CURRENT INTELLIGENCE STAFF STUDY
THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE
(The 6 December Declaration, and Soviet and Chinese Presentations of It)
(Reference Title: ESAU XIV-61)

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SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE STAFF STUDY

THE SINO-SOVET DISPUTE

(The 6 December Declaration, and Soviet and Chinese Presentations of It)

This is a working paper. It discusses the declaration of 6 December 1960, produced by the November conference of the 81 Communist parties, and subsequent Soviet and Chinese presentations of the declaration.

This paper, ESAU XIV-61, would be expected to follow rather than precede ESAU XIII-61, which is concerned with developments at the Moscow conference prior to the issuance of the 6 December declaration. However, information on those developments is still so fragmentary that we have preferred to hold ESAU-XIII, in the hope that additional information will permit us to offer a solid account. Meanwhile, we offer this preliminary assessment of the results of the Moscow conference.

We have had profitable discussion, on several of the matters taken up in this paper, with other analysts of OCI, with analysts of ONE and OO/FBID, and with analysts of the DDP. The Sino-Soviet Studies Group would welcome further comment, addressed to the acting coordinator of the group.
SUMMARY

The 6 December Declaration

The Moscow declaration of 6 December 1960 was a complex document, purporting to set forth a program for the world Communist movement but in fact consisting for the most part of a lumpy mixture of the positions of the Soviet and Chinese parties as to what the strategy of the movement should be and as to the discipline of the movement itself. A judgment as to whether the declaration represented a Soviet "victory" or a Chinese "victory" depends on one's assumptions—namely, whether the statements of the substantive issues in dispute, or the provisions for the procedures of the movement itself, are of greater importance. If the former, then the declaration represented a Soviet victory, because Soviet propositions were given the greater weight, and appeared at greater length. But if one regards the basic issue as that of whether there is to be a universally acknowledged leader and arbiter of the world Communist movement, and assumes the Soviet party to wish to play that role, then the declaration, in explicitly denying such a role to any party, represented a victory for the Chinese party and for every other party desiring greater autonomy in the movement.

As for substantive issues, on the most important of them, the definition of the epoch (including the assessment of the balance of power), the declaration represented a substantial Soviet victory, in that it reproduced the Soviet propositions that the epoch is marked basically by a transition from capitalism to socialism, that the bloc is becoming a decisive factor in world affairs and can deter the West from military forms of action, and that long-range economic competition will be decisive; it reflected less strongly the Chinese emphasis on the "struggle" of the two systems. In the declaration's further discussion of the bloc, Soviet positions also prevailed, in that the USSR was conceded to be far out in front in building Communism, and the declaration endorsed Soviet economic principles and the Soviet call (contrary to the Chinese aim of autarky) for better coordination of bloc economies.

As for questions of war, the declaration represented another substantial Soviet victory. It reaffirmed the Soviet position on the dreadful consequences of nuclear war and on
the importance of avoiding such a war, and it also reaffirmed the Soviet thesis that war is not inevitable, although it restricted this (as the Chinese consistently have) to world war. It was equivocal on local wars, asserting both the Chinese position that Western-initiated local wars are likely and the Soviet position that the bloc will usually be able to deter them or to quench them at an early stage.

The declaration represented a comically equivocal draw on the concept of "peaceful coexistence." Communists were instructed not to "underestimate" either the possibility of coexistence or the possibility of war; and it was contended simultaneously that coexistence favors the struggle and the struggle contributes to coexistence. The declaration endorsed negotiated settlements of international problems (a Soviet emphasis) but it did so in a very brief and slighting way (a Chinese point). It reflected Moscow on the importance of disarmament, but reflected Peiping primarily on the difficulties of achieving any degree of it.

The declaration's discussion of the colonial areas represented another draw. Soviet positions were represented in the emphasis on successes to date and on the importance of non-military means of gaining independence, and in the omission of a pledge of greater support specifically to "liberation" wars. Chinese positions were represented in the recognition of "fierce encounters" in the successes to date and the recognition too of the importance of "armed struggle" and of "liberation" wars. The declaration was evasive on the question of whether to be patient (the Soviet emphasis) or impatient (the Chinese emphasis) with the national bourgeoisie.

The discussion of policy toward newly-independent countries represented a narrow Soviet victory. The objectives for united fronts in such countries were stated primarily in Soviet formulations, being similar to those put forward by Moscow for Communists in developed Western countries, although there was a concession to the Chinese on the unreliability of the bourgeoisie. The declaration set forth the Soviet concept of "national democracy" (a state like Cuba) as the transitional form to socialism in the newly-independent countries. The Communist parties, on the road to "national democracy," were given evasive instructions on the question of the degree of their support for governments led by the national bourgeoisie.
As for the question of peaceful accession to power and the tactics of Communist parties in the West, the discussion represented another narrow Soviet victory. The formulations on peaceful accession reflected both the Soviet emphasis on the desirability and possibility of peaceful accession, and the Chinese emphasis on the possibility of violence and the likelihood of resistance by the ruling class. The declaration affirmed the Soviet program for Communist parties in the West, a gradualist program aiming primarily at the "monopolies" and setting "democratic" goals at this time.

The Chinese did very well in the highly important concluding section on the discipline of the world Communist movement. The discussion leaned to the Soviets in treating the "cult of the individual," in effect an endorsement of de-Stalinization, and in asserting the "fundamental significance" of Soviet experience. The discussion stated positions that the two parties could appeal to equally in treating revisionism (the Chinese charge against Moscow), and dogmatism and sectarianism (the Soviet charges against Peiping); in calling for adherence to assessments worked out "jointly" at these world Communist conferences; in setting out principles for the internal policies of the parties; in holding the parties responsible to the entire Communist movement; and in providing for further conferences and, in the interim, bilateral talks. However, the effect of those provisions on "joint" positions, conferences, and bilateral talks was to reduce the stature of the Soviet party in the movement. Moreover, the discussion reflected an impressive Chinese victory on the most important question of the conference, in failing to establish the Soviet-exhorted principle of majority rule (once the operating principle of the Comintern) and in omitting any reference to "factionalism" in the movement.

The declaration seemed to indicate a Sino-Soviet agreement to refrain for a time from polemics about bloc strategy, but it also gave additional force to certain pressures on Khrushchev which the Chinese had been exerting--to take a hard line in any negotiations with the West, to intervene in any Western-initiated local wars, to give more substance to professions of sympathy and support for "liberation" wars, to move faster toward making pro-Communist regimes of the independent countries, and so on. Whether or not Moscow could withstand these pressures, Moscow did increase them by giving them recognition in a public document which was stated to be the program of the world Communist movement.
The most significant development of the conference seemed to be the success with which the Chinese Communists challenged Soviet leadership of the movement, in that the conference provided an official procedure (world Communist conferences to work out "joint" positions, and bilateral talks in the interim) for the challenge to continue. Given the lack of clarity in the 6 December declaration, the number of positions susceptible to varying interpretations, the probable Soviet and Chinese persistence in different interpretations, the existence of parties and of factions within parties sympathetic to Chinese rather than to Soviet interpretations, it seemed quite likely that there would be a Sino-Soviet contest for leadership of some of the parties, especially in the Asian countries of the bloc and in the underdeveloped areas. These could also develop a movement—if not general, at least among some parties—toward independence of both Moscow and Peiping.

Moscow's acceptance of restrictions on Soviet leadership was perhaps not entirely, however, recognition of a disagreeable necessity. The Soviets might reasonably have concluded that, in subsequent world Communist conferences, they would retain a substantial majority. They may also have told themselves, although perhaps without much confidence, that the discipline of the world Communist movement would eventually be restored.

Presentations of the Declaration

Soviet and Chinese media began to offer tendentious interpretations of the 6 December declaration within 24 hours of its publication. By late January both Moscow and Peiping, without resorting to polemics, had reaffirmed their positions on virtually all of the issues which had been in dispute prior to the Moscow conference. The principal role in reaffirming, amplifying, and clarifying Soviet positions was played by Khrushchev himself, in his 6 January report, while Chinese positions were reaffirmed in a number of editorials and articles in People's Daily and Red Flag.

With respect to matters of world Communist strategy, Moscow and Peiping continued to disagree on the basic "definition of the epoch," in particular on the hard question (within that definition) of the balance of power. Moscow made clear its view that the West is still very strong, while Peiping declined to concede this.
As for questions of war, Moscow and Peiping agreed that world war was not inevitable, but Moscow reaffirmed that the West was increasingly deterred from world war, and, emphasizing the consequences of world war, reaffirmed that the bloc should not accept serious risks of world war*; while Peiping emphasized Western preparations for world war and the possibility of world war, and, minimizing the consequences of world war for the bloc, continued to exhort a program entailing greater risks of world war.

Further, Moscow reaffirmed that the West was increasingly deterred from local wars as well, and, emphasizing the danger of expansion of local wars, contended that the bloc should avoid engagement in local wars if possible, although it would fight if necessary for a "just" cause such as defending a newly-independent country against Western military action; while Peiping contended that the West was, if anything, increasingly attracted to local wars, and, minimizing the danger of expansion of local wars, implied again that the bloc should welcome the opportunity to engage in such wars. Similarly, Moscow affirmed that the bloc would support "liberation" wars in colonial areas and "popular uprisings" anywhere (in the non-Communist world), and implied that the bloc would intervene to match Western intervention, but it also implied that the bloc as well as the West should be wary of actions risking intervention by the other; while Peiping urged strong support of "liberation" wars and emphasized the importance of these wars as a contribution to "peace."

With regard to "peaceful coexistence," Moscow reaffirmed this concept as the basis of Soviet policy, and, although taking a generally militant view of coexistence, did not accept certain extreme Chinese formulations about the "struggle" within the terms of coexistence; while Peiping, although continuing nominally to endorse coexistence, continued to exhort a maximum struggle by all revolutionary forces and by all means short of world war, and with greater risks of world war. Further, Moscow reaffirmed its interest in complete or partial disarmament and in negotiations with the West and personal contacts with Western leaders; while Peiping minimized the prospects for even limited disarmament and continued to speak scornfully of Western leaders and of the prospects of negotiations with them.

