CURRENT INTELLIGENCE STAFF STUDY

THE SINO-SOVIEIT DISPUTE ON WORLD COMMUNIST STRATEGY
(Autumn 1957 - Autumn 1959)

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE STAFF STUDY

THE SINO-SOVET DISPUTE ON WORLD COMMUNIST STRATEGY
(Its Development from Autumn 1957 to Autumn 1959)

This is a working paper, the second in a series of studies of the dispute between the Soviet and Chinese Communist parties --about the strategy of the world Communist movement in the struggle with the West--which began in or about autumn 1957 and which has become critical for the Sino-Soviet relationship since the Bucharest conference of June 1960. The third paper in the series will treat the dispute from autumn 1959 to the eve of the Bucharest conference, and a fourth paper will treat the period of the showdown, beginning at Bucharest.

The summary and conclusions of this paper appear as pages i-vi. Although the paper is longer than we had planned to be producing by this time, it seemed to us that the scope and terms of the Sino-Soviet dispute on strategy were of sufficient importance to those professionally concerned in any way with the world Communist movement to justify considerable detail in support of our conclusions.

We are particularly grateful to ________ chief RPB/FPID, and to his staff, for calling our attention to several of the key articles discussed in this paper, for perceptive criticism of draft chapters, and for suggesting several of the ideas developed in the paper. Informal conversations with Allen Whiting of the Rand Corporation and with Seweryn Bialer greatly helped to sharpen our thinking on some of the points in this paper. Arthur Cohen and analysts of the Soviet Foreign Policy Branch of OCI were also helpful.

The Sino-Soviet Studies Group would welcome further comments on this paper--addressed to Donald Zagoria, the principal analyst, or to W. P. Southard, the acting coordinator of the group ________.
# THE SINO-SOVET DISPUTE ON WORLD COMMUNIST STRATEGY
(Autumn 1957 - Autumn 1959)

## SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Mao Tse-tung during the latter half of 1957--the period of the successful ICBM test and the launching of the first Soviet earth satellite--apparently came to the view that there had occurred a qualitative change in the balance of power between the two camps and a new turning point in the world situation. Mao disagreed with Khrushchev's more conservative view that the Soviet weapons developments did not represent such a qualitative change and that this kind of turning-point in the balance of power would be reached only when the USSR had surpassed the United States in economic productivity. In consequence of the new world situation, in Mao's view, there were great opportunities for the Communist camp to accelerate the process of history by exploiting the long-posed conflicts between the imperialist camp and the colonial and semicolonial areas, among the imperialist powers, and within imperialist countries.

As Mao saw it, the new opportunities called for a much more revolutionary program than that which the bloc was then pursuing, particularly in the colonial and semicolonial areas. Mao continued to agree with Khrushchev that a general war between the bloc and the West was not inevitable, would be too costly, and should be avoided. However, Mao seemed less fearful of the consequences of a general war and less willing for the bloc to compromise in order to avoid one.

Mao by autumn 1957 had come to hold that Soviet military superiority was now such that the bloc could undertake ventures which in previous years would have been regarded by both Moscow and Peiping as highly hazardous. In connection with this, Mao probably believed that Khrushchev's calls for a summit meeting and for negotiations with the West--calls which began in December 1957--would not be fruitful and in any case would both frustrate Chinese policy toward the United States and inhibit the aggressive revolutionary program which the Chinese party advocated. Khrushchev, on the other hand, probably believed that the new Soviet weapons developments afforded a sufficient position of strength for him to begin his long climb to the summit.

Thus Mao, under the shield of Soviet military power, was prepared to take three steps forward, whereas Khrushchev was
willing to take only one. The classical left-right split in Communist party histories was emerging on the international scene, with Mao beginning to adopt neo-Trotskyite views. In early 1960, Mao's spokesmen were to put forward a new version of Trotsky's concept of "uninterrupted revolution" as applicable to the "colonial" countries, and Khrushchev's counter-attack would accuse Mao of reviving Trotsky's "adventurist" foreign policy.

The New Year's Day 1958 editorial of People's Daily illustrated the revolutionary optimism that had transformed both the domestic and the global thinking of the Chinese leaders. The party newspaper's theme was that "people's thinking" tended to be too conservative and timid. With regard to the domestic scene, the editorial revealed the determination of the regime to promote Chinese economic development at unprecedented speed; with regard to world strategy, the editorial spelled out the rationale of Mao's new confidence, relating this confidence to the development of Soviet weapons in the fall of 1957. That the Chinese Communists intended simultaneously in early 1958 to embark on an audacious economic program at home and were encouraging a more revolutionary program abroad can hardly be accidental. Determined to push ahead with an unprecedented pace of economic development at home, Mao probably estimated that tension in international affairs would serve him well domestically. More importantly, he believed that the international climate was particularly favorable for a rapid revolutionary advance both at home and abroad at a time when Soviet weapons developments provided an effective shield against the West.

In February the Chinese Communists publicly hinted, through Chou En-lai, a preference for the more aggressive bloc strategy that Mao had stated privately in Moscow. Peiping then gave practical expression to its disagreement with Moscow by attempting to force the Soviet hand in the course of the dispute with the Yugoslav party, and in part seemed to succeed in this effort. In so doing Peiping showed an interest in circumscribing Moscow's efforts to improve its relations with the West, and in initiating a new stage of more militant struggle with the West.
In May 1958, Khrushchev and Chinese Vice Premier Chen Yun delivered conflicting reports to the Warsaw Treaty meeting. Khrushchev emphasized the Soviet call for an East-West summit conference, reiterated the view that war had ceased to be inevitable, called for "partial disarmament measures," called on the Warsaw Treaty states to undertake further unilateral reduction, and contended that the farsighted leaders in the West "already" recognized the need for a "radical change" in their approach. Chen reiterated Mao's view that a "new turning point" in world affairs had occurred subsequent to the Soviet weapons developments in fall 1957 and argued scornfully that it was "erroneous and harmful" to overestimate the West and to "fear...imperialism when the socialist camp has absolute superiority." In conflict with the spirit of Khrushchev's speech and the Pact Declaration, Chen concluded that provisions of the Warsaw Treaty must be "further strengthened."

At an enlarged party-military conference which was to last eight weeks in the summer of 1958, Mao Tse-tung, in reaffirming his old doctrines, recognized a basic fact of life. Because China probably would not have nuclear weapons in quantity for many years, China must continue to depend on the Soviet deterrent--thus greatly circumscribing any course of action that even Mao himself might hope to undertake.

In mid-1958 the Chinese party seemed to be urging that Western action in the Middle East be countered with armed force rather than with an appeal to the UN. Throughout the crisis Mao seemed to be willing to see Khrushchev accept a greater degree of risk than Khrushchev was willing to accept.

In the early fall of 1958, Sino-Soviet differences over global strategy flowed over into the front organizations. Peiping wanted to use the "peace" fronts to "expose" American aggression, to support "just" wars and oppose "unjust" wars, and to fight colonialism; Moscow wanted to adopt a more flexible approach in the "peace" movement better suited to appeal to non-Communists. In August the Chinese charged that the peace movement had in the past almost wandered onto the path of "unprincipled pacifism." In September they opposed a Soviet-sponsored candidate for the Presidency of the International Union of Students and put up their own candidate from the most extremist student group.
Khrushchev at the 21st party congress committed himself to a strategy of steady development of Bloc economic strength, which by about 1970 would result or begin to result in great political gains. Moreover, the bloc would be so strong militarily that the West would be absolutely deterred from war of any kind. Khrushchev thus provided himself with an ideological justification for detente tactics and a low-risk foreign policy. This could even serve as an ideological justification for a long-term accommodation with the West. Mao Tse-tung, believing that the bloc's military strength could be converted into rapid political gains, almost certainly regarded Khrushchev's program as overly cautious.

During the summer of 1959 the Chinese began to attack Khrushchev's explorations for a detente with the United States. Peiping contended that Khrushchev's concept of peaceful coexistence amounted to revising Marxism, appeasing the imperialists, and believing in the impossible. The Chinese feared that a soft policy toward the West would dampen revolutionary spirit throughout the world and would be too confining for their own foreign policy goals, not the least of which was the conquest of Taiwan and the offshore islands.

In the fall, coincident with the more or less open Chinese attacks on Khrushchev's negotiation tactics, the Chinese adopted a policy of obstructionism and noncooperation in several of the front organizations, particularly the World Peace Council.

During the summer of 1959, in the first practical test of divergent Sino-Soviet views on the revolutionary timetable in the colonial countries, Peiping may have advocated a more revolutionary line for the Iraqi Communists and may have supported extremists in the Iraqi party against Soviet instructions and wishes. If so, the abortive insurrection in Kirkuk, which resulted in a fiasco for the local Communists, must have increased Moscow's displeasure with the Chinese.
In late summer 1959, the proceedings of a Soviet-sponsored seminar on the "liberation" movement in Asia, Africa, and Latin America indicated that while Moscow, like Peiping, had qualms about nationalist leaders in Asia and Africa, it nevertheless expected local Communists to make further gains by cooperating with and even subordinating themselves to these nationalist governments. Moreover, Moscow believed that the progress of the revolution in the "colonial" areas would be intimately related to Soviet economic progress and Soviet economic allurements. Thus the Soviet party stated its favor for a gradual revolutionary process.

The Chinese party in October 1959 seemed to be offering a criticism of the Soviet gradualist policy, and once again—as with the case of Yugoslavia in the spring of 1958—seemed to be trying to force the Russian hand, this time by applying more pressure on Nasir than Moscow deemed advisable. Further, Peiping presented the Chinese revolution as the "classic" example both for effecting the socialist revolution and for building socialism in backward countries, and argued that Communist governments must soon be established in at least some of the backward countries. Peiping contended that nationalist leaders in the newly independent countries were unreliable, that they could not accomplish those tasks Moscow believed they could, and that they could not really escape from imperialist influence and even bondage. Mao apparently believed that the Soviet party intended to back these nationalist leaders for a longer period than the Chinese thought advisable.

The new Khrushchev version of ideological orthodoxy, the textbook of Marxism-Leninism, appeared in the fall of 1959 with several alterations of Leninist-Stalinist doctrine and revolutionary strategy. The textbook represented an accumulation of—and the most precise statement of—the doctrinal innovations that the new Soviet leadership had been effecting since the 20th Congress in 1956. The textbook aimed at giving Soviet strategy much more flexibility than Stalin had allowed for. It minimized the importance of wars in "future revolutionary victories." It took a conservative view on the key question of when a "revolutionary
situation" arises in a non-Communist country. To the 20th congress dictum that peaceful revolution was increasingly possible, it added the thought that peaceful revolution also had "great advantages." It provided a new doctrinal rationale for its gradualist revolutionary strategy in the highly developed capitalist countries, in effect deferring the socialist revolution in these countries; and this line was soon echoed in the resolution adopted by 17 West European Communist parties. It urged Communists to support "democratic" movements in part for themselves and not merely as way stations on the road to socialism. Finally, its chief editor publicly rejected the views of unnamed "sectarians" who were dubious about giving enthusiastic support to "democratic" movements and who urged greater support for the revolutionary Communist movement itself.

This patchwork of ideological positions represented a significant alteration of Leninist-Stalinist revolutionary strategy in the direction of greater caution and flexibility. It is not difficult to see why such arguments were sufficient by April 1960 to produce Chinese charges that Khrushchev had "revised, betrayed and emasculated" Marxist-Leninist doctrine.
INTRODUCTION

Perhaps the overriding issue in the Sino-Soviet dispute that has come into world prominence in the summer of 1960 is the question of who is to be the final arbiter of Communist theory, strategy, and tactics. The history of Communism is replete with heresy and "deviation." These heresies have generally been overcome within individual parties by the application of stern discipline, excommunication, and even death penalties. The Communist world now, however, is faced with an unprecedented historical situation. Never before have two such powerful and autonomous Communist states as Russia and China differed so fundamentally about revolutionary conceptions.

The substantive dispute between Moscow and Peiping centers on two problems of critical significance to the Communist world: how best to build Communism at home and how best to spread Communism abroad. In Communist terminology, these are the questions of the "transition to Communism" and the question of the strategy and tactics for the "world revolution." The purpose of this paper is to trace the origins of the dispute about the latter problem in the period from the fall of 1957 to the fall of 1959. It is impossible to understand fully the present dispute without an appreciation of its three-year background.

As will become evident, the Sino-Soviet dispute about alternatives in revolutionary strategy and tactics has gone on more or less continuously since late 1957. This dialogue has been conducted—as all of the critical questions of Communist theory and perhaps most of policy also are conducted—in open communications. These communications, intended for the party elites and sub-elites, are couched in ideological jargon and often referred to in the West as "esoteric communications." They can take the form of authoritative and programmatic articles in party journals or speeches by top Communist leaders.
In view of the substantial work that has now been published by Western writers such as Richard Lowenthal, Z. Brzezinski, and Myron Rush—and some work that has been done by various individuals in the intelligence community—it is no longer possible to deny the utility of analysis of "esoteric communication" as a valuable—indeed indispensable—tool of the study of Communist politics.

It does not seem accidental that the components of the intelligence community which recognized the existence and significance of the Sino-Soviet dispute on strategy and tactics in the early stages of the dispute were those components, such as RPB/FBID, which devote considerable time and energy to the systematic exploitation of the principal Communist journals. The question to be asked is not whether the tool should be employed but whether it is properly employed—and, in this particular case, the decision must rest with the reader.

A question often asked is whether the Sino-Soviet dispute—genuine as it is now generally acknowledged to be, even by the skeptics—cannot be satisfactorily explained simply in terms of divergent national interests. This paper contends that this dispute cannot be understood on the basis of national interests, especially if those interests are narrowly conceived rather than conceived in terms of a Communist world-view. Manifestly, it is not in any traditional understanding of Chinese "national interest" that we can find an answer to such questions as that of why Peiping is so vitally interested in the spread of revolution in the so-called "colonial and semi-colonial" countries. No Chinese "national interest" dictates the necessity of a "socialist revolution" in Iraq. Yet it is precisely around this and similar questions—on the proper assessment of revolutionary opportunities and the proper choice of revolutionary strategies in the non-Communist world—that much of the Sino-Soviet conflict revolves.

Another question has been voiced frequently within the intelligence community. It is said that the Russians and Chinese differ only over "ideology," so these disputes by definition cannot be fundamental. Such a view seems to us to
conceal a basic misunderstanding of the nature of ideology in the Communist world and the close relationship among ideology, policy, and power. While it is true that ideology is often manipulated, disputes about basic policies, as well as struggles for power and dominance, have to be fought out in ideological terms. But the terms in which the dispute is conducted should not be mistaken for the dispute itself. The Malenkov-Khrushchev fight over light versus heavy industry was conducted in ideological terms, but it concerned a whole range of crucial problems such as investment allocations and defense spending. The present Sino-Soviet dispute is conducted in ideological terms, but it is a battle over foreign and intrabloc policy alternatives, and it is, at the same time, a struggle for power in the Communist world. Thus the Western observer, far from dismissing the present Sino-Soviet dispute or any dispute between Communists as "merely ideological," should recognize from the very appeal to ideological fundamentals how serious such disputes really are.

Another position frequently taken in the West is that the Sino-Soviet dispute can be largely—if not exclusively—explained on the basis of different stages of development. In this interpretation, the youth of the Chinese revolution accounts for the revolutionary fervor of its leadership. Such an interpretation cannot explain how it happened that for some time prior to mid-1957 the Chinese—at an even earlier stage of development—were a moderate rather than an extremist influence in the Communist world. It was, after all, Peiping that as late as autumn 1956 encouraged Gomulka in some aspects of his struggle with the USSR; and it was the Chinese who had espoused the conciliatory principles of Bandung in 1955.

It is true that contributing factors in the Sino-Soviet dispute are differing immediate interests, differing stages of development, differing positions in the world community, and Mao's increasingly delusional thinking. Yet to explain the Sino-Soviet dispute in terms of any one of them or combination of them seems to us a reductive fallacy. The most important factor, in our view, is that the received doctrine has had to be contemplated against a background of the possible consequences of nuclear war, posing the great question as to how the global aspirations of the Communist world can be achieved without provoking those consequences. To this basic question, Khrushchev and Mao have arrived at different answers.
Schoolmaster Tungkuo and Comrade Khrushchev

A wolf is a wolf, and its man-eating nature does not change. An ancient Chinese fable about the Chungshan wolf tells the story of Schoolmaster Tungkuo, who once found a wolf wounded by hunters and saved it by hiding it in his bag. After the hunters had left, he released the wolf from the bag. Instead of showing gratitude, the wolf wanted to devour him. Fortunately a peasant came along who understood well the man-eating nature of the wolf. He lured it back into the bag and beat it to death, and thus Schoolmaster Tungkuo was saved. —Red Flag, 16 June 1960.

It is common knowledge that a wolf is just as bloodthirsty as a lion or a tiger, but he is much weaker. That is why a man fears less meeting a wolf than meeting a tiger or lion. Of course, small beasts of prey can also bite; essentially they are the same, but they have different possibilities. They are not as strong and it is easier to render them harmless.—Khrushchev, 21 June 1960.
I. THE TURNING POINT: Soviet Weapons, Autumn 1957

In the formulation of Communist strategy and tactics in any given period, a fundamental question is the proper assessment of the over-all power relationship--political, military, and economic--between the Communists' own forces and those of the enemy. The determination of this power relationship--the "correlation of forces" (sootnosheniya sil)--underlies the strategy of a Communist party not yet in power as well as of one which has attained power.

On such an assessment depends whether a Communist party takes two steps forward or one step back. The history of Communism is replete with left- and right-wing deviations. Such "deviations" are produced when some members of the party see either a more favorable or a less favorable correlation of forces than do those members dominating the party.* The leftist, anxious to move forward, minimizes the strength of the enemy, whether that enemy be the kulak, the bourgeoisie, or Western "imperialism." The rightist maximizes the strength of the enemy. To want to move forward when the correlation of forces is unfavorable is the heresy of the leftist; to want to retreat or to stand still at a time when the power balance is favorable or dubious is the sin of the rightist.

To tread the delicate path between these two heresies is easy enough, provided one strong leader within a party or one party within the Communist bloc can define the "correct" position. Then, by definition, all who do not agree with this assessment are either left-wing or right-wing deviationists. The problem becomes much more difficult, however, when two autonomous Communist countries view the correlation of forces--and therefore the opportunities for revolutionary advance--differently.

The Significance of Soviet Weapons Developments

The Sino-Soviet dispute over strategy seems to have originated in divergent Soviet and Chinese assessments of the

*Sometimes, of course, "deviations" become "deviations" only after the event. Thus, when the party line moves to the right, what was formerly a "correct" centrist position may be labeled in retrospect a left deviation.
significance of Soviet weapons developments in autumn 1957. In August, Moscow tested its first ICBM. In October it orbited its first sputnik. By November 1957, when the Communist leaders throughout the world gathered in Moscow for the 40th anniversary of the USSR and the ensuing meeting of Communist parties, a fundamental issue for the world Communist movement was how and to what extent Soviet weapons developments had altered the balance of power between East and West and what the implications of this were for bloc policy.

For Moscow, the Soviet weapons developments did indeed seem to represent the culmination of the drive for the long-sought absolute deterrent. The adequacy of Soviet deterrent power—and crucial problems such as the level of defense spending and the posture toward the West which hinged on the assessment of Soviet deterrent power—had been a subject of controversy among the Soviet leadership since 1953.* For example, Mikoyan's declaration in March 1954 that the USSR's possession of nuclear weapons had "considerably lessened the danger of war" was published only in the Yerevan party newspaper and was deleted from the version of his speech published in Pravda. Mikoyan's speech, moreover, was made on the same day that Malenkov made his famous statement that a new world war with present means of warfare would "mean the destruction of world civilization." A month later, at the Supreme Soviet session, Mikoyan again expressed his confidence in Soviet deterrent power when he said that atomic and hydrogen weapons in the hands of the USSR were "tying the hand of those who would want to fight." No other Presidium speaker advanced that idea in the year that followed, and Malenkov's formulation was quickly overturned and subsequently rejected.

In 1955, Major General N. Talensky contended that atomic weapons "by their very nature enhance the danger of military adventures,"—an indication that there remained those in the Soviet hierarchy who did not yet believe in the adequacy of Soviet deterrent power to repel Western aggression. As late as the 20th party congress in 1956 there remained a significant difference in the Soviet leaders' formulations on the

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critical question of deterrence. While Khrushchev, Mikoyan, and Malenkov expressed varying degrees of confidence in Soviet deterrent power, Molotov and Suslov put their stress on the need for a continued alert, and Kaganovich in particular stressed that imperialism was incorrigibly "adventurous." Whatever were the precise lineups, there apparently were conflicting views, and Malenkov and Mikoyan seem to have been the early, and perhaps premature, spokesmen of the mutual-deterrence line.

Khrushchev apparently took a position midway between the optimistic Mikoyan line and the more dire warnings of Kaganovich. Khrushchev had been confident enough at the 20th congress to say that

Prominent leaders of bourgeois countries frankly admit with increasing frequency that 'there will be no victory' in a war in which atomic weapons are used. These leaders still do not venture to state that capitalism will find its grave in another world war, should it unleash one, but they are already compelled to openly admit that the socialist camp is invincible. (emphasis supplied)

The Soviet ICBM, which Khrushchev was to characterize as the "ultimate" weapon, almost certainly added to his confidence in Soviet deterrent power. In an 8 September interview with Pravda--that Khrushchev later said he had dictated in order to sober the American military--Marshal K. A. Vershinin, commander in chief of the Soviet Air Force, spoke at length on the theme of the vulnerability of the United States to Soviet retaliatory power.

In the year that followed the Soviet successes of autumn 1957, Khrushchev became confident enough to claim Soviet superiority in missiles (November 1957); to cast doubt on the American assumption that the US was militarily stronger than the USSR (January 1958); to throw out the traditional Stalinist concept of capitalist encirclement, because it was "no longer clear who encircles whom" (March 1958); and to contend that the situation was such that the West would "hardly dare to unleash a war against the countries of the socialist camp" (October 1958).
There were and have continued to be, however, important limits to Khrushchev's assessments, particularly when viewed in terms of Mao's assessments of the same weapons developments. Khrushchev did not assert—and still does not—that the overall strength of the bloc exceeds that of the West. This is precisely what Mao did and does assert. Khrushchev did not assert—and still does not—that the international situation has reached a new "turning point." This is a phrase coined by Mao in November 1957 and reiterated in the Chinese press.*

Moreover, Khrushchev in autumn 1957 did not claim that the USSR had even military superiority—let alone over-all superiority over the West. He did not claim such military superiority until early in 1960. Mao and Chinese journals, on the other hand have clearly implied since fall 1957 that the Russians have such superiority.

Finally, neither Khrushchev nor any Soviet journals spoke in the post-ICBM days—as Chinese journals did—of a "qualitative" change in the international situation. In Marxist terminology, a "qualitative" change is an accumulation of "quantitative" changes and is exceedingly significant.

*In Khrushchev's 40th anniversary report to the Supreme Soviet on 6 November 1957, an occasion which could have provided the perfect backdrop for a dramatic announcement of the superiority of the bloc over the West, Khrushchev appraised the year 1957 not as a turning point but as a year of "outstanding victories." The nearest thing to Mao's formulation was that in the November 1957 declaration of the Communist parties, to the effect that there had occurred a "decisive shift in the balance of forces" in the world "in favor of socialism." This formulation does not mean that the bloc is stronger than the West but only that it is substantially stronger than it was. After World War II, Soviet media also said much the same thing—that the balance of forces had changed "in favor of socialism"—thus stopping short of attributing absolute advantage to the bloc. As late as 4 March 1959, Khrushchev told an East German audience that if it were possible to invent an instrument which would measure with precision the political and military strength of the bloc and the West, it "would show that both sides are sufficiently strong at present."
in the inevitable march of history. In the months following the November conference, Chinese journals were to give some idea of what they meant by a "qualitative" change. They claimed that the Soviet weapons developments represented the third great turning point in world history since the Bolshevik revolution, the others having been the victory in World War II and the Communist victory in China. No Soviet journals have made such a claim.

