Intelligence Report

THE SINO-SOVIEIT DISPUTE
WITHIN THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT IN LATIN AMERICA
(Reference Title: ESAU XXVIII)
THE SINO-SOVET DISPUTE
WITHIN THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT IN LATIN AMERICA

This working paper of the DDI Research Staff examines the competition among the Soviet, Chinese, and Cuban Communist parties for influence with Communist parties and revolutionary groups in Latin America from mid-1963 through March 1967.

In terms of the period covered it is a sequel to the DDI/Staff Study titled "The Sino-Soviet Struggle in Cuba and the Latin American Communist Movement" (Reference Title: ESAU XXIII-63), dated 1 November 1963, which discussed developments through the first week of August 1963. ESAU XXIII-63, as its title indicates, deals principally with the growth of Cuban Communism in the early years of the Castro regime, the intense Sino-Soviet rivalry to exploit Castro, the aftermath of the Cuban missile base crisis, and, in an appendix, the growth of Chinese influence in some of the hemisphere Communist parties.

The present paper, overlapping somewhat the period covered by ESAU XXIII-63, focuses mainly on the dramatic growth of Chinese Communist activities in Latin America since mid-1963 and on Moscow's reaction, and only on that aspect of the Cuban Communist party's development which concerns Castro's efforts to command for his experience a level of ideological influence in the world Communist movement comparable with that of Russia and China. Because the General Introduction and the Appendix of ESAU XXIII-63 include detailed background information on the Sino-Soviet struggle in Cuba no attempt is here made to duplicate it. In line with the focus of the present paper, there is included as an appendix a country-by-country inventory of the build-up of Chinese-oriented parties, factions, and movements in Latin America.

This paper has not been coordinated with other offices, but it has been reviewed by OCI and by several DDP staff officers specializing in its subject matter; and the author, Blair A. Moffett, is grateful for their review of the draft. The DDI/RS would welcome further comment on the paper addressed to or to the Chief or Deputy Chief of the Staff (all at extension ).
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THE SINO-SOViet DISPUTE
WITHIN THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT IN LATIN AMERICA

Summary and Conclusions

The central issue of the Communist controversy in Latin America is the "national liberation struggle" against colonialism and imperialism. The essential conflict is whether evolutionary tactics or militant revolutionary tactics by Communist parties are best suited to local conditions and most likely to lead to the overthrow of existing political regimes.

The Cuban revolution and its turn to Communism at first facilitated both Chinese and Soviet efforts in Latin America, but, by the time the Sino-Soviet conflict reached an acute stage in mid-1963, Castroism had begun to emerge as a competing "third" Communist influence that has complicated the field for both sides; each has competed strenuously for Cuban alignment with its position.

Because of basic similarities between Chinese and Cuban national liberation theories, which led supporters of Havana and Peking to cooperate in revolutionary enterprises that were deplored and often opposed by the orthodox pro-Soviet Communist parties, this contest for several years appeared to pit Cuba and China against Russia.

For its part, in spite of organized Soviet opposition and great time-space handicaps, Peking has been able to establish a nucleus of supporting parties, factions, and groups within or associated with the Latin American Communist movement. This presently small nucleus, if it continues to be given strong Chinese backing, has the potential eventually to become a full-fledged movement which could compete on more equal terms with the orthodox parties of the Latin American Communist movement.

However, the success of the Russians in effecting a Sino-Cuban party split following the November 1964 Havana conference of Communist parties, compounded the obstacles facing the Chinese, and was a major Soviet victory in
Moscow's world struggle with China. Moscow thereby denied Peking an important reservoir of support in Latin America by forcing the Chinese to distinguish clearly between their own supporters in the area and those Communist and associated extremist sectors loyal to Castro which had formerly been willing to cooperate. Chinese bitterness over this defeat reflects the importance of Latin America in Peking's plans, and the Chinese party has reacted by retrenching and making preparations for a long-term program within the area's Communist movement.

The Chinese leadership has, however, been careful to limit the magnitude of its break with Cuba and apparently sees it as different from the quarrel with the CPSU in spite of the fact that Peking is seriously disillusioned with Cuban "revisionism" and with what seems to the Chinese to be Cuban cooperation with Russia against China in the Sino-Soviet conflict. Castro's vicious personal attack on Mao Tse-tung in March 1966 reflected Cuban resentment of Chinese pressures to get him to take the Chinese side, and marked the hottest point of the Sino-Cuban polemic. Peking's disengagement from this open polemic reflected Chinese interest in preserving future options with Castro. The Cuban leadership has not since acted to carry the quarrel further, but Cuba is evidently reciprocating Chinese coolness in the two sides' state and party relations. The Chinese appear fully prepared to compete with the Cuban party as well as with the CPSU among hemisphere Communists so long as there is no change in the Cuban stance. This Cuban stance of "a pox on both your houses" was expressed by Castro in his regular anniversary speech in January 1965.

The Sino-Cuban rift was engineered by the Soviets against Cuban will, and because of this has engendered some negative effects from the Soviet point of view. Moscow used great care in its handling of the operation, in view of the high stakes, employing a combination of pressures compounded of a concerted demarche by the orthodox hemisphere parties, the Russians' own overwhelming economic leverage upon Cuba's economic future, and superb timing provided by a predictably high degree of Cuban
uncertainty about the intentions of the Soviet leadership which succeeded Khrushchev, Castro's old friend.

Far from encouraging more manageable Soviet-Cuban relations, however, the Russian operation has produced a backlash of Cuban wrath that has been increasingly characterized by vigorous and more open Cuban opposition to Soviet diplomatic overtures and Soviet party activities in the hemisphere. In 1966 Cuban opposition was extended even to the CPSU-dominated international front organizations and to Soviet party claims of doctrinal authority over the course of Communist development in Latin America. The hemisphere Communists and the Communist world in general have thus become witness to the phenomenon of a Communist state practically wholly dependent on Soviet subsidy for its current rate of economic activity responding to important wishes of its benefactor not with amenable accommodation but with a tough unwillingness to compromise that at times approaches the absolute intransigence of the Chinese party toward the CPSU. Cuban indignation reflects Castro's resentment at being coerced by the Soviets from his chosen position of abstention toward the Sino-Soviet dispute because of the limiting effect this would have on his room for maneuver between the two sides. But it has been caused also by another side of Castro's attitude that may prove more basic over the long term.

Since about mid-1966 there has appeared a marked effort by Havana to elevate the Castro revolution to a status for Latin America comparable in historic significance with the historical importance for Europe of Lenin's Bolshevik revolution, and to present Castro personally as a Marxist theoretician comparable in rank to Lenin because of the impact of Castro's ideas on the present-day Communist dialectic. Implicit in this newest Cuban trend is the proposition that Castro's transformation of Cuba as the first socialist state in the new world is of such primordial value to the march of world Communism that the Soviets and East Europeans have an unalterable obligation to give Cuba economic and military support. In the Cuban view, this subsidy has no necessary relationship with—and certainly requires no reduction of—-Cuban export to Latin America and even elsewhere of the Cuban national liberation
model, because that model is a new Marxian "thesis" clashing with an outmoded, orthodox, Soviet-Communist "anti-
thesis".

So far the Soviet party, in its dealings with the
Cuban phenomenon, has had its eye principally upon the
Chinese party. Since their confrontation with Cuba in
November 1964, the Russians have shown themselves unwilling to be drawn into any similar showdown in spite of
recent Cuban challenges, and despite intermittent pres-
sure on the CPSU to do so from the orthodox Communist
parties whom Castro continues to trouble. The Soviet
party's policy has been to ignore Cuban initiatives and
to counsel the orthodox parties to exercise patience in
helping the CPSU deal with Havana, strongly suggesting
a Soviet preference for existing relations, bad as they
may be, to even the remote possibility of a Cuban–Chinese
understanding at Russian expense.

Nevertheless, deliberate and open Castroist support
of a dissident Communist guerrilla faction of the ortho-
odox Venezuelan PCV led the CPSU in March 1967 to issue
an authoritative warning to Castro not to underestimate
or attempt to split orthodox Latin American Communist
parties. The CPSU has been working strenuously in Vene-
zuela for establishment of Soviet state relations with
that government. To that end it had been trying
since 1965 to return the PCV to a parliamentary role as
an acceptable opposition political party in preparation
for the country's national elections in 1968, a course
diametrically opposed to the objective of the Castro-backed
guerrilla faction—which is to disrupt those elections.
The prompt reply to the CPSU's warning, by Castro him-
self, questioning the Communist credentials of the PCV,
may presage a Soviet-Cuban polemic, especially since it
is clear that Cuba intends to try, through the hemisphere
solidarity organization (LASO)—founded with strong Cuban
backing in Havana in January 1966—to dictate future policy
within the Latin American Communist movement.

If, instead of conducting a limited polemic, Moscow
is goaded into accepting a broader ideological contest
with Cuba, the prospects will be stronger for a definite
organizational split between Castroist revolutionaries
and orthodox Communists in the hemisphere, like the existing

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split between the Cubans and pro-Chinese Communists and between the latter and the pro-Soviet Communists, which would complete and formalize a three-way division of the Latin American Communist movement. A reading of all current reporting bearing on CPSU policy toward Latin America and Cuba makes this, however, appear less likely than some very limited form of Soviet response. Soviet estimates of prospects for any meaningful Sino-Cuban rapprochement will almost certainly decide the CPSU's course of action. The events of the first LASO Conference, set for Havana in late July and early August 1967, are likely to provide some firm indicators of the Soviet decision, if none have appeared in the interim.

Although national liberation movements in the underdeveloped areas take second place in Soviet estimates of the most important phenomena of the time, and these movements in Chinese Communist theory occupy first place, the CPSU appears to be devoting more time and attention to their doctrinal support than do the Chinese. The Russians in the period since 1956 have made a relatively much more sophisticated effort than the Chinese to re-appraise the facts and forces of "national liberation" in Latin America. After the 1956 20th CPSU Congress Soviet historians and social scientists were asked to prepare new Marxist-Leninist evaluations of Latin American "wars of liberation", formerly interpreted as expressions of "bourgeois" goals but now seen as broad "national" movements of liberation from foreign political and economic imperialism. Instead of territorial imperialism, the study of economic imperialism is now being emphasized, and much more attention is being given to the possibilities for splitting controlling strata of the national bourgeoisie.
Decisions reached at the 21st and 22nd CPSU Congresses, and the 1957 and 1969 Moscow meetings of world Communist and workers' parties, led to establishment in 1961 of a Latin American Institute within the USSR Academy of Sciences, whose work guidelines were laid down in 1962 in authoritative CPSU pronouncements. These made it clear that the traditional study of Latin American history was to remain in an existing Latin American section of the Institute of History, whereas the new Institute was to specialize in contemporary economic, social, and political analyses of Latin American countries with a view to developing precise, factual data on which the CPSU can rely to determine the best and most proper tactics for promoting national liberation movements there.

And it is clear the Institute has become an important operations research facility for the CPSU in its Latin American policy formation. Institute activities and writings should repay careful surveillance by the United States government in terms of accurate and authoritative forecasts of Soviet intentions toward the area and its individual countries.

The Latin American Institute will doubtless be called upon to help the CPSU leadership solve Moscow's toughest current problem in the area. This is, to develop a public line in Latin America that will, on one hand, not appear so weak and revisionist (compared with greater Cuban and Chinese militancy) as to invite ideological defeat for the Soviets among the rising Communist and radical left-wing nationalist youth that will compose the region's Communist movement in the remainder of the century. This line, on the other hand, must avoid provoking local governmental protest which would hurt and possibly defeat Soviet attempts to expand its state relations with Latin American countries—an effort that appears to have first place in current Soviet policy in Latin America. This dilemma was brought into sharp focus after the Havana Tri-Continental Conference of January 1966. There the Russian delegation was forced to adhere to a series of violent pronouncements with which it did not agree and, in consequence, Soviet officials suffered
considerable embarrassment in subsequent contacts and relations with a number of Latin American governments.

In spite of the seeming intractability of this problem the CPSU has managed to achieve some success in coping with it. Exploitation of Latin interest in trade and aid prospects, the resort to considerable flexibility in its ideological stance toward national liberation movements, and frequent use of tactical retreats into positional ambiguity, have marked the Soviet party’s approach in wrestling with the problem. A good example of Russian opportunism was Moscow’s subsequent official disavowal of the actions of its delegation at the Tri-Continental Conference. By otherwise muting their praise of tactics of violence in the countries with which they have state relations—such as Uruguay, Brazil, and Chile—the Russians have since been able with some success to foster a wide-spread popular view that the USSR has become a relatively compatible 'bourgeois' state that poses little threat to the established order in comparison with the disreputable, revolution-obsessed Chinese.

A striking example of Soviet flexibility is seen in recent actions of Moscow in Chile. In early 1965, the USSR, at the invitation of the new Frei government, established an embassy in Santiago and began economic aid negotiations which had by 1966 brought about a Soviet aid agreement with Chile of a magnitude reported to be second only in the hemisphere to the Russian program of aid to Cuba. Castro, in contrast with this friendly Russian "bear hug", has openly declared his enmity to the Frei government and the "Revolution In Freedom" espoused by its ruling Christian Democratic Party.

Two governments—the Venezuelan and Colombian—burdened with serious Castro-supported guerrilla problems being supported by local Communist parties, have attempted to halt further Russian gains through such straddling tactics by telling the USSR that a condition for good economic relations is that Communists under Moscow's influence refrain from subversive activity within their territories. Known by the name of its originator, Dr. Guillermo Belt, a former Cuban ambassador to the U.S. and UN,
this "Belt Doctrine" could offer an effective wedge with which to exploit current Russo-Cuban differences to Western advantage. Its usefulness will however depend upon how firmly Latin American governments will maintain such a stand once they have taken it.

Because of Russia's far greater resources, its willingness to make its liberation doctrine conform to the circumstances in a much greater degree than its two rivals are willing, and its readiness even to compete within the framework of Western parliamentary procedures if necessary to gain final victory for the Communist over the capitalist system, the USSR poses the clearest long-term threat to United States' interests in the southern hemisphere. This threat is likely to continue, and its effects be felt, as an obstacle to the kind of political stability and ordered economic evolution in Latin America that is the goal of U.S. policy, long after the Castro phenomenon has waned.

However, because of its advocacy of armed violence through "popular war" Castro's revolutionary program--like its remoter but strikingly similar Chinese counterpart--poses a much more direct and immediate threat to the goals of United States' policy in Latin America. So far, its very visibility and comparatively simple doctrine have made the Cuban effort easier to grapple with and deter through local military action wherever the government and armed forces have had the will to do so. But Castro's current effort to produce a distinctive Marxist-Leninist revolutionary ideology for use in other areas of Latin America could multiply the threat from Havana and lengthen its term.

Such an indigenous Communism would appeal strongly to the ambitions of many Latin Americans looking for an ideological weapon to use against the political theories of the United States. It would also be attractive to many Communists and radical nationalists who, unwilling to subordinate themselves either to Moscow or Peking, are otherwise ready under an acceptable Latin banner to resort to violence to try to solve some of the region's pressing economic and social problems.

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Most of the pro-Chinese Communist parties that came into being in Latin America in the wake of Peking's campaign in 1963, have suffered jurisdictional splits, and China's more recent efforts to organize additional Communist parties in the hemisphere have not produced any significant increase in their number. The effect of China's current "cultural revolution" on its Latin American operations is not yet clear; but Peking continues to train groups of Latin radicals and to subsidize the parties and many of the groups and movements in various countries which champion its line. The pro-Chinese Communist parties appear to be experiencing the same kind of political isolation within the Latin American Communist movement as China itself is experiencing in the world Communist movement, because of Soviet and Castroist opposition to them.
## List of Abbreviations

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AALAPSO</td>
<td>Afro-Asian-Latin American People's Solidarity Organization</td>
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<td>AAPSO</td>
<td>Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCP</td>
<td>Chinese Communist Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCP</td>
<td>Cuban Communist Party (after October 1965). See PURS.</td>
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<tr>
<td>CLAE</td>
<td>Latin American Student Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPB</td>
<td>Brazilian pro-Chinese Communist Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>FALN</td>
<td>Armed Forces of National Liberation (Venezuela)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FARC</td>
<td>Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>FIDELEN</td>
<td>Leftist Liberation Front (Uruguayan Communist dominated political front)</td>
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<td>FLN</td>
<td>National Liberation Front (various countries)</td>
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<td>FRAP</td>
<td>Popular Revolutionary Action Front (Chilean Communist political coalition with Chilean Socialist Party)</td>
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<td>Granma</td>
<td>Official newspaper of the Cuban CCP</td>
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<tr>
<td>LASO</td>
<td>Latin American Solidarity Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAR</td>
<td>Revolutionary Action Movement (Uruguay)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIR</td>
<td>Left Revolutionary Movement (various countries)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MLN</td>
<td>National Liberation Movement (Mexico, Argentina)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MR-14</td>
<td>June 14th Revolutionary Movement (Dominican Republic)</td>
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<td>OCLAE</td>
<td>Continental Latin American Student Organization</td>
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<td>PCA</td>
<td>Argentine Communist Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCB</td>
<td>Brazilian pro-Soviet Communist Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCB</td>
<td>Bolivian Communist Party (until March 1965)</td>
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<td>PCB/C</td>
<td>Bolivian pro-Chinese Communist Party (after March 1965)</td>
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<td>Ecuadorean pro-Soviet Communist Party</td>
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<td>PCC-PML</td>
<td>Peruvian pro-Chinese Communist Party</td>
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<td>PCV</td>
<td>Venezuelan Communist Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDP</td>
<td>Panamanian Communist Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prensa Latina</td>
<td>Official Cuban news agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSP</td>
<td>Pre-Castro pro-Soviet Cuban Communist Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>PURS</td>
<td>Cuban United Party of the Socialist Revolution (transformed into the Cuban Communist Party in October 1965)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PVP</td>
<td>Costa Rican Communist Party</td>
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<td>UJC</td>
<td>Cuban Union of Communist Youth</td>
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<td>UFUCH</td>
<td>Chilean National Student Organization</td>
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THE SINO-SOViet DISPUTE  
WITHIN THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT IN LATIN AMERICA

I. The Communist Dispute in Latin America

Among all the points of the international Communist line in dispute, the area that is of most immediate concern to Latin American Communists and extreme left revolutionary groups, and has given rise to the sharpest differences among them over tactics and strategy, is the "national liberation struggle."

An effect of the Sino-Soviet polemic, this controversy has become three-sided as first the Castroist and then the Chinese Communist party have added their influences to that of the CPSU, present in the hemisphere since the 1920's. It is not only a contest for control of the Latin American Communist movement. The problem of who will have ideological authority within that movement is more central, since the ultimate goal of all three sides --destruction of United States' influence in and ties with Latin American countries by the creation of Communist regimes there--is identical.

The three-cornered Communist struggle has seen a corresponding proliferation of interpretations of the "correct" Marxist-Leninist national liberation rationale. Hence, if we want to acquire an understanding of the activities of their respective supporters in Latin America and the implications of their successes and failures for United States' policy in the southern hemisphere, it is necessary to examine comparatively the rival Cuban, Soviet, and Chinese theories about national liberation. To that end, this paper begins with a brief general description of each of the three Communist views about "national liberation" and makes an effort to show its special reference to the Latin American area. The body of the paper attempts to analyze and discuss the most significant events of the three-sided dispute over the conduct of the national liberation revolution in Latin America from about mid-1963 through the winter of 1967. No effort has been made to
give a strict blow-by-blow account or produce a box score of each point made or lost during that time. The intent is that the episodic account here offered will shed further light on some of the main features and the central thrust of the current Communist dispute in the Latin American area.

A. Peking's Dictum: The Party Must Lead

Chinese Communist national liberation theory differs from Soviet theory in major respects.

The Chinese party asserts that the real "storm centers" of the Communist world revolution lie in Asia, Africa, and Latin America--the underdeveloped world of former colonies--and that the strategic objective of the United States is to dominate this "intermediate zone" lying between itself and the Communist bloc. For the Chinese the whole cause of the 'international proletarian revolution' depends in large degree on the outcome of the revolutionary struggles in those areas whose inhabitants, they emphasize, constitute the overwhelming majority of the world's population. Hence, they insist that the liberation movements in the underdeveloped world share top priority with the consolidation and defense of the Communist bloc as one of the "two great historical currents of our times," and that the Communist world must devote at least as much attention to those movements as it does to its own tasks of 'socialist' consolidation and construction.

The Soviet party, on the other hand, is only willing to concede that the liberation movements constitute the second-most important phenomenon of the times, and it maintains that the epicenter of the Communist world revolution and the single most important historical current of our times is the creation of the Communist bloc and its main force, "the international workers class"; the bloc Communist parties and the worker movements in countries outside the bloc.

The Chinese not only assign top priority to Communist revolution in Asia, Africa, and Latin America; their leaders
declare that Maoist liberation theory has universal applicability to the struggles of "all the oppressed nations and peoples," but particularly to revolutionary strategy in those three areas. The Maoist approach was summed up in CCP Vice Chairman Lin Piao's authoritative article of 3 September 1965, titled "Long Live the Victory of the People's War".*

First, say the Chinese, the seizure of power by armed force, the settlement of the issue by war, is the central task and the highest form of revolution. The actual liberation process begins with the establishment of rural revolutionary base areas, and the ultimate encirclement of the cities from the countryside. The peasants constitute the main force of the revolution, and only the countryside can provide the requisite bases from which the revolutionaries can go forward to final victory. The revolution can only be led, and must be led, by the Communist party: no other party can lead it. The first stage, the national democratic revolution, is a necessary prelude to the second stage, the socialist revolution. It embraces in its ranks not only the workers, peasants, and urban petty bourgeoisie, but also the national bourgeoisie and other "patriotic and anti-imperialist democrats." This united front is based on a worker-peasant alliance; and the basic worker-peasant alliance can be achieved only if the workers gain the leadership of the great peasant masses.

The united front creates a people's army, and, supported by the peasants, it carries out guerrilla warfare against the enemy. Later, as the struggle approaches the cities, this becomes mobile warfare as the people's army swells in size. In the enemy-occupied cities and villages, the Communist party allies in the front carry out legal

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*It was repeated in substance more recently by Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi in an interview on 25 August 1966 for a group of visiting French and Swedish left-wing students in a wide-ranging discussion of Chinese policy vis-a-vis the armed revolution.
struggle, while the party itself builds up an underground, illegal urban support structure for attacking the enemy from within during the final phase of capture of the cities.

Thus, while both sides aver that Communist parties must "master all forms of struggle", the Chinese acclaim armed force as the "highest form" of struggle. The CPSU for its part has in recent years consistently played down armed revolution as outmoded in all but a few circumstances. The Chinese party advocates starting people's wars on principle in the three underdeveloped areas to overextend the forces of "U.S. imperialism" and weaken them. Soviet writings carefully limit to a select few the countries in these three areas where resort to armed action is recommended, and display a much greater interest in relatively peaceful political and economic methods for prosecuting the national democratic revolution, especially in Latin America.

Chinese writers are insistent that the Communist party must maintain its role of leadership in the united front. Not only that, but it must also preserve its complete organizational independence throughout the revolutionary process. Soviet theory, on the other hand, admits the possibility that the Communist party will not play the leading role in the national democratic revolution, and even that the Communist party can suffer basic organizational transformations in the process of producing a successful liberation revolution.

The Chinese emphasize that while the middle, or national, bourgeoisie, may collaborate in the first democratic revolution (and even in the later socialist phase), because of its "weak and vacillating character" it can never play a leading role. Soviet analysis of national bourgeoisie leadership prospects in the revolutionary united front are not nearly so categorical, and in fact some authoritative Soviet writings have conceded the possibility that, at least in Latin America, the national bourgeoisie can lead successful national liberation movements.

Chinese liberation theory is more urgently concerned with Latin America, because the Chinese see it as one of the three decisive areas of conflict with 'imperialism' -- that is, United States power. But Latin America, unlike
Africa and some parts of Asia, has a well-developed Communist movement, with parties existing legally or in various degrees of illegality in all countries. With few exceptions, however, these parties have adopted the Soviet "revisionist" line and are, in the Chinese view, unable to effect true liberation revolutions. Thus, wherever 'revisionist' parties exist it is first necessary to bring them back to sound Marxism-Leninism—that is, to Maoist interpretations of the liberation process—or, failing that, to organize another, genuine Marxist-Leninist, party which will persecute the revolution. The Chinese leadership first publicly proclaimed its intention to do this in its famous letter to the CPSU of 14 June 1963, repeated the message in December of that year, and early in 1964 acknowledged its preference for complete organizational separation between the old Soviet-oriented parties and the new, 'revolutionary Marxist-Leninist' parties it was sponsoring.

Revisionism, say the Chinese, varies from party to party and country to country, so that an analysis must be made of each local situation to determine the proper course of action. Revisionist parties are not alike, but show "reciprocal contradictions", and the Chinese party will concentrate on those contradictions and the degrees of revisionism each party exhibits. Where the local party is controlled by Marxist-Leninists (that is, pro-Peking leaders) the question is not whether the liberation revolution will be carried out, but if it will "continue to the bitter end." Where Marxist-Leninist factions have the upper hand in a party, "as in Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, and Ceylon", they must expel the revisionists. Where the Marxist-Leninist faction has been expelled from the party, faction members must form a new party and continue the struggle outside the revisionist party, "as in Brazil, Belgium and Australia." But Marxist-Leninist factions can and should be formed even though they do not go on to establish their own party; in fact in some cases such groups should remain in revisionist parties to combat revisionism from within, making efforts to win over to their side the
"revolutionary masses" both in and outside the party. This can be done because some parties are less revisionist than others, and Chinese strategy calls for working on the contradictions between the "incurables" and those who are not yet hopeless.

During February and March 1963, members of the Chinese national leadership in Peking (not further identified) discussed this tactic with two visiting leaders of the pro-Chinese Communist Party of Brazil (CPB). The Chinese expounded at length their view that all political bodies have a right, a left, and a center, the majority of the membership of any such group always gravitating to the center. This center element, according to their view, oscillated between the leftist and rightist tendencies to a point where the smaller elements of left or right were able to exert influence on the center. Citing their own experience, the Chinese claimed that leftists in their own party who numbered only 5 millions of a total of 18 million members, had succeeded in winning over the support of the center, composed of between 7 and 10 million members. The Chinese urged the CPB leaders never to lose sight of this fact, and to work continuously to win over the central majority of Brazilian Communists who, while then aligned with the "rightist" Brazilian Communist Party (PCB), could be persuaded eventually to join forces with the CPB.*

*Some remarks of the Brazilian delegate to the "First Conference of Latin American Pro-Chinese Parties", held in Santiago, Chile, from 1 through 4 March 1966, give direct evidence of CPB application of these Chinese methods for attacking pro-Soviet parties. At Santiago the CPB delegate said his party did not attempt to draw its membership out of the ranks of the PCB; instead its objective was to win over as many PCB members as possible, but to have them remain in the PCB and work for Marxist-Leninist goals within that party. He claimed that this tactic had netted good results and that the PCB at that time was approaching a very complicated crisis because it had three well-defined sectors: the revisionists of the right, the Marxist-Leninists on the left, and a third group which followed neither of the other two.
In September 1966 Peking in a review of the "present excellent revolutionary situation" announced a new era of world revolution characterized by great political upheavals, divisions, and reorganizations, and reaffirmed its line toward Latin America.

The Latin American people...have come to understand more clearly than ever before that armed struggle is the only way for real...liberation...The patriotic guerrillas in Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, and Guatemala have all registered new advances since the beginning of this year... The Latin American revolutionaries have...real-ized that armed struggle must be carried out under the firm leadership of a Marxist-Leninist party, and that people's war must be waged with guerrilla bases set up in the rural areas, including rural areas encircling the cities.

In a December 1966 NCNA commentary focussing on Latin America, Peking added some further details of its view:

U.S. imperialism has resorted to direct armed suppression of the people's revolutionary movements... the infiltration of American monopoly capital has been accelerated... Consequently, both the national and class contradictions in the Latin American countries have sharpened... Of vital significance is the fact that a number of revolutionary vanguards have begun to accept Chairman Mao's great theory of people's war. They have...repudiated the line of not relying on the masses but attempting to win an easy victory by the roving guerrilla actions of a handful of people.

The distinction between Maoist and Castroist armed struggle theory was thus clearly drawn in this allusion to the separation of Latin American pro-Chinese groups from pro-Cuban forces with which they had formerly associated.
B. The CPSU: The Bourgeoisie May Lead

The Soviet attitude toward national liberation movements was neatly summed up in the following statement, published in 1963, setting out the CPSU's theory of the world revolution:

The nature and content of the world revolutionary process in our times are determined by the merger of the struggle against imperialism by the peoples building socialism and communism, the revolutionary movement of the workers' class in the capitalist countries, the national liberation struggles of oppressed peoples, and the general democratic movement into a single stream. The decisive role in this union of the various revolutionary forces properly belongs to the most progressive element in modern society -- the international workers' class and its main outgrowth--the world socialist system.*

Thus, the center of world revolution in Soviet theory is the Soviet-led bloc of Communist countries which emerged after World War II, together with its supporting Communist parties in the capitalist countries, as leaders of the 'international workers' class', and not the liberation movements of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. According to Soviet writers the era of the national liberation movement would not have emerged if it were not for the successful establishment of this Communist bloc, and they assign the national liberation movement the status of "the second most important event in our times."** The CPSU condemns

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the Chinese view of the movement as not only incorrect; it says that if carried through it will isolate the 'oppressed peoples' from their main source of support, the Soviet Union and its Communist allies.

Soviet national liberation theory calls for a two-stage revolution whose first stage is a "people's, anti-imperialist, anti-feudal" national democratic revolution to be carried out by means of a single liberation front with as broad a political composition as possible. Ideally, it could embrace not only the workers' class and the peasantry, but also the petite, middle, and even big bourgeoisie not connected with monopolistic capitalism. The worker-peasant alliance is crucial to the success of the liberation front, but the main force in this alliance is the workers' class, not the peasantry, say the Soviets.

Soviet writers have responded to Chinese insistence on the need for armed violence in liberation struggles by arguing that the national liberation movement has entered a "new and higher developmental stage" that involves "not only national, but also social liberation tasks", which cannot be accomplished by armed struggle or partisan warfare and which demand "new approaches, other methods." They ridicule rigid Chinese insistence on armed violence as outmoded and wrong as regards the "modern problems" in the national liberation movement. United States' economic 'neo-imperialism' is the cause behind the need for the new tactics, say Soviet writers, who see it not only active in Latin America but expanding also into the newly-independent states of Africa and Asia. Thus, the new tasks facing the liberation fronts call for tactics of economic and political rather than armed warfare. This is especially true in Latin America because the majority of those countries have not only gained political independence but many of them have relatively developed capitalist economies and class structures, according to the Soviet analysis.*

*As one writer puts it: "The National Liberation Movement in a New Stage," article by Ye. Zhukov in Kommunist, (footnote continued on page 10)
The Soviets have, however, never abandoned use of armed methods in principle, and in their discussions they have endorsed its use in Latin American countries "dominated by military dictatorships" and "puppets of the foreign monopolies" which they see to be characteristic of some Central American and Caribbean basin countries (such as Venezuela, Colombia, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, etcetera) and one or two others such as Paraguay, farther south. Soviet treatment of armed violence has emphasized its use to defend the Communist party from repression to a much greater extent than its offensive use through partisan warfare and urban terrorism. This emphasis on creation of self-defense groups of "workers and farmers" to resist

(footnote continued from page 9)

No. 12, 1963, signed to the press on 19 August 1963:

The positions of economic command in many national states are retained, as before, by the imperialistic monopolies. The tasks of the national liberation revolution in these countries cannot be carried out by means of armed struggle. What is needed is a new approach, other methods. Economic tasks are on the daily agenda of the liberated and sovereign countries. These tasks cannot be resolved by partisan methods.

An insight into the CPSU's real reasons for concern over improper "wars of national liberation" is afforded by a report from a middle-level Brazilian Communist source of a meeting in August 1965 between a Soviet embassy official in Rio de Janeiro and some PCB leaders in which--as part of a review of world Communist prospects--he said the CPSU believes local wars are a preferable policy for wearing down and dissipating U.S. strength; however, the "greatest danger" being encountered was Chinese Communist preference for all-out war which could lead to escalation of a local war to "World War Three." This line was parroted by Luis Carlos Prestes in discussions with Sao Paulo PCB state leaders in December 1965. See page 162.
"landing of the U.S. marines" was repeated by the CPSU at the important Thirteenth National PCCh Congress held in October 1965 in Santiago, Chile. Soviet writers also link the wrong use of armed struggle in Latin America with attempts at artificially speeding up the revolution regardless of "local conditions", which are destined to fail and produce a reaction that splits the united front and weakens the whole Communist movement—e.g., the long-range Soviet assets in the Southern hemisphere. This view has formed the main Soviet criticism of Castro's revolutionary theories and abortive overseas operations in Latin America.

The CPSU sees the liberation struggle in the relatively developed Latin American countries as essentially a clash between the two opposing trends of capitalism and socialism. Because it is usually the "representatives of the national bourgeoisie" who are in power in these countries, Soviet analysts since the early 1960s have taken an increasingly closer look at this group, which they see as capable of playing a key role in achieving a national decision to launch their country onto a 'non-capitalist path' ultimately leading to socialism. It is particularly the middle strata of the national bourgeoisie that can play an active part in the 'anti-imperialist' struggle, according to Soviet writers, because of the basic contradictions they see between its interests and those of foreign capitalists. But they have optimistically proclaimed that the petite bourgeoisie and even representatives of the big national bourgeoisie, as well as its middle elements, are more and more actively participating in liberation movements in Latin American countries.

It is clear from these writings that while the Soviets have not abandoned their basic formula of achieving socialist victory through the urban and rural workers under the direction of the Communist party, they now regard this formula to be not as completely applicable in Latin America because of the "bourgeois-nationalist influence upon broad sectors of workers" there. This means that middle-class nationalists, that is, bourgeois groups, must also participate in the national liberation movement. Not only must they participate, but in some cases bourgeois groups can actually play the leading role in the national democratic revolutions which Soviet analysts visualize as the vehicle of national liberation.
Thus, the Castroist revolution in Cuba has received intensive Soviet study not because of its guerrilla phase, but because of the astounding fact that Castro’s bourgeois revolutionaries not only led the island’s ‘anti-imperialist and democratic’ revolution to a successful conclusion, but they absorbed the local orthodox Communist party, made a relatively peaceful transition to a full-fledged social revolution under their own banner, and only then transformed themselves into a new Communist party.* Similarly, analytical study of the events of the Goulart administration in Brazil, and of its overthrow by Castelo Branco, is being made for any lessons the failure there of Soviet liberation doctrine can provide to future CPSU policy.

C. The Cuban Way: Guerrilla Warfare

Cuban national liberation theory in a number of important respects bears a striking resemblance to Chinese theory and differs markedly in other important respects from that of the Soviets. Its exponents, principally Fidel Castro and—until early 1965—Ernesto "Che" Guevara, have however gone to great lengths to emphasize the originality of its contents, Cuban independence from both Chinese and Soviet models, and the specific relevance of Cuban theory to conditions in Latin America.