*It should be understood that this summary of stated Soviet positions is not an estimate of Soviet intentions.
With regard to the "national liberation movement" in general, Moscow emphasized the successes of bloc strategy to date and implied that Chinese advice was not needed, while Peiping presented the 6 December declaration as having adopted the more militant Chinese view. As for the colonial areas, Moscow contended that "armed struggle" was a less important means of attaining independence than were other forms of action, and, while reaffirming that "liberation" wars were inevitable and would be supported, left open the kind and degree of support, and called for Communist parties to make "maximum use" of the national bourgeoisie in the effort for independence; while Peiping emphasized the importance of armed struggle and the advantages of supporting "liberation" wars, and called for strong support of such wars and for Communist seizure of leadership in the early stages of the revolution. As for the newly-independent countries, Moscow reaffirmed the importance of bloc aid (as well as the pledge to defend them) in ensuring the neutrality and eventual seduction of these countries, held up "national democracy" as the middle-run objective, and contended that protracted cooperation with the national bourgeoisie was advisable; while Peiping emphasized the inevitability of Western intervention in such countries to restore the old order, ignored the concept of "national democracy," and seemed to be calling for less cooperation with and more pressure on bourgeois nationalist leaders than Moscow thought feasible. As for Communist parties in the West, Moscow continued to emphasize the difficulties facing them and the need for pursuit of "democratic" goals, while Peiping ignored these difficulties and spoke only of "socialist" goals.

With regard to the underlying question of the discipline of the world Communist movement, Moscow prepared the ground for turning the Chinese charge of Soviet "revisionism" into a Soviet charge of Chinese "nationalism," and affirmed that dogmatism and sectarianism are present dangers to the movement; while the Chinese continued to present revisionism as the principal threat, ignored the danger of nationalism, and showed no disposition to admit dogmatism and sectarianism in their own behavior. Further, Moscow continued to argue that the world Communist movement should operate by majority rule, and implied that majority (Soviet) positions should be supported by all other parties and that those parties should discipline elements which opposed majority (Soviet) positions; while Peiping ignored the Soviet position on majority rule and instead put heavy emphasis on the declaration's commitment to achieve "common" positions and to undertake "joint" actions. Finally, Moscow
appeared to take the view that world Communist conferences would have a limited usefulness in lining up Soviet supporters in a clear majority and in subduing if not converting the dissenters; while Peiping seemed clearly to expect that such conferences, in which the Soviet party would not always be assured of a majority, would result in a diminution of Soviet authority and an increase in Chinese influence.
I. THE 6 DECEMBER DECLARATION

The Moscow declaration of 6 December 1960 is a complex document, purporting to set forth a program for the world Communist movement but in fact consisting for the most part of a lumpy mixture of the views of the two principal parties—the Soviet and Chinese—as to what the strategy of the movement should be and as to the discipline of the movement itself.* Even well-informed observers have disagreed sharply as to whether the declaration represents a Soviet "victory" or a Chinese "victory." This disagreement has generally reflected a difference in assumptions—namely, whether the substantive issues in dispute, or the procedures of the movement itself, are of greater importance. If the former, then the declaration represents a Soviet victory, because Soviet propositions are given the greater weight, and appear at greater length. But if one regards the basic issue as that of whether there is to be a universally acknowledged leader and arbiter of the world Communist movement, and further, assumes the Soviet party to wish to play that role, then the declaration (like the entire conference), in explicitly denying any party such a role, represents a Chinese victory, indeed a victory for every party desiring a greater degree of autonomy in the movement.

The declaration begins with the obviously false contention that the conference demonstrated the "identity of views" of the participants. It then affirms the fidelity of all the parties to the Moscow Declaration of November 1957 which the Soviet and Chinese parties had interpreted very differently and had accused each other at the tops of their voices of violating. It then recites various articles of faith of the world Communist movement, some of which all the parties seem genuinely to believe and which therefore are important cohesive factors in the movement (the growth in strength and influence of the bloc, the disintegration of colonialism, the decline of world capitalism, the eventual global triumph of Communism), others of which are probably recognized as extreme (the current "crisis" in the West), and others of which

*There have been several perceptive analyses of the 6 December declaration, among them the FBIS CD. 178 of 21 December 1960, "The Moscow Conference: CPSU Achieves Nominal Agreement at Cost of Doctrinal Ambiguity." The FBIS study is drawn on, at certain points, in this analysis.
probably some believe and some do not (that the West is actively preparing for a "new world war").

**Definition of the Epoch**

The declaration turns quickly to the definition of the epoch. It observes at once that the epoch is "marked basically by the transition from capitalism to socialism"—a Soviet-emphasized formulation. For the Chinese, it refrains from positing a "new" epoch; this is still an era of "struggle" between two systems, of "socialist revolutions and national liberation movements," an era of the "overthrow of imperialism," and so on. For the Soviets, it has a "new, distinctive feature," namely that the bloc is "being transformed into a "decisive factor" in world affairs,* one which is able to deter the imperialists from impeding the forces of history by military means. It is not implied (as the Chinese imply) that the bloc now possesses a decisive strategic superiority over the West, but neither is it stated as (Khru- shchev has often stated) that the West is still very strong. The Soviets gain a point here, however, in reaffirming their position that long-range economic competition with the West (added to military parity or superiority) will be decisive.

In this same section, the declaration makes a number of statements about the crisis of capitalism, conflicts between productive forces and production relations, exacerbations of the class struggle, and so on. Whereas the 1957 declaration described U.S. "aggressive circles" as "enemies of the people" in the 6 December declaration the U.S. itself becomes the "enemy of the peoples of the entire world" (the Chinese would have said "main enemy," but this is close enough), and this phrase was almost certainly a concession to the Chinese.

The declaration then discusses a number of other "imperialist" powers and reviews anti-imperialist developments in a number of countries—Cuba, Iraq, Japan, France, the U.S., Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, India, Britain, Canada, Belgium, Colombia, Venezuela, South Korea, Turkey, Laos, and others—

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*The locution "is being transformed" is perhaps of some importance, in that the definition of the epoch is an assessment of the balance of power. If it were asserted that the bloc has become the decisive factor, this might imply a belief in decisive strategic superiority.
which both Moscow and Peiping have cited in support of differing emphases ('See how well things are going without our getting involved in war,' versus 'See how the world situation is unprecedentedly favorable for revolutions'.) Indeed, these differing emphases appear together at the end of this discussion of the non-Communist world. It is noted that these developments took place in a time of general peace, but during "an upsurge of the struggle."

The declaration then discusses the bloc, and in this discussion Soviet positions prevail. The USSR is said to have underway the "comprehensive construction of a Communist society," while other bloc states are merely "laying the foundations of socialism" (the Soviet view of China) or have "entered into the period of construction of a developed socialist society" (the Chinese view of China). The USSR is the "most vivid example" for the people of the whole world, while the Chinese revolution gave a "new and powerful impetus to the national liberation movement,...especially (in)...Asia, Africa, and Latin America."

Further, the "large cooperative socialist farm," the "Leninist cooperative plan," is endorsed as the correct path; the commune is in effect scorned. The declaration endorses both "steadfast adherence to the Leninist principle of material incentive" (a Soviet emphasis) and the "development of moral stimuli" (a Chinese emphasis). The declaration also affirms the Soviet emphasis on the need for coordination of bloc economies, and it reaffirms the Soviet view that the "transition to Communism" cannot be effected without a high level of industrialization and an abundance of consumer goods.

The rest of the discussion of intrabloc affairs affirms propositions the Soviets and Chinese can continue to appeal to equally: "socialist internationalism" as the principle governing intrabloc relations; the "universal truth of Marxism-Leninism," but the need for "creative application" of it; the offenses of "nationalism and chauvinism"*; "unity" as the source of strength; and so on.

*There is much more discussion of "nationalism" (also called "national narrowmindedness") in this declaration than in the 1957 declaration, possibly presaging a Soviet effort to make more of this particular charge against the Chinese.
Questions of War

The next substantial section deals with questions of war and peace, one of the incomplete portions of the draft produced by the preparatory conference. The section begins with two Soviet points: the description of the "problem" of war and peace as the "most burning problem of our time," and the strong emphasis on the consequences of general war. The treatment of this latter point, which perhaps in the Soviet view permitted Moscow to make certain concessions earlier on the definition of the epoch without really retreating on the question of the balance of power, is entirely in Soviet terms: The "monstrous means" existing for "mass destruction and annihilation", the capabilities of "unprecedented destruction to entire countries," of the ruin of "large centers of world production and world culture," of the death of "hundreds of millions." These passages reflect a serious defeat for the Chinese.

The Chinese gain a point immediately thereafter, however, in the statement that today "as never before, particularly sharp vigilance is demanded..." and particularly against "US imperialism." American threats to peace are then reviewed in terms both Moscow and Peiping employ (the "occupation" of Taiwan is one item in the list), and it is stated (a Chinese emphasis) that "the military threat has increased."

The declaration then affirms the Chinese-emphasized point that the nature of imperialism has not changed, but then affirms the more important Soviet proposition that war is not inevitable, that the time has passed when the imperialists could decide whether there is to be war; this latter formulation denies a Chinese contention often stated in the form of "we are not the imperialists' general staff." Although the above formulation follows the Soviet practice of not specifying what kinds of wars are not inevitable and thus implies that no type of war is inevitable, the declaration immediately concedes that there have been certain "local wars" in recent years (including some wars usually described as "liberation" wars) and it then restricts the noninevitality of wars to "world war."

As for the prospect of and response to local wars, the declaration twists and turns on itself in a most unhappy way, clearly reflecting a failure to agree. First, it notes that
the imperialists have launched several local wars in recent years, and it implies the Soviet point about the danger of expansion of local wars by observing that these had "put mankind on the brink of a world catastrophe." However, the distinction between Western-initiated local wars and the more complex matter of "liberation" wars, a distinction which Khrushchev was to make in his 6 January report, is not offered in this part of the declaration; the Western intervention in Egypt which the bloc "put an end to," the planned invasions of Syria, Iraq and other unspecified countries which were "averted," the "heroic struggle" of the Algerian people, and the "rebuff to...the imperialists" in the Congo and Laos, are here all put in the same basket. Following this, the declaration offers this equivocal proposition:

Experience confirms that it is possible to struggle effectively against local wars unleashed by the imperialists and to successfully liquidate the hotbeds of these wars.

The declaration seems to be asserting simultaneously (a) that the West will probably "unleash" other local wars (as the Chinese contend) and (b) that the bloc will usually be able to deter the initiation of such wars or to quench them at an early stage (as the Soviets declare to be the case).* The Chinese have contended that these local wars (not only "liberation" wars) should sometimes be welcomed and engaged in, and that such wars can be "contained" in the area even if bloc and Western forces come into conflict, whereas the Soviets have been explicitly wary of any kind of war that threatens to involve bloc and Western forces; i.e., they wish to halt the war without intervening.

