Intelligence Report

The Sino-Soviet Struggle in the World Communist Movement Since Khrushchev's Fall (Part 2)

Reference Title: ESAU XXXV
WARNING

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THE SINO-SOVET STRUGGLE IN THE WORLD COMMUNIST MOVEMENT SINCE KHRUSHCHEV'S FALL

This working paper of the DD/I Research Staff examines in detail the evolving relationship of the Soviet and Chinese Communist parties to the world Communist movement from the time of Khrushchev's fall in October 1964 through the end of May 1967. The paper attempts to describe the principal public and private dealings between the CPSU and the CCP throughout this period; the dealings of each of the two antagonists with the most important parties of the world movement; the dealings of many of those other parties with each other, and the effect of their interests on the policies of the Soviet and Chinese parties; the role played by the evolution of Soviet policy toward the United States in the Sino-Soviet struggle for influence over the Communist movement; and the role played by the internal life of the Soviet and Chinese parties on the course the Sino-Soviet struggle has followed since Khrushchev's fall.

The paper is organized in three parts, published separately as ESAU XXXIV, XXXV, and XXXVI. Part I describes the shift in the emphasis of CPSU policy in the first six months after Khrushchev's fall toward a more vigorous appeal to the interests of all those parties—such as the North Vietnamese—hitherto inclined toward the Chinese and having a special, private vested interest in militant struggle against the United States. Part II traces the growing CPSU success in 1965 and early 1966 in neutralizing these militant former supporters of the Chinese by advocating "unity of action" in support of North Vietnam against the United States and by capitalizing on Mao Tse-tung's refusal to cooperate and Mao's arrogant attitude toward all who would not obey him completely. Part III discusses the flow of events beginning with Mao's refusal to attend the 23rd CPSU Congress in the spring of 1966 and his simultaneous surfacing of the gigantic purge known as the "great cultural revolution," describes the subsequent rapid decay of Sino-Soviet state relations and the resumption of direct Soviet attacks on Mao to take advantage of China's increasing isolation,
and concludes with an appraisal of the policy lines toward the Communist militants, toward the United States, and toward the Chinese Communist regime which the dominant majority in the CPSU leadership may be expected to follow in the future.

A chronological list of secret Sino-Soviet correspondence since Khrushchev's fall precedes Part I. An index follows each of Parts I and II and a cumulative index of all three parts follows Part III.

This paper presents a working thesis against which other analysts may test their own theses and conclusions; it does not, therefore, reflect an official position of the Directorate of Intelligence. It has benefited from the advice and comments of officers of the Office of Current Intelligence, of the Office of Economic Research, and officers of the Clandestine Services. The conclusions expressed—some of which are controversial—are solely those of the author, Harry Gelman. Comments on any aspect of the paper are solicited and may be addressed to the author or the Chief and Deputy Chief of the DDI Special Research Staff.
THE SINO-SOVET STRUGGLE IN THE WORLD COMMUNIST MOVEMENT SINCE KHRUSHCHEV'S FALL

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PART II

The March Moscow Demonstration

Meanwhile, early in March, while the 19-party meeting was still going on in Moscow, the Chinese regime organized an unprecedented provocation against the Soviet Union, designed to create a dramatic impression of Soviet perfidy upon the radical anti-U.S. Communists, and particularly upon the Vietnamese. The CCP decided, in effect, to call the CPSU bluff on the question of hostile demonstrations at the U.S. embassy in Moscow.

On 4 March 1965, the Soviet government, after momentary hesitation, appears to have authorized another demonstration at the U.S. embassy to protest the resumption of bombing of North Vietnam the day before. The Chinese embassy usurped control of this demonstration, which was carried out by some 2,000 Asian students, chiefly Chinese and Vietnamese. Although the Soviets had reluctantly authorized the demonstration (apparently to appease the North Vietnamese), they had anticipated the possibility of unauthorized actions. In fact, after the demonstrators had pelted the embassy building with ink and stones, they broke through the barriers in an effort to get at the building, and were then repulsed by the Soviet police, with considerable difficulty, in a wild melee in which there were a number of injured on both sides and in which Soviet troops were eventually brought on the scene. Several demonstrators were arrested.

A comic-opera propaganda battle ensued over the next few weeks. The Chinese emphasized the contrast between Soviet professions of support for North Vietnam against the United States and Soviet suppression of this demonstration. The whole affair was on balance a CCP tactical political victory over the CPSU, albeit a minor and temporary one. Both sides were playing to an audience, the radical Asian Communists, particularly the North Vietnamese—and the Chinese were on the offensive and the Soviets on the defensive throughout.
However, the most lasting effect of the episode was to bring home to the Soviet leaders the realization that Soviet anti-U.S. demagoguery, while still immensely useful and necessary to Soviet policy, must have more sharply defined limits to prevent unforeseen and possibly dangerous consequences. The CPSU leadership discovered that Khrushchev's ban against demonstrations at the U.S. embassy in recent years had not been such a bad idea after all. Since March 1965, there have been no more such demonstrations before the embassy, although there have been plenty of "spontaneous" meetings elsewhere in Moscow to protest U.S. policies.

The key to the entire Soviet effort to isolate the Chinese from now on was the issue of "unity of action" in support of North Vietnam against the United States. This issue gradually became the most important single vehicle for the restoration of CPSU influence and diminution of CCP influence among all the radical anti-U.S. forces of the Communist world. At the same time, in Eastern Europe, the issue of unity of action was to be a bludgeon in the hands of the CPSU with which the Soviets sought to impose a greater uniformity of line, to shore up Soviet authority, and in particular, to force a reduction in East European contacts with the United States.

The 1965 Sino-Soviet Correspondence

In an exchange of secret party letters between the Soviets and the Chinese in the spring and summer of 1965, the CPSU twice revived the North Vietnamese proposal for a tripartite statement to warn the United States, demanded a tripartite meeting to discuss aid to the DRV, and charged the Chinese with responsibility for the delay of deliveries of Soviet weapons to Vietnam. The Chinese replied with a violent denunciation of the Soviet diplomatic activities in February intended to bring about negotiations on Vietnam, and charged the USSR with continuing collusion with the United States "to find a way out for the American aggressors." The CCP concluded by reiterating that any Sino-Soviet-Vietnamese meeting would only be harmful, and by insisting that "united action" of
any kind with the Soviets would be impossible until the CPSU formally abandoned all its innumerable treacherous activities as well as all the revisionist conclusions of its party program and party congresses of the last decade.

The Chinese were subsequently to distribute copies of this letter to other parties around the world and then to repeat most of its details in editorials published in the fall. In so doing, the CCP was obstinately entrenching itself in a weak position: the Chinese charges of Soviet collusion with the United States, the belittling of Soviet aid to North Vietnam, and the excuse given for refusing a tripartite meeting all were to appear less and less credible to Communists everywhere as time went on. The over-all Chinese position was of great help to the CPSU and was harmful to the CCP in the struggle between the two for influence in North Vietnam and among radical Communists elsewhere. Evidence of this fact, however, did not prevent the Chinese party under Mao from taking a more and more extreme position in condemnation of both unity of action with the Soviets and of all who favored such unity.

The Disastrous Chinese Autumn of 1965

In July 1965, at the Ninth Rumanian party congress, Brezhnev and Teng Hsiao-ping are reported to have held private talks, marked by violent disagreement; and these were the last personal contacts between leaders of the Soviet and Chinese parties to date. It is probable that these will be the last such contacts ever to be held between the two parties while Mao lives, for in the fall of 1965 Mao began to accelerate a process which was to lead to a virtual rupture of party relations with the CPSU the following spring. In the same period Mao began to draw ever firmer lines of demarcation between himself and all of erring humanity, and the Chinese party became increasingly estranged from all its former Communist allies and all the Communist neutrals who insisted on maintaining or improving relations with the CPSU and who thereby refused to demonstrate obedience to Mao's will. At the same time, Mao began to turn on the Chinese Communist party itself, and slowly unfolded an unprecedented campaign--still expanding 18 months later--to
terrorize and purge in stages all CCP leaders at every level similarly suspected of being insufficiently obedient to his will.

A steady succession of major Chinese disasters in dealings with the outside world appear to have not discouraged, but to have confirmed Mao in this increasingly paranoid approach to the universe. The three most important of these defeats in the fall of 1965 were the dereliction of Chinese threats to intervene in the India-Pakistan war in September, the disastrous 30 September coup attempt in Indonesia and the subsequent decimation of the PKI, and the abandonment of the Second Bandung Conference in November as the result of Chinese inability to secure the exclusion of the USSR from participation. In each case, the Soviets exploited the Chinese setback to further isolate Mao.

In the case of the India-Pakistan war, after the Chinese sought to intervene by sending the Indians an ultimatum demanding withdrawal from alleged fortifications on the Sino-Indian border, the Soviets sent Peking an urgent secret party letter deploiring the Chinese action and (according to the Chinese reply) "attempting to make us afraid with a threat about the United States." The Chinese thereupon first extended their ultimatum deadline and then--when Pakistan to their dismay accepted a ceasefire--were obliged to allow the ultimatum to fade away ingloriously, attempting to cover their discomfiture with a dubious claim that the Indians had stealthily complied with their demands. The net effect was to make Peking look somewhat ridiculous, and the widespread impression was created that the Chinese had been forced to back down.

Hard on the heels of this misadventure came the greatest disaster ever to befall Chinese Communist foreign policy and the greatest single loss ever suffered by the CCP in the Sino-Soviet struggle. This was the failure of the 30 September coup in Djakarta and all its eventual consequences. These included the undermining and destruction of Sukarno's power by the Indonesian military leaders, the virtual liquidation of the central apparatus of the Indonesian Communist party and much of the party's membership, and the eradication of the PKI's overt
influence on Indonesian political life. The largest non-bloc party in the world—and the most important such party to have sided with the CCP against the CPSU—was thus driven deep underground, its voice in international Communist councils silenced, and many of its surviving cadres now increasingly susceptible to Soviet anti-CCP propaganda. The Peking-Djakarta axis was destroyed and Indonesian foreign policy totally reoriented, transforming this nation of one hundred million—the CPR's most valuable ally—into another member of the ring of hostile states surrounding Communist China. Indonesia was lost as the most valuable base for Chinese-run international front organizations. The Chinese Communist crusade against the United Nations lost its most important recruit, and the Indonesian campaign to "crush" Malaysia was ended.

From the Soviet point of view, the most helpful side-effect of all was the fact that many Communist leaders, in Asia and elsewhere, needed no Soviet urging to leap to the conclusion that the Chinese had instigated the PKI's attempted coup. The Soviets did their best in their private comments around the world to encourage this view of the PKI's disaster and to point the moral that this was a fate which could envelop any party that listened to the Chinese.

The third great Chinese defeat in the fall of 1965 was the total collapse of Chinese efforts to promote the isolation of the Soviet Union and the condemnation of the United States through the vehicle of a Second Bandung Conference, a second general summit meeting of Asian and African heads of state from which the USSR would be excluded. When the Algerian leader Ben Bella was overthrown on the eve of the scheduled opening of this conference in Algiers in June 1965, the Chinese offended many states by applying heavy pressure and insults in a vain effort to prevent the conference from being postponed until November. By the fall of 1965, however, when the Chinese discovered that they would be unable to keep the USSR from attending the conference, they reversed their position completely. The insults that Chinese representatives had heaped on those who in June had opposed holding the conference at that time were far exceeded by the private vituperation, threats, and boycott warnings used in
October against those who wished to hold it. In
the end, the conference was cancelled, and the Chi-
nese thus saved from the final disaster of a Second
Bandung meeting held without them and with the So-
viets.

Meanwhile, in September and October 1965, while
all these unprecedented foreign defeats were being
suffered, a high-level meeting of Chinese Communist
leaders was taking place in which CPR Chairman Liu
Shao-chi and party general secretary Teng Hsiao-
ping evidently took positions on Mao's plans for a
domestic "cultural revolution" that were unsatis-
factory to Mao. Foreign events may conceivably have
played an indirect role at this meeting by reinforcing
the domestic views of Lo Jui-ching, the PLA Chief
of Staff and central committee secretariat member
who was to be the first great purge victim in late
November. Subsequent charges have implied that Lo,
among other things, had sought to minimize the dis-
ruption of army combat training caused by lengthy
political indoctrination in Mao's writings and by
productive labor. The danger of direct confronta-
tion with the United States created by the Vietnam
war could easily have made differences over this
domestic policy question more acute. And if the
foreign policy setbacks played any role at all in
generating opposition to Mao's wishes at the Sep-
tember-October meetings, it is most likely to have
done so indirectly by intensifying Lo's views on PLA
training.

However, despite subsequent Chinese Red Guard
insinuations and Soviet and Chinese Nationalist
fabrications, no credible evidence has yet been re-
cieved to indicate that Lo or any other top Chinese
leader since Peng Te-huai in 1959 has intrigued with
the Soviets against Mao's power or policies or had
unauthorized or unreported dealings with the Soviet
Union. Moreover, there are as yet no solid grounds
for concluding that any leaders at the September-
October meeting, with or without Soviet encouragement,
directly raised the issue of the massive foreign
policy reverses that were being fostered by Mao's
policies. Yet those foreign setbacks may well have
played another role at this time: that of aggravating
Mao's paranoid tendencies, and of increasing his al-
ready growing suspicion and anger at real or fancied
domestic recalcitrance. External frustrations and humiliations may have helped impel an aging Mao to decide finally to take drastic action, while time was still left to him, in the internal field where he could make his will felt—that is, to remake China and the Chinese Communist party in the image being rejected by an ungrateful world.

The Chinese Editorial and the Abortive Soviet Conference

In a landmark editorial published on 11 November 1965, the Chinese for the first time publicly refused to attend any joint meeting with the Soviets and North Vietnamese, told the Soviets that "there are things that divide us and nothing that unites us," and announced that a "clear line of demarcation both politically and organizationally" must be drawn between themselves and their friends on the one hand, and the Soviets and their friends on the other hand.

The Soviets reacted to this by attempting to exploit Chinese self-isolation to organize an aid-to-Vietnam conference without the Chinese. Using the Poles as intermediaries, the CPSU had secret invitations sent to all bloc countries (including Albania and the CPR) requesting attendance at a meeting to coordinate Vietnam aid which the CPSU planned to hold immediately following the 23rd CPSU Congress in Moscow in April 1966. A number of important non-bloc parties—including the Italians and Japanese—were also to be invited to this conference. The North Vietnamese decision was crucial in determining whether this meeting could be held in the face of the expected Chinese refusal to attend. Although Shelepin apparently lobbied hard for North Vietnamese acceptance of the invitation during his visit to Hanoi in January 1966, the DRV felt obliged to decline rather than affront the Chinese so directly. This effectively killed the conference for the time being. Shelepin received a consolation prize, however, when the North Vietnamese in a joint communiqué with the Soviets publicly announced their intention to attend the 23rd CPSU Congress itself despite signs that Mao was contemplating a boycott of the congress.

Meanwhile, the CPSU had sent a secret letter to the Chinese party protesting the statements made in
the 11 November Chinese editorial, and Mao responded in early January with a secret letter mocking the Soviets, and offering the most authoritative statement to date of the Chinese view of the Sino-Soviet treaty of alliance: the view that this treaty would be of no value to Communist China in the event of a Sino-U.S. war.

At just about the same time, in January 1966, the Soviets disseminated to many parties throughout the world—and then internally throughout the CPSU—a long letter setting forth in detail Soviet grievances accumulated against the Chinese since the new Soviet leadership succeeded Khrushchev. This letter read as if its drafters had decided that Chinese progressive estrangement from the Communist movement because of Mao's obstinacy had now gone sufficiently far to make it politically safe for the CPSU to resume through private channels the sort of direct, across-the-board attacks on the CCP that had characterized most of Khrushchev's last 18 months. The one important difference remaining at this point was that Soviet public propaganda had not yet resumed the vituperative denunciations of the Chinese heard in 1963 and 1964. In the coming year Mao was to make this possible and profitable, too.

Mao Draws Some Lines

In the first months of 1966, Mao Tse-tung (a) clashed personally and dramatically with the leaders of the Japanese Communist party, converting the CCP-JCP relationship from one of growing friction to one of open hostility almost overnight; (b) thereby greatly worsened the already cool Chinese relationship to the Korean party; (c) entered into public polemics with the Cubans for the first time; (d) forced Chou En-lai to pick a fight with the neutral Rumanians; (e) publicly refused to send a CCP representative to the 23rd CPSU congress despite the fact that the North Vietnamese and North Koreans were attending, thus breaking the chief remaining strand of Sino-Soviet party relations at a time when former Chinese allies were maintaining or improving their relations with the CPSU; and (f)
arrested Peking first secretary Peng Chen amidst a mammoth press campaign, and thus brought into the open the long-drawn-out purge of the Chinese Communist leadership and apparatus which was still in progress a year later. Having threatened the universe in November 1965, Mao now began to implement his threat.

The Alliance of Independent Communist Militants

Throughout 1966, as the North Korean, Japanese, and Cuban parties each became more and more estranged from the Chinese, an informal political alliance among these three leading radicals became more and more overt. A fourth member of this radical group—the North Vietnamese party—shared fully the views of the other three, but differed in one important respect: it was unable to speak out publicly as unequivocally as the others on most issues because of its dependence upon the Soviet Union and Communist China for assistance in the war. The North Koreans, Japanese, and Cubans have more than made up for the North Vietnamese reticence.

These three independent radicals (and their relatively silent partner, the North Vietnamese) have a common outlook on these two basic points:

1) Uncompromising opposition to pretensions by either the CPSU or the CCP to have the right to give orders or guidance to the world movement, and particularly to them.

2) Uncompromising hostility to the United States, deriving primarily from a direct clash of the private interests of each of these parties with those of the United States. A corollary has been a constant clamor against any actions of either omission or commission, by either the Soviet Union or Communist China, which appeared to injure the cause of the struggle against "U.S. imperialism."

Because Communist China has virtually written off all of them but the North Vietnamese as parties with which the CCP wishes to have anything like friendly dealings, and because the Soviets, on the contrary, have actively courted them all, the leverage...
of these parties on CPSU policy is now much greater than their leverage on Chinese policy. Because of the direction in which this leverage is exerted, the independence of these parties is not a factor helpful to the United States.
Sino-Soviet Secret Correspondence and Conversations

Since Khrushchev's Fall

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<th>Gist</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Late Oct. 1964</td>
<td>CCP letter to CPSU</td>
<td>Said CCP would welcome CPSU invitation to send delegation to Moscow for October Revolution anniversary; such delegation would be led by Chou En-lai.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Late Oct. 1964</td>
<td>CPSU letter to CCP</td>
<td>Extended the invitation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. November 1964</td>
<td>(Chou talks with CPSU in Moscow.)</td>
<td>Stalemate because of CCP obstinate insistence on CPSU public rejection of all past positions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Late Nov. 1964</td>
<td>CPSU letter to CCP</td>
<td>&quot;Proposed&quot; postponement of 15 December Moscow meeting to 1 March; gave rundown on latest stand of 26 prospective participants in meeting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. February 1965</td>
<td>(Mao-Kosygin talks in Peking.)</td>
<td>Stalemate; Mao supremely arrogant, rejected minor CPSU concessions, demanded CPSU self-humiliation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. 16 Feb. 1965</td>
<td>CPSU (or possibly Soviet government, or both) letter to Chinese. (Similar letter simultaneously sent to DRV.)</td>
<td>Sent immediately after Kosygin return from Far East; proposed &quot;new international conference&quot; for negotiations on Vietnam.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. 27 Feb. 1965</td>
<td>Chinese reply to Soviets.</td>
<td>Rejected this proposal. (Date and exact nature of DRV reply uncertain.)</td>
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<td>Date</td>
<td>Sender and Recipient</td>
<td>Gist</td>
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<td>8. 22 Feb. 1965</td>
<td>North Vietnamese letter to CPSU and CCP.</td>
<td>Sent at Kosygin suggestion; proposed tripartite public statement on Vietnam to warn United States, and furnished draft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Late Feb. 1965</td>
<td>CPSU reply to North Vietnam.</td>
<td>Accepted this proposal.</td>
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<tr>
<td>10. Late Feb. 1965</td>
<td>CCP reply to North Vietnam.</td>
<td>Rejected this proposal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. 25 Feb. 1965</td>
<td>CPSU letter to CCP.</td>
<td>Requested air corridor across China for military airlift to DRV.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. 28 Feb. 1965</td>
<td>CCP reply to CPSU.</td>
<td>Rejected this request.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. March 1965</td>
<td>CPSU (or Soviet government) message to Chinese.</td>
<td>Requested use of air bases in south China (to assemble MIGs shipped by rail from USSR for DRV).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. March 1965</td>
<td>CCP (or Chinese government) reply to Soviets.</td>
<td>Rejected this request.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. 7 March 1965</td>
<td>Communiqué of 1-5 March Moscow 19-party &quot;consultative meeting&quot; sent to CCP (and many other parties) with short covering note, prior to publication.</td>
<td>Professed desire for unity, took no concrete step toward world Communist conference, CCP privately indicated scorn, later publicly attacked communiqué and meeting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. 30 March 1965</td>
<td>Two-year Sino-Soviet rail transportation agreement on Soviet aid to DRV signed.</td>
<td>Chinese nevertheless continue to obstruct shipment of Soviet SAM components and personnel to DRV from March until June 1965.</td>
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<tr>
<td>17. 3 April 1965</td>
<td>CPSU letter to CCP.</td>
<td>Proposed tripartite Sino-Soviet-North Vietnamese meeting on measures &quot;to defend security&quot; of DRV.</td>
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<tr>
<td>18. 11 April 1965</td>
<td>CCP reply to CPSU.</td>
<td>Rejected this proposal as unnecessary; attacked Soviet aid as insignificant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. 17 April 1965</td>
<td>CPSU letter to CCP.</td>
<td>Renewed demand for tripartite meeting and for tripartite public statement; attacked CCP for obstruction of Soviet aid and for rejection of unity. Draft of this letter probably shown to Le Duan, visiting in Moscow, before being sent.</td>
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<tr>
<td>20. 14 July 1965</td>
<td>CCP reply to CPSU.</td>
<td>Denounced Soviet past diplomatic activities regarding Vietnam negotiations; charged USSR with continuing collusion with United States; insisted tripartite meeting therefore could only harm DRV; rejected united action of any kind with Soviets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. 18 Sept. 1965</td>
<td>CPSU letter to CCP.</td>
<td>Rebuked Chinese for their inflammatory stand on India-Pakistan war and for their ultimatum to India.</td>
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<td>Date</td>
<td>Sender and Recipient</td>
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<tr>
<td>24. 23 Oct. 1965</td>
<td>CPSU letter to CCP.</td>
<td>Complained of new Chinese obstruction of a Soviet military rail shipment to DRV.</td>
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</table>
| 25. 5 Nov. 1965 | CCP letter to CPSU.                        | In effect admitted refusal to pass this shipment; blamed it on Soviet delay in signing new documentation.
<p>|              |                                             | CCP considered necessary.                                            |
| 26. 28 Nov. 1965 | CPSU letter to CCP.                        | Attacked 11 November Chinese editorial that had publicly ruled out any joint meeting or unity of action with Soviets. |
| 27. 7 Jan. 1966 | CCP reply to CPSU.                         | Scornfully reiterated 11 November statements, and added that Sino-Soviet treaty of alliance was worthless; USSR would be a &quot;negative factor&quot; in a Sino-U.S. war. |
| 28. 28 Dec 1965 | Polish party letter to CCP.                | Sent at Soviet instigation; invited CCP to bloc conference on aid to Vietnam; Soviets were hoping to hold conference at conclusion of 23rd CPSU Congress in Moscow. |
|              | (received 4 January)                        | (Similar letters sent to all other bloc parties.)                    |
| 29. 7 Feb. 1966 | CCP reply to Poles.                        | Sarcastic rejection of invitation. Conference had already been scuttled because DRV declined. |
| 30. January-February 1966 | CPSU letter circulated to many parties, one version circulated within CPSU. Portions deliberately leaked to Western press. | Reviewed at length and assailed record of Chinese actions since Khrushchev's fall; attacked Mao by name. |</p>
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**NOTE:** This is the last item of Sino-Soviet secret party correspondence (or party contacts of any kind) of which we have had any information as of late May 1967. Government correspondence, including many Foreign Ministry protest notes on both sides, has continued; and all such notes of which we have any knowledge have been published by the Soviets or Chinese. However, there have apparently been CPSU and CCP letters distributed to other parties concerning the opponent; versions of one such CPSU letter dealing with the Chinese "cultural revolution" were shown to representatives of bloc and non-bloc parties in December 1966.
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THE SINO-SOVIET STRUGGLE IN THE WORLD COMMUNIST MOVEMENT SINCE KHRUSHCHEV'S FALL

PART II

IV. March-September 1965: Expansion of Competition

The March meeting represented a watershed after which lines of policy already developed by both the Chinese and the Soviets were pursued much more vigorously. The question of a world Communist conference having for the time being been settled (negatively), the Soviets intensified their cultivation of the radical, anti-U.S. Communist parties of the Far East, began to amplify calls for "unity of action" regarding Vietnam, and further hardened their public posture toward the United States. The Chinese now began a series of frontal attacks on the Soviets calculated to expose the hypocrisy of the CPSU position.

A. The Chinese Open Fire

1. The Demonstration at the U.S. Embassy

Early in March, while the 19-party meeting was still going on in Moscow, the Chinese regime organized a provocation of unprecedented nature against the Soviet Union, designed to create a dramatic impression of Soviet perfidy upon the radical anti-U.S. Communists, and particularly upon the North Vietnamese. The CCP decided, in effect, to call the CPSU bluff on the question of hostile demonstrations at the U.S. embassy in Moscow. As already noted (Part I, pages 21-23), the new Soviet regime, six weeks after taking power, had authorized and publicized the first such demonstration in several years in connection with the Stanleyville Congo airlift, to demonstrate a new Soviet military toward United States "aggression." In February 1965, the Soviet regime had another such demonstration held before the embassy in connection with the first U.S. bombings of North Vietnam. The Chinese resolved to make this inexpensive and safe method of parading revolutionary fervor expensive and dangerous for the USSR.
On 4 March, the Soviet government, after momentary hesitation, appears to have authorized another demonstration at the U.S. embassy to protest the resumption of bombing of North Vietnam the day before. The Chinese embassy usurped control of this demonstration, which was carried out by some 2,000 Asian students, chiefly Chinese and Vietnamese, but also including some Indonesians and others. Although the Soviets had reluctantly authorized the demonstration (apparently to appease the North Vietnamese), they anticipated the possibility of unauthorized actions, for they warned the U.S. embassy in advance and sent uniformed police to the scene to set up barriers and snowplows. In fact, after the demonstrators had pelted the embassy building with ink and stones, they broke through the barriers in an effort to get at the building, and were then repulsed by the Soviet police, with considerable difficulty, in a wild melee in which there were a number of injured on both sides and in which Soviet troops eventually were brought on the scene. Several demonstrators were arrested. (Figure E.)

