INTELLIGENCE STUDY

ZANZIBAR: THE HUNDRED DAYS' REVOLUTION
(ESAU XXX)

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
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ZANZIBAR: THE HUNDRED DAYS' REVOLUTION

This is a working paper, the first in a series of ESAU studies to examine a given revolutionary situation. Because the ESAU studies are primarily concerned with Sino-Soviet relations and with the world Communist movement in the context of the Sino-Soviet dispute, we have treated the subject of Zanzibar-Bloc relations in particular detail in this paper.

We have had many useful comments on this paper from the Department of State, from several officers of the DD/P, and from OCI. The DDI/RS would welcome additional comment, addressed to Helen-Louise Hunter, who wrote the paper, or to the Chief or Deputy Chief of the Staff.
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Summary and Conclusions

After 73 years of British rule, Zanzibar became Africa's smallest independent nation in December 1963. Its Arab-dominated government, which the British had favored, lasted just three weeks. On 12 January 1964, it was overthrown by force, in a revolution that seems in retrospect to have been all but inevitable but which apparently came as a great surprise to the West.

The government of Ali Muhsin (a minority government in the sense of a political minority as well as a national minority) had always seemed to be sitting on the edge of a volcano. National elections in 1961 and 1963 had greatly exacerbated tensions arising from deep ethnic divisions, the limitations of a poorly endowed economy, and the intrigues of emerging Communist-trained politicians. The British had done little to ease these tensions. They had not contributed much to Zanzibar's political stability (e.g., by training leaders) and they had helped to keep in power a coalition Arab government that had less than majority support from the overwhelmingly African population. They had done little more to prepare Zanzibar economically for independence, either in the way of diversifying the economy, correcting the extreme inequalities of wealth, or increasing production. Finally, they had not closely controlled the subversive activities of the Bloc, which became active in Zanzibar around 1960-61.

It now seems clear that sometime around 1959-60 the Communists decided that Zanzibar offered them a particularly favorable opportunity for expanding their influence in Africa. Because of its small size and strategic location, the island was a manageable enterprise that could be developed apart from mainland Africa, in relative isolation and secrecy; yet, it was close enough to the mainland to serve as a springboard for Communist operations there. The political instability that was endemic to the area created an ideal situation for Communist
penetration. Moreover, the Bloc had assets on the island. By 1959 or 1960, it had made contact with a small number of Zanzibaris, some of whom were well-placed, who were already proving useful in promoting Bloc interests in their homeland. For all these reasons, Zanzibar appears to have become a prime target of the Communists in Africa; some of the Bloc's earliest efforts in Africa were focused there.

The first Bloc contacts with Zanzibaris had been made in England, where some 200 Zanzibaris were enrolled in various courses of study each year. The Soviets, working through the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB), had been the first to make contact with the overseas Zanzibar students in the mid-1950's. The Chinese entered the picture in the late 1950's, initially, at least, supporting individuals already chosen by the CPGB and the CPSU. The future Arab radical leader Babu was one of the overseas Zanzibar students who was contacted by the Chinese in London; he had had earlier associations with the Soviets, but he switched his allegiance to China after the Chinese offered him a large subsidy for his journalistic and other political activities in Zanzibar.

As late as 1959-60, Communism was virtually unknown in Zanzibar. There could have been no more than a dozen or so individuals—who had returned to Zanzibar from England—who were at all familiar with the teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, or Mao. In the four years before the revolution, however, the growth in Communist influence and activity was remarkable. Beginning around 1959, large quantities of Communist ideological material were imported into Zanzibar; book stalls openly sold or gave away free-of-charge a wide variety of books, papers, and pamphlets published in the USSR or China. The first regular African language program broadcast by the Bloc to Africa was one in Swahili, transmitted by Moscow to Zanzibar in February 1960. A year and a half later, Peking inaugurated a Swahili program of its own. During the next three years, the radio barrage broadcast to Zanzibar grew steadily more intense.
In a short period of time (1960-1963), Bloc contacts with Zanzibar nationals multiplied rapidly beyond the few leaders first contacted abroad. Around 1959-60, the Communists began formal training of Africans at schools and universities in the various Bloc countries. With little regard to the academic qualification of the students and with minimal administrative delay, they took increasingly large numbers of Zanzibaris—with or without passports. Whereas in October 1959, only two Zanzibaris were reported to be studying in the Bloc, in November 1962 there were 141 and in September 1963 about 110. There is no doubt that a large part of the training in Bloc countries consisted of Communist indoctrination; and, at least in Cuba and China, Zanzibaris are known to have been trained in military tactics and in the art of revolution.