If the above passages on local wars were intended also to state the position on "liberation" wars (not mentioned in these passages), it would represent a defeat for the Chinese, who have exhorted not the "liquidation" of such wars but their encouragement and strong support. However, there is a later treatment of "liberation" wars in the declaration, and it seems likely that the above passages are meant to refer only to Western-initiated local wars.

*The phrase "struggle effectively" might be interpreted very differently by Moscow and Peiping, as might the atrocious final phrase; cf. Yu Chao-li in the 31 December Red Flag.
After reaffirming the non-inevitability of world war (noted above), the declaration returns to the theme of the importance of avoiding such a war; it observes that a "certain part" of the bourgeoisie in the West wishes to keep the peace, although it does not adopt the Soviet formula that certain Western leaders wish to. It then states strongly the Soviet proposition that there is no "more urgent task" than to deliver mankind from "worldwide thermonuclear catastrophe," which it follows with a Chinese emphasis on "struggle" and "vigilance." In its only reference to world Communist fronts, it leans to the Soviet position in describing the width and variety of the movement aimed at preventing "new wars."* It does the same thing near the end of this section in stating that the Communist parties regard the struggle for peace—not the anti-imperialist struggle, as the Chinese would say—as "their primary task," but it concludes this section with the statement (explicitly praised by the Chinese) that a new world war would result in the destruction of capitalism.

"Peaceful Coexistence"

The next section deals with "peaceful coexistence," which is declared (as in 1957) to be the "unshakable basis" of bloc foreign policy, rather than—in the stronger expression the Soviets had preferred—the "general line" of the bloc.** Early in this discussion, the declaration states the Soviet party's 21st congress thesis that a "real opportunity will arise" to exclude world war even prior to the world-wide triumph of socialism—a formulation which is hardly an advance on the proposition that world war is not inevitable, but is important here because the Chinese had resisted it. On the other hand, the declaration notes immediately, as the Chinese had emphasized

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*As part of the "peace" effort, however, the declaration makes clear, as the Chinese wished, that the bloc is to maintain and enhance its military strength.

**An FBID analysis has noted—we think correctly—that acceptance of this line by the CCP might imply acknowledgement of a Soviet right to impose directives on the world Communist movement.
more than the Russians, that only the global triumph of socialism can eliminate the "reasons" for "any wars."*

As for the prospects for peaceful coexistence, the declaration at this point is at its most comically equivocal:

Communists must...prevent underestimation of the possibility of peaceful coexistence and, at the same time...underestimation of the danger of war.

The declaration then reaffirms the Soviet argument that there is no third (Chinese) way in addition to coexistence or "destructive war," and that the movement rejects (the Chinese do not) "cold war" and brinksmanship." This paragraph affirms support for the "solution of controversial international questions by means of negotiations," which is a Soviet position, but this very brief and slighting treatment of a tactic so highly regarded by Moscow is in effect a point for the Chinese.

The declaration goes on to make the Soviet point that peace is the ally of the bloc, as time is working against the West, but it describes coexistence only as "a" form of class struggle, not in Soviet terms as a "higher" form (which the Chinese had objected to), and it is evasive on the ways in which the "struggle" is to be waged within the concept of "peaceful coexistence." It is contended simultaneously that "peaceful coexistence" favors the struggle in the non-Communist world (a Soviet point) and that successes in this struggle contribute to the "consolidation" of peaceful coexistence (a Chinese euphemism).

In the sub-section on disarmament, the declaration reflects the Soviet position on the importance of complete disarmament and the joint position on the difficulties of realizing that. The declaration leans to Moscow in describing disarmament as an "urgent historic necessity," and reflects

*It should be understood that "peaceful coexistence" bars only general war, not local wars, "liberation" wars, and civil wars--although there are differences between Moscow and Peiping on the proper response to the latter three types of war.
Peiping primarily in holding that the imperialists must be "forced" to meet this demand.*

The National Liberation Movement

The section on the national liberation movement, which may or may not have been completed by the preparatory committee, begins by celebrating the emergence of "about 40" new states in Asia and Africa since World War II and Castro's victory in Cuba as an inspiration to Latin America, and by observing that the disintegration of colonialism is of an importance second only to the formation of the bloc. The declaration notes that the world Communist movement is giving "great support" to the liberation movement, without specifying the kinds of support or their relative importance.

As for the colonial areas, the declaration notes that peoples of these areas have won independence in "fierce encounters" with imperialism (a Chinese emphasis), that Communists recognize "the progressive, revolutionary importance of national liberation wars" (a Chinese emphasis), and that the existence of the bloc enhances the prospects of oppressed peoples for gaining independence (a common position). Colonial peoples are now gaining their independence, the declaration continues, both by means of "armed struggle" (a Chinese emphasis) and by "non-military means" (a Soviet emphasis); the document leans a bit to the Chinese here by going on to note that colonial powers do not voluntarily leave. A bit later, the declaration describes the working class and peasantry as the most important forces in winning independence (a common position), and it is evasive on the question of the degree of participation of the national bourgeoisie in the struggle for independence (it depends on "concrete conditions"). Also later, returning to the question of "support" for peoples struggling for independence, the declaration expressed "warm sympathy and support" for the Algerian rebels and goes on to observe that the world Communist movement will render "every moral and material support to peoples struggling for their liberation." This formulation falls short of the reported

*Peiping announced in the early months of 1960 that it would not be bound by any disarmament agreement in which it did not participate.
Chinese demand for a pledge of greater support specifically to national liberation wars, although it is not a major defeat, as it would have been if liberation wars had been included in the "local" wars which were to be liquidated.

As for the newly-independent countries, they are said to be under heavy pressure from the imperialist states anxious to maintain "colonial exploitation" by economic manipulation, military treaties and bases, and support of a susceptible part of the bourgeoisie (i.e., maintenance of indirect control, giving the country a "semi-colonial" status, although this phrase is not used here). The "national revival" of these countries can "only" be accomplished by a "resolute struggle" through a united front (armed struggle is not mentioned). The declaration then states a set of objectives for the united fronts which seem to represent Soviet formulations, in that most are analogous to those put forward by the Soviets for Communists in developed Western countries: strengthening political independence, carrying out agrarian reform, liquidating feudalism, expelling foreign enterprise, developing a national industry, pursuing a neutralist foreign policy, and so on. There is an apparent concession to the Chinese in the emphasis on the unreliability of the bourgeoisie in this phase of the revolution.

The declaration then sets forth the Soviet concept of "national democracy" as the state which may arise from the pursuit of the above-cited objectives—in other words, a transitional form on the way to socialism for the independent countries, a form analogous to the "democracy of a new type" envisaged in developed Western countries.* Such a state would actively oppose the West, reject military treaties with the West, eliminate Western military bases, keep out Western capital, and give its domestic Communists complete freedom to infiltrate the government and built up their forces for

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*The concept of "national democracy" differs from Mao Tse-tung's "new democracy" in a critical respect: in Mao's concept, as when the Peiping regime was proclaimed, the Communists are already in complete control although not frankly so, whereas the Soviet "national democracy" is apparently to be headed by bourgeois nationalist figures who are amenable to Communist influence.
the eventual (perhaps early) takeover. Communist spokesmen have since specified that there already exists at least one "national democratic state"—Castro's Cuba.

The Communist parties, on the road to "national democracy," are instructed to support the actions of national governments (led by the national bourgeoisie) which lead to the consolidation of achieved gains and which "undermine the positions of imperialism." This formulation seems to leave Moscow free to urge protracted Communist cooperation with or subordination to bourgeois nationalist governments, and Peiping free to argue that the goals of the local Communist parties and of bloc foreign policy are not being advanced sufficiently to warrant continued cooperation or restraint, or for Moscow to hold that "national democracy" is not a prospect for this or that country until (say) 1965 and Peiping to contend that it could be achieved much more rapidly by internal and external pressure.

The declaration at this point notes the importance of bloc economic aid (loans, technicians, training) to the newly independent countries. The emphasis on this point is Soviet. As for the peoples not yet independent, it is at this point that they are promised "every support," that sympathy and support is expressed for the Algerian rebels, and that the world Communist movement is pledged to render "every moral and material support to peoples struggling for their liberation."

Peaceful Accession to Power

The next section deals with the prospects for peaceful accession to power by Communist parties, in effect restricting this to the question of tactics within developed Western countries. This section begins with the Soviet point that the Communist parties are the best judges of tactics in their countries, nods to the Chinese by observing that the parties "will increasingly take the offensive" and will prepare for "decisive battles to overthrow capitalism," and then sets forth the Soviet program formulated in 1959 and reaffirmed in 1960. The "main blow" is to be aimed at the "monopolies," or, in some countries, jointly at American imperialism, monopoly capital, and other forces of "internal reaction." Communists are to struggle for "democratic" goals—including peace, national independence, nationalization of the principal
sectors of the economy, "radical" agrarian reforms, and so on—comparable to the goals set forth in November 1959 (by the West European parties) which had been assailed by Peiping as "opportunist."* The declaration goes on to observe that the struggle for "democracy" is a part of the struggle for socialism, and that this program differs from that of the "reformists" who deny the need for revolution.

As for peaceful accession to power, the discussion is equivocal throughout, drawing heavily on the 1957 declaration. It rejects the view that social revolutions "necessarily" develop from wars. It denies any wish to "export revolution" and calls for struggle against "imperialist export of counter-revolution," without stating how the "rebuff" to the latter is to be effected. It notes that the development of the revolution depends on a number of factors, including the degree of resistance of the ruling classes. Communist parties "seek" to carry out the revolution by non-violent means, as is desirable (a Soviet emphasis), and in "a number of countries" they have this opportunity (another Soviet point), but where the "exploiting classes use violence" then violence must be employed (a Chinese emphasis), and it is a fact of history that the ruling classes do not surrender voluntarily (another Chinese point).

Discipline of the Movement

Of at least equal importance to the sections considered above—i.e., those concerned with questions of strategy—is the concluding section, dealing with the discipline of the world Communist movement, a section which had been left uncompleted in critical respects by the preparatory committee. It begins with a statement of the movement's increasing strength, including the specification of 87 Communist parties with a total membership of 36 million.

*Peiping clearly retreated in this discussion, presumably in the belief that Communist tactics in the West are of less importance than tactics in the underdeveloped countries, but without changing its mind; a People's Daily editorial on the declaration the next day ignored these "democratic" goals and their prospects.
It then observes that one factor in the good health of the movement has been the "overcoming of the harmful consequences of the cult of the individual," and it soon thereafter, in discussing the "norms of party life," specifies the duty of preventing the emergence of such a cult. This formulation is largely a Soviet victory, as it is in effect an endorsement of the deStalinization campaign. If applied to Khrushchev and Mao, however, the declaration on this point is a draw rather than a Soviet victory, because the Chinese have objected to Khrushchev's personal leadership every bit as much as the Soviets have objected to Mao's.

