expect the Chinese to continue to make excessive demands in this respect as in others. (One such demand would probably be for the withdrawal of Soviet expressions of interest in visiting the United States.) We do not believe that the Soviet party would agree even privately to the kind of change that Peiping demands--essentially a change to a policy which the Chinese insist is a low-risk policy, but which the Russians have recognized as a high-risk policy--because Peiping could be expected to attack Moscow publicly, in strong terms, for any failure to hold to the agreement, a failure which would soon be apparent. In other words, the Chinese could not be placated, short of giving them control of Soviet foreign policy; they would be constantly pressing Moscow to go further.

Similarly, we think that the Chinese would make demands which Moscow could not afford to meet, with respect to the question of relations among Communist states and parties. As for the states, we think that the Russians would emphasize their readiness to improve state relations with Peiping, specifically their willingness to restore large-scale aid (including the return of techniciens),* and the supply of more modern conventional

*In February 1962 the Soviet party, apparently in an attempt to induce Peiping to cease its polemical attacks, implied a willingness to resume substantial Soviet aid to China; the Chinese recognized this as an attempted bribe, and implicitly rejected it. Moscow made similar vague overtures in February 1963; Peiping showed no interest. In November 1963 a Soviet party letter to the Chinese expressed Soviet willingness to increase trade and to restore technical aid, and to widen scientific (footnote continued on page 63)
weapons than the Chinese have), to settle the genuine border disputes (as distinct from Peiping's propaganda claims) and to refrain from agitation in border areas, and to try to discourage Peiping's enemies (from Washington to New Delhi) by publicly professing in strong language the Soviet intention to honor the Sino-Soviet treaty (which Khrushchev had publicly implied an unwillingness to honor); but we do not see how Moscow could agree to underwrite the Chinese economy (particularly the inadequate food supply), or to provide the Chinese with nuclear weapons, or to give the Chinese absolute assurances about the treaty (assurances which would cover Peiping's ventures against Taiwan or in Southeast Asia or against India and Indian border states, and thus would, again, give the Chinese control of Soviet foreign policy).

(footnote continued from page 62) cooperation. The Chinese in February 1964 explicitly rejected this offer, stating that they could not trust the Russians not to withdraw the advisors and break the scientific cooperation agreements (among others) again, and that in its trade relations with China the USSR had (sometimes) forced the Chinese to take goods they did not need and had (in some instances, e.g., a sample atomic bomb) withheld goods that Peiping did need, and that Moscow sought both to control the economies of its allies and to use economic aid of all kinds for political control. We do not see how Peiping, in considering any new basis for increased cooperation, could ensure itself against another costly withdrawal of technicians and breaking of agreements, even if it were willing in the first place to give Soviet citizens access to national defense secrets; with respect to trade, Peiping would probably insist on importing only those goods which it needed and on better prices for both imports and exports; with respect to its nuclear energy program, Peiping would be likely to demand materials and processes which Moscow would be unwilling to give (i.e., a better deal than the agreement on Soviet assistance to the Chinese nuclear energy program which was cancelled in 1959); and the Chinese would very probably insist on remaining outside of regional bodies such as CEMA.
As for the parties, Moscow and Peiping might be able to conclude a nominal agreement on non-interference in each other's affairs, but we do not see how Moscow could accept Peiping's position on the central question of authority in the movement. Even if some agreement on this question could be worked out with respect to preparations for a conference of the parties, we do not see how the Soviet party could agree to recognition of pro-Chinese splinter parties as legitimate parties of the movement,* or could agree to the principle of "unanimity through consultations" as a permanently-operating principle: either agreement would multiply Moscow's existing problems.