The contention—which is the contention of this chapter—that Mao and Khrushchev had arrived at differing estimates on the significance of the Soviet weapons developments and the way to exploit them—derives not only from divergent Soviet and Chinese public statements of that period but from a reliable account of Mao's and Khrushchev's unpublished speeches to the November 1957 conference. There was subsequent confirmation of portions of that account by Soviet and Chinese media. The account strongly suggests that Khrushchev took a more conservative and realistic view than Mao on the extent to which Soviet weaponry developments had altered the power balance and on the extent to which these developments could be exploited for political gain.

The Soviet weapons developments posed several interrelated questions for the Communist leaders than assembled in Moscow. How strong was the West? Even if it was true that the USSR had or would soon have an advantage in strategic missiles, did not the West still have at its disposal impressive military and economic strength? Would the West risk general war now that the USSR had tested its "ultimate" weapon? If not, what risks could the bloc now take that were previously regarded as hazardous? What kinds of political initiatives should now follow? Should the USSR seek to negotiate with the West from a position of strength, or should it forsake negotiations and adopt a more forward and revolutionary policy all over the globe—particularly in those areas where the West was exposed and vulnerable (e.g., in the colonial underbelly) or where the bloc had "just" grievances (e.g., in Taiwan)?

The frame of mind with which Mao assessed such questions can be inferred from his speech on 18 November to the "meeting of representatives of the Communist and workers parties of socialist countries." (Excerpts from this speech were released only after the event in October 1958.) Mao told the conference:
I consider that the present world situation has reached a new turning point. There are now two winds in the world: the east wind and the west wind.... I think the characteristic of the current situation is that the east wind prevails over the west wind; that is, the strength of socialism exceeds the strength of imperialism. (emphasis supplied)

No Soviet leaders or journals have ever made such unequivocal statements as the one underlined above. Moscow's standard formulation since the fall of 1957 has been the ambiguous one previously noted--that the balance of forces between socialism and capitalism has been altered "in favor of" the former. Nor have Soviet spokesmen or media used independently or quoted Mao's formulation of the new world "turning point."

In his speech a day earlier to Chinese students in Moscow, Mao had added to the east wind - west wind formula the views that the combined numbers of the socialist camp and the new and independent countries now far exceeded the population of the "imperialist" countries, that the Western camp was "divided internally," and that "'earthquakes' will take place" in that camp. Soviet media have rarely made much of the fact that the mere population of the socialist camp and the independent countries exceeds that of the West; and far from predicting "earthquakes" in the Western camp, they have tended to present a much more realistic picture of the Western social and economic scene than they did in earlier years.

In short, it is the contention of this chapter that although Khrushchev undoubtedly regarded the Soviet weapons developments as a breakthrough in Soviet deterrent power—a subject on which there had long been controversy among the Soviet leaders—he still seemed to retain a more realistic estimate than Mao of the over-all power balance between East and West. Perhaps just as important, Khrushchev seems to have viewed the Soviet weaponry developments as an opportunity to begin his long climb to the summit and negotiations. The first Soviet calls for a summit meeting came in December 1957—four months after the ICBM test. In the light of what is known about Mao's subsequent coolness toward negotiations and his preference for a more revolutionary strategy uninhibited by useless talks with the West, it is quite likely that right from the start, Mao disapproved of the Soviet efforts toward negotiations.
Relative Economic Strength

In the Communist world view, economic productivity is an important index of military-political power. One question might have presented itself in terms of whether Soviet weapons development gave the bloc an over-all superiority to the West so long as Western economic production was still so much higher.

Mao, in his private speech to the November conference and in his propaganda after the conference, was to insist polemically that economic strength was not so important as other comrades seemed to think. In his speech to the conference, Mao is said to have begun by asserting flatly that the forces of Communism were already superior to those of imperialism, and by pouncing on the view that the strength of a country depended primarily on economic strength in general and the amount of steel production in particular. The output of steel, he reportedly said, was "not the decisive factor" in measuring the relative strength of the two camps. He gave various examples of the inability of the US and Britain to prevent a number of Communist advances since World War II ---despite the fact that they had more steel than the Russians.

A polemical passage in a People's Daily editorial that appeared soon after the conference may have reflected some responses made in Moscow to Mao's argument:

'Some people who observe things superficially, and do not see the essence of a question, do not believe that socialism is really superior in strength to imperialism. They say that output of iron and steel and the total quantity of many other products in the United States are still much higher than in the Soviet Union, and it will not be long before the United States can also produce its own artificial satellite and intercontinental ballistic missile, and so on and so forth.

It is true that this quotation may have been directed primarily at the Yugoslavs and Poles. The Yugoslav press did in fact contend after the conference was over that Western economic power was still a mighty factor to be reckoned with. On the other hand, there are several reasons why this
quotation may have been directed at Khrushchev as well. Although the available reliable report of the meeting does not specifically quote Khrushchev as having disputed Mao’s assessment, it does indicate that Khrushchev took a more "cautious and realistic" attitude toward the West than did Mao. Such caution and realism were reflected in subsequent Soviet propaganda, which did not, as did Chinese propaganda, deprecate American economic strength. Khrushchev himself was to pay implicit tribute to Western economic strength when he announced at the 21st party congress that the bloc would not achieve a "world-historic victory" over capitalism until about 1970, when it would overtake the West in both physical volume of production and per capita output. "Material production," Khrushchev emphasized at that time, "is the decisive sphere of human endeavor."

Relative Military Strength

Mao reportedly also took a deprecatory view of Western military strength. Even before the sputnik-ICBM developments, he reportedly told the conference, the history of the postwar period had witnessed one Communist triumph after another over the Western "paper tigers." He cited developments in China, Indonesia, Korea, Indochina, Egypt, and Syria.

Mao was particularly impressed with Soviet deterrent power. He boasted that during the Suez conflict, the Soviet Union had sent a telegram to England stating that "if you do not stop we will get into it," and the war was over. In the Syrian crisis, said Mao, "not even the cost of a telegram was required," for Khrushchev had merely published an article in his own newspaper and that settled it.

Mao told the Communist leaders not only that the sputnik represented a "new turning point" in the long battle between capitalism and socialism—a phrase that was to be reiterated by Chinese journals in the months following the conference—but added, according to the report of his private speech, that if one viewed the situation strategically, socialism had "already won." While he was not ready to write off the West tactically, the most that it would be capable of doing in the short run would be to "undertake...a few small offensives."
A People's Daily editorial on 25 November, assessing the Moscow conference, suggested that the world was moving into a new turning point in history which would once again shake capitalism to its foundations as it had been previously shaken by the October Revolution, the victory in World War II, and the victory of the Chinese revolution.

The October Revolution was a fundamental turning point in world history which shook the world domination of capitalism to its foundations and opened up the new era of proletarian revolution. Thereafter, the victory in the world war against fascism and the victory of the Chinese revolution which followed was another important turning point which greatly expanded the forces of socialism and weakened the forces of imperialism. Now the world situation is moving into a new turning point—the forces of the socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union have definitely surpassed those of the imperialist camp headed by the United States both in popular support, in population, and in a number of most important scientific and technological fields.

This editorial reviewed the same examples of the "striking decline" of the West that Mao had cited privately in Moscow. Turning specifically to the cause of the new turning point, it wrote that, as a result of Soviet weapons developments, the superiority of the anti-imperialist forces had expressed itself "in even more concentrated form and had reached unprecedented heights...that is why we say this is a new turning point in the international situation." (emphasis supplied)

While agreeing that the United States would "no doubt" have its own sputniks and ICBM's, it rejected the view that the US could catch up.

If the Soviet Union has already surpassed the United States in major fields of science and technology at a time when its per capita production has still not reached that of the United States, the general trend from now on must be to increase the Soviet Union's lead more and more. The United States will try to catch up, but the Soviet Union will be still farther ahead.
In late December, the Chinese journal World Knowledge published an assessment of Chinese strategic views under the significant title "The New World Situation." The article began—as had People's Daily—by calling the Soviet weapons development the "fourth great historic change in the 20th century. The article contended that "from now on, the superiority of the socialist world system over capitalism will be even more pronounced in all fields." It quoted US scientists as conceding that the US could not catch up with the USSR in earth satellites for at least five years. It went on ominously:

This disparity of the two camps in science and technology has given rise to basic changes in the relative military strength of the United States and the Soviet Union. The absolute superiority of the Soviet Union in intercontinental ballistic missiles has placed the striking capabilities of the United States nuclear weapons in an inferior position. The Soviet ICBMs not only can reach any military base in Central Europe, Asia, or Africa, but also force the US, for the first time in history, to a position where neither escape nor striking back is possible. The superiority achieved by the USSR in this great leap forward naturally has its effect on the development of the international situation. (emphasis supplied)

On February 9, 1959, the Kuang-ming Jih-pao, in commenting on the first US earth satellite, spoke of a "qualitative change" in the distribution of world power:

The contrast in the qualitative change in the distribution of world power has not only torn apart the paper tiger of American imperialism and shattered the tale of the 'position of strength', but, in recent months, has produced profound effects on the entire interrelationships of international affairs.

The Danger and Consequences of War

In Mao's perspective of November 1957, because Soviet deterrent power was now so overwhelming, the danger of the West's resorting to general war was small. As pointed out
earlier, he indicated that the best the West could hope to do in the forthcoming period would be to undertake "a few small offensives" which could "cause us great misery if we do not know how to tackle them properly" but which need not cause such misery if they were handled "properly." This view was and remains at the heart of his advocacy of a more assertive bloc policy. It is not true—as frequently suggested in the West—that Mao has "war fever." His estimate seems to be based rather on the conviction that barring an act of irrationality—the West would not willingly risk general war with the USSR in the post-ICBM world.

While Moscow—as we have seen—was voicing increasing confidence in its deterrent power, it nevertheless took the chance of general war much more seriously than did Peiping. Khrushchev reportedly told the Moscow conference that the actual or contemplated distribution of nuclear weapons all over Western Europe had created a very dangerous and explosive situation. He claimed, in fact, that the immediate situation was more dangerous than it had been for years and that the "real" problem was the danger of war.

Khrushchev was reportedly not so certain as was Mao that the USSR would be capable of acting more quickly and efficiently than the United States if it came to a showdown. Although he reportedly said that he had faith in the power of Soviet nuclear weapons and even that the USSR could "definitely" destroy every American base (probably overseas base) in 15 minutes, he was said to recognize that the US could do the same to the USSR.

Further, Mao reportedly repeated to the conference, his 1954 remark that if half the population of the world would be destroyed in a nuclear war, then half would survive. Khrushchev was clearly not so cavalier about the consequences of all-out war. Before and after the Moscow conference, Khrushchev was placing increasing public emphasis on the unacceptable costs of general war to the USSR as well as to the West. On 14 November 1957 he told a correspondent that in the event of war, "of course, we too will suffer great losses." Lately, Khrushchev and authoritative Soviet journals have
virtually revived the notorious Malenkov heresy of 1954 that
general war would destroy civilization.*

This is not to say that Mao was pressing for or anxious
for general war. He reportedly told the Moscow conference
that although the bloc could win such a war, the costs would
be "too great" for the bloc willingly to undertake such a war.

The Future Course of Action

Having arrived at different estimates of the balance of
power and the dangers and possible consequences of general
war, Khrushchev and Mao apparently arrived at different con-
clusions on the strategy for world Communism in the ten-year
period ahead. They seemed agreed at the Moscow conference
that their prospects for world domination would be immeasurably
enhanced at the end of that period, and that it was therefore
necessary to keep the peace for that long.** They seemed to
disagree, however, on the risks they could afford to run in
that period, the tactics they should employ, and the priori-
ties they should attach to various campaigns.

In Mao's view the bloc could now pursue a policy of
strength or "brinksmanship" all over the world under the cover
of the Soviet nuclear shield. He privately told the Moscow
conference that "from now on, the capitalist countries will
receive blow upon blow" (presumably from anti-imperialist
forces of all kinds). In the months ahead, Chinese journals
would stress that peace could not be won by "begging" for
it and that the imperialists recognized "only strength."

Mao apparently believed that the bloc should push a
particularly militant strategy in the imperialist rear--
those colonial and semicolonial countries in Asia, Africa
and Latin America, which came under the rubric of the "col-
onial liberation movement." As we shall soon see, Chinese
interest in these areas and pressure for more militant tac-
tics turned sharply upward in 1958.

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*N. Talensky wrote in Kommunist no. 7, May 1960, that
"the future war, if the aggressors dare to unleash it, would
lead to such a loss of life on both sides, the consequences
for humanity would be catastrophic."

**Mao reportedly told the conference that the "overriding
necessity" was to keep the peace "for the next ten years,"
and that ultimate victory would then be inevitable.
Mao's views on Soviet deterrent power and the way it should be used were reflected in his proposition that the West would increasingly seek a way out of its strategic dilemma by resorting to local wars. Following Mao's contention in November that the West could be expected to undertake "small offensives," the Chinese journal World Knowledge on 5 December provided the first substantial discussion noted in any Communist journal of the alleged American local war strategy. It contended that the US strategy of massive retaliation had failed and was now being supplemented to take into consideration the fact that "local war would occur more often, have greater possibility, and become more necessary."

Mao's line on local wars, in the context of his insistence on the bloc's over-all military superiority, seemed to have two implications. One was that if the West were to resort to local wars, the bloc should respond with force. The other—the other side of the same coin—was that the bloc could initiate or take part in local wars without fear of incurring a massive Western response.

Khrushchev's strategy for the crucial 10-to-15-year period ahead appeared to differ from that favored by Mao. Not persuaded that the bloc had over-all military superiority, more fearful of general war, convinced that a flexible foreign policy could in time serve his purposes better than the more revolutionary program advocated by Mao, and confident that Soviet economic growth was the key to the spread of Communist power and influence, Khrushchev was inclined to a more moderate, low-risk foreign policy which would allow the Russians to buy the necessary time to win what he regarded as the decisive economic race with the West.

In place of Mao's advocacy of more revolutionary tactics in the colonial liberation movement (see Chapter VI), Khrushchev was apparently convinced that through aid and trade he could alienate the uncommitted countries from the West, orient their trade toward the bloc, increase the "crisis of world capitalism," and ultimately neutralize or seduce these countries.* With regard to Mao's conclusion that

*The importance of Soviet foreign aid as a weapon in Soviet global strategy has been underlined in many useful studies. See "Soviet Foreign Aid as a Problem for US Policy," By Hans Heymann Jr. in the July 1960 issue of World Politics. Mr. Heymann gives a useful bibliography on the subject.
local wars were increasingly likely as a last great stratagem of the West, Khrushchev apparently believed, on the contrary, that the West was not only deterred from general war but from local wars as well. Similarly, testifying to the Soviet fear of general war, Moscow was to contend that local wars could not be localized. Peiping would contend in effect that wars could and would be localized.

This is not to say that Khrushchev was not aware of the appreciable military gains that he had made or of the possibility of employing those gains as blackmail against the West in Berlin or elsewhere. But he seemed prepared to take only minimal and controlled risks of general war—minimal in the sense that there should be no Soviet initiative which could reasonably be expected to provoke a massive Western response, and controlled in the sense that there was always an avenue of retreat if the West showed signs of firm resistance—as it did in the Taiwan Strait in the fall of 1958.

Moreover, the Soviet weapons developments apparently led Khrushchev not to a more revolutionary global strategy in the colonial liberation movements but rather to the beginning of a long climb to the summit with the "colonial" powers. In the polemics that were to break out in 1959 and 1960, the Chinese would argue in effect that negotiations with the colonial powers were acceptable but that little should be expected from them; and, most important, that the "colonial revolution" should not be sacrificed as a concession—even a temporary one—to the colonial powers. Nor, the Chinese were to argue, should negotiations inhibit the revolutionary struggle all over the world and the support lent to this struggle by the Russians.

Summary

Mao Tse-tung during the latter half of 1957—the period of the successful ICBM test and the launching of the first Soviet earth satellite—apparently came to the view that there had occurred a qualitative change in the balance of power between the two camps and a new turning point in the world situation. Mao disagreed with Khrushchev's more conservative view that the Soviet weapons developments did not represent such a qualitative change and that this kind of
turning-point in the balance of power would be reached only when the USSR had surpassed the United States in economic productivity. In consequence of the new world situation, in Mao's view, there were great opportunities for the Communist camp to accelerate the process of history by exploiting the long-posted conflicts between the imperialist camp and the colonial and semicolonial areas, among the imperialist powers, and within imperialist countries.

As Mao saw it, the new opportunities called for a much more revolutionary program than that which the bloc was then pursuing, particularly in the colonial and semicolonial areas. Mao continued to agree with Khrushchev that a general war between the bloc and the West was not inevitable, would be too costly, and should be avoided. However, Mao seemed less fearful of the consequences of a general war and less willing for the bloc to compromise in order to avoid one.

Mao by autumn 1957 had come to hold that Soviet military superiority was now such that the bloc could undertake ventures which in previous years would have been regarded by both Moscow and Peiping as highly hazardous. In connection with this, Mao probably believed that Khrushchev's calls for a summit meeting and for negotiations with the West--calls which began in December 1957--would not be fruitful and in any case would both frustrate Chinese policy toward the United States and inhibit the aggressive revolutionary program which the Chinese party advocated. Khrushchev, on the other hand, probably believed that the new Soviet weapons developments afforded a sufficient position of strength for him to begin his long climb to the summit.

Thus Mao, under the shield of Soviet military power, was prepared to take three steps forward, whereas Khrushchev was willing to take only one. The classical left-right split in Communist party histories was emerging on the international scene, with Mao beginning to look and act like Trotsky. In early 1960, Mao's spokesmen were to put forward a new version of Trotsky's concept of "uninterrupted revolution" as applicable to the "colonial" countries, and Khrushchev's counter-attack would accuse Mao of reviving Trotsky's "adventurist" foreign policy.
II. CHINESE PRESSURE ON MOSCOW: Early 1958

As we have seen, the origins of the Sino-Soviet dispute on strategy were intimately connected with divergent estimates on the significance of—and, consequently, the way to exploit—the Soviet weapons developments of fall 1957. Perhaps just as relevant for the dispute over strategy was the bold new thinking in China in late 1957 and early 1958 which resulted in the "great leap forward" and the communes. It seems not accidental that the more militant and revolutionary Chinese position on world affairs began to develop at precisely the same time Mao was beginning to outline his determination to promote Chinese economic development at unprecedented speed. Nor does it seem accidental that in approximately the same crucial period—early 1958—the Chinese began to apply massive pressure on the Yugoslavs, to become more uncompromising toward Japan, to put increasing emphasis on "Mao's ideology," and to pursue a more evangelical role in the world Communist movement. One of the principal Chinese concerns seemed to be that improved bloc relations with the West and with Yugoslavia would weaken the solidarity of the bloc, promote frictions among Communist countries and tensions within Communist countries. Khrushchev's de-Stalinization efforts, his attempted rapprochement with the Yugoslavs, and his overtures to the West represented to the Chinese a potential grave threat to Communist unity and discipline. Mao evidently wanted the Russians to put greater emphasis on consolidating the economic, political and ideological unity of the bloc and less emphasis on courting either renegades or non-Communist forces.

The following chapter discusses the indications in early 1958 that Peiping was beginning to press Moscow to reassess Soviet strategy. This attitude was reflected in Chinese writings in early 1958 and seemed to underlie the Chinese effort to force the Soviet hand with the Yugoslav party in the spring of 1958.

The People's Daily New Year's Day Editorial

The New Year's Day editorial of People's Daily ushered in 1958 with a great flourish, illustrating the revolutionary optimism that had transformed both Chinese domestic and global thinking. The editorial began by complaining that "people's" thinking often lags behind realities, and they underestimate
the speed of the development of the objective situation." With regard to the domestic scene, the editorial for the first time revealed the regime's determination to promote Chinese economic development at top speed—in other words to "leap forward"—in all branches of the economy; and the Chinese Communists for the first time published a timetable presenting their estimate of the periods of time required to begin the transition to a Communist society.* With regard to the world scene, the editorial spelled out in some detail the rationale of Mao's new confidence:

The successful launching by the Soviet Union of the two man-made satellites and the Moscow meetings of the Communist and workers' parties of various countries, in a matter of a few weeks, changed the whole world atmosphere. As the Soviet satellites circle in the sky, marking the beginning of a new area in mankind's advance to conquer nature, they provide convincing evidence that the socialist system is superior to the capitalist system... The east wind prevails over the west wind, the forces of socialism are stronger than the forces of imperialism, and the peace forces are stronger than the forces of war. If there was still some dispute on this not long ago, even among Communists, the fact is now common knowledge even in the Western world. (emphasis supplied)

Simultaneous with the rapid growth of the forces of socialism, the editorial continued, had been the "tremendous development during the past year in the national independence movement in Asian-African countries. The tide of the national independence movement has spread from Asia to Africa."

The People's Daily editorial also saw a pronounced weakening of the US position in Europe as well as in the colonial underbelly. The Soviet successes in the ICBM and earth satellites, it wrote, had made the American policy of strength "thoroughly bankrupt." This situation "cannot but lead" the West European countries to resist the US policy of arms expansion and thus to sharpen the contradictions between the US and its West European allies.

Looking ahead, the editorial concluded its section on the bloc's global vistas with the prediction that "a boundless grand prospect is opening up for the cause of peace, democracy and socialism."

Chou En-lai's Report on Foreign Affairs

Premier Chou En-lai's report to the National People's Congress on 10 February 1958 was another important statement of the Chinese leadership's thinking on the world situation. Chou explained that he was making this report so soon (six months) after his last report because "profound and momentous changes" had taken place in the international as well as in China's domestic situation. There had indeed been a "decisive" change in the international situation, Chou said—one expressed by Mao Tse-tung in his formulation that the East wind now prevails.

After reviewing intrabloc relations, Chou reaffirmed Chinese support of the policy of "peaceful coexistence and peaceful cooperation" and of specific Soviet "peace" initiatives. He went on, however, to hail instances of the bloc's "powerful support" of "national independence" movements, especially in the Middle East, and from there moved to question at some length the ability of the United States to afford "protection!" to any of its allies. Chou contended that—in the light of Soviet weapons development—American "strength" and "advantageous position" were fictions, that the US was no longer a reliable bulwark, and that those countries which permitted US missiles to be based on their territories were simply ensuring their own "destruction" in the first stage of war.

Further, because an increasing number of "capitalist countries" had begun to realize that coexistence with the bloc was "not only possible but necessary," the US strategic position was weak. If the US and its allies persisted in a policy of preparation for war, it would become "even more isolated," and if they became so reckless as to actually launch a war, they would be "digging their own graves."

In retrospect, perhaps the most important storm warning in Chou's speech was that relating to Taiwan. Twice, without using the qualifier "peacefully" (normal since 1955), he referred to Chinese Communist determination to liberate Taiwan. At the same time, he made a virulent attack on the "two Chinas" concept.