It is impossible to give reliable figures for the total cost of the Communist effort in Zanzibar during these years. The principal items were the travel and study grants, for which the fares alone were estimated at $70,000 in 1962. The total investment may have been somewhere in the neighborhood of $100,000 yearly.

It was not a coordinated investment, however, and not a united effort on the part of the Communist world. Not only were the Soviets and Chinese apparently working without reference to one another’s efforts, but they were actually in competition with one another—in that they were supporting different individuals and organizations which were in active opposition to one another on the local scene. Since there was no organized Communist party in Zanzibar, Moscow and Peking both worked through Zanzibar's leading political parties and other established organizations such as the trade unions and the youth federations. What was not generally recognized at the time was the degree to which the Russians were concentrating their efforts on the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) and its affiliated organizations (i.e., the Africans) and the Chinese on the Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP) and its affiliates (i.e., the Arabs).
There was not a complete separation of efforts; that is, the Soviets did not work only with the leftist elements in the ASP, and the Chinese did not work only with the radicals in the ZNP. Especially in the earlier years, the Soviets avoided exclusive association with or commitment to any one party, no doubt because no one had emerged with prospects of decisive success in the near future. Their increasing concentration on the ASP in the years just before the revolution probably indicated either a growing recognition on their part of the long-run disadvantage in being associated with an Arab minority which was as unpopular on the East African mainland as it was on Zanzibar, or a re-evaluation of the more immediate prospects of the ASP in Zanzibar. The only Zanzibaris known to have received funds from the Soviets after 1959 or 1960 up to the revolution were Africans--men like Hanga and Moyo, who were leaders in the ASP-supported Zanzibar and Pemba Federation of Labor (ZPFL). Only the ASP had an office in Moscow, and its affiliate organizations normally represented Zanzibar at meetings of the Soviet-controlled international front organizations. To get a scholarship for study in the USSR it was virtually a requirement that the student be an ASP supporter.

To a much greater extent than was true for the Soviets, the Chinese position in Zanzibar was dependent on one man--Babu, the general secretary of the ZNP and editor of the newsheet Zanews. With Babu as their opening wedge, the Chinese concentrated their efforts on developing good relations with the ZNP. By mid-1962, virtually every ZNP government minister had been invited to China, if he had not already gone, or had received gifts from Peking. It was always the ZNP or its affiliate front organizations such as the World Conference Against Nuclear and Hydrogen Bombs, held annually in Japan. In their almost total commitment to the ZNP, the Chinese had apparently accepted the advantage of securing an East African base at the cost of alienating pan-African goodwill. In Zanzibar, the first African country in which they had attempted to play a really active role in African affairs, they had actually succeeded in attaining a competitive position with the Russians; each had infiltrated one major political party and rival trade union and youth
federation. In deciding to give their support to the ZNP, however, the Chinese had seriously misjudged the power balance in Zanzibar.

The elections of June 1963 had returned to power an Arab coalition government (a coalition of the ZNP and the Zanzibar and Pemba People's Party /ZPPPP/) which had managed to win a majority of the seats in the Legislative Council, although it had not won a majority of the popular votes. For some months before the revolution, Zanzibar's Africans had been seething with discontent over the fact that a party with an over-all majority (the ASP) could be sent into opposition because of what was obviously an unfair boundary delimitation system. While moderate leaders in the party such as Othman Shariff and Karume tried to persuade their followers that an arrangement could be made that would give "the majority" a share in the government, Hanga and other radical Afro-Shirazi labor and youth leaders were arguing that the majority would, in the last resort, have to rely on violence; they consistently pressed Karume to adopt a more militant stand.

It was at this point that Hanga and his group of radical trade union leaders in the ASP began to make plans to overthrow the government, although this fact was not reported until after the revolution. Sometime in mid-1963, probably soon after the June elections, a group of ASP leaders, including Hanga, went to Tanganyika to ask for money and arms in support of their revolutionary plan. Tanganyikan complicity with the ASP has been well established. Although President Nyerere may not have been aware of the extent to which Tanganyikan Defense Minister Kambona was involved in supplying arms and money to the Zanzibar revolutionaries, he obviously knew and approved of the general plan for the revolution. Apparently, the coup was planned for March or April 1964. The most important figure in the plot was Hanga; Karume personally was never involved; it is doubtful that O. Shariff knew of the plan.