Further with regard to this question of relations among states and parties, even the comparatively small question of the Soviet attitude toward Yugoslavia and Albania seems unlikely to be resolved. There is some possibility of an agreement on Albania, as the Chinese could withdraw at small cost their extreme demand for a Soviet public acceptance of full responsibility for the bad relations with Albania, and the Russians at small cost could make overtures to Albania for a fresh start, but the Albanians themselves would seem likely to spoil any Sino-Soviet agreement by pressing their extreme demands and making Péiping's support of them seem the test for the Chinese attitude toward all of Péiping's followers. Similarly, as regards Yugoslavia, the Chinese might withdraw their extreme demand for a Soviet break with Yugoslavia and the Russians might feel able to agree to be less friendly to Yugoslavia (although in fact the new leaders have been courting Tito), but the Chinese have made so much of Yugoslavia as the embodiment of

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*Nor do we see any chance that Peiping, for the sake of an agreement with Moscow, would abandon these parties; the Chinese hold over these parties is a hard gain in the most important sector of the struggle (questions of authority), whereas any kind of verbal agreement with the Russians is a soft asset, not to be relied on.

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"revisionism" that they would be likely to press for some stronger action than Moscow could afford to take, e.g. another explicit denunciation of Yugoslav "revisionism" in a bilateral Sino-Soviet statement.

Finally, there seems no prospect of an agreement on the other matters set forth by Red Flag in the attack of 21 November—de-Stalinization and Soviet internal policies. The Russians simply cannot accede—in any degree—to the Chinese demands in this sector of the dispute, without relinquishing the Soviet party’s authority over even its internal affairs. This would be literally suicidal.

In sum, we continue to believe that the best that the Soviet party can do, in negotiations with the Chinese—whether the question is the preparatory meeting, or Communist strategy, or relations among states and parties, or whatever combination of these—is to buy time at a ruinous price, i.e. to gain a temporary cessation of Chinese polemical attacks at a cost which could not be long supported. Khrushchev had apparently reached the same conclusion, and was belatedly moving toward a complete break between the two parties, a break which would have been formalized at the meeting scheduled for 15 December. We think it probable that the new Soviet leaders, if they have not already reached that conclusion, would soon be forced to it in the course of any new talks with the Chinese, although it does not necessarily follow that they would go on to formalize a break.

Moreover, even if Moscow were willing to try to pay this price, we believe that the Chinese would not abandon their effort to increase their holdings among the Communist parties, because the Chinese are persuaded both of their righteousness and of their stability—whereas the Russians would be regarded by Peiping as compromising out of necessity, and even a conciliatory Soviet leadership might prove unstable. The best that Moscow can do, we think, is to reduce the rate of accretion to the Chinese camp and to make an occasional recovery,
rather than preventing further loss or reversing the trend.* The Soviet party has, of course, the hope that Mao is mortal and that his successors will be easier to deal with; but the likely successors—the party-machine group led by Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping—do not seem much different.

With respect to the parties of the Soviet camp (the problem of the "unity of the revisionists," in Hoxha's phrase), if Moscow decides to retreat from a preparatory meeting and a conference, the Soviet party will presumably give greater attention to bilateral and regional meetings which do not speak for any "movement." The problem of Soviet authority would still be there, however, as the Russians would still be seeking in such meetings to obtain endorsements of Soviet positions. The abandonment of large meetings, with their stronger implications of the subordination of individual parties, would probably make some of these parties more effective in their home environments (as the Italians have contended), but we doubt that it would check the growth of neutralism or end the call by some parties for "autonomy," both of which can be described more accurately as Soviet losses than as Chinese gains. Here too the best that Moscow can do, we think, is to slow the rate of loss and to make occasional recoveries (e.g. through changes in leaderships).