Chou's fear of the increasing attractiveness of a "two Chinas" solution was well founded. Proposals were being made both in the West and in the non-Communist East for various kinds of "two Chinas" solutions. As Chou said, even some "friends" of China (e.g., India) "naively" thought that by supporting such ideas they were helping Peiping gain international acceptance.
Chou's speech once again made it clear that: Communist China would never consider relinquishing its claims to Taiwan in exchange for admission to the UN and the world community.

Taiwan is Chinese territory.... The Chinese Government and people are firmly opposed to the scheme to create 'two Chinas.' We absolutely will not allow this scheme to materialize in any form or on any occasion. There is only one China--the People's Republic of China.

Faced with an increasing interest in a "two Chinas" solution which would ultimately force the Chinese Communists to recognize the sovereignty of Taiwan--an interest which was perhaps strongest in the uncommitted countries but which may have been covertly shared by the USSR as well--the Chinese Communists may have decided as early as February 1958 that drastic action would have to be taken to scuttle the "two Chinas" concept.

Peiping's Attack on the Yugoslav Party

Peiping's bitter attack on the Yugoslav party in the spring of 1958 seems to have been the first practical expression of Mao's disagreement with Khrushchev over the bloc's strategy. In attacking Yugoslav views on the necessity of co-existence, the need to abate the struggle between East and West, the possibility of a peaceful transition to socialism in "non-Communist" countries, and the need to "modernize" Marxism-Leninist doctrine in accord with the new "epoch," the Chinese were probably aiming at Moscow as well as at Belgrade. The views for which they criticized Tito in the spring of 1958 were in part the same views for which they were criticizing Khrushchev in the summer of 1960. By ostensibly focusing the attack on Tito, the Chinese apparently hoped to avoid a direct confrontation with the Russians and yet to circumscribe Soviet efforts toward reaching a detente with the West--efforts which would result in a dilution of revolutionary spirit. Moscow in December 1957 had begun to call for summit negotiations with the West at the same time that Peiping had concluded that opportunities for revolutionary advance throughout the world--and particularly in the colonial areas--were wonderfully promising.

The last paragraph of Peiping's vitriolic 5 May attack, ostensibly on Tito, carried the Chinese message to Khrushchev. As a result of Soviet weapons developments, the world had reached a "new historic turning point" which should be exploited.
by the bloc and which would necessarily lead to a "sharpening struggle" between East and West—a "struggle" which it was impossible to avoid by negotiations and which, in any case, would be beneficial to the long-range interests of the Communist movement.

We deem it absolutely necessary to distinguish between correct and incorrect views on vital questions in the international workers' movement. As Lenin said: "A policy based on principle is the only correct policy." The world is now at a new historic turning point, with the east wind prevailing over the west wind. The struggle between the Marxist line and the revisionist line is nothing but a reflection of the sharpening struggle between the imperialist world and the socialist world. It is impossible for any Marxist-Leninist to escape this struggle. Historical developments will testify ever more clearly to the great significance of this struggle for the international Communist movement.*

This paragraph, with its insistence on an inevitably sharpening struggle between East and West, was at odds both with the Moscow declaration of November 1957 and with Soviet propaganda and official statements of the period. The Moscow declaration had asserted that "the question of war or peaceful coexistence has become the fundamental problem of world politics" and that "the Communist parties regard the struggle for peace as their foremost task."

The 5 May People's Daily editorial, attacking not only the draft program of the League of Yugoslav Communists but the league's leadership itself, was the most unreservedly belligerent attack on Yugoslavia by any Communist party since before Stalin's death.** The Chinese editorial went far beyond the limits that appeared to have been set in the Moscow Communist's 15 April "principled party criticism" of the Yugoslav program. Kommunist had stopped short of impugning the motives of the Yugoslav party leadership, had conceded that some points in the program were good, and had concentrated its attack on specific revisionist heresies. People's Daily condemned the whole program as "out-and-out revisionist." Going well beyond any previous bloc comment, it charged that the league's leadership was itself revisionist, contended that the 1948 Cominform resolution condemning the Yugoslav party was still basically

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*The second CCP statement, on 1 June, put it even more strongly: "a fierce, life-and-death struggle" on a global scale.

valid,* suggested that the Yugoslav party program was put forward at US behest, and implied that Tito was motivated by an ambition to spread his own brand of revisionism throughout the bloc. It appealed to the Yugoslav party and people over the heads of the "leading group" and warned that the bloc's patience with Yugoslavia was almost at an end. It concluded with the clear implication that refusal by the Yugoslav leaders to reform might lead to a break in state relations.

Although Moscow had initiated the new campaign against the Yugoslavs, it is doubtful that it wished to go as far as Peiping. The Russians evidently wanted to make a forceful condemnation of Yugoslav ideological heresies lest these give encouragement to revisionism elsewhere in the Communist world. A huge campaign against revisionism had been mounted subsequent to the November 1957 summit meeting of Communist parties. Yet there were evidences of a Soviet desire to avoid a serious state breach with Yugoslavia.

Just as the Yugoslav party organ Borba, before the Moscow Kommunist article appeared, declared that "good bilateral interstate relations" were of great importance and that high significance should not be attached to ideological differences, so the Kommunist article itself said that "comradely party criticism" must not stand in the way of friendly relations. Presidium member Furtseva said in Warsaw on 24 April--nine days after the Kommunist article--that "we have been and we will be friends with Yugoslavia--always."

*The 1948 resolution, which confined itself to Tito's heresies, was never withdrawn, as was the 1949 resolution which linked Tito to Western imperialism and described him as a "murderer." French party politburo member Fajon declared publicly on 8 June 1955 that the 1949 documents had been based on documents forged by Beria and Abakumov and were therefore false, but that the 1948 strictures still held good. The Polish Communist defector Seweryn Bialer has written also, on the basis of secret party documents available to him, that the 1948 charges were never withdrawn. However, Moscow, in attacking the Yugoslav party program, had not seen fit to say publicly that the charges were still valid. Although Moscow in 1958 had evidently not desired to embroil its relations with Yugoslavia by publicly mentioning the 1948 charges, its hand was forced--i.e., it could not deny what the Chinese publicly asserted; that these charges were still regarded as valid.
The Chinese statement of 5 May, which the Yugoslavs had described as the harshest ever directed to them by any party, was soon outdone by a new Chinese statement, this time by Mao's spokesman Chen Po-ta, writing in Red Flag on 1 June. The article, almost purely denunciatory, addressed itself to the "Tito group," described the latter as pursuing a "degenerate" policy, and accused Tito flatly of having been bought by the American imperialists—and "at a high price."

Khrushchev continued to show a desire to treat Yugoslavia less harshly than would Peiping. It is true that the USSR suspended credits to Belgrade in May 1958. It is also true that Khrushchev associated himself, in speeches in East Germany and Bulgaria in June, with some of the most offensive Chinese positions. Throughout the campaign against Yugoslav revisionism, however, Khrushchev has dwelt on the desirability of maintaining "normal" state relations with Yugoslavia, and he has in fact maintained them. Not so the Chinese. The Yugoslav ambassador in Peiping, recalled in late June 1958, was refused interviews with Chinese leaders and his farewell reception was boycotted. Peiping recalled its own ambassador in Belgrade on 11 September 1958, and he has not returned.

The following conclusions on the second Soviet-Yugoslav break seem justified: Khrushchev initiated the break because the growth of revisionism after the Hungarian rebellion in the fall of 1956 required a restoration of bloc discipline; Moscow wished to keep the campaign within ideological limits, because it was aware that to bring state pressure on a Communist neutral country might alienate non-Communist neutral countries; the Soviet Union may have been pushed by its Chinese allies to adopt positions more extreme than they originally intended; in any case, Moscow stopped short of the almost complete break desired and effected by the Chinese.

One still has to ask why the Chinese Communists were so interested in bringing the Yugoslav issue to a head. In 1956 and until mid-1957, Peiping's position had been that differences in the Communist world were only to be expected and could be resolved on the basis of "comradely criticism." The Chinese line had hardened, however, in mid-1957 when the campaign against the "rightists" within China itself took on momentum. This hard line was evident at the November 1957 Communist summit meeting when, notwithstanding the apparent Sino-Soviet differences over the evaluation of the balance of power, Peiping took the strongest line ever on the right of the Soviet state and party to lead the bloc and the world Communist movement.
The Chinese level of vituperation against Tito was of a piece with other Chinese policies of that time. In roughly the same period of its vehement campaign against Tito, Peking was also initiating a new tough phase in its relationship with Japan, it was stating a preference for a more militant bloc global strategy, it was in the early throes of its "leap forward" and commune program, and it was reviving the concept of "Mao's ideology" which had been dormant for many years. Looked at in this perspective, the Chinese, in sharpening the conflict with Tito, were probably already interested in circumscribing Moscow's efforts to improve its relations with the West, in preventing any dilution of revolutionary spirit, and in initiating a new stage in which the struggle between East and West would be waged more militantly.

As part of the above, the Chinese attack on Yugoslavia also seemed to represent an implicit criticism of one of the fundamental aspects of Khrushchev's post-20th congress strategy --the effort to woo the uncommitted countries. This was so because the maintenance of good state relations with Yugoslavia had been one of the Kremlin's primary assets in its efforts to convince the uncommitted countries that good relations with Moscow did not necessarily mean absorption into the bloc or interference in their internal affairs.

Finally, the Chinese may also--in their vitriolic attacks on the Yugoslavs--have been seeking to encourage whatever opposition to Khrushchev, actual or latent, remained in Moscow after the 1957 purge of the "antiparty group." On balance, however, it seems likely that the Chinese disaffection for Khrushchev and his policies did not become acute until later in 1958, when Moscow failed to give strong support to Mao's venture in the Taiwan Strait.

Summary

The New Year's Day 1958 editorial of People's Daily illustrated the revolutionary optimism that had transformed both the domestic and the global thinking of the Chinese leaders. The party newspaper's theme was that "people's thinking" tended to be too conservative and timid. With regard to the domestic scene, the editorial revealed the determination of the regime to promote Chinese economic development at unprecedented speed; with regard to world strategy, the editorial spelled out the rationale of Mao's new confidence, relating this confidence to the development of Soviet weapons in the fall on 1957. That
the Chinese Communists intended simultaneously in early 1958 to embark on an audacious economic program at home and were encouraging a more revolutionary program abroad can hardly be accidental. Determined to push ahead with an unprecedented pace of economic development at home, Mao probably estimated that tension in international affairs would serve him well domestically. Moreover, he probably also felt that the international climate was particularly favorable for a rapid revolutionary advance both at home and abroad at a time when Soviet weapons developments provided an effective shield against the West.

In February the Chinese Communists publicly hinted, through Chou En-lai, a preference for the more aggressive bloc strategy that Mao had stated privately in Moscow. Peiping then gave practical expression to its disagreement with Moscow by attempting to force the Soviet hand in the course of the dispute with the Yugoslav party, and in part seemed to succeed in this effort. In so doing, Peiping showed an interest in circumscribing Moscow's efforts to improve its relations with the West, and in initiating a new stage of more militant struggle with the West.
III. THE WARSAW PACT MEETING AND THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS: Summer 1958

The Sino-Soviet dispute was expressed in the middle months of 1958 at a meeting of the Warsaw pact members, in partially divergent Soviet and Chinese views on the Middle East crisis, and in conflicts in the world Communist front organizations.

The Warsaw Pact Meeting

In late May, some weeks after the initial Chinese intervention into the Soviet-Yugoslav dispute, a meeting of the Warsaw Pact members took place in Moscow. Chen Yun, a vice chairman of the Chinese Communist party and the senior Chinese "observer" at the meeting, delivered a lengthy speech to the Political Consultative Committee. There was a marked difference in tone and emphasis between his speech and that of Khrushchev's to the same conference. The final Pact Declaration reflected Khrushchev, not Chen.

Chen began, as had Chou En-lai a few months earlier, by immediately pointing out—as neither Khrushchev nor the Declaration did—that "tremendous and profound changes" had taken place in the world situation since the first meeting of the Political Consultative Committee in January 1956. The Soviet earth satellites and the November 1957 meeting, he said had brought about a new change in the long-existing superiority of the forces for peace and socialism over the imperialist and war forces, pushing world events to a new turning point. In the international situation, it is not the west wind that prevails over the east wind, but the east wind that prevails over the west wind. (emphasis supplied)

Stressing the weakness of the imperialist camp, Chen said that while the power and prestige of the socialist camp was growing, the United States was sinking into a new and deep economic crisis which was "accelerating the coming of the world economic crisis of capitalism." The class struggle in the imperialist countries was intensifying. Friction was growing among the
Western allies. The movements against colonialism were "surg- ing to unprecedented heights." Life had proved that "the seem- ingly strong US imperialism is only a 'paper tiger' outwardly strong."

Chen then went on to deliver essentially the same mes- sage to Khrushchev that Mao himself had delivered at the No- vember 1957 conference:

'US phobia' is entirely groundless. It is extremely erroneous and harmful to overestimate the imperialist forces of war and underestimate the forces of peace and socialism. If formerly, for instance, at the time after the October Revolution, Lenin, the Soviet Communist party, and the Soviet people, confronted with the encirclement of the capitalist world and the armed intervention of 14 countries, were not afraid, why should there be any fear toward imperialism when the socialist camp has absolute superiority? (emphasis supplied)

In short, the Chinese spokesman seemed to be asking how Khru- shchev could justify his call for negotiations and a summit meeting—with the possible consequences for the bloc's global program and Chinese national interests—at a time when the bloc's superiority was unquestionable. The "peace forces," he went on, "were strong enough to stop any risk of an imperi- alist war," and, if the imperialists dared start such a war, "the people throughout the world will wipe them from the face of the globe."

In contradiction to the spirit of Khrushchev's speech and the Pact Declaration, which claimed that the Warsaw Treaty states were reducing their armed forces and that Soviet troops would be evacuated from Rumania, Chen concluded that "the War- saw Treaty alliance must be further strengthened."

Khrushchev's report to the conference contained both threatening and conciliatory statements, but his emphasis was quite different from Chen's. Although he began by asserting that influential imperialist circles were "banking on prepar- ing a war," Khrushchev contended that "in these conditions the primary task...is to work persistently for peace." He con- tended further, as Chen did not, that "the more farsighted political leaders of the capitalist world already recognized
the need for a radical change in the methods of and approach to the settlement of international problems." He held out the prospect to the West of "vast markets" in China, the Arab world, and even the USSR if the cold war were ended. He reiterated the view that "in our time war has ceased to be inevitable." He called for "partial disarmament measures" and urged the Warsaw Treaty states to speak out for "further unilateral reduction" of armed forces and to call on the NATO countries "to follow suit." And he referred once again to the USSR's December 1957 call for an East-West summit conference which could create an atmosphere of "confidence and businesslike cooperation"—a call understandably ignored by Chen.


By May 1958 it was apparent that Mao Tse-tung's formulations of military doctrine were not accepted by all of his military leaders. In late May the military committee of the central committee of the Chinese Communist party—a committee which has met from time to time to enunciate party policies to the military—convened an enlarged conference which was to last for an unprecedented eight weeks. It was addressed by Mao himself and by most of the senior military figures of the regime.

The military conference was probably held in part to discuss the party's plans for its "leap forward" and commune programs. These plans envisaged important roles for the military including the establishment of a "people's militia" in the communes. The military conference no doubt took up, however, other problems which had been noted in the party and military press for some months.

The general problem, which had been a continuing one since the first Chinese Communist armies were organized in 1927, was of course that of party control of the armed forces. The press had already made it clear that there were those who objected to the principle of party "leadership" and to various of its practical expressions—the system of political officers and party committees, the party's determination of strategy and tactics, the party's decision as to the pace of modernization, the party's determination of the role of the military in production and construction, and so on.
The most interesting problem—derived from Mao's extremely high regard for Soviet successes in weapons development which had been revealed in the latter half of 1957—was not that his military leaders disagreed with him on that point, but that they did agree with him. Because they agreed, they were led to question some of Mao's long-standing military propositions and some of his current policies.

An apparently significant proportion of Mao's military leaders were taking the view—a view assailed vigorously by the party and military press in the period before and after the conference—that Mao's military writings, valuable as they had once been, were now outdated. The nature of war had so changed, in their view, that a new doctrine would have to be devised in which the role of nuclear weapons would be paramount. Some of them clearly believed that the new doctrine had already been devised and need only be imported—from the USSR; the exponents of this view were rebuked for worshipping foreign experience.

The insistence of Mao and his spokesmen on the continuing validity of Mao's military writings seems to have been primarily an embarrassed rationalization of the fact that Peiping had no nuclear weapons—a fact that Foreign Minister Chen Yi publicly admitted in May 1958. The party line strongly suggested—and one military leader so wrote in May 1958—that the party did not expect to have such weapons for some years to come. (That particular military leader, air force chief Liu Ya-lou, wrote that "another new turning point—in the international situation"—would probably be reached at that time, in part owing to China's nuclear weapons capability.)

Mao's insistence on his military principles was probably not entirely a rationalization, however. Mao seemed genuinely to believe that his concept of "protracted war" was applicable to his current situation—that is, a situation in which his only potential attacker, the United States, was far superior in weapons but inferior in manpower and relatively inexperienced in the kind of warfare Mao had spent his life in.

The reaffirmation of Mao's old military concepts at the unprecedented military conference represented a recognition of a situation likely to continue for years. China would probably have to wait some 10 or 15 years—until it had a modern industrial and scientific base—
before it could hope to produce its own atomic bombs and modern weapons in appreciable quantities. This basic fact of life would keep China dependent on the Soviet deterrent and would greatly circumscribe any courses of action that Mao might hope to undertake in the coming decade.

The Middle East Crisis

The emerging Sino-Soviet divergences on bloc strategy apparently led to diverging Sino-Soviet views on the significance of the Iraqi coup on 13-14 July and on the manner in which to counter the American-British landings in Lebanon and Jordan which immediately followed that coup.

As Richard Lowenthal has written:*

There is little doubt that the Allied landings were at first genuinely viewed by the Soviet and Chinese leaders as preparation for armed intervention against the new Iraqi government; during the first few days, they were, after all, so interpreted by a great many non-Communists as well. If that expectation had come true, the USSR would have been faced with the choice of using force against American troops, with all the risks involved, or appearing impotent in the face of American intervention in a crucial, contested area.

To avoid this dilemma, Khrushchev was determined to use every conceivable political pressure to prevent the Western powers from carrying out their supposed intentions while at the same time evading a military commitment of his own. Although he hurried to recognize the new Iraqi Government and promised Nasir support in the unlikely event of a Western attack on the UAR, he sent no "volunteer" fighters and instead issued his appeal for an emergency summit meeting with Indian participation on 19 July.

*See Problems of Communism, January-February 1959.
In short, Khrushchev's initial reaction to the Western troop landings may have been one of panic. On 23 July he accepted the Western counterproposal for a summit meeting within the framework of the UN Security Council—an indication of his urgent desire to get the West at the conference table and so to forestall any potential move against Iraq. Official Soviet statements between 15 and 23 July, meanwhile, stressed that the United Nations must take decisive, urgent, and vigorous measures to curb the Western aggression. While the specter of unilateral Soviet intervention was raised—"the Soviet Government...reserves the right to adopt the necessary measures dictated by the interests of maintaining peace and security"—this counterthreat was not as high on the scale as some in the past, during the Suez crisis in 1956 for example.

In this same critical period of 15–23 July, the Chinese Communists appeared to be skeptical of both the efficacy and the advisability of appeals to the UN and of removing the West by political means; they implied their favor for a vigorous military response if the West did not withdraw from Lebanon and Jordan and if it attacked the new Iraqi republic.

The People's Daily editorials of 20 and 21 July did not endorse Khrushchev's 19 July emergency appeal for a summit meeting. The 20 July editorial, significantly titled "The Countries and Peoples of the World Who Love Peace and Freedom Cannot Stand Idly By;" might have been dissenting from Khrushchev's choice of action:

One cannot solve problems by submission. Tolerance of evil only breeds evil. The history of the aggressive wars launched by Hitlerite Germany and Japan are still fresh in the memories of the whole world and are sufficient to bring the lesson home. Therefore, if the US-British aggressors refuse to withdraw from Lebanon and Jordan and insist on expanding their aggression, then the only course left to the people of the world is to meet the aggressors with head-on blows...The imperialists have always bullied the weak and have been afraid of the strong. The only thing they recognize is force. (emphasis supplied)
The 21 July editorial pointed out that the West was already making sport of the UN Charter "without meeting with counterblows." More important, this editorial seemed to be suggesting the contribution of arms and "volunteer armies" to protect the Iraqi Government and to help oust the Americans from Lebanon. It did so in the following key passage comparing the American war for independence with the present situation in Iraq and Lebanon:

What is especially worthy of comparison (between the American war for independence and the present war for independence in Iraq and Lebanon) is that the American war of independence relied greatly on the support of foreign armed forces. The Americans appealed for aid to Canada, Ireland, and France and obtained important military assistance from France, Holland, and Spain.

During the first two and half years of the American independence war, over 90 percent of all the arms used were imported from Europe, especially from France. The French and Europeans formed volunteer armies and went to America to take part in the war.

Yet today both the struggle of the Lebanese people and the victory of the Iraqi people depend almost exclusively on their own efforts. We want to ask: "Why are they not entitled to the international assistance which the American war of independence secured? Who dares to say that the French who supported America in those days were aggressors...?" (emphasis supplied)

It has been suggested that the language above may have been a plea for a united Arab rather than a bloc military response to the Western initiative. This seems unlikely, however, for several reasons. First, on internal evidence alone, the plea was for "international assistance"—suggesting that even if Arab support were envisaged, the plea was not limited to Arab support. Second, if the plea had been intended to mean only Arab support, it would more likely have been couched in terms of the "unbreakable unity" of the Arab liberation movement and the need for the fraternal Arab peoples to come to each other's aid. Third, the language in these paragraphs was the same kind of Aesopian language which has been
characteristic of the Sino-Soviet dialogue since its inception; it is not the kind of language intended for the uninitiated or for "bourgeois nationalists" such as Nasir. Finally, it seems highly dubious that Peiping would have believed Nasir's army—which had been incapable of repelling the Israeli Army—capable of effectively repelling the British and American troops.

Throughout the crisis: in July, there appeared to be a difference between the degree of risk Khrushchev was prepared to accept and the degree Mao was willing to see him accept. In Khrushchev's letter to President Eisenhower on 19 July proposing the emergency summit meeting, he counseled moderation:

We address you not from positions of intimidation but from positions of reason. We believe at this momentous hour that it would be more reasonable not to bring the heated atmosphere to the boiling point; it is sufficiently inflammable as it is. The statesmen of countries must seek solutions—not by means of fanning war psychosis but reasonably and calmly.

A Pravda editorial on 21 July reiterated that the USSR could not remain indifferent to what was happening on its frontiers but called for reason and calm because both the US and the USSR had hydrogen and atomic weapons. A day later, Khrushchev told a reception in Moscow after his talks with Nasir, "You can be confident that we shall do everything to ensure that there will not be a war in the Middle East."

Chinese public statements, on the contrary, seemed to contend that unless Western military action was met with military counteraction, the West would be all the more cocky and an ultimate general war would be inevitable. Moreover, Peiping asserted that because of its overwhelming superiority, the bloc should not fear war.

The first point was made by People's Daily on 17 July:

There cannot be the slightest indulgence or tolerance toward American imperialism's act of aggression.... The present situation is an uncommonly grave one.... If the American aggressors are permitted to do as they wish, then not only will the people of the Middle East be enslaved, but a new world war would be inevitable.... Therefore let the people of the whole world take emergency action.
The second point was made by the Liberation Army Daily a few days later, arguing that the "balance of power in our favor has never been so great."