A comic-opera propaganda battle ensued over the next few weeks. The Chinese published lurid accounts of alleged brutality by the Soviet police against the embattled Chinese students, of the refusal of Soviet hospitals to treat the injured Chinese and of further beating of a Chinese at one hospital. The Soviets publicly denied all this, instead describing the Chinese students as "hooligans" who had attacked the unarmed Soviet police with knives and clubs, injuring several. The two sides exchanged and published Foreign Ministry notes of protest. The Chinese note emphasized the contrast between Soviet professions of support for North Vietnam against the United States and Soviet suppression of this demonstration; the Soviet note termed all the Chinese statements "a heap of concoctions" and said there was a difference between justified "political demonstrations" against the United States and "outrages" contrary to international law against foreign embassies and diplomats. The Chinese held a protest demonstration before the Soviet Embassy in Pe-king (the first ever, and a preview of the more elaborate demonstrations there in August and October 1966 and February 1967). The Chinese brought injured Chinese students home on stretchers (shamming, the
THE CLASH BEFORE THE U.S. EMBASSY IN MOSCOW
4 MARCH 1965
The whole affair was on balance a CCP tactical political victory over the CPSU, albeit a minor and temporary one. Both sides were playing to an audience—the radical Asian Communists, particularly the North Vietnamese—and the Chinese were on the offensive and the Soviets on the defensive throughout. The Chinese made every effort at each stage to involve the North Vietnamese in their actions, and to some degree succeeded; thus Vietnamese students took part in the Moscow demonstration and fought with the Soviet police alongside the Chinese, and a North Vietnamese diplomat is said (by NCNA) to have visited the injured Chinese students in a Peking hospital. Hanoi made no public comment, however. Soviet courting of the Indonesian party received a considerable setback; influenced by the fact that Indonesians were involved in the demonstration and by the hostile reports sent back by the Marijan Rakjat reporter in Moscow, the PKI and Aidit made several acid public comments about Soviet suppression of the demonstration which the Chinese reprinted. The Japanese Communists also took a dim view of the Soviet action; Castro, however—who was by that time becoming incensed at Chinese attempts to proselyte within the Cuban Army—alluded to the demonstration and its aftermath as a Chinese provocation.

The most lasting effect of the episode was to bring home to the Soviet leaders the realization that Soviet anti-U.S. demagoguery, while still immensely useful and necessary to Soviet policy, must have more sharply defined limits to prevent unforeseen and possibly dangerous consequences. The CPSU leadership discovered that Khrushchev's ban against demonstrations at the U.S. embassy in recent years had not been such a bad idea after all. Since March 1965, there have been no more such demonstrations before the embassy, although there have been plenty of "spontaneous" meetings elsewhere in Moscow to protest U.S. policies.

2. Denunciation of the March Meeting

Simultaneously with all this, the Chinese sought to exploit against the CPSU—again, for the benefit of
the radical Communist parties to whom the CPSU was appealing—the holding of the March meeting by the Soviets. Peking prepared the way by publishing, in late February and early March, detailed accounts of continued Soviet dissemination of Khrushchev-era anti-CCP documents within the USSR. The Chinese were thus seeking to demonstrate—to such parties as the North Vietnamese—that the Soviet claim to have ceased polemics against the CCP was a fraud, that Soviet claims to have adopted a more forthright anti-imperialist stand than that of Khrushchev were similarly a sham, and that any statement put out by the March meeting under either heading would be hypocritical.

On 22 March, two weeks after the Soviets published the communiqué of the March meeting, the Chinese published a People's Daily-Red Flag joint editorial which was the CCP's most definitive policy statement to that time on the new Soviet leadership. The editorial was primarily concerned with countering the impression created among "some people" that the Soviets while holding the March meeting had taken a conciliatory line toward the Chinese. Such unnamed people were quoted as believing that the new CPSU leadership had taken a different line from that of Khrushchev because the Soviets had postponed Khrushchev's planned meeting from December to March, had changed its name from "drafting committee meeting" to "consultative meeting," and had spoken in the meeting's communiqué of "unity against the enemy and other good things." The CCP strenuously insisted that all this was nothing but Soviet "tricks" to deceive "some people [who] may not see things clearly or may be hoodwinked or may commit mistakes."

The March meeting held by the new Soviet leadership, declared the editorial, was "the selfsame illegal and schismatic meeting" Khrushchev had planned; the CPSU had therefore taken "a most serious step to effect an open split in the international communist movement," and the struggle in the movement had "now entered a new stage." The Chinese editorial proclaimed that the new Soviet leaders had "obstinately clung to the whole of Khrushchev's revisionist theories, general line, and policies," especially "Khrushchev's reactionary policy of the Soviet-U.S. cooperation for the domination of the world." The CCP ridiculed the Soviet contention that "what unites the Communist parties greatly outweighs that which at the
present time disunites them," terming this a hypo-
critical attempt to "whitewash" CPSU actions and
"conceal their revisionist and schismatic essence."
In this connection the Chinese editorial mocked--not
for the last time--the call for "unity of action"
against imperialism contained in the March meeting
communiqué.

Finally, the People's Daily-Red Flag editorial
contemptuously rejected the communiqué's appeal for a
"cessation of polemics," and reiterated the Chinese in-
tention to support "Marxist-Leninist" factions against
pro-Soviet Communist parties around the world. Like Mao
in his talk with Kosygin, the editorial spelled out a
list of issues on which the CPSU would have to admit its
errors and publicly apologize before unity with China
would become possible. Meanwhile, the editorial pro-
fessed to believe that these well-meaning people who
had been temporarily "hoodwinked" by the Soviets would
"eventually break with revisionism and come over to the
side of Marxism-Leninism in the course of their revolu-
tionary practice." But the Soviets, as will be seen,
were working to prevent this.

3. Chinese Briefings to Adherents

During March, while the Moscow meeting was
going on and after it had been completed, the Chinese
Communists held informal, unpublicized talks with rep-
resentatives of a number of their most loyal "Marxist-
Leninist" splinter groups abroad. Delegates from the
pro-Chinese parties of Australia, New Zealand, Ecuador,
Peru, Brazil, and Panama are believed to have come to
Peking especially for this purpose, and other countries
may well have been represented also. In these conversa-
tions, the Chinese evidently gave their adherents guid-
ance on tactics to be used in the new situation created
by the Soviet holding of the March meeting, by the So-
viet concessions made prior to and during that meeting,
and by the Soviet "hoodwinking" of certain radical Com-
munist regimes (the Cubans, North Vietnamese and North
Koreans).

Organizationally, the Chinese were already on
the defensive. In early March, a Japanese Communist
presidium member remarked privately that the Chinese could have publicly organized a competing conference prior to the March meeting or simultaneous with it, but that the CCP had now lost the excuse to do so, since such an act would now further alienate "neutral" parties in view of the Moscow meeting's call for unity and its failure to condemn the Chinese. The JCP leader observed that the attendance of the North Vietnamese and North Koreans at such a Chinese-organized conference was less likely now and that the likelihood of their participation was continuing to diminish.

B. Soviets Carry New Policies Forward

1. The Unity of Action Line on Vietnam

The evolution of the new Soviet strategy to combat the Chinese was now completed. In January, the Soviets had told Indian party leader Dange that the new CPSU international strategy was to avoid antagonizing those parties which had supported China, and to try to win them over by offering all manner of inducements, and thus to isolate China and Albania. By April, after the March meeting and the Chinese reaction to it, CPSU leaders were telling the Indian party leaders that they were now confident that they were winning the battle with the Chinese, and stated that the Soviet party would continue to adopt a relatively passive attitude toward Chinese abusive attacks, since the CCP's tactics only seemed to lose it friends. Similar confidence that the Chinese were isolating themselves and that Soviet tactics were proving efficacious was expressed in April by a CPSU Central Committee member visiting in Japan.

The key to the entire Soviet effort to isolate the Chinese from now on was the issue of "unity of action" in support of North Vietnam against the United States. This issue gradually became the most important single vehicle for the restoration of CPSU influence and diminution of CCP influence among all the radical anti-U.S. forces of the Communist world. At the same time, in Eastern Europe, the issue of unity of action was to be a bludgeon in the hands of the CPSU with which the
Soviets sought to impose greater uniformity of line, to
shore up Soviet authority,* and in particular, to force
a reduction in East European contacts with the United
States.

From now on, too, parties in the CPSU orbit
began to perceive more and more clearly that a funda-
mental change was occurring away from those priorities
of Soviet policies regarding the United States and the
radicals of the "national liberation movement" that had
been maintained in Khrushchev's time. (See Part I).
In August 1965 the Brazilian party was to receive a
letter from the CPSU which reportedly explained that the
Soviet Union had been forced to revise the policy of
"peaceful coexistence" to one of "more active prepara-
tion to counter United States aggression." In the
spring of 1966 a Hungarian party official was to tell
representatives of another loyal pro-CPSU party that
his central committee had "evaluated the question of
peaceful coexistence." and that "in light of current
conditions" it had been found essential to place "a
new stress" on aid to "liberation movements" and on
strengthening ties with the socialist countries. The
Hungarian official went on to say that "previously"
(i.e., under Khrushchev) the "main line and principal
stress" of his party had been centered on peaceful co-
existence, but that this "former position" of the
Hungarian party had been too "one-sided" and that

*In the first six months after Khrushchev's fall
serious threats to CPSU dominance had been posed in
two of the bloc states most firmly in the Soviet
orbit—not, however, by the Chinese, but rather by
nationalist forces. At a late December plenum of the
Mongolian party, Tsedenbal had been forced to conduct
his third major purge in two years to put down oppo-
sition to Mongolia's dependence on the USSR and its
membership in CEMA. And in early April, a planned
nationalist coup with pro-Yugoslav overtones was
thwarted in Bulgaria. The CPSU dispatched Shelep
in January to Mongolia and Suslov in May to Bulgaria
to survey the scene in each case.
peaceful coexistence was "not now central" to Hungarian policy.

Listing the new priorities of Hungarian policy, this party official cited: (a) the strengthening of bloc ties; (b) "all possible support" for the liberation movements; and (c) the strengthening of contacts with newly liberated countries—in that order—as all now preceding in importance; (d) the development of "good relations" with the capitalist countries (particularly, of course, the United States). While there is considerable reason to doubt the sincerity of Hungarian devotion to these priorities, this list obviously corresponded to guidelines which the new CPSU leadership has sought to impose on the reluctant Hungarians and all other parties susceptible to Soviet pressure.

**a. The April CPSU-CCP Letters**

As already noted, the North Vietnamese in late February, at Soviet suggestion, had prepared and forwarded to Moscow and Peking a draft for a statement to be issued jointly by North Vietnam, Communist China, and the Soviet Union, to "warn" the United States. This proposal was rejected by Peking. According to accounts subsequently sent abroad throughout the Communist movement by both the Soviets and Chinese, on 3 April—a week before North Vietnamese party first secretary Le Duan was to arrive in Moscow at the head of a DRV delegation—the Soviets sent letters to Peking and Hanoi renewing this proposal, and at the same time formally proposing a meeting of representatives of the three parties at the highest level and at an agreed-upon place. The purpose of the proposed three-party meeting, according to a subsequent private statement by Suslov, was to "coordinate the problem of military assistance to North Vietnam."

On 11 April—the day after Le Duan's arrival in Moscow—the Chinese replied to the Soviet proposals, rejecting them once more. The Chinese are alleged to have insisted that they and the Soviets should reach separate, not joint agreements with the DRV, and (not for the last time) derided Soviet aid to the DRV as insignificant. The Soviets later told their friends that their plan for a Sino-Soviet-Vietnamese meeting was discussed with
Le Duan while he was in Moscow, that both during and subsequent to the Le Duan visit the North Vietnamese declared their support for the scheme, and that the central committee of the North Vietnamese party at some point so informed the Chinese leadership.

After obtaining DRV approval for the three-party meeting, the CPSU central committee again wrote to the Chinese party and government to ask the Chinese to reconsider. This letter was dispatched on 17 April, the day before Le Duan left the Soviet Union for a visit to Peking. This 17 April letter charged the Chinese with responsibility for the delay of deliveries of Soviet weapons to Vietnam, and showed in other ways that it was written for Vietnamese eyes. It is reasonable to assume that a version of the message was shown to Le Duan before he left Moscow.

Thus, the Soviets had done their best to set the stage for an acrimonious exchange between the Le Duan delegation and the Chinese leadership, and the highly unusual absence of a joint communiqué when the Le Duan visit was concluded on 23 April suggested that his talks with Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping were not in fact the "cordial conversations" NCNA announced. While disagreements may have arisen under several headings, the subject of the CPSU letter may well have been one of them: the North Vietnamese had every reason to favor strongly (as the Soviets said they did) both the Soviet proposals—the tripartite public statement and the tripartite conference on military aid—and the Chinese were determined to refuse. On 27 April, after Le Duan had returned to Hanoi, Suslov told an Italian party delegation that the Soviet proposal "supported by Le Duan" for a high level meeting between the Chinese, Soviet and North Vietnamese to coordinate military assistance to the DRV had been rejected by the Chinese on the grounds that existing Soviet-DRV bilateral accords adequately covered the problem.

The Chinese had the next word in this correspondence, but only after a three-month delay. On 14 July, the CCP replied to the CPSU's 17 April letter with a violent letter listing a series of Soviet secret activities regarding Vietnam, indicting them as treachery, and
thus justifying Chinese refusal to cooperate with the CPSU on Vietnam. The main Chinese charge was that the Soviet Union had taken specific diplomatic actions in February to try to bring about U.S.-North Vietnamese "peace negotiations," and that the USSR had helped the United States' attempt to use the issue of the bombings of North Vietnam as a bargaining counter with which to bring the DRV to the conference table. Because of the circumstantial detail provided, this was the strongest point made in the CCP July letter; nevertheless, the Chinese were probably exaggerating when they implied that the North Vietnamese had in February already clearly told the Soviets not to do what they were doing.

The second Chinese point was that the Soviets, even in July, instead of carrying on a "blow for blow battle" against the United States, were "exchanging information" and "coordinating activities" with the U.S., were "still continuing the line of Soviet-American unity aimed at domination of the world," and were therefore still "doing your utmost to find a way out for the American aggressors."

The third CCP point was a defense of Peking against the Soviet charge of obstruction of the transit of Soviet aid to North Vietnam. While the letter claimed that contrary to Soviet charges, the Chinese had expedited Soviet equipment deliveries to the DRV (by rail), the letter admitted and defended Chinese refusal both of a Soviet request for overflight rights in order to ship aid to the DRV by air and a Soviet demand for airbases in South China. The CCP again insisted that "both the quantity and quality" of Soviet aid had been "far out of proportion to the power of your country."

In short, said the CCP, the Soviets wanted a tripartite aid conference with Peking and Hanoi "to lure us into your trap so that you might obtain the authority to speak on behalf of Vietnam and China" in order to conclude "a political transaction with American imperialism... designed at deceiving the revolutionary people throughout the world." Therefore, said the Chinese party, any Sino-Soviet-Vietnamese meeting would only be harmful. The CCP concluded by reiterating that "united action" of any kind with the Soviets would be impossible until the CPSU
formally abandoned all its innumerable treacherous activities and all the revisionist conclusions of its party program and party congresses of the last decade.

The Chinese were subsequently to distribute copies of this letter to other parties around the world and then to repeat most of its details in editorials published in the fall. In so doing, the CCP was obstinately entrenching itself in a weak position: the Chinese charges of Soviet collusion with the United States, the belittling of Soviet aid to North Vietnam, and the excuse given for refusing a tripartite meeting all were to appear less and less credible to Communists everywhere as time went on. The overall position spelled out in the Chinese 14 July letter and subsequently reiterated was of great help to the CPSU and was harmful to the CCP in the struggle between the two for influence in North Vietnam and among radical Communists elsewhere. Evidence of this fact, however, did not prevent the Chinese party under Mao from taking a more and more extreme position in condemnation of both unity of action with the Soviets and of all who favored such unity.

b. Growth of Soviet Presence in DRV

The CCP's 14 July letter was dispatched ten days before the first firing of Soviet surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) against U.S. aircraft over North Vietnam. There is good evidence that the use of such missiles had been delayed for several months by Chinese obstruction of the rail transit through China of the Soviet SAM technicians whom the USSR wished to send to North Vietnam with the SAM equipment.* The Soviets would not send this

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*This obstruction of the Soviet SAM personnel was in addition to the Chinese refusal of a Soviet demand for an "air corridor" for the staging of massive airlift across China to the DRV, and in addition to the Chinese refusal of the Soviet request for South China airbases.
equipment through China without the Soviet personnel to accompany it, to guard it from the Chinese while in transit, especially since the Chinese had already clashed with the Soviets over Peking's insistence upon the right of meticulous "inspection" of all items shipped. The Chinese, for their part, sought to block the passage of the Soviet missile personnel because of a desire to minimize the growth of the Soviet military presence in the DRV and a consequent increase in Soviet political leverage over the Lao Dong party.

This Chinese effort would have been foolish and counterproductive in terms of Chinese overall political interests even if it had succeeded. In actual fact, it failed, largely because under mounting U.S. air attacks the DRV could not wait the many months necessary for North Vietnamese SAM personnel to be trained in the Soviet Union before receiving a SAM defense capability—as the Chinese wished Hanoi to do. In June, the DRV apparently prevailed upon the Chinese to allow a certain number of the Soviet missile personnel to pass.* SAM installations were then created with great rapidity, and SAMs were fired in the third week of July.

*It was only after this that the CCP—on 14 July—finally answered the CPSU's 17 April letter, and replied to Soviet charges about obstruction by claiming that "in accordance with the agreements made, we are making every possible effort to expedite the delivery of all the Soviet military equipment Vietnam needs." This peculiarly-worded and carefully-qualified denial was, in fact, an implicit confession. Much later, acknowledged that the Chinese had been vigorously "advising" the Vietnamese as to which Soviet equipment they "needed."
The Soviet military presence in the DRV was firmly implanted, and a long-term North Vietnamese dependence upon continued Soviet military aid created. This applied particularly to air defense: not only to the maintenance and replacement of SAM equipment, but also to the training of DRV fighter pilots and the supplying of advanced Soviet fighters to North Vietnam. While the Chinese are known to have once more seized a pretext to hold up for some time one Soviet rail shipment of military aid to the DRV in the early fall of 1965, it is by no means as certain that any such obstruction has occurred since (although this is possible, as will be seen in Part III of this study).

Nevertheless, the Soviets have ensured that the Chinese go on paying a heavy political price for their obstruction in the spring of 1965. Soviet-sponsored covert—and sometimes open—propaganda has repeatedly sought to imply vaguely that past Chinese obstruction has continued indefinitely. Thus despite the vital role played by Chinese military assistance to North Vietnam—including the dispatch of thousands of troops since June 1965 to maintain the DRV transportation system—many Communists around the world continue to associate the CPR with obstruction of aid to the DRV and hindering of the DRV war effort. Soviet propaganda has been assisted in this respect by Chinese obstinacy in rejecting "unity of action" proposals regarding Vietnam.

2. **Military Aid to North Korea**

With the Vietnam "unity of action" line as a solid foundation, the CPSU in the spring and summer of 1965 intensified its efforts to win over the key Far Eastern radical Communist parties. The North Korean party, which had already moved further than any of the other radicals away from the Chinese position, was now to move still further, with the restoration of Soviet economic and military aid to North Korea.
It has already been noted that the question of the restoration of such aid—suspended by Khrushchev in late 1962—was apparently brought up during the Kosygin-Kim II-sung conversations in Pyongyang in February 1965. In mid-April, Kim gave a lengthy speech in Indonesia broadcast and published in full by North Korea, which was evidently intended in part to warn the CPSU that it had better not hope again to use such aid as an instrument for interference in internal Korean party affairs. Kim alluded to sins committed by both the Chinese and the Soviets in this regard, but gave particular emphasis to alleged efforts by the Soviets (unnamed) in 1955-1957 "to prevent our country from building its own economic foundation" by arguing against the rapid collectivization of North Korean agriculture and the "priority growth of heavy industry." As he had done before, Kim also alluded to collusion at the time between the Soviets and Korean "anti-party, revisionist elements who together had sought "to overthrow the leadership of our party and government" through "subversive activities." The moral Kim

*A official spelled this out more directly, and also implied that the clash in 1955 was related to efforts by Khrushchev to draw North Korea into CEMA. He said that North Korean relations with the Soviets had begun to deteriorate even before the Sino-Soviet dispute developed, because the Koreans rejected Soviet insistence on an "international division of economic effort;" that the Soviets had wanted North Korea to export minerals to the USSR and receive manufactured goods in return; and that the Soviets had cut off economic aid in retaliation for North Korean refusal to comply, causing "temporary hardship" to North Korea. It would appear that the Soviet difficulties with North Korea were similar in many respects to those encountered later with Rumania, but that Khrushchev learned little from the first mistake.

**In an October 1965 speech Kim reiterated this charge, and said that the challenge to his leadership had surfaced "between 1956 and 1957."
drew from this painful past was that while the Korean party "recognized the necessity of assistance from other countries," the "main emphasis should be laid on self-reliance," and that no interference from any outside source in the determination of policy was permissible.

At the same time, Kim in his April speech used this very principle of North Korean independence to justify the new position his party had taken toward the CPSU in defiance of Chinese wishes. He insisted that North Korea "takes an independent position in its attitude toward the international Communist movement especially in the struggle against modern revisionism." He denounced "flunkeyism" and those who "parroted what other people said," and asserted: "We resolutely fight against modern revisionism, yet we carry on this fight strictly on the basis of our own judgment and conviction and in conformity with our actual conditions." What Kim meant here had already been exemplified by the North Korean silence about the Moscow March meeting in the face of Chinese vituperation.

Kim's mid-April public warning against Soviet misuse of aid to North Korea was apparently deliberately timed to precede the opening of concrete negotiations with the Soviet Union two weeks later on the subject of the resumption of such aid. A North Korean military delegation arrived in Moscow in early May, and spent virtually the entire month in what probably was arduous haggling. On 31 May, the Soviets announced that the two sides had reached agreement on "Soviet assistance in the further strengthening of the defense potential of the
DPRK," and on 2 June Nodong Sinmun confirmed this bare fact; there was no elaboration. has reported, however, that the military agreement covered one year from May 1965, and provided for Soviet delivery of communications equipment, radar, and MIG-19s or 21s, preparation of "missile sites" and delivery and installation of "missile equipment," and training in the Soviet Union of North Korean personnel in the use of communications equipment and missiles. An economic agreement is also said to have been signed at an undisclosed date, providing for certain Soviet assistance to North Korean industrial facilities and training for North Korean technicians.

With the military aid agreement signed, the North Korean relationship with the Soviets continued gradually to get warmer and their relationship with the Chinese to get cooler. Both trends were clearly evident in Pyongyang's treatment of the July anniversaries of its friendship treaties with the USSR and Communist China. The same tendency was noted in August, when the Chinese downgraded their recognition of the anniversary of North Korean liberation from Japan, while the Soviets upgraded the occasion, sending presidium and secretariat member Shelepin to Pyongyang to
celebrate the event. Throughout his visit Shelepin made suitably militant, vituperative anti-U.S. noises, calculated to appeal to the North Korean leadership, and never once mentioned the detested concept of peaceful co-existence; the Koreans returned compliments to the Soviet leaders, and Kim Il declared the strengthening of the unity of the bloc and the world movement as "the most important task" in the struggle against imperialism--precisely the new Soviet position, and the opposite of the current Chinese position. The Chinese message to North Korea on the August 1965 anniversary no longer referred, as the message had in 1964, to the "brilliant" North Korean leadership or to its "correct Marxist-Leninist revolutionary line." In Japan, the North Korean Chosen Soren organization had by July received instructions to cultivate closer ties with the Soviet embassy, and Chosen Soren's relations with the Chinese were soon to begin a further decline.

3. Continued Soviet Stalemate with JCP

The Soviets had less luck, in the months immediately following the March meeting, with the Japanese and Indonesian Communists. Although the Soviet "unity of action" line regarding Vietnam continued to hold open a fissure between the position of the Chinese and that of the JCP and PKI, it was not until 1966 that the CPSU's policy was to pay big dividends with the Japanese (and might have done so with the Indonesian Communists as well, had they survived).
In the summer of 1965, the biggest single contentious issue between the CPSU and the JCP remained that of Soviet support for the expelled JCP dissident leaders who had grouped themselves together in the splinter group called the "Communist Party of Japan (Voice of Japan)." The JCP had become seriously alarmed when this group nominated one of their number, Shigeo Kamiyama, to oppose JCP Chairman Sanzo Nosaka in early July elections to the upper house of the Japanese parliament. Both the JCP and its opponents thought that there was a good possibility that Kamiyama would take away sufficient votes from Nosaka to cause his defeat; and if this were to happen, it was also possible that Kamiyama's splinter party might then begin to grow into a significant leftist movement capable of draining away much of the JCP's strength. During the campaign preceding the election, there were numerous vitriolic JCP statements alluding to Soviet perfidy in backing Kamiyama's candidacy.

In the event, not only did Kamiyama lose but Nosaka won overwhelmingly, and subsequent JCP (and Chinese) commentaries exulted over the discomfiture of the Japanese revisionists and their foreign supporters. The CPSU was apparently shocked, and probably revised sharply downward its estimate of the possible usefulness of the Japanese dissident Communists. The July Japanese election, coming after the April Kerala election in which Dange's Indian Communist party/Right was overwhelmingly defeated by the Indian Communist party/Left, must have reinforced Soviet doubts of the tactical utility of CPSU identification with right-wing Communist forces in the Far East.

Thereafter, there was a slow, gradual cooling of Soviet relations with the Japanese dissidents, along with steady pressure from Moscow vainly seeking to force a rapprochement between the dissidents and the JCP. By October, the Soviets were attempting to impose censorship on dissident Communist publications as the price of their financial subsidy. The Soviets had founded a Japan-Soviet Book Center in Tokyo in the fall of 1964 to compete with JCP bookstores; but by the fall of 1965 the
Soviets were not honoring their agreement with the Japanese dissidents to give the new bookstore a monopoly on Russian books, and were continuing to provide books to the JCP-run stores. By December 1965, the dissidents had decided—probably with Soviet prodding—not to attempt to send a delegation to compete with the JCP delegation at the January 1966 Havana Tri-continental Conference. By early 1966, CPSU financial aid to the pro-Soviet splinter group was being greatly reduced.

Soviet relations with the Japanese Socialist party were an even greater headache for everybody concerned—the CPSU, the Japanese Socialist party, and the JCP. By the summer of 1965, the Soviets were in an increasing dilemma. The large JSP and its huge trade union affiliate Sohyo were (and today still are) far more important in Japanese political life than the Japanese Communists. The Soviets had long eagerly sought to court and impress the JSP and Sohyo leadership, and continued to do so; yet they were loath to burn their last bridges with the JCP, and in some circumstances could only avoid doing so by offending the JSP.

Thus at a Helsinki Congress of the Soviet-run World Peace Council in July 1965 there were two competing delegations from Japan—one dominated by the JCP, and one led by the Japanese Socialists, with some pro-Soviet Japanese dissident Communists participating. The Soviets and their agents at the Congress hesitated and equivocated over which to give precedence to, and ended by offending the Socialists.