Obviously the "movement" in the classical sense—with a common doctrine, a single authoritative interpretation, an adherence to a common strategy, a decision-making process based in Moscow, a discipline strongly enforced (including Moscow-directed purges), in all the action of a cohesive team directed by a single center—is finished. The immediate Soviet decision—with respect to a preparatory meeting and a conference—is whether to

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*Since 1960, this accretion has been in terms of splinter parties and factions; no additional recognized parties, as units, have transferred to the Chinese camp, although some have made known their positions in this period.
give up even the concept of a movement, in the limited sense of the convocation of a large meeting of the parties of the Soviet camp to take some modest common actions and to conclude some minimal agreements on a future course. Whatever Moscow's decision, it must accept some further losses.*

*We are not considering here the question of the gain or loss of overall Communist strength, or the increase or decrease of the overall Communist threat, as a result of the diminution of Soviet authority in the "movement" and in its own camp. This is a separate and complex question.
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THE ROAD TO A SHOWDOWN: SOVIET AND CHINESE
BEHAVIOR IN, AND POSITIONS ON, BILATERAL TALKS
MULTIPARTY MEETINGS, AND "WORLD" COMMUNIST CONFERENCES

SUMMARY

Introductory Note

The central issue in the Sino-Soviet dispute has come to be that of authority and discipline, a battle which has been fought in part both in and about large gatherings of the Communist parties. Since 1960, when the Soviet and Chinese parties took part in two such gatherings in which the Chinese successfully challenged Soviet authority, the two parties have spent much time in exploring each other's terms for another conference and in attempting to put each other in the wrong on this issue in the eyes of other parties. While either Moscow or Peiping would stand to gain from a conference of all the parties if it could get one on its own terms, from 1961 to autumn 1964 the two never came close to agreeing on the terms, because Moscow consistently sought some form of Chinese recognition of Soviet authority and some form of Chinese acceptance of discipline, while Peiping just as consistently refused to grant such recognition and assent. From July 1963 until the fall of Khrushchev in October 1964, the practical decisions to be made were (a) for the Soviet party, whether to hold an anti-Chinese conference of the Soviet camp, and, if so, how far to try to go in it (against the Chinese, and in binding other parties to Soviet positions), and (b) for the Chinese party, how to forestall such a conference, or, failing this, whether to convene a counter-conference of pro-Chinese parties and splinters.

The November 1957 Conference

The device of the "world" Communist conference—as a vehicle for the Soviet party's effort to exercise authority and impose discipline—was used with some success in
November 1957. Twelve of the bloc parties (all but Yugoslavia's) met in a conference which issued a declaration asserting their unanimity, generally endorsing the Soviet party line, and "banning factions and groups" in the movement. Moreover, Mao Tse-tung at this conference expressly recognized the Soviet party as the "head" of the world movement.

The Bucharest Conference, June 1960

The Soviet party was understandably attracted to this device again in the spring of 1960, after the Chinese party had made a comprehensive public attack on Soviet positions and had twice rejected Soviet overtures for bilateral talks. The Chinese agreed to attend such a conference--in Bucharest, in June--but declared in advance that they would not recognize the authority of the Soviet party or any combination of the parties--that is, that they would not alter their positions if outvoted or censured. The Chinese held to this position at the conference: they rejected the criticism of them by other parties, they made it impossible for the meeting to issue anything more than a thin and ambiguous statement of "unity," and they made clear that they would continue to insist on the principle of unanimity (Chinese veto power) in future meetings. At Bucharest, the Chinese were strongly supported by the Albanians, and some other parties showed various degrees of sympathy for Peiping. The parties agreed to have another and larger conference in November.

The Moscow Conference, November 1960

Preparations for the November conference took the form of, first, bilateral Sino-Soviet talks, and, secondly, a 26-party preparatory meeting, the latter largely concerned with drafting a statement for the parties to consider at the conference. The bilateral talks were a stalemate. The 26-party meeting made considerable progress
in the drafting, but could not agree on two critical matters related to the issue of authority and discipline, namely, whether the minority was obliged to submit to the majority (as Moscow insisted) and whether the statement itself—like the 1957 statement—was to condemn "factionalism" in the movement (as Moscow wished).