Apart from its overweening attitude toward the balance of forces, one reason for Peiping's posture in the Middle East crisis in 1968 was its high evaluation of the significance of the Iraqi coup for undermining the Western position in the Middle East and other "colonial" areas. On 14 July, the very day of the Iraqi coup, Peiping contended that it was the "equivalent of an earthquake in the Middle East...." On 16 July, a People's Daily editorial wrote that the Iraqi coup broke the backbone of the imperialist position in West Asia and "greatly accelerates the process of complete liquidation of the colonial forces in the Middle East and the world as a whole." On 17 July, politburo member Peng Chen declared that the victory in Iraq would "undoubtedly impel the national liberation movements in Asia and Africa to a new upsurge."

After implying in the People's Daily editorials of 20 and 21 July its favor for a more aggressive course of action, Peiping on 22 July did endorse Khrushchev's 19 July appeal for an emergency summit meeting—possibly because Khrushchev had indicated to them by this time that he was not prepared to use force unless the West moved into Iraq. Thereafter, the emphasis in Chinese comment on means of countering the Western action in Iraq was on the struggle of the "Arab peoples."

That Mao was genuinely distressed at Khrushchev's soft response to the Western landings in the Middle East, however, was again to be suggested in Chinese comment after the Mao-Khrushchev meeting in early August. This comment, stressing the inevitability of future Western provocations in the Middle East and the need for stern action by all peoples against such Western initiatives, sharply diverged from Soviet comment, which put its emphasis on the assertion that the West was deterred from such activities.

Conflicts in the Front Organizations

The differences between Moscow and Peiping over global revolutionary strategy led to conflicts between the two powers in determining the role and tactics of the various Communist-
front organizations throughout the world. Because these organizations are so much less disciplined than the Communist movement itself, there is considerably more reliable information on the nature and extent of the Sino-Soviet differences within them.*

The differences between Moscow and Peiping in the fronts began sometime in mid-1958; these differences sharpened and assumed greater importance during the balance of 1958 and the first months of 1959. By mid-1959, with the Soviet move for negotiations with the West beginning to bear fruit, the Chinese attitude in the fronts hardened into one of distrust, obstructionism, and withdrawal from active work in the central organization of certain fronts.

In general, the differences between Moscow and Peiping were the following: Peiping wanted to use the "peace" fronts to "expose" American aggression and to fight colonialism; Moscow wanted to adopt a more flexible approach in the "peace" movements, to minimize anti-American and anticolonialist propaganda and activities. Peiping wanted to defer less to non-Communists in the fronts; Moscow wished to broaden the base of the front organizations to include more non-Communist elements and to promote greater cooperation between the front groups and their Western counterparts.

The Soviet strategy for the front organizations seemed to rest on the assumption that ultimate Communist goals could be promoted most effectively by a flexible and moderate approach designed to attract support to shorter range Communist goals from the non-Communist left, pacifists, students, etc. In the peace front, Moscow's calculations seemed to be based on the assumption that "peace" should be the primary goal and slogan because it was best calculated to promote Moscow's primary short-range goal of splintering the Western alliance and base system. Peiping's calculations seemed to rest on the divergent assumption that an undifferentiated struggle for "peace" would mean that the peace front would not give sufficient support to colonial "struggle" and to "just" wars of liberation in the colonial and semicolonial areas. To look at this divergence from the point of view of national interest, Moscow was most concerned about the Western alliance system and the potential establishment of nuclear bases and nuclear weapons in proximity to the USSR; Peiping, on the other hand, was more interested in the spread of colonial revolutions and wars, giving it the opportunity to extend its own influence and prestige in the colonial areas and to annex Taiwan.

*In this section we have drawn heavily on an excellent DD/P memorandum of July 1960, "Recent Sino-Soviet Dissension in the International Communist Fronts."
The earliest indication of Sino-Soviet differences in the World Peace Council came on 6 August 1958 in Kuo Mo-jo's speech in Peiping—just after he had returned from the Stockholm Congress of the council. Although Kuo was pleased with the meeting, which he considered the "most fruitful" since the launching of the peace movement, he complained that the movement had in the past almost degenerated into a pacifist movement.

In the past ten years, the peace movement has been reluctant to show the US Government in its true colors, and, out of concern shown by some of our friends in the West, it has hesitated to pose clearly the question of opposing imperialist aggression and colonialism. There was even avoidance of specific mention of the United States. In this way, the peace movement has almost wandered onto the path of unprincipled "pacifism."

Kuo was in effect calling for a more militant "peace" movement which would focus its attack on the United States—everyone's principal enemy—and would oppose only "unjust" wars. Later in his speech he argued that the peace movement could not be separated from colonial liberation movements—a plea for the corollary to the position stated above—that the "peace" movement should support "just" wars of liberation, as in Algeria, as well as other forms of colonial struggle. In 1959 and 1960, this difference between the Chinese and Soviet conception of the relationship between the "peace" and the anticolonial struggle was to intensify.

In September 1958, at the congress of the International Union of Students in Peiping, the Chinese representatives demanded that that organization adopt a more militant anticolonial policy. Moreover, they opposed Soviet-endorsed proposals for broadening the appeal for student unity addressed to the Western student organization, C.O.S.E.C. and its affiliates, as well as to uncommitted national student organizations. Finally, for the first time in a major front organization, the Chinese put forward a candidate for the presidency of the organization in opposition to a Soviet-supported candidate. The Chinese candidate was the representative from the Japanese student group (Zengakuren)—perhaps the most militant of all the groups represented. Only when it became apparent that their candidate could not win unanimous endorsement did the Chinese back the Soviet candidate from Bulgaria.
Summary

In May 1958, Khrushchev and Chinese Vice Premier Chen Yun delivered conflicting reports to the Warsaw Treaty meeting. Khrushchev emphasized the Soviet call for an East-West summit conference, reiterated the view that war had ceased to be inevitable, called for "partial disarmament measures," called on the Warsaw Treaty states to undertake further unilateral reduction, and contended that the farsighted leaders in the West "already" recognized the need for a "radical change" in their approach. Chen reiterated Mao's view that a "new turning point" in world affairs had occurred subsequent to the Soviet weapons developments in fall 1957 and argued scornfully that it was "erroneous and harmful" to overestimate the West and to "fear... imperialism when the socialist camp has absolute superiority." In conflict with the spirit of Khrushchev's speech and the Pact Declaration, Chen concluded that provisions of the Warsaw Treaty must be "further strengthened."

At an enlarged party-military conference which was to last eight weeks in the summer of 1958, Mao Tse-tung, in reaffirming his old doctrines, recognized a basic fact of life. Because China probably would not have nuclear weapons in quantity for many years, China must continue to depend on the Soviet deterrent--thus greatly circumscribing any course of action that even Mao himself might hope to undertake.

In mid-1958 the Chinese party seemed to be urging that Western action in the Middle East be countered with armed force rather than with an appeal to the UN. Throughout the crisis Mao seemed to be willing to see Khrushchev accept a greater degree of risk than Khrushchev was willing to accept.

In the early fall of 1958, Sino-Soviet differences over global strategy flowed over into the front organizations. Peiping wanted to use the "peace" fronts to "expose" American aggression, to support "just" wars and oppose "unjust" wars, and to fight colonialism; Moscow wanted to adopt a more flexible approach in the "peace" movement better suited to appeal to non-Communists. In August the Chinese charged that the peace movement had in the past almost wandered onto the path of "unprincipled pacifism." In September they opposed a Soviet-sponsored candidate for the Presidency of the International Union of Students and put up their own candidate from the most extremist student group.
IV. KHRUSHCHEV AND THE TAIWAN STRAIT CRISIS, Autumn 1958

On 31 July 1958, Khrushchev arrived in Peiping for a three-day visit which had not been advertised and apparently had been undertaken hurriedly. At the time, most observers related the trip to Khrushchev's 19 July proposal for a summit meeting on the Middle East crisis; and many concluded that the Chinese had forced Khrushchev to withdraw his tentative acceptance of a Western counterproposal of a meeting within the framework of the UN Security Council.

As previously noted, Peiping had only belatedly endorsed Khrushchev's 19 July proposal, and had done so only after implying, on 20 and 21 July, a preference for military counteraction. In spite of such criticism, Khrushchev on the evening of 23 July conditionally accepted the Western proposal, speaking of a "special meeting" within the Security Council. On 28 July, however, Khrushchev in effect withdrew his acceptance— even before he flew to Peiping—stating that he had envisaged a five-power meeting, not a regular session of the Security Council, and charging that British Prime Minister Macmillan had abandoned his initial proposal.

It apparently was not Chinese displeasure alone or even primarily that made Khrushchev change his tactics. Something must have happened between 23 and 28 July. The most plausible missing link is that Khrushchev's fear of Western military action in Iraq—the real reason he called for the summit meeting in the first place—was diminishing in the period between 23 and 28 July. At the London meeting of the Council of the Baghdad Pact on 28 July, there were in fact the first unofficial signs that the West intended to recognize the new Iraqi Government.

But if Khrushchev did not intend to go to the Security Council meeting, why did he undertake the trip to Peiping? The most credible reason would seem to be the mounting evidence of a disagreement between the Soviet and Chinese parties on global strategy. (In the circular letter given by the CPSU in June 1960 to all parties, the Russians reportedly, stated that the dispute between Moscow and Peiping went back two years. It is likely therefore that the Mao-Khrushchev meeting was the beginning of the more critical phase of the disagreement that goes back to fall 1957.) This disagreement had already been expressed in the dispute with the Yugoslav party and was now again being expressed during the Middle East Crisis. Perhaps most important, the disagreement could be expressed at any time in the Taiwan Strait, where the Chinese Communists had significant military capabilities and need not confine themselves to talk. Sometime
in late July the Chinese Communists did in fact begin to make military and psychological preparations for their venture in the Strait. They activated the coastal airfields opposite the offshore islands, a move which would allow Chinese Communist MIGs to range further over the Strait than previously and which may have been intended to gain control over the air space in the vicinity of the islands.

At about the same time, on 23 July, following the end of the two-month meeting of the Chinese Communist party central committee's military committee, there began a sharp upsurge in "liberate Taiwan" propaganda--an upsurge which was to last one week and then abruptly cease. During that week--right up to the eve of Khrushchev's sudden visit to Peiping--the Taiwan liberation theme was stressed, particularly in meetings in Fukien and Chekiang provinces, opposite the offshore islands. At these meetings, citizens pledged readiness to liberate Taiwan "at any time." By 27 July, reportage of rallies pledging vigilance and affirming readiness to liberate Taiwan was being carried in home service newscasts and in NCNA transmissions to the domestic press.* Thus it seems almost certain that the venture in the Strait was already in the planning stage in late July. Khrushchev's sudden trip to Peiping--in which he was accompanied by Soviet Defense Minister Malinovsky--was almost certainly related to the impending initiative.

Continuing Disagreement

On the day of Khrushchev's arrival in Peiping, Red Flag published an article entitled "A New Upurge in National Revolution" under the pseudonym Yu Chao-li, which means Strength of Millions and which reflects the Chinese emphasis both then and now on the spectacular results to be achieved in domestic and foreign affairs by "reliance on the masses." Yu Chao-li, a name which may represent a party politburo member or members, or a known second-level official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was to become the party's principal spokesman on imperialism and thus the party's principal critic of Khrushchev's strategy for dealing with imperialism.

*See Bloc Surveys, FBIS, August 1958.
In this first article Yu, significantly, took for his text the "national revolution" movement in the Arab countries. He saw a "new chapter" in the movement opened by the Iraqi coup of 14 July, and his article embroidered at length his opening declaration that the "independence movement of the 80,000,000 Arab people is flaring like a fire set to dry timber." Implying strongly that a little bloc gasoline poured on the fire might ignite other Arab countries besides Iraq, Yu concluded polemically that the significance of the revolutionary movement in colonial areas "must not be underestimated," that Lenin had considered the colonial question "decisive significance," and that there could be no doubt but that "our generation will witness the total destruction of colonialism and imperialism...."

Yu's real message for Khrushchev, however, seemed to be the same message implied in the 20 and 21 July People's Daily editorials and reiterated after Khrushchev left: that the West's action in sending troops to Jordan and Lebanon was a bluff and should have been called.

The US and British imperialists' wanton acts of aggression in the Middle East are to a certain extent an attempt to exploit the people's fear of war. They put on a show as if they would not hesitate to undertake full-scale war in order to force the peoples to accept a fait accompli and thus extend their aggression. The peace-loving people certainly do not want war, but those who really treasure peace will never bow to threats of war. Peace cannot be begged from the imperialists....

Like most intrabloc communiqués, the Sino-Soviet communiqué issued on 3 August, the day of Khrushchev's departure, was thin and ambiguous, phrased in such a way that the two parties could persist in differing positions without flatly contradicting the terms of the "agreement." The communiqué affirmed, for example, that a new war (a) would be a "disaster" and (b) would permit anti-imperialist forces to "wipe out clean the imperialist aggressors and so establish everlasting world peace." Its most interesting omission was the lack of any reference to the "liberation" of Taiwan—a subject on which Peiping's, but not Moscow's, propaganda had turned sharply upward in late July.
Within five days of Khrushchev's departure, two People's Daily editorials again implicitly rebuked Khrushchev's mild response to the American-British landings in the Middle East and set forth Mao's thinking on strategy in terms which suggested strongly that Mao not only had not changed his mind about the need for tougher bloc policies but had felt vindicated by the West's initiative in the Middle East—a result, in Mao's view, of Khrushchev's "soft" policy. The editorial of 4 August, the day after Khrushchev's departure, contended that 1) the US and British troops had still not withdrawn; 2) even if they eventually did withdraw, they would soon seek a new opportunity to renew their aggression against the colonial countries; and 3) to prevent local aggressions in the future, it was necessary to demonstrate to the West that the bloc did not fear the risk of general war.

...the US and British invasion forces are not withdrawing from the Middle East. They are still gravely infringing on the right of the Arab nations to independence.... If they are eventually forced to withdraw their troops, they will use their aggressive forces to grasp new privileges and control a series of Middle Eastern countries to create favorable conditions so that they may seek an opportunity to renew and expand their aggression and launch a new war adventure.

The interests of the US monopoly capitalists are continuously driving Eisenhower and Dulles to carry out so-called "brink of war" and "limited war" adventurous policies. Consequently, in order to ease international tension and maintain peace, we must not merely depend on the well-meaning wishes and unilateral efforts of the peace-loving countries and peoples. We stand for peace, but we are by no means afraid of the war provocations of imperialism. We must have firm determination and full confidence to put out the flames of imperialist aggressive war.

The language employed here presumably reflects the position that Mao took with Khrushchev in their three-day meeting. In essence, Mao's position appears to have been that Khrushchev's resort to the UN and diplomacy in order to eject the Western troops from the Middle East was tantamount to appeasement and would only encourage the West to make further incursions. To

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Khrushchev's apparent reply that he was reluctant to take steps which might lead to general war, Mao evidently contended that the bloc must have "firm determination" and should not "be afraid" of the imperialist provocations.

On 8 August, five days after Khrushchev's departure, another People's Daily editorial set forth Mao's thinking on strategy in terms which showed clearly that Mao was now more convinced than ever of the need for a get-tough policy with the West. The principal points seemed to be aimed at those with whom Mao had recently been arguing—inter alia, Khrushchev—and they have since reappeared in a number of Chinese pronouncements clearly aimed at Khrushchev.

Cast in the form of a commentary on the Sino-Soviet communiqué of 3 August, the party's newspaper's editorial was entitled, "Only Through Resolute Struggle May Peace Be Defended." In a key paragraph reaffirming Mao's view of the importance of armed struggle and of countering Western "brinksmanship," the editorial stated:

The imperialists like to frighten the nervous with the choice between submission or war. Their agents frequently spread the nonsensical idea that peace can be achieved only by currying favor and compromising with the aggressors. Some soft-hearted advocates of peace even naively believe that in order to relax tension at all costs the enemy must not be provoked. They dare not denounce the war provokers, they are unwilling to trace the responsibility of war and war danger and to differentiate between right and wrong on the issue of war and peace. Some groundlessly conclude that peace can be gained only when there is no armed resistance against the attacks of the imperialists and colonials and when there is no bitter struggle against them. (emphasis supplied)

The article went on to observe that after World War II—i.e., in a period of Western military superiority—the world "several times came close to a major war," but in fact there had not been such a war and indeed "resolute struggle" had forced the imperialists to accept a truce in local wars in Korea and Indochina. More recently, in the Middle East, the resolute struggle of Egypt and Syria, with the "support" of the bloc, had forced
the aggressors to withdraw from Egypt and to refrain from attacking Syria. In other words, if general war could be avoided when the bloc was comparatively weak, it could certainly be avoided now that the bloc was comparatively strong; and the West could be repelled in local engagements.

The article went on to warn against compromise with the West:

Peace must be fought for. It cannot be begged.... Each of the victories in the struggle against aggression and colonialism...won by the Asian and African peoples during the decade after the last world war was achieved by resolute struggle.... The imperialists are not to be feared. There should be no compromise in dealing with the imperialists, because this will end in submission.

Moreover, the article continued, it was foolish to concentrate on "peace" to the exclusion of preparing the people for wars:

If...we allow the people to indulge only in the illusion of peace and the horrors of war, actual war will fill them with panic and confusion. Only...by mentally preparing the people with a high morale and confidence in victory and by mobilizing them to fight for peace can peace be effectively defended and aggression stopped....

The Pravda editorials of 5 and 6 August on the Mao-Khrushchev meeting were a study in contrast to the 4 and 8 August editorials in People's Daily. The first editorial, entitled "The Forces of Peace and Socialism Will Score a Great Victory," began by saying that the Khrushchev-Mao meeting "demonstrates the unshakable determination of two great peoples to do everything possible to ease international tension and to prevent the disaster of a new war." The Soviet Union and Communist China were agreed, it went on, that the task at present was to achieve agreement between states, reduce armaments, ban the use of nuclear weapons, and scrap all military alignments and bases. The rest of the editorial was either a paraphrase of the joint communiqué or an innocuous repetition of the unity of views of the two parties. The 6 August editorial, titled "Great Cooperation in the Interests of Peace," began by stressing the deterrent
power of the USSR: "Naturally the Soviet Union...is a powerful restraining factor for the aggressors." The editorial then quoted approving comment on the Mao-Khrushchev meeting from the Communist press and concluded again on the deterrent note: "The forces of peace have unprecedentedly increased everywhere. They are able to inflict a devastating blow upon aggressors /who have/ gone too far." (Emphasis supplied)

There are various possible interpretations of these divergent Chinese and Soviet editorial lines immediately after the Mao-Khrushchev meeting. The Chinese line that the imperialists would renew their aggression against the colonial countries and the Russian line that the imperialists were deterred might be viewed as complementary lines in preparation for the Quemoy crisis. In this interpretation, the Chinese were justifying in advance their imminent action in the Strait as part of the need for a much tougher line against the Western "war maniacs," while the Russians were reassuring the Chinese and warning the West that Soviet power would deter the West from interfering in the Chinese "civil war."

It is difficult, however, to read the Chinese editorials without concluding that their polemical tone was meant not to complement but to refute the Soviet position that had probably been spelled out by Khrushchev in his meeting with Mao. Note, for example, terminology in the 3 August editorial which is used in communication between Communists but not for communication with the West: "Some soft-hearted advocates of peace...are unwilling... to differentiate between right and wrong on the issue of war and peace." It is hard to resist the conclusion that these Chinese editorials expressed a fundamentally different view of the nature of deterrence than did the Soviet editorials--a difference in view that probably reflected the difference between Mao and Khrushchev.

The Chinese position seemed to be that "brinksmanship" had to be replied to in kind or else the West would get the idea that it could initiate "limited war adventures" with impunity (see the 4 August editorial). The Chinese position further seemed to be that, in order to sober the West, it was necessary to undertake some kind of "armed resistance" and "bitter struggle" (see the 8 August editorial). It would follow in the Chinese view, that the perfect place for such a venture was the Taiwan Strait.
If Mao had convinced Khrushchev of the necessity of launching such a venture, it is difficult to explain why there was no mention of the Taiwan "liberation" theme in the joint communiqué released on 3 August. As we have seen, some kind of preliminary Chinese decision to precipitate the crisis was almost certainly taken in late July. Since, as we shall soon argue, the Chinese intention was not to go to war but rather to exercise intolerable political and psychological pressure on the Quemoy garrison, and the Nationalist-American alliance, Mao probably would have desired Khrushchev's public commitment to "liberating" Taiwan as part of his psychological-warfare campaign. To make his threat fully effective, Mao needed a firm, early, public, and high-level Soviet commitment to support the "liberation" of Taiwan. He was not to get such a commitment until a month later—when the crisis had passed its peak.

The Taiwan Strait Venture*

There were several elements in the Chinese Communist decision to launch a venture in the Taiwan Strait in the fall of 1958. First, the West was preoccupied with the Middle East crisis—a fact which was probably central in the timing of the venture. Second, the Chinese believed they had an unbeatable hand. The evidence strongly suggests that they never intended to launch a frontal assault on any of the offshore islands but that they did believe that, by interdiction, they could force the Quemoy garrison to surrender—a surrender which in their view, would then lead to the automatic collapse of the other offshore islands. The Chinese seemed to base their calculations on a judgement that seemed accurate and was widely held in the West: that once air and sea interdiction became effective, the offshore islands could not be supplied unless Nationalist and American forces were prepared to bomb the coastal provinces on the Chinese mainland.

The Chinese Communists probably calculated (a) that their interdiction attempt would be successful—in which case the islands would fall without an invasion, American prestige would suffer a grave blow, and the US-Nationalist alliance an even graver blow; or (b) that to avert the loss of the islands, the US and Nationalists would be forced to bomb the mainland—in which case the USSR would be obliged to come swiftly to Peiping's assistance, great pressure would be exerted by America's Western allies to prevent the risk of World War III over a few small offshore islands, and sooner or later the US would force the Nationalists to evacuate the islands. The flaw in the calculation was that the blockade did not work; it did become feasible to supply the offshore islands without bombing the Chinese mainland.

A third Chinese Communist calculation in initiating the venture has already been suggested. Mao probably believed sincerely that the West needed to be given a sobering lesson in "brinksmanship" in return for its intervention in the Middle East.

Fourth, one of Peiping's intentions may have been to extract from Moscow tactical, nuclear weapons, with which to oppose the tactical, nuclear weapons stationed on Taiwan, or brought into Taiwan, stationed on Okinawa or brought into Okinawa.

Finally, the stimulation of greater popular effort for the "leap forward" and the commune program may have been anticipated.

Most analysts now seem agreed that the Chinese Communists never intended to invade the offshore islands. The artillery shelling began immediately before the typhoon season, when amphibious operations would have been precarious. To the best of our knowledge, the amphibious lift necessary for an invasion was never brought into the coastal areas. Moreover, there were only unconfirmed reports of additional troop concentrations in those areas, despite the fact that most military observers agreed that such reinforcements would have been necessary for invasion. Communist air capability was used with great restraint throughout the crisis. Quemoy, for example, was not bombed by aircraft. In sum, the whole venture seemed to be a classic example of "brinksmanship."

Although the evidence suggests that Mao was playing a very well-controlled hand, there were contingencies which he could not foresee that might have led to a widening conflict. The Nationalists might have bombed the mainland without US
authorization.* American naval vessels convoying Nationalist supply ships might have been hit inadvertently. Communist-Nationalist air battles might have developed into engagements involving Taiwan air space. If the supply situation on Quemoy had really become as desperate as the Chinese Communists evidently thought it would, there was the possibility of American intervention in force. In sum, as well controlled as the venture was, neither the Russians nor the Americans could have been sure that their respective Chinese allies or unforeseen contingencies might not drag them inadvertently into an open military confrontation that neither wanted.