* Cf. World Marxist Review, August 1965, where a survey of data corrected by the American Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, titled "Political Parties in Latin America," has this to say:

The evolution of Cuba's July 26th Movement has shown that revolutionary democratic trends can in some cases assume the leadership of anti-imperialist and democratic struggles and go over to the position of the revolutionary proletariat as the movement progresses, by concluding a solid alliance (or by merging) with the Communist parties both before and after the socialist revolution.

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Although as early as 1960 Guevara forecast Cuba's interest in linking Latin American liberation movements with those of Asia and Africa, the motive was then the need for international support, and Latin America continued to be the special field of attention of Cuban liberation theory which, especially after December 1961, was openly acknowledged to rest upon Marxist-Leninist thought.

In Cuban theory Latin America is the 'back yard' of the 'colonial realm of North American monopoly,' where U.S. capitalism has replaced "some of the old capitalisms," and Cuba has assumed the leadership of the 'anti-colonial struggle in America'. In this underdeveloped America the peasants, who form the overwhelming majority of the population, are of decisive importance in the liberation revolution. But because of their isolation, they must be led by the working class and the revolutionary intellectuals. The liberation revolution is, therefore, agrarian, not urban, in essence; and its essential and fundamental tactic is armed insurrection in the countryside; that is, guerrilla warfare, in which the guerrilla acts as both the political guide and the fighting arm of the rural masses to destroy the existing forms of land ownership and make the rural peasant the owner of the land that is liberated. Only later does this revolution extend to the cities. The critical step in its success is the destruction of the country's professional army, and consolidation of the revolution depends on the subsequent creation of a people's army to replace the old professional army.

In his little manual titled La Guerra de Guerrillas (Guerrilla Warfare), published in 1960, Guevara set out what the Cubans have asserted to be their most important contribution to revolutionary theory for Latin America: that creation of an 'insurrectional focal point' is often enough to touch off mass popular struggle, so that it is not always necessary to wait until "all of the conditions for making revolution exist."

Cuban writers have stated categorically that in Latin America the national bourgeoisie cannot lead a liberation revolution, even when its interests are opposed to those of 'Yankee imperialism,' because in the hemisphere
the bourgeois societies lack the political courage to combat that "imperialism", and the national bourgeoisie is the very group which appeals to the professional army as the only force able to confront the revolutionary movement with any real chance of success.

The Cuban high command has in various ways acknowledged its sober recognition that the original, simple, Cuban revolutionary model, formulated by Guevara in his manual, needed revising within a few years after Castro's triumphal descent from the Sierra Maestra. The "enemy" simply had learned how to organize effective "counter-revolution" faster than the "revolutionary vanguards" were able to learn how successfully to apply the Cuban example. "United States imperialism" rapidly trained special units of Latin American armies in the techniques for wiping out insurrectional forces in the countryside before they could establish themselves. Before his disappearance early in 1965, Guevara had himself alluded to this in an article in a Cuban official journal; and since then other pro-Cuban Marxist writers have discussed extensively these new "post-Cuban" conditions. Armed struggle remains very much the center-piece of Cuban doctrine, however, but more emphasis has recently been given to the need to break away from slavish copying of the Cuban model, and the need to invent new and different approaches to the armed struggle in each country. The new approaches will by definition avoid imitating either Soviet or Chinese models. Cuban interest has remained highest in Venezuela, Guatemala, and Colombia among hemisphere countries because the guerrilla movements there have been able to survive counter-guerrilla operations. As going concerns, these movements are laboratories for testing the new approaches and for learning new lessons, in the eyes of the hardliners in the hemisphere and elsewhere. They also give the Cuban leadership something to point to in justification of its doctrine.
II. Peking Becomes Active

A. The Fruits: Some New Parties and Loyal Factions

In its famous open letter of 14 June 1963 to the CPSU, the CCP made public its intention to split Communist parties wherever possible and to unite party factions favoring Peking. Later, on 26 December, the Chinese published an October speech of a CCP leader which called for the establishment of new parallel Communist parties in countries where "Marxist-Leninists" had been expelled from the existing party. In a Red Flag and People's Daily editorial on 4 February 1964, the Chinese again proclaimed their intent to foster and to support Communist parties opposed to Moscow, announcing their willingness to accept a definite organizational split in the international Communist movement.*

This sequence reflected a definite Chinese offensive in the hemisphere in early 1963 in the wake of the psychological backlash from the Cuban missile base crisis of the previous October. The Soviet backdown under United States' pressure on that occasion gave the Chinese the leverage to challenge Soviet Communist leadership in Latin America, and they made the most of it. Early in 1963 Peking undertook a concerted effort to increase its presence in the hemisphere in terms of NCNA outlets, trade missions, delivery of printed propaganda, and the exchange

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*Early and unwelcome support for the Chinese campaign came from the Fourth International of Trotskyists who in late summer came out for the Chinese thesis and issued instructions to its adherents to back the Chinese attack on the Soviet Union. Charges of Chinese Trotskyism were taken up and vigorously pursued in the second half of the year by Moscow which identified CCP views on revolution and national liberation struggles with the Fourth International.
of delegates between Latin America and China; and succeeded during the year in doubling its presence over that of 1962.

The prospect of definite Chinese support, opened up in the 14 June letter, galvanized pro-Peking factions or sectors in practically all hemisphere Communist parties to new and more concerted efforts to wrest control away from dominant pro-Moscow groups; and the Chinese proclamation was a source of acute concern to Moscow's supporters as well as to the CPSU itself.

After June the policy of isolation of and quiet expulsion for 'factionalism', with as much official silence as possible about pro-Chinese dissidence, was no longer effective as scattered dissident groups began serious organizational activity and, prompted by the Chinese, demanded full disclosure to the rank and file of both the Chinese as well as the Soviet side of the international dispute. Some organized pro-Chinese factionalism had already begun in earnest within a few parties, notably the Mexican (PCM) and the Chilean party (PCCh) in the early months of 1963, and internal power struggles variously related to the Sino-Soviet dispute became general within the Latin American Communist movement during the second half of the year and throughout 1964.

The pro-Soviet party leaderships reacted by purging the dissidents as rapidly as local circumstances permitted, not only from party posts but also in most cases from party membership. These actions, especially in Mexico, Chile, and Central America, succeeded in eradicating pro-Chinese elements from within party ranks and in seriously delaying their organizational efforts, in some cases for years. But Peking's December pronouncement gave new encouragement to the purged Communists, who had in any case a year earlier witnessed the formation in Brazil of an independent pro-Chinese Communist party (the CPB) that had not only taken over the name of Brazil's original Communist party, but had successfully established itself alongside the pro-Soviet party (the PCB). Chinese promises of backing in setting up similar parallel Communist parties elsewhere in Latin America, and active Chinese follow-up support operations there, were rewarded in early 1964 when Peruvian...
supporters of Peking split the Peruvian Communist party (the PCP) and gained control of the major part of it; and in Ecuador, when some months later pro-Peking leaders of the powerful Pichincha Provincial Committee in Quito engineered a de facto split in the Ecuadorean party (PCE). Peking was quick to report and approve claims of these anti-revisionist parties and made continual use of their existence in its printed and broadcast propaganda to show that the "East Wind Prevails Over the West Wind."

Elsewhere in the hemisphere a wide variety of groups, many also identified with Havana until early 1965, came into temporary or permanent existence as centers of agitation for the Maoist national liberation line and of pressure on "hard line" sympathizers who remained in the orthodox Communist parties waiting for more favorable circumstances for their factions. Together with the several pro-Chinese parties that were set up, these groups and factions now form the legacy of the CCP's 1963 campaign in the hemisphere and constitute a new element in Communist affairs in Latin America which, while not yet a powerful or unified hemisphere movement, has nevertheless established itself as a definite threat to the Moscow-oriented Communist establishment there.

Because this new increment of parties and factions has, with Castroism, changed the balance of forces in contemporary Latin American Communist affairs, it was felt an inventory of its components, as nearly as possible on a country-by-country basis, would be useful to readers interested in the detailed material. An attempt is made to do this as succinctly as possible in Section V, beginning with Mexico and moving progressively through Middle and South America and closing with those Caribbean Island countries where Chinese activities has been reported.

B. Efforts to Create a Hemisphere Movement

The evidence we have makes it plain that the Chinese party's interest in organizing its Latin American supporters as a movement has been geared primarily to the exigencies
of its struggle with the CPSU at the world level, rather than to the interests of the hemisphere pro-Chinese parties and groups. For that very reason Peking regards the success of the pro-Chinese parties in Latin America as of "transcendent importance", in the words of one reliable report.

The Brazilian CPB made the first effort to coordinate with other pro-Chinese factions in Latin America when Calil Chadde, a member of its executive commission, visited Uruguay, Bolivia, Argentina and Chile and possibly other countries in July 1963 for talks with pro-Chinese Communists, and helped set up liaison between the Uruguayan MAR (MIR) and an Argentine pro-Chinese Communist group.

A year later, in July 1964, there were some liaison arrangements in effect between the South American pro-Chinese parties--especially the PCC-ML, PCE-ML, and PCP-ML--in which the Santiago, Chile NCNA mission, headed by a Chinese, Li Yen-nien, played a continual and central role. The years 1964 and 1965 saw an upsurge of Latin American party visitors to Peking in search of Chinese support for their particular organizations--sometimes two or three factions within the pro-Chinese movement in one country vying among themselves for Chinese attention. The reporting reflects basic rivalries among leaders of the Colombian, Peruvian, and Ecuadorian pro-Chinese parties for a leading role in a projected regional organization. Both intra- and inter-party jurisdictional squabbles and rivalries, the uncertain political status of the hard line parties, and increasing Chinese caution about large-scale support of competing groups, appear to have been the main reasons why a conference of pro-Chinese parties was not held until March 1966.

About mid-1964, after the Soviet party had launched its public drive to convene a world conference in December of parties to excommunicate the CCP, the Chinese planned a meeting of representatives of Latin American pro-Chinese parties in Peking in early October to discuss "common aims and problems"--as part of the CCP campaign to line up supporters throughout the world for a rival Chinese-sponsored world meeting. On 19 August the Chinese hinted they would
hold such a "world" meeting if Moscow went ahead with its plans.*

A meeting of some hemisphere pro-Chinese party delegates took place in Peking about mid-October 1964, apparently attended by representatives from Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela.** A Chilean representative, also invited, appears not to have participated. It was decided at Peking to hold a meeting of pro-Chinese parties in Santiago, Chile in May 1965, and also to invite the Bolivian faction loyal to Peking. The agenda was to include a status report for each country, a report on the "struggle against revisionists", and planning for "future coordination for guerrilla warfare."

**The Colombian PCC-ML was, since its formation if not before then, in touch with the Venezuelan MIR. January 1965 reports of comments by PCC-ML leader Leon Arboleda have Arboleda saying that the PCC-ML and "Venezuelans" had discussed "converting the MIR into the Marxist-Leninist grouping of the Venezuelan PCV"; and that the PCC-ML was also in touch with "the pro-Chinese group of the PCV and the FALN." During at least the first half of 1965 the Colombian pro-Chinese party seems to have made a concerted effort to gain MIR cooperation with the Latin American pro-Chinese parties by inviting its attendance at meetings of the latter such as the projected Santiago hemisphere conference. The plan failed, for there is no record of Venezuelan participation in subsequent pro-Chinese organizational activities in the hemisphere, nor of any distinct PCV sector loyal to Peking.
After the Moscow meeting had been postponed until March 1965, the Chinese also deferred until then their plans for a parallel conference. The Ecuadorean pro-Peking party faction was in February told to advise its Peru and Brazil counterparts of the projected Peking conference in March. An official Australian service reported that the Marxist-Leninist factions of the Australian and New Zealand parties had also been invited to visit China in early March. The Chinese held one or more gatherings in March, but gave the matter relatively little publicity. A Peruvian source reported Japan, North Korea, Albania, Rumania, Cuba (sic), Indonesia, Pakistan, North Vietnam and Peru were represented in Peking for the March meeting. In their discussions with the Latin Americans, the Chinese promised additional financial support and training.

Plans for the regional pro-Chinese party meeting in Santiago were modified after the November 1964 Havana Communist Party Conference, which represented a critical setback for Chinese aims in Latin America. In January 1965 representatives of the Colombian PCC-ML in meetings with the Ecuadorean PCE-ML had condemned Cuban sponsorship of the "revisionist" Havana Conference and proposed that the hemisphere hardline parties organize to counter the effects of the Conference.

now emphasized the position of the "hard-line" parties toward the Cuban PURS and questions of the tactics needed to offset the "new Cuban strategy" developed at the Havana Conference. The principle of armed struggle as the fundamental precept of the pro-Chinese parties was reasserted and a closer coordination of plans and activities among Latin American pro-Chinese parties was called for to prevent the build-up of "irresponsible groups of adventurers"—that is, Cuban-sponsored groups—that engaged
in guerrilla activities "which detract from the prestige of legitimately sponsored" pro-Chinese groups.

The Lima gathering never took place apparently because of the impact on the internal political situation in other hemisphere countries of the crisis in the Dominican Republic, and an unfavorable political climate in Peru itself respecting activities of hard-line Communists.

A preparatory meeting was, however, held in Bogota, on 2 June 1965, in conjunction with the national congress of the PCC-ML. Colombian, Ecuadorean, and Chilean party representatives met; two Peruvian representatives reportedly arrived in Bogota but could not find the conference site. Venezuelans had been invited but "did not want to attend." The delegates decided to transfer the site of the conference back to Santiago, Chile and tentatively scheduled it for October, when the Chilean pro-Chinese Espartaco organization planned to hold a national congress to reorganize itself as a full-fledged Chilean Marxist-Leninist Communist party. It was agreed that all the pro-Peking parties should mount campaigns against the Havana Conference, and planning was begun to agree on a regional secretariat at the Santiago meeting. Because of a decision of the Espartaco leadership, however, the congress was postponed until January, then to February, and finally to March 1966.

"First Conference of Latin American Pro-Chinese Communist Parties," was held clandestinely in Santiago from 1 through 4 March. Representatives from Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, and Chile attended.* Peruvian and Argentine delegates were also invited; but the Peruvian delegate did not participate because he was unable to establish his bona fides before the conference ended, and the Argentine emissary was not permitted to attend because he did not represent a formal Marxist-Leninist party but only "a Marxist-Leninist faction of the PCA."

*There were a total of eight from the five countries.
As an organizational exercise the Conference was a relative failure. The Colombian delegate led in proposing a basic definition of an acceptable Latin American Marxist-Leninist party which would permit nascent pro-Chinese groups and factions to evolve into formal parties and then join some form of permanent Marxist-Leninist secretariat. He also proposed a key thesis distinguishing between armed struggle based on the masses as contrasted with small, independent military operations without mass support, to distinguish such Castroist deviations from genuine revolution. He was supported in general by Ecuador and Chile.

The Brazilian and Bolivian delegates, however, flatly refused to commit their parties to any principles or formal resolutions or agreements. An Ecuadorian compromise proposal that all should accept the resolutions as a "suggested guide" for further study by their parties was debated, but the Brazilian and Bolivian delegates also objected strongly to this and to suggestions of the other three favoring a more formal organization empowered to handle inter-party communications, Latin American fronts, and certain intra-party matters, such as propaganda.

It was finally agreed that the Conference should serve only as a consultative gathering to discuss common problems and exchange ideas and information. It was also agreed to hold a Second Conference in Brazil in May 1966 (there is no evidence it was held); to divide the Latin American continent into two geographic organizational areas: the first consisting of all countries north of the Ecuadorian-Peruvian border, and the other of all countries south of that border; and not to recognize or associate with any group not having the approval of the country's Marxist-Leninist party. A joint declaration to this effect, prepared at the Conference's termination, was, however, not signed and was accepted only as a guideline for the next Conference.
C. The Break With Havana

Chinese approbation of the Cuban regime reached its peak coincident with the 1962 missile base crisis, when Chinese support of Castro's belligerence and Chinese anger at the Soviets were at crescendo. Cuba was extremely important to the Chinese party as its fighting bridge for the spread of Maoism in Latin America and as a regional bellwether in the polemic with the Soviet party. Although the Chinese party has severely reduced its ties with and support of the Cuban regime, it has been careful to leave the door open to a resumption of warmer relations, and it is clear that Peking regards its differences with Havana as of a different order from its quarrel with the CPSU.

Because of the coincidence of his ideas on rural armed struggle with those of Mao Tse-tung, the Chinese leadership always had greater warmth for "Che" Guevara than for Fidel Castro; and it is indicative that the Chinese did not decide that Cuba had gone over to the "revisionist" camp until after Guevara--heading a three-man Cuban Communist mission--had gone personally to Peking in early 1965 in an ill-fated effort to mediate between the Chinese and Soviet sides and explain the Cubans' role in the Havana Communist party conference of the previous November. Guevara was given a red-carpet welcome and met with key CCP officials. But the two sides found it impossible to agree during four meetings on 4, 6, 7 and 8 February, and the visit ended in a violent exchange between Guevara and Liu Shao-chi, then Chairman of the Chinese Republic.*

* Liu reportedly made it clear to selected Latin American delegates meeting in Peking in early March 1965 that Peking "now" regarded Cuba as "revisionist" and "an enemy of revolutionary struggle in Latin America."
Chinese suspicions about Castro, according to their own statements, date back to his first visit to the Soviet Union in April and May 1963 as Khrushchev's personal guest. Castro's glowing public praise of Khrushchev, whom he personally highly admired, irked the Chinese. But they particularly cite the joint 23 May Soviet-Cuban communique, in which Castro gave at least lip service to every major Soviet foreign policy position and to CPSU revolutionary strategy—where Cuban and Soviet views differed the most and where Chinese hopes for Cuban support were perhaps the highest—as a document "which contained definitely revisionist ideas". Castro's willingness to accept increased dependence on the Soviet Union in the economic and defense spheres, and his preservation of official neutrality in the ideological controversy, only tended to confirm private Chinese evaluation of him as a "traitor" who straddled rather than faced the "key" issues. This evaluation was strongly reinforced by the 1964 Havana Conference where in the Chinese view Castro had an opportunity to take a stand more favorable to them, but instead acquiesced in further Soviet-inspired limitations on his revolutionary activities in the hemisphere. And after November they were much less reticent about sharing their contemptuous opinion of the Cuban leader with visiting officials and members of other Latin American Communist parties. At a March 1965 meeting in Peking of ranking CCP officials and Latin American pro-Chinese party representatives, they announced that Cuba had unquestionably aligned itself with the revisionists.*

*In a very belated 22 February 1966 public blast at Castro and the November CP conference in Havana, NCNA cited the joint Castro-Khrushchev statement of January 1964 as the point when the Cuban party "chose to identify itself with the view of the modern revisionists." This was Peking's first public reference to the 1964 meeting.
1. Operations Against the Cuban Party

The Chinese began to apply their party-penetration theory to the Cuban party, then called the PURS, along the same lines they were using with other pro-Soviet area parties. This activity was first reported in March 1965. It included offers to Cuban party officials of trips to China and intensified dissemination of oral and printed Chinese anti-Soviet propaganda among Cuban civilian and military officials, and was directly related to the changed Chinese estimate of Castro's position resulting from Cuban involvement in the Havana Conference and in the 19-party Moscow conference in March 1965.

Castro, angered at Chinese proselytizing within his party and China's unwillingness to match its bellicose posture toward United States' bombing of North Vietnam with any real action in the latter's defense, openly criticized the Chinese ambassador in Cuba at a meeting with Havana University students early in 1965 and hit back at the Chinese in carefully worded denunciations in a 13 March speech, which many observers at first interpreted as directed at the Soviet Union.*
A full explanation of the reasons why Guevara dropped from public view after a 20 March appearance in Cuba (he had returned to Cuba on 13 March after leaving that country in early December 1964) is still to be given; but it is of interest and probably not completely coincidental that his disappearance occurred just at the time, or immediately after, the Chinese relegated the Cuban party to the enemy camp and launched operations to draw it to the left. Guevara's known admiration for Chinese foreign policy, his disapproval of any Cuban alignment with the Soviets and of Castro's willingness—more and more evident since mid-1964—to soft-pedal Cuba's direct role in Latin American and African revolutionary movements, taken together with the timing of his disappearance, strongly suggest that his disappearance formed an element in China's defeat within the Cuban regime. The Chinese at least were not unwilling to have other Communists believe so; they have both publicly and privately ascribed Guevara's downfall to the fact that Castro had by then gone over to the Soviet side and could no longer tolerate Guevara's 'genuine' revolutionary stance.*

*About January 1965 Castro had used the agreement to cease open polemics—made at the Havana Conference—to get at the Chinese. He then requested both TASS and NCNA in Cuba to refrain from distributing materials attacking either side in the dispute. TASS agreed, but NCNA did not. Cuban authorities thereafter informed NCNA it would have to restrict the dissemination of its bulletins only to newspapers and party leaders. But the Chinese made no effort to comply.

*A recent example of such a public statement was a statement by Sanmugathasan, leader of the pro-Chinese wing of the divided Ceylonese Communist party, carried by NCNA on February 21, 1966, which called Guevara's exit from the Cuban political scene a measure "of the degree to which Cuba has departed from the revolutionary path."
Castro's broad hints to the Chinese in March to desist, were apparently ignored and early in September, according to Cuban reports, Chinese official representatives in Cuba were still conducting a systematic, widespread propaganda campaign at all levels within the Cuban armed forces reinforced with direct contact with some military officers for propaganda and intelligence purposes. An energetic 14 September protest to the Chinese charge d'affaires was also ignored, large-scale shipments of Chinese propaganda continuing to be distributed. At year's end the Cubans were reported restricting NCNA publication and distribution activities through the Friends of China societies in Cuba.

Castro's anger at the Chinese appears in large part responsible for a Cuban decision—after two years' absence from World Peace Council (WPC) meetings because of reluctance to seem to be taking sides—to send a delegate to the WPC meeting in Brussels on 3 and 4 April and in Helsinki from July 10 to 15, 1965. Juan Marinello, the Cuban ambassador to UNESCO in Paris and former president of the old orthodox Cuban PSP, was instructed to attend and to take his lead from the policies adopted by the Havana Communist Party Conference and Castro's "latest speech"—that is, his March diatribes against Peking's interference.

In his January 2, 1966 anniversary speech Castro complained mildly but openly that China had refused to supply more than half the rice Cuba wanted from her that year. This was on the very eve of the Tricontinental Conference. The Chinese responded on 9 and 30 January with pained statements that the Cuban leader had misrepresented the situation, but Cuban spokesmen reiterated the charge and a serious cut in the Cuban rice ration was announced. At the end of January, a new statement issued by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Trade accused the Cubans of making groundless assertions.

Finally, on 6 February, Castro publicly and openly attacked the Chinese and their operations against the Cuban party, accusing them of flagrant violation of the elementary norms of behavior between socialist states. His wrath was so great that he drew a parallel between
Chinese blatant disregard for Cuban sovereignty and former United States' conduct in Cuba. Castro's denunciation of Peking was said to have been the equal in violence to anything in the Sino-Soviet exchange, and its language approached the ultimate degree of bitterness theretofore reserved only for the U.S.*

After a delay of more than two weeks, People's Daily on the 22nd published the text of Castro's 6 February statement and in an editorial note accused Castro of adding his voice to the "anti-Chinese chorus" composed of the imperialists, reactionaries and "Khrushchev revisionists", openly grouping Castro with the Soviets by reproducing Belgian and Ceylon Communist pieces which stated unequivocally that Cuba was then completely subservient to Soviet revisionism.** But the Chinese note withheld a full-fledged...

*Of interest was the prompt and solid backing given Castro in his dispute with the Chinese by the Chilean PCCh and the Ecuadorean pro-Moscow PCE. This was followed in March by vigorous attacks on Castro's anti-Chinese line by the Peruvian PCP-ML, and a bitter open letter to Castro from the Brazilian CPB lamenting his attack on China and his adoption of "revisionist" ties.

**In Warsaw in July 1965 two Chinese journalists had read a prepared statement accusing Cuba of defending "modern revisionists." After the People's Daily note of February 22nd, Chinese public description of Cuba as revisionist became routine. A notable instance of this was an interview of Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi in Peking with Uruguayan newspapermen Carlos Maria Gutierrez, published in the Montevideo weekly Marcha in May 1966. On 8 March Peking gave extensive belated publicity to a 15-16 November 1965 Conference of the Peruvian PCP-ML which denounced Castro for allying with the CPSU and branded the 1964 Havana Conference as a CPSU "production" that had excluded Marxist-Leninist parties. This was Peking's first public reference to the November 1964 meeting. The PCP-ML's statement of November 1965 pre-dated any public Chinese denunciation of the Cuban party and actually went further than the Chinese themselves had yet gone in branding the Cubans as "revisionists."
counterattack, reserving Peking's right to make a systematic reply at a later date.

this nuance evinced Chinese recognition that the dispute with Cuba was not on the same ideological basis as that with the Soviets and reflected Chinese wishes to reserve options this important distinction might allow in the future—such as possibilities of picking up the Cuban pieces in the event of an ultimate Cuban-Soviet falling out.

Castro in his annual March 13 speech at Havana University followed up with a stinging derogation of Mao Tse-tung characterized by extensive personal invective, in which he again accused the Chinese of cutting off his vital rice supply solely as political "blackmail" because of his refusal to swing Cuba to the Chinese side in the dispute with the Soviets.

Since that speech the Cuban leader has, however, made no public reference to the Chinese situation, and in international gatherings Cuban official delegations have been unwilling to comment officially on current developments in China or on the Soviet proposal for a world Communist party meeting. At the Bulgarian CP Conference in November 1966, the Cuban delegation deliberately omitted any reference to Zhivkov's call for such a world meeting, and this noncommittal attitude was repeated at the Hungarian CP Conference in the same month.

In October 1966 three Havana dailies, El Mundo, Juventud Rebelde, and Granma, correctly carried short items congratulating Communist China on its 17th anniversary. The theme of these items was that nothing could break the eternal friendship of the Chinese people and the Cuban people. Nevertheless, in September Granma had carried excerpts from NCNA materials featuring "Chairman Mao's Thoughts", with commentary deeply critical of the absurd lengths to which they went to the amusement of the whole world.

In November 1966 pro-Chinese parties in Brazil, Ecuador, Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia sent delegates to the Albanian Workers' Party's Fifth Congress, but Cuba did not attend.
Sino-Cuban state relations apparently have weakened. The Chinese decision to expel all foreign students prompted Cuban authorities to ask for withdrawal by the end of the month of 45 Chinese students from the University of Havana; and that the last five Chinese technicians in Cuba left in early December, thus ending at least temporarily another facet of the two countries' relations. Reduction of Chinese embassy personnel in Havana from sixty to twelve also reflected this diminution. Chinese rice shipments had diminished by half at the end of the year, and other Chinese goods also became scarce in Cuban markets in 1966.

D. Chinese Experience With Latin Revolutionaries

In the autumn of 1965 a Chinese party official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in discussing his views on the world-wide revolutionary situation among Communist parties, made special mention of the unusual jurisdictional problems his party had found in its dealings with the Latin American parties. His remarks reflected Chinese disgust and disappointment in their experiences with the Latins, and they point up how those experiences have complicated Chinese efforts in the hemisphere. The Chinese official said:

The CPC believes there is a problem in South America. Members were expelled there (sic) and there was a split from which three anti-revisionist groups developed which are not, however, united in their aims. Such groups devote most of their attention to reciprocal struggle and not to the struggle against revisionism! The CPC believes that Marxist-Leninists have a unanimous goal: anti-revisionism and anti-imperialism. On this account, Marxist-Leninist forces must join together. ...Some groups are in contact with the CPC and it is our international duty to support these anti-revisionist and anti-imperialist
groups. A number of these groups are, however, inclined to say: 'We have the right to China's help and support but the others do not!' Others maintain: 'We have been recognized by China and so our Marxist-Leninist group is permitted by China.' Naturally we are grateful for this support from abroad; but which group will become the center for Marxist-Leninist forces will depend upon individual work among the masses for the latter must be united and educated; this will not be in relation to any type of contact with China! (Some) are now making the mistake of claiming: 'We are in contact with China and so we are the only Marxist-Leninist center for the anti-revisionist struggle, therefore we are the only Marxist-Leninists; everything depends upon China.' This is not realistic!

Support has currently been put on a much stricter contingent basis. That is, if the recipient organization lapses into inactivity, support has been reduced or withheld, and only resumed in accordance with Chinese judgments of the worth of any increased activity. This policy toward its Latin American supporters reflects Peking's disillusionment with Latin inability to sink individual differences for the sake of united organizational effort. (Most of the hemisphere's pro-Chinese parties have suffered splits since their formation, because of internal jurisdictional rivalries.) This caution also reflects the Chinese break with Cuban-oriented groups after early 1965, and Peking's determination not to be played off against Castro on the one hand and on the other, to separate the incorrigible Castro-ites in Latin America from its own loyal forces there.

The Chinese party continues to develop its ideological and political strategy in the hemisphere among the two organizational fronts common to its political operations in other underdeveloped areas: (1) those Communist parties
or Communist party factions in disagreement with the CPSU line, and (2) those forces which in the past have been mainly nationalist but whose revolutionary ambitions and outlook are deemed to merit financial and other support. This type of effort seems not only responsive to Peking's assertion it will support any "Marxist-Leninist" group, but also related to Chinese concepts of developing suitable militant united fronts that would be guided by the local Marxist-Leninist party.* Since the Sino-Cuban break, Chinese judgements of the merits of individual movements or groups have been mainly based on the recipients' ability to take serious action against both pro-Soviet and pro-Cuban "revisionists" rather than on any mere potential for guerrilla warfare or Trotsky-style terrorist programs. Such a course is implicit in the Chinese view of the difference between its revolutionary model and those of Cuba and the Soviet Union. Key emphasis has increasingly been placed on longer-term preparatory work, and Peking is actively encouraging its Latin supporters to become more self-sufficient and less dependent upon Peking for vital material resources.

In the face of the diplomatic rebuffs suffered in Indonesia, Cuba, and some African countries, the Chinese in April 1966 announced that Peking would no longer attempt to "come to terms" with governments in power in Latin America, Asia, and Africa, where it has suffered reverses, and will not put great emphasis in the future on promoting all-embracing solidarity movements like AALAPSO and AAPSO. Instead, it would divide nations into "those for China and

*For example, in April 1965 the Chinese invited Ecuadorian radical Socialists of the Socialist Revolutionary Party (PSR) to visit China to discuss support and training; and in March they reportedly had done the same with three leaders of the Bolivian National Leftist Revolutionary Party (PRIN), a revolutionary nationalist party. The PRIN was one of Bolivia's three largest political groupings and counted a heavy representation among the country's important tin miners.

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those against," and "act accordingly." At the same time, China reaffirmed its intention to continue aiding those it considers true Communist revolutionary movements in the underdeveloped countries, and to make greater use of propaganda. Peking will encourage and train tough, well-disciplined revolutionary cadres to return to their own countries to wage the struggle Peking believes the Soviet "revisionists" have abandoned. These points were made in a speech given by Mei Yi, chief Chinese delegate to the fourth plenary meeting of the Afro-Asian Journalists Association held that month in Peking.

Current Chinese support of the hemisphere parties and related groups clearly emphasizes such a training concept. Chinese training now embraces more political indoctrination of the type calculated to enhance trainees' skills in dealing with "revisionist" parties and doctrine, and the significance of the change that has upgraded political and ideological indoctrination, is that it reflects a Chinese decision to prepare its Latin assets for a much longer-term struggle for control of the Latin American Communist movement than had been apparent several years ago before Castroist notions of armed struggle had been clearly separated from those of Peking.*

*In February 1967 a leader of the Uruguayan pro-Chinese MIR who had recently returned from training in China said the Chinese had "recommended" that the MIR avoid becoming involved with the Uruguayan "terrorist" organization, which they described as lacking "Marxist-Leninist revolutionary foundations". (The reference is to a sensational police case in Uruguay in late December 1966 involving arrests of members of a terrorist organization whose ramifications and sponsorship are not yet clear.)
Peking has rarely relinquished willingly even the smallest of footholds it has gained in Latin America in spite of important problems it has had with some of them because of the Sino-Soviet dispute—such as its local NCNA representatives or stringers who have customarily been members of orthodox Communist parties. Not until December 1966, for example, did NCNA cancel its contract with its correspondent in Costa Rica, a PVP member who had served as NCNA representative since late 1960 and who after the turmoil of mid-1963 consistently responded to PVP direction and the CPSU line. The NCNA is not currently represented in Costa Rica. In October 1966 the Chinese NCNA mission in Mexico City closed down at the Chinese own initiative in an unprecedented move, making Chile and Cuba the only two countries in the hemisphere where Peking still has permanent Chinese-manned installations.

1. The Great Cultural Revolution and Latin American Operations

We do not yet have sufficient information accurately to judge what led to the Chinese withdrawal from Mexico. The concern of mission members with the effect upon their status that could come from the Maoist "cultural revolution" has been a reported cause of the action. The critical stages of this crisis, which clearly is the gravest to affect the Chinese party since it came to power in 1949, began about August 1966. Another effect of the crisis, the decision to send all foreign students—including Cubans and other Latin Americans—home, at least on an interim basis, will curtail one phase of Peking's contact with the hemisphere.
2. Operations Research for Latin America

The information we have on the Chinese party-government apparatus gives no indication they set up anything comparable to the CPSU's Latin American Institute established within the USSR Academy of Sciences in 1961 for operational research on Latin America.
comments of a Soviet expert in Cuba that as early as 1956 the Soviets knew the Chinese were preparing important cadres of Spanish speakers who would be well-versed in Latin American affairs.

said the Chinese had created a "Central International Liaison Department" under the Central Finance and Trade Ministry, with responsibilities for the reception of Communist delegates visiting China; and that a "political department" has also been established under the Ministry.
III. Castro: New World Marxism-Leninism

A. A Would-Be Latin American Lenin

In Latin America the Chinese and Soviet parties have had to contend with a third influence: a Cuba determined that its example should guide revolutionary development in the hemisphere. The successful consolidation of the Castroist regime there became both a facilitating and complicating factor for each in their ideological struggle. What is sometimes overlooked is that from the Cuban point of view the reverse was also true. While both have been useful, and the USSR indispensable, to Castro in helping him to achieve national security and the means for developing a viable economy, their power struggle in the hemisphere has greatly complicated his own drive to make of himself the native-born ideologue and charismatic leader of Latin American Communism.

In his now-famous assertion of December 1961 that he was, had been, and would be, a "Marxist-Leninist" until the day he died, Castro proclaimed his abandonment of a capitalist economy for Cuba and acknowledged his intention to build the future Cuban state on a foundation of Communist doctrine.

What was less apparent in his statement was his determination to make independent use of Marxist-Leninist theories in the process of applying them to Cuba and the rest of Latin America. By declaring himself a Marxist-Leninist, Castro--the leader of a revolution whose success had dazzled the Latin American left--was really announcing to all that Latin America could henceforth dispense with foreign revolutionary imports, all extra-hemisphere models, because through him it was developing its own Marxist-Leninist methods and interpretations on the basis of its own history, social formation, and character: a special brand of Communism that was just right for the underdeveloped sector of the western hemisphere, and might even have something to offer the rest of the underdeveloped world.
Thus Castro would end Latin America's "ideological colonialism". More than this, taking as his example the practical triumph of the Cuban revolution, Castro would in Latin America rehabilitate a Marxism which had been discredited by old "pre-Cuban" orthodox Communist party leaders who had continued ideologically subservient to the "European" (read Soviet-model) worker movement when the latter's approach no longer responded to the "Latin American reality", and who had proved unable even after many decades of effort to accomplish anything at all comparable with what Castro achieved in Cuba in only a few years.