Throughout the conference of the 81 parties in November, the Chinese were adamant in refusing to submit to the majority, and, while they were willing to compromise on most of the formulations in the draft in order to arrive at an equivocal declaration which all could sign, they flatly refused to sign any condemnation of "factionalism" (several speakers had sharply criticized Chinese factional activity in the movement, and the formulation was directed primarily at Peiping). Moreover, the Chinese had the support of several other (mainly Asian) parties, and could see that a number of others were reluctant or even unwilling to try to coerce Peiping. In the end, the Chinese won: general discussions were not cut off by majority rule but were suspended while negotiating teams worked out agreed formulations; and the final statement made no mention of "factionalism."

The Quarrel About Albania, 1961

In the early months of 1961, at which time the Chinese were engaged in trade and aid negotiations with the Russians and openly sought "help" in their economic crisis, Peiping made a number of conciliatory gestures toward Moscow. The Chinese refused, however, to make any substantial concessions with respect to recognizing Soviet authority—for example, in Moscow's dispute with the Albanians, whom the Russians were then pressing hard. After the conclusion of a disappointing trade agreement with the Russians, the Chinese announced a loan to Albania and made fresh attacks on Khrushchev's policies toward the West. In October 1961, when Khrushchev publicly attacked the Albanian leaders at the Soviet party congress, the Chinese delegate publicly censured Khrushchev's action.
Soviet Overtures, Early 1962

In February 1962, following a period in which many of the pro-Soviet parties criticized the Chinese party by name on the issue of Peiping's support of Albania, the Soviet party apparently tried to lure the Chinese party into a position which could be presented as a form of recognition of Soviet authority—that is, in exchange for economic aid, to be silent about Albania and (hopefully) to cease polemics altogether. In this overture, the Russians apparently did not offer to convene another multiparty conference, and in subsequent months the Soviet party privately campaigned hard against the Chinese party in letters to and briefings of other Communist parties.

Exchanges on a Conference, 1962

The Chinese party, seeing its own position in the movement as strong and getting stronger, refused to be maneuvered into a position which would jeopardize its prospects for further gains. In April, the Chinese party fielded the Soviet proposals of February by endorsing the proposal of some of the smaller parties for another conference, by speaking of a cessation of polemics as desirable only as a step toward such a conference, and by specifying that another step should be a Soviet initiative to improve relations with Albania. (The Chinese reportedly reaffirmed privately at this time that they would insist on the principle of unanimity at any conference.) In late May, the Russians made a counter-proposal which seems to have envisaged a limited conference stacked (with pro-Soviet parties) in Moscow's favor; in any case, Moscow in this letter declined to change its policy toward Albania.

The Decision to Split, Fall 1962

During the next few months, the Chinese were apparently moving toward a decision (perhaps made in September)
to carry the fight to the end—that is, to destroy the concept of a single Communist movement and to organize a Chinese camp to compete openly with the Soviet camp. Throughout the fall, the Chinese conducted another polemic and rejected Soviet overtures. Following the first wave of a counter-attack by pro-Soviet parties and by Khrushchev himself, the Chinese party in December, while publicly professing its favor for another world Communist conference, also publicly implied its intention of openly splitting the movement.

New Soviet Overtures, Early 1963

Obviously concerned over this new threat to the Soviet position, Khrushchev in January 1963 called publicly for an end to polemics in order to improve the atmosphere for an eventual conference of the parties (he seemed really to have no clear idea of what to do), and in the same month he appealed privately to Peiping for a return to "our former friendly relations"; at the same time, he poisoned the atmosphere by permitting (if not encouraging) the humiliation of the Chinese delegate to the East German party congress. Similarly, Peiping in January described the Soviet overtures as dishonest, while at the same time Peiping's previously-implied threat to split the movement was confirmed privately by a Chinese Communist official who said that the Chinese intended to organize their supporters in the world Communist movement into groups.

In February, Moscow followed up its overtures by stating publicly and privately its favor for a new conference of the parties after the necessary preparatory work. However, because such preparatory work would have to resolve the hard questions of the Soviet attitude toward Albania, and of the participants in, agenda for, and procedural rules governing another conference (in particular the inherently insoluble problem of majority rule versus unanimity), it was apparent that there could be no early conference of all the parties, and it seemed likely that the calls for such a conference by Moscow
and Peiping were simply tactical maneuvers. Indeed, at the same time that the Russians were making conciliatory gestures toward the Chinese, they were privately informing other Communist leaders of their recognition that the Chinese were working to split the movement.