This section then discusses "revisionism" and "dogmatism." The Soviet party scores sharply in the formulation that the movement has (already) "routed" the revisionists and in confining the discussion of revisionism largely to the "Yugoslav revisionists." The Chinese party scores a point in the concluding paragraph on revisionism, which, without declaring revisionism to be exclusively a Yugoslav phenomenon, makes the charges against the revisionists that the Chinese had made against Moscow (revisionism "reflects bourgeois ideology," "paralyzes revolutionary will," "disarms and demobilizes the workers and masses," etc.). The Soviet party scores in the same way, however, in the discussion of "dogmatism and sectarianism," in that the passage (longer than in the 1957 declaration) reflects charges made by Moscow against the Chinese (these offenses prevent the creative development of Marxism-Leninism, isolate the Communists, condemn the parties to passive temporizing or leftist adventurism, etc.) The declaration falls back on the November 1957 formulation that revisionism is the "main danger" (a Chinese point) and that dogmatism and sectarianism "can become" the main danger (a less sharp Soviet point) to individual parties.

The declaration then makes some solemn remarks about the importance of unity in the movement, arguing that its strength is as the strength of ten when it is unified. It then asserts, in what may become the most belabored sentence in the history of the world Communist movement:

The interests of the Communist movement demand that every Communist party display solidarity by observing assessments and conclusions jointly worked out by the fraternal parties at their conferences....
The formulation would seem to permit the Soviets to return to the argument that the minority should be bound by assessments reached "jointly" by the majority, and the Chinese to contend that they will not be bound because they were not among those who "jointly" reached the assessment.

As for the policies not worked out in conferences, all the parties "independently and equally" (truly a joint Sino-Soviet formulation) are to work out their policies on the basis of the specific conditions in their countries, "guided by the principles of Marxism-Leninism"--another formulation which permits one party to assert that another party has violated those principles and the latter party to deny it. Further, each party is to be "responsible" to the entire world Communist movement--which may be a Soviet proposition, i.e., an indirect way of calling for minorities to submit to majorities, but which falls short of imposing that principle and is a two-edged weapon anyway. Further, the parties are to hold additional conferences of this type to work out "unified views,"* and, in interim periods, when disputes arise, are to hold bilateral talks--in other words, there are to be more conferences of the type which had in fact just failed to work out "unified views," and more bilateral talks of the type which had repeatedly failed to resolve Sino-Soviet disputes. The burden of the passage seems to be this: that it is better to have a lot of meetings, and to avoid or at least to postpone a showdown, than it is to have an open split in the movement.

Reflecting Khrushchev's reported abjuration of formal Soviet party leadership of the movement (an abjuration in effect forced on him by Peiping's treatment of the concept of Soviet leadership), the declaration describes the Soviet party not as the leader but as the "generally acknowledged vanguard" of the movement, the "most experienced and tempered unit." The Soviet party then scores a point in the assertion that Soviet experience is of "fundamental

*The same problem arises here as with assessments reached "jointly." The Soviets can maintain that these are the "unified" views of the majority, just as they have sometimes used the phrase "by the unanimous opinion of the majority," whereas the Chinese can maintain that they do not share these views and they are therefore not "unified."
significance" for the entire movement. It scores another point immediately in the assertion that "the historic decisions of the 20th CPSU congress...started a new stage in the world Communist movement and contributed to its further development on the basis of Marxism-Leninism"—as the Chinese had been very cool toward the theses of the 20th and 21st congresses. However, the Chinese scored in omitting any reference to the 21st congress in this context: there is an earlier reference in a passage about contributions made by various parties, contributions which might equally include some of the militant articles from Red Flag.

Shortly thereafter, the declaration asserts that "Marxism-Leninism is the sole great revolutionary teaching." This represents another draw, as both sides of course had based their positions on Marxism-Leninism; the Soviets had been interested in denying Mao as another such source, and the Chinese in denying Khrushchev. There is another pious affirmation that only on the basis of Marxism-Leninism can the world Communist movement "solve successfully" all its tasks—distinct, presumably, from solving unsuccessfully its tasks, a better description of the Moscow conference.*

It should be observed that this concluding section of the declaration does not establish the principle of majority rule, and it makes no reference to "factionalism."

**Evaluation**

It does not seem an idle exercise to attempt to tally the declaration in terms of its final statements of long-disputed propositions, because the Soviet and Chinese parties took each of these questions seriously and did their best to make their positions prevail, working the propositions out line by line and word by word. Certain of the

*Ulbricht in his 18 December report stated: "Somebody has raised the question as to who is the one who determines what is truth, and what complies with the principles of Marxist-Leninist doctrine." He answered that such conferences arrive at the truth, and went on to emphasize that, while the concept of "leader" is no longer employed, "there is no doubt...that the CPSU is the center" of the movement.
formulations can be regarded as a clear Soviet victory, others as a clear Chinese victory, others as a Soviet edge or a Chinese edge, and many others as so equivocal, so evasive, or so susceptible to appeal equally as to represent a draw. It would be a mistake, however, to regard the scoring of the declaration as an evaluation of the entire affair of the conference.

Although the declaration discusses questions of strategy in four categories (nature of the epoch, war and peace, national liberation movement, peaceful accession to power), there are really at least six substantive categories: the balance of power, questions of war, "peaceful coexistence," policy toward colonial areas, policy toward newly independent countries, and tactics for Communists in the West. The Soviet party did not 'lose' any of these six substantive battles; it won two by a substantial margin (the first and second); it won two by a narrow margin (the fifth and sixth); and two were draws (the third and fourth).

As for the first, the balance of power: the description of the epoch represents a draw; the assessment of the balance of power, a Soviet edge; the significance of recent developments, a draw; the treatment of long-term economic competition, a clear Soviet victory; and problems of building Communism, a clear Soviet victory. In sum: a Soviet victory by a substantial margin.

As for the second, questions relating to war: the consequences of general war, a clear Soviet victory; the need to avoid general war, a clear Soviet victory; the prospect of general war, a Soviet edge; the need for vigilance, a Chinese edge; the prospect of local wars, a Chinese edge; the response to local wars, a Soviet edge. In sum: another substantial Soviet victory.

As for the third, "peaceful coexistence": the importance of peaceful coexistence, a Soviet edge; the possibility of peaceful coexistence, a draw; the relationship of "peace" and the "struggle," a draw; negotiations with the West, a Chinese edge; disarmament, a draw. In sum: a draw.

As for the fourth, policy in colonial areas: the treatment of successes to date, a draw; the importance of armed struggle versus other forms of action, a draw; the importance
and necessity of "liberation" wars, a Chinese edge; the question of bloc "support" of "liberation" wars, a Soviet edge; attitudes toward the national bourgeoisie, a draw. In sum: a draw.

As for the fifth, policy toward newly-independent countries; objectives for united fronts, a Soviet edge; attitude toward the national bourgeoisie, a Chinese edge; the concept of "national democracy," a Soviet edge; tactics of the Communist parties, a draw; the importance of bloc economic aid to independent countries, a Soviet edge. In sum: a narrow Soviet victory.

As for the sixth, tactics of Communist parties in the West: the prospects of accession to power by non-violent means, a draw; programs for the parties, a clear Soviet victory. In sum: a Soviet edge.

As for that portion of the declaration concerned with the world Communist movement, regarded here as at least as important as all the other sections combined: the treatment of the "cult of the individual," a Soviet edge; revisionism versus dogmatism and sectarianism, a draw; adherence to assessments worked out "jointly," a Chinese edge, because it depresses the Soviet party to the level of others; internal policies of the parties, a draw; the responsibility of the parties to the entire movement, a draw; the mechanism (international and bilateral) for resolving disputes, a Chinese edge, again because it reduces the Soviet party's stature; the position of the Soviet party in the movement, a draw; the failure to establish the principle of majority rule, and the omission of any reference to "factionalism," a resounding Chinese victory.* In sum: a substantial Chinese victory.

There were various attempts at the time to assess the significance of the 6 December declaration for Soviet foreign policy and Chinese Communist foreign policy, but obviously the declaration itself was of less value in that regard than would be subsequent Soviet and Chinese interpretations and presentations of the document. It was contended, for example, that the declaration expressed Chinese acceptance

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*Another CCIF analyst has discovered in the Comintern statutes of 1920 that the Comintern operated on the principle of majority rule, with proportional representation based on the party's numerical strength and "real influence."
of Khrushchev's intention to seek summit talks with the new US administration, but actually both the Chinese attitude and Khrushchev's intention had to be deduced from other materials. Similarly, it was argued that the declaration presaged a more vigorous Soviet policy in the underdeveloped areas, but actually a Soviet decision of this kind had been indicated after the abortive summit meeting of May 1960 and was clearly apparent in Khrushchev's performance at the UN General Assembly before the Moscow conference opened.* The most that could be said, on the basis of the declaration itself, was that the two parties apparently had agreed to refrain for a time from polemics about bloc strategy and that the declaration seemed to give additional force to certain types of pressure on the Soviet party's foreign policy which were already being exerted by the Chinese. That is, the declaration, at a minimum, committed the Soviets to hold further world Communist conferences to defend their policies. On matters of strategy, it put additional pressure on Khrushchev to take a hard line in any negotiations with the West; to intervene in any Western-initiated local wars; to give more substance to Soviet professions of sympathy and support for liberation wars; to move faster toward making "national democracies" of the now independent countries; and so on. Whether or not the Soviets could withstand any or all of these pressures, Moscow did increase the pressure on itself by recognizing them in a public document which was stated to be the program of the world Communist movement.

Surely the most significant development of the Moscow conference was the success with which the Chinese Communists challenged Soviet party leadership of the world Communist movement, in the sense that the conference formalized and legitimized that challenge. That is (as other observers have noted), the Chinese had challenged the policies formulated by the leader and had challenged the exercise of that leadership, and the 6 December declaration, rather than establishing the Soviet-exhorted principle of majority rule, provided a procedure for the challenge to continue. This seemed virtually certain to affect the "unity" of the world Communist movement. Given the lack of clarity in the 6 December

*It is impossible to judge to what degree this Soviet decision was affected by a wish to pre-empt the Chinese.
declaration, the number of positions susceptible to varying interpretations, the probable Soviet and Chinese persistence in different interpretations, the existence of parties and factions within parties whose temperaments and situations made them sympathetic to Chinese rather than Soviet interpretations, it seemed quite likely that there would be a Sino-Soviet contest for dominant influence over some of the parties, especially in the Asian countries of the bloc and in the underdeveloped areas.* There could also develop a movement—if not general, at least among some parties—toward independence of both Moscow and Peiping.