In the week prior to Khrushchev's sudden arrival in Peiping on 31 July Chinese Communist propaganda had built up a campaign on the theme of "liberating" Taiwan. As already indicated, by 27 July there were meetings reported in the coastal provinces of Fukien and Chekiang at which pledges were made to liberate Taiwan "at any moment." Between 23 and 29 July there were some 30 commentaries on Taiwan broadcasts by Peiping radio.** Abruptly on 29 July this "liberation" propaganda ceased and remained dormant until mid-August. In short, the "liberation" propaganda suffered a decline on the eve of Khrushchev's arrival and continued to be minimal after his departure. As mentioned earlier, there was no reference to Taiwan in the Mao-Khrushchev communiqué. Did Khrushchev refuse to go along with the Strait venture on the grounds that it was too risky?

In this connection, there is a plausible report that the Chinese Communists requested Moscow in early August to deliver the remainder of the 1958 quota of aviation gasoline during September and October. The report states that Moscow replied in late August that it was unable to accede to the request. While such Soviet delinquency may have been due to technical difficulties, there is the possibility that it was political and was intended to cool Chinese ardor in the Strait.

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*It is Tang Tsou's contention, for example, that Chiang sought deliberately to involve the United States in war with Communist China.

**We are grateful to the Research Support Staff of FBIS and to Miss Jean Hite and Mrs. Lucy Johnson in particular for compiling some of the statistics and assembling some of the data used in this chapter.
A Soviet Fleet article on 7 August spoke of the "provocative bustle" in the Taiwan area caused by "instructions from Washington" and "obviously having aggressive aims." On 9 August, Moscow's first voicecast commentary on the impending crisis condemned the "war preparations" on Taiwan. Neither of these initial Soviet commentaries supported Peiping's right to "liberate" Taiwan, although a 13 August article in the Prague party daily Rude Pravo quoted by Peiping did explicitly support China's "invincible fight to liberate" Taiwan.

On 13 August, a bloc diplomat reportedly stated that Khrushchev was concerned over the warlike attitude of the Chinese Communists and that he feared an action which might involve the United States. On 14 August a Chinese source used as a channel to the West claimed that Peiping was pressing the USSR for tactical atomic weapons.

On 16 August, Yu Chao-li wrote an article in Red Flag that may have been intended as the signal of the impending shelling of Quemoy.* Beginning from the proposition that "the forces of socialism are overwhelmingly superior to the forces of imperialism," Yu Chao-li contended that "today the last bastions of imperialism are being shaken violently by irresistible popular revolutionary forces." Events since World War II had shown how right Mao had been in 1946 in describing the imperialists and their supporters as "truly paper tigers." The United States in particular was "isolated as never before," and the imperialist camp was "overextended on too long a front," was lacking the necessary strength and was "vulnerable at many points," and indeed was "shaking in its shoes."

Particularly significant in the same Red Flag article was the revival of Mao's 1946 line that the apparent American fear of Soviet aggression was "in fact a smoke screen" under which the United States was directing its effort toward "invading and enslaving" the countries in the "intermediate region" between the two camps. The US, the writer continued, could not start a war against the USSR before it "first brings this capitalist world to its knees." For this reason, and for the further reason that the Russians had military superiority (the "basic condition preventing the outbreak of atomic war")

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*Allen Whiting of the Rand Corporation predicted in writing--on the basis of this article and earlier Chinese propaganda and without access to much of the classified material--an imminent Chinese Communist assault on the offshore islands.
the author was suggesting that an increase in bloc pressure on the West--i.e., an assault on the offshore islands in this case--would not seriously risk a general war. This may well have been the line that Mao took with Khrushchev in their meeting in early August.

On 19 August, a Soviet commentary broadcast only in Mandarin was Moscow's first comment to assure the Chinese that they were "not isolated" because the "USSR and the socialist countries stand side by side with People's China." The broadcast condemned the United States for "new provocations" and warned Washington that "it should not take such risks." It is strange that such a warning was not widely broadcast or included in a more authoritative Soviet source if the intention was to back up the imminent Chinese initiative.

The Chinese venture began in earnest on 23 August with the shelling of the Quemoy complex and naval harassment of this complex and of the Matsus. Beginning on 27 August, Radio Peiping broadcast warnings to the Quemoy garrison to surrender--threatening an "imminent" landing. Soon thereafter, Peiping began a round-the-clock propaganda effort to get the Nationalists on Quemoy to defect. Warnings were addressed to the Quemoy garrison to stop resisting, to "return to the fatherland," to "kill US advisers," and to cross over to the mainland, because the islands were as "hopeless as a pair of turtles trapped in a flask."

The first authoritative statement of Soviet support came in the form of an article on 31 August by "Observer" in Pravda. The article said anyone threatening an attack against China "must not forget that he is threatening the Soviet Union also," and that the Soviet Union would give China "the necessary moral and material help in its just struggle." The article did not commit the Russians to any specific military response.

On 5 September, another Pravda "Observer" article noted articles in the American press to the effect that Washington might use tactical nuclear weapons against the China mainland and might issue a warning that the US Government would not exclude the use of atomic arms by American forces in the Far East. This was getting to the heart of the matter--the possibility of nuclear weapons being used by the United States. "Observer" then commented:
The Chinese People's Republic has sufficient strength to counter the aggressors fully. The Soviet Union cannot remain inactive in the face of what is happening on the border or on the territory of its brave ally. The Soviet Union will not quietly watch US military preparations in the Pacific, whose waters also wash Soviet shores. The Soviet people will extend to their brothers, the Chinese people, every kind of aid to bridle the adventurous war provocateurs who have grown insolent and rash. The inspirers and organizers of the new military adventure in the Far East cannot count on the retaliatory blow restricting itself to the area of the offshore islands and the Taiwan Strait. They will receive such a devastating counterblow that an end will be put to US imperialist aggression in the Far East.

As ominous as this statement was, it still contained several ambiguities and loopholes. First, note the sentence that the Chinese People's Republic (CPR) has "sufficient strength" to counter the aggressors--the implication being that Soviet help was not essential. Second, note the ambiguity of the Soviet threat that it could not "quietly watch" US military preparations. Third, note that it would be the Soviet "people" and not the Soviet Government who would give "every kind of aid" to the Chinese "people." This may have been intended to leave a loophole for Soviet "volunteers" or for some kind of support short of all-out Soviet involvement. Finally, although the nuclear retaliatory blow is suggested, it was not made explicit.

It may be of considerable significance that in the first two weeks of the crisis—from August 23 to September 7—the Chinese domestic press and radio avoided virtually all reference to the possibility of nuclear war or to the use of nuclear weapons in the Taiwan Strait crisis. Such references were made after Khrushchev's letter of 7 September and particularly after Khrushchev's second letter of 19 September in which he for the first time warned the US that the USSR would reply in kind to a US nuclear attack on China. For obvious reasons, the Chinese did not want to frighten their own people with the specter of tactical nuclear weapons which they themselves did not have. But the question remains why,
in the period from 23 August to 7 September, the Chinese press and authoritative statements did not imply or state that their loyal Soviet allies would answer American nuclear weapons with Soviet nuclear weapons. To give credence to the "brinksmanship" gambit against the West and to encourage its own populace, Peiping almost certainly would have desired to pose this threat of Soviet nuclear retaliation weapons as early as possible in the crisis. Again this is speculative, but it seems possible that Moscow did not give Peiping any concrete assurance of support with tactical nuclear weapons until the Chinese had first taken some of the pressure off the offshore islands and reduced the possibility of an expanding conflict.

The Chinese did this suddenly on 6 September, when Chou En-lai offered to renew ambassadorial talks with the United States. Although this by no means resolved the crisis, it marked the beginning of a new stage, Moscow evidently believed. On 8 September a high Soviet official privately informed a Western diplomat that the Taiwan crisis would die down and that there was no danger of war.

It is most important to note that strong, unequivocal, and high-level Soviet expressions of support for Peiping came only after Chou En-lai's offer to negotiate. Until the Chinese agreed to ambassadorial talks and had themselves reduced the pressure against the offshore islands—thus reducing the chance of a widening conflict—Moscow had stopped short of committing the USSR to direct military involvement in the event of a clash between American and Chinese Communist forces. It was on 7 September—the day after Chou En-lai had taken much of the pressure off—that Khrushchev himself wrote President Eisenhower that an attack on the CPR would be regarded as an attack against the USSR.

Khrushchev's two letters to Eisenhower of 7 and 19 September can be interpreted in various ways for indications of the Soviet attitude toward the Strait venture. It appears that Khrushchev sought to steer a middle course: on the one hand, he wanted to leave the impression that he fully supported the Chinese aspirations and would come to the support of his ally in the event of a showdown with the United States; on the other hand, he clearly did not want to issue an ultimatum to the West nor give a blank check to China. In his first letter he said that an attack on China "is an attack on the Soviet Union" and that the USSR would "do everything" to defend the security of both countries. He immediately followed this threat

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by denying that it was a threat and contending, "All we want to do is to call your attention to the situation which no one would be able to get out of--neither you, nor we--should a war break out...." In his second letter Khrushchev went further and said that if China were attacked with atomic weapons, "the aggressor will at once get a rebuff by the same means." He reiterated that an attack on the CPR was an attack on the USSR, and "may none doubt that we shall completely honor our commitments."

Despite these very strong pledges of support, however, both letters also contained more ambiguous passages which put their emphasis on the Chinese Communist ability to repel Western aggression rather than the joint ability of the two powers. In his first letter Khrushchev said that if a war were forced on China, "we have not the least doubt that the Chinese people will strike back at the aggressor in a fitting manner." In his second letter he stated that if American troops did not leave Taiwan and if the American fleet were not recalled from the Taiwan Strait, "People's China will have no other recourse but to expel the hostile armed forces from its own territory, which is being converted into a bridgehead for attacking the CPR." In short, while he committed the USSR to give aid immediately if mainland China were attacked by the US, he did not commit the USSR to helping China evict American forces from the Taiwan Strait.

The crisis had abated but was not yet over on 5 October when Khrushchev issued a very unusual reply to a "question" put by a TASS correspondent on the Taiwan crisis:

The Soviet Government has openly and unambiguously stated, in messages to President Eisenhower, for example, that if the United States starts a war against our friend and ally, the Chinese People's Republic, the USSR will fully honor her commitments under the treaty of friendship, alliance, and mutual aid with the CPR, and that an attack on the CPR is an attack on the USSR. Does this contain the slightest hint that the USSR is, as President Eisenhower would have it, ready to take part in a civil war in China? No, we have stated and do state something quite different: The USSR will come to the help of the CPR if the latter is attacked from without; speaking more concretely, if the United States attacks the CPR.
The Soviet Government has thought it necessary to make this warning, as the atmosphere in the Far East is such that US interference in Chinese internal affairs has brought the United States to the very brink of a direct military conflict with the CPR. And if the United States steps over this brink, the USSR will not stand aside. But we have not interfered in and do not intend to interfere in the civil war which the Chinese people are waging against the Chiang Kai-shek clique.

The arrangement of their domestic affairs according to their own discretion is the inalienable right of every people. The intention to get back their islands of Quemoy and Matsu and to free Taiwan and the Pescadores is the internal affair of the Chinese people. (Emphasis supplied)

This statement seemed intended to draw a distinction between Soviet willingness and duty to defend the CPR against an American attack on the mainland on the one hand and Moscow's lack of inclination to "interfere in the civil war" on the other. To some this may seem like obfuscation, but the very fact that Khrushchev made the distinction between defending China against attack and interfering in the civil war suggests that he did not wish to encourage Peiping to undertake an ambitious venture in the Taiwan Strait.

The question remains as to whether Khrushchev concurred even in a limited venture in the Strait. As noted earlier, Mao had apparently intended only a limited venture—ones which would not entail an actual invasion of the offshore islands. However, even such a limited venture contained risks which Khrushchev might have been reluctant to take. Mao, in order to make effective his pressure on the Nationalist garrisons and the Sino-American alliance, needed a firm and high-level expression of Soviet support in the advancing rather than the retreating stage of the venture. In Mao's view, because bloc military superiority was such as to constitute an absolute deterrent to general war, this deterrent could be publicly invoked by Khrushchev without risk to Moscow. Khrushchev evidently did not agree. As it turned out, strong high-level statements of Soviet support were not forthcoming until after the crisis in the Strait had been substantially reduced, and even then these statements were ambiguous as to what Soviet action would be against anything short of an American assault on the Chinese mainland. Throughout the crisis, Soviet statements betrayed a genuine concern over the prospects of a nuclear war.

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Thus Mao Tse-tung, having undertaken a venture on the basis of a calculation of the balance of power—and of appropriate policies—which was not shared by Khrushchev, was forced to undertake a public and humiliating withdrawal. It seems likely that the Strait venture left much ill feeling on each side.

The "Paper Tiger" Again

The Chinese Communist humiliation in the Taiwan Strait called for a massive application of propaganda to explain why the reverse was not really a reverse. The most important development in this campaign was the publication in October 1958 of a collection of Mao's writings under the rubric, "Imperialists and All Reactionaries are Paper Tigers." The compilation was clearly intended to be a guide to Mao's current thinking on strategy, and it was much publicized as the party's line on current affairs.

The essence of Mao's paper tiger concept, first formulated in 1946, was that however strong the enemies of the revolution seemed to be at any particular moment in history, they were always weaker than they appeared to be. This was historically the case with the Russian Czar, the Chinese emperors and Japanese imperialism. It was now the case with US imperialism which, although it had atom bombs, was nevertheless, in long range terms, a "paper tiger." As a consequence, the correct revolutionary strategy was that "strategically we should despise all enemies, and tactically take them seriously." To overestimate the enemy's strength was to commit the mistake of opportunism; yet to underestimate him in specific tactical engagements was to commit the mistake of adventurism. Only the shrewd communist tactician could make his way through the sharp turns of history without falling victim to one or the other miscalculation.

The relevance of the "paper tiger" thesis to the Sino-Soviet dispute was evident. For more than a year—from the November 1957 conference right up to the Taiwan Straits debacle a year later—the Chinese leaders and Chinese journals had implicitly been accusing the Russians of overestimating the strength of the West and therefore pursuing unnecessarily cautious policies. The Chinese may have felt that this excessive Soviet caution had been largely responsible for the failure of the Straits venture.

For if Soviet strength was as great as Mao for months had been asserting, and if Soviet

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friendship for China was as strong as Mao for years had been asserting, then why was that Soviet strength not brought to bear in China's just cause? The answer was that while Comrade Mao Tse-tung at every critical moment for more than 30 years had been able to make a "penetrating analysis of the state of the struggle," not all comrades were so gifted. As the editors' introduction to the October compilation of Mao's writings pointed out in the first sentence, the assessment of the balance of forces was a problem which bewildered "many people." Although it was clear (to Mao) that "it is the reactionaries that should fear the revolutionary forces, and not vice versa," it was the melancholy fact that many people still fail to see this, ... still stand in awe of the imperialists in general and of the US imperialists in particular. On this issue they remain in a state of passivity.

Mao's 1947 formulation was cited as still applicable:

In the history of mankind all reactionary forces on the verge of extinction invariably exert themselves to give a dying kick at the revolutionary forces, and some of the revolutionaries are apt to be deluded for a while by the enemy's apparent strength, which conceals his real weakness, and fail to grasp the essential fact that the enemy is nearing extinction, while they themselves are approaching victory....

The final section of the October compilation cited Mao's speech in Moscow in November 1957 on the theme of the east wind prevailing over the west wind. The October version credited Mao with having made the point in Moscow about the need to exploit the revolutionary opportunities presented by the shift in the balance of power—in this way:

There is a saying in China: 'If the east wind does not prevail over the west wind, then the west wind will prevail over the east wind.'

People's Daily in early November 1958, about two weeks after the publication of Mao's writings on the "paper tiger," underlined the key points for readers in Moscow. It began
with the unusual caveat that only by clearly understanding the inner weaknesses of imperialism "can we correctly chart our strategic plan...." In the paragraphs following, there were no fewer than seven references to the misguided or mistaken judgments of "some people" who overestimated the strength of imperialism, mistook superficial calm in the West for stabilization, were afraid to offend the imperialists lest they become more frenzied, and did not understand that peace could not be secured without "opposing and stopping them and driving them away."

Khrushchev's respect for Western weapons capabilities and economic power were, the editorial implied, exaggerated:

Some people still hold that the might of the West should not be underestimated. This is superstition.... In certain aspects of military science and technology, the US has lagged far behind the Soviet Union. As to iron and steel, nobody is awed by them. Iron and steel do not constitute the sole factor for the comparison of strength. The superiority in steel production of the United States and the imperialist camp over the Soviet Union and the socialist camp will disappear soon. Both the theory of 'weapons are supreme' and the theory of 'iron and steel are supreme' are completely unreliable.

In still another paragraph, the editorial obliquely accused Soviet policy of being detrimental to the cause of the revolution:

Imperialism and reactionaries are the ones who should fear the revolutionary forces, not the revolutionaryists fearing imperialism and the reactionaries. However, right up to the present there are still many people who overestimate the strength of imperialism and the reactionaries and underestimate the strength of the revolutionary forces. They see only the superficial strength of imperialism and the reactionaries, but do not notice the actual weakness of imperialism and the reactionaries. They see only the fact that the development of the forces of the people at certain places is still rather slow, but they do not notice that the people are being
awakened and united.... They see only that in certain places under the rule of the reactionary forces, superficial calm is still maintained, but they do not notice that the flames of the local population are burning underground and must one day break out.... All these views are extremely erroneous; they can only bolster the prestige of the enemy and sap our own morale, and they are thus detrimental to the cause of the people's revolution. (emphasis supplied)

The same editorial described Mao's thesis on the "paper tiger" as the Communist world's "sharpest ideological weapon" in the struggle with imperialism and all reactionaries. Moscow did not share this view. Soviet media originated no comment on Mao's thesis and did not even publish it in full.

Summary

The fundamental disagreement between the Soviet and Chinese parties on global strategy—with Peiping urging a much tougher line against the West—persisted into autumn 1958 and was sharply illustrated in the Taiwan Strait venture. Strong expressions of Soviet support for Peiping—support which Mao needed early in the venture if his pressure was to be effective—came only after Peiping had reduced the pressure through Chou En-lai's 6 September offer to renew ambassadorial talks with the United States.

Moscow was evidently not prepared to take the kind of risks during the crisis that Mao believed were necessary for his venture to be successful. Relations between Mao and Khrushchev were almost certainly worsened by the Chinese venture in the Strait and by the humiliating curtailment of the venture. Subsequently, Mao and his spokesmen charged the Soviet party in effect with poorly estimating the balance of forces and with being "deluded...by the enemy's apparent strength." Still smarting from the Taiwan Strait debacle, the Chinese later in 1958 obliquely charged Soviet policy with being "detrimental to the cause of the...revolution."
V. THE DISPUTE ABOUT A DETENTE, 1959

The year 1959 was notable for the widening Sino-Soviet dispute on the two central issues of strategy: the possibility and advisability of achieving a detente with the West, and the revolutionary means and pace in the colonial and semicolonial and semicolonial areas. The rationale of Khrushchev's detente tactics was given in his speech to the Soviet 21st party congress—his essential point was that Soviet economic progress would result in a gradual political gain for the bloc within the coming decade and, by implication, that a relaxation of tension was essential to realizing this economic program. Peiping received this gradualist program coolly and began to attack Khrushchev's detente tactics in the summer and fall of 1959.

In early 1959, Peiping also insisted that there was a new "high tide" in the revolution in colonial and semicolonial areas. Its desire for a faster revolutionary pace in the uncommitted countries may have caused it to back the militant wing of the Iraqi Communist party—against Soviet objections—in a premature revolutionary policy that ended in the Kirkuk fiasco. In the autumn there was a systematic statement of the gradualist Soviet revolutionary strategy in the uncommitted countries and a partial Chinese critique of that strategy. The dispute about this latter aspect of strategy, although carried on concurrently with the dispute about a detente, will be handled separately in Part VI to avoid clutter.

Khrushchev's 21st Congress Report

Earlier ESAU papers have treated those portions of Khrushchev's report to the 21st party congress in January 1959 which were directed toward pre-empting the Chinese claim to be advancing toward Communism and toward rejecting a number of other claims the Chinese had made for their commune program. Here we are concerned only with those portions of the report addressed to the problem of bloc strategy.

Khrushchev in his report provided some detail on bloc strategy in the 5-to-15-year period ahead. His essential point was that Soviet and bloc economic progress would result in a great political gain for the bloc at a foreseeable time and, by implication, that a relaxation of tension was essential to realizing this economic program. "The fundamental problem of
the coming seven years," he said, "is to make the utmost
time gain in socialism's economic competition with capital-
ism." The fulfillment of the plan would

exert a deep influence on the international
situation...attract millions of new adherents
to the side of socialism, will lead to strength-
ening the forces of peace and weakening the
forces of war, and will cause tremendous changes
not only in our own country, but throughout the
world; there will be a decisive shift in favor of
socialism in the economic sphere of the world arena.
(emphasis supplied)

Here was the economic essence of Khrushchev's
scheme. In his view, when the USSR had outstripped the
West in its economic race, the uncommitted countries would
naturally gravitate toward the USSR and there would be a
complete realignment of political power in the world arena.

What other new factors would be "introduced into the in-
ternational situation with the fulfillment of the economic
plans of the Soviet Union and of all the socialist countries?"
Khrushchev replied:

As a result of this there will be created real pos-
sibilities for eliminating war as a means of settl-
ing international issues. (emphasis in original).

Indeed, when the USSR becomes the world's lead-
ing industrial power, when the Chinese People's
Republic becomes a mighty industrial power, and
when all the socialist countries together will be
producing more than half the world's industrial
output, the international situation will change
radically.... One need not doubt that by that
time the countries working for the strengthening
of peace will be joined by new countries which have
freed themselves from colonial oppression.... The
new balance of forces will be so evident that even
the most diehard imperialists will clearly see the
futility of any attempt to unleash war against the
socialist camp. Relying on the might of the socialist
camp, the 'peace-loving' nations will then be able
to compel the militant circles of imperialism to abandon plans for a new world war.

Thus there will arise a real possibility of excluding world war from the life of society even before the complete triumph of socialism, even with capitalism existing in part of the world.

In sum, Khrushchev expected that by 1970, or shortly thereafter, bloc economic strength would provide a fundamental attractive power for and political influence in other countries, particularly backward and underdeveloped countries; he believed that there would be further nationalist revolts in the underdeveloped areas similar to those in Iraq and Cuba; and he believed that bloc strength would be such that the West would be absolutely deterred from war of any kind.

Khrushchev's statement on the possibility of eliminating war represented a further erosion of the Leninist thesis that wars were inevitable as long as imperialism remained. Lenin's thesis on the inevitability of war referred specifically to intra-imperialist wars (wars among the imperialists for markets and raw materials, wars between the imperialists and their colonies, wars between the imperialists and their own peoples), and derived from his analysis of the antagonistic contradictions in imperialist society. Although some of Lenin's statements can be interpreted as meaning that a final military collision between Communism and capitalism is inevitable, this position was, at least in recent years, never stated unambiguously. War between the two camps was apparently regarded as possible but not inevitable.