The Soviet problem was intensified immediately thereafter by the necessity of deciding what to do about the two annual competing anti-nuclear bomb conferences to be held in Japan in August—the Gensuikyo conference, run by the JCP, and the Gensuikin conference, organized by the JSP in protest against JCP domination of Gensuikyo and the JCP refusal to condemn nuclear testing by all nations. In August 1964, in the Khrushchev era, a Soviet delegation had been
forced by the JCP to leave the Gensuikyo meeting, and had then attended only the Gensuikin meeting. In July 1965, the Soviets made it plain in conversations with Gensuikin representatives that the CPSU central committee did not want this to happen again, explained that the JCP would not permit the Soviets to send delegations to both conferences, and asked JSP forgiveness and understanding if the Soviets did not attend the Gensuikin meeting this year. The Soviets were apparently contemplating not going to either conference, as the solution to their problem. The JSP violently protested, however, and the CPSU at the last minute changed its mind, adopting a solution which satisfied neither side and offended both. A WPC representative was sent to the Gensuikyo meeting, not to attend, but to deliver a message also intended for the Gensuikin conference; the insulted Japanese Communists refused to allow him to do this. On the other hand, a Soviet trade union delegation in Japan for a Sohyo meeting was shunted off at the last minute to attend the Gensuikin meeting; but the Socialists were vastly irritated by this minimal Soviet gesture, by the failure of the WPC to send "official" delegates to their conference, by the Soviet failure to give Gensuikin the financial support it had anticipated, and by an abortive Soviet effort, at the Gensuikin meeting, to get Gensuikin to drop a statement denouncing the idea that testing of nuclear weapons by some countries is justified (the issue which was the main reason for Gensuikin's existence). The pro-Soviet foreign delegates who made the latter suggestion did not hide the fact that they were attempting to make the statement "less directly offensive to certain parties"--i.e., to the JCP.

Thus the Soviets twisted and turned in simultaneous pursuit of incompatible interests. Ideally, the problem would be solved for the CPSU if Genuikyo and Gensuikin were to be reunited on Gensuikin's terms--i.e., rejecting the Chinese line on nuclear testing. The JCP, however, would not allow this, and the right-wing Socialist leaders--particularly the Sohyo leadership--would not permit reunification on any other basis. The next best solution for the CPSU would be JCP modification of
its position to allow the Soviets or Soviet-run organizations to send delegations to both conferences--and this, in essence, is what was to happen in 1966, as the result of JCP estrangement from the Chinese party.

The JCP and the Abortive Helsinki Party Meeting: Amidst all this continuing friction between the JCP and the CPSU in the summer of 1965, there was one episode which presaged the drastic changes to come later. In early July, shortly before the opening of the Helsinki Congress of the WPC, the Finnish party at CPSU instigation sought at the last minute to organize a private meeting of Communist parties that would be represented in peace front delegations at the Congress. The nominal purpose of this meeting was to reach a unified position on a number of issues scheduled for discussion by the Congress. Mitsuhiro Kaneko, an official of the Japanese party central committee apparatus, was originally sent to Helsinki to participate in this interparty meeting, and in accordance with instructions from his leadership first attempted to persuade the Chinese delegation leader in Helsinki for the WPC Congress, Chao I-min, to participate as well. The argument used by Kaneko was revealing: he said that the international situation, and especially the "gradual hardening" of the Soviet position on the Vietnamese question, made it greatly advantageous for the Chinese now to "demonstrate a desire for unity" at a time when the bulk of world Communist opinion was more in sympathy with Chinese views (i.e., regarding the United States) than at any time in recent years. Chao I-min is said to have replied that he was personally opposed to Chinese participation in any such meeting, but that he would report Kaneko's request to Peking and await instructions. Kaneko next planned to report this conversation by telephone to the JCP in Tokyo and urge that party secretary general Miyamoto attempt at once to persuade the Chinese to participate. Instead, Kaneko apparently received instructions--no doubt, at Chinese insistence--to absent himself from the interparty meeting, for no JCP representative was present when the meeting was held.
In the actual event, this preliminary party gathering before the WPC Congress in Helsinki proved abortive because of the absence of many important parties, both pro-Chinese and pro-Soviet, and because of the recalcitrance of some of those who were present. The initial JCP willingness to attend, however, and Kaneko's estimate (contrary to the Chinese view) that the Soviet attitude on Vietnam was "hardening," were symptomatic of the gradual change which was going on in JCP thinking because of the Soviet "unity of action" line, and which was to be surfaced six months later.*

4. Final Soviet Dealings With PKI

In the summer of 1965 the CPSU made what was to prove (although no one would have guessed it at the time) its final effort to improve its position with the Indonesian Communist party as a powerful factor in Indonesia and in the world Communist movement. In late May, a strong CPSU delegation was sent to Djakarta to attend celebrations of the 45th anniversary of the founding of the PKI, and the chief CPSU representative, alternate presidium member Rashidov, delivered a speech reiterating the new Soviet call for unity of action of all "anti-imperialist forces" to oppose the wicked actions of the arch-enemy, the United States, in Vietnam and elsewhere around the world. When Peng Chen, leader of the Chinese delegation to the celebrations, delivered a vitriolic attack on the Soviet leadership, the Soviet delegation--and TASS--released a strong rebuttal denouncing Peng's speech as Chinese "provocation and slander," but also piously noting that the CCP action had "misused the hospitality of the PKI" and undermined anti-imperialist unity, helping only the United States.

*In the fall of 1966 the CCP's Belgian retainer Grippa alluded to the JCP conduct at Helsinki as the first evidence of their coming fall from grace.
Such an open CPSU reply to the Chinese was most unusual in this period, but the CPSU seemed to think that a display of righteous indignation cast in these terms might be helpful for CPSU relations with the PKI (as well as with other Asian Communists). The reason for this Soviet estimate is evident from PKI statements in May and June. On the one hand, the overall PKI position remained sympathetic to that of the Chinese and quite far from that of the Soviets: thus at a PKI central committee plenum in the first half of May Aidit had reiterated attacks on "modern revisionism" and praise for "Marxist-Leninist groups" that split away for revisionist Communist parties; thus, too, Aidit in a speech welcoming Peng Chen on 25 May termed the CCP "a red beacon light in defending Marxism-Leninism and combatting modern revisionism," and defended the Chinese against the charge of being too dogmatic and insufficiently "flexible" in their struggle against modern revisionism. In the very same speech, however, Aidit said that "of course, we Indonesian Communists have our own way and style in expressing our attitude toward modern revisionism"--apparently, an allusion to differences with the Chinese on how to deal with the Soviets. In another speech the next day, Aidit went much further along this line. He said that the PKI "cannot but feel concerned" about differences in the international Communist movement, and added that "the PKI's attitude is to solve them as differences among comrades and preserve unity on the basis of Marxism-Leninism"--a rather outspoken rebuff to the Chinese position regarding the CPSU as expressed by Peng Chen the day before. Turning to internal PKI policy, Aidit went on to stress that although the PKI should "learn as much as possible from the experiences of fraternal parties," the problem of the Indonesian revolution "must be solved by the PKI itself and not by any other Communist party," and that furthermore "there is no other people or individual" (emphasis added) who could take the place of the Indonesians in carrying out the Indonesian revolution. The reference to an "individual" sounds very much like an allusion to Mao, and the entire passage suggests that Peng Chen may have privately brought pressure on the PKI
regarding both policy toward the CPSU and domestic policy which Aidit personally resented.*

A month later, on 23 June, Aidit told the Soviet ambassador, and then publicly announced, that his party was accepting a long-standing CPSU invitation to send a delegation to Moscow for talks with Soviet leaders. This decision—which was probably taken contrary to Chinese desires—was balanced by a simultaneous talk with the Chinese charge and subsequent announcement that a PKI delegation would be coming to China for consultations. In fact, Aidit headed both missions, spending virtually all of July in the Soviet Union and going on to Peking in August. Thus in the 12 weeks immediately preceding the events of 1 October and the resulting catastrophe for the PKI, the PKI's leader spent about half of his time away from Indonesia conferring with the Soviet and Chinese leaderships.

There is little good information available about Aidit's talks in the Soviet Union, and virtually none about his talks in China. After Aidit had finally departed the USSR, Pravda on 1 August tersely noted only that there had been an "exchange of views" between him and Brezhnev, Suslov, and Ponomarev on the international situation, on the international Communist movement, and on questions of interparty relations. The fact that Pravda did not choose to characterize either the talks or the atmosphere in which they took place suggested at the time that arguments had taken place, and that relations between the two parties remained cold, although not publicly hostile.

One may speculate that likely subjects of discussion were CPSU allegations of Chinese obstruction of Soviet aid shipments to Vietnam; CPSU demands for "unity of action" regarding Vietnam and charges

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*There has long been evidence to suggest that differences existed within the PKI leadership both with regard to domestic policy and with respect to the precise line to be taken toward the CPSU and the CCP. Aidit had appeared both less rigid about the Soviets and less obsequious toward the Chinese than, say, Lukman, the second-ranking PKI leader.
that the Chinese were preventing such unity; Soviet desire that the PKI--and Indonesia--cease supporting Chinese opposition to Soviet participation in the Second Bandung conference now scheduled for November; Soviet unhappiness at Indonesia's withdrawal from the United Nations and the PKI support for that withdrawal; Aidit's apparent desire that the USSR not only participate in Sukarno's project of a Conference of New Emerging Forces (Conefo) but also help turn it into a new "forum" to substitute for and compete with the United Nations;* and asserted complaints by Aidit

*On 21 July Aidit made a side-trip to Bucharest to attend the Ninth Congress of the Rumanian party, and there made a speech in which he used polemical language to defend this view of Conefo's future against objections which the Soviets had apparently raised. Describing Conefo as "a conference of socialist countries, anti-imperialist nonsocialist countries, and progressive forces in the capitalist countries," he insisted that "the Conefo idea not only is not opposed to, but is in full accord with, the Leninist view." (Emphasis added) He went on:

In 1922, when there was only one socialist country in the world...and when the League of Nations was an imperialist tool, Lenin had high regard for the idea of comrade Chicherin to hold a world congress, which would mean the introduction of something new in modern international forums, to prevent the transformation of this body into a tool of imperialism. In this world congress "could participate not only representatives of states but also representatives of colonized people and workers' class organizations." The Conefo concept contains the essence of this world congress idea... It will be a very good forum to unify the anti-imperialist forces throughout the world....

In taking this line, however, Aidit was primarily supporting Sukarno's views, rather than those of the CCP; while the Chinese were supporting the Conefo conference, it is doubtful that they had committed themselves to an attempt to create an "anti-imperialist" rival to the United Nations.
over "revisionist" characteristics remaining in Soviet policy toward the United States and toward the world at large.

Later, not long after the 1 October abortive coup, one important Soviet official confirmed privately that Aidit's conversations with Brezhnev and Suslov in July had involved such recriminations against Soviet "revisionist" policies, particularly with regard to the underdeveloped world. The CPSU also later told the Indian party that Aidit had attacked as detrimental to the world movement the "building of Communism in the USSR alone"—that is, concentration on the economic development of the Soviet Union, avoidance of actions likely to produce a war which would threaten that development, and consequent downgrading of revolutionary violence in different parts of the world. And told that Aidit in the July talks had espoused the Maoist line that Asia, Africa, and Latin America represent the revolutionary "villages" of the world which would eventually overcome the "cities" of North America and Europe. (In fact, the Lin Piao September 1965 article claiming title to this metaphor had not yet appeared, but Aidit himself had invented the metaphor two years before.)

There is particularly scant information on what was said about the internal Indonesian scene during Aidit's last meeting with the CPSU leadership. After disaster had overtaken the PKI, the important Soviet official previously mentioned spoke scathingly in private about Aidit and his "fairy tale policies," implying not so much that the coup was a poor idea in itself as that it was predestined to fail because of poor PKI organization and leadership under Chinese influence. This Soviet official did not suggest that Aidit had directly broached the matter of the coming crisis while in Moscow in July; and it seems on the face of it unlikely (even if the PKI was already contemplating the coup, itself uncertain) that Aidit would have trusted the CPSU with details of its desires and intentions, particularly in view of the hostile activities the Soviets had
been carrying out against the PKI only seven or eight months before.* But it seems likely that domestic Indonesian policy was discussed in some fashion. In early August 1965, soon after Aidit's departure from the USSR, a source reported that Aidit had stated in a lecture at the CPSU Higher Party School that if the PKI were to follow the Soviet line, this would be tantamount to giving up the struggle in Indonesia. There was no explanation of precisely what Aidit meant by this. It is conceivable that the Soviets may have privately remonstrated against PKI pressure on Sukarno for the arms training of workers and peasants—the creation of a so-called "fifth force"—on the grounds that such pressure was adventurist; there is no evidence to confirm this speculation.

In early August, as Aidit went off to China, PKI-CPSU relations seem not to have been changed appreciably by Aidit's visit to the Soviet Union. Fundamental disagreements remained on many subjects and a cold atmosphere prevailed, but it remained PKI policy to work to strengthen unity in the movement and to maintain and even "further develop" contacts with the CPSU and its friends, as a PKI joint communique with the Bulgarians stated on 31 July. Aidit had in the past several times alluded to the post-Khrushchev CPSU leadership as being still "one-third or half revisionist" but he had apparently by no means given up hope for them, even after his acrimonious discussions with them in July. Had Aidit remained alive and the PKI escaped disaster, it is likely that the further evolution of Chinese policy toward the movement into greater and greater extremes of intransigence would have created increasing problems for PKI-CCP relations, as it did for Chinese relations with the Japanese party.

*See Part I, page 52.
Soviet Union.* (The Chinese by then had made it clear that they did not.) The deputy minister added, however, that even after Pham's visit the Soviet position was still not clear to the DRV, and that "further observations" were needed badly. He expressed puzzlement at claims by Brezhnev and Kosygin that there would be no change in Soviet policy, and hypothesized that such statements were a "domestic political move for the transition period, since Khrushchev's policies have taken root for ten years, and it is difficult to make radical changes quickly."** As will be noted,

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*The North Vietnamese were probably all the more anxious for a rapprochement with the USSR because of the degree to which their past isolation from the Soviets had made them vulnerable to uncompensated Chinese pressures. In August and September 1964 DRV representatives were concerned to assert the independence and originality of North Vietnamese theory and practice (implicitly, independence from Maoist doctrine), and in December the Chinese were to reassert Mao's claim to exclusive originality in revolutionary theory. This dispute over CCP pretensions to have provided the decisive guidelines and inspiration for the Lao Dong party--as for everyone else--has gone on ever since. (See DDI Intelligence Memorandum, "Peiping-Hanoi Differences over Doctrine and Strategy for the Viet Cong," RSS No. 0006/65, 2 April 1965.)

**Seventeen months later, in April 1966, an important DRV official told a high-level Viet Cong gathering that "we do not hold the view"--which he explicitly attributed to the Chinese--"that the Soviet leadership is as revisionist as the leadership under Khrushchev, or that it is somewhat more dangerous than Khrushchev." It was the North Vietnamese view, instead, "that the Soviet leadership still contains some revisionists, some indecisive elements, and also active elements."
V. Fall-Winter 1965-1966: Mao Draws Lines of Demarcation

In July 1965, at the Ninth Rumanian party congress, Brezhnev and Teng Hsiao-ping are reported to have held private talks, marked by violent disagreement; and these were the last personal contacts between leaders of the Soviet and Chinese parties to date. It is probable that these will be the last such contacts ever to be held between the two parties while Mao lives, for in the fall of 1965 Mao began to accelerate a process which was to lead to a virtual rupture of party relations with the CPSU the following spring. In the same period Mao began to draw ever firmer lines of demarcation between himself and all of erring humanity, and the Chinese party became increasingly estranged from all its former Communist allies and all the Communist neutrals who insisted on maintaining or improving relations with the CPSU and who thereby refused to demonstrate obedience to Mao's will. At the same time, Mao began to turn on the Chinese Communist party itself, and slowly unfolded an unprecedented campaign—still expanding 18 months later—to terrorize and purge in stages all CCP leaders at every level similarly suspected of being insufficiently obedient to his will. A steady succession of major Chinese disasters in dealings with the outside world appear to have not discouraged, but to have confirmed Mao in this increasingly paranoid approach to the universe. The three most important of these defeats in the fall of 1965 were the deflation of Chinese threats to intervene in the India-Pakistan war in September, the disastrous 30 September coup attempt in Indonesia and the subsequent decimation of the PKI, and the abandonment of the Second Bandung Conference in November as the result of Chinese inability to secure the exclusion of the USSR from participation. In each case, the Soviets have exploited the Chinese setback to further isolate Mao.

A. The Disastrous Fall of 1965

1. The Lin Piao Article on "People's War"

The month of September 1965 opened with the publication of Lin Piao's celebrated article "Long
Live the Victory of the People's War," in which Lin defied the United States to invade China, and closed with Chen Yi's remarkable press conference in which Chen loudly defied all of Mao's enemies to invade China simultaneously. In between, Mao's fortunes abroad had begun another drastic decline.

The publication of the Lin Piao article had multiple purposes. The first was to provide, on a suitable occasion (the 26th anniversary of the end of the war with Japan) an authoritative summary and restatement of Mao's views on the lessons of the Chinese revolution for the world revolution, and at the same time an aggressive trumpeting of Mao's insistence that these lessons are obligatory for all revolutionaries everywhere. Despite some lip service to the point that other peoples should "ponder and solve" their own problems of revolution, the overwhelming burden of the article was that Mao's interpretation of Chinese experience had provided the detailed blueprint which all the revolutionary peoples of the "world village" (Asia, Africa, and Latin America) should use--and allegedly were in fact already using--to defeat the United States on a global scale and thus produce the liberation of the "world city" (North America and Western Europe). Lin's article was larded with references to specific details of Mao's revolutionary practice as "universal truths of Marxism-Leninism."

The second purpose of Lin's article was to emphasize that it had been Mao, and no one else, who had discovered and elaborated all the revolutionary truths expounded in the article. Lin pounded home the point that the concepts of "people's war" and "people's army" (phrases which in past years had been associated more closely with the title of General Giap's book than with Mao's writings) were Mao's own, and were universally applicable because it was Mao who had invented them. Similarly, Lin conveyed the impression that the famous metaphor about the world village and world city was Mao's, whereas in fact it was coined by Aidit in 1963, and the Chinese (including Peng Chen during his visit to Djakarta in May-June 1965) had up until now given Aidit credit for this.
In short, Lin's article was a major step in projecting Mao's cult, as well as his ideas, further on the world scene.

Thirdly, Lin's article had importance for the situation within the Chinese Communist party, and the purges soon to be unleashed by Mao. On the one hand, the publication of this major document bearing Lin's name was a further increment to his stature by Mao, and a presage of additional increments; it is clear now, in view of what was to happen over the next year, culminating in Liu Shao-chi's replacement by Lin as Mao's heir, that in September 1965 Liu could not have been overjoyed at the article's appearance. At the same time, at least one of the passages in the article may have been aimed at Lo Jui-ching, who apparently had been a rival of Lin's within the Defense Ministry for several years, and who was purged three months later. This passage attacked the Khrushchev revisionists' "line in army building," which allegedly "ignores the human factor and sees only the material factor and which regards technique as everything and politics as nothing." It will be seen later that one of the charges made against Lo after his fall has implied that he had sought to minimize the disruption of army training caused by lengthy political indoctrination and excessive use of troops for productive labor--both facets of Mao's practice highly praised by Lin.

2. Soviet-Chinese-American Interaction During The India-Pakistan War

a. The Peculiar Soviet Dilemma

Chinese and U.S. conduct during the brief undeclared war between India and Pakistan in September 1965 put to considerable strain the general, worldwide Soviet policy of focusing all public attacks upon the United States as the central enemy of mankind responsible for all "aggression" everywhere, while avoiding specific attacks upon Communist China and lamenting in Chinese conduct only Peking's unwillingness to join the USSR in a united front against the perfidious activities of the United States. It
was very awkward to try to make the events of September 1965 fit this caricature of the world, since it was the Chinese who were sending ultimatums to India and publicly denouncing the very Soviet efforts to promote a cease-fire with which the United States was in public agreement.

The Soviets heroically surmounted this difficulty, however, and managed to have their cake and eat it, too: there were no direct Soviet attacks on the Chinese or explicit Soviet admission that it was Peking, rather than Washington, which was behaving aggressively; on the other hand, there was some reportage of Chinese assertions and several indirect public Soviet condemnations of "incendiary statements" which the reader knew to be Chinese, always coupled with admonitions that such behavior only served the interests of U.S. imperialism, the real enemy of the Indian and Pakistani people.

Similarly, while the USSR was cooperating with the United States at the United Nations to help bring about a cease-fire, Soviet propaganda broadcasts to the subcontinent were claiming that the United States had instigated the war and wished to have it continue, and the KGB apparently planted a report to this effect in the Indian and British press. This extraordinary dual Soviet posture regarding the United States and China—in publicly falsifying the U.S. position in terms more appropriate to the Chinese position while privately working parallel with the U.S. to frustrate Chinese efforts—was determined not only by the world-wide requirements of Soviet policy but also by the fact that the main Soviet rival for influence in India is, after all, the United States and not Communist China.

Meanwhile, because the United States was in fact seeking to end the war, it adopted a publicly neutral stance and halted military shipments to both countries, incurring on both counts resentment in India and anger in Pakistan. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, incurred less anger than the United States in Pakistan despite a public Soviet position leaning slightly toward India; at the same time, the
USSR reaped a large propaganda harvest in India as India's only true friend. The Soviets earned great credit in India for past military aid delivered or promised, despite the fact that no new military equipment was shipped from the USSR either, during the fighting; and they similarly earned credit for rebuking the Chinese despite the fact that the Soviet Union, because of more important interests in the Far East, was unwilling to criticize the Chinese by name for their threats to India. In short, Soviet diplomatic, covert, and propaganda activities were coordinated with great skill to help secure immediate objectives while obscuring incompatible elements in Soviet policy.

Before India on 6 September finally unleashed a general attack on West Pakistan in response to Pakistan's policy of infiltrating and supporting rebels in Kashmir, the USSR in August had taken only a vaguely neutral line regarding the Kashmir fighting, urging restraint on both sides and blaming only the United States. This was the position taken in a 24 August Pravda Observer article, and again in a 4 September Pravda summary of an Indian Communist resolution in which Pravda omitted everything indicating support for the Indian government over Kashmir, quoting only passages calling for peace between the two countries. This attitude was in line with Soviet efforts at the time to cultivate Pakistan so far as possible without jeopardizing the great Soviet investment in India. After the Indian 6 September invasion, and the start of outright war, this position gradually became less tenable for the Soviets, and the wording of Soviet news accounts and the several official statements professing Soviet good offices for the settlement of the dispute began to favor the Indian side subtly but perceptibly.

Meanwhile, Communist China from the first had of course opposed its Indian enemy and sided with Pakistan regarding the Kashmir infiltrators; the Chinese were presumably all the more ready to take this line because of the obvious similarities between what the Pakistan government was doing and what was being done in South Vietnam by direction
of the DRV and in Thailand at North Vietnamese and Chinese instigation. After the Indian government finally responded to the infiltration with a general attack on 6 September, the Chinese government the next day issued a statement defending the Pakistanis and denouncing the Indians and their putative supporters—the United Nations, the United States, and the "modern revisionists." In the next week, as Soviet TASS statements and press articles sought with increasing vigor to dampen the conflict and to reprove somebody's "inciting statements," the Chinese became increasingly explicit and shrill in condemnation of the U.S.-Soviet-Indian imperialist plot.

b. The Chinese Ultimatum and Its Consequences

The climax came in the week beginning 16 September, during which a number of important events occurred in close succession, some publicly, others in secret.

First, in the early morning of 17 September the Chinese government handed the Indians a note dated the 16th containing an ultimatum: the Indians were to dismantle within three days installations alleged to have been erected in the Sikkim area on the Chinese side of the border or on the border, or unpleasant unspecified consequences would result. The implication was that the Chinese might attack through Sikkim down the vulnerable Chumbi valley to cut off all the eastern Indian forces in Assam. Whether or not any such drastic action was ever contemplated, the Chinese note was evidently intended, by frightening the Indians, to demonstrate to the world Chinese ability to affect the course of the struggle between India and Pakistan despite the wishes of Peking's two chief enemies, the United States and the Soviet Union.

Second, on 17 September Kosygin sent new letters to Shastri and Ayub Khan (published three days later) renewing previous offers of Soviet good offices and proposing for the first time that negotiations take place in Tashkent or another Soviet city. The letter to Shastri recalled an earlier TASS "warning to those who are not loath to extract profit from India-Pakistan relations."
Third, the next morning, 18 September, People's Daily appeared with an editorial attacking the "Soviet leaders" as willing pawns of the United States in the most direct and strongest fashion yet. The editorial focused particularly on past implied Soviet press criticism of Chinese incendiary behavior to which People's Daily had not previously reacted in this fashion. It seems possible that the Chinese had gotten wind of the 17 September Kosygin letters, interpreted them as a first Soviet counter to the Chinese ultimatum to India, and were now escalating their attacks on the Soviets to back up their ultimatum.

c. The Secret Soviet Warning to China

Fourth, on 18 September the CPSU dispatched an urgent secret letter to the Chinese Communist party. The date that this letter was received and read by the Chinese leaders is unknown, but it seems reasonable, under the circumstances, to assume that this occurred either on the 18th or on the 19th. No hint of the existence of this letter has ever been made public. We have only an incomplete version of the CPSU letter, but we also have the reply which the Chinese party sent to the CPSU a month later, after the crisis was over; some of the main points made by the CPSU can be filled in from allusions made by the Chinese.

(1) The overall theme of the Soviet letter was an expression of alarm at the spreading India-Pakistan hostilities, of sorrow at the alleged aid and comfort this was giving the United States, and of indignation at the role the Chinese had assumed. According to the Chinese reply, "the Soviet Union answers the question 'Who is or is not in the right?' in a very one-sided manner" in "recognizing India as the attacked." The Chinese said that "there is a serious difference of opinion between us on this point," and that the CCP held that the conflict was begun on the instigation of the United States and was caused and undertaken by India. It appears from this that the CPSU may (although this is not certain) have criticized Pakistan's sponsorship of the Kashmir infiltrators—if so, a very delicate
point for the CPSU to make, in view of the Soviet cultivation of the DRV, who were doing something similar.

(2) The CPSU letter cited a Chou-En-lai 24 February 1964 statement regarding the need for a peaceful solution of the Kashmir question—apparently, to demonstrate that the Chinese had previously endorsed the position the Soviets were now taking. (The Chinese reply maintained that the Soviets had quoted Chou out of context, as a "trick." )

(3) The CPSU letter paid due respect to the central Soviet line, the need for "unity of action" against the United States. According to the Chinese, the Soviets professed to be "saddened" by the Chinese viewpoint, and the CPSU spoke "shamelessly" about "the struggle against the main enemy, American imperialism." (The Chinese reply said that in fact, the Soviet Union was a friend of American imperialism, and that the Soviet request in the letter for a "united stand" was a request for Chinese cooperation with Soviet-American cooperation.)*

(4) The CPSU letter is said by Peking to have attacked the Chinese government ultimatum note of 16 September as having "further complicated the matter." (The Chinese reply asserted that instead of condemning India because the Chinese were in the right, the Soviet Union had reproached China, "sowing confusion.")