Moscow's acceptance of restrictions on Soviet leadership perhaps should not be interpreted entirely, however, as recognition of a disagreeable necessity. The Soviets might reasonably have told themselves that, in subsequent world Communist conferences, they would retain a substantial majority. Beyond this, it may be that the Soviet party, just as it has appeared to be confident that the world will eventually succumb to Soviet successes and the Soviet example, told itself too that sooner or later the discipline of the world Communist movement would be restored. This kind of confidence had actually been expressed, on behalf of the Soviet party, in December 1956, after the highpoint of the Soviet troubles in Eastern Europe, and by (of all people) a Chinese, Peng Chen:

And if younger brother does not want to listen to him /the Soviet party/, well, let him do as he thinks best. Sooner or later he will learn to appreciate the elder brother's advice and be grateful to him.

*The declaration itself gives the Chinese party (and others) an opening for disputing Soviet policies in talks with other parties, despite the Soviet condemnation of "factionalism." The declaration notes: "When this or that party raises questions about the activity of another fraternal party, its leadership turns to the leadership of the party in question, and, when necessary, meetings and consultations are held." The "activity" of the party may well be in implementation of a Soviet policy.
II. SOVIET AND CHINESE PRESENTATIONS OF THE DECLARATION

Early Soviet Comment

The day following the publication of the 6 December declaration, Pravda, like People's Daily, was on the streets with a tendentious interpretation of it. Pravda gave a fitfully accurate summary of the document but, inter alia, returned to the concept of a "new era," did not mention that the threat of war had increased, took no note of local wars, emphasized the importance of "peaceful coexistence," did not refer to the "armed struggles" of colonial peoples, and failed to remark the instability of the national bourgeoisie in newly independent countries. As for the discipline of the movement, Pravda played straight the final section of the declaration, although adding several paragraphs of comment on the "immense importance" of Sino-Soviet solidarity.

The report of First Secretary Ulbricht to the East German party on 18 December—in effect another Soviet comment on the conference, as the CPSU had almost certainly approved Ulbricht's report—made public a number of the disputes which had arisen during the Moscow conference and made clear that disagreement persisted beyond the conference. Attributing the dissident views to "some comrades" or simply "people," but clearly referring to the Chinese and their supporters (Albania was named), Ulbricht criticized those who hold an "obsolete" view of the character of the epoch, who are guilty of "nationalism" in building Communism, who wish to "conceal" the consequences of nuclear war, who do not believe that world war can be abolished so long as capitalism exists, who reject any "general line" and in consequence make errors in "complicated situations, such as in border problems," who believe that "peaceful coexistence" will weaken the movement, who present the "great danger" of dogmatism and sectarianism, who believe in such a concept as "Chinese" Marxism-Leninism, and so on. The censure of Albania introduced a new device for bloc criticism of Peiping, much as Peiping had long used Yugoslavia to attack the Soviet party.
On 19 December, Fro1 Kozlov reported on the November conference to Soviet party functionaries in Moscow. Moscow's brief account of the speech indicated that Kozlov emphasized such Soviet propositions as the bloc "becoming" the "decisive factor" in world affairs, the non-inevitability of war, the avoidance of war as the most urgent task, and so on, although he apparently gave some attention as well to portions of the document which the Chinese had pressed for. Between 23 December and 3 January, every full member of the Soviet party presidium except Khrushchev was appearing in provincial centers throughout the Soviet Union to talk with local party officials about the results of the Moscow conference. This is said to have been the most ambitious briefing effort undertaken by Soviet leaders since early 1957, following the Hungarian revolution.

Khrushchev's 6 January Report

It remained for Khrushchev himself, in a 6 January report to a Soviet party audience in Moscow (a report not published or broadcast in full until 18-19 January) to offer the definitive Soviet interpretation of the 6 December declaration. The report, longer than the declaration itself, was a strong reaffirmation of Soviet positions in the dispute with Peiping, as well as a clarification of Soviet views.

The original report (as given on 6 January, not as published later) is said to have contained much criticism of the Chinese. Khrushchev is reported have said, for example, that the Chinese leaders were "stupid" but it was necessary to reach "agreement" with them.

Opening with the assertion that the declaration was a "militant Marxist-Leninist document," Khrushchev went on in effect to notify the rank-and-file of the world Communist movement that the Chinese party had not forced him to be any more militant than he cared to be. Asserting further that the declaration would serve as a "true compass" for the movement, he went on to construct another compass which, rather than swinging wildly from one direction to another like the 6 December declaration, would point more steadily to Soviet positions.
Balance of Power

Taking up the question of the definition of the epoch, Khrushchev reiterated that this was by no means a "narrow theoretical question" but the basic estimate underlying world Communist strategy and tactics. He gave virtually verbatim the definition given in the 6 December declaration, expatiated on that, observed that the "balance of forces" in the world had undergone "a radical change in favor of socialism, reiterated (as had the declaration) that the bloc "is becoming the decisive factor," and then stated very clearly the other half of his position, the half the Chinese minimize, on the balance of power:

This does not mean that imperialism represents an infinitesimal quantity which can be disregarded. Not at all. Imperialism still possesses great strength. It possesses a strong military machine....

The declaration had said nothing about Western strength, it has simply rejoiced in Western weakness.

Still discussing the balance of power, Khrushchev did not content himself with the declaration's vague formulation that imperialism was being halted in its attempt to retard history by "military means." He specified (like the declaration) that the balance of power deterred the West from initiating a "world war," but he declared also (where the declaration fudged) that Western "attempts to unleash local wars are being cut short."

As had the declaration, Khrushchev in this section reviewed the "deepening crisis" of world capitalism, in particular of the United States. He did not repeat, however, the declaration's (Chinese) description of the US as the main enemy of the peoples of the world. Neither did he speak, as the declaration had spoken, of world revolutionary forces merging to "destroy" the world imperialist system.

Following the organization of the declaration, Khrushchev turned to bloc internal affairs. He gave considerably more detail (several pages) than had the declaration to the USSR's accomplishments, failed to mention the declaration's citation of Communist China as an inspiration to the underdeveloped
countries, reaffirmed Soviet confidence in surpassing the United States in per capita production in or about 1970, and remarked "To win time in the economic contest with capitalism is now the main thing."

Khrushchev also gave much more attention than had the declaration to the principles of building Communism. He was very harsh on the (Chinese) "levelling and weakening of the principle of material incentive...the concentration of emphasis on enthusiasm...on social and moral forms of incentive...." Like the declaration, but contrary to the expressed Chinese aim of autarky, Khrushchev spoke of the need for "coordination of national economic plans" among bloc countries, implying again that the degree of Soviet aid to China would depend on Peiping's accommodation to this policy.

Questions of War

Khrushchev then turned to questions of war and peace, which he said were "the center of attention" at the conference.* In this long section of his report, he improved considerably on the discussion in the 6 December declaration,** although there remained certain ambiguous formulations.

Khrushchev distinguished, much more clearly than had the 6 December declaration, four types of war: world war, local wars, liberation wars, and popular uprisings. Communists are "determined opponents" of world wars, he said, and are "generally opponents of wars among states"/Intra-imperialist wars/? Khrushchev at this point declared forthrightly that "we can forestall the outbreak of a world war," and he returned to the pre-conference position that the "unleashing of wars" (of any kind) had become more difficult for the West. Apparently restricting the category of "local wars" to Western-initiated wars against other states, he conceded that such wars "may occur again in the future," but he reiterated the long-standing position

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*This part of Khrushchev's report is discussed, along much the same lines as in this paper, in the FBIS Bloc Survey of 26 January 1961.

**It is curious that certain of these clarifications did not appear in the declaration itself, as the Chinese would have welcomed some of them.
that Western opportunities for initiating them "are becoming fewer and fewer." He reiterated the Soviet position that a local war may become a world war, and therefore that local wars as well as world wars must be opposed.*

Khrushchev then spoke of "national liberation" wars, giving the examples of the Indochina war (up to the 1954 truce, apparently) and the current Algerian war. Liberation wars, he said, "will continue to exist as long as imperialism exists, as long as colonialism exists," and are "not only admissible but inevitable." Colonial peoples, he continued, could attain their freedom and independence "only by struggle, including armed struggle," a formulation which seemed to put armed struggle in a subordinate position, whereas the declaration had put it first.**

Khrushchev then posed the question of why the "US imperialists," while wishing to help the "French colonialists" in the Indochina war, had "decided against direct intervention" there? The reason, he said, was that American intervention would lead to "relevant aid" (presumably intervention) by China, the USSR and other bloc countries, which "could lead to world war." In other words, the United States, like the USSR itself, was sensible of the danger of expansion of local wars.

Whereas the declaration had failed to describe liberation wars as "just" wars and had gone on to state that Communists recognize the "importance" of national liberation wars but had not pledged any support to them, Khrushchev specified the Algerian war as a "sacred" war, stated that Communists "recognize" such wars, and asserted that "we help and will help peoples striving for their independence." He evaded the question, however, of how far bloc aid was to extend—an omission which, in the light of his earlier remarks, suggested

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*The implication remains, however, that the USSR will intervene in certain kinds of local war, e.g. to defend a newly-independent country against Western military action; Zhukov's 5 January Pravda article on colonialism implies the same, more clearly.

**Zhukov's 5 January article makes clear that the Soviet party does indeed regard "armed struggle" as less important, owing to various other forms of pressure on the colonial powers.
a wariness about assisting "liberation" wars to a degree which would risk the commitment of American forces.*

Khrushchev then gave the "war" in Cuba as an example of a "popular uprising," i.e. a civil war. Just as the "liberation" war in Indochina had not become a local war (between states) because American forces had not intervened,** so in Cuba the United States "did not intervene...directly with its armed forces," and again, as in Indochina, the "people" won. Such national uprisings are to be expected, Khrushchev went on, and Communists take a "most positive" attitude toward them. While these wars "must not be identified with wars among states"--i.e., presumably, must not be permitted to become local wars through intervention, risking counter-intervention and possible expansion to world war--Communists "fully support such just wars."