Castro has given increased emphasis to this line after he first tested it with some apparent success at the Tri-Continental Conference.* In his 1966 May Day speech, he clearly stressed that Cuba should not blindly follow any other revolution but should learn from its own experience how properly to conduct its own revolution. He coupled this with blame of other Communists for their misguided advice to Cuba in the early stages of the revolution, citing the failures of the industrialization program and the successes of his own agrarian reform program.

The Cuban leader also decided, possibly also in the euphoria of Cuban successes at the Tri-Continental Conference, to convert the principal Soviet-controlled front organizations to vehicles for active support of revolutionary action in the underdeveloped areas by substituting Cuban leadership and influence for their traditional European Communist leadership. This Cuban enterprise is discussed below in this chapter, section D. 1.

In claiming to be elaborating an original, intrinsically Latin American revolutionary theory to replace foreign 'bourgeois' and Communist constructs, Castro has singled out a goal that is of authentic interest to large numbers of Latin American intellectuals and political elites as well as the man in the street, because its accomplishment will signify that--in a way psychologically important to the Latin mentality--the area will have come of age politically and able to confront the politically dominant Anglo-Saxons with infinitely more self-respect.

*Held in Havana from 3 through 15 January 1966.
than is presently possible. As a relatively successful "Jack the Yankee killer" Castro is doing what thousands of envious Latin Americans would themselves like to do; and if he can bring it off through use of the intellectual arsenal furnished by Lenin—a Slav—so much the better; the "gringo's" humiliation will be that much greater and deeper.

The effort to elevate the significance of Castro's revolution to that of the Russian revolution and Castro to the status of a Lenin, was clearly outlined in two editorials appearing in Granma, the official Cuban Communist party (PCC) newspaper, on 5 and 7 November 1966* and was summarized by Radio Havana several days later. The first editorial is entitled "Crisis of the Communist Movement?" The opening statement is remarkable:

The Cuban Socialist Revolution; directed by our Commander in Chief Fidel Castro is, without a doubt, one of the most important

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*There were earlier indications of this trend. According to the 21 August 1966 issue of Verde Olivo, a "recently held" ceremony of the Cuban Armed Forces, attended by a group of Soviet technicians, was used to eulogize Castro and compare his revolutionary exploits and valor with those of Jorge Dimitrov, tried before a Nazi tribunal in 1933, and with Lenin's historic guidance of the early Russian bolsheviks. In September Armando Hart, the PCC's organizational secretary and a leading Cuban party theorician, was emphasizing that the current situation facing Latin American revolutionaries is "very similar" to that which faced Lenin during the rise of the revolution in Russia, when "insurrection and unity of the revolutionary forces served to define the revolutionaries," and he said these two things define Latin American revolutionaries. Hart significantly stated that the world Communist schism is because "the surge of the revolution" has overturned old concepts and habits of work and has made apparent a need for "new working methods and styles."
events in the universal history of the communist movement.

The remainder of the article says that from the Cuban revolution emerged a "correct" thesis—armed struggle as the way to liberation. "Others" offer the opposite thesis of peaceful transition. The former are backed up by history, while the latter depend on ideas that have never been confirmed. From this difference there emerges a crisis which has alarmed revolutionaries who forget that "historical crises have a dialectical character." In the case of the crisis, caused by the Cuban thesis, the positive dialectical value is Cuban denunciation of the "incorrect" thesis which flouts historical experience, and is anti-socialist and anti-Marxist. The proper procedure is to put forward the correct thesis against the incorrect thesis. Reference is made to recent talks by Armando Hart, which discussed how the Third Communist International arose from the ashes of the Second International, and how at the moment of birth of the new Soviet state a crisis racked the Bolshevik party and saw Lenin ranged against some members of its central committee who opposed his "correct" thesis of armed insurrection. Then appears this sentence:

The crisis posed, not by Fidel, but by the reality of events, although Fidel is its firmest supporter, is a positive crisis, because it is a necessary step and essential for the real culmination of a correct revolutionary strategy.

In other words, plainly put, the Cuban doctrine is the thesis opposing a "revisionist" antithesis, from the clash of which will emerge a new synthesis, or stage, in the international Communist movement.

The second editorial is titled "Our Homage to the October Revolution", and takes the form of a statement commemorating the 1917 Russian revolution. It makes no reference at all to the current Soviet leadership. It opens with this statement:
We commemorate today the 49th anniversary of the triumph of the October Revolution, that is, Lenin's Revolution. The triumph of the Russian revolution was the victory of Bolshevism and the victory of Bolshevism is the victory of Lenin.

The article, a sort of paean to Lenin and Leninism, asserts that for two years before the revolution the bolsheviks had to struggle against pseudo-revolutionaries as well as feudalism and capitalism, and were marked down as stupid, not only by the reactionaries but also by the pseudo-revolutionaries in the European social-democratic movements. The editorial then says that it should be remembered that many leaders of the Second International, "the organism that brought together the Marxist and worker parties of the epoch", considered that a Socialist revolution could not succeed in Russia. The bolsheviks, however, succeeded, because their ideas led to correct solutions, and because their leader was Lenin. Now, fifty years later, Lenin's analysis of conditions in Russia and Europe during his time applies with "singular" precision to Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The October Revolution was the preamble of a much broader and deeper national liberation struggle now taking place on those continents, whose character is exemplified in the Vietnam war. Because Cuba forms a part of this struggle it stands for unconditional support to the North Vietnamese. Then comes another remarkable series of sentences:

Our Socialist Revolution forms part of that great movement. For this reason the Cuban-North Korean communique signed in Pyongyang, could affirm that the Cuban Revolution is the continuation in Latin America of the October Revolution. Because of this Cuba has a duty to fulfill in the continent: to be ever faithful to the traditions of the October Revolution and the ideals of Marxism-Leninism. (italics added)
The editorial concludes with the assertion that Lenin's dictum, that to take power, armed insurrection is necessary, was not a passing fancy but a key point of Communist work; that the real Communists, the genuine defenders of Leninism in Latin America, will join the fight; those who remain on the sidelines will cease to be Communists.*

While Cuban spokesmen were emphasizing their vision of Cuba as the continuation of Lenin's bolshevik revolution, the Soviet ambassador in Havana, in a television broadcast commemorating the October Revolution, said "Revolutionary Cuba is the first State in America to set out on the road of the Great October Revolution." The ambassador quoted a 2 January 1964 statement of Castro's that "Our Revolution forms part of that powerful world revolutionary movement which began with the historic revolution of the workers and peasants of the Soviet Union: the revolution of Lenin, the revolution of Marx and Engels," and said further that Cuba "is in the community of the Socialist states, which, based on the principles of proletarian solidarity, are giving her all necessary political, economic, and military aid." His emphasis was on the place of Cuba within the "socialist community" led by the Soviet Union. It is interesting that the official Cuban newspaper Granma did not mention the ambassador's talk, whose reportage was relegated to the less important, non-official El Mundo. Implicit in Ambassador Alexseyev's

*That not all Cuban party members shared these views was seen in the dismissal sometime in October 1966 of five staff members of the editorial board of Granma because of their objections to Castro's stepped-up support of armed subversion in Latin America, his subversion against Chilean President Eduardo Frei, and his continued emphasis on economic centralism at a time when Liberman's concepts were gaining ground in the USSR and Eastern European nations. Among the five were the secretaries of the PCC organization and of the Communist youth organization at the paper, although this was not announced.
milder acclamation is an apparent Soviet willingness to accept without comment this latest Cuban conceit as long as Havana doesn't officially trace the source of its revolution to the Yenan caves of Mao Tse-tung.

1. Havana: Center For New-World Marxist-Leninist Theory

There is evidence, accumulating since 1966, of a Castro plan to make Havana an influential center of Communist theoretical activity of the kind that will nurture and support the grandiose role within world Communism which he clearly visualizes for himself and for Cuban liberation doctrine.

A study of the activities of the Casa de las Americas (House of the Americas), the Cuban-Latin American friendship organization, its journal of the same name, and the group of radical intellectuals and emigres from other hemisphere countries who contribute to the Casa's programs and form a part of its staff, lead almost inevitably to such a conclusion. The extent to which radical pro-Castro Latin American and other emigres connected with the Casa are also active in the University of Havana, and recent debates over doctrine between the philosophy department of the University of Havana and the Schools of Revolutionary Instruction (EIR), the Cuban party's advanced ideological indoctrination school, headed by Lionel Soto Prieto, a pre-Castro Communist of the Cuban PSP, reinforce it.

For example, the January-February 1966 issue of the Casa bimonthly journal contains a lead article by Louis Althusser, a prominent French Marxist attached to the Ecole Normale Superieure de Paris, titled "Theory, Theoretical Practice, and Theoretical formation, Ideology and Ideological Struggle". In the March-April issue, the lead article, by Ricardo Alarcon,* is titled "Latin America

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*Probably identical with Ricardo Alarcon Quezada, Cuban permanent representative to the UNO.
and the Tricontinental Conference". A section of this issue is dedicated to a roundtable discussion on "the Role of the Intellectual in Movements of National Liberation", with French, Italian, and a wide range of prominent Latin American participants.

One collaborator of the Casa, a youth French Marxist who has studied under Althusser, named Jules Regis Debray,* has lately assumed special prominence as an intellectual apologist of Castro and the Cuban revolution. Debray's activities are of interest because his interpretations of the place of the Cuban revolution in contemporary Marxism-Leninism and of Castro's role as a revolutionary have been endorsed by Castro himself. Since this is so, a perusal of Debray's writings on Cuba should help in understanding how Castro himself visualizes these matters.

Debray appears to have traveled extensively in Latin America since 1961, and is known to have visited Uruguay,

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*Debray turned up in Bolivia in April 1967, in the remote guerrilla area near Camiri where he was arrested on the 29th together with a British and an Argentine journalist who had joined the guerrilla column. Debray's fate is uncertain.
Venezuela and Cuba.

Then in Montevideo, as a representative of Revolution, a pro-Chinese magazine put out in Paris in French and English editions, which was then planning a Spanish-language edition. Debray first attracted Cuban attention and gained prominence in Latin American Marxist circles when he published a long essay in the Paris Marxist review, Les Temps Modernes, titled "Castroism: The Long March of Latin America", in January 1965. His next important production was the essay first described above. In January 1967 the official Cuban press announced that a book by Debray, titled "Revolution Within the Revolution?", with an edition of 100,000 copies, was then going on sale as "Notebook Number 1" of a series to be published under Casa de las Americas auspices. Debray received prominent attention in a number of articles and interviews published in Granma and other Havana periodicals and broadcasts over Radio Havana. He was described as a "professor of the History of Philosophy at the University of Havana".* The 110-page book, a pithy, well-written defense of Castroist revolutionary experience, attempts, among other things, to correct Debray's earlier emphasis on the rapid outdating of the Cuban model for revolution, by arguing that other Latin Americans who tried without success to implement that model in their own countries failed primarily because they had not made the correct analysis of the Cuban experience whose lessons still remain valid and of central importance to guerrilla liberation warfare in the hemisphere. The title of the book is pitched to Debray's discussion of the Cuban revolution as a new Communist thesis clashing with an aged, outmoded European-based, Soviet-oriented Communist anti-thesis, along the lines already mentioned. His book offers a systematic refutation of current Soviet liberation

*According to the introduction to "Revolution Within The Revolution?", by Roberto Fernandez Retamar, Debray returned to Cuba at the end of 1965 to remain there and conduct an exhaustive study of the Cuban Revolution.
doctrine, and it can be expected to attract very wide 
attention among area Communists and revolutionaries of 
all persuasions. It can profitably be studied by any U.S. 
official or scholar whose duties require an understanding 
in depth of Castroism and its intentions.

An article by Saverio Tutino titled "The Bearded 
Caiman Talks of Philosophy", published in the 31 December 
1966 issue of Rinascita, the Italian Communist party's 
theoretical journal, contains additional evidence of a 
Castro-directed movement taking shape in Havana to produce 
a new approach to Communist philosophy and theory. The 
article says that "about three years ago" Castro "decided 
that Marxism should reach Cuba by a different route" than 
through the standard Konstantinov manual on Marxist Philo-
sophy which has been in use in Cuban. EIR classrooms. 
Castro chose a group of "youngsters" to undertake to 
organize a school of philosophy free of any dogmatic in-
fluence of any kind whatever. After three years of effort, 
this group began to publish a combative anti-conformist 
magazine titled "The Bearded Caiman"* which has focused 
on topics of the underdeveloped world, especially national 
liberation movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. 
As the result of an attack against the new approach by 
Lionel Soto in "Theory and Practice", the journal of the 
EIR schools of revolutionary indoctrination, the confronta-
tion of ideas that Castro desired has begun. Soto, a pre-
Castro Communist, defended use of the Konstantinov and 
other basic CPSU-prepared manuals, but in a later issue 
of "Theory and Practice" Aurelio Alonso, a director of 

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*"The Bearded Caiman" (El Caiman Barbudo) is a Spanish-
language monthly literary supplement to Rebel Youth 
(Juventud Rebelde), the daily newspaper of the Cuban Com-


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the "Bearded Caiman" project, refuted Soto and categorically affirmed that the manuals "no longer fit into the Marxist education effort which is part of our national culture," and they must be done away with.

Other good examples of the ideas being purveyed by "The Bearded Caiman" are the following from an article titled "Thought Exercise", in issue No. 11, February 1967:

In Latin America, Marxism has not completely avoided producing distorted, sterile or even monstrous resultants. The transfer of the Marxist revolutionary position characteristic of a developed proletariat...to a Latin American setting has very often meant the formation of a sect...that is ineffectual.

This article discusses the "prominent place...occupied by the...mistakes and deceptions in the history of the international Communist movement," notes that all too frequently Communist "militancy implied the existence of an ideological pre-concept opposed in general to the creative development of Marxism", and speaks of the necessity of further reports on, among other topics, "the success and the errors of the Third International"--that is, the CPSU-led Communist movement.

While the evidence is not complete, it is fairly clear that Castro, feeling himself saddled with a party educational apparatus controlled by orthodox Communists tied to Soviet interpretations of Marxism-Leninism, decided to get rid of it and supplant it with an ideological fountain-head for political education within the Cuban party more in keeping with his own views, and elected to do so by setting up the "Bearded Caiman" group in Havana University's Philosophy Department as his stalking horse to compete with and ultimately defeat the orthodox Cuban Communists now in charge of the party educational schools.

A February 1967 decision of the Cuban party's politburo to discontinue publication of the party's theoretical journal, Cuba Socialista, which began in 1961, is probably a part of Castro's plan. The editorial board of the monthly
magazine was composed of Castro, Dorticos, Blas Roca, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, and Fabio Grobart: three old, orthodox Communists against two new Cuban Communists. The announcement of the journal's termination said its publication "must be interrupted until the first congress of the party adopts decisions concerning some of those theoretical, strategic, and tactical problems of the revolutionary movements of the world and some problems in the construction of socialism and Communism." It appears likely that if the first PCC congress (which should convene in October 1967) decides to issue a new party theoretical journal, neither Roca, Grobart, nor probably Rodriguez, will figure in its editorship, and that its offerings will consist of a more pure brand of Castroist theory than the Cuban Premier evidently was able to get printed in the pages of Cuba Socialista.

B. The Tri-Continental: A Cuban Triumph

The Castro leadership early forecast Cuban interest in Latin America's entry into the mainstream of the national liberation movement, represented by the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO), and Cuban eagerness for the role of area sponsor and spokesman. Discussing the future of the Cuban revolution in his 1960 guerrilla warfare manual, Guevara said "Asia and Africa joined hands in Bandung; Asia and Africa come to join hands with colonial and indigenous America, through Cuba, here in Havana."

That year a Cuban observer, the first Latin American, attended the AAPSO conference in Conakry and--according to Havana--broached the idea of extending AAPSO to Latin America. Cuban propagandists began to emphasize concepts of a tri-continental revolutionary movement. In February 1961 AAPSO extended observer status to all Latin American "popular organizations". The first official impetus from AAPSO for the holding of the tri-continental conference was given at an April 1961 meeting of its executive committee at Bandung. Two years later, in 1963, Castro invited the AAPSO to participate in a "First
Conference of Solidarity of the Peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America" to be held in Havana, and his bid was accepted.

By 1960 the AAPSO, fallen virtually under the control of Communist countries, had been diverted from its ostensible purpose as the expression of anti-imperialist but uncommitted nationalism to the status of a quasi-front group. Since the autumn of 1961 the AAPSO had been the scene of open and bitter Sino-Soviet struggles obscuring the movement's original purpose. Because a Latin American increment would tip the power balance in AAPSO, the Cuban tri-continental proposal had been shelved. In 1964 the Morocco-Algeria axis thought it saw an opportunity to help the independent nationalists regain control of AAPSO by bringing Cuba and the other Latin Americans into an expanded organization, and the Algerian leader, Ben Bella, proposed again to bring in the western hemisphere contingent. The USSR apparently did not fully consent to the idea until after the Cubans had attended the 19-party Moscow conference in March 1965, when it felt more confident that pro-Chinese Latin American groups would not be included in the representation from that region.

The first Tri-Continental Conference held in Havana in January 1966 was the scene of a major Sino-Cuban-Soviet organizational struggle. It saw (1) UAR hopes dashed as the Chinese successfully but only temporarily defended their investment in AAPSO and a proposed 1967 AAPSO conference in Peking; (2) an important but fragile organizational victory won by the Cubans; and (3) the defeat of Russian conference objectives, which forced the Soviet delegation to play a passive, defensive game to preserve important future options.

The Soviets before the Conference worked out with the UAR a joint strategy to achieve some common aims. This was, to turn the AAPSO into a tri-continental solidarity organization—the AALAPSO—with no modification except in title, to make Cairo its headquarters, and to veto any meeting in Peking in 1967. Because Cairo was also the headquarters of the AAPSO, the Soviets could argue compellingly for the irrelevance of an organization representing only Africa and Asia alongside a new
body representing all three continents, thereby bringing about the dissolution of AAPSO into the larger body and opening the way to cancel the Peking gathering. British reports have Cuba's ambassador in Cairo giving Nasir Castro's personal assurance that the Cubans were in full agreement with the Soviet-Egyptian "plan" and wanted the AALAPSO to be a development of AAPSO. According to reported statements of Rashidov, head of the Soviet delegation, a CPSU group had visited Cuba a month before the Conference and it too had received Castro's assurances of agreement with this proposal. Thus the Soviets were confident they had the organizational outcome of the Conference locked in.

The main Chinese Conference objective was to prevent AAPSO's disbandment and the Soviets' packing it with Latin American organizations loyal to Moscow. Peking was also determined to use it as a forum to establish the United States as the entire Communist world's principal enemy and further the Maoist guerrilla warfare line as the answer to liberation struggle in Latin America as well as Asia and Africa. That Peking judged its Conference actions a success was seen in a People's Daily editorial, January 18, 1966 titled "No One Can Stem The Tide of Anti-Imperialist Revolutionary Struggle of Asian, African and Latin American Peoples", lauding the "great successes" achieved by the Conference and emphasizing Soviet inability to destroy AAPSO.

The Cuban aim was to bring the Latin American liberation movement out of its hemispheric isolation by linking it organizationally with its counterparts in the AAPSO on a basis of equality, and maintain the primacy of Cuban leadership over the Latin American wing of the new tricontinental body. Castro wanted also to develop independent Cuban relations with potential allies in the other regions that might be welded into some sort of bloc able to resist both Soviet and Chinese pressures and ensure the sort of effective voice in future international Communist activities which he had in the past insisted upon for Cuba with relative lack of success. The Conference provided him with a glorious opportunity to further his own line on guerrilla warfare not only among his fellow

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Latin Americans but also among African and Asian revolutionaries.* The Cubans were therefore determined that the Conference not be wrecked by the Chinese-Soviet polemic nor by other side issues, and succeeded in this purpose by dint of rough-shod treatment of many delegations.

Castro's victory in the Conference's principal issue, the organizational one, came in large part from the fact that the Cubans had succeeded in packing hemisphere delegations with Castroist supporters to a much greater extent than the Soviets appear to have reckoned with.** The Latin American delegations varied in composition, some representing principally local pro-Moscow Communist parties, and others being led by representatives of local revolutionary groups responsive first to Cuban rather than Soviet pressures even though they included Communist party delegates. There is not space in this paper to inventory.

**Castro ambitiously declared at the Conference: "We do not hide that any revolutionary movement anywhere in the world can count on Cuba's unconditional and determined help."

**The Cubans, instead of first consulting the Latin American countries, in a letter of 8 October 1964 to the AAPSO Secretary General, unilaterally proposed Mexico, Venezuela, Guatemala, Chile, Uruguay, and Cuba as the six countries to represent the hemisphere in the tri-continental preparatory committee. Of the six national movements they nominated, four were clearly responsive first to Cuban rather than Soviet interests, while the other two--the FRAP in Chile and FIDEL in Uruguay--were already controlled and manipulated by their respective Communist party leaders but including pro-Cuban representation. The kidnapping in Paris in October 1965 of Mehdi Ben Barka, the preparatory committee's chairman, removed from the Conference leadership the only influential, non-aligned personality from AAPSO and left final preparations for the Conference almost exclusively in Cuban hands.
the hemisphere delegations. During the critical phase of committee work on 12 January, the Cubans could count on "19 of the 25" Latin American delegations to support their bid for Havana as a provisional AALAPSO headquarters, and other reporting confirms that on other key issues the Cubans were able to make their views prevail among their sister hemisphere delegations.

The Cubans also fully exploited their leverage as hosts and played an intense, fast and loose game to extract their Conference gains. Castro apparently fully intended well before January to make Havana the seat of any new tri-continental organization if he could, and did not hesitate to renege on his reported assurances to the Egyptians and Soviets. Nor did he hesitate to make tactical alliance with a basically cold and unfriendly Chinese delegation* on matters he deemed important.

| Castro made every effort to win African votes by promises or financial aid, arms and training to liberation movements, apparently with such success that the head of the UAR delegation made no secret of his disappointment that so many Africans who had been supported by Cairo had given in so easily to Castro's promises, even after Nasir had sent a special emissary to the Conference to line up African support for UAR organizational proposals. But an important reason for this Cuban success was the Africans' concern that their own regional interests would suffer in consolidating the AAPSO with the AALAPSO (see the following section). |

*The Cubans denied entrance to at least one Latin American pro-Chinese party delegation: the Peruvian PCP-ML sent a group to the Conference but the credentials committee seated another delegation from Peru composed of orthodox PCP and pro-Cuban representatives.
1. The Main Arena: The Organization Committee

The Organization Committee first met on 7 January, and almost immediately its chairman limited discussion to the point whether the proposed tricontinental organization should be set up as a single group that would absorb AAPSO. On the following day several crucial events occurred. The Chinese delegation served notice it would walk out if AAPSO were abolished as a separate organization. The Algerian delegation proposed that AAPSO and the projected Peking conference be preserved and a temporary Latin American Solidarity Organization (LASO) be set up until 1968 when the proposed Cairo tri-continental gathering would decide whether to merge AAPSO with the AALAPSO. Three Latin American delegations, the Mexican, Venezuelan, and Puerto Rican—all significantly led by pro-Cuban delegates—sought to marshal support for a separate Latin American organization with headquarters in Havana.

That evening a Latin American caucus was held. It was described by a reliable non-Bloc source in Havana as "probably one of the key meetings of the entire Conference." It saw sharp disagreement between Communist party delegates favoring the establishment of one organizational headquarters in Cairo—the Soviet-UAR plan—and "liberation movement" delegates who favored a Mexican proposal to set up LASO with a Havana secretariat and only at a later stage establish the AALAPSO. The Cubans swung their support to the latter, and "admonished" the orthodox Communists—whose leaders were the Uruguayan, Chilean, and Argentine delegates—for not thinking in terms of Latin American regional interests. In the next Committee meeting on 9 January the pro-Cubans, particularly the Mexicans, Venezuelans, Puerto Ricans and Guatemalans, came out strongly for a regional headquarters in Havana, while the pro-Soviet Communist party delegates named above came out for a tri-continental organization but significantly did not reiterate their stand against the regional headquarters in Havana. The Cubans themselves asked for a temporary secretariat in Havana to study ways of setting up the new AALAPSO and preparing for its 1968 conference. The Chinese backed the Cuban proposal.
The Africans for their part were badly split between the UAR's extreme pro-Soviet stand and the opposing extreme pro-Chinese stand of South West Africa. But primarily most Africans were concerned that a new organization centered on Latin America would witness the downgrading of their own area interests, and for this reason most African delegates opposed any step to abolish AAPSO. They therefore decided to follow the Cuban proposal to study the prospects for a new organization and to continue the AAPSO centered in Cairo. A sub-committee was formed to work out concrete proposals. The Africans and the Latin Americans each met again in regional caucus. Strong Egyptian and Soviet pressures were applied to Castro, but the Latin American caucus hardened the Cuban determination to make Havana the headquarters of an interim secretariat while the future of the solidarity organization was being decided, and on the 11th Castro moved into the Havana Libre Hotel and called delegation after delegation to persuade them to support the Cuban view. He was only willing to have the secretariat in Cairo after the 1968 conference.

On 12 January, the intense round of debate, proposal and counter-proposal which had reached an impasse, was dramatically affected when the Soviets let it be known they had decided on the matter of a headquarters site to vote with the majority. Moscow had instructed the Soviet delegation to do its utmost to change Castro's mind, but to accept his proposals if he proved adamant.

The UAR was furious at being deserted by the Soviets, but on the 13th gave up its debate. Meanwhile, on the 12th Castro had closed the Havana airport to all outgoing flights, and let it be known that none would leave until the critical organizational agreements had been hammered out.

Delegations from the three continents then met separately to choose their delegates to the AALAPSO secretariat, and to a "Committee for Assistance and Aid to National Liberation and Fighting Movements Against Colonialism and Neo-Colonialism", an operational body
whose aims were to include promoting and coordinating solidarity with national liberation movements, implementing practical action—including armed struggle—and giving all necessary political and material aid to them. By the 14th the delegates had agreed the AALAPSO secretariat would be temporarily located in Havana until the 1968 conference, but agreement on composition of the "Liberation Committee" bogged down because of Sino-Soviet arguments over the original selections (both China and the USSR had been nominated by the Laotians). At 2 a.m. on the 15th the Conference President, Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Roa, convened a meeting of heads of delegations, and read out a decision by the chairman of the previous days' session to support the composition originally elected. Roa gave none of those present an opportunity to demur, but peremptorily closed the meeting by announcing, that "It shall be recorded that there was no opposition." That day the airport was opened and the Conference delegations, led by the Chinese, began to leave.

2. A Hemisphere Guerrilla High Command Is Born

Coincident with the closing of the Tri-continental Conference, the Latin American delegates met and established a separate hemispheric solidarity body (LASO) with headquarters in Havana and a Cuban secretary-general. The only government represented was Cuba, whose delegation, headed by Castro himself and composed of the entire Cuban Communist party politburo, clearly dominated the proceedings. The meeting named a nine-country executive committee* to function as a body to prepare the "First Solidarity Conference of People's of Latin America" to be held in Havana from 28 July to 5 August 1967, and to work in cooperation with national LASO committees to be set up in

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*Of representatives from Brazil, Cuba, Colombia, Guyana, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
each country "to represent the most active anti-imperialist sectors having the largest and most popular following in each country."*

Since at its formation AALAPSO existed in name only as a resolution of the Tri-Continental Conference, and AAPSO had not been disbanded, Granma’s announcement of LASO did not dwell on the fact that it is intended to become the Latin American regional member of the tri-continental solidarity organization if AALAPSO is confirmed at its 1968 conference in Cairo.

Cuban official reporting of LASO objectives and methods of operation make it plain that this solidarity body is intended to function as a hemispheric guerrilla Internationale, along the lines envisaged for the broader AALAPSO "Liberation Committee", rather than primarily as a propaganda or political action organization, and that its principal target is the United States' presence in Latin America.

The announcement of the criteria to be used to select future national LASO committees implicitly warned the orthodox Communist parties they could be by-passed in favor of larger, more militant revolutionary groups in their countries. Significantly, no "old" Cuban Communists were included in Castro’s delegation to the LASO meeting. Obviously, then, LASO can afford Castro an additional and collective means of prodding the Soviets and the orthodox parties and even of forcing them to accept a greater degree of Communist militancy in the future than they would like in some Latin American countries.

*Worth mentioning here is the key organizational position in Cuban revolutionary planning that is occupied by Haydee Santamaria de Hart, Armando Hart’s wife. Mrs. Hart is not only director of the Casa de las Americas, she is also Secretary General of the LASO secretariat; and she is President of the Cuban national preparatory committee for the coming July-August 1967 LASO Conference.
3. The Outlook For the AALAPSO

The Soviets, their strategy at the Conference having failed miserably, subsequently went to great lengths to play down its significance for Latin American Communist strategy on the one hand, and on the other hand pursued other means to accomplish their central purpose in the solidarity game which is to wrest control of the Cairo-based AAPSO from the Chinese and prevent the Peking AAPSO conference scheduled for 1967. (A detailed discussion of the reactions of the OAS and its members to Soviet participation in the Tri-continental Conference and Soviet post-Conference policy will be found in a later section of this paper).

After the Conference Soviet, Indian, UAR and other like-minded AAPSO delegations met and worked out a provisional plan to try to settle AAPSO's future status through the latter's executive committee sessions in an effort to undercut Chinese plans. Chinese influence in AAPSO waned later in 1966 after Sukarno's downfall in Indonesia, and after the Japanese Communist party shifted away from Peking.

By February 1967 the pro-Soviet forces had succeeded in convening the Eighth AAPSO Council session in Cyprus, which was boycotted and denounced by Peking before it began. The Cyprus Council session shifted the Fifth AAPSO conference site from Peking to Algiers. The Chinese' principal point was that the Cyprus "revisionist" gathering had no authority to make the change, and Peking now appears intent on bolting the AAPSO and setting up its own rump organization.

The much-touted "Liberation Committee"—composed of delegates from Algeria, Ghana, Tanzania and Congo-Brazzaville in Africa; Guyana, Guatemala, Brazil, and Cuba in Latin America; and Japan, Cambodia, China, and the USSR in Asia—set up in the final marathon phase of the Tri-continental Conference reportedly was the result of a UAR attempt to give the Cubans something in return for Cuban acceptance of a Cairo headquarters for AALAPSO. Inclusion of the Soviets constituted a formal recognition of the USSR as an Asian power, a point of considerable importance.
to the Soviets in their polemics with the Chinese. It also gave the Soviets the means for influencing any Committee activity and perhaps ultimately for gaining a controlling influence over the Committee. The Soviets gained some long-run advantages both from their membership on the "Liberation Committee" and in the composition of the AALAPSO secretariat which—as part of the bargain to accept Havana as provisional secretariat headquarters—will serve future Soviet purposes better than some other composition would have done. The fact that the three principal contenders are members of this Committee militates against any active role for it for the time being; and, in fact, little has been heard of it or any deliberations or meetings it may have held since January 1966.*

The twelve-nation AALAPSO executive secretariat was officially constituted at a meeting in Havana in May 1966, under the chairmanship of its Cuban Secretary-General Osmani Cienfuegos, according to a Granma report. The same month a Cuban was sent to Cairo to head an AALAPSO liaison office with the AAPSO headquarters. Since then Havana has published and broadcast bulletins and resolutions issued by the AALAPSO Secretariat on a series of topics implementing resolutions of the Tri-continental Conference.

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* A November 19, 1966 Radio Havana broadcast reflected some movement by the "Liberation Committee", however. This statement announced plans to set up a guerrilla training school in each of the three continents. It said Cuba and North Korea had already offered their territories for such schools and that "other states" were soon expected to follow suit. This may refer to a Cuban-operated guerrilla facility in Congo-Brazzaville which apparently has grown rapidly since the Tri-continental Conference and, was supporting at least 200 Cuban guerrilla experts training cadres from Congo-Kinshasa, Angola, Gabon and neighboring areas.
The complicated lobbying and political horse-trading over organizational issues which the Tri-continental Conference entailed have been emphasized because they clearly epitomized the lines of the three-way Communist competition in Latin America. The fact that Sino-Cuban-Soviet and African disagreement over national liberation matters was so strong as to require three postponements and a Cuban tour de force to bring the Conference to an orderly formal close, speaks for itself despite portrayal of the Conference in Communist media as an epoch-making event. Like the secretariat established there, the victories of the various sides were all provisional, and at this writing it is not completely certain that the tri-continental organization forced through at Havana will survive its projected second conference in 1968.

C. The Orthodox Communists Are Not Impressed

1. Post-Havana Conference Developments

The dissatisfaction of the orthodox Communist parties with Castro's policies, which had been lulled in the months immediately following the November 1964 Havana Conference in the belief that the Cuban threat had been removed, reappeared as it became increasingly apparent in 1965 that in spite of "agreements" signed in Havana Castro had no intention of terminating his operations in several countries and that he clearly had put his own interpretation upon them.

Area parties pressed the CPSU for support in sponsoring another regional meeting--again under the guise of dealing with pro-Chinese influence in the hemisphere--to lay the Cuban ghost. The effort of the CPSU delegation at the Chilean party's Thirteenth National Congress to get general agreement on a political line, was probably made in part to accommodate the Latin parties. But the Soviets, having accomplished their own objective at the Havana Conference, were clearly
not interested in sponsoring another confrontation with the Cubans, and tactfully desisted in the face of Venezuelan, Cuban and Dominican refusal to accept formulations favoring peaceful national liberation methods. The CPSU delegation avoided getting embroiled in any controversial item during the general exchange at Santiago concerning the best time and place for an area meeting, and counseled that such discussions be postponed until later "when all were prepared for a full discussion."

The Venezuelan party wanted a meeting in Havana "as soon as possible". Most of the other parties preferred its convocation in Moscow in March 1966 at the time of the 23rd CPSU Congress. A five-party committee was reportedly chosen to work up an agenda for the gathering. Some of the area parties did get together in Moscow for discussions, but apparently no formal regional party meeting was held.

The emphasis on a regional Communist party meeting to be held in Havana under Cuban sponsorship in connection with the 1966 annual July 26 celebrations, and several countries prepared delegations to attend it. Discussed were the following:

A. Programs that Latin American CP's should be carrying out;
B. Programs of the Communist Party of Cuba;
C. A new means of helping Vietnam;
D. The situation in the Dominican Republic; and
E. The military coup in Argentina.

The projected meeting was not held because not all the area parties were present in Havana and because the Cubans --anticipating its purpose--had invited "other pro-Castro revolutionary groups" to participate, and the orthodox parties backed down from full-dress discussions of differences with them in the absence of firm Soviet backing. A confrontation of sorts nevertheless took place between Castro and some at least of the party delegations. A meeting in which Armando
Hart heaped scorn upon the orthodox party representatives for their incapacity to launch revolutions in Argentina, Chile, Brazil, and Venezuela, where he asserted conditions were already ripe for them. When the Chilean and Brazilian delegates strongly demurred, Castro, who was present, replied heatedly that had he been in the Brazilian PCB "General Castelo Branco would not be in power today." A donneybrook evidently developed, several delegates telling Castro to stay out of the affairs of Communist parties in other countries and concentrate on solving Cuban economic problems. These delegates invoked Castro's own recent charges against China of interference in Cuban affairs.