(5) The most important point in the CPSU letter appears to have been a warning of some sort to the Chinese about the danger of American intervention if the Chinese followed through on their 16 September

*A CPSU message to other parties later confirmed that the CPSU Central Committee had "called upon the central committee of the Communist party of China to take a unified position with respect to the Indo-Pakistani conflict," and added that "in reply, the Chinese leaders stated: 'This will never happen.'"
ultimatum. The chief evidence that such a warning was made is in the CCP reply: "You attempted to make us afraid with a threat about the United States. We are not afraid of them." The Chinese added (writing in October) that "in fact, the Indian reactionaries retreated in panic"—i.e., implying that the Chinese ultimatum had created no real risk of U.S. intervention, since the Indians were bound to yield to the ultimatum, removing any necessity for the Chinese to take any military action likely to lead to U.S. intervention.*

Obviously related to this Soviet "threat" was the question of the Sino-Soviet military alliance, although this apparently was not explicitly mentioned. In the context of Soviet policy toward India, a Soviet intimation to the CCP that a Chinese attack on India could bring Peking war with the United States would also carry at least the clear implication that the Chinese would be alone in such a war, with all its possible consequences. Only three months later, the Chinese were to ridicule the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Alliance in another secret letter to the CPSU, asking the Soviets sarcastically "in what drawer" they had put the treaty. It is fairly likely that the CCP was then alluding not only to the general deterioration of the Sino-Soviet relationship but also to the CPSU 18 September letter.

It is also quite conceivable—although there is no clear evidence—that the Soviet 18 September letter to the Chinese deliberately exaggerated the likelihood of U.S. intervention beyond what the USSR itself thought was likely, in order better to deter the Chinese from action of any kind on their ultimatum to India. The Soviets may well have leaned heavily on the "threat" the Chinese say they made if only because this cost them nothing and involved

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*In fact, as will be seen, it is by no means certain that the Indians did yield, i.e., did dismantle any fortifications. It is quite possible, although not certain, that there were no such fortifications.
absolutely no risk to the Soviet Union; the USSR could afford to be far more cavalier about brandishing United States nuclear power at Mao Tse-tung during the crisis than the U.S. thought suitable for itself. It is noteworthy, in this connection, that on 18 September Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin, who had just returned from Moscow, called upon Ambassador Thompson in Washington, apparently with the primary purpose of asking whether anything had been said in Sino-U.S. talks held in Warsaw on 15 September which might have had any connection with the 16 September Chinese ultimatum. Dobrynin was probably really anxious to know if the United States had said anything (whether before the ultimatum was decided on or afterward) to weaken the credibility of a private Soviet suggestion to the Chinese that the United States would respond forcefully to any new Chinese military initiative against India--the suggestion apparently made in the 18 September CPSU letter. It is quite likely that Dobrynin had in fact been consulted during the drafting of this letter by Andropov's section of the CPSU central committee.

d. The Chinese Ultimatum Withers Away

On the night of 19 September, the Chinese government handed the Indians a new note extending its ultimatum for the dismantling of Indian "military works of aggression" an additional three days, until midnight 22 September. This was the initial step in a Chinese climb down from the military threat to India implied on 16 September. It is likely that the Chinese began to back down under heavy pressure from the Pakistan government, which was deeply concerned lest the United States be drawn into the conflict on the Indian side as the result of precipitate Chinese action. President Ayub told the U.S. ambassador on 21 September that twice in recent days Pakistan had asked the Chinese not to intervene. It is also conceivable, however, that the Chinese were also influenced at least marginally by the CPSU letter to them: that is, that the Chinese attached at least some credence to Soviet warnings about the likelihood of a U.S. response to Chinese intervention. It may be significant, in this connection,
that the Chinese October reply to the CPSU 18 September letter, while denouncing the Soviet attempt to "frighten" the CPR, apparently did not claim that the Soviets had misrepresented U.S. intentions.

On 22 September, a ceasefire went into effect between India and Pakistan; and the Chinese perforce allowed their new deadline to pass at midnight that day without taking any action. Instead, People's Daily on the same day announced that the Indians had stealthily complied with the Chinese demands to destroy their alleged "military works," and the Chinese subsequently stuck to this story resolutely despite Indian denials that they had done anything of the kind. While the truth cannot be reliably established, it would at the very least have been a remarkable coincidence if the Indians had acted in the nick of time to save the Chinese face on the eve of a ceasefire which was about to make Chinese intervention politically impractical anyway. It thus seems most likely that the Chinese at the last minute invented the account of Indian compliance to escape from the embarrassment created for their ultimatum by the ceasefire.

It is entirely possible--even probable--that Peking from the start never intended to mount a serious invasion of India, but merely intended to demonstrate its ability to render help to Pakistan by frightening and distracting the Indians (as the Chinese ultimatum did in fact do). It is unlikely, however, that the Chinese, having issued a public ultimatum with a time limit, expected their scenario to end in the undignified fashion it did; it is more likely that they expected to take some limited military action in the Sikkim border passes which could be represented as accomplishing the destruction of the alleged Indian installations, and the aftermath of which would serve to keep pressure on the Indians indefinitely. The Chinese evidently did not expect the Pakistanis to take the position they did, first in asking the Chinese to refrain from any action, and then in agreeing to a ceasefire. To the degree that Soviet pressures on Pakistan and India helped to force the cease-fire, they also helped to undermine the Chinese pose of resolute belligerence.
The Soviet secret letter to the Chinese "attempting to make us afraid with a threat about the United States" was the other half of the Soviet effort to the same end.

The net effect was to make the CPR look somewhat ridiculous; the widespread impression was created—and was duly recorded in the world press—that the Chinese had been outmaneuvered by the Soviet Union and the United States and had been forced to back down. It is quite possible that this episode had something to do with the convocation on 29 September (eleven days after the sending of the CPSU letter and seven days after the cease-fire) of the remarkable press conference at which Foreign Minister Chen Yi bombastically defied Moscow and Washington and dared all of China's enemies to invade the CPR, "the sooner the better."

3. The Indonesian Catastrophe
   a. Consequences of the 30 September Disaster

   Hard on the heels of this embarrassing end to the Chinese adventure regarding the India-Pakistan war came the greatest disaster ever to befall Chinese Communist foreign policy and the greatest single loss ever suffered by the CCP in the Sino-Soviet struggle. This was the failure of the 30 September 1965 coup in Djakarta and all its eventual consequences. The most important of these included:

   --The undermining and destruction of Sukarno's power by the Indonesian military leaders;

   --The virtual liquidation of the central PKI apparatus, the elimination of virtually all its top leadership, and the eradication of its overt influence on Indonesian political life. The largest non-bloc party in the world—and the most important such party to have sided with the CCP against the CPSU—was thus driven deep underground, much of its membership killed, its organization very badly disrupted, its voice in international Communist councils silenced, and many of its surviving cadres now increasingly susceptible to Soviet anti-CCP propaganda.

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Almost as important was the destruction of the PKI front organizations--particularly SOBSI, the PKI's huge trade union federation, which for years had been the most important champion of the Chinese viewpoint at meetings of the Soviet-run World Federation of Trade Unions, and which had once been the nucleus of an abortive Chinese attempt to found their own competing Afro-Asian trade union organization.

--The destruction of the Peking-Djakarta axis and the total reorientation of Indonesian foreign policy, transforming this nation of one hundred million--the CPR's most valuable ally--into another member of the ring of hostile states surrounding China.

--The loss of Indonesia as a base for Chinese-run international front organizations, such as the Afro-Asian Journalists Association and the Afro-Asian Writers Association.

The Chinese catastrophe in Indonesia in 1965--and the sudden elimination of what had been generally thought to be the increasingly likely prospect of Communist domination of the sixth largest country in the world in the next few years--was one of the half-dozen most important events of the post-war period. It had innumerable additional side-effects helpful to the United States or to the Soviet Union or both. The Chinese Communist crusade against the United Nations lost its most important recruit. The Indonesian campaign to "crush" Malaysia was ended. The Indonesian hostile attitude against China's enemy India was reversed. Anti-Western Sukarno projects such as CONEPO were abandoned. Peking's ability to protect Overseas Chinese populations in Asia was placed in public doubt as the result of the CPR's inability to halt persecution of the Chinese minority in Indonesia.

From the Soviet point of view, the most helpful side-effect of all was the fact that many Communist leaders, in Asia and elsewhere, needed no Soviet urging to leap to the conclusion that the Chinese had instigated the attempted coup; the most natural reaction for the conspiratorial mind of many a party leader was to take this for granted.
The Soviets did their best in their private comments around the world to encourage this view of the cause of the PKI's disaster and to point the moral that this was a fate which could envelop any party that listened to the Chinese. As will be seen, the attitude of the North Korean and Japanese party leaderships toward the CCP was especially affected by their belief in Chinese responsibility for the PKI's calamity.

b. The Question of the Chinese Role

While the Chinese indeed bore an important part of the responsibility for the chain of events that produced the coup, it is still uncertain whether they instigated the coup attempt itself as it materialized.*

There appear to have been two great factors, steadily growing in importance throughout 1965, which were creating the basis for a violent explosion. The first was the question of the creation of an armed force in Indonesia which would take the side of the PKI when the eventual death of Sukarno precipitated the inevitable PKI showdown with the anti-Communist army leaders. The second was the question of the apparent rapid deterioration of Sukarno's health, which seemed to everyone concerned (particularly after mid-summer) to have gone so far that Sukarno's death and the showdown could come without warning at any time: and this, in turn, made the issue of the formation of a leftist-oriented armed force all the more pressing (to the PKI and the Chinese) or all the more alarming (to the army).

Both the PKI and the Chinese had for several months been urging Sukarno, both publicly and privately, to permit the training and arming of workers and peasants—the so-called "fifth force." The army

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*The generalizations set forth here are highly tentative, and may be modified by the findings of a major study of the PKI and the 30 September coup to be published as a DDI/RS report later this year.
had been pressing Sukarno to refuse. Sukarno had
withheld permission, hesitating under the army pres-
sure (and perhaps also because of misgivings of his
own about possible dangers to his own position
arising from this step); and then at last he was to
yield to the Chinese and PKI urgings by endorsing
the principle of the fifth force publicly in August
and by privately approving the beginning of worker-
peasant arms training (in fact, training of PKI
cadres) in September.

At the end of the first week of August,
Aidit came back to Indonesia after spending only a
few days in China (as compared with nearly a month
spent in the Soviet Union). There is every reason
to believe that his visit was cut short; and it has
been credibly reported that Aidit was called home
because of the worsening state of Sukarno's health.
A team of Chinese doctors soon thereafter arrived
to examine and treat Sukarno, and is reported to
have given a pessimistic prognosis; the PKI leader-
ship is said to have then issued special instruc-
tions to the party to prepare for the possible death
or incapacitation of Sukarno.

In the latter half of August, Chen Yi ar-
ived in Djakarta for talks with Sukarno, and is
reported to have renewed Chinese exhortations for
the establishment of a worker-peasant militia or
"fifth force" to supplement and, apparently, eventu-
ally to supplant the army. A Chinese decision
to press Sukarno harder on this point would follow
naturally from the doctors' report just received.
Moreover, it had long been Chinese Communist doc-
trine, based on the CCP's own experience, inces-
santly recounted to its adherents around the world,
that a Communist party could not hope to survive
and grow in strength--let alone eventually to win
power--without both an underground apparatus and a
powerful armed force at its own disposal. Finally,
it was at just this moment--in August 1965--that
other Chinese leaders in Peking were telling a
visiting Japanese Communist delegation of the urgent
need for the JCP to build up a paramilitary under-
ground apparatus and prepare for guerrilla warfare
and other violent resistance to the Japanese govern-
ment.
In other words, there seems to have been both (a) a generalized Chinese desire for Asian parties sympathetic to the CCP to accelerate military preparations against the possibility of a Chinese clash with the United States in the next few years, and (b) a specific Chinese anxiety to help the PKI do this because of the crisis building up in Djakarta in connection with Sukarno's reported deteriorating health. Chinese preoccupation with the Indonesian military training issue was demonstrated as late as 30 September, on the very eve of the coup, when Mao Tse-tung is reported to have lectured a visiting Indonesian government delegation on the need for "all the leaders" to have "training as soldiers."

Army worry about the PKI and Chinese pressure on Sukarno regarding worker-peasant training was compounded by reports—which began to be received as early as April 1965 and which continued through September—of Chinese covert small arms shipments to Indonesia. The landing of arms is reported to have occurred both in Djakarta and at other Java cities; the Chinese embassy is supposed to have used its diplomatic facilities for this traffic, and there were also a number of reports that such arms were being smuggled in from China with construction materials being imported for Sukarno's CONEFO project. While the army had an obvious reason to disseminate such reports in exaggerated form publicly after the coup to discredit the Chinese and the PKI, it seems likely that some credence was attached to them by the army before the coup.

It was also reported before the coup that Dani, the leftist Air Force commander who was to be one of the central figures in the coup attempt, had made a secret trip to Peking in mid-September, supposedly to arrange to ship Indonesian fighter planes to Pakistan via China. The Army in February 1967 publicly asserted that in reality Dani had made this trip at Sukarno's behest, without consulting with other leaders of the armed forces, to arrange for further Chinese small arms shipments to Indonesia. It is a fact that some of the Air Force arms used by leftist coup forces at Halim Air Force Base on
1 October were of Chinese origin, although it is difficult to determine when they reached Indonesia.

A picture thus emerges of undisguised heavy PKI and Chinese pressure on Sukarno to begin small arms training for peasants and workers, of some clandestine Chinese arms shipments to Sukarno's leftist Air Force, and of reports reaching the Army about these shipments. The Army leadership had set up a private Council of Generals in the spring to consult about this situation, but there is no good evidence to demonstrate that the Council was planning to do anything drastic on 5 October, as the Communists have alleged. Only a beginning had yet been made toward creating an armed force of workers and peasants that could stand up to the Army after Sukarno's death, and some time would elapse before such a force became a serious threat itself. (A more serious threat always had been and remained that of leftist disaffection within units of the Army itself.) Over the long term, the prospects for the anti-Communist army leadership were indeed gloomy, as the PKI continued to entrench itself with the aid of the continued leftist drift of Sukarno's policies; but the short-term danger raised by the possibility of Sukarno's imminent demise was not to the army but rather to the PKI and the pro-Communist leaders such as Dani clustered around Sukarno--the danger being that Sukarno would die too soon, before the PKI and its friends had consolidated a position which would guarantee victory over the army in the subsequent showdown. The best evidence suggesting that the top Army leaders were not contemplating any preemptive action on 5 October was the fact that nearly all of them were seized for slaughter so easily in their beds at home on the night of 30 September; it seems unlikely that men plotting a coup would not have taken any elementary precautions to protect themselves a few days beforehand--particularly after Sukarno had already told them he suspected them.

There is good evidence, however, that the PKI leadership, both directly and through the medium of its friends in leftist Foreign Minister
Subandrio's intelligence organization, the BPI, repeatedly attempted to persuade Sukarno in August and September that the army was indeed plotting a coup. (It is possible, although there is no evidence on this point, that the Chinese aided the PKI in this effort—conceivably when Chen Yi visited Sukarno in late August). The PKI's motives for attempting to frighten Sukarno were probably mixed. It is quite possible, as some reports suggest, that the PKI itself was genuinely apprehensive of the army's intentions, merely because of the overall situation and the PKI's knowledge of the meetings of the Council of Generals. A more important reason, however, was the PKI's urgent need (urgent because of Sukarno's dangerous state of health) to convince Sukarno quickly that the army leaders represented a serious threat to him, and that he should do something about it. One thing that Sukarno could do would be to open the door to the most rapid possible training and arming of a force of workers and peasants, as the PKI desired. This at last was begun in September; but it would, however, take time, during which a supposedly coup-minded army leadership would have both provocation and opportunity to act. Another thing that Sukarno could do would be to remove the most dangerous army leaders from office, by one means or another. However, a slow, piecemeal transfer or replacement of individual generals, one by one—which would be Sukarno's normal method of operation—might only precipitate a coup, if the army were actually now contemplating one; moreover, there would not be enough time in any case if the army was already plotting to act on 5 October. This left only an attempt at violent removal of the entire top army leadership; and this is what transpired.

Thus the line taken by the PKI in August and September had the effect of compelling Sukarno, bit by bit, toward a final decision to take drastic action. It is difficult to imagine that Aidit did not foresee and desire violent consequences flowing from the warnings of a coming army coup with which Sukarno was being bombarded. The PKI through its warnings was plainly seeking to induce Sukarno to act; and it was Sukarno on whom the PKI vainly
attempted to rely to protect it from the subsequent adverse consequences. The best evidence suggests that after some preliminary planning and hesitation Sukarno made his final decision to liquidate the dangerous generals at the last minute, not more than a few days at most before 30 September;* that the PKI, after Sukarno had made his final decision, used both leftist-inclined military units and manpower from its own front organizations, as previously arranged, to help carry it out, and endorsed the purge in Harian Rakjat; and that when Nasution escaped and the army under Suharto counterattacked, Sukarno got cold feet and backed out of public identification with the purge, leaving the PKI exposed to terrible retribution. The Albanian Zeri i Popullit a year later publicly criticized the PKI for this apparently fatuous reliance upon Sukarno. Were Aidit still alive then, he might have replied that he had had no choice: that there was apparently an urgent need to act (both because of Sukarno's supposed imminent demise and the army's supposed imminent coup),** but that while Sukarno remained alive it was out of the question for the PKI to attempt an uprising without his permission and outside of his control.

The evidence is less clear as to whether the Chinese approved the purge in the form in which it

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*Only one week before, Sukarno for the second time confronted General Yani, the army commander who was one of the subsequent victims, with the allegations of army coup plotting, and received what must have seemed an evasive answer. It is unlikely that Sukarno would have done this--giving the army this forewarning--if he had already made up his mind to have Yani killed, or even arrested.

**Ironically, one of these crucial suppositions was certainly incorrect, and the other probably so.
was attempted. It should be noted immediately that since the real decision was probably Sukarno's, Chinese views were in any case only tangentially important, to the degree that they influenced Sukarno either directly or through the pressures and alarms brought to Sukarno by the PKI. What is known is that Peking was working with the PKI to persuade Sukarno to create a new armed force by training peasants and workers; it is less certain, although quite possible, that the Chinese were also, like the PKI, attempting to frighten Sukarno into precipitate action with allegations about an army coup plot. It seems likely that the Chinese had been smuggling some small arms into Indonesia for several months, and that some of these arms were then given by the Air Force to leftist forces to be used on 30 September; but this is insufficient evidence to support the conclusion that the Chinese knew when they sent the arms to Indonesia of a specific occasion on which the arms were to be used. In the absence of other evidence, it seems more likely that this was part of a generalized slow buildup of a leftist armed potential which the Chinese were aiding side by side with the efforts to persuade Sukarno to train the workers and peasants—both looking toward an indefinite, eventual clash with the army. It is significant in this connection that reports of Chinese arms shipments began to be received long before the PKI had even begun to try to frighten Sukarno into action against the army; and if Sukarno's final decision was indeed taken only within the last few days, virtually all the arms shipments may have occurred before the Chinese could be sure he would act at all.

From the Chinese point of view, what the PKI did on the night of 30 September was to commit itself, not to an "armed struggle" on the CCP model (protracted warfare waged in the countryside by an armed force totally controlled by the party), but rather to an urban putsch, something the CCP is not
known ever to have sponsored abroad. This would probably not have mattered at all to the Chinese if they thought the opportunity suitable for such PKI action and the risks acceptable. A more important consideration, however, was that the PKI was risking its existence in helping to carry out this violent purge for Sukarno without controlling or dominating the forces involved—it was acting in subordination to Sukarno, at the mercy of his decisions and, as it turned out, of his betrayal. It is true that the Chinese would certainly welcome enthusiastically a successful purge by Sukarno of the anti-Communist army leadership. Moreover, it is of course conceivable that the CCP trusted Sukarno so well and was so impressed by the need for action—because of the imminent danger of Sukarno's death or an army coup or both—as to minimize or fail to realize the potential danger to the PKI if Sukarno were to back out after the PKI had committed itself. If the Chinese had had any doubts about Sukarno, however, they might well have questioned at least the wisdom of a public endorsement of the 30 September Movement by Harian Rakja before Sukarno had done so. There is still insufficient evidence to make a judgment on this matter.

*Other Communists had long categorized urban uprising—perhaps in oversimplified fashion—as something opposed to Mao's precepts for armed struggle in semi-colonial areas. In India in the late 1940's, for example, after urban insurrection had been attempted by the Indian Communist party with disastrous results, another faction seized control of the party with the explicit program of rejecting what was termed the "Soviet path" to power—urban uprising—in favor of what was publicly proclaimed to be the more suitable "Chinese path"—peasant guerrilla warfare in the countryside (i.e., in the Telengana district of southern India). See ESAU XVI-62, "The Indian Communist Party and the Sino-Soviet Dispute," ODI No. 0697/62, 7 February 1962."
On a few occasions since 30 September 1965, the Chinese and their friends have attempted to convey the impression that the PKI acted contrary to Chinese wishes. As already noted, the Albanians in 1966 publicly criticized the PKI for its "tailism" with regard to Sukarno. On 7 March 1966 a People's Daily article on the "twists and turns" of revolution referred to the "mistakes of one kind or another" which leaders of revolutions may make, and on 31 January 1967 NCNA quoted an Indonesian Communist as saying that the PKI had suffered because it did not apply closely enough Mao's principles "for dealing with domestic counterrevolutionaries and for launching a new type bourgeois democratic revolution." In November 1966, Adjitorop--a PKI politburo member who was in Peking at the time of the coup and has lived there ever since--explained to an Albanian party congress the PKI's mistake: the Indonesian "proletariat" (the PKI) had been allowed to assume "a position subordinate to the national bourgeoisie" (Sukarno). Adjitorop said that the PKI had now rectified its mistake and realized that power can only be attained by "armed revolution" led by the working class. (Emphasis added.) In other words, the PKI would never again place its fate in the hands of a non-Communist like Sukarno.

In addition, a rumor circulating in Peking in October 1965 to the effect that Mao Tse-tung, immediately after hearing news of the attempted coup, had supposedly cabled the PKI an "order" to call the whole thing off, thereby creating confusion in PKI ranks. And Chou En-lai is reliably reported to have claimed privately in 1966 that the downfall of the PKI had resulted from its failure to adhere to basic principles and its refusal to accept advice (presumably CCP advice.)

Unfortunately, all of these statements and rumors constitute a self-serving position which the Chinese would adopt whether or not they had previously approved what was attempted on 30 September. On balance, a Chinese direct role in what happened must be considered simply unproven, while major Chinese indirect responsibility is clear.
c. Subsequent Chinese and Soviet Reaction

Not long after the coup attempt, was told in China that Sukarno had known beforehand of the plot to murder the generals, that the PKI had not "inspired" the 30 September movement, but that the Chinese hoped Aidit would be able to turn the situation to the advantage of the PKI--if not, the PKI would be set back for many years. was informed that China was waiting to see what moves Sukarno would make before commenting, and that China was not sure which way Sukarno would turn.

This comment appears to have summarized the Chinese attitude fairly accurately. For 18 days Peking waited, hoping that Sukarno would find the courage--and the ability--to reassert enough control over the army to rescue the PKI and the Indonesian alliance with China from the campaign to destroy both which the army leaders had begun. During this period the Chinese embassy in Djakarta told local overseas Chinese to lie low, and Peking published nothing about events in Indonesia except for a telegram from Liu and Chou to Sukarno on 4 October expressing gratification that he was in good health (a gentle hint that they were counting on him). In this first week after the coup attempt, the Chinese could not bring themselves, however, to comply with the Indonesian desire that they fly their embassy flag at half-mast in tribute to the murdered generals, as the Soviets and most other foreign governments did;* and this refusal of course played into the hands of the army in its struggle with Sukarno over the direction events were to take.

It could be argued that this Chinese defiance--together with People's Daily's later insistence that

*The Cubans characteristically also refused, but the Indonesian army for good reasons concentrated its fire on Peking's refusal.
the murdered generals had been "executed" and its implicit endorsement of the 30 September movement--testified to direct Chinese complicity in the plot. This does not necessarily follow, however; the PKI had irrevocably exposed itself with its original endorsement of the 30 September movement's actions, and Mao may have been unwilling to take a position either implicitly or directly contradicting the PKI initial stand. More important, it would in any case be highly characteristic of Mao to refuse--whatever the consequences--to make a symbolic gesture (the lowering of his embassy's flag) which he would regard as flattering his dead enemies (the murdered generals) in order to appease his live ones (the army leaders busy exterminating the PKI leadership and attacking China).

On 19 October, after nearly three weeks, the Chinese gave up waiting for Sukarno, and NCNA released a long account of events in Indonesia since 30 September. This Chinese report described the communiqué issued by the Revolutionary Council of the 30th of September movement, the PKI's editorial endorsement of the communiqué and condemnation of the alleged planned generals' coup, and General Suharto's recovery of military control in Djakarta and initial attacks on the PKI. The NCNA account painted a picture of Sukarno attempting rather feebly to quiet things down and regain control of events, of the army openly contradicting him and ignoring his orders with impunity, and of Sukarno gradually making more and more concessions to the army position (e.g., by terming the "executed" generals "revolutionary heroes," by saying the establishment of the Revolutionary Council had been "incorrect," and by confirming Suharto at the head of the army in place of the leftist general whom Sukarno at first had attempted to install). In other words, the Chinese summary of events (a) came out squarely in opposition to the army leadership, especially Suharto; (b) strongly implied endorsement of the 30th of September movement and its actions; and (c) strongly implied that Sukarno since October 1 had proved a weak reed for the PKI to rely upon, and that in view of Sukarno's ineffective stand matters would probably get worse for the PKI and for
Sino-Indonesian relations.* The NCNA article concluded with a roundup of expressions of gratification in the West and with an attack on the Soviets for a 16 October Izvestiya article that had criticized the PKI for its initial support of the 30 September movement.

In the months that followed, as the army pursued the PKI on the one hand and fenced with Sukarno on the other hand in a long-drawn-out struggle to reduce his power, Sino-Indonesian relations indeed became more and more openly hostile. The CPR began to bombard Djakarta with angry Foreign Ministry notes protesting army-sponsored violations of Chinese diplomatic facilities and alleged mistreatment of overseas Chinese in Indonesia, and Chinese Communist editorials by 1966 were denouncing the "fascist military rule" in Indonesia. By the end of 1966, NCNA was calling openly for armed struggle (i.e., the adoption of guerrilla warfare by the PKI) against the army regime; but this was easier said than done.