Khrushchev then returned, as the declaration had returned, to the theme of the need to avert a world war. He gave much more detail than had the declaration on the consequences of general war, inter alia citing a Western estimate that up to 750 million people could die in a 60-day war. He followed the declaration in affirming that imperialism would be "wiped out" in a new world war, but he then made the Soviet point that in the event of war it would be the "working people" all over the world who would "suffer most." Bearing down hard for the benefit of the Chinese, he said:

A sober appraisal of the inevitable (sic) consequences of nuclear war is the indispensable condition for a persistent pursuit of a policy of preventing war and of mobilizing the masses for the achievement of this task.

*Zhukov's 5 January article makes a somewhat stronger statement of support for both newly-independent countries and "liberation" movements, but still evades the question of degree: "...in whatever form a national-liberation revolution develops--whether peaceful or non-peaceful--it is correct in counting on the fact that any attempt at imperialist intervention with the aim of suppressing such a revolution will meet timely, decisive and powerful opposition."

**Colonial forces present from the start, in Indochina, Algeria, or wherever, apparently do not count as interventionist.
"Peaceful Coexistence"

Taking up "peaceful coexistence," Khrushchev returned to the formulation that this concept was the "general line" of his foreign policy--i.e., the Soviet party's policy, because the Chinese had rejected any "general line." He went on to reaffirm the Soviet argument (reflected in the declaration) that peaceful coexistence is to the advantage of the bloc. He reiterated, again for the benefit of the Chinese, that the USSR would "do everything" to increase its military capabilities and would continue to "rebuff" aggression by the imperialists, but

We always seek to direct the development of events in such a way as to ensure that, while defending the interests of the socialist camp, we do not provide the imperialist provocateurs with a chance to unleash a new world war.

After reaffirming his intention to conclude a German peace treaty, Khrushchev passed to disarmament and reiterated the Soviet position that the Soviet effort toward disarmament "is not a tactical move. We sincerely want disarmament." (He went on to imply that partial disarmament was better than none.) He again put forward the slogan--which Peiping had emphatically rejected--of a world "without weapons and without war." The "slogan" of the struggle for peace, he went on, was not inconsistent with the struggle for Communism, and here he reaffirmed the Soviet view of the proper tactics for the world Communist fronts by pointing to the "movement of peace partisans" as the "broadest movement of modern times."

As for negotiations with the West, Khrushchev returned to the pre-conference Soviet position that Western policy had "militant-aggressive" and "moderate-sober" elements, and he cited Lenin on the need for contact with "prudent representatives of the bourgeoisie." Reiterating that Western "ruling circles" included both adventurist forces and others which "understand the danger of a new war to capitalism itself," Khrushchev reaffirmed that bloc states "strive for negotiations and agreements" with the West and "endeavor to develop personal contacts" with the Western leaders.
The National Liberation Movement

Khrushchev then turned to the national liberation movement, beginning, as did the declaration, with a review of recent progress—the implication being, as it had been in Khrushchev's speeches at the Moscow conference, that the Chinese could hardly complain about results like these. Citing the great experience of the bloc in applying Marxism-Leninism to bloc countries themselves, Khrushchev again implied that the Communist parties of the underdeveloped countries of today did not need to look to Peiping as a special authority in this area:

The correct application of this experience, the correct determination of which policy should be pursued, naturally can be done only by actual party functioning in the given country.

As for the colonial areas, Khrushchev cut through the discussion of "armed struggles" for independence and of "liberation" wars which had appeared at this point in the 6 December declaration, evidently having said all he cared to say on this point in his earlier treatment of types of war—namely, that armed struggle was an admissible (although secondary) means of gaining national independence, and that Communists recognize the importance of "liberation" wars and would support them (although evading the questions of the kind and degree of support). As for the tasks of the Communist parties and their attitude toward the national bourgeoisie in the struggle for independence, he let stand the evasive formulations of the 6 December declaration. He did, however, imply a more tolerant Soviet attitude than Peiping's toward the national bourgeoisie in noting immediately that the statement directs maximum use of the revolutionary capabilities of the various classes and social strata, drawing into the struggle against imperialism all allies, even those who are inconsistent, wavering, and unsteady. Communists are revolutionaries, and it would be a bad thing if they did not take advantage of new opportunities which arose....

*Zhukov in his 5 January article gives more attention to the limitations of the bourgeois role in revolution, but he still falls well short of the Chinese emphasis.
Unlike the declaration, Khrushchev spoke of the Soviet initiative at the UN General Assembly in October on the granting of independence to colonial peoples, remarking the importance of this initiative in isolating the colonial powers and their American supporters. Khrushchev reaffirmed his intention to stay on the offensive in the colonial areas.*

As for the newly-independent countries, Khrushchev, while referring his audience back to the 6 December declaration on the tasks of the Communist parties and their attitudes toward various classes and groups, made the point noted above about making "maximum use" of all classes and groups (a formulation apparently meant to apply to the newly-independent as well as colonial countries), and he went on to observe that "particular note should be taken of the (Soviet) concept of "national democracy" for the underdeveloped countries. He went on, in more conciliatory language than that of the declaration, to say that Communists "generally support democratic measures" taken by the present governments of underdeveloped countries, while at the same time they "explain to the masses that these measures are not socialist measures." He reaffirmed the importance (as had the declaration) of bloc economic aid to these countries, and he added the (Soviet) point that this aid would influence the development of these countries in a direction favorable to the bloc.

Turning to the question of peaceful accession to power by Communist parties, Khrushchev admitted that there had been disagreements on this concept. He reaffirmed (more clearly than had the declaration) the Soviet position that peaceful accession was desirable and increasingly possible as the bloc grew in strength, and that parliamentary action to this end was a good thing.

Khrushchev pointed out the "special significance" of the passages in the 6 December declaration which denied any intention to "export revolution" but which also called for struggle against "imperialist export of counter-revolution." Like the declaration, however, he was evasive on the question of how this latter struggle was to be conducted.

Khrushchev in this report gave only a few paragraphs to the question of the tactics of Communist parties in developed
Western countries, whereas the 6 December declaration had devoted several pages to it. He presumably believed that the clear Soviet victory on the question, in the formulations of the declaration, made it unnecessary for him to reaffirm Soviet positions at great length. He contented himself with observing that the local parties were the best judges of tactics (again implying that Chinese advice was not needed), noted the importance of work among young people, described the working class in developed Western countries as an "immense revolutionary force," and closed with the Soviet point (not mentioned in the declaration) that Communist parties in these countries faced great difficulties.

**Discipline of the Movement**

Khrushchev devoted the final section of his report, as had the declaration, to questions of the discipline of the world Communist movement. He gave these questions about six pages of discussion as against four-and-a-half in the declaration.

Khrushchev did not take up, as the declaration had, the question of the "cult of the individual." He began instead with a discussion of revisionism, dogmatism, and sectarianism. Enlarging on the discussion in the declaration, he noted that it was "three years ago" that the revisionists were most active in the world Communist movement, and they had been "unmasked and thrown out." Since then, the parties had all condemned the "Yugoslav variety of contemporary revisionism," implying other varieties (e.g. Chinese).

Implicitly relating, through Yugoslavia, the two offenses of revisionism and "nationalism," Khrushchev craftily went on to discuss briefly the question of "nationalism" in the world Communist movement. He was wary of provoking the Chinese to polemics on this point; he observed merely that Lenin had stated "with his usual perspicacity" that "the struggle with the evil of nationalism, with the most deep-rooted national petty bourgeois prejudices, moves more and more urgently into the foreground" as the bloc grows.*

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*Khrushchev seemed to be preparing the ground for future efforts to turn the offense of "revisionism" into the offense of (Chinese) "nationalism." Ulbricht's report had implied this also.

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Taking up another topic closer to his heart than revisionism, Khrushchev observed that "at the present time" dogmatism and sectarianism "can do great harm to our cause," cited Lenin as being "uncompromising toward dogmatism," and reiterated the charges made in the declaration against both dogmatism and sectarianism. He concluded with the standard formulation (since 1957) that revisionism was the "main danger" but dogmatism and sectarianism could become so.*

Khrushchev then addressed himself to the most important topic of his report, the "solidarity" of the movement, this being the "principal condition" for the eventual triumph of Communism. This solidarity was to be based on the "principles" of Marxism-Leninism and "proletarian internationalism"--the latter a longtime euphemism for adherence to the decisions of the Soviet party. The 6 December declaration at this point had specified that solidarity was to be expressed by "observing assessments and conclusions jointly worked out by the fraternal parties at their conference...." Khrushchev in his 6 January report went a bit beyond this. The "essence of Leninism itself," Khrushchev said, demanded that every party must prevent actions, "both within its own ranks and in the international Communist movement," which could "undermine" the solidarity of the movement. As it stood, Khrushchev's formulation could be interpreted simply as another way of saying that agreed formulations should be adhered to, which at that would leave the Chinese free to argue that solidarity is maintained by adhering to the formulations as they interpret them, not as the Russians do. However, the implication in Khrushchev's remarks went beyond the question of statements adopted at conferences; Khrushchev seemed to be calling again for support of majority positions and to be suggesting that other parties discipline or purge those opposed to such positions--in other words, a return to the position on majority rule and "factionalism" which the Chinese party had repeatedly refused to accept.**

*The Russians have never been able to answer successfully the Chinese question as to how, if the Soviet party is willing to concede revisionism to be the present "main danger," it can maintain at the same time that revisionism has already been "routed." It has been noted that this is Milton's view of Satan.

**Red Star later explicitly reaffirmed the principle of majority positions being binding on the minority. The Chinese could interpret Khrushchev's formulation, but not Red Star's, otherwise.
Khrushchev then pointed out, as the declaration had not, that the Soviet party itself had rejected the concept of the Soviet party as the "head" of the movement. He reiterated the provisions of the declaration that the parties are "equal and independent," responsible to the entire Communist movement. Noting that the CPSU remained the "universally acknowledged vanguard," he denied that leadership of the movement "from any center at all" is either "possible or necessary." Referring again to the practice of calling the Soviet party the "head" (or "leader," glava meaning either), he posed the question of whether the omission of this description of the Soviet party (as "head") would not weaken solidarity, and he then denied this, observing that "there is no statute (ustav) which could regulate relations among parties," and that solidarity would be maintained by "loyalty" to the common Marxist-Leninist ideology. (The declaration at this point had spoken of the practice of holding world Communist conferences to work out "unified" views and, in interim periods, holding bilateral talks. Again Khrushchev failed to mention this.)

Khrushchev gave only a paragraph in this section of his report to the internal policies of the parties. He did not mention, as the declaration had, the "fundamental significance" of Soviet experience, but he made the same point in observing that there was "no need to exaggerate the significance" of national "peculiarities," i.e. to fail to see that the main lines had been laid down by Marx and Lenin.