A Colombian PCC proposal for a party meeting later in the year, for discussion of "mutual problems," was vetoed by the Cubans; but some parties continued without success to formulate plans for another regional conference. A forceful orthodox Venezuelan party protest in late August against Cuban "factionalism" favoring the Douglas Bravo dissident FALN, provoked more urgent expressions of interest in a new conference by the Chilean, Brazilian, and other parties. The Chilean PCC noted Cuban influence in the Chilean Socialist Party, its partner in the FRAP electoral front*, while in Brazil PCB leader Prestes came out in favor of a bloc of Communist parties to oppose indiscriminate Cuban influence in Latin American guerrilla operations.

In December the Costa Rican PVP leadership made a proposal for dealing with the Cuban problem which had not been reported previously and about which more may likely be heard in the future because of its obvious appeal to the Soviets. Prefacing a report on the Chinese problem, PVP organization secretary Arnoldo Ferreto told a party

*In December 1966 leading Socialist Senator Salvador Allende Gossens had become a behind-the-scenes partner of a Cuban-sponsored biweekly magazine Punto Final, printed in Santiago, Chile, on a Socialist-controlled press, Prensa Latino Americana.
plenum that a serious problem existed in Latin America because of Cuban policies. He said many of the parties hoped that the next world Communist party meeting would produce an agreement denouncing the policy of armed revolution in Latin America (emphasis added) and that this step would bring Castro to modify his operations. The PVP plenum agreed to support such a proposal.

Barring some dramatic change of events in the hemisphere, it is unlikely the CPSU will give up its position that Castroist interference is primarily the responsibility of the area parties. About the best the Soviets offer their supporting parties was summed up when he said the PCC had been on the verge of openly criticizing Castroist meddling on several occasions but had remained silent for the sake of unity, even though his party expected further difficulties with Cuba. Suslov, told him that the Latin American Communist parties "would have to have patience with Castro". Suslov said the USSR had experienced "very trying times" because of Castro's intransigence, but by being patient the USSR had been able to exert some influence over him.

that widespread attention was being given a meeting of Latin American party delegates to the Bulgarian national party congress of the previous November, which was sponsored by the Venezuelan party delegation and at which the problem with Cuba was discussed. The discussion focussed on prospects for a Latin American party meeting in Havana at the time of the LASO conference scheduled for late July-early August 1967. Delegates from Venezuela, Chile, Brazil, Peru, Bolivia, Haiti, Mexico, Honduras, and the Dominican Republic--aside from Cuba--were reported in Sofia for the Bulgarian party congress. When approached on the issue, the Cuban delegate sidestepped by saying the proposal would have to be taken up directly with the Cuban party's national leadership.
2. Post Tricontinental Developments

I attended the 23rd CPSU Congress in Moscow from 29 March through 9 April 1966, summarized in the following two paragraphs, gives a good account of the mounting difficulties Castro faces in his drive for unilateral control of revolution in the hemisphere.

There was a noticeable coolness in Moscow between the other Latin American delegations, who did not even stay at the same hotel with the Cubans, and the Cuban delegation composed of Armando Hart, his wife Haydee Santamaría, Major Pedro Miret Prieto, and Leonel Soto. This was because of orthodox party resentment of the undisguised Cuban determination to dominate the LASO executive committee and LASO itself, the "negative attitude" of the Cubans toward the established Communist parties, and their efforts to impose a Cuban solution in each country without reference to the local party's views. Most Communist party delegates to the Tri-continental Conference, according to this source, never gave wholehearted support to the creation of LASO and--under Cuban pressure--only finally grudgingly endorsed it to avoid division within the Latin American Communist movement. Support for LASO and for Cuba came mainly from Guatemala and Venezuela and to a lesser degree from Guyana and the Dominican Republic. The rest of the Latin American parties are generally opposed to the Cuban concept of LASO and what they regard as Cuban attempts to "meddle in their affairs."

Because of Cuban insistence that the majority of the LASO executive committee members represent non-Communist parties, only two of the six (sic) countries concerned have named representatives--the Chilean PCCh, and the Venezuelan MIR.* Communist determination that the majority shall be regular party members in good standing, and mistrust of Cuban motives, have so far prevented the naming of the rest. If Cuban control proves absolute,

*The LASO executive committee is composed of nine country representatives (see page 55), not six, and they include Venezuela but not Chile.
it is likely that most parties will simply withdraw support from LASO and some may actively oppose LASO.

Reporting in 1966 of LASO progress confirms the information summarized above that the Cubans are having real problems with the orthodox parties in their efforts to establish a LASO organizational framework throughout Latin America. Since the Colombian PCC formed a "National Committee for Solidarity with National Liberation Movements Throughout the World" in February 1966, formation of the additional projected national LASO committees has been very slow, as most of the orthodox parties have either dragged their feet or proved completely unwilling to share national committee control with local Castroist organizations.*

In September 1966--after its falling out with Havana because of Cuban support of Venezuelan Communist dissident guerrillas--the Venezuelan PCV politburo stated its views about Cuban domination within LASO:

Our party, in accord with several other Latin American parties, holds that LASO should be governed by the following principles: the organization of the national committees should be the outgrowth of agreement among the forces of the country, without interference of the organizing commissions. The organization...should not be a supranational organization providing direction, which would be impractical and possibly lead to failure.

It also asserted that the Venezuelan delegation to the Tricontinental Conference neither "gave expression to" nor

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The Colombian delegate to LASO, Manuel Cepeda Vargas, a member of the orthodox PCC, was deliberately selected to keep an eye on Castroist LASO efforts in Colombia.

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defended "the political position of our Party"—thereby disowning even further orthodox PCV approval of LASO.

As late as December 1966 leftist groups in Uruguay—a member of the LASO executive committee—were disputing the claim of the orthodox PCU's front organization, FIDEL, that it constituted Uruguay's national LASO committee. When Carlos Rafael Rodriguez was in Uruguay in mid-December 1966 as Cuban representative to the FAO, a group of some five radical organizations, after meeting with him, cited statements by Rodriguez that FIDEL was not the national committee but had responsibility for convening a meeting of all interested groups to decide upon one. As of January 1967, however, the PCU clearly had no intention of sharing control of its FIDEL-based national LASO committee with the country's other "minority" left-wing bodies.

Formation of a Chilean LASO committee was stalled as of November 1966 because of Chilean PCCh unwillingness to accede to demands by its Socialist party partner in the FRAP* to include other Chilean revolutionary groups, such as the small MIR, in the national committee. On January 24, 1967 El Siglo, the PCCh newspaper, announced that formation of the Chilean committee "was being postponed."

—*In July 1966 the secretary-general of the Chilean Socialist party—a consistent supporter of LASO—had this to say to the Chilean PCCh: "What do you think about this matter [the importance of an operative LASO]? In our view, it seems that the Chilean Communist party, like those in Argentina and Uruguay, lacks any serious interest in promoting this undertaking, or at least is seeking to limit its action to a mere traditional form of solidarity. For our part, we do not want the national organ of the LASO to be...a mere appendix of the FRAP..." (El Sol, No. 311, Montevideo, 8 July 1966, pp. 4-5, 7)
Continued Cuban preference for the Mexican National Liberation Movement (MLN)--led by Heberto Castillo Martínez*--over the Mexican Communist Party (PCM) has caused serious differences between the two Mexican groups. After learning that the Cubans had given the MLN responsibility for Mexican preparations for the 1967 LASO Conference, the PCM ordered all organizations in which it had influence, and which were cooperating with the MLN, to withdraw, in order to show up to the Cubans the actual small size of the MLN. The PCM at its Eighth Plenum in September 1966 noted PCM differences with the Cuban CP because of the latter’s ties with the MLN. As of February 1967 the MLN leadership had begun to feel the effects of the PCM campaign and was reportedly pessimistic about the future of the Movement. The PCM is determined that unless a PCM member controls the Mexican LASO committee the PCM will dissociate itself from LASO.

In March 1966 a top director of the Brazilian PCB talked in Prague with Carlos Rafael Rodriguez following the 23rd CPSU Congress, and told Rodriguez that the PCB would offer "only outward solidarity with LASO and the tri-continental" development. The Brazilian strongly criticized Cuban support of Leonel Brizola, a Brazilian revolutionary living in Uruguay, as worse than Cuban support of the Brazilian peasant leader, Francisco Julião Arruda de Paula, in 1964. In August the PCB Sao Paulo State Committee expressed its private conviction that the Tri-continental Conference had harmed the cause of international Communism more than it had helped it.

A Prensa Latina report of 24 July 1966 noted formation of a national LASO committee by the Argentine Popular Vanguard Party (PVP) of Abel Alexis Lattendorf, the National Liberation Movement of Ismael Vinas, a "Political Youth Group" composed of youths of "several political parties"

*Castillo headed the basically pro-Cuban Mexican delegation to the Tri-continental Conference.
that included Peronists and Christian Democrats; the Peronist Revolutionary Action group led by John William Cooke—pro-Cuban Peronist who headed the Argentine delegation to the Tricontinental—and the Buenos Aires Union of Journalists. The announcement reported by Prensa Latina appeared in Socialismo de Vanguardia, official organ of the PVP. It said further that the PCA and its labor and youth fronts did not attend three preparatory meetings to which they had been invited, and that it was finally decided to organize the LASO committee without them. The PCA was charged with using “every kind of argument” against PVP and national Liberation Movement attendance at the Tri-continental Conference. This development could presage an official PCA boycott of the coming LASO conference.

In October 1966 Granma noted a recent LASO executive committee meeting had approved a draft agenda for the LASO conference, and published its outline. The Conference’s central business, according to the outline, will be analysis of United States’ political and military “intervention” and economic and ideological “penetration” of Latin America; development of a common strategy for all Latin American revolutionary movements to combat these phenomena; defense of the Cuban revolution; elaboration of more effective ways for generating armed struggle against U.S. “imperialism”; and agreement upon a LASO statute of organization. The executive committee had according to Granma prepared and circulated throughout the hemisphere an extensive questionnaire designed to elicit broad categories of data about U.S. activities in Latin America for use at the conference.

Havana has continued to publish reports of LASO committee proceedings in optimistic tones which give the impression that conference preparations are proceeding without problems,* and that a fully structured hemispheric

*For example, arrival of LASO delegates Hector Perez Marcano and Silvia Moreno from Venezuela, Leopoldo Bruera from Uruguay, Lal Bahadur from Guyana, and Aluizio Palhano from Brazil, was announced in Granma on 27 January (footnote continued on page 68)
As the date of the conference approaches, it can safely be predicted that the struggle for control of national committees between the orthodox Communist parties and the Castroist organizations will intensify and Latin American Communist resistance to the Cuban intent to employ LASO as a command organization to dictate future revolutionary policy in the hemisphere to stiffen. It is possible that between now and Conference time the orthodox parties could even unite sufficiently to disrupt it or cause it to fail altogether. But this is not likely in the absence of a Soviet directive or significantly greater backing from the CPSU than the parties have been given thus far in their recent moves to deal with Havana. Soviet intentions toward the AALAPSO and LASO's usefulness to them in such an expanded solidarity body are not yet clear, and probably will not be until after Peking moves in the AAPSO framework become clearer. It therefore seems more likely that the first LASO Conference will bring together delegates from area Communist parties and Castroist revolutionary groups, a majority of whom will represent groups responsive to Havana. The Communist party bloc will again be on the defensive, playing a moderating role and keeping its hand in the Cuban game until the Soviets come to a decision. The Soviets and the orthodox parties can in any case be expected to play down the significance of the Conference and any militant resolutions it may issue, as they did the Tri-continental Conference.

(footnote continued from page 67)

1967; and on the 13th of the month the Cuban newspaper mentioned a declaration of a "Paraguayan National Solidarity Committee", issued in Montevideo, greeting the first anniversary of the Tri-continental Conference. On 8 March Guatemalan delegate Afmundo Palma made a statement over Radio Havana backing the LASO Conference.
The growing Cuban involvement in some African liberation movements and new African nations and Cuban strengthening of ties with some East Asian Communist regimes—largely since the Tri-continental Conference—are of interest here because they suggest that Cuba is actively seeking some kind of a third force of small powers within the world Communist movement.*

Havana has regularly invited African revolutionary organizations to attend special Cuban events such as the annual 26th of July celebration. Congolese dissidents were among the first to get Cuban guerrilla training and to have Cuban advisors attached to their field units. In 1965 the Angolan MPLA, one of two principal nationalist groups, began getting similar support. After the Tri-continental Conference, where Castro personally paid great attention to Amilcar Cabral, a Portuguese Guinean rebel leader, evidence turned up of probable Cuban military support being extended to his group through Guinea. In Congo-Brazzaville Havana has made a major contribution to maintaining a radical regime in power. Cuba officially and publicly confirmed its military support to the Brazzaville regime for the first time in Granma on 29 June 1966. Earlier, in Congo-Kinshasa, the Cubans were very active with the rebels at the heights of the 1964–1965 rebellion, especially on the northwestern shore of Lake Tanganyika. In Guinea Cubans are active in training pro-Nkrumah Ghanaian exiles. There is some evidence of Cuban training of

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*Castro and Guevara had been impressed with revolutionary prospects in Africa at least since 1961 when they offered limited guerrilla training to several African extremist groups. The Cubans initially gained a strong foothold in Algeria, and held it until Ben Bella’s downfall in June 1965. Thereafter the foothold shifted to Ghana until Nkrumah’s regime disappeared, and it is currently centered in Congo-Brazzaville.
Nigerians, Malians, Tanzanians, and--in February 1967--of Burundi police and militia in Bujumbura.

The makings of a "Havana-Pyongyang-Hanoi Axis" began to appear following a Dorticos-led official Cuban visit in Hanoi and Pyongyang during October and November 1966, which featured red-carpet receptions of the Cuban delegation by the North Vietnamese and North Korean top leadership. Earlier in the year North Korean and Japanese Communists had joined Rumania in a neutral attitude toward the Sino-Soviet struggle within the international Communist movement; after a Rumanian shift to an independent stance in the CPSU's dispute with the Chinese party. At the Bulgarian party congress the Rumanian, Cuban, North Korean and North Vietnamese delegates were silent on the world conference issue floated by Zivkhov.*

It is clear that the Cuban build-up in Africa responded to Castro's interest in establishing his credentials as a revolutionary leader in the underdeveloped world. He undertook this where it was easiest at the time for him to do so--namely, in Africa, where he could count on full Algerian cooperation. African acceptance of Cuban aid would enlarge Cuban guerrilla experience and enhance Castro's revolutionary luster in Latin America and Asia as well. It would also help justify Cuba's claim that Latin America deserved parity treatment in the AAPSO solidarity framework. His African relations helped Castro break out of the diplomatic isolation his country was increasingly facing in the western hemisphere and among NATO member countries.

*For a more detailed analysis of the Cuban, North Korean, and North Vietnamese relationship, see ESAU XXX, titled "The Sino-Soviet Struggle in the World Communist Movement Since Khrushchev's Fall".

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Castro early took a violent line toward U.S. involvement in the Vietnam conflict and the lack of unified Communist bloc response to it. On 3 March 1965 he delivered a clear rebuke to the major bloc powers for inaction in support of North Vietnam, professing regret that Cuba was not closer to North Vietnam so that it could "help them with whatever we could", and asserting it a duty of all socialist countries to give all-out aid to the DRV. Three days later he announced with fanfare a Cuban donation of 10,000 metric tons of sugar to North Vietnam as a "modest" demonstration of Cuban militant solidarity, and linked Cuban interest in the DRV with Cuban full preparedness to defend their island against U.S. aggression, as the North Vietnamese were doing.* In a 14 March speech Castro sharpened his earlier criticism of the lack of bloc support for the DRV, ascribing it to the Sino-Soviet division, although he nowhere named either Moscow or Peking. Castro's speech reflected the essential Cuban fear that in some future situation in which Cuba might be the "imperialist" victim it too would find itself unaided in spite of Soviet and bloc commitments to do so. This speech also contained Castro's famous contemptuous reference to the Sino-Soviet war of words as a "Byzantine discord" in which Cuba wanted no part, and a reiteration of the point made in his earlier January 1965 speech that "we are not and will never be satellites of anyone."

*Castro has followed up with an active Cuban program of military aid to the DRV. Early in 1966 he was canvassing the Cuban armed forces for volunteers to serve in Vietnam, notes assignment of nine Cuban military attaches to the Cuban embassy in Hanoi, and appointment of one of Cuba's top missile experts, Major Julio Garcia Olivera, as Cuban ambassador there.
Official Cuban-North Korean relations warmed rapidly during the spring and summer of 1966, Granma regularly reporting the travels of Cuban and North Korean delegations and mutually flattering exchanges between Cuban leaders and the North Korean ambassador and other North Korean spokesmen. By mid-year the relations of the two countries were described as "never better."

In his 5 October report to the Korean Workers Party Conference, Premier Kim Il-sung gave unusual attention to Cuba, describing it as "a continuation of the Great October Revolution in Latin America" that had "brought about a turning point in the revolutionary movement in Latin America." Not only did he thus employ terms to describe the Cuban phenomenon which were identical with those used by Castro himself, but his description of the independent stance being taken by the North Korean Workers Party toward both Chinese and Soviet pressures was remarkably like some of Castro's own assertions of Cuban independence in the dispute. The North Korean premier came explicitly to the defense of Cuba in its relations with other "socialist countries":

The Communist Party of Cuba knows the Cuban question better than anyone else, and it is the Communist Party of Cuba and no one else that can map out correct policies to suit the factual conditions in Cuba. Every socialist country is duty bound to respect the policies pursued by the Communist Party of Cuba and support the struggle of the Cuban people. No attempt should be made to exert pressure upon the Communist Party and people of Cuba and split the revolutionary forces in Latin America.

Kim effusively praised Cuba as marching in the vanguard of the anti-imperialist struggle, correctly leading revolution and construction in its country, and "correctly" striving for the unity of the international Communist movement. Like Castro, he condemned Yugoslavia, refusing to recognize it as a member of the international Communist movement, and named U.S. "imperialism" as the principal Communist enemy.
The build-up in mutual admiration between Havana and Pyongyang intensified with the Dorticos official visit. Early in 1967 Kunrocha, organ of the Korean Workers Party central committee, carried an article entitled "Cuba—Standard-bearer of Socialism in the Western Hemisphere," which repeated Kim's assertion that the Cuban revolution is a continuation in Latin America of the Great October Revolution.

1. The Cubans Flag Moscow's Front Groups

Cuban determination to challenge the "aged, outmoded, European-based, Soviet-oriented" Communist status quo was made clear at the Seventh World assembly of the WFDY held in Sofia from 6 through 16 June 1966. The Cuban Communist Youth (UJC) delegation, in an obviously carefully prepared presentation reportedly dictated by Castro himself, attacked the WFDY for its narrow sectarianism, complaining it had not approved the Tri-continental Conference's declarations as "the basis for the work of the Federation in those three continents"; of not bringing in the youth of "the armed fronts of Venezuela and Guatemala" although invitations had been extended to "organizations of another nature"; and of opposing affiliation of the youth section of the MR-1J4 with the WFDY.

The Cubans strongly argued for Havana as the site of the next, twice-postponed, Ninth World Youth Festival, against the obvious desire of the Soviet and pro-Soviet delegations (including Brazil) to hold it in Sofia in 1968. The Cubans finally demanded that it be held in some Asian, African, or Latin American country and not in a European country, and that a Cuban be named permanent WFDY secretary-general to replace the traditional selection of a French student for that post. The Cubans, in the wake of the May 1966 invasion scare, also proposed a WFDY resolution pledging arms and men to Cuba similar to one voted for North Vietnam, but the proposal was rejected by all except the Chinese, Israeli, and the pro-Boumedienne Algerian delegations. Finally, the Cubans insisted that the WFDY be radically decentralized on a tricontinental basis, its present headquarters to serve merely to
coordinate activities of three WFDY presidencies to be located respectively in Latin America, Africa, and Europe.

A clandestine Italian Communist party (PCI) report of Cuban private statements at Sofia brought out Cuban intentions to continue to insist on WFDY decentralization and the decentralization of the other international fronts, because those organizations have in the Cuban view succumbed to "bureaucratic immobilism" and are ignoring the "real problems" of the "third world" and the emerging nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The Cuban delegate at Sofia noted with some surprise hostility by the Soviet Komsomol representatives because of implicit Cuban criticism of Soviet efforts to disassociate themselves from the militancy engendered by the Tri-continental Conference.

After the IUS had agreed in February 1966 to attend and support the Fourth Latin American Student Congress (CLAE), which it believed would be held in Chile, the Cuban FEU reneged on an apparent understanding to this effect that it had with the Chilean UFUCH and, at a Cuban-dominated preparatory committee meeting in Havana in April, managed to schedule the CLAE to be held in Havana from 29 July through 9 August. The pro-Soviet forces in the IUS wished to avoid holding the Havana CLAE because they saw it as an attempt by the Cubans to make it a "junior" Tri-continental Conference that would push the Cuban line of violent revolution in Latin America, and therefore detrimental to Soviet aims in the hemisphere. In spite of efforts to do so (the IUS vote on providing financial support to CLAE had deadlocked at 7 to 7) the Soviets by June saw they could not block it without a great loss of face for the Cubans. They adopted a strategy of attempting to "control" the Cubans and the orientation of the CLAE proceedings by encouraging moderate student elements to attend. Cuban success in achieving control of the CLAE proceedings was in large part because of the work of the Cuban IUS Vice President, who apparently acted on his own and in secret in Prague during February and March 1966 in arranging the Havana preparatory committee meeting. He kept the pressure on by strongly criticizing the IUS for what he termed its "anti-Latin Americanism".
Soviet fears were fully justified. Even though Chile did not attend, the Bolivians were absent, and the Brazilians arrived late, and there was far less Latin American student support for the CLAE than there would have been if the preparatory committee members had not split, the Cubans brought together a majority of Latin American national student unions for the event. Not only did Congress resolutions explicitly support the Tri-continental Conference, stress the need for armed struggle in Latin America, and urge students to take up arms against "Yankee Imperialism"; it was also decided to hold a tri-continental solidarity meeting of students of the three continents under the auspices of the AALAPSO Executive Secretariat then established in Havana. Moreover a Continental Latin American Organization of Students (OCLAE) was formed with headquarters in Havana to coordinate hemisphere student activities. A Cuban was selected to head the permanent OCLAE secretariat, with representatives of Venezuela, Panama, Uruguay, Puerto Rico, Guadaloupe and the Dominican Republic named as secretaries. It is significant that the CLAE was ignored by the Soviet press except for a brief reference to the decision to establish a permanent organization. On the other hand, NCNA (China attended the CLAE as an observer) hailed the event as a defeat of "pro-Soviet" delegates attempting to place the OCLAE "into the orbit of the IUS"; but NCNA coverage also noted Cuban efforts to block Chinese initiatives at the CLAE. Early in 1967 two Soviet Komsomol representatives were reported in Chile as a result of a promise made by Soviet IUS representatives the previous November to support the Chilean UFUCH against a prospective Cuban effort to have UFUCH expelled from the IUS at the next IUS congress.
IV. The Soviet Response

A. Parrying the Chinese Thrust

During 1963 the CPSU's problems in Latin America intensified and became more complicated under the pressure of the direct Chinese challenge to its authority within the Latin American Communist movement. The Soviets had to cope with an unpredictable Cuban leadership whose free-wheeling revolutionary tactics brought official repression not of the pro-Castroists but in most cases of the USSR's own supporters in the area—the various orthodox Communist parties. This was happening just when Moscow was demanding the use of strong measures against the pro-Chinese factions emerging within the area's Communist movement, and more than ever required a broader and more forthright defense of the CPSU line on the part of the "old reliables" in the hemisphere.

Because individual party relations with the CPSU varied, and because Moscow had never been able to establish the high degree of control over all the parties that it had in other areas, the Soviet party mainly relied on a number of veteran Communist party leaderships for its leverage on the rest. In middle America the Costa Rican and Salvadoran parties, and in South America those of Brazil, Chile, Uruguay,* and Argentina, were among the most important CPSU bellwethers. These parties have traditionally maintained very close liaison on problems of interpreting and implementing shifts of the CPSU line among the area parties. Under the pressures of the growing struggle with Peking, the Soviets resorted to more direct tactics. At the Czechoslovakian and Hungarian national party congress in late 1962, and especially the

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*The PCU first jumped on the CPSU bandwagon on 12 December 1961 in a condemnation of Albania's party leadership and the support given it by the Chinese Communists ratifying the line taken by its delegation in Moscow.
January 1963 East German SED national congress in Berlin, the Soviets convened meetings of Latin American party delegates and attempted through Luis Corvalan, PCCh secretary general, to force general acceptance of resolutions backing the anti-Chinese case. All of the hemisphere party delegates present at the Berlin congress except the Cuban and Venezuelan parties, signed these documents, but some did so apparently only reluctantly because they lacked the information needed to make judgments on the issues in contention, and had doubts about whether their party's central committee would approve taking sides (and, in the cases of those parties having strong pro-Chinese sectors, whether the leadership could do so).

In its 14 July reply to the Chinese the CPSU made very clear its desire that the parties should side openly and unequivocally with the Soviet position. Several Latin American parties, among them the Chilean and Nicaraguan, had earlier issued acceptable statements of support and, after July most of the others--again excepting Cuba and Venezuela--responded with some official formulation condemning Chinese "splittism", supporting Soviet policy during the Cuban missile crisis, and sometimes including statements supporting the partial nuclear test-ban treaty--which Peking had quickly condemned. The small Panamanian party (PDP) notably did not issue any pro-Soviet statement until October 1965.

Soviet efforts to force the Latin American Communist movement into line with its position were not completely effective. Some party central committees could be induced to do no more than issue heavily qualified formulations whose main thrust was basically an appeal to both China and the USSR to negotiate their differences bilaterally and not drag other parties into the quarrel. Latin American inherent individualism and lack of discipline, and a genuine conviction of many area Communists that taking sides could only weaken further the main strength of the
international movement--its image of unity--added to Soviet suppression of general information about the dispute and Chinese factionalism, to water down the response to Moscow's initial anti-Peking drive in the hemisphere.

1. Strengthening Moscow's Hemisphere Reserves

Besides instructing area parties to stop supporting Chinese propaganda operations in the hemisphere, the Soviets began more extensive briefings of reliable Latin American Communists through party central committees in 1963. But Moscow's effort to conserve its authority and prestige among area Communists was most evident in its stepped-up dispatch of senior party officials to key Latin American countries and in the increasingly high-level composition of the Soviet delegations sent to the area.**

**As early as 1960 Cuba and Brazil had led the other Latin American parties at the 81-party Moscow Conference in proposing formulations for the final communique that strongly emphasized this point. A report of August 1964 detailing the Mexican PCM's stand on the matter is a good example of the implicit or tacit opposition of a good many of the area parties otherwise loyal to the CPSU. In it the PCM's secretary general said the party had decided to send a delegation to the CPSU-proposed world conference, and the delegation would support the CPSU, but it did not favor expulsion of the Chinese from the world Communist movement, nor did it favor a break in party relations between the CCP and other parties and would work to prevent such a break and support any efforts among other delegations to improve CCP-CPSU relations. This stand by the PCM hardened as it has become more apparent that neither side seeks reconciliation.

**Further evidence that the CPSU had run into significant resistance to its proposed world conference was the fact that A. P. Kirilenko, a member of the CPSU Presidium, speaking at the Thirteenth National Congress of the Chilean PCCh in October 1965, carefully avoided any mention of an international meeting of Communist parties of the world. The occasion, a congress of a pro-Soviet party, should have called for a reference to it.

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In Bolivia, for example, a group of TASS newsmen who arrived in La Paz on 27 September 1963 included Mikhail Kudachkin, ostensibly a correspondent for Problems of Modern History, a Soviet magazine. Kudachkin met secretly with Mario Monje Molina and other members of the PCB national secretariat, describing himself as a representative of the Latin American section of the CPSU Central Committee's Foreign Department. He was mainly concerned to learn if any organized Chinese factionalism was present within the PCB. He also asked the PCB leadership whether it had received and was studying "information documents" on the dispute, apparently furnished by the Soviets; and he requested the PCB to select two central committee members to go to Moscow for "detailed" study of the Sino-Soviet differences.

Kudachkin also plainly asked the Bolivians why the PCB had failed to make a public declaration upon the ideological dispute. That Monje had some time before been instructed by "a Communist party" --probably the CPSU--to notify the Chilean PCCh of the date when it intended to issue such a statement. In late September Volodia Teitelboim Volosky, a PCCh Political Commission member, went to La Paz to pressure the CPB diplomatically to hasten its issuance and, with Monje's approval, visited PCB regional committees where he proselytized for the Soviet side. Monje took the position with Kudachkin and with his Latin American colleagues, that the PCB would make the required statement at its next national congress, then promised for October. But Monje, afraid such a congress would be used to oust him, kept putting it off.*

*Moscow's concern over the impact of Peking's militant campaign upon the Latin American Communist movement was also reflected in remarks made about September 1963 by a Soviet diplomat to a Cuban official in Geneva, acknowledging that there is "great danger that Latin America will fall under Chinese Communist influence." It was also reflected in requests to the other Latin American parties, in the spring of 1963, to "lend full support" to the Sixth (footnote continued on page 80)
By December 1963, Ivan Ribeiro, described as a high official in the Brazilian PCB, was in La Paz to apply more pressure on Monje and the party national secretariat for the promised pro-Moscow statement, arguing against the need to wait for a national congress in order to do so.

In September 1963, the Soviets sent four senior party officials to Uruguay on the occasion of the PCU's 43rd anniversary celebrations set for early October. The

(footnote continued from page 79)

National Congress of the Brazilian PCB, then being scheduled for late 1963, where a meeting of delegates might be used to justify a hemisphere movement against the Chinese. Several CPSU leaders at that time told the Colombian PCC's organizational secretary of their fears the Chinese sought to try to organize a "Fourth Internationale" with the Albanians and other parties. Monje was in part unwilling to come out for the CPSU because he believed doing so would harm his relationship with Havana. In May 1963 the Soviets had rebuked Monje for "interference in the internal affairs of other Communist parties" because of his participation in a Castro-inspired South American revolutionary plan, affecting Peru and Argentina, that he had not coordinated with the Communist party leaderships in either of those countries. This Castroist operation is discussed below. Soviet concern over Monje's Castroist ties, as well as its desire to line the PCB up on Moscow's side in the dispute with China, was very likely an important reason behind the unusual efforts made to commit the PCB in the international polemic. The PCB's Second Congress was finally held from 30 March to 2 April 1964 and did issue a communiqué that censured Chinese dogmatism and condemned Chinese splitting activities. Monje managed to preserve his control, but a year later, in April 1965, the PCB split and a parallel pro-Chinese PCB emerged in Bolivia.
members of the Soviet delegation, all ideological and propaganda experts, were led by Vasili P. Stepanov, a central committee candidate member and chief editor of Kom- munist, the CPSU central committee's authoritative journal. The others were V.G. Korionov, deputy head of the CPSU central committee's section for liaison with non-bloc parties; P. A. Rodionov, chief editor of the CPSU's propaganda journal, Agitator; and V. E. Tikhmenev, a "journalist" who attended the PChU congress of 1962.

During their long three-week visit in Uruguay, the Soviet delegation planned to visit various PChU units including some outside Montevideo. Stepanov gave a radio address in which he stressed the "completely natural" exchanges of fraternal delegations—in other words, a custom was being established. Korionov made a strong declaration that the PChU and CPSU stood "shoulder to shoulder" in the fight against the Chinese, part of a major effort to bolster the PChU leadership just then feeling the effects of an internal party struggle based on the Sino-Soviet issue.

Two years later, in early October 1965, the CPSU sent a delegation headed by Vladimir I. Stepakov, Chairman of the CPSU Central Committee's Section for Agitation and Propaganda, to the PChU's 45th anniversary celebration, demonstrating considerable continued relatively high-level CPSU interest in the PChU. Soviet journalists D.P. Goryenov and V.I. Chernyshev also attended. The Soviet press featured extensive, laudatory coverage, unlike former routine notices of congratulations. But the Soviets were unable to use this occasion for a meeting of Latin American Communist party leaders, as they reportedly hoped to do.

Most impressive of all was Soviet participation in the PChU's Thirteenth National Congress in October 1965. A 17-man delegation, headed by Andrey P. Kirilenko, CPSU Politburo member and secretary of the CPSU central committee, that included five Soviet "staff members" was flown to Santiago in a special Soviet aircraft. Kirilenko was almost constantly in attendance and discussed at length many aspects of the Communist movement with Latin American party delegations, both in Congress sessions and privately. One of the Soviet delegates was Nikolay V. Mostovets,
chief of the Latin American section of the CPSU central committee's foreign department. This was the first time a CPSU Politburo member is known to have attended a Latin American Communist party congress. At Santiago the Soviets finally convened the parallel meeting of Latin American delegates they had been trying to hold. The Soviets widely expressed in private their continuing concern over penetrations "of other forces" in Communist ranks. One reliable source said this referred to pro-Chinese Communist groups, but it probably also referred to Castroist operations.*

B. Cuba: A Special Case

The Castro phenomenon is not the first time the Soviets in Latin America have had to cope with an outsider crashing into the international Communist movement over the heads of regular pro-Moscow Communist party leaderships. In 1932 Luis Carlos Prestes, then a rebellious Brazilian army captain, was invited to Moscow and made a member of the Comintern executive without ever having carried a Brazilian Communist party card. About 1940

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*Kirilenko and Mostovets chaired the meeting of the Latin American delegates to the Congress on 14 October where they clearly hoped a common policy of support for the CPSU line on the "continental revolution" could be developed. When this proved impossible because of Cuban, Venezuelan and Dominican refusal to adhere to the "peaceful" line, the discussion moved to the question of when and where "the next meeting of Latin American Communist Parties" should take place. See page 59.
the Soviets were cultivating Lombardo Toledano, a key trade union figure in Mexico and in hemisphere labor activities, even though he had never been and never became a member of either of Mexico's two small Communist parties with both of which Moscow then retained relations. Later in the decade Moscow allowed Toledano to build up his own Marxist party in Mexico.

There are of course important differences between Castro and the Prestes and Toledano cases. Castro is the effective leader of a state. He has important charismatic influence over some of the Communists in other Latin American countries. And, he joined the socialist "club" just when the emerging Sino-Soviet split brought the world Communist movement into new circumstances favoring his independent stance and policy of maneuver.

The most urgent Soviet task in these new circumstances was to prevent Castro from joining forces with Peking, with which he had much greater affinity in terms of revolutionary stance; and to deny him use of the emerging pro-Chinese Communist movement in Latin America as a revolutionary base. Because Castro's own revolutionary operations had direct disruptive effects upon Moscow's own hemisphere movement, the Soviets had to deal with this additional complicating factor in ways that would soften if not terminate the Castroist impact—but without pushing Cuba into the waiting arms of the Chinese. In the first endeavor Moscow has been successful, but not enough that it can yet afford to relax. Nor has Soviet success proved effective enough to ensure control by their Communists in all Latin American countries vis-à-vis the Castroists. As of this writing, the CPSU is attempting to gain a fuller measure of control in Guatemala than it has enjoyed for years, after the recent violent death under unexplained circumstances of Luis Turcios Lima, a pro-Castro guerrilla leader. With the formation in Colombia of the FARC, a guerrilla arm under the political direction of the regular PCC, the Soviet party is in a better position to influence a Colombian guerrilla movement too heavily penetrated by and responsive to
Cuban direction for Soviet liking.* But in Venezuela, the main Cuban revolutionary target since the beginning, Soviet efforts to bring the Cuban-supported FALN under the control of the pro-Moscow wing of the PCV leadership have so far failed. The CPSU has not even been able to maneuver this wing back into control of the local Communist movement.** The case of Venezuela will be examined at the end of this section of the paper.