The Soviet reaction to the Indonesian events, meanwhile, was remarkably hypocritical. Except for the momentary lapse with the 16 October Izvestiya article, the Soviets for the next year did not publicly criticize the PKI by name; on the other hand, they more than made up for that with private briefings for Communists around the world in which they

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*The Chinese account was perhaps a bit unfair to Sukarno, who did make strenuous efforts to bully and cow the generals as he had done so many times before, and in one notable private confrontation even attempted vainly to remove Suharto from his command for having ignored Sukarno's orders. This attempt failed because of the unprecedented cohesion of the Indonesian military leadership in defying Sukarno and in refusing to obey him on this and other matters of greatest importance. Sukarno--like many other observers--had not expected this; if he had, he might well have chosen not to betray the PKI on 1 October and might have thrown in his lot publicly with the 30th of September Movement, accepting civil war as his best chance under the circumstances.
repeatedly ridiculed the common sense of the PKI leadership (especially Aidit). In these briefings the CPSU always emphasized that the primary error of the PKI leaders—and the reason the PKI was in such desperate trouble now—was the fact that the PKI had listened to the Chinese. The CCP was responsible, according to the Soviets, for the attempted coup and for everything bad that had followed. As already noted, this Soviet message found wide acceptance.

On the other side of the coin, the Soviets fairly soon during the autumn of 1965 began publicly to weep copious tears for the PKI, and began to attack the Indonesian military leaders sharply, and fairly directly, for the massacre of PKI cadres. Soviet motives for doing this were mixed. The most important reason was to demonstrate to Communists being courted by the CPSU—particularly in the Far East—the depth of Soviet comradely concern for a persecuted fraternal party. The CPSU was predictably sensitive to the Chinese charges that the initial reporting of the Soviet press had sided with the military leaders against the PKI; and this probably had something to do with the evident Soviet decision not to repeat (for the time being) the direct criticism of PKI conduct made in the 16 October Izvestiya, and instead to concentrate on defending the prostrate PKI.* In

*The closest the Soviets came to such public criticism of the PKI for the next year was a statement in the 26 October 1965 Pravda editorial commenting on the Indonesian situation. Pravda said pointedly that "political adventurism, putschism, and sectarianism are alien to Marxism-Leninism." Much later, in the fall of 1966—in the context of the all-out anti-CCP campaign then being waged by the CPSU—the Soviets at last opened up with fairly direct criticism of the PKI's mistakes, and for the first time publicly charged that Chinese influence had led to the PKI's downfall. As a necessary protective accompaniment to this line, the CPSU then resumed low-keyed criticism of the suppression of leftist forces by the military, after having suspended such criticism through the summer of 1966.
addition, the Soviets were probably genuinely concerned at the growth of pro-Western tendencies in Indonesian policy as the PKI and its friends were purged and Sukarno's power progressively constricted; and the Soviets may have hoped to slow this trend through attacks on the military purge of leftists. Since Sukarno was forced to agree to formalize a major transfer of power to General Suharto in February 1966, the Soviets have concentrated on attempting to divide the army leadership.

4. The Bandung II Fiasco

The Chinese retreat from the ultimatum to India in September and the loss of Peking's Indonesian allies in October were accompanied by the total collapse of Chinese efforts to promote the isolation of the Soviet Union and the condemnation of the United States through the vehicle of a Second Bandung Conference, a second general summit meeting of Asian and African heads of state. This was the third great Chinese defeat in the fall of 1965.

The Chinese had been pressing for a second Bandung-type meeting since early 1964, and a major feature of public Sino-Soviet polemics in the last six months of Khrushchev's tenure was the question of Soviet participation in such a conference. The Chinese insisted that the Soviet Union's Asian territories did not qualify it as an Asian state to participate in the Afro-Asian conference; and the USSR insisted that they did. Both countries issued thunderous government statements on the issue, and both had representatives all over the world vigorously and rather openly applying pressure to secure votes. The issue became a monumental matter of prestige, particularly for the Chinese, who were, so to speak, "in possession" and attempting to bar the door to the Soviet intruder. If the Chinese had quietly assented in the first place to the Soviet request to participate, the conference would have been much less advantageous to Peking but might still have been fairly useful. But after the initiation of the titanic struggle over Soviet participation, the prospect of Chinese attendance at this conference with the Soviets apparently became more than Mao could bear.
At the first preparatory meeting for the conference, held in Djakarta in April 1964, the Chinese found it fairly easy—with the assistance of Sukarno and the PKI, who were running the meeting—to block an Indian proposal for Soviet participation, and also to block even a proposal that the question be referred to the conference itself to decide. The Chinese were unable to get an outright rejection of Soviet participation, but they managed to have the matter left in limbo, with the Soviets remaining outside trying to get in and the Chinese inside helping to dominate events. The Chinese press exulted over the April preparatory meeting, and claimed that the issue was settled.

The Chinese leaders, however, knew better. As already noted, in late November 1964, within six weeks after Khrushchev's removal, Chen Yi made a hurried visit to Djakarta to bolster Sukarno's will in view of the prospect of a renewed campaign by the new Soviet leadership for Soviet participation in Bandung II. In February and March 1965, Chinese representatives followed this up with a new round of exhortations of African leaders, concentrating particularly on the UAR and Algeria, whose influence was felt to be especially important.

China's intense cultivation of and reliance upon the Algerian regime—the host government for the conference, now scheduled for June 1965—led the Chinese into their first monumental blunder over Bandung II. When the Algerian army leader Boumediene overthrew Ben Bella shortly before the conference was to start, there was widespread shock in Africa, a general tendency to put off recognition of the new regime, and a wave of decisions by heads of state not to come to Algiers. It was the common expectation that the conference would have to be postponed.

But Mao would have none of this. At the last preparatory meeting in Algiers in early June the Algerians had been most helpful to the Chinese in repelling attempts to get the Soviets (and various controversial pro-Western Asian governments) into the conference. The Chinese foresaw a triumph for themselves in the conference with the cooperation of the
Algerian hosts: The Soviets would be excluded, the Indians and other moderates humiliated, and the United States excoriated. Peking was not to be cheated of this; therefore it hastened at once to recognize the Boumediene government (long before any Soviet bloc state did), much to the indignation of many African leaders. The Chinese followed this up by insisting that the conference be held as scheduled and by applying heavy pressure and insults to all who disagree—the great majority. After all this, the Chinese had to yield in the end anyway (as could easily have been foreseen);* and the Bandung II conference in Algiers was postponed until November. The Chinese press then lamely attempted to represent this decision as a great victory over imperialist attempts to kill the conference altogether.

In the aftermath of this experience, however, Chinese enthusiasm for the conference gradually began to cool during the summer of 1965. The Chinese began to hint privately in various places that it might be necessary to postpone the conference again if conditions for the conference proved unsatisfactory. What they meant by this was that it had begun to appear more and more (a) that they might not be able to keep the Soviets out of

*Chinese behavior on this occasion—stubborn entrenchment in an obviously untenable position, making the inevitable subsequent retreat much more ignominious—has been characteristic of many of Mao's actions in recent years. A similar example was the Chinese temporary obstruction of Soviet military aid to North Vietnam in the spring of 1965. Another was the revival of many of the worst features of the "great leap forward" in the fall of 1959—after the plain warnings offered by the events of 1958—only to lead to the humiliating economic policy retreats of 1961-1962. A third was the Chinese refusal to let Castro have the last word in a mounting polemic with him in January and February 1966, only to be followed by enforced Chinese silence under more humiliating circumstances in March because of the dire threat of a Cuban break in diplomatic relations.
the conference, and (b) that moderate sentiment among prospective participants was increasing to the point of reducing the likelihood that the conference would produce the sort of vehement anti-U.S. resolutions (on Vietnam and other matters) that the Chinese wanted. To a considerable extent, this unfavorable trend was the result of reaction to the ham-handed tactics previously used by the Chinese.

Between the beginning and the end of September 1965—that epoch-making month of Chinese disasters—the Chinese suspicion that they might have to try to scuttle the conference was converted into frantic determination to do so. In addition to all the other forces at work unfavorable to their interests, the Chinese now were shown the full power of the Soviet political leverage upon the key radical Arab and Black African states resulting from Soviet economic and military aid to those countries.

On 1 September, Nasser publicly stated in Moscow for the first time that the Soviet Union must be admitted to the conference. A week later, Chen Yi had a private confrontation in Algiers with Boumediene and Algerian Foreign Minister Bouteflika over the question of Soviet participation, only to be told that Algeria could not oppose Soviet admission to the conference because Algeria had received much aid from the USSR and expected to receive more in the future. Chen Yi also clashed with the Algerians over an invitation sent by them to U Thant to attend the conference and over Algerian unwillingness to denounce India over the India-Pakistan war. Thus the Chinese received their reward for their unseemly haste to recognize the new Algerian regime in June.

Chen Yi issued a private ultimatum to the Algerians to help block Soviet participation or face a Chinese boycott, and this threat was immediately reiterated publicly in a Chou En-lai interview with an Egyptian newsman in Peking, reported by NCNA. Next, Chen Yi received further setbacks in his effort to stave off Soviet admission to the conference when he visited Guinea and Mali after Algiers; both were now on the Soviet side of this issue.
By 29 September, Chou En-lai was telling an Indonesian government delegation that it would be best to postpone the conference until 1966; and the Chinese had all the more reason to think so a few days later, as it became apparent that the catastrophe in Djakarta was transforming the Indonesian regime—hitherto their staunchist ally in the Bandung II struggle—into another opponent on the question of admitting the Soviet Union and other issues.

Throughout October the Chinese fought with mounting vehemence to postpone the conference, and not merely until 1966, but indefinitely. In ludicrous and grotesque fashion, the Chinese position had now become completely reversed from what it had been in June. The insults that Chinese representatives in June had heaped on those who had opposed holding the conference, however, were far exceeded by the private vituperation used in October against those who wished to hold it. The Chinese now published open demands for cancellation coupled with repeated threats to boycott the conference if it were held. Before the Chinese finally won their point and were saved from the prospect of a conference held without them and with the Soviets, Chou En-lai had sent a circular message to all the heads of state concerned, Chinese propaganda had openly attacked the Algerians for their attitude, and a Chinese note had even apparently threatened formally to break off diplomatic relations with Algeria if the conference were held. After the conference was finally cancelled at the last minute (partly because of Algerian sensitivity to this Chinese pressure), People's Daily published an editorial explaining the complete harmony between Peking's stand in June and its stand in October.

5. **Abortive Revival of Effort to Block Soviet Aid to DRV**

Finally, while all these misfortunes were besetting Chinese foreign policy in September and October 1965, Peking was simultaneously secretly embroiled in a smaller-scale sequel to the great dispute with the Soviets in the spring over the transit of Soviet military aid to Vietnam. The evidence,
contains some ambiguities, but on balance suggests that the Chinese in late August had held up a single Soviet rail shipment to the DRV, using legalistic excuses; that the Chinese spent the month of September trying to persuade the Vietnamese that they did not need the equipment involved; and that after lengthy private sparring between the CPSU and CCP in September and October the Chinese eventually relented.* In other words, the CCP again took up a position hardly likely to endear it to the Vietnamese, yet which would probably have to be abandoned in the end, and was.

Not long thereafter, Soviet MIG-21 fighter planes were discovered to have arrived in North Vietnam for the first time, to be used by the first contingents of DRV pilots retrained by the USSR to fly them. Although these planes were not part of the specific rail shipment that is known to have been blocked from August through October, their arrival apparently followed the cessation of Chinese obstruction of that shipment, and signalled a further expansion of North Vietnamese dependence upon Soviet military aid, much to Chinese unhappiness.

6. The Internal Chinese Background, Fall 1965

Subsequent Chinese statements have indicated that in September 1965, while all these foreign disputes and unprecedented calamities were simultaneously going on, a central committee "meeting" took place at which several of the Chinese leaders who have subsequently been disgraced--probably including Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping--took positions that were unsatisfactory to Mao. This meeting was not a formal central committee plenum, and may have been a "work conference;" it probably took place in the last week of September, when an unusual number of top-level figures were in Peking before National Day.

*A widely distributed CPSU letter early in 1966 confirmed in passing that the shipment in question had eventually been released.
It is tempting to speculate that whatever friction arose at the September central committee meeting may have involved, at least in part, recriminations over Chinese foreign difficulties. This is conceivable, but it is necessary to emphasize that to date there is very little evidence to support this conjecture. Even those Red Guard poster attacks on Liu and Teng which are the chief source of charges that they behaved unsatisfactorily at the September meeting mention only alleged unenthusiasm for or opposition to Mao’s desire for "cultural change" or "changes in the schools." In view of the fact that many of these attacks also reach far into the past in contrived fashion to distort old statements by Liu and Teng to accuse them of having been pro-Soviet revisionists, it seems likely that any heretical statements on foreign policy in September 1965 would also have been at least alluded to after they had fallen.

There is one further consideration, relating to Lo Jui-ching, the PLA Chief of Staff and central committee secretariat member who was the first great purge victim in late November 1965. Although the regime has been generally reticent about Lo’s crimes, Liberation Army Daily in the summer of 1966 and a few subsequent Red Guard posters have implied that Lo, among other things, had fallen into an error of professionalism akin in some respects to that of Peng Te-huai—that is, that Lo had sought to minimize the disruption of army combat training caused by lengthy political indoctrination in Mao’s writings and by productive labor. The danger of direct confrontation with the United States created by the Vietnam war could easily have made differences over this domestic question more acute. Similarly, if the foreign policy setbacks played any role at all in generating opposition to Mao’s wishes at the September central committee meeting, it is most likely to have done so indirectly by further reinforcing Lo’s views on PLA training. (The 18 September CPSU letter warning that Chinese intervention in the India-Pakistan war might bring China into war with the United States without Soviet help could easily have exacerbated any existing dispute on this question.)
It should however be stated at this point that no credible evidence has yet been received to indicate that Lo or any other top Chinese leader since Peng Te-huai in 1959 has intrigued with the Soviets against Mao's power or policies or had unauthorized or unreported dealings with the Soviet Union. Although fairly lurid charges of this nature were made in 1966 by Red Guards--probably at regime instigation--to vilify the deposed central committee secretariat alternate member Yang Shang-kun, on the evidence thus far available the charges seem improbable, and may well have been advanced in imitation of the long Soviet tradition of blackening defeated opponents or helpless purge victims by proclaiming them to have been foreign intelligence agents (e.g., Trotsky, Bukharin, Marshal Tukhachevskiy, Beria, and many others).* It has been well understood for several years by all party leaders--certainly since the Peng Te-huai affair--that such dealings with the Soviets are considered treasonous. Thus when Khru- schev in October 1961 in conversations with Chou En-lai in Moscow attempted to intervene with Chou on behalf of purged Chinese "antiparty elements" (as the Chinese later publicly revealed), Chou--a marked man because of previously expressed Soviet sympathy

*It is also at least a remarkable coincidence that one of the specific charges against Yang Shang-kun--that he had "bugged" Mao's house--was voiced by the Red Guards only weeks after the sensational disclosures in Yugoslavia that Rankovic and his friends in the Yugoslav secret police had "bugged" Tito's house.
for him--was careful to report this back to Mao.* In this atmosphere, it is hard to understand what political advantage any high Chinese official could hope to gain from private dealings with the national enemy. And if any Chinese leaders at any time were actively plotting an attempt to overthrow Mao--which itself seems unlikely on the evidence available--contacts with the Soviets would add nothing to the forces available to the plotters but would add immensely to the danger. Since the Peng Te-huai affair, military men have been made particularly aware of the danger of talking to the Soviets.**

This is not to deny (a) that the KGB may have recruited lower-level figures for espionage (cadres from minority populations in areas such as Sinkiang being a particularly good possibility); and (b) that prominent film writers or minor Chinese

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*In 1966 and 1967, first authoritative wall posters and then regime publications charged Liu Shao-chi with having proposed, at a central committee work conference in January 1962, that some of the "right opportunists" condemned in 1959 be rehabilitated. Many of these current charges about former Liu statements have been removed from the context of the times in order to blacken him, and it is quite likely that Liu had had Mao's consent at a time of great economic difficulty to make this proposal in order to regain badly needed economic expertise. In any case--and this is the key point--even the accusing wall posters and articles agree that Liu made this suggestion only about those "right opportunists" who were not guilty, as Peng Te-huai was, of having had secret dealings with the Soviets. As one wall poster quoted Liu: "We can reverse the cases of those who had the same viewpoints as Peng as long as they had not betrayed China to a foreign country."

**In 1966 and 1967, fabrications regarding alleged contacts between allegedly dissident Chinese military leaders and the Soviets were manufactured and disseminated by the Soviets themselves, and no doubt by others.
leaders such as the economist Sun Yeh-fang who had made authorized visits to the Soviet Union may have had unauthorized talks there with Soviet colleagues (as the regime has charged publicly) and returned with unauthorized revisionist ideas. This is a long way, however, from the main levers of power.

Thus there are as yet no solid grounds for concluding that any leaders at the September 1965 central committee meeting, with or without Soviet encouragement, directly raised the issue of the massive foreign policy reverses that were being fostered by Mao's policies. Yet those foreign setbacks may well have played another role at this time: that of aggravating Mao's paranoid tendencies, and of increasing his already growing suspicion and anger at real or fancied domestic recalcitrance manifested prior to and at the September meeting. External frustrations and humiliations may have helped impel an aging Mao to decide finally to take drastic action, while time was still left to him, in the internal field where he could make his will felt—that is, to remake China and the Chinese Communist party in the image being rejected by an ungrateful world. In this sense, a succession of insufficiently obedient comrades—Lo Jui-ching, Peng Chen, Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsiao-ping, Tao Chu, and a host of others—have been made to pay (in part) for what the Soviets, Americans, Indians, Indonesians, Algerians, Egyptians, North Koreans, Cubans, and so on have done to Mao.*

*One of the leaders who was later placed under heavy Red Guard criticism (although he had not been purged as of May 1967) was Foreign Minister Chen Yi, who was said by the Red Guards to have committed "20 foreign policy errors" (unspecified), and who had to criticize himself for these errors. Chen, who was a logical scapegoat for Mao to use, may have suspected that he was in trouble with Mao even before his emotional press conference of 29 September 1965.
B. Soviet-Sponsored Overtures for Unity of Action Meeting

1. The Soviets Resume the Offensive

The Soviets took due note of all the Chinese setbacks. A CPSU official in October privately pointed to China's role in the India-Pakistan war and the Indonesian coup as two important new events that were causing many underdeveloped countries to become disenchanted with China; and a CPSU letter some months later was to list these two events plus the Bandung fiasco as well, as landmarks of Peking's fatuous policy. The Soviets evidently concluded that the time was now ripe to take the offensive against the CCP--to speak a bit more loudly, a bit more openly (without, however, abandoning the pose of avoiding direct polemics), and to resume probing to see what international organizational measures to further isolate the Chinese might be possible.

On 29 September, the Soviets published a Brezhnev speech to a CPSU central committee plenum in which he openly expressed regret that the CCP leaders had not reciprocated Soviet efforts to improve relations, but professed the intention of continuing the alleged Soviet quest for accommodation. On 3 October, Pravda lashed out at People's Daily for having published anti-CPSU statements made at a 26 September press conference in Peking by the recently defected Chinese Nationalist leader Li Tsung-jen. A week or so later, in private conversations Brezhnev said that Communist China was "not a good place," and described as provocative and "terrible" Chen Yi's 29 September press conference statements inviting a U.S. invasion. Kosygin told that Sino-Soviet differences went beyond personalities (i.e., were not Khrushchev's fault--a significant admission) and were fundamental. Both Brezhnev and Kosygin are said to have told this European premier that the Sino-Soviet differences were basic divergencies between the "European" and "Asian" viewpoints. These statements were considerably more outspoken than had been customary in conversations between Soviet leaders--particularly Brezhnev--and Western officials in 1965.
Later in October, Brezhnev made it clear to visiting Mali President Keita that future Soviet economic assistance would be dependent upon a reduction of Chinese influence upon Mali.

On 22 October, Ponomarev in Prague repeated publicly that the CPSU had taken "all possible measures" to normalize relations with the Chinese party, and that the measures "have not brought positive results." Ponomarev also reiterated the Soviet professed continued desire to overcome differences; but on the very next day, in the CPSU slogans for the October Revolution anniversary released on 23 October, the slogan greeting the Chinese people for the first time deleted a long-standing tribute to Sino-Soviet friendship and cooperation. Two weeks later, Polyan-skiiy's 7 November keynote speech on the October Revolution anniversary took the process one step further by asserting that "on our part, everything possible has been done" and that the "development" of CPSU-CCP relations now "depends on the Chinese leaders." At this time, most of the Soviet East European allies chimed in with statements condemning Chinese divisive tactics.

2. The Soviets Probe for a Conference

At the same time, the CPSU began to take careful soundings to see how the latest developments had affected the reaction of the bloc--and the world Communist movement--to suggestions to hold some sort of international Communist meeting. These probings got under way during a September round of visits to the USSR by European bloc leaders, and Novotny and Ulbricht each signed a communiqué with the Soviets endorsing a world Communist conference. At subsequent multi-party gatherings in Moscow and Prague to
commemorate the 7th Comintern Congress the CPSU apparently once again canvassed regarding such a conference, and Suslov in Moscow (on 4 October) and Ponomarev in Prague (on 22 October) issued cautious public endorsements of the idea without committing the Soviets as to timing. In the next few weeks the Soviet press published a few more such statements from parties which were wheelhorses of the Ponomarev-Andropov machine or which had always been foremost for their own reasons in pushing for such a conference: the Central American parties, the Czechs, the Portuguese. Some parties were meanwhile pressed into service to attempt private missionary work: the Hungarians with the Dutch, with the Rumanians, and probably with the North Koreans; the Bulgarians with the Rumanians; and the Czechs with the Italians.

By the end of November the Soviets knew pretty well where they stood. Some of the principal obstacles to a world conference remained as formidable as ever. The Rumanian party--which the CPSU had tried so hard in vain in January and February 1965 to persuade to attend the March Moscow consultative meeting--was no more amenable eight months later to Soviet pressure on the conference issue. It has been reported that the CPSU directly raised the issue when Rumanian party chief Ceausescu visited Moscow in September 1965 for talks with Brezhnev and others, and that Ceausescu categorically refused to change the Rumanian position and rebuked the CPSU. Subsequent Soviet badgering—including the intervention of the Hungarians and Bulgarians with the Rumanians at CPSU behest—was without result.
The North Koreans were similarly unhelpful. As already noted, (page 14), certain stormy episodes in the history of their relationship with the CPSU had paralleled some of the later CPSU misadventures with the Rumanians, and for Pyongyang, as for Bucharest, any Soviet murmurings about the desirability of a new world meeting seemed to revive old unpleasant memories of Soviet attempts to assert hegemony. On 10 October, Kim Il-song delivered a long report on the Korean party's anniversary in which he recalled the "economic pressure" to frustrate North Korean industrialization brought upon his country at one time by the "modern revisionists" (the Soviets, in 1955), and the subsequent attempt to overthrow him fostered in 1956-1957 by revisionist "outside forces." Kim read the Soviets a thinly-disguised lecture, insisting that "revisionism still remains the main danger in the international Communist movement today" because it encourages the weakening of "liberation struggles" as the result of fear of "the nuclear blackmail of U.S. imperialism," and warning also that "the policy of peaceful coexistence...is only one aspect" of socialist foreign policy, which must not be allowed to "dissolve or weaken" anti-imperialist struggle. This was the most critical tone taken by Kim toward the Soviets since Khrushchev's fall, and it was also more critical than anything he has said subsequently. In part this may have reflected Kim's reaction to such events as the Soviet resumption of participation in disarmament talks in Geneva, despite the Vietnam war; in part, his suspicions of the policy import of the recent new Soviet feelers for a world Communist meeting.

Kim did, however, reaffirm his independence of the Chinese as well (he attacked those in his party who in the past had been "infected with flunkeyism toward the great powers," he omitted both Soviet and Chinese experience in listing foreign sources of military knowledge for the Koreans to draw upon, and he called on the international movement to fight both
"right and 'left' opportunism"). Finally—and this was somewhat more promising from the Soviet point of view—Kim pledged to try to strengthen unity with all the bloc countries and all the nonbloc parties, and called on the bloc and the movement to take "concerted action" in the struggle against imperialism, particularly regarding Vietnam. This could be read as a hint that he might be more forthcoming about a conference limited solely to Vietnam.

In this connection, the Italian Communist party took a similar line, more explicitly. After the CPSU had been re-exploring the conference issue for some weeks, PCI Secretary General Longo felt it necessary to restate his party's position publicly. In a 26 October speech, Longo said that the convocation of a new conference "in present circumstances and at this moment" could lead to deepening of existing divisions in the movement and should therefore be rejected as harmful and dangerous. In November, however, when the Czechs at Soviet behest invited a PCI delegation to Prague to discuss the matter further, the PCI told them privately that while it would refuse to participate in any gathering to condemn any other party, it might well participate in an eventual conference having "objectives of a positive character," such as reaching agreements on the anti-imperialist struggle. As will be seen, the Soviets later took the PCI up on this.

To sum up: By late November, the Soviets had confirmed that opposition to a conference openly aimed at the Chinese was as strong as ever, but that prospects for a conference narrowly focused on an issue such as coordination of aid to Vietnam were somewhat better. They soon acted on this assumption; but first, Mao was to take another long step toward self-isolation.

3. The Chinese 11 November Editorial

In early November, Chinese leaders—and subsequently Chinese publications—began to voice, in several variants, a new fundamental CCP theme: that the world had now entered a period of "great upheaval, great division, and great reorganization"—a period of "drastic differentiation and regrouping"
in every country in which both known and hitherto hidden pro-imperialist revisionist goats everywhere would at last be identified and separated for good from the Marxist-Leninist sheep. This theme was stated in its most authoritative form in a thundering People's Daily-Red Flag joint editorial article released on 11 November 1965:

As the struggle against Khrushchev revisionism becomes sharper and deeper, a new process of division will inevitably occur in the revolutionary ranks, and some people will inevitably drop out. But at the same time hundreds of millions of revolutionary people will stream in.

This line was designed to serve several purposes. The first was to explain and rationalize the huge losses suffered by the Chinese in the contests with the Soviet Union and the United States in recent months. In this connection, the editorial article spoke of the necessity of contradictions and conflict, zigzags and reversals, and advances only in the form of waves. Excuses of this sort were to be voiced again in People's Daily editorials in March 1966 in the wake of further humiliations such as Nkrumah's ouster from power in Ghana in February while visiting China.

The second purpose was to make it unmistakably clear that henceforth there would be no compromise by Mao with Communists anywhere in the world who refused to toe his line or who sought to persuade him to cooperate with the Soviets. In the course of a lengthy review of all the perfidious actions of the new Soviet leadership since the fall of Khrushchev, the editorial alluded publicly for the first time to the private Soviet efforts "to bring about a summit conference of the Soviet Union, Vietnam and China," and vowed never to attend either such a conference or the world meeting the Soviets had also been pushing. In a formulation which was to be cited often by friend and foe thereafter, the
two chief organs of the Chinese Communist party announced:

The relation between the Khrushchev revisionists and ourselves is certainly not one in which 'what binds us together is much stronger than what divides us,' as alleged by the new leaders of the CPSU; on all the fundamental issues of the present epoch the relation is one of sharp opposition; there are things that divide us and nothing that unites us. Things that are antagonistic and nothing that is common.