While moderate leaders of the Arab-dominated ZNP, like their moderate counterparts in the ASP, were working
with the British towards peaceful independence, a minority of extremists in the ZNP was also insisting on the need for "violent revolution." In the spring of 1963, the agitation of ZNP radicals like Ali Sultan Issa and Qual-latein was boosted considerably by the reappearance of Babu, who had been in jail since June 1962 on a charge of sedition. Finding his position in the party considerably weakened by his long absence in jail, Babu resigned his position as general secretary of the ZNP and announced his intention of forming a new political party called the Umma Party. With the formation of the Umma Party in June 1963, Babu and his Arab extremist following of some 300 persons were no longer under the restraint of the more moderate leadership of the ZNP. At private meetings of the party during the fall of 1963, its members (mainly Communist-trained youths) are known to have advocated the violent overthrow of the government and the nationalization of all land and industry.

We may still not know the full extent of the preparations that the Umma Party was making for a revolution. In mid-December 1963, just one month before the revolution, Babu returned to Zanzibar after more than three months in Peking. During that time he is suspected of having participated in a course in military tactics; when his Umma Party headquarters were searched in early January, the police seized large quantities of documents including a diary written in Peking that contained a full description of the methods for the overthrow of a government by violence. During the three-month period from October to December, the Umma Party is reported to have brought a supply of arms and ammunition to Zanzibar which were concealed in different spots on the island.

Although during the last six months before the revolution there were some indications that the Umma Party and the radical ASP party members were beginning to work together for the first time on matters of common concern, such as the trade unions, and though each group is known to have had its own plans for a revolution, there is no evidence that there was ever any consultation between the two parties in their revolutionary planning. Press reports which lumped together Karume, Babu, and Hanga in a
plot to overthrow the government were completely unfounded. It is, of course, possible—and it seems to have been the case—that the revolutionaries in the Umma Party and in the ASP knew of the actions envisaged by the other group.

Two things happened during the last month before the revolution that had a direct effect on the timing of the revolution. Ali Muhsin, the leader of the ZNP and a minister in the government, made two highly publicized trips to Cairo, one just before and one just after Zanzibar's accession to independence on 12 December 1963—a very indiscreet thing for him to have done at that particular time. The trips were linked with a rumor that the government was importing arms from Egypt for a planned mass arrest of ASP leaders on 13 January. This only served to reinforce African suspicions of the pro-Arab intentions of a government which seemed, to them, to be accelerating its program of Arabization of the police, civil service, and other institutions. Anti-government feeling was further heightened by a police raid on the headquarters of Babu's Umma Party, shortly after the party had been declared unlawful on 4 January. The radicals in both the Umma and ASP parties saw this as an indication that the hitherto complacent government was preparing to crack down on the extensive growth of revolutionary activity on the island. It lent credence to the rumor that the government was preparing a similar raid on the ASP, after receipt of the Egyptian arms.

The notion that the banning of the Umma Party led Babu and his followers into armed revolt is probably the main misconception about the Zanzibar revolution. Almost without exception, articles in the press and also the reports of the Western intelligence community (which were prepared on the basis of early reporting after the coup and did not have the advantage of the many facts which have come to light since then) emphasized the central role of Babu in the coup. As the leading Zanzibar nationalist, who had served time in jail for "seditious activities," and the most outspoken critic of the West, who was known to have Chinese Communist contacts, Babu was the obvious suspect in a plot to overthrow the government. However, there is no convincing evidence that he played any significant
part in the revolution. Although he may have known of ASP planning for a revolution, he apparently had no advance knowledge of the coup that materialized on 12 January. He was in Dar es Salaam at the time and, by all accounts, was completely surprised by events in Zanzibar. During the course of the fighting, some of his followers joined the ranks of the rebels, wearing special ribbons so they could be distinguished from other Arabs on the island, but they do not seem to have played any part in the initial attacks in the early morning hours.