Hardening Positions, Spring 1963

The Chinese replied to the February proposals in kind, in a letter of 9 March 1963 which followed a fresh Chinese attack on the Soviet party. Peiping reaffirmed its favor for a conference but pointed out that one of its conditions was a Soviet initiative to improve relations with Albania, and added that before polemics could be stopped there must be agreement on the terms of stopping them. The Chinese also made clear in this letter that they would be difficult about the agenda for a conference and about the procedural rules.

On 30 March, a Soviet party letter took the Chinese letter of 9 March as expressing agreement to bilateral talks (one of the steps to a conference), and returned to the question of divisive activity. The letter specified a new condition for a conference—one which there was no chance that the Chinese would agree to—namely, cessation of criticism of the other party inside one's own party and other parties. Also, in response to the indications that Peiping would be troublesome about the conference agenda, Moscow declared that there were no grounds for re-examining the lines taken in the 1957 and 1960 statements of the parties—in other words, that Moscow did not wish to resume the debate on underlying premises and in any case would be less willing to compromise on formulations. The letter also strongly implied that Moscow would not again permit the Chinese to exercise veto power.

Moscow and Peiping did cease polemics in April and May 1963, and did reach an agreement to begin their bilateral talks in July. The Chinese had correctly read the CPSU's 30 March letter, however, as a reaffirmation...
of Soviet authority in the movement, and they soon made clear their attitude toward it. In April they took their first organizational step in splitting the movement, establishing a new Afro-Asian front organization with no organizational ties to the Soviet-controlled front movement. And in this same period of spring 1963, there were credible reports that the Chinese were advising their supporters in some parties to work toward splitting those parties, and were providing funds (in some cases) for the organization of pro-Chinese splinter parties.

On 14 June, the Chinese sent a letter (soon published) to the Soviet party which utterly rejected Soviet authority and which in effect called upon all parties to follow Peiping. Among other things, this letter justified Chinese efforts to organize rival Communist parties in those countries in which pro-Chinese forces could not gain control of the existing parties, and it strongly implied that there would be an increase in such efforts.

Sino-Soviet Talks, July 1963

The Sino-Soviet talks of July were a formality, and not even a polite one. The Russians were tough, and the Chinese intransigent, from the start. In mid-July, while the talks were going on, an open letter of the Soviet party--expressly in reply to the CCP's letter of 14 June--moved the dispute to a new level by attacking the Chinese party by name on the full range of issues in dispute, the first time that Moscow had done so. The Chinese took the initiative in suspending the talks on 20 July, and began to attack the Soviet party and its supporters by name on the full range of issues. These no-longer-disguised exchanges constituted what has been called a "de facto break" between Moscow and Peiping.

It seems probable that each party, in those July talks, was confirmed in its estimate of the other's position, namely that each would insist on unacceptable terms
for a conference of all the parties. Thus, as suggested above, it seems likely that after July 1963 at the latest all subsequent talk by each party about such a conference was for the record, and that the practical decisions to be made were (a) for the Soviet party, whether to have an anti-Chinese conference of the pro-Soviet parties, and if so, how far to go in it against the Chinese (an impersonal condemnation, a condemnation by name, or even an excommunication?), and how far to go with respect to binding other parties (unanimity or majority rule, minimal agreements or a detailed common program, voluntary discipline or a new central organization?); and (b) for the Chinese party, if an anti-Chinese conference could not be deterred, whether to have a counter-conference of pro-Chinese parties and splinter parties.