1. The Sovietization of Castro

Castro's surprise visit to the USSR in April and May 1963 at the invitation of Khrushchev was a milestone in the Sino-Soviet struggle. In Moscow Castro was given an unprecedented red-carpet reception, and the flattering attention and treatment accorded him during his stay made clear this was a political courtship of major importance to the Soviet leadership. Castro's personal admiration for Khrushchev was played to the hilt by the Russians. The visit occurred in the midst of the 1963 Chinese Spring offensive, shortly after the Cubans had taken a strong neutral stand in East Berlin in response to concerted Soviet efforts to commit all the Latin American parties to join a chorus of denunciation of the Chinese. Its timing, before the formal Soviet-Chinese meetings set for

*As of March 1967, however, Castro appeared still to be in effective control of an important Colombian guerrilla force, the National Liberation Army (ELN), and was using it as a means to compete strenuously with the PCC for authority over the FARC, apparently with some success, for clandestine reporting reflected PCC difficulties in achieving clear-cut control of the FARC.

**But see page 110 for indications the Russians may now have achieved some effective measure of control in the PCV itself.
July, gave the Soviets the maximum benefits of any support they could get from Castro for their position.

On 23 May, toward the end of his visit, Castro signed a joint Soviet-Cuban communique that endorsed every major Soviet foreign policy position, including the Soviet line on revolutionary strategy, where Cuban and Soviet views probably differed the most. Even though after his return to Cuba Castro emphasized his independence in an aggressive 26 July speech featuring a militant call for Guevara-style armed revolt in the "inevitable" Latin American revolution which Cuba would lead, Moscow had stolen a march on Peking and obtained public Cuban support that it had been unable to get at a party-to-party level in East Berlin. As noted earlier, the evidence is clear that private Chinese concern over the Sovietization of Cuba increased dramatically following the issuance of the May communique.

An important follow-up victory in the Soviet effort to split Castro off from Peking came in January 1964 when Castro again went to Moscow, this time with his hat in his hand because of the gravity of the Cuban sugar harvest failure. Included in the 23 January Soviet-Cuban communique was a Cuban endorsement not only of the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence as the "general line of foreign policy of socialist countries", but also an explicit condemnation of "splitting activities", Cuban approval of CPSU measures to end differences within the world Communist movement; and--finally--Cuban approval of Soviet adherence to the Moscow limited test ban treaty of the previous summer. The much stronger economic leverage gained as a result of the long-term sugar purchase agreement (for the period 1965-1970) concluded in January increased Moscow's capacity for disciplining Cuba and formed a major element in Soviet pressures increasingly exerted upon the Cuban leadership as the year progressed, pressures that culminated in tough economic aid talks and the crucial Havana Conference of Communist parties in November.
2. The Andes: South America's Sierra Maestra

Castro has mainly confined his export of armed revolution to Middle America and the Caribbean basin countries of South America, most likely because of economic and logistics restrictions rather than lack of interest. There is good evidence that as early as 1962 the Cuban leader had prepared a "master plan" for launching 'spontaneous' revolutions in at least three South American countries--Argentina, Bolivia, and Peru--from a central base in the Bolivia highlands, and that the Cubans made strenuous efforts in 1963 and 1964 to put this plan into effect. Its existence was forecast in Castro's public boast that he would convert the Andean plateau into the "Sierra Maestra of South America."

The major elements of the plan were deals made, on the one hand with Mario Monje Molina, first secretary of the Bolivian PCB, and with Bolivian President Victor Paz Estenssoro, through the Cuban Embassy in La Paz, for use of Bolivian territory as a guerrilla safe haven and staging area; and on the other, intensive negotiations, through the Cuban embassy in Montevideo, with certain left-wing Peronists to enlist Peron's support in creating an Argentine movement along the lines of the Venezuelan FALN rural-urban guerrilla-terrorist force. The plan failed primarily because of CPSU and orthodox Latin American Communist party opposition; withdrawal of support by Peron--whose principal interest in it was its possible aid for his political campaign in the July 1963 Argentine national elections; the decimation and capture of the guerrillas themselves; and the loss of Cuban diplomatic bases in Bolivia and Uruguay in August and September 1964.

There is no real evidence Castro has ever fully abandoned his Andean dream because of his initial failure. In fact, in November 1966 Monje reportedly traveled to Cuba to discuss guerrilla warfare plans with the Cuban government; after his return late in December he set about hand-picking his own guerrilla force, obviously with full Cuban backing, without consulting the PCB, an indication that Castro may feel the time has arrived for another try.
at implementing his insurrectionary theory of national liberation in the area. Repeated but unconfirmed reports during 1966 of the presence of Guevara in the Andean plateau may be related to this development. In March reports of a Cuban-trained Bolivian guerrilla band clashing with Bolivian army units were received, and the situation there was unclear at this writing.

Some time in 1962, to recapitulate the first Andean project, the Cuban embassy in La Paz approached President Paz Estenssoro with a request for support in affording use of Bolivia as a staging area for a guerrilla force to invade Peru; Paz Estenssoro promised his cooperation. Even as Castro was visiting the USSR in May 1963, a small group of about twenty to forty guerrillas crossed from Bolivia into Peru near Puerto Maldonado and Cobija. They had arrived in Bolivia in December 1962, after training in Cuba. Bolivian Communist involvement through Monje, who acted independently of other PCB leaders, was an agreement to do nothing to affect the stability of the Paz Estenssoro regime. The Cuban embassy gave the PCB money to support, arm, and launch the guerrilla invasion into Peru. Instead, the party held the funds and, using various pretexts, kept many of the guerrillas in Bolivia for months until they ceased to be a cohesive force. President Paz Estenssoro reportedly double-crossed the Cubans by informing the Peruvian authorities when and where the guerrillas entered Peru, for they were all either killed or swiftly captured by Peruvian army units.

About August 1962 Castro began talks with a Peronist delegation to explore prospects for a combined Cuban-Peronist insurrection in Argentina. Between July and December a group of 30 to 50 assorted Argentine left-wing extremists were trained in guerrilla warfare in Cuba, and then sent to Montevideo for infiltration into Argentina. In February 1963 Peron is reliably reported to have named one of his lieutenants in Argentina, Hector Villalon, as his liaison with the Cubans in support of Peronist revolutionary preparations, then primarily focused on the national Argentine elections scheduled for 7 July. By mid-1963 a number of commandos had been established in some northern provinces, notably Tucuman and Cordoba, and several "training
In mid-October a Cuban ambassador (a former "old guard" PSP member) remarked that a Cuban guerrilla group had been sent to Argentina under Jorge Ricardo Massetti Blanco, a protege of Guevara, that Havana believed Massetti had died of hunger in the Argentine mountains. In late 1964 Guevara was reported to have remarked to a PCA central committee member visiting Havana that he (Guevara) did not understand why the guerrilla operations in Argentina had failed since the groups had been adequately equipped and financed by Cuba.

The CPSU learned of PCB involvement in the Cuban plan late in 1962, probably in December. When it was learned that the PCB had not informed the Communist parties in two target countries (Argentina and Peru) of the project, the Soviets specifically instructed the PCB to do so immediately, particularly to advise the Argentine PCA, but the PCB did not respond until several months later. In March or April 1963 a PCB representative finally visited Argentina and advised PCA Secretary General Victor Codovilla

*At some point early in the game an unidentified confidant of Castro, presumed to be Cuban, left Cuba and settled on a large rural estate on the Bolivian side of the Argentine border, set up radio contact with Havana, collected arms, and waited for D-Day. In Cuba this person was in contact with John William Cooke, another left-wing Peronist revolutionary with close contacts with the Castro regime.
of the matter. A PCA emissary went immediately to Bolivia to investigate the situation, and discovered that the Cuban plan called for training in Bolivia of guerrilla forces from Argentina, Bolivia, Peru, and Venezuela, who were to begin coordinated armed action on a date set for mid-1963. When PCB leaders refused to accept PCA admonishment against such unilateral revolutionary planning outside of regular Communist party channels, the Bolivians and the Argentine envoy reportedly almost came to blows.

PCA reaction to its envoy's report was so strong that Codovilla went himself to Moscow to air the matter with Khrushchev and Castro. Significantly Monje and two other PCB leaders, Alfredo Arratia and Jorge Ibanez, were in Moscow in May "to discuss the Sino-Soviet dispute with members of the CPSU central committee". Unidentified CPSU officials berated Monje for involving the PCB in the Cuban-sponsored venture, particularly in Peruvian guerrilla activities (then largely sponsored by Peruvian Trotskyites). Monje was told the CPSU had received an official complaint from the Peruvian PCP of PCB interference in internal PCP affairs.

After this meeting, according to Monje's own report, he was visited in his Moscow hotel room by Codovilla who also lectured him "like a father". Infuriated, Monje excoriated Codovilla and the Argentines as cowards, but Arratia censured Monje and pointed out Codovilla's great prestige in the international Communist movement. On the following day a CPSU foreign department functionary, Igor Ribalkin, tried again to convince Monje and his two companions of the correctness of PCA censure of their guerrilla policy, apparently with little success. In Codovilla's report of his talks with Castro and Khrushchev, Castro is made to have professed his unawareness of the extent to which his independent planning was creating ill-will among area Communist parties, and to have promised to suspend the project on his return to Havana.

In contrast to restrained Cuban comment about Chile's 11 August 1964 diplomatic break with Cuba, after Bolivia followed suit a few days later Havana struck out viciously at Paz Estenssoro, denouncing him as a "corrupt politician"
who had "compromised with imperialism". While considerable Cuban comment was directed at the role of U.S. influence in Bolivia's decision (and that of Uruguay, which severed relations on 8 September), the bitterness directed at Paz Estenssoro personally appears to have reflected Cuban chagrin at his double-cross of Castro's Andean guerrilla venture.

3. The Havana Conference of November 1964 and the Proposed Moscow Meeting

The new Soviet leadership--determined to reassert its authority among a group of parties moving toward polycentrist positions, as part of its strategy of preparing for possible renewed confrontations with China after the projected Moscow preparatory meeting--was handed a good opportunity to deal with the key Cuban party through complaints by many Latin American parties of Castroist interference in their affairs and territories, that had become stronger since early 1964 and taken more concrete form in calls for a meeting of the parties to get Cuba to halt its actions.*

Soviet stakes in the Havana Conference were high, and the Conference worked so well for the CPSU that it can fairly be called the Soviet party's "clean-up" operation on Cuba in terms of the Sino-Soviet struggle because--against the Cuban leader's will--it led to final Chinese loss of confidence in Castro and it set the Latin American pro-Chinese Communists against Havana. By taking advantage of

*The OAS resolution of July 1964 condemning Cuban subversive action in Venezuela had led directly to the break in diplomatic and consular relations with Cuba in August and September by the several Latin American countries (Bolivia, Uruguay, and Chile) still maintaining them, leaving only one exception--Mexico--and almost completely isolating Cuba.
Castro's unease over Premier Khrushchev's removal and uncertainties about the new Kremlin leaders, and placing Cuba on the defensive among its sister parties, the Conference gave the CPSU one more pressure point to use in persuading Cuba to revise its opposition to the proposed Moscow preparatory conference—a matter of extreme importance to the Soviets. The "extra Conference dividend" was a temporary crimp in Castro's operations in the hemisphere, but this consideration was not Moscow's reason for sponsoring the meeting.

The CPSU's instrument for separating Castro from the Chinese and their supporters in Latin America was a Conference document addressed to the Cuban PURS and the Chinese CCP (and also to the CPSU, at least in its final form), requesting the addressees not to support groups or activities not recognized or sanctioned by the "official" Communist party in each Latin American country. The descriptions of this agreement are varied enough to show that the three sides—the Soviets, Castro, and the other Communist parties—each had a distinct conception of what it was intended to do. The factionalism which concerned the Soviets was that of the Chinese. The factionalism bothering the Latin American party chiefs was not only Chinese but also Cuban. On the other hand, Castro is reliably reported to have expressed serious concern with Soviet factionalism in the hemisphere.* According to clandestine reports of the Havana discussions by Bolivian PCB secretary general, Monje Molina, Castro developed the thesis that all factional activities regardless

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* the Cuban and Venezuelan delegates to the Latin American CP meeting with the CPSU delegation at the 13th PCCP national congress in October 1965 insisted again with greater success on a resolution avowing the complete independence of each party from "directives" from Moscow or Peking. The resolution was passed, but it also provided for independence from directives from Havana.
of their source must be condemned. The Cuban leader took the line that the Cubans, as well as the Chinese, had been guilty of factionalism, and therefore it had become necessary to denounce such activity from any source.* Castro's unspoken point—that Soviet "factionalist" activities among Latin America's "independent" parties was just as pernicious as that of Cuba and China—was grasped by the Argentine, Chilean, and Brazilian delegates who said they couldn't support the Cuban thesis before they consulted their parties, because "it appeared that they would be condemning an action of the CPSU."**

Castro's conception of the agreement clearly was not shared by most of the other Latin American parties represented in Havana, but it is probable that the CPSU was also asked at Cuban and possibly Venezuelan insistence—to assent to the agreement (perhaps as the price for Cuban adherence to it), because Moscow signed it before it was taken to Peking.

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*Monje's report of Conference activities are especially interesting but Monje appears to have played an important part in getting Cuban agreement to hold the Conference, perhaps because of his confidential relations with the Cuban party developed the previous year in the joint guerrilla warfare planning discussed above.

**The Cuban position reflected Castro's stubborn insistence upon parity treatment of both sides and his determination to preserve his party's neutral stance in matters concerning the world dispute. But it also offers good evidence of Castro's resentment toward any outside influence over the hemisphere Communist movement, especially any that would diminish Cuban ideological proprietorship thereof, and it is of a piece with our estimate of Castro's ideological objectives made in the earlier section of this paper.
The Cuban leader, who even before the meeting could have had few illusions about widespread acceptance of his non-conformist ideas, bowed to the pressure of the majority of participants and, albeit unwillingly, agreed to a formulation against factionalism that he knew was directed at the Chinese. To make the blow less drastic, the CPSU promised increased Latin American support for Cuba and increased Communist armed militancy in a few areas. In his 2 January 1965 anniversary speech, Castro was careful to assert strongly his refusal to be dictated to from abroad—an obvious reaction to the Soviet squeeze. The Soviet delegation to the victory anniversary was of a notably low level.

Cuban response to increasing Soviet pressures for Havana's attendance at the Moscow meeting was to try to retain a definition of impartial neutrality toward the CCP and CPSU by offering formal mediation with China. This policy was broached to the Soviets by Cuba's ambassador in Moscow toward the end of September after Cuba had earlier in the month signed a scientific and technical cooperation agreement with Albania in an obvious move to avoid siding too openly with Moscow, an action which the Cubans knew would weaken their position in future negotiations with the Soviets.*

*In analyzing the reporting of the Cuban-Soviet-Latin American aspects of this period, it is useful to bear in mind what was happening in the main arenas of the dispute. Following the U.S. attack on the North Vietnamese in the 5 August 1964 Tonkin Gulf incident, Pravda on 10 August published a 30 July CPSU letter to the Communist parties that offered a concrete plan for a world meeting. This move broke protocol inasmuch as Moscow had not received answers from all its respondents. The Chinese replied in their 30 August letter whose pitch was intended to block the proposed December preparatory meeting and designed to convince leaders in other parties that cooperation with Moscow's proposal would bring a formal split in the world movement. Peking did not say clearly in the letter that (footnote continued on page 94)
The Conference delegation that left for Moscow and Peking in early December after the Havana gathering ended, was led by the Cuban orthodox Communist, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, whom Castro had selected as his envoy to persuade the Soviets to allow him to make a personal mediation effort with the Chinese. We lack details of Rodriguez' activities in Moscow but have, however, good reporting on his conduct in Peking with the Latin American Communist party delegation seeking Chinese assent to the agreement against factional activities in the hemisphere. Rodriguez took a very provocative stance toward the Chinese and appears to have led others, notably the Venezuelan party representative, in disputing their arguments. When the Chinese leadership recognized that the Havana document was really directed against their position, they refused to sign it, saying that the factionalists represented

(footnote continued from page 93)

it would boycott the preparatory meeting, but on 19 August it had hinted it would hold its own meeting if Moscow went ahead. By 17 September only eleven of the nineteen parties expected to support Moscow had accepted the invitation to attend a preparatory meeting. Cuba was not among them. On 22 September, after a hurried trip to Havana, Ambassador Carlos Olivares Sanchez and an unnamed secretary of the Cuban PURS were received by Khrushchev and told him that Cuba had a "more positive view" about attending the conference, but was planning to assume the role of "intermediary" and not take a stand against the Chinese party. On 12 December Pravda announced plans to postpone the proposed meeting from December to 1 March 1965, and the objective of the meeting was downgraded from a preparatory gathering for a future conference to a "consultative" meeting. Cuba for its part was just then (December) negotiating a vital trade agreement with the Chinese—the famous sugar-rice deal that a year later was to become the cause-celebre of the Sino-Cuban polemic.
"true Marxist-Leninists" who had a right to form parties if they wished; and they bitterly condemned Cuban adherence to the agreement. This made it possible for Rodriguez' heated exchanges with the Chinese to seem a defense of Cuban rights and Cuban unwillingness to take sides. In view of Rodriguez' background, his known direct links with the Kremlin, and his strong support of the CPSU line within Castro's government councils, it is impossible not to suspect that he played a deliberate role in Peking to further exacerbate Sino-Cuban relations.* Castro had personally seen Rodriguez off at the Havana airport on 5 December, a sign of the importance he assigned to Rodriguez' mission. It is not altogether reasonable to believe that Castro intended or would have countenanced Rodriguez' inflammatory actions with the Chinese.** On the other hand, he would probably disapprove also of anything-like Cuban truckling to the Chinese leadership.

The final communique of the Havana Communist Party Conference was not issued until 18 January 1965, when it was released simultaneously in Moscow and Havana. The agreement on factionalism in the final paragraph merely says:

Thus, also, the conference feels that the unity of each party is a necessary condition to carry on the revolutionary process in each country and thus, every factional activity must be categorically repudiated.

Obviously this language allowed the three sides the leeway each needed to interpret the intent of the agreement.

*The delegation of Latin Americans that travelled to China went at the suggestion and request of the CPSU.

**On 15 February 1965 Castro dismissed Rodriguez from his post of Director of INRA, assumed the post himself, and kept Rodriguez on as minister without portfolio.
as it saw fit. In the outcome the real winner of the Conference was the CPSU, not Castro or the Latin American orthodox parties.*

A major reason for the delay in making the communiqué public was the Conference mission in Peking. Talks there did not terminate until close to 21 December, when Rodriguez, in China since 12 December, left there to return to Havana. Also involved was probable disagreement over the text, and Castro's mediation demarche was almost certainly an additional reason. There is some evidence that Castro hoped to be able to speak in this sense in the name of all the Communist parties of Latin America.

Castro hoped to be "authorized" to do so "when" the Latin American parties "met" in Havana "on January 19".**

*At least one hemisphere party recognized that the outcome of the Conference had resulted in no fundamental changes in Cuban-orthodox party relations or Cuban intentions to continue supporting Latin Americans interested in violent revolution. In mid-March 1965 Jiocondo Alves Diaz, number-two man in the Brazilian PCB, admitted this and complained of continued Castro support for Lionel Brizola, a radical leftist and former federal deputy in exile in Uruguay, then planning an invasion of southern Brazil.

**Some such meeting was held in Havana in February 1965, but it apparently was not at all what Castro visualized. In Bolivia Monje was reliably reported late in January to have been instructed to return to Havana "urgently". The left La Paz on 9 February and returned on 13 March 1965. Monje said a meeting of a "political bureau" formed after the Havana Conference was convened in Havana in February; its purpose was to take action because of a Cuban decision not to attend the Moscow meeting then scheduled for 1 March. (footnote continued on page 97)
The strictly Cuban mission to Peking of February 1965, for which Ernesto "Che" Guevara was diverted from his African trip and joined by two key Cuban Communists, was probably Castro's attempt to rectify his error in sending Rodriguez, in hopes that Guevara—who of all those composing Cuba's top leadership he knew to be the most acceptable to the Chinese and most admired by them—could get across Castro's neutral and if anything anti-Soviet interpretation of the Havana document, thereby reopening prospects that the Cuban leader might serve as a link between Peking and Moscow. The Guevara visit also failed, and the information we have makes it likely that it was only after Guevara's visit terminated that the Cubans decided to attend the Moscow 19-party conference in early March.

(footnote continued from page 96)

leader of the PVP enroute to Moscow attended a meeting of Latin American Communist leaders in Cuba in early February, and spoke of the February meeting with Castro, and the fact that Guevara was not present. In mid-January Emilio Aragones Navarro, PURS organization secretary, had been reliably quoted as saying that "for the present" the Cuban government had decided not to attend the March meeting. 

First a firm indication that Cuba would attend the Moscow meeting. The important 1965 Cuban-Soviet trade protocol was not signed until 17 February, and then only after very protracted negotiations; strong suspicion the delay was caused by Soviet economic pressure on the Cubans because of their holdout regarding the Moscow meeting. Finally, the Guevara mission, which arrived in China on 2 February, have the talks ending on 8 February. Guevara returned to Algeria on 11 February, but not to Cuba, until early March.
To sum up, the evidence strongly suggests that Castro was subject to a variety of intensified pressures from his erstwhile hemisphere and Soviet comrades, but he held out and only made the decision that the Chinese were hopelessly intractable after the results had been received from Guevara. Sometime in December the Soviets downgraded the Moscow gathering from a meeting to prepare a world conference to a meeting of consultation, in an attempt to conciliate the British and Italians—but also perhaps the Cubans—to get them to attend. This clearly made it easier for the Cubans to give last-minute assent to send a delegation in March and still maintain their formal neutrality.

*The Cubans have continued to maintain their formal neutrality in the matter. In October 1966 Raul Castro and President Dorticos—Number Two and Number Three man respectively—attended the Moscow assembly of bloc leaders that included all the bloc states represented at the March 1965 Moscow meeting, plus Rumania. But on the 19th, after its close, Grama expressly denied that it was "aimed at adopting any kind of agreement against any socialist state". TASS' brief uninformative communique on the gathering mentioned neither China nor Vietnam, nor an international conference. The Cubans left Moscow for Pyongyang—the first high-level Cuban visit to North Korea—where they arrived on 26 October.
4. Venezuela: Another Maverick

After the overthrow of the Perez Jimenez dictatorship in 1958 the PCV regained legal status, created a paramilitary defense organization against future right-wing repression, and rapidly picked up significant numerical support and parliamentary representation. In the spring of 1960 a radical pro-Castro left wing of the ruling AD party of Betancourt was expelled and formed a revolutionary group with ties to Havana called the MIR. With the MIR, the PCV that year went over to a policy of militant opposition to the Betancourt government marked by civil strife and violence. Many of the younger Communist nationalists active in the party's military organization were greatly impressed with the nearby Cuban revolution, and developed close relations and contacts with the Castro regime. By 1962 conversion of PCV defense units to an active terrorist organization had taken place, and the PCV in May and June played a key role in two abortive revolts of disaffected military officers.*

After the October missile base crisis, these younger Communists took a stronger hard-line stance, but were just as adamant in their insistence that this did not mean they favored the Chinese side in the polemic. By December 1962 they had for all practical purposes taken over the PCV.

*The fact that Jesus Faria and other party old-guard pro-Soviet leaders acquiesced in, if they did not encourage, this trend strongly suggests Moscow had given the PCV the green light to disrupt Betancourt's representative democratic government at all costs, even including armed insurrection. Cf. OCI Intelligence Study No. 3089/65, titled "Foreign and Domestic Influence on the Venezuelan Communist Party, 1958-mid-1965", dated December 65, for a good detailed account of the PCV and MIR during this period, especially in relation to domestic Venezuelan political developments.
In a central committee plenum that month they committed the party to a strategy of armed urban and rural violence on the Cuban model which evidently had wide support among the party rank and file and even enough support among party moderates to render impotent those few who wanted the PCV to endorse CPSU liberation policy. The party's principal task was defined as the formation of a "people's army" on the basis of the PCV's paramilitary organization the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN). It was decided that legal forms of liberation struggle, although "not to be abandoned", were to be subordinated to armed struggle. The soft-line faction had thus lost any real control over the party.

This controlling group took a highly independent, firmly neutralist policy toward the Sino-Soviet dispute, publicly and at the party-to-party level, emulating that of Cuba, and has maintained it essentially unmodified right up to the present. The Venezuelan party was the only Latin American Communist representation aside from the Cuban which in early 1963 refused to submit to CPSU pressures--reportedly exerted by Khrushchev himself--to sign CPSU-sponsored documents denouncing the Chinese party. And it has since avoided issuing any official statement favoring either side in the world dispute.*

The example of China's revolutionary dynamism unquestionably had considerable appeal among PCV youth,

*The VI PCV Plenum in April 1964 proclaimed the party's official neutrality in the Sino-Soviet dispute, and resolved to work toward the unity of a world Communist movement based on "autonomous" parties. Shortly afterward, a PCV delegation led by Eduardo Gallegos Mancera began a lengthy tour of Communist capitals (Havana, Moscow, Pyongyang, Sofia, Prague, Peking, Hanoi, and East Berlin) to gain support and understanding for the Venezuelan party's position and its armed methods. But see page 110 for evidence the PCV may issue a statement in 1967 supporting the CPSU in the world dispute.
and Chinese doctrinal materials were freely studied and used by the party's new leadership. Venezuelan Communists as early as 1959 were getting paramilitary training in China and by mid-1963 at least three such training courses had been given to Venezuelan visitors. Peking has consistently supported the armed struggle in Venezuela publicly and in private statements to other Latin American Communists. The PCV has maintained liaison with the Chinese as well as with the Soviets and Cubans, and has in the past accepted Chinese aid and support. But there is no evidence that Chinese Communist policy within the international Communist movement has gained any significant support among Venezuelan Communists, nor that the Chinese party has ever exerted an influence with the PCV comparable with that of the CPSU or the Cuban Communist party.

In fact Chinese party relations with the Venezuelan FALN leadership appear to have worsened. In June 1966 [redacted] said the FALN had "many problems" with China; for this reason the FALN preferred to send its trainees to Vietnam rather than China. After visiting Moscow and Peking about October 1966, a FALN commander said the Chinese had made an unacceptable offer to supply "every necessity" to the FALN in return for an open anti-Soviet stand. The terrific polemics that have racked the PCV have never—as they did elsewhere in the hemisphere—caused any significant threat of formation of a parallel pro-Chinese Communist party; the cleavages have always formed on clear Cuban-versus-Soviet lines. The PCV therefore poses more special problems for the CPSU than it does for the Chinese, not only because of Venezuelan iconoclasm, but also because of Cuban involvement in the Venezuelan liberation movement and—since mid-1966—heightened Soviet hopes for reestablishing diplomatic relations with Venezuela.

*In August or September 1966 a MIR delegation seeking support visited Peking; the Chinese cordially received it and gave encouragement to its armed objectives, but made no firm offer of material or financial support.
After June 1963 the CPSU's overriding concern was to avoid pushing the Venezuelans toward Peking. The influence of Moscow sympathizers had diminished within the PCV. The Soviet leadership also had to take into account the special Cuban interest in Venezuela and the many affinities between the Cubans and the new PCV leadership. There is some evidence that the Venezuelans and probably the Cubans had convinced the Soviets before the FALN fiasco of November 1963 that the terrorist campaign had a real chance of disrupting the December Leoni election. In any case Soviet publications, which had been playing up the advantages of peaceful methods in the Venezuelan liberation struggle, after June reversed themselves and printed only loud praise of the FALN and the armed path in Venezuela.

Most of the soft-line PCV congressional leaders, and some hard-line PCV leaders in the congress, were arrested between September 1963 and January 1964, the party was reduced to little more than a clandestine skeleton organization and regular party activities practically ceased. On the armed front, government successes brought great losses and setbacks to the FALN, and this, added to its stark failure to disrupt the election, brought pressures for some modification of the armed struggle policy, both from within the domestic revolutionary movement and from abroad. Cuban support of the FALN had dropped off after the much-publicized discovery in November on a Venezuelan beach of a Cuban arms cache valued in millions of dollars. Early in 1964 the MIR leadership split, producing a soft-line faction responsive to imprisoned Domingo Alberto Rangel, and weakened but did not destroy the MIR guerrilla force.

Rangel's supporters were actively encouraged by Pravda during 1964, and high-level PCV sources began admitting difficulties in financing even reduced FALN operations—an indication that if Soviet subsidy of the Venezuelan guerrilla experiments had not been terminated, it had been reduced. The leaderless pro-Moscow PCV minority, complaining bitterly earlier in the year over CPSU failure to support its position against the hard-line faction, began to pull itself together and by October
was holding its own secret formal meetings. The catalyst was the then-imminent (December) Moscow preparatory conference,* which the soft-liners suspected would bring a world Communist split and a corresponding PCV split for which they wished to be prepared. At the same time the hard-line PCV leadership had not been immune to the effects of the great debate over the armed versus peaceful struggle that had been taking place within Venezuelan revolutionary circles.

It was only after the November 1964 Havana Communist Party Conference, however, that the Soviet leadership took a firm line toward the Venezuelan situation and CPSU handling of the revolutionaries began to assume greater clarity. The Soviets, to appease Castro and the Venezuelan guerrilla chiefs, directed the other area parties to approve the Venezuelan guerrilla "freedom fighters" and inserted in the Conference communique a commitment to support them, something the PCV had not previously been able to get from its sister parties.** But they were evidently able to insist on greater FALN subordination to PCV political direction and--more important--to work out a new division of labor with the Cubans that shifted responsibilities for financial subsidy of the FALN from Havana to Moscow. It will be recalled that the Bolivian delegate to the Havana

*This appears to have been behind reported strong Soviet pressures, including Khrushchev's personal insistence that the PCV take sides with the CPSU position in the Sino-Soviet dispute

**Because of its armed policy the PCV was widely regarded by leaders of the South American Communist parties as "a party with leftist and pro-Chinese deviations", and as a result was refused expressions of Communist solidarity which it then sought when Alberto Lovera, political secretary of the PCV's Federal District Regional Committee, visited a number of South American parties to explain the PCV's position. In particular, we have a reliable report that in April Corvalan of the PCCh plainly refused Lovera support from the Chilean party.
Conference, Monje Molina, said that Cuba and the CPSU made "certain secret agreements at the meeting for Cuban and Soviet assistance to the Latin American liberation movements, which he could not discuss." Not only does subsequent reporting show Soviet insistence that aid to active revolutionary movements in certain Latin American countries be channeled through the local Communist parties, but in the case of Venezuela it makes clear that the 1965 subsidy to the FALN—totaling about one million dollars—was to be delivered on Soviet behalf by Italian and other European couriers directly to the PCV, which would in turn parcel out the money to the FALN leadership in the mountains.

In December, with Soviet blessing, the Italian Communist Party's foreign section assumed responsibilities for rehabilitating the PCV party structure and rebuilding the soft-line faction to a position of influence within it. The CPSU was aiming for a dual policy in which the armed struggle would not be completely abandoned but would be played down, and main PCV emphasis shifted to the traditional mass political action in which the PCV would seek alliances with other political parties in a united front, and the FALN, as the party's paramilitary arm, would be subordinated to PCV political direction. Surprisingly, the hard-line PCV leadership in its December talks with a PCI representative admitted errors in pursuing terrorist methods, agreed to halt urban terrorism and reduce the FALN guerrilla force, and offered plans for reviving party political activities. Early in 1965 the PCV politburo did order a halt to urban operations, and in April the PCV Seventh Plenum restored mass political action through a refurbished FLN as a principal party objective in creating a "government of democratic peace." Although reference was made in plenum resolutions to armed struggle as the "superior" form, the Seventh Plenum had in fact accepted a dual policy of action that conformed essentially to the CPSU's recommended strategy for the Venezuelan liberation movement.

Opposition to this new strategy by FALN field commanders and the dominant MIR hard-line faction, was swift. the MIR hard-line faction blocked PCV efforts to get a political action campaign started by refusing to cooperate
in the FLN. The PCV itself developed three recognizable factions: an uncompromising hard-line left wing led by Douglas Bravo and other nationalist, pro-Cuban guerrilla leaders in the FALN; the majority "center" faction composed of the existing party central committee and politburo leadership; and a soft-line old guard right wing flatly opposed to the armed struggle. Government security services intercepted and confiscated two of the quarterly subsidy payments from Europe—about $325,000—in March and October, and the PCV leadership controlled and apparently reduced the amounts forwarded to the FALN from the other two payments that got through. What was in effect a stalemate set in between the center and left-wing faction and persisted throughout the year.

Toward the end of 1965 Bravo, supported by some other commanders, organized a FALN revolt against the "center" PCV leadership because of the cut-off of funds. The BRAVO group informed the CPSU, the Cuban party, and the CCP of its intentions to seize control of the PCV and appealed for support. Bravo's move failed when German Lairet, the newly-appointed FALN chief, backed the PCV, but his campaign badly shattered the still feeble PCV organization. In January 1966 the PCV politburo met, reaffirmed the dual policy of the Seventh Plenum, and announced a "middle of the road" policy toward both extreme party factions. In March, after three years in prison, soft-liner Jesus Faria was exiled to the USSR, where he was accorded a hero's welcome on his arrival in Moscow. In his speech to the 23rd CPSU Congress some days later, Faria solidly supported the Soviet line of a "broad patriotic front" to bring about the "government of democratic peace." Nevertheless, in April when a presumably loyal FALN commander, Alfredo Maneiro Gonzalez, went to Moscow to defend the Venezuelans' armed line against Faria's point of view, he was diplomatically received "warmly" by a delegation of Soviet military officers.

Maneiro may have told his Soviet contacts about a second effort by Bravo, supported by Fabricio Ojeda and unidentified MIR leaders, to "restructure" the FALN and FLN, which took place in April 1966. This proposal was made to the PCV, the MIR and the Nationalist Popular...
Vanguard (VPN), the three parties that originally formed the FLN and FALN.* The MIR and VPN accepted the proposal; the PCV, which did not reply, suspended Bravo in May from his membership in the politburo, expelled a PCV guerrilla commander who supported Bravo, and began its own reorganization of the FALN.

In February the Soviets were "at odds" with the Bravo faction and favored the dual line of both mass political action through the PCV and armed struggle through the FALN in Venezuela, but insisted that the FALN, as the PCV's paramilitary arm, be subordinated to the party's political leadership and accept politburo control of its funding.

But significantly his Soviet contacts told Maneiro in June that if and when a formal split took place between the Bravo FALN group and the PCV leadership, they would support both sides financially, "in order not to repeat their error in Cuba where initially they neglected Castro and gave all their support to the orthodox Cuban Communists"; but their major support would go to the party, rather than to the guerrillas. In August a MIR delegation seeking aid in Moscow was coldly received and no Soviet support was offered.**

*Three of the five guerrilla front commanders accepted the Bravo plan.