Not only was Babu not directly involved in the revolution of 12 January, but there is some question as to whether he would have approved the timing of the revolt. After his return from China in December, it was noticeable that speeches at the various private meetings of the Umma Party no longer advocated the overthrow of the government. Babu himself is reported to have told his followers to give up their talk of violence (presumably, just for the short term); he urged the formation of a united front with all opposition parties, including the ASP—a united front in which the Umma Party would have the predominant influence. There is a supposition that the Chinese may have encouraged him along these lines. It is quite possible that they became nervous at the prospect of Babu's staging a revolution that would have been primarily the work of an Arab minority. Thus they may have become anxious to ensure African support for a Babu-led revolution, and may have advised Babu to form a united front with the other opposition parties and to postpone the revolution until he could be assured of broader popular support.

The great majority of the reports on the revolution trace the events of the revolution from the same starting point: the ASP fete that was held at ASP party headquarters on the night of Saturday, 11 January 1964. Apparently, the revolution started as the spontaneous action of the Africans at the fete. It was triggered by a rumor that the government planned mass arrests of ASP leaders the following Monday. A number of disgruntled ex-members of the Zanzibar police force, who were at the fete, probably played the major role in inciting the
crowd to the point of action against the government. As former police officers, they knew where the police arms were stored and how best to gain access to the armories. (Their familiarity with the security procedures of the police armories contributed in large measure to the success of the coup.) They appear to have got the crowd to follow them—right then—in an attack on the government's strongholds.

It is possible that John Okello, the hitherto unknown individual who was to emerge from obscurity to a position of power in the government on the strength of his military prowess in the fighting, was at the fete and somehow contributed to the timing of the revolution with his wild talk of revolution. This possibility is suggested by the several reports that state that at the time of the revolution Okello had a following of some 200 to 600 persons (which could refer to the Africans at the fete) whom he was prepared to lead in an attack on the government. It may also explain Okello's apparent claim to a position in the government as one of the main instigators of the revolution. However, not one report of the fete mentions his having been there; he does not appear on the scene on the night of the revolution until later, and then only as the leader of the first successful raid (on the Ziwani police armory), not as a central figure. In view of the Zanzibaris' natural aversion to fighting it is as a street fighter would naturally have won him the adulation of the people and could easily have plummed him into a position of power afterwards. It seems clear that Okello had no plans for a revolution and did not even play an important part in getting the crowd to follow him in an attack on the government. He did, however, contribute significantly to the success of the coup in military terms. Without his example of bravery, the ASP rebels might well have held back from actual combat with the government forces.

Apparently, Hanga and Karume and other ASP leaders learned of the excited state of the Africans at the fete and went down to ASP headquarters to see what was happening. It seems fairly well established that they did address
the crowd that evening. Thus, Karume was involved to some extent in the actual events of the revolution, although he had not been party to the previous coup planning of Hanga and the radical element in the ASP.

In summary, although there was multiple planning for a revolution in Zanzibar, the revolution that actually materialized on the morning of 12 January was not that planned by either Babu and his Umma Party or Hanga and his ASP group. It was more of a spontaneous action. Basically, it was an African revolution to put Africans in control of a country which they felt was in the hands of a racial minority only because of an unfair constituency system. Whereas the government might have averted it if it had taken the ASP into a government coalition--as many Ministers on both sides wanted--the policy of the government provoked an explosion. Although they had not planned the revolution for that time nor exactly that way, Hanga and the other ASP leaders seized the opportunity when it presented itself. Babu and his followers jumped on the bandwagon; and the uneducated and ideologically unsophisticated Okello simply emerged by historical accident, the military hero of the day.

The military actions of the revolution are well-known. The fighting lasted less than 12 hours. After they had gained access to the first police armory, where most of the government arms were stored, the rebels easily took control of the cable office, the airstrip, and the radio station, in that order. By late afternoon, the government machinery was virtually paralyzed. In retrospect, it can be seen that the Arab regime in Zanzibar was ready to fall at a push. The police, the government's only security force, was largely disaffected and did not fight well in the government's defense. Though it probably could not have been foreseen that it would be quite so easy to topple the government, the Zanzibar revolution suggests how little it may take to stage a coup in many of the African countries today. In this regard, the Chinese have used the Zanzibar revolution as a model for the African revolution; on several occasions they have suggested to other Africans that they follow the Zanzibar pattern of a "do-it-yourself
revolution" (i.e. first raid their own police barracks for arms, then stage an uprising, and immediately apply to the Chinese for help). Since the Zanzibar revolution in no way corresponded to the Chinese model for a revolution except in the very general sense of a resort to armed force, the Chinese have emphasized this one feature that the two revolutions had in common, and they have further held up the way in which the Zanzibar revolutionaries obtained their arms as a worthy example to other African revolutionaries.