Soviet Threats, Fall 1963

In September 1963, the second-ranking Chinese leader (Liu Shao-chi) declared publicly that the Chinese party would "absolutely not" submit to the Soviet party or keep silent. The Soviet party immediately replied publicly that Peiping's persistence in its course--including (especially) its "factional" activities--would meet with a "most resolute rebuff" from the Soviet party. (It did not at that time promise that the rebuff would come from the movement, e.g. in the form of an anti-Chinese conference of pro-Soviet parties.)

Beginning in late September, and continuing through most of October, the Soviet press carried a series of statements by foreign Communists--some, no doubt, Soviet-inspired--indicating that Moscow was canvassing the movement in order to decide whether to press for an early anti-Chinese conference. By late October, the Russians had apparently decided against it, and in November they began to speak privately of autumn 1964 as a suitable time for a conference (of unspecified nature).
Soviet Pseudo-Overtures, Fall 1963

The Soviet party, having failed to gain general favor for an anti-Chinese conference, returned in late November 1963 to a conciliatory approach to the Chinese party. This too seemed to be for the record, to impress other parties with Soviet reasonableness prior to another Soviet effort to line up as many parties as possible for some kind of anti-Chinese action. A Soviet letter of 29 November again professed willingness to give material aid to Peiping, again called for a cessation of polemics, and affirmed Soviet favor for a world Communist conference at whatever time it would be "fruitful" rather than producing a "split." Peiping did not answer the letter at the time, but effectually rejected Soviet proposals (a) first on 12 December, by issuing another commentary (on the CPSU's July letter) which included much criticism of Khrushchev by name, and (b) on 26 December (Mao's birthday), by publishing a long article presenting Mao as the foremost living defender of Marxism-Leninism.

Proclamation of a Split, February 1964

A few weeks later, on 4 February 1964, the Chinese party publicly proclaimed and justified a split in the world Communist movement, and offered itself as the center of the true movement. In a long and much-advertised article which amounted to a declaration of war against the Soviet party, the Chinese party declared that the movement "inevitably" divides itself between "Marxism-Leninism" and "opportunism-revisionism," and that the latter is invariably responsible for the split. The Soviet party, it said, had forfeited its position as head of the movement and was now the head only of the "revisionists and splitters"; moreover, Moscow's majority in the movement was a "false" majority, because Peiping represented the world's revolutionary forces. The article went on to declare forthrightly that the Chinese party would indeed
support pro-Chinese forces inside and outside the existing movement. (By this time, three bloc parties in addition to the Chinese party, plus six of the non-bloc Far Eastern parties, were solidly in the Chinese camp; pro-Chinese forces were strong enough to be struggling for domination of at least five other parties; there were pro-Chinese rival parties in seven other countries; and pro-Chinese groups were capable of forming rival parties in several additional countries.) The article taunted the Soviet party for its failure to deliver the "most resolute rebuff" promised the previous September, said that Peiping would continue the polemics, and concluded that the Soviet party could achieve the "unity" of the movement very simply--by abject surrender.

Plans for Anti-Chinese Conference, Early 1964

This latest public attack moved the Soviet party to re-open the question of an anti-Chinese conference, nominally a "world" Communist conference to which "all" parties would be invited, but one which would in fact assemble the pro-Soviet parties for the purpose of condemning or even (conceivably) excommunicating the Chinese party. In a letter of 12 February to other parties (not copied to Peiping), the Soviet party complained of intensified Chinese schismatic activity, said that it was imperative to give a "rebuff" to the Chinese, informed them that the CPSU would consider the matter at the imminent plenum of its central committee and would publish the relevant documents, and concluded that there was an "urgent" need for a multiparty conference (implying a connection between a conference and a "rebuff").

Two days later, Suslov at the plenum reviewed the dispute and the record of Chinese factional activity, and said that the Chinese did indeed demand "unconditional surrender." Suslov concluded with a call for a conference (and, as in the 12 February letter, failed to specify that it should be of "all" the parties), but, if the text released in April is to be accepted, he did not speak of it as "urgent" or as designed to give a "rebuff" to the Chinese. Thus he left the Soviet party free to retreat altogether from a conference, if it wished,
or from strong action at a conference, if it could not find enough support.