Particularly, in the late Stalinist era, Lenin's thesis was employed to mean only that intra-imperialist wars were inevitable. A war between the camps was simply possible. Even in his strongest statement (1951), Stalin said that world war was not inevitable but "might become" so if the people were ensnared in lies, etc. In his 1952 testament, "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR," Stalin seemed to pour cold water on the idea, apparently held by "some comrades," that a two-camp war was more likely than intra-imperialist wars. These mistaken comrades, he said, believed that "contradictions between the camp of socialism and the camp of capitalism are greater than the contradictions among capitalist countries." They were wrong, said Stalin, because they saw only "external appearances," rather than the "profound forces" operating "imperceptibly" which would lead the imperialist countries to grasp for each other's throats.
In his programmatic 20th congress statement in 1956, Khrushchev took the first step toward an erosion of the Leninist tenet that intra-imperialist wars were an inevitable by-product of imperialism. This thesis, he said, was evolved at a time when imperialism was an all-embracing world system and when antiwar forces were weak. Neither of these tenets being true any longer, "war is not a fatalistic inevitability." Although Khrushchev did not specifically say so, the context of his speech and the way it was followed up in Soviet journals suggests that he meant to leave the impression—and did—that he believed that not only intra-imperialist wars but wars of any kind were no longer inevitable. Stalin's chapter had been specifically titled "the question of the inevitability of wars among capitalist countries." Khrushchev's section was titled "the possibility of preventing war in the present era." By not specifically referring to the Leninist concept of wars among capitalist countries and dwelling on "war" in general, Khrushchev seemed to be holding out the possibility of preventing wars in general.

Khrushchev's speech to the 20th congress did leave an escape clause, however. He asserted that "as long as imperialism remains, the economic base giving rise to wars will also remain. That is why we must display the greatest vigilance." In other words, the danger of war remained.*

*ESAU IX-60, Mao Tse-Tung on Strategy, contains a misleading passage (on page 36) on Khrushchev's February 1956 revision of the received doctrine on the inevitability of war. With respect to general war between the USSR and the West, Lenin had often strongly implied, in his writings from 1917 to 1923, that such a war was inevitable, and Stalin and Stalin's Comintern had subsequently stated explicitly that a Soviet war with the West was "inevitable"—a proposition which appeared in new editions of Stalin's works as late as 1953. In December 1952, as ESAU-IX notes, Stalin in an interview had remarked that "war between the United States and the Soviet Union cannot be considered inevitable." Thus, with respect to a war between the bloc and the West, ESAU-IX was correct in describing Khrushchev's February 1956 position as a formalization of one taken by Stalin in 1952. However, Khrushchev's formulation in February 1956 suggested the further possibility that intra-imperialist wars were no longer inevitable, and in this respect—which ESAU-IX fails to note—he was revising the doctrine held by Lenin and Stalin (and Mao); Stalin had reaffirmed this tenet as late as October 1952. As noted in ESAU-IX, the Chinese party's official newspaper twice in February 1956 endorsed Khrushchev's formulation. Whether because they misread Khrushchev or were not then concerned with the problem, the Chinese did not at that time draw the distinction—which has since become so important to them—between the noninevitability of an East-West general war and the continuing inevitability (in their view) of wars among the imperialists, between imperialist countries and colonial and semicolonial countries, and in the imperialist countries themselves.
At the 21st congress Khrushchev was still ambiguous, but his remarks seemed to indicate once again that he believed that no kind of war—intra-imperialist or inter-camp—was any longer inevitable. He said at one point there would arise a "real possibility of excluding world war from the life of society even before the complete triumph of socialism," and elsewhere he said that by about 1970 "any attempt at aggression will be stopped short." Khrushchev's 21st party congress speech was a further erosion of the Leninist-Stalinist dogma on war—and even of his own 20th congress statement on war—largely because the escape clause was significantly altered. At the 20th congress he had said that despite the non inevitability of war, the economic base giving rise to wars would exist "so long as imperialism remains." At the 21st congress he made a significant alteration in this formula by stating that, even so long as imperialism remained, there was a real possibility of eliminating both inter-camp and intra-imperialist war. In short, Khrushchev at the 21st congress virtually threw out the cherished Leninist thesis that imperialism inevitably breeds war.

The significance of Khrushchev's 1959 doctrine on war was that it provided an ideological justification for his detente tactics and for his low-risk foreign policy. It could even serve as an ideological justification for a long-term accommodation with the West, in that both sides would avoid the use of armed forces.

Khrushchev's description of the strategic situation in or about 1970 contained the implicit assumption that economic and political advantage—added to the bloc's imposing military might—would be strategically decisive. That is, by 1970, in Khrushchev's prospectus, the bloc would have the political and economic, as well as the military, advantage. In this situation,
with any kind of war ruled out, the decisive advantage would be held by the side with the most political and economic power. (As of January 1959, Khrushchev was apparently not confident of achieving the kind of technological breakthrough required to give the USSR an overwhelming military advantage by 1970; he seemed to envisage a situation by that time in which each side would have an assured strike-second capability, and, while the USSR would be the stronger, both sides would be restrained from military initiatives.)

To the Chinese, Khrushchev's prospectus was vulnerable to the charge that Peiping had been making before the Soviet party congress—that since the bloc already had decisive military superiority, it was not necessary to wait until 1970 to take advantage of it; i.e. to convert it into absolute political superiority. The prospectus was also vulnerable to the charge that the Chinese began to make later—that while the bloc military advantage was real, the advantage could be thrown away by disarmament negotiations or force reductions.

In the Chinese view, Khrushchev's 5-to-15 year program must have seemed strangely cautious, one putting insufficient reliance on the bloc's military power, and in all a program not befitting professional revolutionaries. Khrushchev did not foresee that the bloc would be enlarged by any new territory in that period; he foresaw merely that it would have the benefit of the addition to the "peace-loving" ranks of a few more countries which had freed themselves from colonial and semicolonial bondage, such as Iraq. Reading this program, Mao almost certainly concluded that such a leisurely and gentlemanly affair would be a very bad, perhaps fatal, mistake.

In January 1959, the Chinese party was at a low point in self-assertiveness. Only the month before it had been forced to revise drastically its commune program, which had been in serious trouble, and under Soviet pressure it had withdrawn some of the claims for the program. In January and February, in a brief dampness of spirit, the Chinese party was not prepared to challenge Khrushchev's propositions in its customary clanging fashion. The Chinese party did not, however, go all the way with Khrushchev, even at that time. Chou En-lai, the principal Chinese delegate, took a rather different line on
the years ahead. "The imperialists may run wild for a while," Chou said, whereas Khrushchev had not said they would run wild even for a minute; he had said that conditions were better than ever for deterring the imperialists. As for means of struggling against the imperialists, Chou continued, the actions of the imperialists would "help to awaken the peoples, cause them to unite, to cast away their illusions, and to take the road of struggle and revolution."

A Red Flag editorial of 16 February commented on the Soviet party congress. Although Soviet party journals and newspapers had found numerous points on which Khrushchev had "creatively" developed Marxist-Leninist theory, the Chinese journal could find only one: "the creative proposition that the socialist countries...will more or less simultaneously pass to the higher phase of Communist society." Red Flag did go on to credit Khrushchev with having "correctly pointed out" the possibility of eliminating world war even before the end of imperialism.

Immediately after making this concession, however, Red Flag declared that "naturally, vigilance against the war maniacs can by no means be lessened"; the term war maniacs had not been in use in Soviet media since 1956. Again, Red Flag reiterated its theme of late 1958 that

if all peace loving countries and peoples unite and stand resolute in their struggle, they will assuredly be able to shatter the war schemes of the imperialist reactionaries.

Red Flag endorsed Khrushchev's contention that there were no disputes between the Soviet and Chinese parties. These parties, the journal said, were "bound together by a common ideal and cause." This was true, and he might have added they were also bound together by strong military and economic considerations. But they had ceased to be bound together by a common view of the means for waging the struggle with the West.

Chinese Attacks on "Detente" Tactics

On 22 April 1959, Secretary Dulles was replaced by Christian Herter. In subsequent months, Moscow almost
completely avoided attacks on Secretary Herter, picturing him as one of the moderate elements among American "ruling circles" and suggesting that he was carrying on the more "realistic" American policy which had already begun to evolve even before Dulles' death and which opened the way for a detente. This more "realistic" policy, Moscow contended, had led to the Mikoyan visit to the US in January, to the foreign ministers' talks in May, and to the Kozlov visit to the US in July. In July the beginning of the detente was taken a step further when private exchanges between President Eisenhower and Khrushchev began, followed the next month by an announcement confirming that the two would exchange visits.

As some kind of US-Soviet rapprochement thus appeared imminent, Peiping intensified its attacks on American (and by strong implication, Russian) policy and made it plain it saw no essential change toward "realism" in the American position. On 5 June, Peiping's World Knowledge asked the rhetorical question whether Herter would change American policy and answered with a resounding no. The journal pointed out that the aggressive American policy toward China had remained intact since the turn of the century, despite the fact that there had been nine changes of President and sixteen changes of Secretary of State. The aggressive nature of American imperialism, it warned, would remain intact.

Directly contradicting the Soviet thesis that even Secretary Dulles had in his final days begun to assume a more realistic attitude toward the socialist camp, the journal contended that Dulles continued to be a lackey of American monopolist capital right up to his death. It was plain, the article continued, that "imperialism remains imperialism forever" and that "so long as imperialism exists, the people cannot avoid the threat of war"--a line which was to be the core of Peiping's polemics with the Russians in the months to come.

All the Chinese journal was willing to concede was that Herter would "resort to camouflage and appear outwardly more moderate than Dulles...; this is to say, will (probably) be more crafty than Dulles." But, it warned, no matter how imperialism "decks out and disguises itself, it seeks to bite...."
On 16 August, after the exchange of visits between Eisenhower and Khrushchev had been formally announced, Red Flag came forth with its first detailed examination of the possibility—or rather the impossibility—of peaceful coexistence. This article set the tone of the articles that were to follow.

While the article opened with a nod to the forthcoming exchange as a "good thing" which would contribute to relaxation of tension, its force was directed to "ifs" and "buts." First of all, Peiping suggested, a relaxation of tension might not be in the bloc's interest because "the American policy of creating tensions can only further stimulate the development of the movement for national independence (and) indeed...scare away its own allies." Moreover, the policy of tensions "may also lead to the enhancement of political awakening of the American people." In short, tension—in the Chinese view—probably worked to the advantage of the bloc.

Secondly, the American Government was not really interested in relaxing tensions. One could no more hope for the United States to relax tensions than expect "a cat to keep away from fish."

Third, United States foreign policy was in a quandary. It wanted tension but was afraid of it; it was forced to turn to relaxation but at the same time feared such relaxation. The implication was that any US policy to relax tension would be subject to change at any moment.

Fourth, the American stratagem could be viewed only as a "trial measure," an "experiment with relaxation," dictated by the fact that American military science and technique lagged far behind that of the USSR. The implication here—later spelled out—was that the US would use the detente only to build up its military power and seek to reverse the balance of power currently in its disfavor.

Fifth, the American intent would have to be judged solely by actions. If the Americans really wanted coexistence, they would "first of all abolish their military bases and abandon the occupied territories" on which those bases were maintained. "It must get out and that's all there is to it," said Red Flag. In short, no coexistence was possible short of a complete US military withdrawal from Europe and Asia.
Finally, understandably skeptical that the US would meet Peiping's conditions for coexistence, the journal concluded with the warning that was to become paramount in the days ahead: the forces of peace must not be deluded, must maintain their vigilance, and must "continue to struggle against the war schemes of imperialism so as to fetter the hands and feet of the warmongers."

The Chinese Communist assessment of the likelihood, desirability, and criteria of peaceful coexistence were clearly a far cry from the Soviet assessment that there was no alternative to coexistence but war and that "realistic" US circles were beginning to understand that.

On 16 September, the day Khrushchev arrived in the US, "Yu Chao-li" struck in Red Flag with a bitter and scarcely veiled attack on Khrushchev's negotiations tactics—the first of many such attacks to follow in the months ahead. The article was cast in the form of a long account of how the Chinese people, under Mao's leadership, had struggled heroically against imperialism and would remain "undaunted" in the struggle until imperialism was finally destroyed. The author asserted that Maoist "revolutionary determination, far-sightedness, and firmness" were the spiritual conditions "indispensable to crushing imperialism"; that if these conditions had been lacking, the revolution could not have won. It is not known whether Yu's article was written before or after Khrushchev's on peaceful coexistence—in the US magazine Foreign Affairs—which appeared in Pravda on 6 September, an article with an unprecedentedly conciliatory tone; in any case, Yu's remarks would apply to it.

Purportedly referring to the bourgeois democrats in China after 1949 who had no faith in the revolutionary viewpoint, the author clearly had Khrushchev's policy in mind when he said these persons "could not clearly perceive the true nature of imperialism and entertained various illusions about it. Hence they often lost their bearings." These naive people thought "the US imperialists would 'lay down their butcher knives and become Buddhas,' that a hard, long-term, anti-imperialist struggle was no longer called for, and that the imperialists would no longer proceed with their disruptive schemes." These people were "very much afraid of thoroughly exposing the fundamental nature of imperialism. They feared
to meet the imperialists in face-to-face struggle and to provoke the imperialists 'too much'—as if by not 'provoking' them the imperialists would have 'a change of heart.' This "muddle-headed way of thinking," the author continued, could only serve to make the enemy more arrogant and "bring discouragement to our own ranks, blur the line between the enemy and ourselves, and dull the vigilance of the people against the enemy."

When dealing with the imperialists and their jackals, the author said, Mao had correctly pointed out that "provocation or no provocation, they will remain the same.... Only by drawing a clear line between reactionaries and revolutionaries" could the reactionaries be defeated.

It is important to note in this first full-scale attack on Khrushchev's detente tactics that the Chinese were in effect contending that Khrushchev's soft policy toward the West was hazardous primarily because it would dampen the revolutionary spirit of peoples throughout the world, thus retarding if not preventing the world revolution. Khrushchev's fear of nuclear war, the author in effect was saying, should not be an excuse for diluting the revolutionary struggle. The imperialists would continue to be provocative regardless of the actions of the Communists, so there was no reason to pursue "soft" tactics. Khrushchev was appeasing the West, and such appeasement could lead only to disaster.

All these erroneous views toward imperialism had been "emphatically refuted" by Chairman Mao, who had written in 1949:

Make trouble, be defeated, make trouble again, be defeated again, until destruction. This is the logic of imperialism and all reactionaries in the world. They will by no means go counter to this logic. This is the Marxist truth. When we say 'imperialism is heinous' we mean that it is impossible to change the fundamental nature of imperialism. The imperialists will never repent, will never be saved, until their final destruction.

There could be no breathing space in the struggle against imperialism, no real detente, no genuine peaceful coexistence.
Obstructionism in the Fronts

Coincident with the more or less open Chinese attacks on Khrushchev's negotiations tactics was the Chinese policy of obstructionism and noncooperation in several of the fronts, particularly the World Peace Council.* In September 1959, when the Presidential Committee of the WPC convened in Prague, Kuo Mo-jo, the Chinese member of the committee, did not participate. The Chinese secretary who did attend was reportedly under instructions from his government not to commit the Chinese affiliate to anything; his behavior in discussions was characterized by a reliable source as obstructive. Clashes between the Chinese and the Indian representative were violent, with the Soviet representative endeavoring in the main to avoid giving offense to the Chinese. It was this meeting which endorsed the Soviet proposals to the UN for general and total disarmament and launched the supporting world-wide campaign under the slogan "To Make War Impossible."

In the September and October 1959 issues of the World Marxist Review, there appeared a two-part article setting forth the Soviet position on the strategy of the peace movement under the title "Peace Does Not Come; It Has to Be Won." The article began by implicitly rejecting the Chinese demands for a more militant line in the peace front on the grounds that the peace movement was designed to appeal to a wide strata and did not have socialist objectives.

Its main peculiarity is that it represents the people, not any one class or even sections far removed from each other. It is not, nor can it be, a movement with the mission of dethroning capitalism and establishing socialism. Right from its inception the movement had had the democratic objective of preserving peace. Being a democratic, not a socialist, movement, its aim is not to investigate the basic causes of war.

The article went on to urge the peace movement to create popular pressures for "genuine negotiations," and stated bluntly that the movement could not impose or demand a rigid anti-imperialist attitude.

*This section also draws on the DD/P memorandum of July 1960 cited in Part III.
Summary

Khrushchev at the 21st party congress committed himself to a strategy of steady development of bloc economic strength, which by about 1970 would result or begin to result in great political gains. Moreover, the bloc would be so strong militarily that the West would be absolutely deterred from war of any kind. Khrushchev thus provided himself with an ideological justification for detente tactics and a low-risk foreign policy. This could even serve as an ideological justification for a long-term accommodation with the West. Mao Tse-tung, believing that the bloc's military strength could be converted into rapid political gains, almost certainly regarded Khrushchev's program as overly cautious.

During the summer of 1959 the Chinese began to attack Khrushchev's explorations for a detente with the United States. Peiping contended that Khrushchev's concept of peaceful coexistence amounted to revising Marxism, appeasing the imperialists, and believing in the impossible. The Chinese feared that a soft policy toward the West would dampen revolutionary spirit throughout the world and would be too confining for their own foreign policy goals, not the least of which was the conquest of Taiwan and the offshore islands.

In the fall, coincident with the more or less open Chinese attacks on Khrushchev's negotiation tactics, the Chinese adopted a policy of obstructionism and noncooperation in several of the front organizations, particularly the World Peace Council.
VI. THE DISPUTE ABOUT "COLONIAL" REVOLUTION, 1959

In the Leninist-Stalinist world view, the so-called national-colonial question is the problem of emancipating the oppressed peoples in the "dependent" countries and "colonies" from the yoke of "imperialism." Enormous "revolutionary potentialities" were deemed to be latent in the colonial countries festering under imperialist exploitation. The strategic objective, as Stalin wrote in 1924, was to transform those countries from "a reserve of the imperialist bourgeoisie into a reserve of the revolutionary proletariat." The prime importance of this colonial emancipation to the ultimate Communist goal of world revolution was spelled out clearly by Stalin:

The road to victory of the revolution in the West lies through the revolutionary alliance with the liberation movement of the colonies and dependent countries against imperialism.

Hence it was necessary for the "proletariat of the 'dominant' nations to support--resolutely and actively to support--the national liberation movement of the oppressed and dependent peoples."

One of the flaws in this Leninist-Stalinist world view, however, was the dogmatic assumption that the colonial countries could be freed only through bitter struggles, almost inevitably including armed violence and civil war, against the imperialist exploiter. These bitter struggles, which, it was assumed, would go through several stages, would finally lead to a "crisis of world capitalism." Seeking their independence under conditions of bitter and prolonged armed struggle against the "imperialists," all the "colonial" peoples and countries, it was assumed, could be won over to the side of revolution and ultimately to Communism.

There was little room in this world view to explain some of the major developments after World War II. The Americans kept their promise to free the Philippines. The British withdrew peacefully from India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, and the Middle East. The Dutch withdrew fairly peacefully from Indonesia. The French did not withdraw peacefully from Indochina--they reoccupied it instead--but were willing to negotiate. There was in some cases close cooperation, both political and economic, between the former imperialist master and the former imperialist colony. With the possible exception of those in
Indochina and Algeria, the nationalist movements in the former imperialist colonies were not forced to fight bitter and prolonged struggles against their Western masters.

This phenomenon presented a critical dilemma to Stalin. How was he to behave toward the newly independent backward countries such as India, Indonesia, etc., and to the nationalist revolutionary movements in countries which had not yet gained their independence? The tactical possibilities were numerous. At one extreme, one could treat the Nehrus and Sukarnos as nationalist traitors who had sold out the revolutions in their own countries for imperialist pittances, and could instruct local Communist parties to make life as difficult as possible for these nationalist governments. And one could give wholehearted support to the nationalist revolutionary movements in the countries from which the imperialists had not yet withdrawn. This was the path that Stalin took.

Having seen the failure of these tactics to make any substantial gains except in Indochina in the postwar years, the Soviet leaders--beginning in 1951, and increasingly after Stalin's death in March 1953--developed a more subtle strategy in the colonial countries. In 1955, Moscow inaugurated a program of foreign aid to the newly independent countries. At the 20th party congress in 1956, the independent countries became part of the "zone of peace" and, although not Communist, were suddenly declared to be on the road to revolutionary progress. The Russians extended the hand of friendship and began sending technicians, artists, and capital in an effort to convince the newly independent countries that they sought only their welfare and their genuine independence from the imperialists. At the same time, Soviet doctrine, which had began in 1951-52 to play down the concept of armed struggle and civil war in non-Communist countries,* now began to play up the parliamentary road to socialism. This road was not limited to the more advanced countries. Khru- shchev specifically said at the 20th congress that in "many capitalist and formerly colonial countries," the winning of a parliamentary majority by the proletariat could make possible "fundamental social changes."

*See ESAU IX-60
The shift in Soviet tactics toward the newly independent countries apparently involved—or came to involve—a shift in tactics toward the nationalist revolutionary movements in countries still dominated by the imperialists. Although Algeria is in some ways a special case, it is nonetheless striking that the Russians did not recognize and have not yet recognized the FLN, the rebel government of Algeria proclaimed in 1958 (Peiping recognized it at once); and that since October 1959 Moscow has thrown its weight behind De Gaulle's still vague plan of self-determination and negotiations. In short, the Russians are not agitating for a continuation of the one possible example of a classic nationalist armed rebellion as anticipated by the Communist fathers.

It is obvious that the Russians are behaving this way in Algeria in part because of their desire to maintain good relations with the French and ultimately to split France from the NATO alliance. Yet their behavior leaves them open to many charges by other Communists who see things differently. Are the Russians not, by their passivity, contributing to "social peace" in the colonial countries at a time when they should be doing everything in their power to support the Algerian revolution and spread it elsewhere? Are they not placing their own European objectives above those of the liberation struggle in Asia and Africa? Are they not overestimating the possibility of splitting the French away from the Western alliance and, by so doing, jeopardizing the cause of the colonial revolution?

There is still another fundamental factor in the current Soviet strategy toward both the newly independent governments and the nationalist revolutionary movements in the colonial areas. The Communists have been forced to ask themselves: can we incite and/or support armed rebellions and civil wars without creating a situation in which the United States will take one side and we the other? Can the colonial revolution be advanced by means of armed force without risking general war?

It is on these and related questions of strategy and tactics toward the colonial revolution that Mao and Khrushchev differ. The question of revolutionary strategy in the colonial areas—emmeshed with divergent Soviet and Chinese interests in the area—has become one of the main issues in dispute. When is armed struggle necessary as opposed to
other forms of struggle? How long should local Communists subordinate themselves to the newly emergent nationalist governments? To what extent should the local Communists pursue independent policies and programs? How soon can local Communists strike for participation in the government and ultimately for power? What is the role of Soviet aid in the newly independent countries, and is this aid not shoring up non-Communist leaderships? Over all these interrelated questions, there looms the big question that has confronted Communists at every phase of their history: how fast to move toward the ultimate and inevitable goal.

The Soviet Line, Fall 1958:

Typical in recent years of Moscow's conservative revolutionary line in the "colonial" areas was the November 1958 article by Y. Zhukov in World Marxist Review, entitled "Impact of the Chinese Revolution on the National-Liberation Struggle." Zhukov, one of the most important Soviet writers on Eastern questions, declared--as the Chinese declare--that the Chinese revolution is a "classic type of victorious anti-imperialist revolution." He went on, however, to give a very different emphasis than do the Chinese to the various aspects of the revolution and to its significance for the national liberation struggle elsewhere. He said nothing at all about the central role of "armed struggle" in the Chinese Communist effort from 1927 to 1949. His implication, in fact, was that the importance of the Chinese revolution lay in demonstrating the possibility of "long cooperation" between the "national bourgeoisie and the working masses," i.e., between the genuine nationalist leaders and the Communist party.