The Zanzibar revolution was almost certainly the main inspiration for the army mutinies that broke out in the neighboring East African states of Tanganyika, Uganda, and Kenya within the following week. However, if the revolution provided the inspiration for the mutinies, this would seem to have been the only connection between them. The supposition that the Zanzibar revolt and the uprisings in East Africa were somehow closely interrelated and the speculation that this gave rise to—that they might all be part of a coordinated Communist plot to take over the area—appear completely unfounded. Moreover, there is no evidence to support the belief that the Zanzibar revolution—as it actually occurred—was planned or organized by any of the Bloc countries or that they had any advance warning of events in the offing. It is necessary in particular to dispel the notion that the Cubans were somehow involved. Except for the fact that some of the Umma Party members who joined the ranks of the rebels after the uprising was well underway had been trained in Cuba (and Okello was not one of them), there was no Cuban connection with the revolution. Contrary to the many published reports, no Cuban nationals participated in the fighting. For the African revolutionaries, the really important feature of the coup was that it was done by Africans alone, without any outside help whatsoever. They have made a special point of this fact, and they would seem to be quite right in making the claim.

While the Bloc had not engineered the coup and was not really in a position to control the course of events in Zanzibar, it managed to derive considerable advantage from the revolution. While the West stalled on recognition
and further alienated Karume and the other pro-Western Zanzibaris by interpreting the revolution as Communist, the Soviets and Chinese moved quickly to win Zanzibar's favor; they applauded the revolution, hastened to extend recognition to the new government, and offered to support it with arms and economic assistance. At the same time, they acted quickly to strengthen the radical, pro-Communist elements in the government. Whether Babu and Hanga and those other government officials whom the Bloc was supporting with money, propaganda, and displays of friendship were dedicated and disciplined Communists or not did not really matter much; they were clearly working in the foreign Communist interest.

Short of the use of force, Babu made every effort to consolidate his position within the government. He was reported to be the hardest-working member of the Revolutionary Council; as Minister of Foreign Affairs, he was in a good position to promote Bloc influence, and he used his position to good advantage. More than anyone else, he was responsible for opening Zanzibar to Communist penetration via economic and military aid agreements. The GOZ decision to recognize East Germany (which no other non-Communist state had done) was completely his doing; in this case, he engineered a reversal of an earlier decision by Karume. Zanzibar's subsequent recognition of North Vietnam and North Korea—in which Babu was involved in even more deceptive maneuverings—was probably his greatest achievement on behalf of the Communists.

There was considerable Western concern expressed at the time—shortly after the revolution—that Karume was either poorly informed or indifferent to Babu's independent course. Actually, there is good evidence that the President had been fully alerted to Babu's pro-Communist maneuvers and was very much perturbed by his disregard of presidential decisions. Although Kenyatta, Obote, and Nyerere had all warned Karume not to associate with Babu and his pro-Communist Arab "comrades," the President initially took the rather naïve position that every Zanzibari should have the opportunity to demonstrate his loyalty to the Zanzibar revolution. By March, however Karume's suspicions had been aroused to the point that
one of Hanga's men was regularly attached to Babu on all the latter's trips away from Zanzibar; about this time, Karume is reported to have told a close confidant that he had lost all confidence in Babu. Apparently, he still thought that he could control him, however.

It is doubtful that he could have done so for long. Until the internal political struggle was resolved, at least for the time being, in Karume's favor--by the sudden transfer of Babu to Dar es Salaam with the formation of the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar in April 1964--Babu was well on his way to developing his own power apparatus. (Although his greatest strength was in the army, Babu had supporters in certain government offices such as the Immigration Office and the Protocol Office; some of these men still hold important positions and furnish the basis of the strength that Babu has retained on the island.) The one factor that had kept Karume on top in the struggle for power had been the Tanganyikan police force contingent, which Nyerere had originally sent to the island as a measure of protection for Karume against Okello and his armed followers. After Okello's removal from Zanzibar, Karume kept the police as protection against Babu and his clique.