As for the over-all significance of the Moscow conference, it was this--that, "as comrades figuratively stated," the parties had "synchronized their watches." This phrase gives the show away. The comrade who had used this figure was Khrushchev himself, at the Bucharest conference, and he used it precisely to indicate the necessity of lining up behind the Soviet party in support of Soviet propositions in the dispute and in condemnation of Chinese misbehavior. He went on to indicate that this would be expected of future conferences as well:

*Ulbricht in his report had noted that the Soviet party had voluntarily renounced the title of leader, and he then made clear at once that he and all other right-thinking Communists continued to regard the Soviet party as the leader.
Indeed, the socialist countries and Communist parties must synchronize their watches. When someone's clock is fast or slow, it is regulated to show the correct time. Similarly, it is necessary to check the time of the Communist movement, so that our powerful army keeps in step and makes confident strides toward Communism. If it is possible to use such a figure of speech, Marxism-Leninism and the jointly worked-out documents of international Communist conferences serve us as chimes, striking the hour. After all, the Communist and workers' parties attending the conference unanimously worked out their decisions. Every party will adhere to these decisions in a strict and sacred manner, in all its activities.

What had happened at the conference, of course, was that the Soviet party had said it was four o'clock, the Chinese party had insisted it was eleven o'clock, and the 6 December declaration had said that it was either both or about six-thirty. But the conference had at least made clear to everyone that the Soviet party thought it was four o'clock and that the great majority of the parties were willing to agree; and the entire burden of Khrushchev's 6 January report was that the Soviet party still thought it was four o'clock, no matter what the declaration said. Khrushchev could have had no illusions about the success of world Communist conferences in achieving "unified" views, but the conferences might serve at least to deter the Chinese from marching about the world beating a gong for the imminent world revolution.

Khrushchev then rather pointedly addressed two paragraphs to the Soviet party's "invariable endeavor to strengthen the bonds of fraternal friendship" with the Chinese party and people. He repeated some remarks to other audiences to the effect that Sino-Soviet solidarity was "exceptionally important" in the common struggle. He was constrained to point out that with the Chinese Communists, as with all other Communists, the Soviet party shared the goal of safeguarding peace and building communism, the interests of the well-being of the working people, and the principles of Marxism-
Leninism.* Khrushchev promised that the Soviet party would "do everything," to ensure Sino-Soviet unity, and he then closed his report with an expression of confidence in Communism as the "invincible force" of the century.

Khrushchev in Sum

To recapitulate, Khrushchev reaffirmed those of his pre-conference positions which had been qualified in the 6 December declaration, and amplified or clarified others. As regards the balance of power, the balance is shifting to the bloc, but the West is still very strong. As for war, the West appears to be deterred from general war, and the bloc will not accept serious risks of general war; the West is increasingly deterred from local wars as well, and the bloc will avoid local wars if it can, owing to the danger of their expansion, although it will fight if necessary for a "just" cause such as defending a newly-independent country; the bloc will support "liberation" wars in colonial areas, and it might intervene to match Western intervention, but the bloc as well as the West should be wary of actions risking counter-intervention; "popular uprisings" are possible in almost every part of the non-Communist world, and both sides should refrain from intervening militarily in these. As for "peaceful coexistence," this is the basis of Soviet policy, and Moscow will decide how sharp a struggle to wage within that concept; the USSR is interested in complete or partial disarmament; there are some sober leaders in the West, so negotiations and personal contacts are worth while. As for the "national liberation movement," things are going well and Chinese advice is not needed; as regards the newly-independent countries, Soviet aid is an important factor (as is the promise to defend them) in ensuring their neutrality and their eventual attraction to Communism, "national democracy" is to be the middle-run

*Of these four things Khrushchev cited as shared with the Chinese, the Chinese see none the same way: i.e., the Chinese concept of "safeguarding peace" is to press the struggle against imperialism more militantly; the Chinese are "building Communism" in a manner offensive in important respects to Moscow; the Chinese are willing to subordinate the well-being of the workers to a much greater degree than the USSR (now) is; and the Chinese interpret the "common" doctrine very differently at some points.
objective, and the national bourgeoisie still have a lot of mileage left in them; in the colonial areas, "liberation" wars are inevitable and will be supported (by unspecified means), colonial people will attain independence by both violent and (primarily) non-violent means, Communist parties should make "maximum use" of the national bourgeoisie in the struggle, and the USSR will retain the initiative in the colonial areas. As for Communist parties in developed Western countries, these face formidable difficulties. As for the discipline of the world Communist movement, Khrushchev prepared the ground for turning the Chinese charge of Soviet "revisionism" into a Soviet charge of Chinese "nationalism," and he reaffirmed that dogmatism and sectarianism are present dangers; he implied also that Soviet positions should be supported by other parties, that those parties should discipline elements which oppose Soviet positions, and that world Communist conferences have a limited usefulness in lining up Soviet supporters in a clear majority and in subduing if not converting the dissenters.

Neither Suslov's 18 January report on the Moscow conference nor the CPSU central committee resolution of the same date added significantly to Khrushchev's account of the postconference Soviet position. On 13 January, however, Red Star spelled out the implication in Khrushchev's 6 January report that the Soviet party had not retreated from its position that majority positions are to be binding on the minority. Discussing the Moscow conference, and emphasizing the need for unity in the movement, Red Star quoted Lenin to this effect:

To discuss a question, to speak and hear various opinions, to learn the view of the majority of organized Marxists /the parties/, to express this view in a decision taken in their absence, and to carry out this decision in good faith--that is what is called unity everywhere in the world among all reasonable men.

The point of the phrase "in their absence" in the original was presumably that the Soviet party would sometimes have to make decisions, reflecting the majority will, without being able to consult the parties further. The main point of the entire passage, both originally and on 13 January, was of course that majority positions are to be binding on all parties--the operating principle of the Comintern.
Chinese Comment

The Chinese equivalent of Khrushchev's report of 6 January, Teng Hsiao-ping's report given in mid-January, was withheld from publication, presumably in the interest of bloc "unity." However, Chinese comment in official party organs (People's Daily, Red Flag) within a few weeks had amounted almost to a published equivalent to Khrushchev's report.

The first People's Daily comment (7 December) was just as tendentious as Pravda's had been on the same day. It chose to emphasize Western preparations for war, the immutable nature of imperialism, the United States as the main enemy of peoples, the danger of war and the need for unprecedented vigilance; it agreed that general war was not inevitable, but it expressed no confidence in deterring local wars. It affirmed the policy of "peaceful coexistence," defined simply as attempting to prevent a general war, and observed further that, if deterrence should fail, capitalism would be wiped out (this latter statement was made in the declaration too, but in another context). The declaration's discussion of the national liberation movement was described as a call "to rise and fight," as a "fighting program," and the "democratic" goals of Communist parties in the West were not mentioned.

The editorial summarized the section on the discipline of the world Communist movement fairly accurately, but did not mention the "cult of the individual." It devoted several paragraphs to the theme of the Chinese and Soviet parties (in that order, in People's Daily) being the largest parties and therefore having special responsibilities (i.e., as Peiping sees it, all parties are equal but some parties are more equal than others). The strongest emphasis in the entire editorial was reserved for the final section, which was concerned with the provisions in the declaration for reaching "common" views and taking "joint" actions. The need for and prospect of "joint" actions, efforts, and struggles, on the basis of "joint" positions, was cited seven times in 17 lines.

Red Flag on 15 December was more brazen. Expressing pleasure in the declaration, it spoke of the Chinese record of fidelity to such declarations, and pledged equal fidelity to this one. As an earnest of this pledge, in treating the basic substantive question, the definition of the epoch
(which it postponed to late in the article), it omitted the principal Soviet point in the definition, namely that the transition from capitalism to socialism basically marked the epoch. It emphasized the imperialist "plan" to initiate a general war, and, with an eye to Khrushchev's continued overtures for summit talks with the new US administration, it observed sourly that the United States was attempting to delude the world with "empty talk about peace." It contended further that peace could be "safeguarded" only by a "revolutionary struggle against imperialism," and in this connection it cited the most dangerous and costly of local wars, the Korean war, as engaged in "precisely for realizing peace."

As for "peaceful coexistence," Peiping's faith in this policy was founded on the success of "anti-imperialist struggles." In this connection, even partial disarmament would be hard to achieve.

Further discussing the balance of power, Red Flag returned to the objectionable formulation of Mao's that the East Wind was prevailing; indeed, the article pointed out, it was Mao who in 1957 "attested to" the possibility of preventing a new world war (not, as some may have ignorantly believed, Stalin or Khrushchev some time earlier). The article did not express much confidence in Mao's discovery, however; it went on to emphasize the possibility of general war, again observing cheerfully that such a war would bury capitalism.

Going on to discuss the national liberation movement, Red Flag cited Liu Shao-chi as having discovered that the success of the national liberation movement was a development second in importance only to the formation of the bloc. The article clearly distorted the declaration at one point by contending that it had pledged support to the "armed struggles" of the suppressed peoples in colonial areas, struggles which were a part of the struggle for peace. With respect to the newly-independent countries, it did not mention the Soviet concept of "national democracy," which Khrushchev had asked be particularly noted. In discussing Communist tactics in the West, again it failed to mention "democratic" goals, speaking only of "struggle for socialism." With respect to intrabloc relations, the editorial did not mention the need, emphasized by Moscow, for better coordination of bloc economies; it observed merely that the more
developed the economies of the individual countries, the greater the role played by these countries, and it reaffirmed the Chinese aim of becoming a "truly great socialist power." With respect to the discipline of the movement, it did not mention the Soviet role as "vanguard" or the significance of Soviet experience, remarking merely that the CCP would continue to regard the "safeguarding" of Sino-Soviet "unity" as an "important international duty."

The 31 December Red Flag was noteworthy for the reappearance of "Yu Chaö-Ii," for more than two years a spokesman for Mao's positions (and against Soviet positions) on matters of world Communist strategy. Much of Yu's article, which surveyed the prospects of the global struggle, was unusually conciliatory in tone, with its insistence on Sino-Soviet unity, its specification of the "struggle for world peace" even before that of "promoting the development and victory of the revolutionary struggle" as the twin goals of the movement, its endorsement of "peaceful coexistence" without snarling at the same time, its praise of Khrushchev's initiative at the UN General Assembly in October 1960 on ending colonialism, its expressed favor for easing international tension, and so on.