**Bitter Exchanges, Early 1964**

At about this time, the Rumanian party asked the Russians to withhold publication of the plenum material, and asked the Chinese to cease polemics and meet with a Rumanian delegation. Moscow and Peiping agreed to the meeting. A few days later, the Chinese party, in a talk with the Soviet ambassador and in a letter, denounced the Soviet party for its own divisive activity in sending its 12 February letter to other parties. The Soviet party retorted on 22 February by again denouncing Chinese factional activity in the movement and by condemning the Chinese too for having "openly called"--in the 4 February article--for a "split in the Communist movement" (i.e., for having openly split the movement by proclaiming the existence of two camps and by stating frankly that the Chinese camp would attempt to increase its holdings). The 22 February letter admitted that the 12 February letter had called for a "rebuff" to the Chinese, and reiterated the need for it.

In a reply of 27 February, the Chinese party took the Soviet letter of 22 February as an admission that the Soviet party was "planning behind our backs" to take anti-Chinese measures in concert with other parties, thus going "a step further in splitting the international Communist movement" (i.e., toward making the split complete as well as open). The letter jeered at any possible "rebuff," and challenged the Soviet party to agree to the mutual publication of documents. Before Moscow could answer this letter, the Chinese on 29 February formally replied to the Soviet letter of 29 November 1963 which had proposed an improvement in state relations and an end to polemics. The 29 February letter rejected Soviet overtures, declined to end polemics, and again challenged the Russians to deliver their "rebuff." With respect to another conference, the letter made a mock proposal that bilateral talks begin in October 1964 (which would mean
that there could be no early conference), to be followed by a preparatory meeting of 17 parties (of which ten were either in the Chinese camp or opposed to a showdown). The point of the letter was again that the price of "unity" was a Soviet surrender.

The Sino-Rumanian talks began in Peiping in early March. While the talks were going on, the Soviet party on 7 March replied to the Chinese letters of 27 and 29 February. The Soviet letter rejected the proposal for mutual publication of documents as simply a proposal for an intensification of polemics, again defended the content and handling of the CPSU's 12 February letter (particularly in the light of the CCP's "disgraceful" article of 4 February proclaiming and justifying a split), and again asked the CCP to respect the will of the majority. With regard to preparations for a conference, the letter went on to propose that bilateral talks begin in May 1964, that a preparatory group of 26 parties (in which Moscow would have majority support for its positions) meet in June-July, and that the conference itself be held in autumn 1964; the letter insisted that polemics and factional activity must cease if the meetings were to succeed. The Soviet party, well aware that Peiping would not accept any of these proposals, was again speaking for the benefit of other parties.

The Rumanians left Peiping on 10 March, having failed completely. Polemics resumed at once. Then on 31 March, the Chinese published another violent attack on Khrushchev personally, in which, among other things, they said that they regretted their earlier compromises at world Communist conferences and that it was necessary to "amend" some of the formulations in the 1957 and 1960 documents—thus informing Moscow that it could not get from another conference even a document as poor as the 1960 statement of the parties.
Soviet Indecision, Spring 1964

Three days later, on 3 April, the Russians published the (purported) text of Suslov's report to the February plenum. Although the report was a generally hard-hitting presentation of Moscow's case, what may have impressed the Chinese most—in this published version—was that the report came to a lame and timid conclusion, in that it did not commit Moscow either to an early conference or to a conference which would condemn Peiping. Soviet spokesmen, including Khrushchev, gave a similar impression of indecision in public and private remarks throughout April.