Zhukov contended further that revolutionary progress in the Eastern countries could be made through nationalist parties and organizations.

In our era of mankind's revolutionary transition from capitalism to Communism, when there are growing possibilities for accelerated political and economic development of the underdeveloped countries, the farsighted representatives of the national bourgeoisie in the Eastern countries cannot but take an interest in the prospects of their future relations with the working class and the peasantry. In those
countries socialist programs are advanced by nationalist parties and organizations, though their class nature may be alien to that of the proletariat or the working masses in general. (emphasis supplied)

This line, in short, was the doctrinal justification for the prolonged cooperation said to be possible between the local Communists and the nationalist parties. "Socialism"—i.e., Communism—could be advanced through nationalist parties. The implication of this line was that there would be maximum cooperation between local Communists and Nasser, Nehru, Sukarno, et al. Another implication was that there would be a minimum of Communist sponsorship of armed riots, demonstrations against the government, etc.

The Iraqi Communist Party and the Struggle for Power

There were some indications of differences between Moscow and Peking on this critical question of strategy toward the uncommitted countries in the summer of 1959 when a revolutionary opportunity seemingly presented itself to the local Iraqi Communist party (CPI):

In December 1958, an ineffectual attempt to overthrow the young Iraqi republic had weakened the anti-Communist elements, and by early 1959 the Communists felt sufficiently strong to drop the national-front facade and operate openly. They gained control of a number of associations, unions, and federations. A special target for Communist domination was the Popular Resistance Force, a paramilitary organization utilized on occasion by the Communists to hunt down "enemies of the republic."

Communist strength and influence reached its zenith following the revolt in Mosul in March 1959. A wave of Communist-inspired terror swept the country, and thousands of suspected Baath members, nationalists, and anti-Communists were imprisoned.

In April, evidently believing that they had Qasim's backing—or at least that they had achieved a position where he could not effectively oppose them—the Iraqi Communists began a campaign for actual participation in the cabinet
and the resumption of political party activity. Qasim countered this demand with a May Day statement declaring that although Iraq was on the road to democratic rule, the time was not ripe for political parties. He also rejected the Communist demand for the inclusion in the Iraqi cabinet of acknowledged Communist party representatives.

This incipient struggle between Qasim and the Iraqi Communists arose against the background of a split within the CPI itself between a militant wing, which favored pressure to force the party's inclusion in the government, and a more conservative faction, which counseled caution until the party had improved its organization and discipline.

As late as 12 June the militant group seemed to be dominant in shaping the CPI's tactics. On that date, street demonstrations were staged by the party in favor of a "National Union Front"--defying Qasim's wishes for the suspension of party activities; meanwhile, there were clashes in the countryside between Communists and NDP members who were vying for the leadership of the Iraqi peasantry.

In late June, a credible report indicated that a CPI meeting sometime during the month had discussed two alternate courses of action; first, to seize power as quickly as possible by any means; and second, to go slowly in order to make certain, even if it took many years. The second course of action reportedly received the support of the majority. Another credible report indicated that Moscow on 27 June ordered the CPI to cease open opposition to Qasim and to cease agitation for party representation in the Iraqi Government; the party was enjoined to return to activities at the cell level and to continue to stockpile arms. Moscow evidently agreed with the conservative faction of the CPI that the time was not yet ripe for a contest of power with Qasim. Moscow may also have feared that a Communist coup in Iraq would put an abrupt end to its hopes of attracting Nasir in particular and pan-Arabism in general, not to speak of Asian neutrals.

In early July, Qasim, evidently concerned at the growing influence of the CPI, undertook a two-pronged campaign of making slight concessions to them on the one hand and cracking down on the other. He gave two minor cabinet posts to the Communists while at the same time moving against Communists in the army.
It was against this background that the CPI politburo met on 8 and 9 July—a week before the fateful Kirkuk uprisings. The politburo, "after studying present conditions," issued a statement which clearly indicated that the CPI—while continuing to support Qasim—had no intention of backing away from its earlier demands or ceasing to criticize him.

Peiping broadcast a summary of this rather defiant CPI statement, while Moscow ignored it and continued instead to confine its remarks to general approval of Iraq's foreign and economic policies. If it is true that Moscow ordered the CPI on 27 June to cease both its open opposition to the Qasim government and its agitation for inclusion in the cabinet, the CPI's 10 July statement was in disobedience to Soviet instructions. It seems unlikely that the CPI would so act unless it was assured of powerful support from another quarter. There were, in fact, persistent reports in the summer and fall of 1959 that the Chinese Communists, largely through their embassy in Baghdad, were urging the CPI to take a more revolutionary course of action.

In mid-July the growing conflict between Qasim and the local Communists came to a head in the Kirkuk uprisings. Whether or not the Communists inspired these uprisings, they clearly joined in them. Their aim may have been to force Qasim into making further concessions, to halt Qasim's actions against them, and even possibly to take power in Kirkuk. In any event, the uprising was quickly put down and the Communist-infiltrated Popular Resistance Force was disarmed and disbanded.

This fiasco was followed by a CPI plenum in late July which issued a long mea culpa for its "irresponsible acts" and "excessiveness." The statement, published on 3 August in the CPI press, promised in essence that the CPI would abandon its militant tactics and cooperate more fully with Qasim. While it regarded the party's demand for participation in the government as "intrinsically sound," it concluded that the demand had been premature and had disrupted the necessary solidarity with the government and nationalist forces. The report's most important conclusion was that the CPI had "underrated" the role of Qasim and other nationalist forces and their ability to "safeguard" the republic—in other words, had underrated Qasim's strength and had acted in an adventurist manner.

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Whether or not the mea culpa had been dictated by the Russians—or, as more likely, had derived both from the CPI's own awareness of the futility of its revolutionary tactics and from Soviet pressure—TASS promptly reported the CPI self-criticism on 4 August, saying that the plenum had critically examined party policy in the period since September 1958. A brief NCNA (New China News Agency, the Chinese equivalent of TASS) report of the same plenum on 5 August made no mention of self-criticism. More important, Pravda belatedly published the CPI statement on 17 August, but People's Daily never did. This disparity lent credence to reports from Baghdad in early August that there had indeed been a Sino-Soviet divergence on policy in Iraq, with Peiping having favored a "tough" line.

The possibility that Peiping was enjoining more aggressive action on the CPI than Moscow was to be strengthened by two other developments. In the fall of 1959, on the heels of the Kirkuk uprising, Moscow and Peiping outlined some partially conflicting views toward the "colonial" liberation movement. Secondly, in the summer of 1960, when Moscow criticized (without naming) the Chinese Communists for their "leftist" attitudes, included in the bill of particulars was the premature Communist demands for sharing power in Iraq. Finally, there have been recent reports suggesting the existence of close ties between the Chinese and the CPI.*

Soviet Policy Toward the "Colonial Liberation" Movement

In August and September 1959, the World Marxist Review, organ of the international Communist movement, published an "exchange of views" on "The National Bourgeoisie and the Liberation Movement" in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Although there were contributions from 16 parties, including two from

*The CPI representative was reportedly one of the few to have supported the Chinese at the Bucharest congress in June 1960 on the importance of continuation of the Algerian war with France and continued hostility toward negotiations. It was also reported that the CPI newspaper had placed a telegram from Khrushchev to Qasim on page 3 instead of page 1; this drew angry comment from Syrian Communist party leader Bakdash.
the Soviet party, none appeared from the Chinese party. Whether by Soviet or Chinese choice, the lack of Chinese participation in a Soviet-sponsored seminar on the colonial liberation movement suggested an important disagree- ment with Soviet views on the subject. In October 1959, only a month after publication of the Soviet-sponsored discussion, top-level Chinese spokesmen were to present a detailed and fundamental criticism of the gradualist Soviet strategy in the "colonial" countries.

As for the purpose of the "seminar," the editors of the journal noted that it was the first collective effort to study this "important and complex problem." They agreed that it would be useful to continue discussion of it in forthcoming issues. Why was the problem of Communist strategy toward the "national bourgeoisie" so complex?

The crucial dilemma was manifest in the problems posed by the participants in the discussion. The Iranian delegate, for example, noted that local Communist parties must avoid both "left-wing sectarianism"—underestimating the anti-imperialist, antifeudal character of the national bourgeoisie—and the right-wing opportunist deviation—overestimating the revolutionary tendency of the national bourgeoisie. Stripped of Marxist jargon, this problem—which was at the center of the dilemma—involved the extent to which local Communist parties should support or oppose local nationalist leaders—Kassim, Nasir, Sukarno, Castro, et al.—all of whom, in Marxist terms, are representatives of the national bourgeoisie. As indicated earlier, this problem has historically been an irksome one for Communist tacticians. Overestimation of the revolutionary character of local nationalist leaders means supporting a government which wishes to stabilize the existing society rather than to make further fundamental changes. Underestimating the revolutionary character of such leaders involves the danger of opposing prematurely a government which might carry the revolution—and the Communists—further along the road. The essential question was: when did the local nationalist governments stop being "progressive" and therefore forfeit the support of local Communists and the Communist bloc? Put in its most extreme form, this question is: at what point should local Communists seek to dislodge the existing nationalist leadership and take power itself?
The very title of the principal Soviet contribution, "Two Tendencies of the National Bourgeoisie," illustrated the Kremlin's middle road position. The Soviet writer, G. Levinson, began by posing the critical question: in what direction were the national bourgeoisie which had come to power in the East moving? In short, whither Nasir, Nehru, Sukarno, et al? He began by noting, "imperialist rule has been undermined in these countries, (and) their governments are by and large pursuing an independent foreign policy." Moreover, "many important economic levers" had been wrested from the imperialists and were now in the hands of the national government—e.g., the former Imperial Bank of India, the Suez Canal and the banks in Egypt, and big Dutch enterprises in Indonesia. Laws had been passed which partially protected national capital from foreign competition. The liberated countries were now able to establish economic relations with other countries, including most advantageous ties with the socialist countries. The Soviet delegate stressed, "We should not underrate these gains, which have dealt a grave blow to the imperialist world system."

At the same time, Levinson continued, it would be wrong to lose sight of the fact that imperialists have retained considerable economic and—"here and there"—political power in their former colonies. Foreign capital had preserved particularly good positions in India and Pakistan, where investment had actually increased. In Indonesia, Burma, the UAR, and elsewhere there was still "considerable" investment. The shortage of technical personnel and capital resources had compelled the national bourgeoisie to compromise with the foreign monopolies. Worse yet, the national bourgeoisie in some of the underdeveloped countries had, over the past few years, become more favorably inclined toward Western capital.

Levinson continued that although the liberation of many dependent countries meant that the imperialists were now getting a much smaller income from their former colonies, nonetheless the "anti-imperialist tasks of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in the economic sphere have not been resolved consistently in the independent bourgeois countries of the East." In simple terms, this meant that there was still much to do to eliminate Western capital and economic influence in the underdeveloped countries. Similarly, a big job remained in putting through social reforms—primarily land reform. In no country, Levinson complained, had land reform laws gone beyond a slight restriction of landlords' property.
A "revolutionary solution of the land problem" still awaited a consistent solution.

This being the case, Levinson posed the big question:

To what extent will the outstanding tasks of the bourgeois-democratic revolution be fulfilled, within the framework of the existing regime, in the independent capitalist countries of the East? In other words, how far are the national bourgeoisie prepared to go along the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal path; have they gone as far as they can in this respect? (emphasis supplied)

In other words, had Nasir and Nehru and other nationalists leaders been of maximum use to the Communist world and the revolution—and therefore become obsolete—or could the Communists still expect to make gains with them? Levinson's answer was that the Communists "probably" could expect to make further gains with existing regimes, although reactionary tendencies could not be ignored:

The ruling bourgeoisie in the countries of the East will evidently continue, despite their vacillations, to combat the imperialist colonial policy, to fight for independent economic advance.... They will, in all probability, meet with a certain measure of success along this path.... We cannot, however, ignore the fact that as the class contradictions in their countries sharpen, the national bourgeoisie tend more and more to come to terms with the imperialists and the feudal landowners. (emphasis supplied)

If Levinson was not greatly optimistic about the trend of the nationalist governments in the underdeveloped areas, neither was he pessimistic. Perhaps the most important statement he made was his concluding one, in which he provided a good indication of the rationale of the Kremlin's waiting game in the former colonial areas. He suggested that the final outcome of the revolutionary dilemma in the nationalist countries of the East (including Latin America) would be decided not only by the strength of the local Communists but, perhaps more important, by the economic power, foreign policy, influence, and example of the USSR. The revolution in the underdeveloped areas was intimately related to the progress of the USSR in its economic,
political, and ideological competition with the West. By definition, this implied a gradual, steady, revolutionary process in which the principal revolutionary agent would be not local Communist parties but Soviet aid, trade, and blandishment.

Two opposite trends stand out clearly in the policy now pursued by the ruling national bourgeoisie in the Eastern countries. The first is the tendency to oppose the imperialists and their attempts to regain domination in one or another form over their former colonies, the tendency to preserve peace, to maintain economic cooperation with the socialist camp. This trend is backed by the people, who, as they gain in strength and their organization improves, can exert an ever-greater pressure to this end of the policy of their governments. Externally, this trend has the support of and is reinforced by the growth of the socialist system, the foreign policy of the USSR and other socialist countries.

The second trend finds expression in the desire of the national bourgeoisie to slow down or curtail democratic and social reforms, to compromise with imperialism and the feudal landowners, and, in a number of countries, to go over to open dictatorship. The imperialist powers, first and foremost the United States, are doing all in their power to ensure that this reactionary trend gains the upper hand.

Hence the further advance of the independent bourgeois countries in the East will be decided not only by the balance of class forces in these countries, but also in the course of the competition between two systems—the moribund capitalist system and the growing socialist system. (emphasis supplied)

In sum, the prospects in the bourgeois Eastern countries were not for rapid revolutionary progress, but they were quite good for a continuation and perhaps even for a slight improvement in the present independent economic and political policies of the bourgeois governments. Nowhere did Levinson so much as mention
the possibility of armed struggle or of rapid replacement of present nationalist leaderships by Communist leaderships.

The Chinese Criticism of Soviet Policy

If Moscow was prepared to bide its time with the nationalist governments of the East, Peiping apparently was not. As we have seen, the Soviet 21st party congress envisioned 10 to 15 years for the "liberation"—i.e., the economic and political alienation from the West—of merely some of the "colonial" countries, and Soviet spokesman Kuusinen was to conclude in 1960 that the "colonial" countries would not be fully liberated until the turn of the century. Even this formulation did not mean that they would be fully Communist by that time, only that they would have rid themselves of Western economic and political influence.

Although Moscow was not entirely satisfied with the nationalist leaderships in the East—as is evident from the Leipzig seminar—it was nonetheless not prepared to sanction any direct revolutionary action against these leaderships in the near future. Its initial aim was to get its own foot in the door by entering into barter agreements, subsidizing economic projects, training technicians, etc. Its second goal was to help build up heavy industry in these countries and to win the confidence of the country's leaders while keeping the local Communists temporarily under wraps building up their organizations. Eventually, through a combination of Soviet economic and political pressures and action by the local Communists, it hoped to take control of these countries.

Chinese reservations about the Soviet gradualist revolutionary timetable in the uncommitted countries, and Peiping's feeling that Chinese rather than Soviet experience offered a better model for the seizure of power as well as the construction of socialism in those countries, were apparent in comment on 1 October 1959—the tenth anniversary of the Chinese People's Republic and the very eve of Khrushchev's visit. These views were set forth by spokesmen no less important than Mao's deputy, Liu Shao-chi, Secretary General Teng Hsiao-ping, and Wang Chia-hsiang, party secretary and former ambassador to the USSR.

Wang and Teng resurrected the argument put forth by Peiping in 1949 but withdrawn in 1952—when the earlier emphasis on "armed struggle" was changed—that the Chinese revolution
constituted a model for the colonial and semicolonial countries. Peiping had already suggested in early 1958 that its "great leap forward" and general line of socialist construction, including the communes, was "relevant" for other underdeveloped countries. The principal significance of the October 1959 articles lay in the renewed assertion that the Chinese road to power was also to be regarded, in the words of Wang, as a "classic example" for these countries. Moreover, Wang contended and Liu hinted that the principal significance of that Chinese experience in taking power was that the revolution must be "uninterrupted"—a thinly veiled doctrinal argument for speeding up the revolutionary pace in the colonial countries.

In short, these articles argued that the nationalist governments in many of the Afro-Asian governments should be replaced by Communist governments at the earliest revolutionary opportunity. This did not mean that the Chinese were so naive as to believe that these governments could be overthrown in a week or two; they themselves had struggled against the Kuomintang for more than 20 years before finally taking power. But they believed for a variety of reasons that the nationalist governments in the colonial areas could and should be brought down faster than the Russians were planning to bring them down.

Teng Hsiao-ping wrote in Pravda on 2 October that the Chinese people provide

...an example of going over from the democratic revolution to the socialist revolution in a colonial and semicolonial country and of transforming a backward, agricultural country into an advanced, industrial country. This cannot but tremendously inspire all the oppressed nations... (emphasis supplied)

In short, the Chinese model was valid both for the seizure of power and for the rapid construction of socialism and Communism after the seizure of power.

Wang Chia-hsiang, writing in the 1 October Red Flag, put his emphasis on the unreliability of nationalist leaderships:
The capitalist class in power in these states /In Asia and Africa/ is exercising certain historically progressive functions in opposing imperialism and in seeking national independence. Their attitude toward the anti-imperialist, anti-feudalistic revolution task is progressive and active in one sense but wavering and traitorous in another sense. In varying degrees, they may travel a distance along the road of anti-imperialism and anti-feudalism and thus become friends of the anti-imperialist struggle of socialist stages.... However, the bourgeois class is, after all, a bourgeois class. As long as it controls political power, it cannot adopt a resolute, revolutionary line and can adopt only a wavering, conciliatory line. As a result, these states can never expect to effect the transition to socialism, nor indeed can they thoroughly fulfill the task of the nationalist, democratic revolution. It should be added that even the national independence they have won is by no means secure. Subject to the attack of reactionary cliques from within as well as from without, they may often suffer regression and once again lose their national independence. (emphasis supplied)

Wang's impatience with the policies of the nationalist governments in the uncommitted countries was further spelled out in another key passage of his article:

The capitalist classes that control the political power of certain Afro-Asian states prefer to develop their economy along the road of capitalism, or state capitalism and moreover call it by the beautiful name: the road of 'democracy.' Actually, by following this road they can hardly free themselves from the oppression and exploitation of imperialism and feudalism; indeed they may even pave the way for the emergence of bureaucratic capitalism, which is an ally of imperialism and feudalism. Under these circumstances, industrial development can only be very slow and painful; national industrialization fundamentally cannot be realized; and even less can be expected in the "betterment" of the peoples' living standard. In the final analysis, they can never escape from the control and bondage of imperialism. (emphasis supplied)
In between these two paragraphs, indicating the Chinese suspicion that some if not most of the nationalist govern-
ments in the colonial areas would sooner or later return to
the Western camp, Wang guardedly advanced the thesis that the
nationalist governments should be brought down as soon as pos-
sible. Citing Chinese experience, he did this in terms of an
alleged necessity to "transform the democratic revolution
immediately into a socialist revolution."* In Marxist terms,
the democratic revolution is the phase in which most of the
newly independent countries now find themselves. The social-
ist revolution is the phase of Communist take-over. To call
for the "immediate" transformation of the one into the other,
is, for the initiated, to call for a radical reversal of So-
viet gradualism in these areas.

Wang's article was in effect saying: 1) that the national-
ist leaderships in some uncommitted countries which had a-
chieved independence (he did not identify any by name, but
it seems likely that he was talking about the largest countries, such as India, Indonesia, and the UAR) could no
longer be counted on to make further revolutionary progress,
and their policies might even pave the way for more strongly
anti-Communist governments; 2) that these particular nationalist
governments could not escape from imperialist influence;
and 3) that therefore, local Communists parties in these coun-
tries should seek to gain control of the revolutionary leader-
ship and take power. In sum, the argument was that if the
Russians were betting heavily on certain of the nationalist
leaders such as Nehru, Sukarno and Nasir—they were following
an erroneous policy.

Liu Shao-chi's anniversary article, which appeared both
in People's Daily and in the World Marxist Review, was directed
primarily toward repelling Soviet criticism of the "leap for-
ward" and the commune program. However, some of Liu's article
was relevant to the question of strategy in "colonial" areas:

*Strictly regarded, the Chinese example is irrelevant.
The Chinese Communists proclaimed the "socialist" revolution
when their armies gained control of the mainland. Communist
movements in the new and independent countries are not en-
gaged in military action.
On the one hand, the right opportunists in the Chinese revolution, like the Russian Mensheviks, set up a 'great wall' between the democratic and socialist revolutions--failed to see the interconnections of the two revolutions and the possible prospect, during the democratic revolution, of transforming it into a socialist revolution. On the other hand, the 'left' opportunists, like the Russian Trotskyites, confused the distinction between the democratic and socialist revolutions and would eliminate the bourgeoisie and carry out the tasks of the socialist revolution in the stage of the democratic revolution. Both of these two "erroneous" tendencies cost the Chinese revolution dearly.

Contrary to 'left' and 'right' opportunism, the correct policy represented by Comrade Mao Tsetung in guiding the Chinese revolution was: on the one hand, by following the Marxist-Leninist theory of revolutionary development by stages, a clear distinction was made between the revolutionary tasks of the two stages, the democratic and socialist revolutions; on the other hand, by following the Marxist-Leninist theory of uninterrupted revolution, the two revolutions were closely linked, and every means was sought during the stage of democratic revolution to create the conditions for the future realization of socialist revolution so that the struggles of the socialist revolution could be waged without interruption immediately after the nationwide victory of the democratic revolution.

The firm grasping of the hegemony in the democratic revolution by the proletariat through the Communist party is the key to ensuring the thorough victory of the democratic revolution and the successful switchover from the democratic revolution to the socialist revolution. (emphasis supplied)

As noted earlier, Stalin had forced the Chinese Communists in the period 1924-27 to adopt a disastrous policy of cooperation with the "bourgeois" Kuomintang. The implication in the first paragraph of Liu's October 1959 article was that essentially the same mistake in Soviet strategy--in this case, excessive and protracted cooperation with a non-Communist "bourgeois"
government--was again setting back the Communist cause in some countries of the world. It is noteworthy that Liu specifically identified as Russian both the right (Menshevik) and left (Trotskyite) opportunist heresies which "cost the Chinese revolution dearly." Chinese party histories generally attribute mistakes in the 1920s and 1930s to Chinese, not Russian, heresies.

In the second and third paragraphs, Liu was stating even more explicitly than Wang the need for "uninterrupted revolution" in transforming the democratic into the socialist phase of the revolution. Although Liu did not say so, he probably had in mind the revolutionary situation in the underdeveloped countries. What he seemed to be saying, in other words, was that it was unwise to allow "bourgeois nationalists" such as Qasim and Nasir to consolidate their power during the democratic phase of the revolution. After all, to the degree that Qasim or Nasir consolidated his power, the Communists would be unable to consolidate theirs; moreover, the Communists would be "persecuted"--and that was what was happening in Iraq and the UAR.