Although Zanzibar's union with Tanganyika was in his interests--inasmuch as it got Babu off the island--Karume apparently was not initially enthusiastic about the idea; certainly, he was not as strongly in favor of the union as Hanga, who claims that he and Kambona agreed when they were students together in London that Tanganyika and Zanzibar should be united one day. The idea of a union was not a new one. Nyerere probably had it in the back of his mind when he first became involved in Zanzibar politics, beginning around 1956. For years, he had looked forward to the time when an African government would come to power in Zanzibar, at which time he planned to merge the two countries. His feeling of urgency about the union in March and April 1964 was probably a reflection of his concern that Babu was well on his way to consolidating his position in Zanzibar and his belief that only decisive action taken in time could save Zanzibar's African revolution from Arab control. There is evidence that
Nyerere was concerned about the excessive degree of Communist influence in Zanzibar, but press and other comment in the West was probably wrong in emphasizing this as Nyerere's chief concern. It seems that the Tanganyikan President deliberately exaggerated his fears that Zanzibar was falling under Communist control; it was an argument that he could use most convincingly in the West to win support for his move to absorb Zanzibar into Tanganyika. Whereas in private conversations with Westerners, Nyerere has always emphasized the anti-Communist line as the main rationale for the union, in public he has taken the position that the union was simply a natural step toward African unity.

The important point is that the union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar was a Tanganyikan initiative. Although the idea had occurred to Western officials as the obvious solution to the Zanzibar problem, the subject was never officially discussed with the Tanganyikans. Thus, it appears that the move to form the union was strictly African in origin, without British or American inspiration; the news of the event caught all of the major world powers by surprise.

For more than a month, Nyerere and his representatives had been conducting secret negotiations with Karume and other Zanzibari leaders. Although they had succeeded in convincing several of them—including Hanga and Twala—that it was in their best interests to follow the Tanganyikan guidance, Karume was not immediately persuaded. Finally, Nyerere's threat to recall the Tanganyikan police contingent had the force of an ultimatum. Faced with the prospect of being deprived of the support he needed against Babu, Karume agreed to the union.

As an independent nation, Zanzibar had lasted just one hundred days. In its brief and turbulent career as a sovereign state, it had faced a bitter internal struggle for power, near economic collapse, and an intensive Communist offensive. It is not surprising that its new African leaders should have found it impossible to preserve their independence against these odds. Zanzibar was not really equipped for independence. To preserve the integrity
of the African revolution they had just won, its leaders had to sacrifice the independence they had just been given. Zanzibar's future had always seemed in the long run to lie with Tanganyika. It was only surprising that this should have been realized so quickly.
Preface

In Zanzibar, there is the second largest non-African minority in all the countries south of the Sahara, an Arab community which constitutes almost 20 percent of the total population. The majority of Zanzibaris—the so-called Shirazis—trace their descent from the inter-marriage of Arabs with indigenous Africans. Another 20 percent of the population are descendants of slaves imported from the mainland or more recent African immigrants. Finally, there are some 20,000 Asians, mainly Indians.

Through the years, social differences between these four major groups have been reinforced in the economic sphere. Ever since the slave-trading days, Africans have felt hostility towards the Arabs, who have been the landed aristocracy for whom the Africans have worked as indentured servants. Meanwhile, the commercial activities of the Indians have made them disliked and envied as a second privileged group.

In the mid-1950's, the element of race, which had always been present in the social and economic spheres, moved into politics. The socially-prominent Arab and the economically-privileged Indian were suddenly and significantly challenged in the political field. Since then, their fear—not unlike that of the whites in Kenya—has been of being swamped by the illiterate African masses at the ballot box. It is a fear rooted in a concern for Arab culture and economic advantage, not for racial purity; there is scarcely an Arab or Indian in Zanzibar who does not have some African blood.
I. Zanzibar's Political Awakening: 1955-62

A. Internal Politics

Zanzibar's first political parties grew out of, or were closely linked with, the Arab, African, and Shirazai associations which, as semi-political, social, and mutual-help societies, had been in existence in the country for many years. The British had established the first political institutions in Zanzibar on the same communal basis; members of the Legislative Council were appointed as representatives of the separate groups representing the Arab community, the Afro-Shirazis, the Indians, and the Europeans. One of the Arabs on the council--Ali Muhsin--first voiced opposition to the idea of communal organization in 1955, on the grounds that such an organization gave the British a chance to perpetuate their rule by a divide-and-conquer policy. He and his followers boycotted the Legislative Council, refusing to attend its meetings until the communal organization was ended. In December 1955 they founded Zanzibar's first political party, the Zanzibar National Party (ZNP). Although professing to be non-racial in composition, it was an Arab-led party and its members were drawn from the Arab Association.*

Toward the end of 1956, Julius Nyerere, Tanganyika's foremost African nationalist and the founder of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), is reported to have come to Zanzibar to urge Africans and Shirazis to stand against the Arabs and to form a political party.