The joint editorial noted that the new Soviet leaders had been trying, more insidiously than Khrushchev, to woo other Communist parties and bloc states, to "buy them over, deceive them, and sow dissension among them," in order to "isolate" the CCP. The editorial asserted that those who fell into this trap would become corrupted, go downhill, and degenerate; and it demanded that "all Marxist-Leninist parties" now "draw a clear line of demarcation both politically and organizationally between themselves and the revisionists."

All these points—repeated several times publicly and in private party letters over the next few months by the Chinese—clearly presaged the increasingly intransigent line toward the entire Communist world Mao was to take from now on. The demand for a clear political and organizational separation from the revisionists foreshadowed the CCP refusal to attend the Italian party congress in January and the 23rd CPSU Congress in March. The reference to once-revolutionary parties that had allowed themselves to become corrupted by the Soviets was to be followed in December by Chinese attempted economic blackmail of the Cubans (the outstanding example of such a party, in Chinese eyes), and by a public controversy with Havana after Castro openly protested in January. The surfacing and public rejection of the secret Soviet attempts to convene a tripartite meeting was intended to inhibit the North Vietnamese—who,
according to the Soviets, had explicitly endorsed
this suggestion twice in 1965--from doing so again.
(As will be seen, here the CCP apparently succeeded.)
And the warnings against allowing oneself to be
deceived by the unacceptable Soviet pleas for "united
action" were to be followed, in the spring of 1966,
by increasing estrangement from the North Korean and
Japanese parties which would not desist from advo-
cating such united action.

Thirdly, it appears in hindsight that much
of the generalized language of the editorial also
reflected a decision already taken by Mao to separate
the sheep from the goats in China as well, and to
institute some sort of shakeup of the Chinese Commu-
nist party. Some two weeks after the editorial
proclaimed that "a new process of division" was be-
ginning in which "some people will inevitably drop
out," PLA Chief-of-Staff Lo Jui-ching did indeed
drop out, and was not seen from the moment of his
probable arrest in late November 1965 until his pic-
ture appeared in posters a year later showing him
being manhandled by the Red Guards, wearing a huge
humiliating placard around his neck and a visible
cast on the leg reportedly broken in a suicide at-
tempt.* On 10 November 1965, the day before the
editorial appeared, Mao instructed officials of the
Shanghai party committee to publish in the local
newspaper Wen Wei Pao the article which initiated
the "great cultural revolution" and provided the
final test of Peng Chen's willingness to purge re-
visionists in his own Peking party organization.**
On 22 March 1966, the CCP formally rejected the
Soviet invitation to the 23rd CPSU Congress--Mao
thus extending his line of demarcation interna-
tionally; and a week later Peng Chen disappeared--
Mao doing the same internally. Over the year that
followed, the process of intensifying self-isolation

*See Figure H, in Part III, following page 38.

**For an account of Mao's actions in the fall and
winter of 1965, see POLO-XXIV, "Mao's 'Cultural Revo-
lation': Origin and Development," which will be published
shortly.
internationally and the process of purging and terrorizing the Chinese party apparatus went forward simultaneously, on parallel tracks.

4. The Polish "November Initiative" and Its Outcome

The Soviets seized upon the 11 November editorial as a marvellous opportunity. On 20 November, the East German party organ Neues Deutschland--evidently at Soviet prompting--responded to the Chinese surfacing of the tripartite conference issue by announcing for the first time the urgent necessity of talks between "the CPSU, the Vietnam Workers Party, and the CCP, on joint measures against the U.S. aggressors, on the coordination of aid to Vietnam." On 28 November, the CPSU sent the CCP a secret letter complaining about the 11 November Chinese editorial; the text of this letter is not available, but it seems (from the Chinese reply) to have protested the fact that the Chinese editorial called the Soviets an "enemy," and to have alluded (perhaps in the same context) to the Sino-Soviet treaty of alliance. On the same day, a Pravda editorial referred to the "particularly hard blows" which the Chinese "splitting line" was dealing to the Vietnamese party, and denounced "those who refuse to cooperate and turn down proposals for joint actions" regarding Vietnam. Then, on 3 December, the Polish party organ Tribuna Ludu made the first allusion by anyone to the desirability of a summit meeting of all the bloc states regarding Vietnam.

This Polish public statement reflected action the Polish party had just taken. A year later, Pravda revealed (and the Poles confirmed) that in November 1965 the Polish party "made an important initiative," aimed at coordinating bloc actions in aiding the DRV, and "proposed to fraternal parties the calling of a conference at the highest level." This proposal was formally addressed only to the members of the Warsaw Pact plus the "socialist countries of Asia," but the Soviets obviously intended to have at least some of the leading nonbloc parties participate in some fashion, since both the
Italian* and Japanese parties, after receiving private explanations of the nature of the suggested meeting, planned to attend it. The time and place of the conference were not spelled out in the Polish invitation, but there is good evidence that the plan was to hold it in Moscow in conjunction with the 23rd CPSU Congress of March-April 1966, either during or immediately after the congress. In other words, this was to be another Soviet-run show, taking advantage of the presence in Moscow of fraternal delegates to a Soviet party congress from all over the world; and from this and much other evidence there is no doubt that the CPSU was behind the Polish "initiative."

The Poles did not send their proposal to all the bloc parties simultaneously; rather, they seem to have circulated it to the pro-Soviet states (the Warsaw Pact countries, minus Albania and plus Mongolia) first, in late November and early December, and to the Chinese and Albanians and probably North Koreans and North Vietnamese later, at the end of December and early January.

*In early January a representative of the Italian party was told by the CPSU in Moscow that the Soviets intended to utilize the 23rd CPSU Congress as the occasion for a conference of the parties represented. When the Italian protested and pointed to the traditional PCI opposition to such a scheme, the Soviets said that this would be neither a conference to excommunicate anyone nor a conference to deal with all the problems of the Communist world--in other words, not one which would draw up a 1960-type statement. Rather, it would be a conference devoted to a single pressing theme, such as the anti-American struggle in Vietnam "and the increasing political and military claims of West Germany." (This was the only hint anywhere that Germany was a prospective subject of discussion.) The PCI representative later told his own leaders that it would be difficult for the PCI to decline an invitation, however hypocritical, couched in those terms.
The crucial decision was the DRV's. The Chinese and Albanians would of course not attend; the Rumanians probably would not, if the Chinese did not; the North Koreans and Cubans probably would, particularly if North Vietnam came; but the conference would proceed no matter what all these parties did, if only the North Vietnamese would agree to come. On the other hand, as an Italian party official pointed out privately in January, if the North Vietnamese declined to participate in this conference ostensibly being called to coordinate aid to the DRV, there would be no conference.

On 28 December, the Poles finally signed their secret letter to the Chinese inviting them to the projected conference, although this was held up and not received, according to the CCP, until 4 January. On 5 January, a similar letter was sent to the Albanians.

On 28 December--the same day--the Soviets announced that presidium and secretariat member Shelepin would visit the DRV, and on 6 January Shelepin left Moscow for Hanoi. It seems likely, in the context, that the Polish invitations to China and Albania had been delayed until the letter to the North Vietnamese was sent, that Shelepin was sent on the heels of the DRV invitation, to try to persuade the Lao Dong party to accept, and that this was in fact the primary purpose of Shelepin's visit.

There were other purposes as well: a new agreement on Soviet aid to the DRV was signed during the visit, and Shelepin may well have probed to see if the North Vietnamese would modify their position on negotiations with the United States during the current cessation of U.S. bombing of the north. It is unlikely, however, that Shelepin would have pressed the North Vietnamese hard on this question, particularly at a moment when the CPSU was desperately trying to get the Lao Dong party to take a major political risk (to the benefit of the CPSU) in a completely different direction—that is, to agree to attend a bloc aid-Vietnam-and-resist-the-United States conference in Moscow without the Chinese.
The Soviets would surely know that pressure by them on Hanoi to make what Hanoi would regard as concessions to the United States position would hardly be likely to impress the North Vietnamese with the bona fides of a conference billed as coordinating resistance to the United States or with the desirability of infuriating the Chinese by attending such a conference. Moreover, ever since the Soviets burned their fingers in February 1965, there has been no credible evidence that the Soviets have at any time been willing to endanger their credit in Hanoi by seeking to make the North Vietnamese do something they did not wish to do regarding negotiations; on the other hand, there is abundant evidence that the CPSU has several times sought to draw on the credit thus preserved to get Hanoi to take part in Communist anti-U.S. gatherings boycotted by the Chinese.

On 9 January 1966, two days after Shelepin's arrival in Hanoi, he took the occasion to announce in a speech at a rally that the CPSU and the Soviet government welcomed any "initiative" to promote bloc unity and "joint practical steps" to aid the DRV. This was clearly a reference to the Polish "initiative," a good indication that it was then on the table being considered by the Lao Dong leadership, and also evidence suggesting that Shelepin was vigorously pressing the proposal in the private talks with the North Vietnamese then going on. On 11 January, Shelepin made a vaguer public reference to the need for unity in the bloc and the Communist movement to improve support for the DRV. On the 13th, Shelepin concluded his visit, and the next day a joint communique was published which made no reference to bloc joint action or to the Polish proposal but which did contain North Vietnamese public acceptance of a Soviet invitation to the 23rd CPSU Congress. It is most unusual for what is ordinarily routine, private acceptance of such an invitation to be placed in a joint public communique. It is likely that the possibility of a Chinese refusal to attend the 23rd CPSU Congress was already being considered by the Vietnamese and Soviets (in view of the line taken by the 11 November People's Daily-Red Flag editorial), and that
the North Vietnamese were taking the opportunity to inform the Chinese and the world in advance that they would not disrupt party relations with the CPSU by boycotting the Soviet party congress no matter what the CCP chose to do.

This apparently was all that Shelepin obtained in Hanoi, however; for customary attendance at a CPSU congress was one thing, and attendance at a unity-of-action meeting without the Chinese quite another. The North Vietnamese may well have informed Shelepin before he left Hanoi that they would have to decline the Polish proposal, and even conceivably may have made Soviet abandonment of this project a condition of their announcement that they would attend the CPSU congress. At any rate, by 9 February the North Vietnamese had definitely rejected the Polish "initiative," and the Soviets had consequently abandoned the bloc unity-of-action meeting: for on that date Peng Chen in Shanghai informed a Japanese party delegation newly arrived in China, much to its surprise, that the meeting had been cancelled.

The meeting safely dead, the Chinese party now (on 7 February) sent the Poles its expected rejection of the Polish proposal, asking the Polish party sarcastically, in tones typical of Mao, how it could even tolerate the idea of joining a dogmatic, adventurist, racist, warmongering party like the CCP around a conference table. The Chinese added that "we know that you will use this against us, and we do not care," and repeated that they would never join the Soviets "at any form of meeting" or sign any political document with them until they had renounced all their revisionist policies. This Chinese reply to the Poles has never been published;
but five days later, the Albanians duly made their own reply (a long, vituperative one), and published it together with the Polish invitation.

5. The Chinese and Soviet January Letters

a. The 7 January CCP Letter to the CPSU

By the time the Polish proposal was killed by the North Vietnamese, two more long strides toward a rupture of Sino-Soviet relations had been taken in the secret war of Chinese and Soviet party letters.

On 7 January, the CCP replied to the letter the CPSU had sent it on 28 November protesting the 11 November People's Daily-Red Flag editorial.* In addition to repeating privately all the charges made publicly in the editorial, this CCP reply made several points of special interest, including some that were new. First, it reaffirmed that all Marxist-Leninists must now "draw a clear demarcation line" from the revisionists to separate the two "both politically and organizationally." The CCP taunted the CPSU that "this point has apparently put you on pins and needles." The Chinese arrogant reemphasis of this stand in a private communication was another strong hint to the CPSU that Mao was contemplating breaking the principal remaining strand of party relations with the Soviets by refusing to attend the 23rd CPSU Congress; and some ten days later, the CCP was to provide another hint by refusing to attend the Italian party's congress (which they had done in past years).

* A month later, the CCP letter to the Poles rejecting their proposal referred to this 7 January letter to the CPSU and said that the Poles had received a copy. The Chinese may also have sent copies to other parties; the French party, for example, is known to have received a vituperative CCP letter in early January, to which the FCP replied later in the month.
Secondly, the Chinese letter asserted that "we have said in the past, and we still think, that the great part of the central committee and the great mass of the CPSU still want and can achieve unity," while only "a mere handful of Khrushchev revisionists stand in the way of this unity." In fact, in all the years of Sino-Soviet conflict no Chinese communication, public or private, is known to have claimed that substantial sympathy for the CCP existed in the CPSU central committee, although the Chinese have many times said this about the CPSU membership at large.

In any case, the claim about the CPSU central committee was an expansion of interference in CPSU affairs which clearly presaged the open Chinese statements later in 1966 calling for a revolution in the Soviet Union and the violent overthrow of the Brezhnev-Kosygin "gang."

The claim was, of course, ridiculous. As already noted in Part I, the removal of Khrushchev had already effected a shift in the balance of opinion in the CPSU presidium toward the less liberal, more ideologically-motivated side which more fully reflected the views of most apparatchiks of the central committee on those issues on which they had views at all. While differences on some foreign policy questions have certainly remained within the presidium and, to a much lesser extent, may be reflected within the central committee membership, the question of whether or not to sacrifice Soviet national interests to those of the Chinese—which is what Mao was really demanding—has certainly not been one of them. The CCP letter once again made what Mao wanted (and what the CPSU central committee was supposedly yearning to give) quite clear: the Soviets would have to make "a clean breast" of all their innumerable past mistakes, and in addition, to make a further supplementary confession to the effect that since Khrushchev's downfall the CPSU line had remained revisionist.
Thirdly, and most important, the CCP letter provided the most authoritative statement to date of the Chinese view of the Sino-Soviet treaty of alliance. The Chinese party asserted:

You have had the impudence to speak about a Chinese-Soviet friendship and cooperation treaty. What has happened to this treaty? What drawer have you put it in?...We take into account [the possibility of] an escalation of the [Vietnam] war into China, and we are preparing ourselves for this. We therefore had to decide to regard you as a negative factor, instead of a positive one, in such an escalation. The American imperialists cannot blackmail us, neither will your intimidations.

While the Chinese had previously said or implied as much publicly—for example, during Chen Yi's rantings at his 29 September press conference—some occasional public statements by Chinese leaders have on the other hand sought to imply (for the sake of the deterrent effect upon the United States) that the Chinese considered the treaty still valid. This private Chinese communication to the Soviet Union is the most important and reliable statement yet received of what is likely to be the private Chinese Communist estimate: that the military alliance with the USSR would be of no value to the CPR in the event of a Sino-U.S. war. That the Chinese do believe this is quite credible, and they are also likely to be right.

b. The January CPSU Circular Letter

At just about the same time, at the beginning of January 1966, the CPSU began to send out to many parties in different parts of the world a long letter setting forth in detail Soviet grievances accumulated against the Chinese since the new Soviet leadership succeeded Khrushchev. An anti-Chinese campaign probably based on this letter was being conducted within Bulgarian organizations in early January. The letter continued to be dispatched to different parties during the month of January, and late in the
month another version of the letter began to be disseminated internally throughout the CPSU. At this time Soviet leaders addressed closed party meetings at which the letter was read and explained. No publicity was given the letter in the Soviet or East European press, but its existence and versions of its contents were carefully leaked to the Western press from Moscow and elsewhere; thus the Soviets could piously pretend to be still abstaining from open polemics with the Chinese while making sure that the anti-Chinese burden of the letter received wide publicity throughout the world.* In this respect and others the letter and its handling recalled the Suslov Report of February 1964 and the initial treatment given it at that time.

The central theme of the letter in the version sent abroad was that the Chinese editorial of 11 November, by threatening an organizational break, had merely carried to its furthest extreme the consistently pernicious conduct of the Chinese over the entire period since Khrushchev's removal. A picture was painted of the CCP repeatedly rejecting the hand of sincere Marxist-Leninist friendship which the CPSU, rebuffed but unabashed, kept offering out of motives of the purest anti-U.S.-imperialist zeal. The letter touched on Chinese obstinacy in the Brezhnev-Chou Moscow talks of November 1964 and the Mao-Kosygin talks of February 1965; on the anti-Soviet demonstration at the Soviet embassy in Peking in March; on alleged Chinese renunciation in April of an industrial construction "cooperation" agreement concluded with the Soviets in 1961; and on Chinese withdrawal in July from the Dubna nuclear research institute and rejection of a Soviet proposal (undated) for joint bloc space exploration.

The CPSU letter dwelt in loving detail on Chen Yi's 29 September remarks and other Chinese

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*The first paragraph of the CPSU letter in fact bragged of the fact that the CPSU was abstaining from open polemics; and this brag was also leaked.
statements through which the Chinese population was being "stubbornly fed the idea that it is necessary to prepare for military conflict with the USSR."
The letter said that the CPSU had "already informed" the fraternal parties that the Chinese had been "provoking border conflicts" and that such conflicts had "again increased in recent months." The Soviet letter also asserted that the Chinese had refused to renew the negotiations on delineation of the Sino-Soviet border terminated in May 1964,* and quoted the Chinese representative at the "bilateral consultations on border questions" (presumably those in 1964) as having threatened that China might "try to reestablish our historic rights" through "other ways." In reaching back more than two years for such an alleged threat, the CPSU was clearly strain- ing to document its depiction of the CPR as an ag- gressive power presenting a real menace to Soviet territory. In the year to follow, Soviet covert remarks to other parties were to expand greatly on this theme; for while the Soviets undoubtedly have genuine concern over the Chinese attitude toward the Soviet border and Chinese intentions (particu- larly over the long run), they are also very much aware of the political usefulness of this issue. As in 1963 and 1964 under Khrushchev, the CPSU in 1966 and 1967 was again to utilize the matter of the Chinese aggressive appetite for Soviet territory as an argument for a stronger anti-Chinese stand by hesitating parties.

Predictably, the CPSU January letter also laid heavy stress on the Chinese refusal to undertake joint action regarding Vietnam with the USSR, and on Chinese obstruction of the transit of Soviet military aid to North Vietnam. The letter accused the Chinese of seeking to prolong the war indefi- nitely and to provoke a military conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States, while the

*All previous information in 1964 indicated that the border talks of that year had continued until July or August.

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Chinese planned to "observe the battle of the tigers while seated on the hill." The CPSU recounted with gusto the record of Chinese disruptive actions in connection with Bandung II and the India-Pakistan war; and excoriated, as so many times before under Khrushchev, Chinese preference for international tension and the allegedly "disdainful" Chinese attitude toward the horrors of nuclear war. Finally, the CPSU letter returned to the language of 1963-1964 and of the Suslov report in assailing Chinese domestic policies and in once more attacking Mao Tse-tung and his personality cult by name.

In short, the CPSU letter disseminated in January and February 1966 read as if its drafters had decided that Chinese progressive estrangement from the Communist movement--because of Mao's obstinacy, particularly on unity-of-action over Vietnam--had now gone sufficiently far to make it politically safe for the CPSU to resume through private channels the sort of direct, across-the-board attacks on the CCP that had characterized most of Khrushchev's last 18 months. The one important difference remaining at this point was that Soviet public propaganda had not yet resumed the vituperative denunciations of the Chinese heard in 1963 and 1964. In the coming year Mao was to make this possible and profitable, too,
a) The super-ideologue Suslov, overseer of CPSU relations with the foreign Communist world,* now received vindication after years of struggle with Khrushchev over the emphasis of CPSU foreign policies and the direction of CPSU tactics. In terms of function, experience, and habits of thought, Suslov was at the opposite pole from Mikoyan. Mikoyan's career was wholly on the government side, Suslov's wholly within the party apparatus. Mikoyan under Stalin had dealt with matters of industry, trade and supply; Suslov, to take one example, after World War II had supervised the Soviet reabsorption of the Baltic republics and the arrest and exiling to Siberia of thousands of Latvians, Lithuanians, and Estonians. In the years after Stalin's death Mikoyan had favored some of the Soviet liberal writers; Suslov emphatically did not, and in 1957 publicly called them "right opportunists." Mikoyan had supported the cause of consumer goods; Suslov had sided with Kozlov in opposing Khrushchev on this issue and insisting on continued priority for heavy industry and especially the steel industry. In the last decade, both Mikoyan and Suslov had concentrated more and more on foreign affairs, but from opposite angles: Mikoyan dealt primarily with the bourgeois governmental and commercial leaders of the capitalist and underdeveloped world, while Suslov dealt almost exclusively with Communists, both bloc and nonbloc, and indeed from one year to another hardly ever even talked with a non-Communist. From the Soviet point of view, there was nothing strange or sinister about this sharp dichotomy of functions;

*This phrase is not intended to suggest that Suslov today creates CPSU policy toward the foreign Communist world (it is created by the CPSU politburo as a whole, led by Brezhnev) or that other senior politburo members do not deal extensively with senior foreign Communists (nearly all of them do, and Brezhnev particularly has been quite active in this field). Suslov is the senior secretary and politburo member, however, who specializes, spending nearly full time in this work, and directly supervising Ponomarev and Andropov, the next-ranking specialists.
ECONOMICS VERSUS IDEOLOGY
THE SHIFTING BALANCE OF THE FALL OF 1964

Khrushchev: Gone

Brezhnev: Gathering Power

Mikoyan: Going

Suslov: Vindicated

Kosygin: Minority Premier

Shelepin: Promoted

CONFIDENTIAL
VI. Spring-Fall 1966: Mao Completes Self-Isolation

In the first months of 1966, Mao Tse-tung (a) clashed personally and dramatically with the leaders of the Japanese Communist party, converting the CCP-JCP relationship from one of growing friction to one of open hostility almost overnight; (b) thereby greatly worsened the already cool Chinese relationship to the Korean party; (c) entered into public polemics with the Cubans for the first time; (d) forced Chou En-lai to pick a fight with the Rumanians; (e) publicly refused to send a CCP representative to the 23rd CPSU congress despite the fact that the North Vietnamese and North Koreans were attending, thus breaking the chief remaining strand of Sino-Soviet party relations at a time when former Chinese allies were maintaining or improving their relations with the CPSU; and (f) arrested Peng Chen amidst a mammoth press campaign, and thus brought into the open the long-drawn out purge of the Chinese Communist leadership and apparatus which was still in progress a year later. Having threatened the universe in November 1965, Mao now began to implement his threat.

A. The Alienation and Defection of the Japanese Communists*

1. The Japanese Party Shifts Course

The most spectacular change in position in 1966 among the old Communist supporters of the Chinese was that of the Japanese party. Early in the year, processes which had long been going on beneath the surface in the JCP began to emerge into the open, and the majority faction of the JCP under secretary general Miyamoto started on the road which by the summer was to produce a break with the Chinese party.

The disenchantment of the Miyamoto leadership with the Chinese and with the policies the CCP was seeking to impose on the Japanese party had grown for a number of reasons:

*See DD/I Intelligence Report, "The Disintegration of Japanese Communist Relations with Peking," 28 December 1966, RSS 0018 (ESAU XXXIII), for a detailed discussion of this subject.

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(a) The first of these was the Indonesian debacle. The leaders of the JCP, like the North Koreans and many other Communists formerly sympathetic to Peking, became convinced, rightly or wrongly, that the Chinese were responsible for the PKI's disastrous decision to resort to violence and therefore for the catastrophe visited upon the Indonesian party. The Soviets and their friends, of course, were assiduously seeking to promote this belief; but the JCP leadership had a special reason to jump to this conclusion independently in any case: for the Chinese party since the late summer of 1965 had been pressing the JCP to adopt more militant tactics than Miyamoto considered desirable, in order to put pressure on the Japanese government and the United States.

The JCP was reportedly urged in this direction by Liu Shao-chi, Chou En-lai and Chen Yi during a visit to Peking by JCP politburo member Hakamada in August 1965. Liu demanded to know what military role the JCP would or could assume if a Sino-U.S. war began, and insisted that the JCP take up as an "actual problem," not as a more theoretical question, preparation of a "resistance movement." Chou backed this up by offering the JCP financial aid for this purpose. While the Chinese probably did not really believe that a Sino-U.S. war was imminent, and while Liu denied that he was asking the JCP "to start an armed revolution in cadence with China," the tenor of his remarks—that the JCP should at once begin to prepare itself for a drastic change in "its present struggle setup"—would certainly have suggested to the JCP that the Chinese wanted at least a major expansion of the JCP covert party organization and establishment of a powerful clandestine paramilitary apparatus. Such steps would in themselves be difficult to disguise and would therefore be harmful to the peaceful expansion of the JCP's influence and the party's parliamentary prospects (as the Chilean Communist leader Corvalán in a similar situation had pointed out for Fidel Castro's benefit three years before). The Chinese demands would also inevitably have brought to mind for the JCP leadership the very harmful effect upon the party's fortunes caused by the violence the party had used during the Korean war.
Having received such unwelcome advice themselves, the JCP leaders were all the more ready to believe that the PKI had been pressed into unwise, hasty action by the Chinese; conversely, having seen what happened to the PKI, the JCP leadership was all the more ready to take a dim view of Chinese demands upon itself for greater militancy.

The dominant Miyamoto faction of the JCP was reinforced in this view by the simultaneous emergence, in the fall of 1965, of a splinter organization (the JCP (Liberation Front)) led by dissident Communists such as Shigeo Shida who defended the disastrous violent tactics used by the JCP in 1951-52 and who had left the party after it abandoned and condemned such tactics. The JCP now had a pro-Chinese annoyance on its left flank to complement the pro-Soviet splinter on the right, the JCP (Voice of Japan). The leaders of the leftist splinter were much the more serious danger, for they apparently retained contact with a good many cadres within the JCP and vigorously proselyted among these cadres against the Miyamoto leadership. When the JCP finally made its first open reference to these leftist dissidents in May 1966, Akahata accused them of "agitating the party" by using "the situation brought about in Indonesia by the brutal suppression by the reactionary forces as an excuse" for "spreading doctrinaire, sectarian and adventurist assertions which totally disregarded the scientific analysis of the concrete situation in our country."

In other words, these Japanese leftist dissidents had used the fact that the PKI had proved to lack the armed strength to withstand the Indonesian army in order to bolster the same point already made by the Chinese privately to the JCP in August: that the JCP should adopt militant tactics...

*Akahata was referring to pamphlets the JCP (Liberation Front) had distributed through Japan in February 1966—at the very time Miyamoto was visiting China—attacking the party leadership for its views on the lessons to be drawn from the Indonesian events.
and make active preparations now for a coming armed struggle. While it is not clear whether or to what degree the leftist dissidents had the direct support of the Chinese when they merged to form the JCP (Liberation Front) in September 1965, the coincidence of the dates and of the views expressed is likely to have struck Miyamoto and to have fed his suspicions. By May 1966, Akahata left no doubt that now, at least, the JCP considered these leftists the creatures of the Chinese.