The Chinese party on 7 May replied to the Soviet letter of 7 March and at the same time—for the benefit of members of other parties who might be denied the letters if they were private—published the texts of all letters exchanged with the Soviet party since November 1963. The 7 May letter withdrew Peiping's earlier proposal for bilateral talks in October 1964, said derisively that these should not take place until May 1965 or later, and, with regard to the preparatory meeting to follow said that Peiping still favored its 17-party proposal, and that, with respect to the CPSU's 26-party proposal, the Chinese would support the right of rival (pro-Chinese) parties in some of these countries to attend a meeting. As for the conference itself, the letter said, a conference held in autumn 1964 would produce an "immediate open split" (i.e., a complete split, as there was already an open split); because preparations should continue until full agreement was reached, the conference should not be held for four or five years or even longer. Should Moscow go ahead to convene a conference without such agreement, the letter went on, it would be "strongly condemned" and would bear the "responsibility for a split." In thus suggesting a genuine interest in preventing the early convocation of an anti-Chinese conference, Peiping may have been calculating that such a conference would be quickly followed by purges of the parties of the Soviet camp which would remove pro-Chinese forces, forces that by remaining in the parties for a while longer might be able to gain control of some of them.
On 10 May, in a long article reflecting Moscow's difficulties in lining up support, Pravda took a soft line on the question of how to achieve "unity." The Soviet party newspaper encouraged the parties to believe that at any new conference Moscow would not seek to impose majority rule or to excommunicate any party, although other Soviet materials suggested a tougher line of Soviet thought.

Toward an Anti-Chinese Conference Again, Spring 1964

In mid-May, after more than a month of publicly avoiding the question of another conference, the Soviet party publicly affirmed its favor for a conference of "fraternal parties" (it did not say "all" parties) and described the CCP's 7 May letter as a rejection of a conference. The Albanian party immediately challenged Moscow to make clear what kind of conference it had in mind. Statements by other parties of the Soviet camp which were published in the Soviet press pointed in different directions—at one pole, the excommunication of the Chinese and the adoption of strong measures binding other parties (e.g., a new central organization), and, at the other, no strong action of any kind.

In early June, Soviet party organs seemed to be signalling that Moscow had made up its mind—namely, to move ahead with the organization of an anti-Chinese conference, without the Chinese camp, which at the least would condemn the Chinese party. These articles too suggested the possibilities of, but were evasive about, the excommunication of the Chinese and the establishment of a new international organization. In mid-June, Soviet and pro-Soviet spokesmen at the Polish party congress called for preparations for a conference—with or without the Chinese—to begin soon. Later in June, there was a report that Khrushchev hoped to have enough parties lined up against Peiping to make feasible a conference in spring 1965, although he was continuing to leave himself room to delay it or even to abandon it.
The official Soviet position on a new conference was provided in mid-July with the publication of a Soviet letter of 15 June, sent to Peiping (but directed really to other parties) in reply to the CCP's letter of 7 May. The theme of the 15 June letter--as Moscow was later to contend explicitly--was that a "split" would be produced by failure to participate in a conference, not by the proceedings of the conference itself. Taking a cleverly conciliatory line, the Soviet letter professed no interest in "condemning" anyone at a conference and went on to state the Soviet interest in an idea which Moscow had previously ignored--that of obtaining limited agreements at a conference. If full agreement could not be reached, the letter said, this would not "amount to a split," as the parties could agree to cooperate as far as possible and could agree also to refrain from action which "aggravates the difficulties." In other words, Moscow was immediately interested in gaining recognition of its right to call a conference, and, at the conference itself, the Soviet party would demand only an agreement on a few basic propositions, perhaps little more than an agreement to disagree and to refrain from polemics and factionalism. While the Soviet party presumably calculated that Peiping would continue to refuse to recognize any degree of Soviet authority and would regard the proposed non-aggravation agreement as just another attempt to silence and contain Peiping, the Russians probably calculated also that the overall proposal would be attractive to those parties which did not want to excommunicate another party and did not want to tie themselves tightly to particular positions and tactics, but which also would be hurt by polemical exchanges and factional activity.

As for the immediate issue, the 15 June letter went on to insist that the conference could not be long delayed, to defend the Soviet right to take the initiative in calling a conference, and to reject Peiping's bid for the seating of the pro-Chinese splinter parties.