*Although Ali Muhsin came from a wealthy family, his political views were considered "radical" by the older "Arab establishment." The political party which he formed--the ZNP--attracted the more liberal Arabs, who represented a threat to the very conservative Arab element.
based on pan-Africanism. On his initiative, the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) was formed in 1957. The essential differences between the ZNP and the ASP lay not so much in their official programs as in the contrasting nature of their appeals to the electorate. They differed only slightly on the question of pace of constitutional development. But whereas the ZNP made its appeal to "national unity" of all Zanzibaris and to indigenous fears of mainland African influence, the ASP emphasized the unity of "Africans" and appealed strongly to common fears of Arab domination. Engaging in a hate campaign against the Arabs, ASP propaganda recounted tales of the Arab slave holders long ago and their descendants who still owned almost all of the land and still exploited African labor. Capitalizing in this way on pan-Africanism and anti-Arabism, the new party won all six of the elected constituencies in the first elections held in Zanzibar in 1957. With the total defeat of the ZNP, the traditional ascendancy of Zanzibar's Arab minority was threatened for the first time.

The racial and political antagonisms aroused by the election manifested themselves in a variety of forms throughout 1957-58. Relations deteriorated between plantation owners (generally Arab supporters of the ZNP) and squatter farmers (ASP supporters); protectorate-wide boycotts sprang up; and a chain of consumer cooperative stores, opened under the auspices of the ASP, forced hundreds of Arab shopkeepers out of business. By the end of 1958, the political tension between the ethnic communities had reached such a point as to threaten social stability with the likelihood of racial violence.

The major credit for averting open clashes between the ZNP and ASP in late 1958 lay with the Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa (PAFMECA). Nyerere and other of its leaders emphasized that the most important objective must be the struggle against colonialism and that racial conflicts were an obstacle to the achievement of national freedom. In a series of public meetings and private discussions, PAFMECA representatives chided Zanzibaris for allowing racial animosities to stand in the way of independence. Immediately afterwards, the
principal leaders of both parties united together to form
the "Zanzibar Freedom Committee," the result being a
visible lessening of political tensions. Throughout 1959,
party leaders toured the country together. So impressive
was the display of inter-party unity that the British
Administration agreed to Freedom Committee demands for
acceleration of the pace of constitutional change.

However, disagreement within the ASP over the
latter's participation in the Freedom Committee ultimately
led to a split in the party and the formation of a third
political party in Zanzibar. In November 1959 Ameri Tajo,
Mohamed Shamte and Ali Sharif Musa resigned from the ASP
and founded the Zanzibar and Pemba Peoples' Party (ZPPP),
which was open to members of all races but was specifically
designed for those Shirazis who wished to avoid involve-
ment in the heavily Arab-influenced ZNP or the predomin-
ately mainland-African ASP. (The ZPPP had its greatest
strength on Pemba Island.) Although the specific incident
which brought about the break in the ASP was the open
denunciation by some ASP party members of Tajo for sup-
porting the youth group of the Freedom Committee, the
split between the Shirazi and the Africans in fact repre-
sented a growing inability of these two groups to work
together. In large measure, this was due to the deep
personal hostility between Karume, a leader of the ASP,
and Mohamed Shamte. For several months prior to the
final break-up, relations between Karume and the leaders
of the Shirazi Association had been characterized by
threats, intimidations, and openly hostile acts.

By the time the ZPPP was formed, the honeymoon of
the Freedom Committee had ended. The announcement of
Zanzibar's second general elections to be held in January
1961 led both the ASP and the ZNP to disaffiliate from
the organization.