**Throughout 1966 the PCV complained of lack of funds and by January 1967 had been forced to discontinue many routine party activities, suggesting Soviet caution in handling Cuban aspects of the problem until the dust had settled. But Soviet interest in the brighter prospects for a resumption of state relations with Venezuela almost certainly were involved. The Venezuelan government had insisted that such relations with Moscow were precluded by the continuation of Communist efforts to overthrow it. Diplomatic relations between Venezuela and Rumania had been resumed on 29 January 1967. On 29 January 1967 a PCV politburo member said the PCV "is now" in favor of re-establishing (footnote continued on page 107)
On 11 June Granma published a manifesto in the form of a letter addressed to Fidel Castro, signed by Ojeda, Americo Martin (the MIR acting secretary-general), and Douglas Bravo. It denounced "those who would abandon the armed struggle" and announced formation of the "Unified Command of the FLN and the FALN," with Ojeda as the Front's president, Martin as its secretary general, and Bravo as its commander-in-chief.

The Havana announcement signified an open break between the PCV and its extremist partner, the MIR, and brought a new crisis of authority to the "center" PCV leadership and the orthodox FALN headed by German Lairert. It also made clear that the dissidents had Cuban not Soviet backing, although if forced to, the CPSU might countenance them solely to keep its hand in the game. Punctuating the development was a successful landing near Tucacas in Falcon State on 24 July 1966 of some 40 guerrillas (including some Cubans) led by Luben Petkoff, Bravo's second in command, that had obviously originated from Cuba. Petkoff's diplomatic relations between the two countries, and that "Soviet officials" were being so notified in response to an earlier request for the PCV's opinion. The PCV in February 1967 began again to receive monthly sums "from abroad" amounting to $30-40,000, "after a two-year discontinuation of outside economic support", offer clear evidence of CPSU use of its financial club to swing the Venezuelan party into line. received only after the PCV had said it favored resumption of Russian-Venezuelan state relations, and in the period when it was feverishly attempting to hold a new plenum—despite the many security hazards—to clarify its position regarding "(A) Cuba; (B) the USSR; and (C) the armed revolution in Venezuela" That is, it was going to respond to Russian pressure all the way by renouncing the armed path and accepting CPSU-favored parliamentary national liberation methods, if at all possible.

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group included Venezuelans trained in North Vietnam, and he carried a large sum of money—reportedly between two and three hundred thousand dollars—for use by Bravo's dissidents. There was an unconfirmed report of a second landing in November of an estimated 70 armed men at a point on the north-east coast of Venezuela.

The PCV's reaction was an angry protest sent to Cuba in late July over Cuban "moral" support of the Bravo dissidents, to which Castro gave an "unsatisfactory" reply, and apparently made declarations unfavorable to the PCV and repeated some of Bravo's accusations against it. Castro withdrew recognition of the PCV's central committee representative in Havana, and accorded recognition to the parallel Bravo leadership group there. The PCV appealed to "sister parties" for help in normalizing its relations with the Cuban party, and undertook extensive consultations with Castro to that end. PCV contact with "other Latin American Communist parties" was in part to promote a meeting of all hemisphere parties to condemn Cuban "factionalism" and unite against Castro. By September relations between the PCV and the Cuban party had apparently been virtually suspended, Bravo had clearly stated his intention to disrupt the next national election in Venezuela, and he had reportedly stated the orthodox Latin American Communist parties should be "destroyed" because they are run by middle-class bureaucrats who really fear a genuine Communist revolution on the continent.

In the same period Pedro Medina Silva, titular supreme FALN commander, issued a series of communications condemning Bravo's factional activities against the orthodox FALN, and reaffirming the positions of German Laière as FALN political director and its real commander-in-chief, and of other orthodox FALN leaders. Medina also said he was resuming his role as supreme commander. By this action he countered what appears to have been a precipitate Cuban attempt in June to name him as successor to Ojeda* as president of the dissident Bravo FALN. In

*Who reportedly died on June 21 under mysterious circumstances after his capture four days earlier by Venezuelan security forces.
October Castro reportedly reassured the PCV politburo of continued Cuban support, but the PCV had to accept a Castro decision to divide Cuban aid between the Bravo group and the PCV proper. Castro thereby adopted a stance identical with that of the CPSU, except that primary Cuban aid would go to Bravo whereas major Soviet aid would go to the PCV. This ploy had the merit of being unsailable by Moscow which had adopted it first!

Growing discontent with the "center" leadership became apparent in December, when eleven of Caracas' 16 active ward committees issued a manifesto to the politburo demanding "unified support for the armed revolution." This followed a series of successful terrorist acts including several assassinations of police officials carried out in the federal district by Bravo and MIR forces. At the same time a delegation of the dissident FLN-FALN arrived in Havana, where with extensive publicity Granma announced that it had set up a permanent FLN-FALN mission in Cuba under Gaspar Rojo.

Moscow ignored Bravo's dissidents, but publicized statements by PCV secretary-general Faria disclaiming PCV involvement in the renewed urban terrorism and castigating them as "contrary to Marxist-Leninist principles." PCV leaders' statements carried by Radio Moscow have ignored the party's dispute with Bravo and Castro. But Castro made no effort to hide his support of Bravo whom he lauded for saving Venezuela's "revolutionary standard" in his January 2 anniversary speech, obliquely censuring the PCV for abandoning guerrilla warfare. Since October Radio Havana had given extensive time to interviews with the principal Bravo lieutenants in which the Venezuelans expounded their views on armed struggle as the only path to Venezuelan liberation.

After a sensational jail-break in February of three top orthodox PCV political directors imprisoned since 1964, the PCV began feverish efforts to convene an eighth party plenum in April despite the enormous security risks this entailed, indicative of the intense pressures it was experiencing—probably in good part from the CPSU—for an
authoritative party clarification of its stand against Castro's initiative, for an even greater disavowal of the armed insurrection policy, and for the party to go on record in favor of "the USSR's position in international affairs." This last point was being reported in terms of a "desire" of the PCV politburo to support the USSR publicly. If this is true, after the Venezuelan party's many years of firm refusal to take such sides, it indicates clearly that the CPSU has managed finally to regain some measure of effective control within the PCV in the aftermath of the Cuban-Venezuelan party split. (See footnote on page 107 for additional information on this development).

C. Repercussions of the Tri-Continental

The Soviet dilemma in Latin America was laid bare in the aftermath of the Tri-Continental Conference.* The horns of the dilemma are formed by Moscow's commitment to a policy of peaceful coexistence with non-Communist states on the one hand, and on the other by its commitment to support national liberation movements against "imperialist" and "colonialist" regimes. Unwilling in the first place to support such a conference, the Soviets finally agreed to do so only because they believed it could be used to isolate the Chinese in the world solidarity movement. But they seriously underestimated Cuban initiative at the conference, were out-maneuvered by both the Cubans and the Chinese, and found that, in order not to be shown less "revolutionary" and less interested in national liberation struggles than the Chinese or the Cubans, their delegation had to adhere to a series of conference resolutions strongly endorsing resort to violence to achieve political

change in the hemisphere and elsewhere. A Soviet effort to defend the CPSU line on peaceful coexistence, and have it read into the conference's general declaration, was resoundingly defeated as the Chinese and Cubans refused to let Moscow have it both ways.

The CPSU's delegate, Sharaf Rashidov, told the conference:

First of all I wish to stress that the Soviet delegation has come to this conference with the objective of facilitating in every way the unification of the anti-imperialist forces of the three continents [in] our common struggle against imperialism and neo-colonialism--headed by the United States of America. Our attitude is clear to all and we do not intend to enter into polemics.

We believe that relations between sovereign states with different social structures should be based on peaceful coexistence. However, it is quite clear that there is no peaceful coexistence, nor can there be peaceful coexistence between the oppressed peoples and their oppressors--the colonialists and the imperialists, between the imperialist aggressors and their victims.

The Indian delegate moved to include a Soviet resolution on peaceful coexistence in the Conference's General Declaration, but Cuban and Chinese influence was running strong enough to prevent this, and it was only finally published as a "special" and separate resolution. It declared:

Peaceful coexistence applies only to relations between states with different social and political systems. It cannot apply to relations between social classes, between the exploited and the exploiters within separate countries, or between the oppressed peoples and their oppressors.
Even this, which was about as far as the CPSU was willing to go in watering down its "peaceful coexistence" line, was not satisfactory to many of the Communists and revolutionaries present in Havana.*

If Moscow had miscalculated the revolutionary temper of the conferees, it also seriously underestimated Latin American official reaction to its participation in the conference.** Russian ambassadors in Brazil and Uruguay were early confronted with strong official criticism of the Soviet role in Havana. In Brazil the Soviet ambassador

*The Soviets were reliably reported at the conference to have privately encouraged their preferred "united front" tactics which they had pushed so hard at the Chilean PCCh's Thirteenth National Congress and the little-publicized 30th anniversary celebrations of the Seventh Comintern Congress held several months previously in October 1965 in Eastern Europe.

**In the OAS the Peruvian delegate on 25 January condemned Rashidov's speech as an intervention in the American Republics' affairs and as contrary to a UN resolution on non-intervention (Number 2131) signed the previous December by the USSR. On 2 February the OAS by a vote of 19 for, none against, and with two abstentions (Mexico and Chile) formally denounced the Tri-Continental Conference's policy of intervention and aggression, and the open participation by official and unofficial delegations from UN member states that had voted for Resolution 2131. The OAS resolved to prepare a full report of the Conference, which was issued in December 1966. Meanwhile, led by Brazil, the Latin American group in the UN met to prepare a letter to the Secretary General as a Security Council document; and it was signed by all the delegates, except Mexico, and delivered to the Secretary General on 8 February. It characterized the Conference as a flagrant violation of the Charter and the first deliberate violation of Resolution 2131, and singled out Cuba as particularly delinquent.
took the position that Rashidov had spoken at the conference, not as an official of the Soviet government, but only as a Communist party member. Brazilian concern with the "serious implications" of the conference led to the creation in April 1966 of a special section within the country's national intelligence service to be responsible for international Communist matters, ranking as one of the service's four major organizational components.

In Uruguay the Soviet ambassador, already smarting under Uruguayan charges of embassy interference in internal Uruguayan trade union affairs, had on 28 January submitted a formal Russian offer of $30 million in credits on extremely favorable terms, as a peace gesture. The next day he was called to the foreign ministry where the Uruguayan Foreign Minister demanded to know whether Rashidov had spoken at the conference for himself or for the Soviet government. The Soviet envoy refused to reply, and was warned Moscow could expect grave consequences to its relations if a satisfactory explanation of Rashidov's statements was not produced. The Soviets in February delivered a note verbale which claimed Rashidov's delegation represented only "Soviet social organizations." The official Uruguayan reply, published in the Montevideo press, ridiculed this explanation, showing the government had no illusions about the duplicity of the Soviet position.

In the face of the strong adverse reaction from these and other Latin American capitals, the Soviet Foreign Ministry later in the month took the unusual step of officially disavowing Rashidov's statements to the conference, and, visibly embarrassed, Soviet and East European officials both in Moscow and in the hemisphere went to great lengths in private talks and meetings arranged for the purpose, to play down to Latin American officials the significance of conference talk about armed violence. Venezuelan President Leoni soon after the conference stated privately that he had assurances from local representatives of "Eastern European countries" that Moscow wanted Communists to disengage from the FALN terrorist campaign there.
1. The Credibility Gap: Moscow's Latin American Institute

Moscow's Tri-Continental Conference experience brought out the difficulty, if not the impossibility, inherent in the Soviet effort to take a public line toward the underdeveloped world that will avoid provoking additional protests—in our case, in Latin America—but at the same time will not seem so weak and revisionist compared with the greater militancy of the Chinese and Cuban Communists and their supporters as to become an invitation to ideological defeat among the new Communists.

In Latin America Moscow faces more complex problems attending this endeavor than it does in some other underdeveloped areas. Here it has responsibilities to some twenty-odd Communist parties, originally spawned during the 1920s, many of them existing in various degrees of illegality, whose existence imposes limitations on CPSU maneuverability in the area. It has regular state relations with a number of non-Communist Latin American governments, and is actively seeking to expand such ties with others.* It must take into account not only Chinese competition, but also Cuban competition of a novel order that has steadily grown since 1963. Finally, it must cope with these problems in the very back yard of the United States' power sphere. The previous low level of Soviet commitment in the hemisphere was dramatically raised to a near-strategic level after Moscow accepted Cuba into its bloc in 1960; and the potentially explosive consequences to the USSR of this commitment were rudely brought home to the Soviet leadership in October 1962.

All this took place as the fundamental quarrel with Peking, in train since 1956, was reaching its critical

*As of January 1967, there were strong indications of Soviet interest in establishing missions in Costa Rica, Venezuela, Colombia and Ecuador.
stages, and in fact probably helped to exacerbate the dispute. The Soviet party had begun the creation of its current credibility gap in 1956, when it revised the Communist revolutionary line by announcing that in certain conditions socialism could be achieved through use of peaceful, even parliamentary methods, and that resort to armed violence was not absolutely necessary in every case in the class struggle. As we have seen, differences over this point of doctrine in application to the national liberation movement in Latin America have become the focus of Chinese and Cuban differences with Moscow in the area, and have led to repeated embarrassment for the Soviet party in Latin America during the 1960s.

Soviet policy-makers’ need for more reliable data on the Latin American area and more competent representatives to deal effectively with the new situation is nowhere more clearly seen than in the establishment in 1961 of a Latin American Institute within the USSR’s Academy of Sciences, as a full-time research facility for specialized study of the area’s contemporary economic and political problems. The traditional study of Latin American history was left to the existing Latin American Section of the Academy’s Institute of History.

Published guidelines for the type of research and writing to be carried out by the new Latin American Institute were established in 1962 in a series of pronouncements of S.S. Mikhailov, then its director, and B.N. Ponomarov, secretary of the CPSU central committee. These made it clear that the Institute’s central function was to generate new ideas and proposals for effective national liberation tactics, and rationales that could be applied in Latin America by the Soviet leadership.

Institute personnel were in part drawn from individuals who had served in Soviet diplomatic posts or missions in Latin America. Since its establishment, Institute professional officers have become a pool from which the CPSU draws its key ambassadors, mission chiefs, and other foreign service officers for assignments in the area. A recent example was assignment in September 1965 of Mikhailov, head of the Institute, as Soviet ambassador in Brazil—
Writings of Institute members have not only appeared in increasing numbers in Soviet theoretical economic and political journals, but also in authoritative CPSU policy publications such as the magazine Kommunist, the organ of its central committee; and the results of their research are becoming more apparent in contacts of Soviet party and government officials with Latin Americans. One American student of Soviet historiography who specializes in Soviet-Latin American writings, in a recent analysis of the subject* noted the "dramatic increase" in the Soviet post-1956 effort to conduct systematic Marxist re-evaluations of Latin American history. In illustration, he offers statistics developed by the Slavic and Central European Division of the Library of Congress in 1965 showing that, whereas 51 historical books and articles devoted to Latin America were produced between 1945 and 1959, the total produced between 1959 and 1965 jumped to 300 titles. He emphasizes that the focal point of these 'historical' studies is the evaluation of problems connected with the Marxist-Leninist "national liberation wars" in Latin America.

2. Soviet-Cuban Confrontation

The evidence through the end of 1966 tends to confirm that Moscow considers Cuba a unique situation, a challenge which must be accepted no matter how much it costs. Soviet unhappiness with the economic burden is clear enough,

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*G. Gregory Oswald, Department of History, University of Arizona, in a paper on Soviet Historical Writing on Latin America since 1956, presented to the American Historical Association meeting in San Francisco, on December 28, 1965.
but there is no indication of Soviet intentions over the near future to do anything about it, other than to screen each year's arrangements in minute detail to ensure as nearly as possible that desired results will be obtained. The lengthy annual Cuban-Soviet trade protocol negotiations in 1965, 1966, and 1967--averaging several months--make this clear.

On the political side the Soviet party and government intend to make major efforts to convince Castro to be more patient during Cuba's present stage of development; and the CPSU has requested the other Latin American Communist parties to help them influence Castro's attitude--chiefly the Brazilian, Argentine, Chilean, Colombian, and Venezuelan parties. Moscow has been manifestly unwilling to repeat its November 1964 confrontation with Castro in spite of pressures from its Latin American party supporters to do so.

To the contrary, the record strongly suggests the Soviets are willing to go to unheard-of lengths, for a long period of time if need be, to capture the Cuban comet and settle it into a normal orbit around the Soviet sun, as they did with the movement of the Mexican Toledano and the Brazilian Prestes in an earlier era. To that end the CPSU appears content to ride with the pendulum swings of Cuban action, avoiding major public squabbles with Castro, and use its economic and military leverage to attain the partial and reluctant Cuban concessions necessary for it to minimize any critical impact Castro may seek to have in areas of high-priority CPSU concern. This stance appears to include Soviet willingness to put up with a sizeable, if embarrassing, Cuban independent role in the international Communist movement.

However, open Cuban criticism of Soviet doctrine and attacks on the credentials of the pro-Soviet orthodox area parties had by the winter of 1967 become sharp enough to produce an authoritative Soviet reply that could presage a Cuban-polemic. Pravda in early March issued an extensive statement, Moscow's first on Latin America in almost a year, indicating clear disapproval of the Cuban position and warning that underestimation of the role of the local
Communist parties in the national liberation struggle would be a mistake, and any attempts to split them would bring "irremediable" damage. A prompt retort by Castro specifically denouncing the mild stance of the orthodox Venezuelan PCV—his first such completely open attack on a hemisphere Communist party—appears to have laid bare Soviet concern over Cuban interference in its long-term operation to regain control of the PCV and reconstruct it as a political entity free of its FALN guerrilla incubus. The Soviet announcement could also apply to similar Castroist interference in the affairs of the Guatemalan PCG and elsewhere, and could conceivably presage not merely a polemic, but a more robust Soviet opposition to the Cuban attempt, through the hemispheric solidarity body, LASO, to achieve greater control over the course of Communist revolution in the southern hemisphere. The projected July-August LASO First Conference in Havana is likely to witness a confrontation between orthodox pro-Soviet Communists and the more militant Castro Communists whose sharpness will probably largely depend upon the CPSU. But in view of its past extreme patience and care in its dealings with the Castro regime, the CPSU is most likely to try to limit or discourage any such split, and restrict itself at most to a polemical defense of its area party supporters.
V. Appendix: Pro-Chinese Parties and Groups

1. Mexico, Middle America, and Panama

Mexico

A Chinese Communist trade mission which had been in Brazil visited Mexico in January 1963, seeking to conclude a trade pact and hold a trade fair there later in the year. Members of this mission were in contact with some PCM leaders and offered the latter financial aid in return for PCM support of the Chinese in their dispute with Moscow. This contact catalyzed long-simmering Sino-Soviet differences within the PCM central committee, and soon after the Chinese mission departed dissidence tied to the dispute mushroomed rapidly.

The crisis also involved a PCM directive statement that the PCM completely supported the line of the CPSU, circulated among the membership after a 9 January meeting of the party's central committee and political commission. The ninth PCM plenum in February 1964, was concerned entirely with a wrangle over the PCM's stance toward the polemic. Clandestine reports of this plenum reflected a basic split within the central committee and the political commission. Several voting rounds were required before the central committee could get a majority for a pro-Soviet statement, and even then the final vote reportedly was eight against four with four others remaining 'neutral.' By March an important Mexico City cell had begun to attack the central committee's "arbitrary stand" and to demand that Chinese documents be furnished all party members. In April the first of the four pro-Chinese central committee members was sidelined, and at a 17-19 July party plenum the other three were suspended from their posts. The expellees formed a defense group but it never had an opportunity to function. The pro-Soviet PCM leadership quietly held the party's Fourteenth National Congress on 19 December without troubling to notify the dissidents,
packed the Congress, rigged its agenda, and thereby achieved 'unanimous' endorsement of the Soviet line and ratified the expulsion of the four leaders and other pro-Chinese members.

The Chinese evidently were not prepared to back a separate party in Mexico, at least at that time, and were clearly disappointed that their supporters inside the PCM had been expelled before they could win control of the party. Even though members of the Chinese mission were in close touch with sympathizers who were still in the PCM or in the Popular Socialist Party (PPS) of Vicente Lombardo Toledano, the group expelled from the PCM were reportedly unable to effect contact with the Chinese. Efforts of a number of pro-Chinese splinter groups to organize an effective opposition during 1964 and later have been unsuccessful.

The Chinese used their trade fair presence in Mexico to set up a permanent Chinese-manned NCNA mission in the country which flourished until October 1966. Mexico's trade with China in 1965 had been halved from that of 1964 and there was no sign that the small trade exchanges would increase because the countries appeared unable to agree on financial terms, the Chinese wanting better terms and Mexico refusing them. The Mexican government late in 1965 rejected visa applications for both a cultural and a trade group Peking had been trying to get into Mexico, and maintained a policy of tight surveillance of the limited Chinese presence in the country. The small NCNA mission was finally closed down at the Chinese's own initiative—perhaps the only instance where Peking has apparently given up a bridgehead in the hemisphere when not absolutely forced to do so.

In March 1964 Mexican pro-Moscow Communists, largely of the PPS, won control of the Mexican Society of Friendship with People's China (SMACP) from pro-Peking forces. The latter got Chinese support in setting up a separate friendship society, the Society of Friends of China (SACP), in November 1964, but it has never achieved real growth. In all, Chinese experience since 1963 with sharp factional rivalries typical of the Communist movement in Mexico, appears to have discouraged Peking's hopes for any early successes there.

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Middle America

In January 1964 the Communist parties of Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica issued a communique after the "Third Conference of Communist and Workers' parties of Mexico and Central America," reportedly held in Mexico, which took a stand on the world dispute in essential agreement with that of the CPSU. It called for an end to the public polemic, appealed strongly for unity within the international movement, and implied that another international conference should be held to settle the matter. This Mexico meeting of party representatives appears to have been only one of several which were hurriedly convened to hammer out some acceptable accord among the Central American parties on the dispute in the face of the Chinese campaign in the hemisphere. There is evidence that they were inspired by direct Soviet pressure from Mexico City.

The communique reflects the fate of pro-Chinese factions simmering in each of the Central American parties. They have never been able to gain effective control in, or even split, any of the parties despite their campaigns against local party pro-Soviet leaderships. The emergence of any significant pro-Peking Communist movement in Central America remains a thing of the future. There is some evidence of Chinese training of Central American Communists and extremists who return to their homelands, and of the presence of small numbers of illegal mainland Chinese Communists in some Central American countries. The major threat to the orthodox Communist parties in this region since 1963 has come from Cuban unilateral operations in support of the various "hard line" sectors, and not from China.

Panama

The Panamanian PDP was not a signatory of the "Third Conference" communique because in 1963 the PCP central committee was so divided that its President, Ruben Dario Souza, was unable to bring his party into line in support
of the Mexico City regional pronouncement. Not until two years later did the PDP sign a "Fourth Conference" communique, in October 1965. This one included an explicit statement backing the CPSU line and condemned "all manifestations" of factionalism in the international movement. But the PDP took a more definitely neutral stance on the matter than did other Central American parties because Souza was not able to expel pro-Chinese sympathizers from the PDP.

The Chinese party has always taken a special interest in Panama because of the strategic relation of the Canal Zone. Following the Panama disorders of January 1964, Mao Tse-tung issued one of his rare personal pronouncements of condemnation of the U.S., and of support for the Panamanians. Peking claimed a cumulative total of more than 16 million Chinese participated in massive demonstrations for Panama in China, and Chinese official propaganda gave unusually sustained attention to the affair.

The PDP pro-Chinese faction, led by Chang Marin, has not been able either to split or to dominate the party. Evidence is clear of Chinese-Cuban competition for control of the Panamanian Revolutionary Union (URP), a radical left-wing organization formed toward the end of 1964 to promote a prolonged "people's war" in Panama, which was set up by dissidents from another revolutionary group, the Vanguard of National Action (VAN), an inactive pro-Cuban organization which the PDP had bitterly opposed. This competition heightened after the Tri-Continental Conference. A Chinese offer to train a group of URP members was withdrawn after a leader of the URP student arm (MUR) had accepted a similar offsetting Cuban offer. URP leaders who traveled to China in the spring of 1966 were told Panamanian "rivalries" among revolutionaries would have to be buried, and an agreement to form a new pro-Chinese Marxist-Leninist Communist party would have to be achieved, before Peking would resume its support.

In June-July 1966, a small Panamanian Marxist-Leninist Party (PMLP) was formed--largely on paper--by URP leader Alvaro Menendez Franco on the basis of provisional
Chinese training offers. This led to more clear-cut discussions between the pro-Cuban and pro-Chinese elements in the URP. A pro-Cuban faction led by Floyd Britton Morrison, got the nod from Havana; but the Cubans, like the Chinese, were demanding united action by the URP as the price for further support. Menendez turned up in Peking in August as a delegate to the Chinese-sponsored twelfth rally against the atomic and hydrogen bombs, where he attacked Soviet "revisionism." On his return to Panama Menendez claimed Peking had given official recognition to the PMLP, authorizing its contact with the overt China Peace Committee and PMLP use of funds previously advanced to the URP. Peking recommended the PMLP put itself as much as possible on a self-sustaining basis. But the PMLP, like the other factions of the URP, boasted no more than several dozens of members. By the end of the year Menendez, Britton, and Jorge Turner—leader of the defunct VAN—were reported seeking a formula under which the three groups could form a united revolutionary front without giving up their individual organizational status. It was clear that this move was a reaction to Cuban and Chinese withholding of desired large-scale subsidy until the dust settled enough for each to see what real assets it had in Panama.

2. South America

Colombia

After the Colombian Communist party (PCC) plenum of October 1963, pro-Chinese ferment forced its orthodox leadership to resort to widespread suspensions and expulsions of dissidents. Among those dropped with central committee member Pedro Vasquez and candidate member Carlos Arias were Hector Bogota Rubiano, NCNA representative in Colombia, Luis Carlos Miranda, a leader of the important PCC-controlled Federation of Workers of Valle (FEDETAV), and Francisco Garnica Narvaez, PCC youth secretary in Valle.
In March 1964, according to their own statements, a convention of 29 representatives of Colombian pro-Chinese groups, formed largely of the PCC expellees, set up a "provisional executive committee," named Vasquez as its political secretary, and decided to form a new Communist party, the PCC-Marxista-Leninista (PCC-ML).

Vasquez, Bogota, and Luis Villar Borda traveled to China in search of backing and were successful in spite of evidence the Chinese were less than completely happy with their heterogeneous supporters in Colombia. As one source then put it, "Until the differences between these potential leaders are resolved, or until the Chinese CP hierarchy selects a leader, the chances of forming a monolithic party appear to be slight." In addition to the expelled dissidents a well-defined pro-Chinese sector remained in the PCC because of reluctance to leave until another party had been formed and had been given official recognition and support by the Chinese party. Vasquez, Bogota, and Luis Villar Borda traveled to China with about $1500 per month, and Vasquez, after his return in August 1964, with about $1000 per month.

At the PCC's 30th Plenum in June 1964, PCC Secretary General Guillermo Vieira White acknowledged that the party was suffering greater internal stresses and strains than it had in the last 34 years. He disclosed that open splits existed in the majority of the party's 21 regional committees, especially in Bogota and the departments of Antioquia, Valle, Atlantico and Meta, and that the entire Magdalena regional committee had gone over to the pro-Chinese side.*

A "plenary" of the embryonic PCC-ML met in early September near Medellin, bringing together 32 representatives.

from eight of the country's 17 departments, representatives of dissident PCC-ML youth units which had split from the regular JCC in February, and seven members of the "provisional executive committee". Vasquez told this assembly that he had been promised Chinese financial aid and that as soon as the PCC-ML openly declared itself against Moscow it would qualify for greater Chinese support. The "plenum" re-elected Vasquez as secretary of a new executive committee charged with preparing a national congress within six months.

This congress met in May 1965. Like the Peruvians, the Colombians decided to appropriate the name of the existing PCC and termed the gathering the "Tenth Congress of the Colombian CP". It expelled Vieira and several other PCC leaders. Attending were representatives of pro-Chinese parties in Peru and Ecuador, and also Venezuelan pro-Chinese Communists; and it called for a common line against Castroist "revisionism." The Congress' resolution echoed Peking's opposition to future "schismatic" international Communist meetings, condemned (Cuban) "neutralism" in the struggle against modern revisionism, and praised new Marxist-Leninist groups springing up everywhere. The resolution was carried by the NCNA in August. The PCC-ML had a numerical strength estimated at 2-3500, compared with 7-800 in the PCC.

Vieira and his party called central committee meetings of the PCC in July and August to condemn the "Chinese splitters" and reaffirm PCC alignment with Moscow.

The PCC-ML boasted some control over a small guerrilla band in Santander, but the previous year the PCC had shifted to a line accepting guerrilla struggle as a "natural evolution" of Communist military "self-defense" activities in certain areas. (i.e., the five or six

*The official PCC journal Voz Proletaria, carried a statement to this effect on 17 December 1964. It was followed by an article in the January 1965 issue of the PCC's theoretical journal, Documents Politicos, where self-defense was called an "intermediate" stage, and "the natural development of self-defense, its subsequent step, its conclusion, is the guerrilla struggle". This line was confirmed several months later by a PCC plenum.
principal guerrilla redoubts of Marguetalia, Riochiquito, El Pato, Guayabero, Sumapaz and Ariari) while "peaceful" methods would continue to be applied elsewhere in the country.

The PCC however effectively blunted PCC-ML efforts to expand its guerrilla assets and operations through "Plan Aurora"—a PCC-ML plan for alliance with the MOEC and ELN to create pre-election disorders early in 1966 by opening guerrilla fronts in Santander, North Santander, Antioquia, and Guajira, at the Venezuela-Colombia border. Its PCC-ML planner appears to have been Alfonso Romero Buj.

The PCC-ML had at least one member (Romero Buj) in the provisional national United Front (UF) organization formed by Camilo Torres Restrepo, in the autumn of 1965. But here also the PCC quickly gained control and maintained it until Torres' death in February 1966 brought the collapse of the UF.

The Tenth PCC Congress in January 1966, decided the party should actively prepare for armed insurgency. Communist guerrilla leaders attended this Congress. In April and May, the Cuban-backed ELN quit the PCC-ML's "Plan Aurora" and there were reports of limited ELN cooperation with the PCC's guerillas. (The Cuban-trained ELN lost its support organization when the JMRL had disbanded in mid-1965.) There is evidence this consolidation of PCC with ELN guerrilla forces was ordered by the CPSU in line with "specific instructions" PCC delegate Diego Montañéz Cuellar brought from the Tricontinental gathering for the PCC leadership in February.

Between 25 April-5 May the various guerrilla forces met in a "second conference of the Southern Guerrilla Bloc" and created the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), announced as under PCC direction. PCC youth secretary Manuel Cepeda Vargas, a member of the party's Tri-Continental Conference delegation and of the Colombian national LASO committee announced in February, played an active role in creation of the FARC.
By February 1966 PCC-ML secretary-general Vazquez admitted that his party did not have the strength to carry out "Plan Aurora", and would concentrate on anti-election propaganda. He also acknowledged a party split and expulsion of Fred Kaim Torres, Alfonso Cuellar Solano, Bogota, and at least four others, Vazquez stressed that the party had to be strengthened and politically consolidated before guerrilla insurgency could begin. The split was along familiar lines of the "Young Turks" against the entrenched party bureaucracy. Kaim had accused the PCC-ML leadership of spending 45 percent of monies received from China on trips of the leaders and other bureaucratic expenses. Among the expelled was Uriel Barrera, secretary of the PCC-ML's military apparatus for rural areas. A Vazquez delegation flew to China in April but apparently failed to convince Peking to disown the dissidents. Unable to discredit the dissidents in Peking, Vazquez continued to work with armed groups in Magdalena and Bolivar departments which he boasted were the PCC-ML's best assets.

The PCC-ML had then lost 50 percent of its strength, and its activities had come to a standstill. Chinese-line Communists, however, gained control of the National Federation of University Students (FUN) at its 3rd National Congress on 27-30 May 1966. In May the party reportedly had decided to postpone insurgency until August 1967 because it believed popular expectations centered on the new Restrepo government would have waned and PCC-ML organizational strength would be improved. By the end of the year the PCC-ML national executive committee had moved to the countryside, the majority to a guerrilla training camp in Cordoba province where they hoped to be able to attract Chinese financial support which appeared to have withered away. But the PCC-ML had disintegrated for all practical purposes and there was evidence of renewed Chinese interest in MOEC. Five members of that organization returned to Colombia in December 1966 after training in China, and had been given some funds by the Chinese.
Ecuador

In Ecuador, Peking, encouraged by the fact that the Seventh Congress of the Ecuadorean Communist party (PCE)* had adopted an armed insurrectionary line at the insistence of an influential "hard line" faction, took early and positive steps to use the latter to gain control of the local Communist movement.

In March 1963 Alejandro Roman Armendariz, a PCE member and the NCNA representative, secretly extended a direct offer of Chinese financial aid to PCE central committee members Jose Maria Roura Cevallos and Rafael Echeverria Flores. Both Roura and Echeverria, the secretary-general of the important PCE Pichincha Provincial Committee based in the capital city of Quito, were convinced hard-liners interested in armed revolution. Roura and Armendariz traveled to London, and Roura went on to China. In Peking Roura met with CCP central committee members who urged his group to "split the PCE". The Chinese argued that when Communist discipline and unity no longer helped produce revolution, then anything which would do so was good. Roura was given U.S. $25,000 and told to set up a printing establishment to publish the "real pamphlets" (the CCP's polemical materials) on the Sino-Soviet dispute. Any money left over was to be used to organize the revolution. Roura, however, was arrested in May as he reentered Ecuador; the funds and a revolutionary plan he was carrying were confiscated, and his visit with Chinese Communist leaders was given wide publicity.

The orthodox PCE pro-Soviet forces headed by PCE Secretary general Pedro Saad of the coastal city of Guayaquil, had agreed to a policy of armed insurrection at the Seventh Congress, but had done so under pressure and only reluctantly, as a necessary tactic to keep the Saad-controlled national executive committee in command of the

*Held from 9 to 12 March 1962 in Guayaquil.
party organization. Subsequently Saad watered down the insurrectionary line enough to justify his not pushing actively for early armed action. In May Saad convened the central committee, expelled Roura for his unauthorized trip abroad, removed Echeverria as head of the Pichincha Committee, and dissolved that Committee, which was to be replaced by one loyal to him. Echeverria and his organization, however, refused to accept Saad's verdict, and the two factions were soon exchanging formal accusations and were busy throughout June soliciting support from party provincial organizations for their side. Echeverria called for a national party assembly to expel Saad on grounds he had obstructed accelerated revolutionary preparations.

A military doup d'etat in July brought Saad's arrest and imprisonment for more than a year.* The coup forced both factions to go underground, but Echeverria remained at large and his group was largely untouched. Echeverria used the opportunity to reorganize the PCE on pro-Chinese lines. A provisional Guayas Provincial Committee was formed to replace imprisoned pro-Saad provincial leaders. Echeverria announced that "recent developments" in the international Communist movement (Peking's June letter) had "given the Chinese Communists a free hand to support dissident movements" and he said that a de facto split existed in the PCE. Echeverria however, also failed to gain control over all sectors of the PCE, and through the year Ecuador had in effect two warring Communist parties, each claiming the PCE banner.