(b) At the same time, these leftists inside and outside the JCP, like the Chinese, "underestimate the importance of the pressing task of strengthening the international united action and the international united front in opposition to American imperialism," as Akahata put it on 11 May 1966. In other words, they opposed the Miyamoto leadership's policy of seeking to draw the USSR further into struggle against the United States, and they denounced the gradually growing JCP optimism on this score, as the result of the CPSU's "unity of action" line on Vietnam. We have already seen that at various points in 1965 the JCP had publicly or privately diverged from the dogmatic Chinese view on this matter. A major turning point for the JCP seems to have been the Tri-Continental conference of Asian, African, and Latin American radicals in Havana in January 1966, where the JCP was gratified to note the substantial concessions to hysterical anti-U.S. militancy made by the Soviet representatives as the result of pressures from the Cubans, the North Vietnamese, the JCP itself, and other radical anti-U.S. forces. On 10 February Akahata published a self-congratulatory account of the Havana conference which jubilantly pointed out "that there has been a sharp retreat" of Soviet "mistaken international views" regarding peaceful coexistence and national liberation struggles. Comparing what happened at the Havana meeting with the Warsaw World Peace Council meeting of November 1963, Akahata said that "we can see from actual facts how greatly the mistaken international trend and the schismatic policy line have withdrawn during the past two years." The JCP was thus growing more and more openly optimistic about what the CPSU could be induced to do at a time when the CCP was becoming more and more paranoid in
its denials that there was any hope for the CPSU leadership.

(c) Thirdly, the JCP was well aware that the North Vietnamese, the North Koreans, the Cubans, and other radicals were departing more and more from the Chinese on this issue as the Chinese position became more and more extreme. The Miyamoto leadership had no desire to become isolated from this group of independent-minded radical Communist parties and states whose interests and world-view the JCP generally shared. The JCP was probably particularly sensitive to the growing antagonism between the North Koreans and the Chinese because of the reverberations of North Korean policy within the large Chosen Soren organization in Japan. A triumvirate of Far Eastern parties with especially close ties and interests—the Japanese, North Koreans, and Indonesians—had come together in 1962 and 1963, sharing among other things a common detestation of Khrushchev and affinity for the Chinese viewpoint. Now Khrushchev was gone; Soviet policy was apparently slowly improving; it was the Chinese who were now hindering anti-imperialist unity; the JCP's Indonesian partner had been virtually destroyed, apparently because of Chinese folly; and the North Koreans (as will be seen) were now privately expressing violent condemnation of the Chinese. Thus a multitude of foreign pressures was reinforcing JCP impatience with Peking.

2. Resumption of JCP Contacts with CPSU

For all these reasons, the JCP toward the end of 1965 began to be a trifle more responsive to Soviet approaches. In September and October, after visiting China, Hakamada went to North Korea and is reported to have there resumed contact with the CPSU on behalf of the JCP. In mid-November, the Soviets are said to have proposed to the JCP through the Soviet embassy in Tokyo that friendly party relations be reestablished. Two weeks later, a senior embassy official told [REDACTED] that Moscow had sent a representative to Japan to negotiate with the JCP; and one of the subjects for negotiation, he indicated, was the JCP attitude toward the holding of a world Communist conference on "the Vietnam issue" in the spring.
It is likely that this was part of the general worldwide pulse-taking which the CPSU was carrying out on the subject from September through November. The matter of the concrete Polish proposal soon to be sent to bloc states was probably not yet broached by the CPSU to the JCP, for Miyamoto apparently did not learn about this suggested bloc meeting at the 23rd CPSU congress until January, and was not even formally invited to attend the Congress until February, when the Polish proposal had been killed. Yet the CPSU in November was evidently trying hard to get the JCP to approve the notion of a general Communist conference on Vietnam, and to this end—judging from the embassy official’s remarks—tried to give the JCP the impression that the acquiescence of both North Korea and North Vietnam was already assured.

The Soviet embassy official in question professed in late November to see a hopeful trend in JCP thinking since the Indonesian coup, particularly on the part of Miyamoto and some of his close associates. He estimated—correctly—that the JCP would soon begin to dissociate itself somewhat from the Chinese. In January, Soviet collection of information and assessments of JCP attitudes was ordered intensified, in preparation for the 23rd CPSU congress.

3. Miyamoto’s Plan

In early February, secretary general Miyamoto led to China the largest and most important JCP delegation ever to visit the CPR. The Japanese party made its position regarding the Soviets and Chinese plain on the eve of Miyamoto’s departure in two lengthy Akahata editorials on 1 and 4 February. The 1 February editorial denounced the CPSU because of Soviet dealings with the Sato government of Japan, CPSU financial support of the "JCP (Voice of Japan)," and recent renewed Soviet overtures to the Socialist sponsors of the Gensuikin antiaatomic bomb conference. The 4 February editorial further denounced Soviet "double-dealing" and "revisionism" at some length, but it also significantly emphasized the urgent need to strengthen "the international united front and united action" against the United States, and added that Soviet participation in this united front could
not be postponed until the final demise of revisionism.

It is clear from a multitude of reports, before, during, and after the JCP visit to China that the central issue of Miyamoto's trip was the growing divergence between the Chinese and the other leading Communist parties of the Far East over the Soviet "unity of action" line, and the fact that this divergence was apparently about to be publicly dramatized in connection with the 23rd CPSU congress.

Afterwards, Miyamoto informed his Executive Committee that in mid-January the JCP had received a report (presumably, in connection with Shelepkin's visit to North Vietnam) that a "European and Asiatic Communist party conference to support North Vietnam" would be held in Moscow immediately after the 23rd CPSU Congress--i.e., in early April--and that both the North Vietnamese and North Koreans were likely to attend. The source of Miyamoto's information was unspecified, but he also said that the JCP had received an "informal request" from the Chinese to intercede with these parties.

The Japanese Communists, however, had no intention of trying to persuade the North Vietnamese and North Koreans not to attend--or as Miyamoto put it, "to persuade [them] to follow Chinese policies with which we ourselves were not fully in accord." It was rather Miyamoto's plan to visit the DRV and North Korea, then in early March to hold secretly in Peking "an informal conference attended by the four nations' party representatives to coordinate the views of the parties of the four nations" [the CCP, JCP, North Vietnamese and North Koreans], and then to go to Moscow with the North Vietnamese and North Koreans to attend the "European and Asiatic party conference" on Vietnam aid to follow the CPSU Congress. It was also implicit in Miyamoto's Executive Committee report that he also intended to attend the CPSU congress itself with the North Vietnamese and North Koreans.

At the Vietnam conference in Moscow, the JCP planned "to present a joint proposal with the
parties of North Vietnam and North Korea calling for drastic amendments to the special report expected to be submitted by the Soviet Communist party to this conference." Miyamoto explained that "we further intended to exert efforts towards drafting a policy to draw the Soviet Union into the North Vietnam aid movement and thus strengthen this movement." Thus the JCP not only expected the aid-to-Vietnam conference to be held and expected to attend it, but was already anticipating that the CPSU would take a position at the conference (presumably, regarding further commitments toward the Vietnamese war effort and concrete actions against the United States) which because of Soviet caution would be ambiguous and less than completely satisfactory to the JCP and the other militant anti-U.S. radical parties. And the JCP was already planning in advance to bring coordinated pressure on the CPSU in the hope of extracting concessions to the militant viewpoint, as the JCP and other radicals had helped the Cubans to do at the Tri-Continental conference in Havana in January.

In short, the JCP hoped to be able to have its cake and eat it, too. If Miyamoto's complex plan had been carried out, the JCP would have avoided isolation from its fellow-thinkers in Hanoi and Pyongyang, pursued its policy of seeking to draw the USSR into more consistent anti-imperialist struggle, and still maintained its ties with the Chinese, who by attending a preliminary coordination conference with the JCP, North Vietnamese and North Koreans would have implicitly acknowledged the legitimacy of the policy these three parties intended to pursue in Moscow.

4. Miyamoto's Odyssey

Nothing of all this came to pass. When Miyamoto's delegation first arrived in Shanghai in early February, he was greeted by the Chinese with the news that the Soviets had had to abandon the project of a multiparty conference on Vietnam aid; although the Chinese did not say so, it seems probable that a North Vietnamese refusal to participate had been decisive in scuttling the idea. Miyamoto later reported that in these first JCP talks with
the CCP in Shanghai, the Chinese representatives (Peng Chen and Liu Ning-i)* "scoffed at, as [having been] wishful thinking, our idea of going to Moscow to propose amendments and to try to draw the Soviet Union into a unified movement for supporting North Vietnam." Even though the Moscow multiparty conference had been abandoned, the JCP delegation continued to spar with the CCP over the issue of cooperation with the USSR in united action over Vietnam. On 11 February, while the Shanghai talks were going on, the CCP organ Red Flag again informed all the erstwhile Far Eastern allies of the Chinese party that "we will never take any united action with the leaders of the CPSU" so long as the latter continued their "line of Soviet-U.S. collusion."

From Shanghai, the JCP delegation went to North Vietnam, where Miyamoto repeated publicly the JCP position of unity of action, and apparently received first-hand private DRV concurrence in this position, although the North Vietnamese were too wary of Chinese ire to say so publicly. Next, after lengthy meetings in Peking with much of the CCP politburo, Miyamoto's group went to North Korea, where his public statements again combined chastisement of Soviet sins with reiteration of the need for a united front with the Soviets. The North Koreans

*It must be emphasized that there is no evidence to support the conjecture that Peng Chen was purged because he privately offered the JCP concessions on "unity-of-action" with the CPSU, and a great deal of evidence to refute it. At none of the three meetings with the JCP in which Peng participated (in Shanghai 10-13 February and in Peking 4-8 March and 21-28 March) do the best clandestine reports and the public JCP account describe him as taking a position in any way unorthodox or differing in any respect from that of Chou En-lai and other participating leaders who have since remained in good favor. It was Chou--the senior member of the Chinese delegation that approved a draft joint communique with the JCP that Mao subsequently rejected--who was reprimanded by Mao.
vigorously endorsed this point, which was prominent in the joint communique issued when the JCP delegation returned to China. In early March, CCP leaders in Peking remarked to Wilcox, secretary-general of the pro-Chinese New Zealand party, about the baleful effect the JCP was having upon the North Vietnamese and North Koreans.

When on 21 March Miyamoto reappeared in Peking, a third round of acrimonious negotiations with the CCP took place. Miyamoto strove once more to persuade the Chinese to accept the principle of unity of action with the Soviets, to no avail. At the same time, Miyamoto was involved in a tug-of-war with the CCP over whether the JCP should accept a Soviet invitation to the 23rd CPSU congress. The JCP had received this formal invitation in the third week of February, after Miyamoto had returned to China en route to North Korea from North Vietnam; and despite the demise of the projected multiparty conference on Vietnam, attendance at which had been Miyamoto's primary reason for wishing to go to Moscow, the JCP secretary-general still wished to send a small delegation to the CPSU congress (to be headed by presidium member Oka) since the North Vietnamese and North Koreans would be there. In the end, in an effort to appease the Chinese and avoid straining relations still further, Miyamoto yielded on this point and told the JCP Secretariat in Tokyo on 24 March to announce that the invitation was being declined. The Secretariat did so on the 25th. The Chinese then rewarded the JCP by finally holding a banquet for Miyamoto on the evening of 25 March and a rally for him the next day.

Subsequent comment in Japan that the JCP had demonstrated subservience to Peking by refusing to go to Moscow was to evoke extremely defensive (and transparently mendacious) reactions from Miyamoto, and he may well have later come to regret the decision. He had all the more reason to regret it because of what Mao did next after receiving this concession.

According to a 24 January 1967 Akahata account, the Chinese party after Miyamoto's return from Korea had proposed for the first time that a joint communique be worked out, and it was agreed that a concise draft
would be negotiated (by Oka and Liu Ning-i) which would omit all points of disagreement (i.e., regarding the Soviets and "unity-of-action"). On 27 March, according to Akahata, a Chinese delegation led by Chou En-lai and including Peng Chen, Kang Sheng, Liu Ning-i and Liao Cheng-chih went over the draft with the JCP and formally approved it. Chou is said by Akahata to have disclosed that the text of the communique had already been transmitted to Mao (in South China), and that the communique would be published after the JCP delegation had had a previously-scheduled interview with Mao. Soon thereafter and Chou flew down (reportedly, to Canton) for the meeting with Mao. To Miyamoto's apparent astonishment, Mao now personally resumed heavy pressure on the JCP, attacked the party for its failure to use "revolutionary" tactics, and denounced JCP demonstrations as weak and ineffective and JCP parliamentary tactics as harmful. Mao also reportedly demanded new changes in the joint communique already agreed upon (apparently, to insert direct attacks on the Soviets). When Miyamoto would not yield on either point, Mao tore up the communique and tongue-lashed Chou—in front of Miyamoto—for having agreed to it. According to , Miyamoto later told his party that "Mao also made some very sarcastic remarks to me," and that "at the time I received the impression that the attitude Mao took was like that taken by Stalin in his later years."* Miyamoto then went home.

*The fact that this confrontation took place has now been attested by (a) several reports of 24 January 1957, and (b) by Michael's Red Guard wall newspaper statements attacking the JCP on 22 January 1957. The picture presented of a paranoid Stalin-type dictator possessing complete and arbitrary power over his politburo colleagues—and about to exercise that power by purging some of them and terrorizing the others—is convincing and is completely consistent with Mao's actions before and since.
5. Aftermath: The JCP-CCP Split

After this, the relationship between the two parties seemed to slide rapidly and inexorably down an inclined plane. Miyamoto apparently hoped at first to limit the deterioration of relations so far as was consistent with the vigorous assertion of an independent stand, but Mao would have none of this.

In April, Miyamoto fought a momentous battle at a plenum of the JCP central committee, and won approval for his actions and his line over the objections of an adamant Maoist minority. In the same month, the JCP representative in Peking began to be ostracized by Chinese officials. In May, Akahata warned of the need to fight "flunkeyism and dogmatism" as well as revisionism and surfaced the existence of the JCP (Liberation Front) and the recent attacks by that pro-Chinese group on the JCP. By the end of May, Akahata and People's Daily had stopped reprinting each other's articles. In June, JCP publications stopped listing Radio Peking broadcasts and advertising Mao's works. On 11 June—in evident response to statements made during Shehu's visit to China the month before vehemently extolling Mao as the leader of the world revolutionary movement and assailing Communist "neutralists"—Akahata denied that there was a "guiding center" for the international struggle and warned of the increasing danger of dogmatism both in Japan and abroad. Although the JCP maintained official public silence on the events thus far in the Chinese "cultural revolution," a secret JCP meeting on 14 June heard a party official make a strong attack on the Chinese.

In early July, CPSU politburo candidate member Grishin, in Japan for a visit to the Sohyo trade union federation, was allowed to pay a public call on JCP headquarters for talks. The JCP subsequently publicly denied that this meant it was willing to re-establish normal relations with the CPSU until the Soviets had renounced all support for Shiga's right-wing dissidents; but the next month, the JCP made another important concession to the CPSU by admitting a Soviet WFDY delegate to the Communist-run Gensuikyo anti-atom bomb conference despite the
fact that WFDY also was represented at the rival Socialist-run Gensuikin conference.* The Chinese and all their vassal delegations thereupon walked out of the Gensuikyo meeting, and held big rallies in Peking soon afterward in which the (Japanese Communist) leaders of Gensuikyo were vehemently attacked for having admitted the Soviets. Pro-Chinese forces in Japan both inside and outside of the JCP now chimed in with open attacks on the Miyamoto party leadership. The outstanding pro-Chinese rebel group within the party was the Yamaguchi prefectoral committee, which used its local newspaper—Chenshu Shimbun—for unabashed flattery of Mao and assaults on JCP policy. The Chenshu Shimbun editorials now began, and continued thereafter, to be picked up by NCNA, which may well have written them in the first place.

Miyamoto struck back in early September with a drastic purge of the Yamaguchi committee, and set up another newspaper to replace Chenshu Shimbun, which remained in the hands of the CCP followers. The purge was extended to other parts of the JCP provincial and central apparatus in September and October, and was confirmed at the JCP's 10th Congress in late October—which was boycotted by the CCP. By this time, the Chinese had taken steps to cut off their indirect subsidies to the JCP by forcing firms responsive to the JCP out of the China trade. Direct subsidies had long since been discontinued, and Chinese money that had previously been given to the JCP now began to be funneled primarily to the left wing of the Japanese Socialist Party, as well as to the anti-JCP leftist splinter groups.

The JCP now found itself under considerable financial strain, and the Soviets soon took forceful action to fill the gap. On 11 November 1966 the Soviet embassy is reported to have offered JCP representatives no less than $600,000—half to rebuild JCP Headquarters, and half to finance the next election campaign—on condition that Shiga and

*See pp 19-21 for the background of the Soviet-JCP controversy over these conferences and for an account of the dilemma in which the CPSU had found itself.
the other pro-Soviet right-wing dissidents be taken back into the party. On 30 November the embassy was informed of Miyamoto's characteristic decision that the JCP would not accept the Soviet condition—whereupon the Soviet representatives, obviously acting upon prior contingency instructions from Ponomarev's central committee section—withdraw the condition (thus betraying Shiga) and urged the JCP to accept the money without any strings. At last report, the JCP was inclined to do so. The CPSU thus showed itself both decisive and willing to invest money freely when a special situation arose with an important party offering unusual political returns.

Meanwhile, JCP-CCP relations continued to deteriorate rapidly. Akahata correspondents in various parts of the world and Japanese students in China belonging to the JCP who chose to back Mao rather than the JCP leadership were expelled from the party. For his part, Mao welcomed an expelled JCP central committee member to the rostrum at Tienanmen in Peking on Chinese National Day; Japanese Maoists in Peking were encouraged to beat up the local Akahata correspondent who remained loyal to the JCP; and Chinese propaganda poured forth a steady stream of thinly-veiled attacks on the JCP and reports of statements by Japanese "Marxist-Leninists" expressing adoration of Mao and Mao's line.

In the Japanese election campaign of January 1967, an unprecedented situation arose. The Chinese put their tame Japanese on Peking radio to urge Japan to support Maoist candidates rather than the JCP; the Sato government tried to brand both the JCP and the Japanese Socialists as pro-Maoist and thus identify them with Mao's "cultural" revolution, which had evoked intense revulsion in Japan; and the JCP candidates did their best to repudiate Mao's regime and to separate themselves in the minds of the electorate from what was happening in China. After the election, the JCP privately considered that it had nevertheless suffered somewhat in the election because of some anti-Communist carryover from Japanese reaction to the cultural revolution. The Japanese Socialist party, however—whose left wing had recently strengthened its hold on the party, had refused to disavow Mao's actions, and had reportedly
received more than two and a half million dollars from China for the election campaign--was consequently the major loser in the elections. The net effect on the JCP was to intensify the view Miyamoto had already formed of Mao, and the net effect on the JSP was to create conditions which might eventually lead to a split between pro-Mao and anti-Mao Socialists.

Following the election, in February and March 1967, the Chinese finally dropped the last veil in their attacks on the JCP, and began publicly to assail the party repeatedly by name. The JCP responded in kind. It had now come full circle since 1964.

B. Mao's Clashes With Cuba and North Korea

1. The Outbreak of Public Polemics With Castro

a. The 1965 Decay in Relations

At the very moment Miyamoto was disembarking in Shanghai in early February 1966 to begin his unpleasant confrontation with the CCP, the Chinese party had already become embroiled in public recriminations with Fidel Castro.

As mentioned earlier, the Chinese had already been growing cooler toward Castro for some time when the Castro question was settled for Mao by Cuban acquiescence--at the secret Havana conference of November 1964--in Soviet desires to isolate pro-Chinese groups in Latin America. (See Part I, pages 112-113.) Following a stormy encounter between Chinese leaders and Che Guevara in Peking in February 1965, pro-Chinese Latin American revolutionaries assembled in the Chinese capital the next month were told by Liu Shao-chi that the Cubans were now anti-revolutionaries. Liu explained:

We thought the Cubans were caught between two powers, needed assistance... and we felt that we understood their delicate position...We now realize that the Cubans are and have been actually led by the Soviets and are in fact in the revisionist camp.

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Throughout 1965, as Castro did indeed break those ties he had had with Chinese-sponsored organizations, pro-Chinese Latin Americans in private meetings frequently repeated this estimate of Fidel; and by the fall of 1965 anti-Castro comments had begun to emerge publicly from some. The disappearance of Che Guevara after March 1965 was also interpreted privately by the pro-Chinese Latin Americans (and loudly and publicly, by the Latin American Trotskyites) as evidence of Castro's betrayal of the revolutionary cause; and even Chinese officials, both at home and abroad, began to say as much in private conversations, despite Guevara's argument with the CCP in his last visit to Peking.

b. Castro's September 1965 Private Warnings

On 14 September 1965, according to Castro's later revelations, he and Dorticos privately summoned the charge of the Chinese embassy in Havana and protested against this "slander campaign against the Cuban revolution that was being carried out in some parts of the world by elements closely linked to the Chinese Government."

At the same time, Castro warned the charge against further Chinese dissemination of unwanted (i.e., anti-Soviet) propaganda in Cuba, and particularly Chinese proselytizing within the Cuban army. The Chinese had apparently persisted in such activity despite the thinly-veiled warnings against polemical work in Cuba which Castro had addressed to both the Soviets and Chinese in a speech in March 1965. Now the Chinese charge, according to Castro, promised to inform his government and obtain a response to the points raised; but the Chinese government never did respond, and apparently never did desist either. In November 1965, the NCNA chief in Mexico City claimed privately that Chinese news was now being "suppressed" in Cuba and that publications which were formerly distributed through societies of Friends of China in Cuba were now "prohibited" by Castro. In fact, as will be seen, the Chinese were still trying to disseminate at least some of their propaganda in Cuba, despite Castro's ban. Mao's answer to Castro's demand that
he stop was to impose economic sanctions against Cuba in December 1965.

c. Castro's January Attack

Until January 1966, the growing hostility between Mao and Castro had not yet broken out into public polemics. But on 2 January, addressing a Havana meeting on the eve of the opening of the Tri-Continental meeting—and thus in a context where the Chinese were rendered doubly sensitive and vulnerable—Castro explicitly portrayed the Chinese as having just dealt a painful blow to the Cuban rice supply by reneging on an implicit agreement he had thought he had with them to maintain in 1966 the 1965 level of China's rice-for-sugar trade with Cuba. This criticism, although couched in moderate terms, was calculated to do the Chinese a good deal of political harm; and the CPSU gave the speech elaborate publicity in the Soviet press and radio.

On 9 January, Peking acknowledged the speech for the first time, and published a rebuttal in the form of an interview with a "responsible official" of the Foreign Trade Ministry. This official said that Castro's version was "at variance with the facts" and that Fidel had acted badly in divulging "unilaterally and untruthfully" the substance of trade negotiations that were still in progress.

On the 12th, three days later, the Cuban Foreign Trade Ministry issued a point-by-point rebuttal about the rice, still fairly cautiously worded. Here was the moment for the Chinese to decide to halt the public debate, even at the cost of allowing the Cubans to have the last word; but this, Mao apparently could not bear. On 30 January NCNA publicized a second interview with an unnamed CPR trade ministry official who repeated and strengthened Peking's earlier insinuation that Castro had made his "untruthful" statements with ulterior motives on the eve of the Havana tri-continental conference.

On 6 February, Castro responded with a new, much more violent attack on the Chinese in which he now brought forward for the first time
publicly the accusation that the CCP had been spreading hostile propaganda among the Cuban armed forces by means of leaflets and personal contacts. He described this as a "truly incredible act which no sovereign state...which respects itself will ever tolerate." He revealed the warning he and Dorticos had given the Chinese charge on 14 September and added that the Chinese had insolently continued to distribute in Cuba more than 800 mail bags of propaganda since that time.

For several years, of course, the Chinese had continued to disregard Soviet and East European protests by attempting to disseminate such propaganda in these countries; it is thus understandable that the CCP would act similarly toward the Cubans, and characteristic of Mao to fail to estimate correctly (or, more likely, even to consider) Castro's probable personal reaction.

In the same 6 February 1966 speech, Castro returned to the rice question and now accused the Chinese of conducting harsh reprisals of an economic nature for purely political reasons. Hardly drawing a breath, Castro denounced the CCP for "hypocrisy; insolence; absolute contempt; betrayal of confidence, friendship and brotherhood; bad faith; cynicism; and the worst form of poison."

The Chinese replied on 22 February with a People's Daily editorial note decrying Castro's "vicious abuse," defending as perfectly proper Chinese efforts to distribute CCP publications in Cuba (apparently, whether Castro liked it or not), and warning that Castro, after having once called for an "end to public polemics," had now made two public attacks on the CPR and had "gone very far down the road of opposition to China." After this, the Chinese began to publicize statements made by pro-Chinese Ceylonese, Belgian, and Latin American groups--
some of them several months old--assailing Cuban revisionism.

d. Castro Has the Last Word

Fidel Castro replied on 13 March by raising the level of his invective. He now made a personal attack on Mao, called him a "cretin and fool," assailed Mao's personality cult, and described him as a senile leader who should have retired long ago. He said that the Chinese people would settle accounts some day with Mao for the errors Mao had committed with regard to Castro. He mocked the 22 February People's Daily reply to him, reiterated that the Chinese had engaged in attempted blackmail and subversion, repeated the charge that the CCP had continued to distribute propaganda in Cuba in defiance of a Cuban warning, and warned that should such activities continue he would limit the number of Chinese diplomats in Cuba to the number of Cuban diplomats in Peking. (This was in fact the action he had taken in 1960 to force a break in U.S. diplomatic relations with Cuba, and also the action the Albanians had taken in 1961 to accomplish the same end with the Soviet Union.) He gave added emphasis to the threat by suggesting that the Chinese were planning "to provoke a break with our country."

This threat apparently did the trick; the Chinese did not reply. Castro is the first and only national leader to attack Mao publicly by name without drawing a return attack in kind. Having refused to halt the public exchange with Cuba in January, the Chinese did halt it in March, under much more humiliating circumstances. They seem finally to have realized that there was a real possibility that Castro would indeed force them out of Cuba, thus depriving them of their only diplomatic presence in Latin America, which they had been so overjoyed to obtain in 1960.* Although Castro's restrictions

*Anna Louise Strong's Letter from China newsletter in late April stated that Castro's 8 February attack had used "epithets so extreme that diplomatic circles said he seemed to want to force a break." With good reason, it did not allude to his attack on Mao in March, in which the question of a diplomatic break was directly raised.