It is important to note Liu's avowal in this connection of the so-called "Marxist-Leninist theory of uninterrupted revolution." Although such a theory does indeed exist, it is almost never mentioned or discussed in current Soviet doctrinal writings. In reviving this theory the Chinese were leaving themselves open to the charge of Trotskyism--a charge Moscow did in fact began to make in the fall of 1959.

Bakdash's Attack on Nasir

The bloc's growing disenchantment with Nasir--particularly because of his "persecutions" of Arab Communists--had been reflected in Khrushchev's speech in January 1959 to the 21st party congress, where the Soviet leader made the first direct bloc criticism of the UAR President since he came to power. Throughout the spring of 1959, Moscow and Cairo exchanged criticisms, with Moscow's largely centered on Nasir's actions against local Communists. Peiping echoed these Soviet criticisms.*

*For a review of these developments, see "Recent Soviet Bloc Criticisms of Nasir's Policies," FBIS, 24 November 1959.
Nasir continued to take the initiative against the Communists in the summer. In late June, Lebanese Communist party leader Farajallah al-Hilu was arrested in Damascus. On 15 July, Damascus broadcast "confessions" by defectors from the Syrian Communist party, and on 23 July, Nasir himself attacked Arab Communists as "foreign agents."

The Soviet-sponsored Leipzig conference in the summer was, as we have been, a reflection of the Soviet disenchantment with the "bourgeois nationalist" leaders in the backward countries. In September and October, Moscow went so far as to hint that it would withdraw bloc aid from the UAR, and in October the Soviet anniversary slogans did not contain the customary greetings to the UAR.

Although the Russians were disenchanted, they evidently were not ready to impose economic sanctions or to force a showdown between Nasir and local Communists. The Leipzig seminar concluded that further progress could be made in the "colonial" areas under the present nationalist leaderships, and there were no injunctions to local Communists to begin a greater revolutionary initiative. The big question for the bloc was, as in the case of Yugoslavia in the spring of 1958, how great a degree of pressure to bring to bear on Nasir. The Chinese again evidently wanted to exert greater pressures than did the Russians.

Peiping's greater impatience with Nasir was demonstrated not only in the theoretical articles described earlier, in which it was suggested that some "bourgeois nationalist" leaders were traitors and waverers and were liable to move back into the Western camp. In August, for example, Peiping, unlike Moscow, directly protested in People's Daily the arrest of Al-Hilu, explicitly expressing the "concern" of the Chinese party and people.

More important, on 28 September, the Chinese provided a forum for the exiled Syrian Communist leader Khalid Bakdash, head of the Syrian Communist delegation to the Chinese tenth anniversary ceremonies, to launch the most violent attack on Nasir and the UAR ever made by a Communist spokesman. This attack was given tacit endorsement by Peiping two days later, when it was broadcast by Radio Peiping in Arabic; Moscow did not publish or broadcast this speech. Bakdash called Nasir's government "a terroristic, dictatorial regime which applies fascist tactics against all democratic national forces."

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Bakdash warned that Nasir's policies threatened to do away with "all the important victories" of the Arab liberation movements, to effect a rapprochement with American imperialism, to disrupt relations with the socialist countries, and to exploit Arab unity for narrow class purposes. Bakdash also charged that Syria, too, was now suffering under a "dictatorial anarchist regime unparalleled in modern Syrian history."

Even before Bakdash's statement at the Peiping anniversary, the UAR reacted sharply to his appearance as head of the Syrian Communist delegation. The UAR chargé withdrew from the ceremonies, and on 30 September, the same day Peiping broadcast Bakdash's statement, Cairo lodged a formal protest with the Chinese Communist Government and stated that its representatives would take no further part in the anniversary celebrations. Steps were also taken to discourage any local participation in the celebration held by Chinese Communist representatives in Cairo and Damascus. Further, it was announced that the new UAR ambassador to Peiping would not be departing at present for his post, and that the chargé in Peiping was being recalled for a report. Peiping explained blandly that Bakdash had been speaking as the representative of the Syrian Communist party and was free to make whatever remarks he desired. Even if this explanation is taken at face value, there was clearly no need for Peiping to associate itself with Bakdash's remarks by broadcasting them to Arab audiences.

In sum, as was the case with Yugoslavia in the spring of 1958, Peiping seemed to want to exert greater pressures than did Moscow on an opponent whom they both regarded as potentially dangerous and who they agreed must be restrained. As in the spring of 1958, Peiping moved in such a high-handed manner that it seemed likely its purpose was to push Moscow onto a more extreme course than Moscow had intended.

Summary

During the summer of 1959, the first practical test of divergent Sino-Soviet views on the revolutionary timetable in the colonial countries, Peiping may have advocated a more
revolutionary line for the Iraqi Communists and may have supported extremists in the Iraqi party against Soviet instructions and wishes. If so, the abortive insurrection in Kirkuk, which resulted in a fiasco for the local Communists, must have increased Moscow's displeasure with the Chinese.

In late summer 1959, the proceedings of a Soviet-sponsored seminar on the "liberation" movement in Asia, Africa, and Latin America indicated that while Moscow, like Peiping, had qualms about nationalist leaders in Asia and Africa, it nevertheless expected local Communists to make further gains by cooperating with and even subordinating themselves to these nationalist governments. Moreover, Moscow believed that the progress of the revolution in the "colonial" areas would be intimately related to Soviet economic progress and Soviet economic allurements. Thus the Soviet party stated its favor for a gradual revolutionary process.

The Chinese party in October 1959 seemed to be offering a criticism of the Soviet gradualist policy, and once again—as with the case of Yugoslavia in the spring of 1958—seemed to be trying to force the Russian hand, this time by applying more pressure on Nasir than Moscow deemed advisable. Further, Peiping presented the Chinese revolution as the "classic" example both for effecting the socialist revolution and for building socialism in backward countries, and argued that Communist governments must soon be established in at least some of the backward countries. Peiping contended that nationalist leaders in the newly independent countries were unreliable, that they could not accomplish those tasks Moscow believed they could, and that they could not really escape from imperialist influence and even bondage. Mao apparently believed that the Soviet party intended to back these nationalist leaders for a longer period than the Chinese thought advisable.
VII. THE NEW BIBLE OF MARXISM-LENINISM, October 1959

On 30 September, Khrushchev arrived in Peiping for his first known meeting with Mao since the unsuccessful attempt to resolve their dispute on strategy in the summer of 1958. (This visit will be discussed in the first part of the next paper in this series.) Six days after Khrushchev's arrival the most comprehensive ideological work since Stalin's death was signed to the press. This book, "The Foundations of Marxism-Leninism," was evidently designed to replace Stalin's classic "Problems of Leninism," which had gone through eleven editions and had been the bible for Communist revolutionary strategy and tactics throughout the Stalinist era.

Before examining the period from October to December 1959 --in which Mao and Khrushchev talked, rejected each other's views, and continued to go their opposite ways--it is useful to examine the above-named textbook, Khrushchev's version of orthodoxy. The book represented as important an alteration of Stalinism as Stalinism had represented an alteration of Leninism. To put it another and perhaps more appropriate way, the book signified the adaptation of Communist revolutionary strategy to the nuclear era. It is noteworthy that this textbook has not so far been reviewed by the Chinese Communist party journal Red Flag, although the Soviet textbook of Political Economy was.

The Strategy: Flexibility and Caution

The chief editor of "Foundations of Marxism-Leninism" was O. Kuusinen, one of the Presidium; specialists on ideology. A few months later he was to deliver the official Soviet reply to the Chinese Communist critique of the ideological basis of Soviet strategy. The textbook--almost four years in preparation--was commissioned by the 20th party congress in 1956 and was evidently designed to provide the ideological framework for Khrushchev's post-Stalin grand strategy.

The World Marxist Review, the organ of the international Communist movement, published in its December 1959 issue substantial excerpts from Part Four of the book dealing with the "theory and tactics" of the movement. Although Stalin's chapter on the same subject in his "Problems of Leninism" was never explicitly criticized in the new book, much of it was either a repudiation or an alteration of that chapter.
The chapter began by stressing the similarity rather than the difference between tactics and strategy.

The word tactics is often used to denote the political line pursued for a relatively brief space of time, and determined by certain definite conditions, while the word strategy denotes the line for an entire phase of development. But such distinctions were not always made. In the early stages of the working class movement (before the October Revolution), the word tactics presupposed the entire policy of the party, irrespective of any particular period. It was in this sense that Lenin used it...; he did not consider it necessary to distinguish strategy from tactics. (emphasis supplied)

Why did Khrushchev's ideologues insist, contrary to Stalin and to Mao, on the merging of tactics and strategy? They seem to have done so to justify a maximum of flexibility within any given "stage." That is, when Khrushchev decides to try a new tactical approach, he cannot be accused—as the Chinese were in effect to accuse him in the spring of 1960—of subordinating strategic to tactical goals, because, by Khrushchev's definition, strategic and tactical goals are essentially the same.

A second important modification of Stalin was the insistence that political and military strategy cannot be equated. Stalin's chapter on revolutionary strategy was permeated with military language and drew frequent analogies between military and political strategy. The textbook contended that "in speaking about the political strategy of the party, it is necessary to be on the alert against drawing analogies from the military sphere, for political strategy is vastly different from military strategy." It went on to explain that the political leader was handicapped because, unlike the military commander, he did not have all the available forces under his specific command. Moreover, the social classes and forces working out the historical process acted not by order of a superior but rather under the influence of their own interests and, what is more, in accordance with their understanding of those interests at any given moment. In sum, the task of a political leader in plotting strategy and tactics was more complex than that of a military leader—another justification for flexibility.
Revolutions and War

In discussing the prospects for revolution in non-Communist countries, the textbook devoted a special subsection to the question of whether revolution was "necessarily connected with war." In the traditional Leninist-Stalinist view, imperialist wars were the "locomotives" of revolution. It was the task of Communist parties to use such imperialist wars to accelerate discontent among the masses and finally to convert the imperialist war into a civil war, the result of which would be that a new and more "progressive" class would rule the given society.

Lenin and Stalin had never said, of course, that revolutions could not take place without war; they merely said that war accelerated revolutionary opportunities. The conclusion was, therefore, that imperialist wars—which were in any case inevitable—were a good thing for the Communists in that they hastened the inevitable collapse of the world capitalist system.

Now that Khrushchev had decreed at the 20th and 21st congresses that wars were no longer inevitable during the imperialist era, the question naturally arose as to whether or not the absence of imperialist wars would not slow down the engine of revolutionary progress. The textbook therefore felt it necessary to explain that, despite the fact that both world wars served as powerful accelerators of the revolutionary movement,

...it by no means follows from all this that future revolutionary victories over capitalism presuppose an obligatory premise of war. Although world wars are unthinkable without revolutions, revolutions are fully possible without wars.

The implications in this doctrinal contention are numerous. First of all, it suggests that the Russians are quite serious about avoiding war; otherwise they would have no need to stress to their own party—and to the other Communist parties—that revolution is possible without war.

In the view of other Communists, and particularly the Chinese, the question must inevitably be asked whether or not the avoidance of war—particularly local wars—will not slow down and perhaps make impossible the further expansion of Communism. Communism, it is quite apparent, has made its two
biggest gains as a direct result of the two world wars. Can it now advance without war? The Chinese Communists have indicated on many occasions their belief that local wars are inevitable and that such imperialist wars are powerful accelerators of revolutionary opportunities. In April 1960 they were to quote Lenin's dictum, "Not a single great revolution in history has been carried out without a civil war, and no serious Marxist will believe it possible to make the transition from capitalism to socialism without a civil war." This line of thought was a direct challenge to the line--expressed in Khrushchev's speeches to the 20th and 21st congresses and in the textbook--that Communism could advance without war of any kind.

The Chinese evidently calculate that colonial wars in particular are inevitable and necessary locomotives of revolutionary progress in the underdeveloped countries. For example, Peiping has consistently held up the Algerian rebellion as an "example" for other African peoples and has lobbied for international brigades of Africans in the Algerian war against French imperialism. Peiping probably considers that the participation of African brigades in the Algerian war would sharpen African hatred of European imperialism, offer the Africans training in armed rebellion, and constitute the beginning of an Africa-wide "liberation" army.

The "Revolutionary Situation"

The textbook also devoted a special subsection to deal with the question of "just what is a revolutionary situation." In this section it dismissed the "naive" idea that revolutions could be made "according to someone's whims" and stressed that revolutions can grow only out of "objective conditions." It recalled the three main characteristics ascribed by Lenin to a "revolutionary situation": the impossibility of the ruling classes to maintain their rule in an immutable form (i.e. a crisis within the ruling class); the intense aggravation of the misfortunes of the oppressed classes; and a "significant increase" of the "activity of the masses." Without such "objective" changes, the textbook warned, revolution "as a general rule is impossible." In particular, it stressed, "revolution is impossible without a nationwide "crisis"--one that envelops both the ruling and the lower classes. Moreover, the book warned, while revolution is impossible without the leadership of the party, "it is impossible to win with a vanguard [i.e. the party] alone."
Such views were the views of "conspirators and putsch-makers who are attempting to take power behind the backs of the masses."

Although the Chinese Communists of course would not advocate the making of revolutions when the necessary "objective" conditions are absent, it is obvious that the assessment of when such "objective" conditions are present is susceptible to varying interpretations. In November 1917, many leading Bolsheviks were convinced that the "objective" conditions were not yet ripe for an attempted seizure of power in the USSR. On the basis of Chinese doctrinal writings and the apparent Chinese encouragement of the revolutionary forces in Iraq in the summer of 1959, it is a fair presumption that Peiping has in the past and will continue in the future to see "revolutionary" opportunities somewhat more frequently than the Russians. When Moscow replied to Peiping's attack in the spring of 1960, it laid heavy stress on the impossibility of "stimulating" revolutions from outside.

Peaceful Revolution

Still another section of the textbook was devoted to the "possibility of a peaceful path of revolution." At the 20th congress, Khrushchev had first dwelt on the increasing possibility of the nonviolent and parliamentary path of socialism. He did not exclude the possibility of violence—as no Soviet spokesman could do or has done—but his emphasis was on those new elements in the international power balance and the "historical situation" which "made possible a new approach to the question." The textbook took the Soviet argument for a peaceful transition to socialism a step further than the 20th congress, contending not only that the nonviolent transition was increasingly possible but stating in the very first sentence that "the peaceful transition to socialism has great advantages" because it permits a "radical reorganization of social life" with the "least sacrifices on the part of the laborers" and with "minimum destruction of the productive forces of society." The whole question depended, therefore, not on whether the Marxists want a peaceful revolution—a foregone conclusion—but on whether the "objective premises for it exist." The textbook then went on to argue that both Marx and Lenin believed that "under certain conditions such premises can arise."
Such dialectical arguments were, needless to say, ambiguous. The Russians since the 20th congress have phrased their dogma on the question of violence in such a way that they could choose to stress either one or the other side of the proposition that peaceful revolution is possible except when it is not possible. But the burden of the textbook's argument--like the burden of the argument at the 20th congress--was that peaceful revolution was now more possible than ever before and, more important, that it was desirable.

**Gradual Revolution in the West**

In one section of the textbook, Moscow's intention seemed to be to provide a new doctrinal rationale for its gradualist revolutionary strategy in the developed capitalist countries. In effect, it took the line that the socialist revolution in these advanced countries could be deferred. It did this by incorporating in the dogma what seemed to be a new stage of revolutionary development somewhere between the "democratic" and "socialist" revolutions--a "democracy of a new type." This new "democracy" would be a government further left than an ordinary "bourgeois democracy," but it would not yet be dominated by the Communists. The rationale was put in these words:

Today there is a basis for democratic movements not only in the underdeveloped countries and countries with pronounced feudal survivals, but also in the highly developed capitalist countries. (emphasis in original) In the latter case these movements are spearheaded against the ruling bourgeois circles, against imperialism and monopoly domination. (emphasis in original) This does not mean, of course, that all these movements are anticapitalist by nature....Yet they cannot be characterized as bourgeois-democratic. For ordinary bourgeois democracy, even where it has reached its highest development, cannot resolve such issues as ending the menace of war, granting formal and real national liberation, nationalizing the property of the monopolies, and restricting their political power. This can be achieved only under a democracy of a new type which expresses the interests of the masses of the working people and the other progressive sections.... (emphasis supplied)
This "democracy of a new type" appears to represent a stage to the right of—i.e. prior to—the stage envisaged in the concept of "new democracy" outlined by Mao, on the basis of Stalin's writings, in 1940. Mao's "new democracy" was also envisaged as a stage of transition between the democratic and socialist revolutions, but it was to be a "joint dictatorship of all Chinese revolutionary classes headed by the Chinese proletariat," with an anti-imperialist and anti-feudal program. Thus Mao's "new democracy" was clearly to be a Communist dictatorship—although power was nominally to be shared with other parties—and it was definitely to be allied with the USSR.

The "democracy of a new type" appears to have closer similarities to the transitional stage of the "people's democracy" as it was outlined in the very early postwar period—before the Communists seized control of Eastern Europe and then ex post facto equated the people's democracy with a proletarian dictatorship. The concept as developed by Soviet scholars between 1945 and 1947 held that the people's democracy was not to be confused with a proletarian democracy, because in the latter the proletariat did "not share its power with any other class." The "people's democracy was called "a big step forward in comparison with the bourgeois democratic states" because it offered "possibilities for further progress by these countries in the economic and political field."* In short, it was a hybrid form somewhere between the old bourgeois democratic and the new socialist state.

Although, as Brzezinski points out, evidence could be cited to support the argument that the concept of the people's democracy was a sham from the very beginning,

... looking more closely at this particular phase, and even at the events preceding it, one notices aspects which suggest that the people's democracy phase, certainly never an end in itself, was (emphasis in original) considered to be a meaningful political expression of the peculiar relationship of domestic and external forces which the Communists felt (in 1945) would exist in postwar Europe.

*Quoted by Z. Brzezinski "The Soviet Bloc, Unity and Conflict," 1960, p. 31. Brzezinski's introductory chapters on the people's democracy are the fullest and best discussion of this subject in English.
The argument that Soviet domination was the ultimate objective of the people's democracy phase does not in itself mean that the people's democracy did not have content on its own, and it certainly does not prove that this phase had to last the three years that it did, rather than one, five, or ten.

Similarly, the concept of the "democracy of a new type" envisaged in the Soviet textbook of 1959 appears to be a meaningful political expression of the relationship of domestic and external forces which Moscow expects to exist in Western Europe and the developed capitalist world sooner or later. It appears to be a government still dominated by the bourgeoisie which may or may not soon evolve into a socialist government:

...not every democratic revolution will inevitably evolve into a socialist revolution; ...it may do so (emphasis in original) provided the working class is able to secure the leading position in it.

Moreover, this new democracy would be neutral ("end the menace of war"); it would put an end to colonialism ("grant formal and real national liberation") and would nationalize basic industries ("nationalize the property of the monopolies and restrict their political power"). It would appear to be something like a left-wing Labor government in England which would cooperate with the local Communists and which would be regarded as serving Soviet interests reasonably well, in the short-run at least.

It might be objected that Moscow has for many years been encouraging the formation of left-wing neutralist governments in the West; the point is that for the first time Khrushchev was incorporating into the dogma a revolutionary stage of development that would allow for such a government—an indication that Moscow was prepared to coexist with such governments for an extended period. It is not unlikely that the polemical Chinese Communist stress on the need for "uninterrupted revolution" (see Chapter VI) was in part a reaction to this Soviet theory of deferred revolution that had been gestating since 1956.
The textbook's directives to Western Communists to work for a "democracy of a new type" were quickly implemented in the resolution adopted in Rome on 25 November by 17 West European parties. Placing its primary emphasis on the possibility that "war can be eliminated forever," the resolution called for the fullest support in each country to "democratic governments which...will be able to carry out a program of democratic advance." It made it quite evident that this would be a minimum program to which the Communists would lend their full support: nationalization of monopolized industry, decentralization of the economy, greater worker initiative and influence in economic life, popular control of economic investment, agrarian reforms, etc. The resolution also made a plea for working class unity and concluded that "the perspective of democratic development shows the way forward to socialism." In sum, this seemed to be a declaration of open support by Western Communist parties to any left-wing Western government which introduced the minimum program advanced above and at the same time struggled for "peace." Peiping never commented on this resolution and carried only skimpy versions of the resolution a week later. The Chinese reportedly called the Rome declaration "opportunist" in private communications with the CPSU.

"Democratic" Movements

In encouraging the establishment of left-wing neutralist governments in the West, the textbook also emphasized the need for Communists to support "democratic" movements in part for themselves and not only as vehicles for preparing the masses for further advances toward a Communist order:

...it would be wrong to regard the democratic movements as a simple means for bringing the masses to socialist revolution. It would be wrong first of all because they are of tremendous importance as independent (emphasis in original) movements for the working class in particular. Is the struggle for peace, against nuclear destruction, to be regarded solely as a reserve means? (i.e. an auxiliary rather than a primary goal) Is it not one of the principal aims of the democrats and progressive mankind as a whole? The same is true of the struggle against fascism and the shameful colonialism from which a large part of humanity suffered only recently.
The practical importance of this doctrinal statement was that it amounted to a directive to Communists throughout the world to support wholeheartedly such mass movements as the "peace" movement and not to seek to turn them into crude and immediate tools of Communist strategy. This position too was acknowledged in the Rome resolution of 17 Western parties.

In February 1960 the editor of the textbook, Presidium member O. Kuusinen, was to refer to some of these aspects of Soviet doctrine before a theoretical conference in East Berlin--one purpose of which was clearly to reassert Soviet ideological primacy in East Germany.* Kuusinen criticized those unnamed "people who tended towards sectarianism," who "were dubious about (supporting) democratic movements" and who believed that it would be "better to spearhead the Communist movement exclusively... for the dictatorship of the proletariat." The opposition argument, in short, openly stated by the Chinese later in 1960, was that stress on the support of "democratic" movements could impede progress toward the long-range goals of the Communist movement. Kuusinen contended that the fight for "democratic" demands was, on the contrary, "of first-rate significance" and he reiterated Soviet support for a "democracy of a new type" in the advanced capitalist countries.

Summary

The new Khrushchev version of ideological orthodoxy, the textbook of Marxism-Leninism, appeared in the fall of 1959 with several alterations of Leninist-Stalinist doctrine and revolutionary strategy. The textbook represented an accumulation of--and the most precise statement of--the doctrinal innovations that the new Soviet leadership had been effecting since the 20th Congress in 1956. The textbook aimed at giving Soviet strategy much more flexibility than Stalin had allowed for. It minimized the importance of wars

*For a discussion of the Chinese Communist ideological impact on East Germany, see ESAU VII-60.

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in "future revolutionary victories." It took a conservative view on the key question of when a "revolutionary situation" arises in a non-Communist country. To the 20th congress dictum that peaceful revolution was increasingly possible, it added the thought that peaceful revolution also had "great advantages." It provided a new doctrinal rationale for its gradualist revolutionary strategy in the highly developed capitalist countries, in effect deferring the socialist revolution in these countries; and this line was soon echoed in the resolution adopted by 17 West European Communist parties—a resolution later to be condemned by the Chinese as "opportunist." It urged Communists to support "democratic" movements in part for themselves and not merely as way stations on the road to socialism. Finally, its chief editor publicly rejected the views of unnamed "sectarians" who were dubious about giving enthusiastic support to "democratic" movements and who urged greater support for the revolutionary Communist movement itself.

This patchwork of ideological positions represented a significant alteration of Leninist-Stalinist revolutionary strategy in the direction of greater caution and flexibility. It is not difficult to see why such arguments were sufficient by April 1960 to produce Chinese charges that Khrushchev had "revised, betrayed and emasculated" Marxist-Leninist doctrine.