In December 1963, Echeverria set up a 'provisional national party directorate' to prepare a congress, and the split was formalized in August 1964, when he convened an "extraordinary party congress" of some 18 members from the principal provinces of Pichincha, Guayas, Loja, Azuay, and Esmeraldas. This congress expelled Saad and three

*Until 30 December 1964.
pro-Soviet leaders from the party, approved a greeting to the CCP, proclaimed PCE solidarity with the Cuban revolution, and approved a policy decision to put the armed insurrection line of the Seventh Congress into effect in a "correct, Marxist-Leninist manner." A united "Patriotic Front of Liberation" was to be organized, and emphasis was given to "the norms for open and secret work" by the party. The Saad faction was quick to announce the illegality of the congress, but the Echeverria party soon gained organizational control of the major part of the local Communist movement.

One PCE provincial committee, that in Esmeraldas, headed by Wilson Burbano, took a position independent of both the Saad and the Echeverria parties, and refused to align his provincial Communist organization with either or to participate in either's programs, although he personally favored the harder stance of the pro-Chinese forces.

After the formation of the PCE-ML, Echeverria sent a nine-man training group to China, and both he and Roura traveled there. In October Teng Hsiao-ping met with Echeverria, accepted and approved a pro-Chinese party platform for 1965 which was submitted by the latter, and pledged Chinese moral support and financial aid of $50,000 to help carry it out. Roura returned to Ecuador in December, when dissension for leadership of the PCE-ML broke out between the acting secretary-general, Hugo Salazar Tamariz, and Jorge Arellano Gallegos. Echeverria had gone from China to Cuba, where he was hospitalized, underwent major surgery, and remained until August 1965, when he returned to Ecuador.

There are indications the Cubans used Echeverria's absence to attempt to gain control of the PCE-ML after the Sino-Cuban break early in 1965. In March 1965 a PCE-ML

---Gallegos was arrested and in December 1965 exiled to Europe from where he went to China, and did not return to Ecuador until June 1966.
supporter who had been in China during most of the previous year returned to Ecuador and attacked the acting party leadership, ostensibly on behalf of Echeverria, who he said had realigned himself with Cuba and the USSR against China. But the party's executive committee stood its ground and issued a long document on "The Central Tasks of the Party" in May which drew a clear distinction between unwanted Castroist guerrilla adventures on the one hand, and the authentic Maoist concept of the long-term "people's war" in the country accompanied by secret clandestine cadre action in the cities. The PCE-ML had been continually importuned throughout 1965 by two small Castroist terrorist groups, the "Victory or Death" (V/M) and the Detachment of Secret Organization (DOS), to begin active guerrilla operations; but its leadership withheld any commitment. The May document reflected the growing divisions within the PCE-ML between those advocating immediate revolutionary action and those dedicated to the more orthodox, longer-term Maoist program.

After his release from prison in December 1964 Saad could only described his "soft-line" PCE as "destitute." But he quickly began a drive to undercut the PCE-ML by open appeals for reunification and defining the party's central task as "preparation for armed struggle." Mid-year talks between provincial-level leaders of the two parties broke down, but a Saad maneuver to go around leadership echelons to bring Ecuadorean Communists at the rank-and-file level under his domination affected the PCE-ML. In August a small PCE-ML dissident splinter-group had appeared in Guayaquil whose local PCE-ML organization was in chaos.

Echeverria returned to Ecuador that month with a substantial Cuban donation and had clearly taken a pro-Cuban position. He made strenuous efforts to revitalize the PCE-ML by setting up an active guerrilla organization with a view to an early offensive. When Echeverria went to Guayaquil in October to round up support, he and several of his principal PCE-ML lieutenants were arrested and held until early spring of 1966. Significantly Echeverria reverted to his former pro-Chinese stance after his release. The timing strongly suggests his decision was
influenced by the public Sino-Cuban falling-out which took place after the Tri-Continental Conference.

It was apparent at the end of 1965 that the Saad PCE had staged a successful comeback at the PCE-ML's expense. The Saad party had not suffered serious persecution since the 1964 crackdown, and had since operated relatively openly. Saad had spoiled PCE-ML courtship of the Socialist Revolutionary Party (PSR), a radical left-wing party with which the PCE-ML hoped to form a Maoist popular opposition front and oust the ruling military junta. The PCE-ML had been instrumental in getting a PSR delegation to visit China, but the PSR proved wary of Chinese offers of financial backing, and by mid-1966 had swung about and was coyly toying with Saad's proposals that it join a PCE-led political front.*

The public Sino-Cuban dispute of early 1966 led to further dissidence within PCE-ML ranks, as efforts by Roura to get the party to take a clear-cut stand against Cuba were resisted by a number of members and leaders within the party's Guayaquil organization, reflecting the covert struggle taking pace between Havana and Peking for the loyalty of the hard-liners in the Ecuadorian Communist movement.

By the year's end the PCE-ML executive committee, based in the highland capital city of Quito, was deeply at odds with the coastal Guayaquil provincial committee leadership, and also contending with jurisdictional problems being posed by the party's other principal unit, the Pichincha provincial committee. The PCE-ML was in fact on the verge of complete disintegration into a series of

*Saad's success very likely was because of new injections of funds from the CPSU. The swing of the PSR leaders to Saad's party and away from the PCE-ML—with whose ideological stance they had much greater affinity—reinforces this likelihood in the opinion of the writer of this paper.
ineffectual splinter groups. But Echeverria had apparently not given up his hopes to preserve effective control over the rebellious party provincial organizations, which were then trying to convene a party congress to oust him.

Peru

The Peruvian party (PCP) was one of the first to split in the wake of Peking's June letter, the division following the pattern of a pro-Chinese "young Turk" faction rebelling against an orthodox pro-Soviet "old guard." The pro-Chinese faction gained some key posts in the powerful Lima Regional Committee at the party's Seventeenth Plenum in May 1963, and—over old guard objections—began publishing Bandera Roja (Red Flag), a pro-Chinese newspaper. Several months later the PCP's youth arm (JCP) convened a national conference that demanded that the party newspaper, Unidad (Unity), publish "the documents of the CCP, since this party publication has published documents of the Soviet and Italian parties." The old guard reacted at the party's Eighteenth Plenum, in October, by railroad- ing in a new party political commission loyal to itself. When the Lima regional committee refused to recognize the results of the plenum, an open dispute broke out. Saturnino Paredes Macedo, peasant secretary of the PCP political commission, emerged as leader of the pro-Chinese faction, the old-guard 'clique' being led by Jorge del Prado and PCP secretary general Raul Acosta.

The Lima committee, citing provisions of the party statutes, demanded an extraordinary congress within three months, asserting that until the congress could be held the former political commission (named at the Seventeenth plenum), which it controlled, was the only authorized commission. Claims and counter-claims ensued until the Paredes group literally took over the PCP by convening a "Fourth National Conference" of a majority of the party's central committee, representatives of 13 of its 17 regional
committees, and observers from the JCP, on 18 and 19 January 1964.*

This conference expelled nine pro-Soviet PCP leaders for revisionism, elected Paredes as first secretary of the party, and announced a "Marxist-Leninist" policy and support of Cuba. A resolution of the conference condemned the revisionist theories of Tito and his followers, and stressed the "correct" stand of the Chinese Communist party in the ideological controversy with the CPSU. Several days later, pro-Chinese Communists stormed the office of Unidad and wrecked its equipment; but the newspaper remained in the hands of the pro-Moscow Communists, who had convened their own "Fourth Lima Regional Conference" on the 25th and 26th claiming "the attendance of 64 of the 75 base organizations," and support from all over the country.

The Paredes group's "expulsion of the revisionists" was given prominent NCNA play on 31 January. On 6 April TASS replied with a strongly anti-Chinese statement from Unidad. On 13 May 1964 NCNA published an extensive review of the PCP-ML congress' political report.

The Chinese also maintained contact with the Peruvian Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), a revolutionary group dedicated to active guerrilla warfare in the country, whose leader, Luis de la Puerta Uceda, had spent most of his time from 1963 until early 1964 in France and China. De la Puente apparently visited Peking about November 1963, and was received by Mao. Some 20 YIR members were in training in China and in North Korea early in 1964. De la Puente claimed to the Chinese that the MIR

* the Paredes group first contacted the Chinese embassy in Bern, Switzerland about November 1963, to enlist Chinese backing. Two delegates then went to Peking, where the Chinese agreed to provide the dissidents with extensive support, and returned in time for the "Fourth Conference."
was cooperating fully with the PCP-ML, whose leaders Mao had encouraged him to invite to go to China; but in fact De la Puente did not favor this invitation, and there is no evidence that the MIR ever genuinely collaborated with the PCP-ML.

The MIR also was getting Cuban financial assistance; but later in the year the Cubans were reported disillusioned with De la Puente and had greatly reduced their support. De la Puente reported Chinese insistence that the Peruvian revolutionary groups unite, and in September 1964 appointed Hector Cordero Guevara, a member of the MIR central committee just back from China, as MIR liaison officer with other leftist groups. The MIR spent 1964 in nation-wide preparations for a projected guerrilla offensive in 1965.

After the split, the PCP-ML emerged as the dominant of the two Communist parties, and proceeded rapidly to consolidate itself in that position. The two parties developed parallel local and regional committee structures in parts of the country. The orthodox PCP retained considerable strength in the important central area centered on Junin, a town north of Lima. In a number of other areas, local Communists proved unwilling to make clear-cut choices between the two sides. The orthodox PCP suffered the heaviest interim organizational losses, however, and much of its local activity came to a halt during the year.

Initially both sides lost out to the APRA in the important Peruvian university student field. At the University of San Marcos in Lima, the Communists for the first time in five years were defeated in student government elections when a fight between pro-Chinese and pro-Soviet Communists opened the door for the APRA candidate. But by the end of the year the pro-Chinese student sector had emerged as stronger than its pro-Soviet counterpart in university student organizations, especially in Cuzco and Huancayo.

The growing MIR guerrilla preparations and those of other extremist groups did much to dilute Peruvian rank-
and-file Communist interest in the two parties. The suspension of guarantees, and widespread arrests of Communists, in the wake of guerrilla campaigns in central Peru in 1965, added to the passivity and disorganization of the orthodox PCP. Continued PCP-ML disinclination to take an active guerrilla role led to defections and formation of a small splinter group within its youth organization in the autumn of 1965.

Some gains were made by the pro-China student faction during 1965 at the expense of their pro-Soviet rivals. Only one top post in the May 1965 San Marcos University student elections was won by a pro-Soviet student, as compared to 11 gained by the pro-Chinese students, and three by APRA. In early April 1966 the pro-Soviet faction withdrew from the San Marcos Student Federation (FUSM) and formed its own rump organization. Pro-Chinese internal rivalries helped defeat the pro-Chinese slate in October elections at the University of Arequipa, where a pro-Soviet slate won.

In November 1965 the PCP-ML split because of a power struggle that ensued at its Fifth National Conference. The dissidents were led by Jose Sotomayor Perez in alliance with an Arequipa sector loyal to Enrique Zapater Ballon. But Paredes retained an estimated 80 percent of the party's approximately 4,000 members. In early March 1966, Peking belatedly publicized the PCP-ML's November Conference in a propaganda campaign whose timing gave strong support to Paredes.

The Sotomayor faction, with its estimated 20 percent of PCP-ML strength, left the PCP-ML early in 1966 and formed a party which it called the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of Peru (PCMLP), whose strength is centered in the mountain towns of Cuzco and Puno. But Zapater, having failed to unseat Paredes, soon quarreled with Sotomayor and broke away from the PCMLP. Peking pronouncements continued to evince Chinese backing of Paredes.

In July pro-Chinese university students at the University of San Marcos, generally responsive to PCP-ML directives, again won the FUSM election with 37.5 percent
of the vote as compared with 16 percent for their pro-CPSU rivals, after they had both combined in 1965 to win FUSM control from an APRA student ticket with an election victory of 51.1 percent of the vote. This was followed by a rump victory for pro-Chinese students in elections in November of a national university student governing board at the Eleventh Congress of the Federation of Peruvian Students (FEP) where an anticipated pro-Chinese student victory led several delegations to walk out before the pro-Chinese students could name their own "Transitional Directive Board." NCNA and PCP-ML propaganda hailed this event as a resounding victory, NCNA noting a decision of the "revolutionary students" to "greet and support the great Chinese cultural proletariat revolution" and student emphasis on "Yankee Imperialism" as the "fundamental enemy" of Asian, African, and Latin American students.

At the end of the year the PCP-ML was claiming to be "the first party on the American continent to expel revisionist agents", noting how its Fourth Conference had "boldly broken" with and expelled the revisionist clique and its Fifth Conference had consolidated the party by "cleaning out the Sotomayorists." The party newspaper was stressing the secret and clandestine nature of party activities.

A power struggle within the Bolivian Communist party (PCB), based on personal rivalries rather than any well-defined pro-Chinese sympathies, led to a party split in 1965 that produced a second Bolivian Communist party, the PCB/C* which has since aligned itself with Peking.
During this struggle against an entrenched pro-Soviet group led by PCB first secretary Mario Monje Molina, only one dissident central committee member, Hilario Claure, emerged as a genuine ideological supporter of Peking. Claure, and Raul Ruiz Gonzalez, Alfredo Arratia Tellez, and Attilio Carrasco--personal rivals of Monje--were expelled from the party by a PCB central committee plenum in August 1964.

In December anti-Monje forces and Peking sympathizers gained control of the PCB Santa Cruz Regional Committee. In March 1965, after Monje had postponed the regular Oruro Regional Congress to frustrate a similar attempt, the dissidents held an independent congress and elected their own Oruro regional committee. This procedure was repeated in April in the Llallagua region, another mining center. The same month the dissidents convened an "extraordinary national party congress," in a third mining region, the Siglo Veinte mines, and set up the PCB/C. The original factionalists, Claure, Ruiz, and Arratia, dropped out of the leadership picture, and the central committee of PCB/C was formed of 30 persons who included Federico Escobar Zapata, a mining leader, Oscar Zamora Medinacelli, a former student leader, and Justiniano Ninavia as first, second, and third secretary respectively.* The new party initially announced that it was not pro-Chinese but independent, and that its formation had become necessary because the PCB/M had fallen into an "opportunist and rightist" line which had "condemned" the Chinese party.

Pravda on 9 April published a detailed but mild account of the split, which favored the Monje side. The U.S. Embassy in Moscow commented that such a detailed discussion in Pravda of differences within a fraternal party was a relatively rare action for the Soviets, and reflected unusual concern over the fortunes of their supporters in the remote Bolivian plateaus.


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The PCB/M held its Seventh National Conference early in April, expelling all who had gone over to the PCB/C, reaffirming the policy of a "peaceful road to power," and taking steps to retrench organizationally. But the report of the PCB/M leadership to the Conference acknowledged the seriousness of the split the Bolivian Communist movement had suffered.*

A political crisis in May severely disrupted all the country's political parties producing widespread disagreement over how to respond to the new military junta. The Communist party split took place amid the general national political turmoil and to some extent was produced or triggered by it.

The PCB/C did not cooperate with the PCB/M when the latter assumed control of a national miner's strike in May. Trade Union leader Simon Reyes Rivera, a member of the PCB/M National Secretariat, took over direct supervision of strike forces. After government forces broke the armed strikers, Reyes and Escobar, head of the PCB/C, were among many extremist Bolivian labor leaders exiled.

In June it was reported that the PCB/C had established a party structure, but that its organization was incomplete and lacking capable leadership. This statement also held true for the PCB/M for the rest of the year, because the

*A factionalist movement, joined by nine of the 44 members of the national leadership, led to the split. This movement...has set up parallel organizations in 6 (Santa Cruz, Oruro, Tarija, La Paz, Cochabamba, and Senore) of the 14 regions where there are regional committees of the Party. The factionalist organizations in La Paz, Santa Cruz and Cochabamba departments are but tiny groups....In the three other regions, however, this is not the case. Some time will be needed to get the considerable groups there...to change their mind and return to the Party." --World Marxist Review, July 1965, page 49; article by Jorge Kolle Custo, titled "Communist Party Conference."
leadership of both parties, down to and including second-
echelon levels, was in exile, and only a few among them
had returned clandestinely to Bolivia by the end of the
year.

The PCB/M however wasted no time in sending Jorge
Kolle Cueto abroad. In Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay,
he obtained joint communiques affirming the solidarity
of the other parties with PCB/M and upholding the validity
of the anti-factionalist agreements made at the Havana
CP Conference.

Kolle visited Moscow in July-August on CPSU invi-
tation. He was received by Ponomarev, and Pravda gave
full CPSU support to Monje's party in a 3 September arti-
cle commenting on the visit and condemned the factionalism
of the PCB/C. Kolle at least attempted to prevent the
PCB/C from entrenching itself in the TUS and Problems of
Peace and Socialism staffs in Prague, and managed to
circumvent recognition of a PCB/C delegate by the Rumanian
party congress.

The PCB/M came out victorious in a clandestine
national miners conference of the FSTMB in Oruro in late
December, when the two PCB's agreed to collaborate at the
mining level. The pro-Soviet PCB/M also excluded the PCB/C
from a Bolivian "national liberation front" being formed
of left-wing groups to attend the Tri-Continental Confer-
ence. Nevertheless, a composite delegation sponsored by the
PCB/C went to Havana; but was rejected by the conference's
credentials committee after an altercation with the PCB/M
delegation. Following the conference the PCB/C delegation
reportedly went to China.

The PCB/C sustained further defeats in 1966. In
May PCB/M national leaders were able to regain strong
influence in the Second National Congress of Communist
youth (JCB). In the July national elections the PCB/C
called for voter abstention. The PCB/M, which had joined
a left-wing party coalition (FLIN) to contest the elections,
emerged with some 30,000 votes for the PCB-FLIN coalition.
Response to the PCB/C abstention campaign was insignificant.
There was some indication in January 1967, that Peking wanted temporarily to discontinue regular training visits of the PCB/C members. NCNA on the other hand continued regular use of PCB/C materials in support of the Chinese cultural revolution and in opposition to the "revisionist" FLIN-PCB/M front. The death of Escobar, and official harassment of Medinacelli and Ninavia, had left the PCB/C leaderless by March 1967.

Chile

In early 1963 a few pro-Chinese Communists expelled from the Chilean Communist party (PCCh) had formed a group around Luis Cares called the Marxist Revolutionary Vanguard (VRM). The pro-Chinese CPB in Brazil mentioned the VRM in October, noting a VRM letter to the Chinese party backing Peking in the world dispute.

But the real Chinese thrust was directed at the PCCh, and it began seriously to trouble the orthodox party soon after NCNA opened a Chinese-manned Santiago office in mid-March. Not only did the Chinese, Li Yen-nien, staff his office with sympathetic PCCh members; he used them and dissident Socialist party members to set up a printing and publishing establishment, Espartaco Editoras Ltda., next door to the NCNA office, and began to distribute Spanish-language editions of Chinese pamphlets criticizing the policies of the CPSU and the Italian and French Communist parties.

The PCCh, alarmed, officially complained to the CCP, and published a declaration in El Siglo, the party newspaper, noting circulation in Chile of documents "pretending to be Marxist-Leninist" which attacked several "brother" parties as well as the line of the international Communist movement. The declaration asserted that the PCCh line was incompatible with that of the documents—a reference to the via pacifica (peaceful way) policy which had been defined in March 1962 at the party's Twelfth National Congress. PCCh leaders began to press the members connected with NCNA to dissociate themselves from the Chinese.
or be suspended from the party.

The sensitivity of the pro-Soviet PCCh leadership to the events of the Sino-Soviet polemic and the degree of their dependence upon the CPSU for guidance and instruction.

News of the coming visit of a CCP delegation to Moscow led PCCh secretary-general Corvalan to extend the period during which offending PCCh members could sever connections with the NCNA mission. A party plenum in June again put off definite action against the offenders pending the outcome of the Sino-Soviet talks in July. On 25 July Corvalan left for Moscow to get instructions and report the disruption of the PCCh's election campaign because of discussions and uncertainties about the international dispute among party rank-and-file. Only thereafter, in October, did the party begin actual suspension and subsequent expulsion of recalcitrant members, and even then it did so cautiously. The catalyst was open participation of about 30 members in the October celebrations of the Chinese People's Republic anniversary. Those suspended included Jorge Palacios Calmann, David Banquis Jacard, and Oscar Vasquez, all actively involved in the NCNA office and the Espartaco publishing house. Their dissident circle became known as the Espartaco group.

In April the PCCh political commission had appointed a special committee to investigate in depth the impact the Chinese campaign was having upon party members, members of other parties allied with the PCCh in the Frente de Accion Popular (FRAP), and on the general Chilean public. Reports to this committee from all over the country showed that a high proportion (30 to 40 percent) of PCCh members actively sympathized with the Chinese line on armed struggle and only tolerated Corvalan's "peaceful way" line because of party discipline. The real constraint on PCCh action against the pro-Peking element was Corvalan's fear of jeopardizing the prospects of the FRAP presidential candidate, Socialist party senator Salvador Allende—the undisputed choice of the Chilean extreme left—for victory in the national elections set for a year hence (September 1964).
Late in October Palacios, in contact with VRM leaders, was considering forming a new Chilean Communist party like the Brazilian CPB. But he desisted because the prospects of an Allende election victory—then optimistically expected—cut both ways, so that any call for a more revolutionary path appealed only to a small fringe of the extreme left. Palacios hoped to form a broad pro-Chinese front after the elections. It is likely also that he was constrained by the Chinese themselves from any early action to form a new party.

In January 1964, the Espartaco group issued a publication titled Principios, Marxista-Leninistas (a deliberate imitation of the official PCCh theoretical journal, Principios) a pro-Chinese magazine highly critical of the via pacifica policy as "revisionist" and "conciliatory." The new publication was launched at a meeting of 60 "Marxist-Leninist militants of the Chilean Communist party." In April Peking widely reported the January Espartaco meeting and a resolution hailing the CCP as the "true heir of the revolutionary organization, which should never be abandoned." Peking's comment on the January conference made clear that it wanted the Chilean "Marxist-Leninists" to first make a determined effort to throw out the "revisionist" PCCh leadership and replace it with pro-Peking revolutionaries before it decided to set up a parallel, rival Communist party.

The Chilean Socialist party (PSC), FRAP's other principal member, also felt the impact of the polemic. A pro-Chinese dissident PSC sector grouped around Deputy Clodomiro Almeyda emerged within the party. The PSC dissidents included a strong pro-Castro element as well. The Almeyda faction opposed PSC leader Raul Ampuero.

The Espartaco group campaigned hard within and against the PCCh through the year. By autumn it had "regional committees" in nine or ten of the country's most populous central provinces (Chile has 24 provinces in all) from Valparaiso southward to Concepcion, and counted an estimated 2000 supporters.
Allende's defeat in September produced much Communist rank-and-file dissatisfaction and led to the resignation of several prominent PCCh members; one of these, Senator Jaime Barros, went over to Espartaco, becoming an important asset to its efforts to penetrate the PCCh and gain wider support within the Chilean Communist movement. A measure of Corvalán's concern over the safety of his party was his toleration of the many pro-Chinese sympathizers still in the party. The ban on discussion of the world dispute in party cells— instituted in 1963—continued to be enforced in spite of demands for such debate in many party cells. Complaints of pro-Chinese competition were made at an April 1965 PCCh plenum by PCCh delegates from Iquique, Bio-Bio, Cautín, and other areas of the country. The head of the party's National Control Commission warned the plenum that pro-Chinese members were being allowed to continue in the party, and openly demanded their expulsion.

The Chinese-manned "commercial information office," with the approval of the new Frei government, was upgraded to a permanent trade office early in 1965. A new three-man Chinese commercial mission, accompanied by two wives and a cook, entered Chile on diplomatic rather than special passports, with no time limit on their entry visas. NCNA personnel who formerly handled commercial matters were freed to work on propaganda and related operations. The Chinese presence in Chile was expanded even further by an agreement with the Frei government to allow a small number of Chinese students to enter and study at Chilean universities.*

A Chilean project to open a commercial office in Peking was seriously considered by the Frei government, but was finally postponed and has not yet been implemented. During President Frei's triumphal post-election trip to Europe in July, there were reliable reports from Paris...

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*The new Soviet ambassador in Santiago reportedly protested firmly against this student entry arrangement, without any apparent success.
of direct Chinese diplomatic appeals to Frei for establishment of diplomatic relations between Chile and China; but Chile has continued to avoid recognizing the Peking government and maintains diplomatic relations with the GRC.

Peking maintained some contact with the VRM as well as the Espartaco group. VRM head Cares, and another movement official, visited China in the spring of 1965. Members of both organizations were sent to China for training. Toward the end of the year the Chinese National Women's Federation, through Cares' VRM, extended an invitation to ten Chilean women to visit China in early 1966 for a two-month stay. Cares' selections included a number of Socialists and members of a pro-Chinese offshoot of the PSC called the Popular Socialist Party (PSP).* Cares, perhaps buoyed by these Chinese attentions, expressed hopes at the Second VRM National Congress which met late in the year, that the VRM would become the "focus" of the Latin American pro-Chinese Communist movement. But the Espartaco organization continued as the favored pro-Chinese organization in Chile.

In March 1966, the Espartaco group merged with the URB at a "First Marxist-Leninist Congress" held clandestinely in Santiago to become the Revolutionary Communist party (PCR). The first regional meeting of pro-Chinese Communist parties, discussed above, had convened immediately before. Public announcement of the international gathering, and of the formation of the PCR was withheld until May, and Chinese media waited until August before giving it wide publicity. Peking in July had used materials from a VRM publication, and the same month Cares expressed interest in merging the VRM with the PCR; but nothing came of this. The new party, like other pro-Chinese groups in Chile, appears to have little real numerical strength and consists mainly of a leadership hierarchy.

*Another extreme left-wing pro-Chinese micro-group worth mentioning was the Communist Rebel Union (URB), composed largely of students.
The general Chilean reaction of revulsion and dismay to the cultural revolution could be seen in the sparse attendance at the October 1966 celebrations of Chinese Communist accession to power. In former years this anniversary had been heavily intertwined with Chilean leftist politics and the Sino-Soviet dispute, and well attended. Only a few diplomats, and some extremists--mostly from the Socialist party--attended the 1966 events.

Argentina

The Communist party of Argentina (PCA), one of the staunchest in the hemisphere in its support of the CPSU in the international dispute, was not spared from troublesome pro-Chinese dissidence. But the China sympathizers have not been able even to effectively challenge the iron control over the PCA exercised by old-line pro-Soviet PCA President-founder Victorio Codovilla and his associates. Unlike Corvalan, Codovilla did not tolerate dissidents within the party, and 1963 and 1964 witnessed major purges of them from PCA ranks.*

PCA loyalty to the CPSU became apparent at the party's Twelfth National Congress, held in Buenos Aires from 22 February to 3 March 1963, when the PCA sent official greetings to the CPSU but refrained from extending this courtesy to the CCP; and a long-time party leader, Rodolfo Araoz Alfaro, was dropped from the newly-elected central committee because of his ideological stand. In September the PCA reportedly had to reorganize its Entre Rios Provincial Committee because the majority of its members favored the Chinese side--the only party provincial organization known to have been so badly split--and

*As early as October 1961 Codovilla took the CPSU side in the ideological dispute; in January 1963 the PCA publicly condemned the Albanian and Chinese parties and gave its "unconditional support" to the CPSU.

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in October expulsions of a number of Chinese sympathizers occurred.

Peking's supporters in Argentina—then largely indistinguishable from the Castroites—have not been able to achieve any unity, and offer the spectacle of repetitive minor splits, purges, and jurisdictional disputes among themselves. Their efforts to establish unified organizational bases had its beginnings in mid-1963 about the time the Chinese party issued its June letter. The strongest organized dissidents were then a group calling themselves the Movement of Revolutionary Action (MAR). Some sixty expelled PCA members formed a second movement known as the "Luis E. Recabarren Study Center", and were reported considering founding of a second, pro-Chinese Communist party.

By early 1964 the MAR was in touch with a Uruguayan counterpart, the pro-Chinese MIR, to perfect arrangements for regular future delivery of Chinese Communist publications and propaganda materials from Uruguay to Argentina, a perennial problem because of effective Argentine official mail surveillance.

A June decree-law declaring the PCA illegal and prohibiting all Communist activity, and two supplementary decree-laws which became effective in July 1963, dampened down the evolution of the conflict within the Argentine Communist movement until after November 1964, when Communists regained a measure of legality and emerged from hiding.*

In October 1964 two other groups which had emerged from a four-way break-up of the Vanguard Socialist party, publicly sided with the Chinese Communist party—the only

*In mid-June, for example, the NCNA stringer and his two assistants in Buenos Aires were arrested and their office closed. The Ongania coup of June 1966 led to a renewal of official repression of all Communist activities.
Argentine groups aside from the PCA to take such a public stand on the Sino-Soviet polemic. The two pro-Peking factions were known as the Vanguard Socialist party section headed by Elias Seman,* which published the magazine No Transar (No Retreat); and the Labor Party of Andres Aldao and Gustavo Andrade, publishing Democracia Popular. Both independently defended the Chinese "battle against revisionism" and attacked the PCA leadership as "spokesmen of revisionism." A third group, the David Tieffenberg wing of the Vanguard Socialist party, also favored the Chinese line, but it did not join in the others' public stand. Other groups worth mentioning here are one led by Juan Carlos Portantiero, a former PCA member expelled in October 1963; another directed by Ismael Vinas, known as the "National Liberation Movement" (MLN); and a "Committee of Friendship with China" whose principal figure was Bernardo Kordon, expelled from the PCA in April 1964. The Marxist Leftist Revolutionary Movement of Argentina (MIRA), formed in 1962 for guerrilla activities, remained basically a pro-Castro body until after the November 1964 Havana CP Conference, when it began to be described as pro-Chinese.

After their Cuban backing had dried up,** leaders of the Peronist Revolutionary Movement (MRP) and some associated Peronist radical groups, turned to China for support. From December 1964 through February 1965 Hector Villalon, head of the MRP, and Joe Baxter, a leader of Tacuara, an Argentine anti-Semitic terrorist organization, traveled to Peking, Hanoi, and other overseas capitals. In Peking Villalon dutifully mouthed a pro-Chinese line. In April, after returning to Montevideo, Uruguay, Baxter and Villalon again traveled to Hanoi for North Vietnamese guerrilla warfare training. Reporting of Villalon's

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*Semán, an attorney and formerly secretary-general of the Vanguard Socialist party's youth organization, attended a guerrilla warfare course in Cuba sometime before October 1963.

**See pages 86 and 87.
Chinese activities during this period indicates Peking extended the MRP some financial and other support, at least on a provisional basis. In July Villalon led a MRP delegation to the World Conference Against the Atomic and Hydrogen Bomb in Tokyo. Villalon there denounced the policy of peaceful coexistence adopted by a "majority" of Latin American Communist parties and said that Cuba, "under the influence of the USSR", favored peaceful coexistence and sought a rapprochement with the U.S. Villalon was invited to visit Peking and did so in August.*

There were indications throughout 1965 of continued PCA concern over pro-Chinese and Castroist pressures inside the party. In April the PCA central committee discussed expulsion of the Montevideo Prensa Latina representative, an Argentine, and other PCA members associated with La Rosa Blindada (The Armored Rose), a Buenos Aires intellectual magazine which was a rallying point for pro-Chinese Communists and whose editors refused to accept PCA discipline. Juan Gelman, former NCNA stringer in Buenos Aires, was its poetry editor. The staff of La Rose Blindada were in close contact with the Casa de las Americas in Havana.

In June the PCA was worried about the pro-Chinese activities, in Mendoza Province, of Antulio Lencinas, who until his expulsion in May 1964 had been a member of the PCA's Provincial Committee. In the same month reports reflected PCA concern over pro-Peking attitudes of party leaders in Rosario, Santa Fe Province, and in San Nicolas, Buenos Aires Province.

About mid-August leaders of MIRA, the Workers Party, and the Communist Vanguard party (PCV)—a Marxist-Leninist

*Some MRP members went to China for guerrilla training in 1955. Peking's interest in the MRP included its use to get Chinese propaganda into Argentina by clandestine means.
party formed by the Tieffenberg and Seman groups in April—met to seek to create a common front which could be used to "reconstitute" the PCA.* The talks were unproductive because the PCV insisted that no Marxist-Leninist movement in Argentina could ignore the "international movement" headed by the Chinese party, whereas the other two conferees were just as adamant that an Argentine movement could be developed on a strictly national basis independent of any international involvement. This exchange reportedly strengthened PCV resolve to demonstrate that other pro-Chinese groups in Argentina were not genuine Marxist-Leninist parties.

The PCV began to emerge as the Argentine organization having Peking's confidence after Seman was in Peking in September and October 1965. Seman, PCV political secretary, had become the driving force behind the magazine No Transar, which he edited and regularly furnished with doctrinal articles, and had developed as the real PCV leader, Tieffenberg having become its titular head. In February 1966 NCNA broadcast a lengthy review of a No Transar article describing the magazine as the "organ of the Communist vanguard group in Argentina." In March an officer of a pro-Chinese Latin American Communist party quoted Chinese officials of the foreign department of the CCP central committee as saying that the Chinese were preparing to support the PCV, which they described as "the organization having the best doctrinal base and potential for organizational growth in Argentina", because of the

*There is a large, constantly changing assortment of left extremist parties and groups in Argentina, whose memberships may range from four or five to perhaps several hundreds, favoring "Chinese Communist" tactics over Soviet tactics. But the PCA and the Soviet line still dominate Communist activity in Argentina, and it is impossible accurately to estimate the aggregate numerical strength of the dissidents.
demonstrated abilities of Seman as a political organizer.* NCNA in Peking broadcast material from No Transar on 5 April, when Seman was named as its author; on 8 April, 10 July, and 24 September; and published an article by Seman titled "China in the Forefront of the Struggle Against Imperialism and Revisionism" in the Peking Review on 15 April 1966. But, as noted elsewhere, a PCV delegate was refused permission to participate in the March 1966 regional pro-Chinese party gathering in Santiago, Chile.

The Chinese, trying since 1960 to establish a full-fledged NCNA office in Buenos Aires, were being represented in early 1966 by Bernardo Kordon, secretary general of the "Argentine-Chinese Cultural Association," and by other members of that Association, who were active in efforts through sympathetic Argentine newspaper editors to extract official recognition of NCNA from the Argentine Government's Press Secretariat. Kordon was in June 1965 to have been in touch with the Chinese NCNA representative in Chile, Li Yen-nien.

*The CCP officials also expressed "disappointment" in the "Leftist Peronist Movement"--essentially the MRP of Villalon--as lacking a proper doctrinal base and therefore as incapable of moving beyond the level of trade union influence to that of political influence. The Chinese said they had no intention of inviting John William Cooke to China, apparently because of his obvious primary loyalties to Castro. This and the Chinese will limit but not completely stop bringing selected leftist Peronists to China, and will work with them to preserve influence in the Argentine labor movement. But they apparently have chosen and intend to back the PCV as a political organization that can ultimately challenge PCA control over the Argentine Communist movement.
Uruguay

In May 1963 a three-man delegation of the Communist Party of Uruguay (PCU), headed by party secretary-general Rodney Arismendi, went to Moscow to discuss the dispute with top CPSU officials. After his return Arismendi told the party executive commission that the CPSU was convinced its projected talks with the Chinese would fail. Therefore, said Arismendi, the PCU must prepare to purge its ranks of Chinese supporters "to prevent a coup".