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had already considerably reduced the value of this base for Chinese activities in Latin America, its loss would still have been an enormous blow to the CCP and a great coup for the CPSU. Moreover, the Chinese were well aware that Castro was still cool to the Soviet idea of a world Communist conference without the CCP, that Castro was still carping publicly at what he regarded as Soviet cowardly unwillingness to take greater risks to defeat the United States in Vietnam, and that Castro was expanding daily a vendetta against the policies of many of the pro-Soviet Communist parties of Latin America. (More of these points later in Part III.) It would be folly to jeopardize any of these remaining advantages, despite all his anti-Chinese actions, by pushing him further into the CPSU orbit than he wished to go. What is surprising and instructive is that Mao in this one case, after having foolishly misjudged Castro and having pushed him to the very brink of a formal rupture, nevertheless was then able to exercise some restraint for the sake of self-interest. Mao’s retreat suggests that his irrational impulses are sometimes subordinated to prudence on the advice of Chou En-lai, especially when the effect of his irrational actions can be demonstrated to him to be clearly detrimental to a goal he considers of overriding importance.

e. The Departure of Robert Williams

Sino-Cuban hostilities continued, however, albeit in a lower key, and with the threat of a diplomatic break averted for the time being. The American Negro expatriate Robert Williams, who had long been broadcasting to the United States calls for racial violence over Cuban radio facilities, had begun to quarrel with Fidel Castro toward the end of 1965, for reasons which are not entirely clear but which appear to be at least partially related to Williams’ connections with the Chinese.*

*Williams, long a favorite of Chinese propaganda, had made two well-publicized visits to China in the fall of 1963 and the fall of 1964. Mao’s 8 August 1963 statement on U.S. “racism” was ostensibly issued in response to queries by Williams. Chinese propaganda (continued on next page)
In the fall of 1965 Castro had the printing of Williams' newsletter halted; in January 1966, Williams, prevented by Castro from participating in the Havana tri-continental conference, was vainly seeking Castro's permission to leave Cuba (presumably, to go to China); and on 16 March--three days after Castro's attack on Mao--Williams' thrice-weekly radio program, "Radio Free Dixie," was terminated by Castro. This sequence of events suggests that Williams (a) may have been having unauthorized dealings with the Chinese embassy, and (b) may have been fighting with the Cubans over the content of his propaganda, including, perhaps, the line he wished to take therein toward China. Eventually, Williams was allowed to leave Cuba, and in July 1966 duly arrived in Peking, where he has remained ever since, praising Mao unstintingly and alluding publicly to the iniquities of certain pseudo-revolutionaries. The Chinese presumably will now use him not only for propaganda purposes but also for whatever help he can give in providing an additional line of contacts with potential Mao-followers in the United States. (Figure F.)

Sporadic mutual sniping meanwhile went on from time to time between the Cubans and the Chinese and their friends. On 26 April Liao Cheng-chih asserted that the Latin American revolution could not be impeded by Moscow, by the U.S., or "by those anti-Chinese 'heroes' who put on such grand airs and pose as revolutionaries." On 5 May the Albanian Zeri i Popullit reprinted an attack on Castro by the pro-Chinese Communist party of Brazil which assailed him for betraying his revolution, for his hypocrisy in "pretending" to be independent, and for his insults to Mao. The Cubans then made a few acid comments on the more ridiculous aspects of the Chinese "cultural revolution." On 30 July the Cuban party organ Granma published a picture of Mao's Yangtse swim along with NCNA's remarkable caption and a notation on the world record for swimming. On 31 August Granma published some of the more egregious Chinese claims regarding the magical powers of Mao's thought and told the Chinese that they were in a "ludicrous position" and had always obscured his connection with Cuba, but in early 1966 NCNA and pro-Chinese parties began to allude publicly to his difficulties with Castro.
were giving "the enemies of socialism cause for ridicule, mockery, and raillery." Later, Cuban students in China (like those of nearly all other countries) were asked to leave because of the "great cultural revolution," and the Chinese students at Havana University did the same in December. Toward the end of 1966 the Cuban government is reported to have forbidden Cubans of Chinese descent to send food or clothing to anyone in China. The Sino-Cuban relationship had now frozen into pretty open hostility; yet direct public recriminations, by tacit mutual consent, were relatively rare—much rarer, as will be seen, than the polemics between the Cubans and the pro-Soviet Latin American Communists.

2. The Growing North Korean Attack on the CCP

a. The May Directive

The North Korean regime, which had preceded the Japanese Communists in the process of drawing apart from Peking in 1965, went much further after both the JCP and the Cubans had clashed with the Chinese, and at last began to issue direct attacks on the CCP through private channels which were repeated publicly in only slightly less outspoken form.

We have already seen that during Miyamoto's visit to North Korea in March 1966 he was evidently encouraged by Kim Il-sung to adhere to his insistence upon "unity-of-action" with the Soviets over Vietnam despite Chinese opposition. Kim told the delegation that Pham Van Dong had complained in a previous talk with him that the Chinese had persistently demanded that the DRV cut off receipt of all assistance from the USSR, and that they had sometimes become threatening in trying to enforce this demand.

If Kim was quoted accurately by the JCP, this allegation about the Chinese attributed to Pham Van Dong went beyond anything reported more directly from the North Vietnamese, or even anything the Soviets have explicitly charged. The statement is likely to have become exaggerated in the retelling. Nevertheless, it seems probable that the JCP discussed
Chou En-lai congratulates Robert Williams at a rally in Peking on 8 August 1966 after a Williams speech hailing the "Inspiration" to American Negroes of "our great leader and teacher, Chairman Mao Tse-tung." Williams vowed to "true revolutionaries throughout the world" that he would "set the last great stronghold of Yankee imperialism ablaze with our battle cry of Black Power."

Mao Tse-tung autographs a copy of Quotations from Chairman Mao for Williams during Peking celebrations of National Day, 1 October 1966.
with the North Koreans the question of Chinese pressures on North Vietnam in connection with Soviet aid, and Kim and Miyamoto are reported to have agreed to do their best to help North Vietnam resist unreasonable Chinese demands and threats.

After Miyamoto had departed, a Nodong Sinmun editorial warned against the dangers of both revisionism and dogmatism and thundered against attempts "to force a unilateral will upon fraternal parties," to "meddle in their internal affairs" or to "bring pressure upon them." A month later, the North Koreans were further annoyed when the Chinese torpedoed a conference on Vietnam scheduled to be held in Pyongyang in mid-May under the auspices of the World Federation of Democratic Youth. The Chinese in April objected to the attendance of "revisionists" supporting the "weak" Soviet policy on Vietnam and threatened to boycott the conference. The North Koreans had to put the conference off.

In the third week of May, the Korean Labor Party conveyed a directive on North Korean policy to the leadership of the Chosen Soren, its organization in Japan. This May directive said that since Khrushchev's ouster, the USSR had been trying to correct its revisionist errors, and that as this could only be accomplished gradually, the Soviet leadership should be allowed more time. It stated that the unity of the bloc was vital, and that the Chinese were obstructing that unity, particularly through its hostile attitude toward Soviet aid to North Vietnam. The directive attacked the Chinese for the positions they had taken toward both the Cubans and the Japanese Communists, and praised the Miyamoto leadership of the JCP for its "extremely independent position." Finally, the directive criticized the PKI for having overestimated its strength and ventured into ultra-left adventurism and said that the PKI's capability had been further weakened by interference from China.

In late May, very soon after this directive was handed down, Brezhnev and Kim Il-sung seem to have held a secret meeting in Vladivostok. One of the subjects they discussed is likely to have been an expansion of the Soviet military and economic aid
to North Korea reinstituted a year before. A North Korean economic delegation visited Moscow soon thereafter and on 22 June signed with much fanfare a new agreement on Soviet economic aid; with less fanfare, the North Korean Defense Minister and another Korean general simultaneously took a "vacation" in Moscow in the company of Malinovskiy. In addition to this, it is also probable that Brezhnev and Kim took the occasion to compare notes on the dual events that had just taken place in China: the purge of Peng Chen and of the CCP Propaganda Department, which was then in the process of being revealed; and the simultaneous reappearance of Mao Tse-tung after his long absence from public view, accompanied by far more extravagant claims for his status as leader of the world Communist movement than had ever been made before.

b. The July Directive

Seven weeks after the Brezhnev-Kim meeting, on 20 July, the North Korean party bestowed a new and important private directive upon the Chosen Soren. This was a broad, basic policy document of the North Korean party; it covered much the same ground as a subsequent article published in Nodong Sinmun on 12 August asserting Pyongyang's independence of both the CPSU and the CCP, but which went into much greater detail in criticizing both.

This July directive to Chosen Soren began by explaining both the virtues and faults of the current Soviet leadership. The Soviet Union was depicted as having been gradually reoriented, since Khrushchev's fall, back to a Marxist-Leninist course, both internally (e.g., by "correcting the erroneous appraisal of Stalin") and internationally. The North Korean party found that the Soviets still clung to peaceful coexistence, "but only to a limited degree," since the Soviets were now supporting the national liberation movement, "which Khrushchev not only ignored but undermined," and since the Soviets
were now boosting their national defense, which Khrushchev implicitly had neglected.*

Nevertheless, the Soviets still had considerable faults: the North Koreans (like Castro) did not like the Soviet "preoccupation with profit-making" (i.e., Kosygin's economic policies); nor, the short hours worked by Soviet workers; nor, Soviet participation in the United Nations; nor, Soviet dealings with the Japanese Sato government (which the North Koreans and the JCP had already criticized publicly); nor, Soviet failure to bring real pressure in Europe against West Germany, a failure which was "enabling the United States to pursue her policy of aggression in Asia"; nor, Soviet courtship of the "imperialist" de Gaulle; nor, Soviet siding with India (which Pyongyang regarded as "a tool of the United States") against China. In short, Soviet revisionist tendencies, while definitely being corrected, had not yet been "completely overcome."

The Chinese sins were viewed as much more serious. The Chinese Communists were said to be "treading a very dangerous path today." They had "turned to extreme leftist adventurism" and were "attempting to impose their line of thinking on Communist parties of other countries."

This Korean party directive assailed the CCP bitterly and at great length for the Chinese attitude toward the Soviet Union and for the Chinese obstructive attitude toward unity over Vietnam. The directive attacked Mao personally for the purge of Chinese intellectuals then in progress, called this another manifestation of Mao's "extreme leftism," and avowed anxiety over the harmful effect the "great cultural revolution" might have on the attitude of intellectuals toward the Communists in other countries--particularly, of course, Korean intellectuals in Japan and South Korea. (The JCP had similar well-founded worries about the effect on Japanese intellectuals.)

*More to the point, the North Koreans could have mentioned (but did not) the post-Khrushchev Soviet help to their national defense.
The July directive went into considerable detail in denouncing Chinese "big-power pressure on weaker countries" and interference in the internal affairs of others. The Korean party said that the Chinese had applied economic pressure on Castro in a vain effort to bring the Cubans under their influence, and that they had done this not because of any trade problems but because Castro was obstructing the Chinese effort "to dominate the Communist movement in Latin America." The Koreans revealed that their party had attempted "to caution the Chinese about their excesses in dealing with the Cubans" (presumably, in a secret letter), but said that this had gone unheeded.

The Korean party directive cited Chou En-lai's unsuccessful attempt to force Chinese anti-Soviet views on Rumania during his visit there in June 1966. It described Chinese "Trotskyite" efforts to force the Japanese party to launch an armed uprising, and added that "in this connection, it should be remembered that Peking is also responsible for the Indonesian debacle." And finally, it revealed that the Chinese had objected to the Koreans sending a delegation to the 23rd CPSU Congress in March and had "applied all sorts of pressures," but that the Korean party "did not and will not tolerate their meddling" in Korean internal affairs. In short, the North Koreans categorically rejected the Chinese efforts to place "Ma0 Tse-tung in Stalin's former position as the leader of the Communist world."

Three weeks after this, the North Koreans set these views forth for the world at large (in much less explicit form) in a Nodong Sinmun editorial entitled "Let Us Defend Our Independence." An Akahata editorial soon thereafter spelled out a similar position for the JCP, and the two statements may well have been coordinated. Vehemently insisting that all Communist parties should stop worshiping "everything concerning the great powers" and should assert their independence, the Nodong Sinmun editorial took what was by now the customary North Korean line toward the Soviets and Chinese; a measure of criticism for the CPSU, and much more for the major offender, the CCP.
The Chinese response to the private and public North Korean assertions of independence was, as usual, absolutely unyielding. In early September, the CCP took the occasion of the North Korean national day—otherwise sharply downgraded by Peking—to lecture the North Koreans to their faces. Speaking at a Korean embassy anniversary reception in Peking, Chen Yi once again informed the Koreans that "true revolutionaries must draw a line of demarcation between themselves and the revisionists, must expose them as scabs, and on no account take united action with them." The use of the Korean embassy as a rostrum from which to repeat these views was undoubtedly viewed by Kim Il-sung as another example of Chinese arrogance and effrontery.

c. Kim's October 1966 Report

Early in October, Kim delivered a report to a Korean party conference in which he once again paid his respects to both the fraternal great powers. "Modern revisionism" and "left opportunism" were each duly chastised; and both the Soviets and the Chinese were upbraided for attempting to influence North Vietnamese policy in the war, when, according to Kim, their only proper function was to humbly assist Hanoi to do whatever it decided to do. The Soviets were subjected to thinly-veiled criticism for their "weakness against imperialism" and for still showing a somewhat "passive approach" to revolutionary struggle; the Chinese were again implicitly condemned for their rejection of "joint action" and for urging "extremist action under super-revolutionary slogans."

Kim contemptuously rejected both the Soviet claim to be the leading party (still being advanced by proxy for the CPSU by such henchmen as the Bulgarians) and the more aggressively advanced Chinese claim to be the "center of world revolution." He warned that "no one should make exaggerated or distorted appraisals of any fraternal country or party," or place any such party "in the same category as the enemy." This was primarily aimed at the CCP, which was by far the worst offender in this regard; but by now it also applied to a considerable extent to the CPSU, which since the late summer had been exploiting the Chinese "cultural revolution" as the
occasion to return to sharper and sharper public attacks on the Chinese leadership, and which was now privately calling Mao a "fascist." Finally, Kim reiterated his traditional opposition to the Soviet project for a world conference without the Chinese, which the CPSU by now had also revived.

This doling out of reprimands to both Moscow and Peking by Kim did not prevent Korean-Soviet relations from growing steadily closer and Korean-Chinese relations from growing steadily more hostile. North Korean statements on education in September and November strongly implied Pyongyang's disavowal of what was being done to intellectuals and teachers in China, emphasized the Korean rejection of "subjective rashness of all hues," and swore eternal opposition to "flunkeyism," a new category of Marxist-Leninist deviation which the North Koreans and the Japanese Communists never tired of denouncing.*

d. North Korea and the International Fronts

In 1965, the North Koreans had begun to abstain during Sino-Soviet clashes in international front organizations; in 1966, they began to support the Soviets more and more frequently (although not invariably). In June 1966, North Korea accepted election to one of the vice-presidencies of the World Federation of Democratic Youth after North Vietnam had declined because of a reluctance to be forced to take sides in Sino-Soviet infighting in the WFDY. Pyongyang was not reluctant. In November, a Korean editorial praised the WFDY, the International Union of Students, "and other international democratic organizations"--all supervised by Ponomarev's section of the CPSU central committee--for their support for "the just struggle of the Vietnamese people." This was precisely what the Chinese were denying that these Soviet-run organizations were doing.

*In a related development, the North Vietnamese in September 1966 called on party theoreticians to multiply their labors to produce native theoretical works untainted by harmful foreign influences to justify North Vietnamese policies and actions.
In early February 1967, the North Koreans told the Japanese Communists that they would attend the 13 February Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) Council session in Nicosia, and urged the Japanese party to see that their own relevant front organization attended. The Chinese were boycotting this session, because they (and everyone else) knew that the Soviets planned to use the occasion to transfer the site of the scheduled 1967 Fifth AAPSO Conference away from Peking, the site previously ordained. The Japanese did attend,* the Soviets did succeed in transferring the site (and in purging some Chinese-backed member organizations), the North Koreans and Japanese cooperated in these actions, and the Chinese subsequently roared in protest, vowing to hold their own "genuine" AAPSO Conference in Peking anyway. Thus the North Koreans and the JCP assisted the CPSU in eliminating Chinese influence from AAPSO—which they had once almost dominated—and in leaving the CCP with only a rump of sycophants from the former AAPSO to attend their Peking meeting. This was a further severe blow to Chinese influence, particularly among African radicals.

*The JCP first took the precaution of purging the Japanese representative on the AAPSO Secretariat, who had been showing dangerous pro-Chinese tendencies.
Korean party contacts with the CPSU continued to grow more frequent. In February 1967, a public visit to Moscow was made by a North Korean delegation headed by first deputy premier Kim Il; as in the public visit the previous summer, a top Korean Defense Ministry official also came to talk to Malinovskiy.

e. The Red Guard Attacks on Kim

Finally, there were public Sino-Korean insults in early 1967. In mid-January, Red Guard posters observed in Peking by Japanese correspondents, a report from and IL testified that hostile rumors about the North Korean regime were being widely circulated among the Red Guards. Two wall poster versions of these rumors were picked up by foreign news media and disseminated throughout the world; one, that there had been a coup in North Korea in which Kim Il-sung had been deposed by the army; the other, that Deputy Premier Kim Kwang-hyop had been arrested. Both these reports were false.

It is true, however, that there had been a quiet purge not long before this in Pyongyang. After Nodong Sinmun in August had hinted that something would have to be done about North Koreans still tainted with "flunkeyism" (i.e., overly pro-Chinese or pro-Soviet leanings), Kim Il-sung partially re-organized the party structure and leadership at the October party conference, dropping several politburo members (not including Kim Kwang-hyop, the man later mentioned by the Red Guards). It is probable that internal Chinese Foreign Ministry documents had been written commenting on this purge. It is known
(from bitter complaints by Chou En-lai and others) that in January 1967 Red Guards were "supervising" and intimidating Chinese Foreign Ministry personnel, running wild within the ministry and doing much to obstruct its work. It is possible that Foreign Ministry Red Guards saw some documents discussing the October Korean conference or speculating on other Korean inner-party differences and reported a garbled version of this in wall newspapers for the world to see. Chou subsequently attempted to disavow the January wall newspaper statements about Korea.

The North Koreans, however, held the Chinese regime responsible. On 26 January an unprecedented step was taken: KCNA issued an "authorized statement" denouncing the "false propaganda" within China "that something like a 'coup' had broken out and that political unrest had been created in our country." Insisting on the unity of the Korean party and the reliability of the army, KCNA warned that "such false propaganda should not be repeated."

It was repeated, however. On 19 February--a week after First Deputy Premier Kim Il left Pyongyang leading a delegation on a public visit to Moscow--many posters, signed by "Chinese soldiers who were participants in the Korean war," were put up in the center of Peking attacking Kim Il-sung personally and violently. The posters accused him of betraying Marxism-Leninism, of following revisionist policies, and of being "Khrushchev's disciple." Whatever had happened in January, there could be no mistaking the authenticity and authoritativeness of these February posters--particularly since it was just at this time that Chinese Communist official propaganda dropped the last veil in its attacks on the Japanese Communist party. It is probable that the decision to have these posters put up was made by Mao.

The North Koreans responded in late February by holding simultaneous press conferences at their embassies in capitals throughout the world--a procedure designed to attract more attention than the KCNA January statement had done. At these press conferences, embassy spokesmen read a prepared statement
asserting that the Red Guard "lies" had been authorized by the Chinese leadership, saying that it was the Chinese who were revisionists, that the Chinese were slandering North Korea because they did not like Pyongyang's independent policies, and that North Korea would adhere to those policies and "never yield to external pressure."

A few weeks later, on 7 April 1967, the president of the Japan-Korea Society was privately told by Kim Il-sung in Pyongyang that the CPR had shown tendencies toward "big power chauvinism" regarding North Korea. Kim said that he could not tolerate this attitude and that if it became stronger, North Korea would take "appropriate action." Now the North Koreans, too, had come full circle.

3. The North Vietnamese - North Korean - Japanese - Cuban Axis

Throughout 1966, as the North Korean, Japanese, and Cuban parties each became more and more estranged from the Chinese, an informal political alliance among these three leading radicals became more and more overt. A former member of this radical group--the North Vietnamese party--shared fully the views of the other three, but differed in one important respect: it was unable to speak out publicly as unequivocally as the others on most issues because of its dependence upon the Soviet Union and Communist China for assistance in the war. The North Koreans, Japanese, and Cubans have more than made up for the North Vietnamese reticence.

These three independent radicals (and their relatively silent partner, the North Vietnamese) have a common outlook on these two basic points:

1) Uncompromising opposition to pretensions by either the CPSU or the CCP to have the right to give orders or guidance to the world movement, and particularly to them.
2) Uncompromising hostility to the United States, deriving primarily from a direct clash of the private interests of each of these parties with those of the United States. A corollary has been a constant clamor against any actions of either omission or commission, by either the Soviet Union or Communist China, which appeared to injure the cause of the struggle against "U.S. imperialism.*

On the first point the views of these independent radical Communists coincide with those of the Rumanians and Yugoslavs (and to a lesser extent to those of several other parties of Eastern and Western Europe).

On the second point their views do not match those of the Rumanians at all—as a JCP delegation to Bucharest was naively surprised to discover in the spring of 1966—and in most respects are even further from those of the Yugoslavs.

In consequence of the first point, the radical independent parties oppose any attempt by either the Soviets or Chinese to put pressure on Hanoi regarding policy in the Vietnam war. They reject Mao's claim to be the leader of the world Communist movement, reject the supremacy of Maoist doctrine, ridicule the supposed magical quality of Mao's thoughts, deplore the excesses of the "great cultural revolution," and

*The most recent such manifestation occurred in the context of the Arab-Israeli war of June 1967. The Cuban Government on 7 June issued a statement denouncing the cease-fire resolution adopted by the UN Security Council (including the USSR) as "imposing a surrender to imperialist aggression." North Korean and North Vietnamese propaganda during the crisis week each repeated the Egyptian charge—suppressed by the Soviets—that United States and British forces had actively participated in the war on the Israeli side.

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oppose any attempt to export that revolution.* At the same time, they oppose any attempt by the CPSU to represent its views as the "general line" of the world movement, and they continue to stand fast against CPSU attempts to generate a world Communist conference without Peking which the CPSU would then try to use to expand the present limits of Soviet influence and authority.

In consequence of the second point, they demand militant unity of action from all revolutionaries against the United States, particularly in support of the North Vietnamese war effort. Therefore they condemn Chinese obstruction of cooperation with the USSR over Vietnam, and approve Soviet professions of support for the unity line. At the same time, they criticize both Peking and Moscow—and particularly the Soviet Union—for their unwillingness to make greater efforts and to take serious "risks" to defeat the United States in Vietnam. (Castro in particular has made this point repeatedly.) Moreover, they take a dim view of any and all Soviet dealings with the United States. Further, they object loudly to any Soviet dealings with capitalist governments friendly to the United States and hostile to themselves (e.g., the Chilean and Venezuelan governments in the case of Castro, the Japanese Government in the case of the JCP and the North Koreans). They all remain on bad terms with Yugoslavia, which they still regard as symbolizing the "soft" elements in Soviet policy. And finally, Castro in particular has never ceased to demand the use of violent tactics against many of the Latin American governments friendly to the United States, and to push this demand, as in Venezuela, even to the point of an open break with pro-CPSU Communist parties.**

*For example, Akahata on 9 February 1967 explicitly denied the universality of Mao's thought, said that forcing Mao's thought on other Communist parties constituted "undue interference," placed Mao's works on a par with those of Ho Chi Minh as having some value for Japanese Communists, and reserved the right to criticize Mao's thought wherever appropriate.

**The Japanese party, however, may eventually become rather embarrassed by what Castro is doing with...
In addition, this group of radical parties continues to take a hard-nosed, hostile attitude toward "revisionist" economic practices in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe: what they regard as over-emphasis on profit-making, on shorter working hours, on material interest to the detriment of ideological exhortation, or on consumer goods production. (Here, too, Yugoslavia is the supreme bogey.) North Korea, North Vietnam, and Cuba, sharing a "garrison state" mentality, welcome every step the Soviet Union takes to increase the relative priority given to military expenditures in resource allocations, and deplore every sign of backsliding toward Khrushchev's "goulash Communism."

In short, this hard core of radical neutrals in the world Communist movement have changed few of the views they upheld in Khrushchev's day (see Part I, pages 1-10).* The main change that has occurred has been their recognition of the shift in Soviet policy and their consequent alienation from the Chinese Communists—or rather, the Chinese rejection of them for their refusal to submit totally to Mao, despite the fact that even yet so many of their views and interests inevitably remain closer to those of the CCP than of the CPSU. They today constitute a mutually supporting group who praise one another at every opportunity and unite in pressing their shared views upon the two Communist great powers.

the Latin American Communist parties. There is no much difference between the Chinese intervention in JCP internal affairs in support of the Shida group's militant line, on the one hand, and Castro's intervention in Venezuelan party affairs in support of the anti-party militant dissidents led by Bravo, on the other. The Japanese are very sensitive on the subject of anti-party splinter groups supported from the outside, and in the past have refused to have dealings with Grippa's Chinese-financed Belgium splinter party for that reason.

*The Indonesian party, the other leading member of this group considered in Part I of this paper, has of course removed itself as a significant factor for the time being.
Because Communist China has virtually written off all of them but the North Vietnamese as parties with which the CCP wishes to have anything like friendly dealings, and because the Soviets, on the contrary, have actively courted them all, their leverage on CPSU policy is now much greater than their leverage on Chinese policy. While the Soviets have disregarded their wishes on some matters where overriding Soviet interests appear (as in the cases of disarmament negotiations with the United States and Soviet dealings with the Japanese, Chilean, and Venezuelan governments), the Soviets have shown themselves very loath to quarrel with them even when directly criticized—and even, as will be seen with Castro, where CPSU supporters are being directly undermined. There is little doubt that the tone of vituperative Soviet propaganda regarding the United States today is strongly influenced by the Soviet felt need for protection against the pressures from these radical independent parties (and from others with similar views), and it is at least questionable that this felt need would disappear if the Vietnam war were to end.

Over the short term, the objective conflicts of interest between the United States and the four leading independent radical Communist parties appear to be virtually irreconcilable. This is particularly true in the cases of the two divided countries, Vietnam and Korea. Whether the Vietnamese war goes on indefinitely or is halted, North Vietnamese political hostility toward the United States is most unlikely ever to end while Hanoi lacks the complete control of all of South Vietnam so desperately coveted. Nor is there much that the United States can do to change the North Korean attitude toward the U.S., short of placing South Korea under Kim Il-sung's control (the central remaining goal of his life). It is improbable that any amount of proffered economic aid, for example, would in the next few years outweigh political fanaticism of this intensity united with nationalism. With Castro, the issue is less certain, but he has now gone so far with organizational efforts to promote revolution in Latin America that it has become unlikely that he would halt those
efforts even if the United States were to offer to humiliate itself as fully as he has demanded and recognize him on his terms. Finally, the Japanese Communist leaders, whose views remain heavily influenced by Chinese Communist habits of thought despite their bitter quarrel with the CCP, are ideologically inclined toward hatred of the United States, and are moreover convinced that loud, fervent hostility to the United States is essential to the multiplication of their influence in Japan and is a vehicle on the road to power. They are unlikely to change this view in the next few years, and it is hard to see what the U.S. could do in Japan to change it.

In short, the Communist leaders in each of these four countries are motivated by one overwhelming desire which is being blocked in part or whole by the United States and which they feel cannot be compromised. Future Communist leaderships in each country may come to feel differently, but even this is uncertain, and in any case, is a question well in the future.

Given these facts, and given the apparent leverage of these parties upon Soviet policy, it also seems apparent that the independence which the radical neutrals have developed is pernicious to the interests of United States policy, which might, ironically, be better served if each of these parties was a satellite whose interests the CPSU could arbitrarily sacrifice at will, Stalin-fashion, for the sake of its own national interests.*

*Contrariwise, of course, the independence of neutral moderate parties such as the Romanians and Yugoslavs—to the limited degree that they exercise any leverage on Soviet policy—is helpful to U.S. policy.
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