After that, however, in discussing the national liberation movement, Yu began to sound like his old self, praising the Algerian rebels for persisting in military struggle rather than accepting a political settlement, and citing developments in the Congo as evidence that imperialist nations inevitably attempt to restore the pre-liberation condition of servitude. Later, Yu seemed to be reaffirming the full range of the Chinese positions on both local wars and "liberation" wars. Western-initiated local wars ("brush-fire wars") were said to be the principal instrument of imperialism in "present-day conditions." Yu went on to declare:

We Communists resolutely oppose not only imperialist preparations to launch a world war but also such local wars of aggression by imperialism. We are of the opinion that should imperialism be permitted
to unleash local wars of aggression and obtain what it wants in these wars, it is likely that a world war would result. We Communists have consistently maintained an extremely clear-cut attitude toward a series of local wars that have broken out in the world. We firmly support just revolutionary wars waged by all opposed nations and peoples, and are resolutely opposed to and are prepared to put a halt to unjust counterrevolutionary wars launched by imperialism and reactionaries. It is for this very reason that we firmly believe a world war can be averted, and we have no doubt that, under present conditions, it is possible to prevent counterrevolutionary local wars from turning into a world war, and it is possible to make victories gained in the revolutionary wars of various countries contribute to the growth of world forces of peace and to the weakening of imperialist forces of war.

In other words, contrary to the Soviet emphasis on all counts, the West is increasingly attracted to local wars, the danger of expansion of local wars becomes operative only if the West is permitted to win such wars, and such wars can be contained within the geographical area in which they are fought. In the last four lines quoted above, in the generalization about "revolutionary" wars, which does not distinguish between local wars and "liberation" wars, Yu seems to be reaffirming the Chinese position that the bloc can make positive gains from engaging its forces with the West in Western-initiated local wars and that it therefore should welcome the opportunity, as well as the Chinese position that the bloc should give maximum support (including military intervention if necessary) to "liberation" wars.

Yu went on to remark that "we Communists" advocate the settlement of international disputes by negotiations, but "we never pin our hopes for world peace primarily on these negotiations." US imperialism, Yu went on, was as "vicious and truculent" as ever. Affirming his faith that developments would continue to favor the bloc, the liberation movement, and world forces of peace, Yu concluded.
with the contention that in 1961 the East Wind would continue to prevail over the West Wind.*

In the same issue of Red Flag (31 December), a long article addressed nominally to the two stages of the Chinese revolution reaffirmed some Chinese positions which in effect were a partial dissent from the formulations in the 6 December declaration on the tasks of Communist parties in the newly-independent countries, in particular the task of cooperating with bourgeois nationalist leaders on the road to "national democracy." Although the article cautioned against "left" as well as "right" deviations from Mao's position (Mao alone is always correct), thus permitting Peiping to maintain in any given case that Mao's position had been misunderstood, the burden of the article was the need for Communist seizure of the leadership of the revolution at the earliest possible stage. The formula was "unity and struggle"

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*The Chinese seem to use this phrase, relating to the balance of power, in two ways, both of which are objectionable to the Soviet party. Sometimes it is used to imply a decisive strategic superiority, in a military sense, of the bloc over the West, a degree of superiority which Moscow has not asserted and evidently does not care to see asserted on its behalf. Sometimes (as above) it is used to suggest the superiority, in a general way (partly moral), and in part as a potential rather than a realized force, of the assets of socialism all over the world, much in the same sense that the Soviet party itself estimates a "preponderance of the forces of socialism over the forces of imperialism, of the forces of peace over the forces of war," etc. Used in this sense, the Chinese have often defined the concept of "East" to include the bloc and the underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. However, the Soviets have objected to the East Wind - West Wind formulation of this concept too, on the grounds that a large part of these assets are physically located in the West, some of them (elements of classes) actually in developed Western countries, so that Mao's formulation is misleading; moreover, the Soviets have pointed out, the formulation permits the enemies of the world Communist movement to put the matter in terms of defending the West against revolution exported from the East (something like the 'Yellow Peril' argument).
with the national bourgeoisie, with the emphasis on struggle, on the need for establishing the "strong hegemony" of the Communist party during the "democratic" phase of the revolution, thus permitting a "smooth transformation of the democratic revolution into the socialist revolution." The process of establishing "hegemony" would, of course, entail a harsh interpretation of specific policies pursued in the "democratic" phase, such as "agrarian reform," in order to destroy the competitor's base of support.

Also in the 31 December Red Flag, the Chinese party reaffirmed its intention to persist in marching under the "red banners" of the general line, the "leap forward," and the people's communes, although actually continuing to modify the practical programs. In effect commenting on the 6 December declaration's and Khrushchev's assertion of the fundamental significance of Soviet experience, the editorial affirmed that Peiping would learn from the "advanced experiences" of other bloc members, but "should take into first consideration the actual conditions of our country" and should be guided by Mao's thinking.

On 18 January, at about the same time Khrushchev's 6 January report was being published, Peiping published the Chinese party central committee's comparatively formal and polite resolution on the 6 December declaration. The resolution expressed "satisfaction" with the work of the Chinese delegation to the Moscow conference, and it pledged the party to "defend" the declaration "just as it has defended the Moscow declaration of 1957." As for substantive issues, it misrepresented the definition of the epoch and then derided "all modern revisionist" definitions; reviewed the "upsurge of the struggle" everywhere; denounced the United States (the Soviet revolution did not); declared the party's favor for peace, peaceful coexistence, and peaceful competition;* emphasized US preparations for world war, the possibility of such a war, and the need for unprecedented vigilance; declared that peace could be safeguarded "provided there is reliance on the struggle of the masses;" and abjured war, and advocated negotiations

*Peiping has often endorsed these concepts and proposals in this fashion, i.e. simply as items on a list. When the Chinese discuss these and other matters, however, they make clear that they see them rather differently.
and disarmament.* As for the discipline of the movement, it
spoke of the importance of solidarity, and summarized the
provisions for Communist conferences to "work out common
views...and coordinate joint action"; reviewed the stric-
tures against revisionism, dogmatism, and sectarianism;
spoke of the special importance of Sino-Soviet "unity";
noted the "vanguard" role of the Soviet party (but gave less
attention to this than did the Soviet resolution); and called
on the Chinese people to hold aloft the banners of the 1957
declaration and this latest one. In sum, this central com-
mittee resolution was, as might have been expected of a party
pronouncement at this level, the least tendentious of the
Chinese pronouncements on the Moscow conference.

A People's Daily editorial on 22 January, by which time
the Chinese had certainly read Khrushchev's 6 January report,
was more pointed than was the central committee resolution.
While affirming the non-inevitability of world war and ex-
pressing Peiping's long-time favor for "peaceful coexistence,"
it cited the Western press as having correctly interpreted
the declaration to foretell an intensification of efforts to-
ward the world revolution (especially in underdeveloped areas),
and, identifying the forces of world revolution (the bloc, the
national liberation movement, and the Communist parties every-
where), it contended that the declaration had "pointed out
that the strengthening of these revolutionary forces is com-
pletely identical with the interests of safeguarding world
peace."

The editorial summed up the declaration this way:

We are particularly glad that the fundamental
principles and revolutionary spirit of Marxism-
Leninism, in which the Chinese Communists (under-
lining added) and Communists in other countries
have for many years persisted, are clearly reflected
in the Moscow statement.

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*Peiping has often endorsed these concepts and proposals
too simply as items on a list.
In sum, by the last week of January, i.e., by the time Khrushchev had publicly reaffirmed the pre-conference Soviet positions, the Chinese party had publicly reaffirmed most of its pre-conference positions and had not withdrawn from any of them. As for matters considered in the definition of the epoch, the Chinese were misrepresenting the definition given in the declaration, did not follow Khrushchev in conceding that the West was still strong, and had returned to their offensive formulation of the East Wind prevailing; and as for the related question of building Communism, the Chinese were reaffirming (in principle if not in practice) the correctness of their internal programs and the primacy of their own experience and Mao's thought, and they ignored Moscow's call for better coordination of bloc economies. With regard to wars, the Chinese agreed (at least publicly, as they had before the conference) that world war was not inevitable, but their emphasis remained on Western preparations for general war, the possibility of general war, and the far more serious consequences of general war for the West than for the bloc; further, they retained their views on local wars, contending that the West was not increasingly (was, if anything, decreasingly) deterred from initiating such wars and that there was little or no danger of expansion of these wars, and again implying that the bloc should welcome the opportunity to engage in such wars; and that the bloc had committed itself to support of "liberation" wars (which Khrushchev had indeed done, but with a suggestion of wariness not matched by the Chinese). With regard to "peaceful coexistence," the Chinese nominally endorsed this concept (as they had before the conference), but continued to exhort a maximum struggle by all revolutionary forces and by all means short of general war, and with greater risks of general war; they continued to minimize the prospects for even limited disarmament; and they continued to deride Soviet overtures for negotiations and personal contacts with Western (particularly American) leaders. With regard to the "national liberation movement," the Chinese were presenting the declaration in general terms as having adopted the militant Chinese view, as setting forth a "fighting program," as asserting that revolutionary struggle in the underdeveloped areas was identical with struggling for peace, and so on; and Peiping was also reaffirming certain specific positions which the declaration did not state. With respect to colonial areas, the Chinese emphasized the importance of "armed struggle," called for bloc support specifically for "armed struggle" in colonial areas (misrepresenting the declaration as having promised that), emphasized the advantages and minimized the
dangers of supporting revolutionary wars against counter-revolutionary wars, and were calling again for Communist seizure of leadership in the early stages of the revolution. With respect to newly-independent countries, the Chinese again contended that imperialist nations invariably intervene to restore the old conditions, argued that the bloc should seize its opportunities to prevent this, failed to mention the Soviet concept of "national democracy" that Khrushchev had particularly called attention to, and appeared to call for less cooperation with and more pressure on bourgeois nationalist leaders than indicated in the declaration.* As for Communist parties in the West, the Chinese continued to fail to recognize the difficulties confronting them, and continued to ignore their "democratic" goals and to speak only of their "socialist" goals.

As for the discipline of the world Communist movement, the Chinese ignored the declaration's treatment of the "cult of the individual," made no mention of Khrushchev's point on the danger of nationalism, and continued to treat the questions of revisionism, dogmatism and sectarianism as they had before the conference; they ignored Soviet statements and implications in support of the principle of majority rule, and they instead put heavy emphasis on the declaration's commitment to "common" positions and "joint" actions, to be achieved through further conferences—a mechanism through which they clearly expected Soviet authority to diminish and their own influence to increase.

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*Subsequent E5AU papers will discuss the capabilities and intentions of the Chinese party with respect to both cooperation and competition with the Soviet effort in the underdeveloped areas.