Arismendi's report reflected the active concern of the PCU's pro-Soviet hierarchy over discontent within the party because of the Sino-Soviet struggle. Early in 1962 the PCU ordered its principal Montevideo bookstores to destroy all materials being received from China and to cease importing Chinese publications. The PCU itself had erroneously distributed the Chinese pamphlet Viva el Leninismo before its anti-Soviet content—which "caused much comment in the party"—had been noticed. Pressures on the PCU hierarchy for explanations were great, reflecting in part "fall-out" from the missile crisis of the previous October, for in February 1963 Arismendi was talking about "sending the necessary documents" from the PCU central committee to party cells. PCU concern over the possibility of a "coup" in FIDEL, the leftist electoral front it openly controlled, led to a May decision that PCU manipulation of FIDEL was to be strengthened by creation of a secret party fraction within the front, which could stiffen party control but hide it from public view. PCU members selected to work in this FIDEL fraction were told they must thoroughly master "the ideological differences between the Chinese and Soviet parties".

Throughout the spring of 1963, national party leaders held indoctrination sessions with departmental and sectional committee members to enforce the Soviet line. Nevertheless, the existence inside the party of a definite pro-Chinese faction was reported in May. This faction was largely composed of members of the party's youth organization, whose leaders, Julio Arizaga and Mario Echenique, had been suspended from the party because of their pro-Chinese
stance. By July, expelled PCU dissidents and some Communists still in the party—numbering about 200 persons—had organized a "Movement of Revolutionary Action" (MAR) in Montevideo, Tacuarembo, Colonia del Sacramento, and Carmelo on the southern coast, where the MAR was composed of almost the entire former PCU city organization. MAR members made early contact with the Brazilian CPB and pro-Chinese groups in Argentina. This liaison was primarily concerned with ensuring the continued flow of Chinese publications among the three countries by legal and illegal means. The PCU intensified its efforts to restrict discussion of the polemic and to emphasize the CPSU line within party circles.

There is good reporting on Chinese sponsorship of the MAR. In July Li Yen-nien and Tan Tai-sheng, two NCNA representatives in Santiago, Chile, began visits to Montevideo which continued into September. They met clandestinely with MAR representatives, who decided to change the name of their organization to the Left Revolutionary Movement (MIR). In September Li advised the MIR about a series of "revelations" of Soviet "violations" of agreements to be published in Red Flag, requesting the MIR to replay this material. He said the Chinese party leadership was "informed of the situation of the MIR, salutes it, wishes it great success and offers it support" in the form of free political literature and travel to China.

Because of its location and official Uruguayan tolerance of Communist activities, Montevideo has long been used by Moscow, Havana, and Peking as a principal distribution point for their respective propaganda production to other South American countries. Although their own propaganda activities in Uruguay were small compared with those of the CPSU, the Chinese party's initial interest in the MIR was clearly its value as a means to protect Peking's growing distribution activities in South America. The MIR arranged for replaying Chinese material attacking
the PCU, in Epoca, a major Marxist Montevideo daily, in the autumn of the year.*

Other pro-Chinese groups formed after 1963 from Uruguayan Communist, Socialist party and pro-Castro elements. In early 1964 a composite "guerrilla command" of MIR, Socialist, MAC,** and other extremists had grown up around Raul Sendic, a radical Socialist labor leader who the year before had carried out an audacious bank robbery. But by mid-year the MIR leadership was opposed to Sendic's erratic revolutionary tactics,*** and was devoting its energies to preparing and publishing a pro-Chinese Marxist magazine. By the end of the year the MIR had begun to issue this magazine, Liberacion, as its official journal. Another journal supporting the Chinese line, Barricada, sponsored by an independent group of Uruguayan intellectuals, had also made an appearance.

The year 1965 was characterized by MIR efforts to unite the country's various pro-Chinese groups and sectors within one new Marxist-Leninist party. The MIR had some success in coordinating its program with those of the MAC

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*The Chinese terminated advertisements in Epoca, in September 1966, because of an editorial severely critical of the "Red Guard" phenomenon. Epoca, generally sympathetic in its treatment of China, had served as virtually the only advertising medium for Chinese books, magazines, and pamphlets, in Uruguay since 1963.

**The Movement of Agrarian Action (MAC) was formed in 1963 by persons who, because of their pro-Chinese position, broke away from the Uruguayan Revolutionary Movement (MRO), a pro-Castro partner of the PCU in FIDEL.

***Sendic was responsible for fire bombs thrown against houses of members of the Uruguayan National Council of Government in September 1964 after Uruguay broke relations with Cuba.
and Socialist pro-Chinese sectors, but the desired unity was not achieved in spite of the fact that an apparent agreement to form one party had been reached at a series of meetings held in March.

A more direct Chinese effort to evolve the MIR from a revolutionary movement to a Marxist-Leninist party appears to have begun in mid-1966 when several MIR leaders went to Peking. A four-man MIR leadership group went to China in September for a four-month training program, and in September and October Peking replayed MIR statements supporting China's cultural revolution.

In January 1967 Eduardo Mariani, a MIR executive committee member who was one of the trainees, described the experience as "extremely useful". Mariani said the Chinese expressed satisfaction with the MIR as an organization and with MIR officers as potential leaders of the Uruguayan revolution. The Chinese said they foresaw no significant problems in converting the MIR from a "Marxist-Leninist Movement" into a "Marxist-Leninist Party". They contrasted the MIR favorably with various Argentine left-wing Peronist organizations which they described as "not politically mature" and "having no real understanding of the science of Marxism-Leninism". The Chinese promised to receive a second MIR training group of five persons in February or March 1967. But it was made clear that Chinese financial support would be limited during the "probationary" period when the MIR would be attempting to make of itself a Marxist-Leninist party "able to deal seriously with revisionism in Uruguay", and would thereafter be proportionate to MIR success.

Paraguay

In February 1963 the pro-Soviet Paraguayan Communist party (PCP), headed by Secretary General Oscar Creydt, then headquartered in Montevideo, Uruguay, expelled some thirty-three PCP members allegedly for their support of the Chinese line. Among those expelled was Alfredo Alcora, described as the leader of the pro-Chinese faction, and three members of the PCP's hierarchy. In July, PCP members
in Montevideo were getting pro-Soviet indoctrination, and in early September about twenty-four more PCP members inside Paraguay were declared expelled for "factionalism." About the same time Timoteo Ojeda and Antonio Camarra, two PCP labor leaders, were reported trying to organize a "Leninist" Communist party which would look for its leadership to Peking rather than to Moscow. Ojeda and Camarra were active among Paraguayan exiles in Argentina.

By December the Paraguayan Leninist Communist party (PCLP) had been formed by the former PCP members. Its leaders included Ojeda, Alfonso Guerra, Sebastian Querey, and Jose Asuncion Flores, one of Paraguay's best-known musical composers. Guerra, Ojeda, and a third dissident Communist met visiting Chinese Communist representatives then in Montevideo; the Chinese—probably NCNA officers from Chile—promised to help the PCLP conduct an organizing campaign and they invited Flores to visit China to consult on the matter. Soon thereafter the PCLP drew up a document which rejected Creydt's authority over the PCP. In February 1964, the PCLP held a "Third Congress of the Paraguayan Communist Party" at Chanelones, Uruguay, where a PCLP "central committee" "nullified" Creydt's direction of the PCP and resolved that the PCLP would conduct activities inside Paraguay in competition with the PCP. About March Flores and several other PCLP members went to China to seek financial aid, but there is no firm evidence such aid was ever furnished them by Peking.

the failure of the Chinese to follow up their initial offers of support was because they realized the PCLP split was essentially a reaction against the Creydt leadership of the PCP and had no real basis in any ideological sympathies in the PCLP for the Chinese position or party. At a PCLP meeting in Asuncion in October 1966 Alfonso Guerra, a PCLP central committee member, noted that the founding document of the party had placed the PCLP in agreement with the CPSU.

These facts had begun to come to light earlier in the year in connection with a CPSU-backed campaign to drop Creydt and replace him with Obdulio Barthe as PCP Secretary
General.* The Barthe forces had begun careful preparations for the long-deferred "Third Party Congress" which would properly oust Creydt, but were being slowed down by an equally careful counter-campaign directed by Creydt. The PCLP, seeing a chance to get rid of Creydt, made several overtures to the Barthe group in 1965 and 1966, and has shown itself willing to attend and participate in such a Congress. Flores went to the Tri-Continental Conference as an invited guest of the Cuban government, and the PCP delegation including both Creydt and at least one member of the Barthe group. But the PCP delegation to the Twenty-Third CPSU Congress included Flores and Barthe supporters, with no Creydt supporters present.

Since 1959 the PCP--kept off-balance by the tough Stroessner dictatorship and reduced essentially to exiled groups in surrounding countries--has endorsed the line that the only possible path to revolution in Paraguay is through armed action. It has, however, insisted on careful preparation of the rural peasantry beforehand and coordinated use of legal and guerrilla tactics in its efforts. References to the Paraguayan Communist movement in official Chinese publications have been almost nonexistent since the initial 1963-1964 contact with the PCLP. The PCP represents no real force inside Paraguay nor has any real political prospects there, and Paraguayan Communists are already working along lines of action with which Peking can sympathize. Paraguay apparently ranks very low in the Chinese order of priority and is probably viewed by Peking as a special case.

*A likely catalyst was the fact that Creydt had gone to Moscow in April 1965 to arrange a trip to North Vietnam. He obtained Moscow's approval for the trip on the grounds that he wanted to study North Vietnamese guerrilla methods in order to apply them in his own country. But, after visiting Hanoi, he went on to Peking where he talked to Chinese party leaders. This probably did the trick.
Brazil – I

Late in 1961 a Sino-Soviet ideological rift in the Brazilian Communist party (PCB) led to the expulsion for fractional activities of Joao Amazonas, Pedro Pomar, Mauricio Grabois, and Cali Chadde and others. In January 1962 this group, naming itself the Communist Party of Brazil (CPB), published a manifesto calling for a people's government and revolutionary struggle using armed as well as legal means. In February, triggered in part by a PCB resolution supporting the decisions of the 22nd CPSU Congress and Khrushchev's attack on Albania, the left-wing Communists held a national conference of some 50-70 delegates from nine states in south and central Brazil and the Federal District. The conference called on Brazilians to overthrow the existing regime by violence, affirming that only armed revolution could solve the country's problems. It supported the Castro regime, and announced the formation of the CPB as the "legitimate" Communist party in Brazil, because the Prestes leadership not only had changed the name of the party, but had revised its statutes and program without being authorized to do so by a party congress.*

In April Havana informed the PCB that it approved the CPB's "revolutionary character", and two top CPB leaders went to Cuba for meetings with Cuban and Chinese representatives, hoping to go also to China. As a result of an invitation extended in Havana, Joao Amazonas and Lincoln Oeste went to Peking in February-March 1963 where they had extensive discussions with high CCP officials. They were told that Peking supported the CPB but could not then break publicly with the PCB because such official

*The roots of the split went back to 1957 when Prestes adopted a "revisionist" peaceful way policy inspired by the 20th CPSU Congress of the previous year. In August 1957 four militant opponents of this line had been expelled from the party central committee.
Chinese recognition of the CPB would add fuel to CPSU charges that the CCP was sowing disunity within the world Communist movement. In March NCNA representatives in Rio de Janeiro concluded an agreement with the CPB for the latter to handle distribution of Pekin Informa. CPB officials of the party's Sao Paulo State Committee were invited and visited North Korea and Albania in May 1963. As of June 1963, CPB membership was reported at about 900, with some 3000 to 4000 sympathizers.

After the Chinese-Soviet exchange of letters in June and July 1963, the PCB national executive committee sent a letter to Peking referring to reception in China of CPB officials and to Chinese press and radio replay of articles from the official CPB newspaper Classe Operaria. An explanation of Chinese support of the "dissident" CPB was requested, the letter asking if this implied Chinese recognition of the CPB over the PCB. An early meeting of party representatives was requested to clarify the matter. This came to nothing and by October China, Albania, North Korea, and Cuba had extended tacit if unofficial recognition to the CPB, and CPB documents and speeches were being regularly reprinted in Chinese and Albanian media.

Grabois had gone to Peking in late December 1963 and was given additional, more elaborate Chinese advice on the conduct of the revolution in Brazil and the proper methods for fighting against the PCB "revisionists". (See the first section of this paper for material from these discussions on the Chinese theory of penetrating and controlling pro-CPSU Communist parties).

The April 1964 revolution brought a drastic change to CPB prospects, as well as those of the PCB; and an abrupt end to the growing official Chinese presence in Brazil, where a strong NCNA office as well as a trade delegation were flourishing.*

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*Nine Chinese NCNA and trade mission personnel were imprisoned and convicted and sentenced for espionage and subversion in December. Peking responded with a worldwide campaign of denunciation of the convictions, and in January sent wives of four of the convicts to Brazil. The whole group was deported from Brazil in April 1965.

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In September 1964 the CPB was involved in an abortive guerrilla operation in Sao Paulo state, and it continued to issue periodic resolutions clandestinely. In August it had issued a scathing denunciation of the PCB's failure to act at the time of the April revolution, which was reprinted in La Voix du Peuple, the French-language weekly newspaper of the pro-Chinese Communist party of Belgium and replayed by NCNA in May 1965 in Peking Review. Its central committee met in May 1965 for the first time since the revolution. The plenum reaffirmed the line of armed revolution, a broad united front based on worker-peasant alliance, and special emphasis on rural struggle. A resolution encouraging recruitment of pro-Chinese PCB members was also issued. During the next several months, reports of increased CBP infiltration in the PCB multiplied, but there is no evidence of any expansion of CPB membership or activities. The Second Institutional Act of October 1965, intensified official harassment of Brazilian Communists and further dampened all Communist operations. But a training group of about 14 CPB members who had gone to China in May had returned to Brazil by February 1966.

In mid-1965 Leonel Brizola sought Chinese support through the Chinese Embassy in Paris, through an aide, Paul Schilling, who may in fact have visited Peking. Several months later, reliable clandestine sources were saying the Chinese had given Brizola "some" financial backing to begin guerrilla operations in Brazil's southern tier of states, and had promised more after successful guerrilla action. Reported contacts of Brizola and the CBP in 1966 were sparse, and there were firmer indications that Chinese interest had dried up and Brizola was getting Cuban help.*

* Drying up of Chinese support of Brizola, and debate over immediate revolution versus a longer-term build-up within the CPB were coincident in time with the public Sino-Cuban dispute that began in January and extended through March 1966, and which led to divisions between Chinese and Castroist supporters who formerly had cooperated in radical movements in a number of Latin American countries.
By mid-1966 violent debate had sprung up between CPB leaders advocating immediate commencement of programmed terrorism and those contending that the party's basic task was "the organization of the masses".* The former were led by João Amazonas and Lincoln Cordeiro Oest. This hard-line faction prevailed at the CPB's Sixth National Conference, held in São Paulo from 26 June to 1 July 1966. The Congress' political report attacked Soviet revisionism more than imperialism. Its political resolution emphasized organization of the peasants, and formation of a clandestine united front of workers, peasants, and discontented members of the middle class and the military; and each state committee of the party was put in charge of its own military organization and each was committed to begin some action.

*This three-sided political resolution, assigning equal priority to all three objectives, was designed to accommodate both the hard line and the moderate factions, leaving it pretty much up to each state party chief to emphasize whichever objective seemed best within his state.

The August 1966 arrest of several members of a 13-man CPB training group returning from China, brought new dismay to the party. Six of the trainees were diverted to Albania for safe-haven until new means could be devised to infiltrate them into Brazil. A state of emergency within the party was declared to minimize official penetration and apprehension of other members. Party concern was great.

*The internal CPB debate was doubtless sharpened by the CPB's famous open letter to Castro of March, whose contents was given wide publicity when the Albanian party published its text the following May in Zeri i Popullit, Tirana. Aside from defending the Chinese party and condemning Castro's attacks against it, the CPB letter ridiculed Castro's dreams of applying Cuban liberation theory to Latin America and castigated Cuban refusal to seat the six Latin American pro-Chinese parties or allow them to have observers at the Tri-Continental Conference.

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because the 1966 class was the largest of three training groups sent to China since 1964. In December the arrested CPB members escaped and took refuge in the Uruguayan Embassy, but activities and operations of the party had been thrown into disarray because of extensive information the authorities had gained from them.

Brazil - II: Pro-Chinese Continue Within the Orthodox PCB

As reported by the CPB delegate to the Santiago meeting of pro-Chinese parties in March 1966, a minority of the national PCB leadership sympathetic to Peking's theses continued to favor a harder line for the PCB. Among these were Mario Alves da Sousa Vieira, member of the party's national executive committee (CEN). The differences between those favoring a peaceful line of party reconstruction and those wanting prompt violent action against the Branco government were to some extent sectional. In August 1965, for example, pro-Chinese dissidents brought about plans to reorganize the PCB Recife Municipal Committee. The PCB Pernambuco State Committee decided in 1965 that because of tight Fourth Army control over northeast Brazil only a peaceful policy made sense. The PCB State Committee in Rio Grande do Sul, an area traditionally rebellious to the central authority, called, however, for preparation for armed fighting in alliance with the Brizola and any other 'popular' movement in a united opposition front as a basic party task. For its part, the influential PCB Sao Paulo State Committee (CESP), disagreed with the parliamentary line of the majority of the national leadership, mainly in terms of emphasis, its differences originating essentially from dissatisfaction with Prestes' domination of the central committee. A CESP delegation met with Prestes in December to propose a moderate line of support for the official opposition party, the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB), while Prestes advocated open opposition to the government, repeating Soviet-line arguments of concern with a newly-active U.S. imperialism willing to engage in small wars in the Dominican Republic and Vietnam.

A "Political Resolution" which had been issued in May 1965 by the central committee meeting for the first
time since the April revolution, had reaffirmed the line, adopted at the 1960 Fifth Congress, of alliance with the national bourgeoisie in a united political front of "national-progressive" forces, a policy of civic protest (strikes, demonstrations, agitation) and of participation in local and national elections. The 31-member central committee passed it by a vote of 24 against five objections and two abstentions. The latter seven "pro-Chinese" objected to the resolution's half-way stance of reliance on the bourgeoisie rather than a front of the urban proletariat with the rural peasants to prepare for armed struggle. Three of them—Manuel Jover Teles, former head of the Guanabara State Committee, Sergio Holmos, and Antonio Ribeiro Granja—were then removed from the CEN. Teles, the strongest proponent of PCB cooperation with the CPB, had discussions for that purpose with CPB representatives. The May plenum resolved that conditions in Brazil were not suitable for arming the masses, but advocated self-defense training. It also called for preparing a Sixth Congress to be held in 1967.

Disagreement and lengthy bitter debate over draft position papers for the projected Sixth Congress in January 1966 revealed three definite PCB factions: a hard-line group led by Alves, a moderate-line sector led by Prestes, and an even less violent Sao Paulo group advocating close cooperation with the Branco government. The left-wing group under Teles, Alves, and Jacob Gorender of Rio Grande do Sul sought to build up its support in key states with a view to unseating the Prestes leadership at the Sixth Congress. A moderate paper substantially in accord with Prestes' views was, however, finally approved in early June 1966 for presentation to the Congress. The paper sharply attacked the "coup d'etat mentality of the petty bourgeois group" of the central committee (the six or seven pro-Chinese hardliners), upheld the CPSU line in the world dispute, and criticized China.
3. The Caribbean

The Dominican Republic

Since 1963 the Chinese party has worked with two Dominican extremist groups, the Dominican Popular Movement (MPD) and the 14th of June Revolutionary Movement (MR-1J4), in efforts to create reliable Marxist-Leninist assets in the Dominican Republic. Chinese support has taken the usual form of substantial money subsidies from time to time, periodic training of members of both groups, and important propaganda support of Dominican revolutionary activities, especially during the 1965 revolution.

Both the MPD and the MR-1J4 were, however, originally formed under Cuban inspiration, always maintained close ties with the Castro regime, and have been the recipients of substantial Cuban financial support. The overlapping membership and objectives of the two groups, as well as their fierce no-holds-barred competition for foreign subsidy, appear to have discouraged Chinese hopes, especially after the Sino-Cuban dispute in 1966, and in the autumn of that year the CCP was reliably reported to have suspended its financial support of both organizations, in effect bowing out in the face of resurgent Cuban influence over an MPD which was then incorporating into its ranks the major part of the former MR-1J4 leadership and, by the end of the year, had become a newly-organized body.

Indications of underlying pro-Chinese sympathies in the MPD appeared following Peking's June 1963 letter and the July Sino-Soviet talks. The MPD newspaper mildly defended Peking's position in the talks against attacks by the orthodox, pro-Soviet Dominican Communist party (PSPD); and the MPD, among the country's extremist groups, was singled out for its heavy receipt and use of Chinese propaganda materials. "Shrewdly remarked, however, that while the MUP [almost surely harbors Chinese sympathizers] [it could] be expected to avoid open avowal of the pro-Chinese line as long as Fidel does."
MPD contacts with Peking expanded during the second half of 1964 when MPD leader Lopez Molina and other prominent party directors visited China. Lopez' contacts appear to have been largely confined to the China Peace Committee, and none of the MPD visitors seem to have been directly received by the top CCP leadership.

On the other hand, there is stronger evidence that Mao Tse-tung himself received several MR-1J4 representatives who visited China about the same time; and of the two groups, apparently the MR-1J4 got the firmer nod from the Chinese, who promised "unlimited support" and training for its members. The MR-1J4 also got offers of guerrilla training from the North Koreans and North Vietnamese.

Tangible proof of this came when one of the two visitors, Fidelio Despradel Roques, was given US $20,000 by the Chinese Embassy in Paris on his return trip to the Dominican Republic. The number of MR-1J4 members going to China for training increased after August, as did the amounts and types of Chinese doctrinal materials received, which had by December reached marked proportions. Chinese official mention of Dominican revolutionary progress was almost exclusively confined in 1964 to the MR-1J4 and almost no mention of the MPD is to be seen. Chinese preference for the MR-1J4, a less 'Communist' and more nationalist body than the MPD, was probably because of the Movement's impressive numerical strength compared with that of the MPD, and because the MR-1J4 had played a leading role in an actual, if ill-fated, guerrilla operation inside the Dominican Republic in November and December 1963.

Havana also kept its ties with the MR-1J4 active during this period. A group of MR-1J4 members were given extensive guerrilla warfare training in Cuba in 1964 and returned clandestinely to the Dominican Republic that autumn.

Both the MR-1J4 and the MPD early assumed leading roles in the April 1965 revolution, and both quickly received from the Chinese embassy in Paris substantial sums which were brought into the Dominican Republic to aid the rebels. The U.S. landings touched off a full-scale Chinese propaganda blast highlighted on 12 May by one of Mao's relatively rare personal anti-U.S. pronouncements. The
Chinese leader compared the landings to actions of the World War II dictators and pledged "firm support" of the rebels. A mass rally in Peking, and a People's Daily Commentator article rounded out the unusual Chinese attention to the Dominican conflict. Soviet UN action in June supporting a permanent cease-fire in the Dominican Republic was bitterly attacked by Peking as a betrayal of the Dominican people.*

Although the MPD had no more than 300 members involved in the fighting—a relatively small contribution compared with that of the MR-1J4 and other recognized groups—there is better evidence of MPD use of Chinese doctrine within rebel councils than there is for the MR-1J4. Just when the OAS was negotiating a cease-fire with the Caamaño government late in June as the first step to a permanent settlement of the conflict, the MPD was pressuring the other rebel factions to agree instead to a prolonged armed struggle which, it argued, would lead to establishment of the second socialist regime in the hemisphere. When the others demurred, the MPD decided to continue armed opposition alone.** Both the MPD and the MR-1J4 set up their own training schools for guerrilla and ideological training, but the latter's effort was much more extensive and gained official recognition as the rebel's multi-party training facility. The MPD's training effort developed along open Chinese doctrinal lines.

*Peking played up a second commemorative rally of Chinese people held a year later, on 26 April 1966, which was addressed by a leading regime spokesman on non-bloc affairs, and formed part of a "week of solidarity with the Dominican people" decreed by the Tri-Continental Conference.

**Both the PSPD and a controlling MR-1J4 faction generally approved negotiations on grounds that only a political solution offered any hope for the rebel cause. But already the MR-1J4 was beginning to split along Communist versus nationalist lines.
The MPD, and a militant faction of the MR-1J4, built up some guerrilla assets in the interior and collaborated in abortive raids on interior towns toward the end of June.

MPD favor in Peking increased dramatically after mid-1965 for several reasons. One was the Movement's frank adoption of Maoist ideas and doctrine during the revolution. Another was a letter that MPD President Maximo Lopez Molina had sent to the Cuban party's central committee in July from his place of exile in Paris, in which he strongly criticized Castro for not extending greater support to the rebels during the fighting.* Lopez sent a copy of his letter to the CCP. In August the MPD held a ten-day "Preparatory Congress" which adopted a militant program of opposition along Maoist lines calculated to make the Dominican Republic "the Vietnam of the Caribbean", and sent Mao a message of full support against "modern revisionism", describing itself as a Marxist-Leninist party. Lopez himself had visited China and North Vietnam since he was exiled by the Dominican government in May 1964. The Congress named him as president of a provisional executive committee; in his absence the Movement was actually run by Cayetano Rodriguez del Prado. After this Congress the MPD took the lead in mounting a terrorist campaign against U.S. troops; and early in 1966 it was publishing a theoretical Maoist journal, Bandera Roja.

*There is good evidence that Castro's interest in promoting revolution in the Dominican Republic was high even before 1963, and after that year the Dominican Republic became a priority Cuban target.
NCNA, for the first time since the inception of the Dominican crisis, mentioned the MPD in a 30 August report that 46 Dominican political parties and social organizations, including the MR-1J4, had proclaimed their readiness to form a united front to fight for withdrawal of the inter-American force and restoration of the 1963 constitution. Thereafter, NCNA mention of the MPD began to displace Peking's former emphasis on the MR-1J4. In September the MPD accepted an offer from Peking to train a group of its members in guerrilla warfare in China.

Havana continued its contest with Peking for control of the MPD, also offering the Movement training slots. At the end of the year a five-man MPD group was selected for eight months' training in Cuba. For its part, a militant faction in the MR-1J4 continued to work hard to retain Chinese attention, issued a training manual that embodied quotations from Mao and Lenin and recommended that sympathizers become Communists. A group of MR-1J4 members who left the Dominican Republic in November and December 1965 for political and military training in China, began to return in May 1966; and MR-1J4 militants continued active armed harassment of the Inter-American troops. Both the MPD and MR-1J4 boasted leadership elements in the Communist-run labor confederation, FOUPSA-CESITRADO, and both were in contact with the All China Federation of Trade Unions which was supporting them with some funds and propaganda.

But by the beginning of 1966 the Chinese had suspended the regular subsidy they had been furnishing the MR-1J4, reportedly because Peking disapproved of MR-1J4 plans for urban terrorism that countered the Maoist doctrine that revolution should begin in the countryside. The MR-1J4 financial secretary was sent to China to make amends; he returned in May with new funds and apparent Chinese approval of new MR-1J4 plans for "popular war." For its part, Havana cut off its regular funding of the MR-1J4 after the 1 June national elections (in which the MR-1J4 had thrown its electoral support to Bosch), accusing the MR-1J4 of "not knowing how to work properly in the 1965 revolution." (The real reason was probably because of MR-1J4 acceptance of the Chinese aid.) In mid-July the MR-1J4 convened its
"Second Congress" where the Sino-Cuban duel produced a sharp division between those on the one hand who wished its open identification as a Communist party, led by Fidelio Despradel Roques and almost all other MR-1J4 leaders who had traveled to China; and on the other hand, those who favored retention by the movement of a non-Communist nationalist character following MR-1J4 Secretary General Rafael Francisco "Fafa" Taveras Rosario.

In September Peking reportedly again suspended all further financial support to the MR-1J4, pending an authoritative accounting by the movement of funds already received, which were reliably estimated to have amounted to US $137,000 during the previous year. Because of the serious financial crisis this occasioned, a militant MR-1J4 group in October robbed the Dominican National Lottery of U.S. $83,000. The movement had also begun selling its tools and equipment, including cars stolen during the revolution, to raise necessary operating funds. But the sensational robbery led to important leadership defections in November and served to further the split between the two factions.

Cuban victory over China for control of the MPD had its beginnings at the January 1966 Tri-Continental Conference, where Cayetano Rodriguez del Prado, the MPD delegate, claiming MPD central committee authorization, officially disavowed Lopez Molina's July letter to Castro. According to Rodriguez, the Chinese were contemplating using the letter and its contents in their polemic with the Cubans, until Rodriguez was assigned by the MPD central committee to disavow it. Castro was reported very appreciative of Rodriguez' official action, and after it was taken told Rodriguez that from then on the MPD could count on his backing and support. As an earnest of this, he gave Rodriguez U.S. $25,000 to take back to the Dominican Republic. Rodriguez reportedly traveled to China to try to explain his actions before re-entering the Dominican Republic.

Lopez Molina, who had returned clandestinely to the Dominican Republic late in 1965, counter-attacked an April MPD decision to remove him from the MPD presidency and reduce him to a simple member. When the Rodriguez forces
expelled him on 21 April, Lopez Molina countered by "resigning" several days later, defending the Marxist-Leninist soundness of his July letter to Castro, accusing Rodriguez and one other of being CPSU penetrations, and announcing he intended to form a new Marxist-Leninist party, the Orthodox Communist Party (PCO). He formed the PCO in June, and in mid-July sent a letter to the Peking Peace Committee attacking MPD collusion with Cuban "revisionism."

In that month the MPD itself suffered a further split, the Rodriguez faction remaining the stronger of two groups. The new dissident group was largely a nucleus of former MR-LJ4 members whose leader was Narciso Gonzalez. But the split was grave enough to bring MPD activities to a halt in a flurry of charges and counter-charges highlighted by assertions of each faction that the other had been expelled, and "Red Guard"-style youth raids by Rodriguez supporters against both Gonzalez and Lopez Molina. Compounding this chaos was the fact that a Rodriguez emissary to China, whose mission was to ask that Chinese funds going to the MR-LJ4 be withdrawn and applied to the MPD because of MR-LJ4 shortcomings, was refused a visa by the Chinese and in September the Chinese again suspended funding of Rodriguez' MPD faction. Rodriguez, who had backed Castro and had never fully subscribed to Chinese hostility toward the Cuban regime, probably rightly ascribed the termination of Chinese aid to the fact that Peking had learned of a subsidy the MPD regularly received from Havana, and wished to express its displeasure at Rodriguez' ties with Castro and Cuba.

In October the Gonzalez faction of the MPD also split, and a new (and fifth) Communist party, calling itself the Communist Party of the Dominican Republic (PCRD), was formed by Luis "Pin" Montes Gonzalez and Alfredo Toussent Jean, and immediately attacked the Rodriguez and Gonzalez groups. The PCRD, claiming a Marxist-Leninist pro-Chinese line, made no mention of Lopez Molina's PCO, whose theoretical stand was practically identical with its own. But by this time the MPD no longer existed as an organized Communist movement. Gonzalez resigned in November and with others formed a Marxist study group outside of the parties, and Rodriguez also resigned that month.
ostensibly because of worsening health, amidst increasing signs of Cuban control of a "special organization" within the MPD for carrying out certain terrorist activities in collaboration with MR-1J4 extremists.

In December the Taveras ("non-transformist") MR-1J4 group began to leave the MR-1J4 en masse to join the MPD group of Rodriguez.* The Taveras group, which had custody of the funds stolen from the National Lottery and MR-1J4 equipment and vehicles, turned everything over to the Despradel ("transformist") group, which then assumed direction of the MR-1J4. A newly-elected MPD central committee headed by Marino Nazario (aka Maximiliano Gomez), in January 1967, favored MPD ideological and international alignment with Cuba, reflecting the influence of its new, pro-Cuban MR-1J4 members. Nevertheless, pro-Chinese sympathies persisted among the lower-class worker membership of the MPD.

Haiti

The first real evidence of serious Chinese support of the Haitian Communist movement concerned a visit to Peking by Fred Baptiste, a pro-Chinese Haitian Communist living in exile in Paris, in the spring of 1966. Following his return to Paris, carrying $2000, he reported a

*This split involved a majority of the MR-1J4 central committee and a large number of its members who left to join the MPD at least partially because of ideological reasons: The Tavernas group believed that because of the bourgeois background of its membership the MR-1J4 could never transform itself into a party of the working class; while the "transformists" of Despradel believed this could be done after it completed its historic task of carrying out the "democratic bourgeoisie revolution" as a party of "many classes." The Tavernas "non-transformists" joined the MPD because they described it as "the party of the working class in development."
Chinese promise of arms for an organization to be known as the Armed Forces of Haitian Liberation (FALH), which Baptiste and three other exiles representing both pro-Peking and pro-Soviet Haitian Communist factions, were attempting to organize for an invasion of Haiti. But friction between the four soon developed on Sino-Soviet ideological as well as racial grounds, Baptiste and Paul Arcelin—the other Chinese sympathizer—being Negro, and the two pro-CPSU Communists being mulattoes. Baptiste had played a key role in the organization of an invasion of Haiti from the Dominican Republic in the summer of 1964. He escaped to the Dominican Republic and led the Haitian commando group that joined the rebels in the April 1965 revolution in the Dominican Republic.

Further evidence of Chinese activity was the creation in Europe in May 1966 of a new Peking-oriented Haitian revolutionary group, with assistance from the Chinese and the Belgian pro-Peking dissident Communist, Jacques Grippa. The Haitian group, headed by exile Garard Duplessis, held its first "congress" in June in the Paris home of a Professor Joseph Marchiso, then teaching French to members of the Chinese Communist diplomatic mission in Paris. With the aid of Grippa the Haitians began publishing a French-language periodical, La Manchette, in Belgium in May 1966. The new group maintained liaison with the Paris representatives of the Dominican MR-1J4 revolutionary movement, and with Cuban representatives.* Duplessis, who had visited Peking several times—the last in early 1966—left for Peking again in late July with two companions, and the three were still in training in China in late September 1966.

As of mid-December 1966 Haitian Communist Jacques Dorcean had reportedly moved to Brussels to become editor that the Cuban ambassador to France had been commissioned to enlist the cooperation of the Duplessis group in a Cuban-backed invasion operation then in preparation in Cuba.
of La Manchette, after supporters of the publication, financially backed by Grippa, had searched for several months for someone to take over the non-paying editorial post. At that time Duplessis was expected to return to Paris from China.

Jamaica

Some evidence of Chinese interest in training young Jamaicans was provided in an official Jamaican service report of June 1965. A member of the Communist-infiltrated Youth Socialist League (YSL), who was a member of a Jamaican delegation attending the January 1965 victory anniversary in Havana, reported a private meeting he had with the Chinese ambassador in Cuba at night after his two fellow-delegates were asleep. This youth, Levi Wellesley Stevens, said the Chinese ambassador had told him the Chinese government was willing to train 30 Jamaicans in China. Twenty of this number would come from the YSL and ten from the Unemployed Workers Council (UWC), a Jamaican left-wing group. Transportation costs would be mailed from London. Stevens allegedly discussed with the ambassador problems of leaving and re-entering Jamaica illegally because of the authorities' practice of seizing passports.