Ali Muhsin, realizing the inherent weakness of
his political situation as the leader of an Arab minority,
apparently had decided soon after his defeat in 1957 that
the best way to win political control in Zanzibar was
through professional, well-organized, mid-twentieth cen-
tury political methods. As a first step, he had recalled
from London his deputy and general secretary--Mohamed Babu--to aid in the reorganization of the party. On his return to Zanzibar, Babu concentrated on the organization of youth, women, and worker groups as effective political instruments for the ZNP. Ali Muhsin himself travelled extensively in Africa soliciting support for his objectives of self-government and independence for Zanzibar. He was particularly well-received by Nkrumah of Ghana,* and links with Cairo, which had existed since 1956, were revitalized. Nasser's interest in promoting pan-Arabism, with Cairo as the focal point, led him to make promises of support and financial aid to the ZNP for the forthcoming elections. Through Babu, the ZNP was also receiving Chinese Communist money for its election campaign against the ASP.

Largely due to Ali Muhsin's and Babu's efforts, the ZNP entered the 1961 elections as a highly-disciplined, well-financed, and organizationally integrated body. The two leaders had, during three years of intense organizational and recruiting activity, attracted many of the educated elite with their appeal for multi-racial unity in the fight for immediate independence. The ASP response to this go-getting program of the ZNP had not been lively. The 1959 split in the party and the emergence of the ZPPP had stripped the ASP of many of its outstanding leaders and much of its organizational strength; with a divided leadership and a sprawling and unmanageable party organization, it was unable to command the financial and technological resources necessary to conduct a modern, nationwide election. Once again, as in 1957, its approach was mainly to criticize its opponents for being Arab-dominated. In 1961, however, appeals to racial prejudice were not to substitute for good party organization and a sound political policy.

*In spite of the defeat suffered by the ZNP at the polls in 1957, Nkrumah invited Ali Muhsin and not Karume to attend Ghana's anniversary celebration in March 1958; by 1961, however, Nkrumah had thrown his support to the ASP.
It was generally predicted that the elections would be close, and so it turned out. The ASP won ten seats (one seat by a majority of one vote), the ZNP nine, and the ZPPP three. Since neither of the major parties had a clear majority to form a government, leaders of each approached Shamte, the leader of the ZPPP, with the objective of forming a coalition government.* When two of the ZPPP party members supported the ZNP and one the ASP (which made it 11 to 11), the British appointed a caretaker government pending new elections in June.

Apparently many ASP supporters erroneously suspected the ZNP of having won votes by impersonation, double-voting, and intimidation in the January elections. There is no evidence to support this thinking which appears to have been inspired by a reluctance to believe that Africans and Shirazis would voluntarily vote for an Arab-led party. Nevertheless, these fears led the Afro-Shirazis to attempt to assert their own authority at the June elections by challenging the right to vote of certain individuals and by refusing ZNP election agents access to some polling stations. These actions soon led to general disorders. The bitterness of the pre-election campaign erupted into bloody racial rioting in which 67 people (65 being Arabs) were killed and some 300 (mainly Arab) wounded. A state of emergency was declared, and British troops from Keyna, Tanganyika and the Middle East had to be called in.

The ASP had reason to be annoyed at the June election results. Although it could claim 45,000 votes to 32,000 for the ZNP and 12,000 for the ZPPP, it won only 10 seats in the Legislative Council, compared to 10 for the ZNP and 3 for the ZPPP; a coalition agreement between the ZNP and the ZPPP brought those two parties to power.

*When the Sultan offered to pay off his personal debts, Shamte threw in his lot with the ZNP. However, he was not able to convince both of the other two elected ZPPP representatives to do the same; one of them switched over to the ASP.
For 18 months afterward, ASP leaders complained about the unfairness of a boundary delimitation which could send a party with an over-all majority of 1,000 into opposition.*

As for the election riots, Babu made a statement to the British press in London in mid-summer in which he laid the entire blame for them on the ASP. Ali Muhsein, in a private interview about the same time, made a similar claim. And it would seem that the truth was generally on their side. Although ASP leaders insisted publicly that many more Africans than Arabs had been killed but that the bodies had been hidden, their case was not convincing. However, the British Commission of Inquiry into the disturbances in June was clearly reluctant to place the blame on one side or the other. Its official report stated that the "blame was fairly evenly distributed between the ASP and the ZNP." It attributed the savagery of the disturbances and the large number of deaths largely to the "violent attitude of the political youth wings" of both parties and "to the paying off of old scores." In an obvious effort to avoid aggravating an explosive situation, it concluded that "the disturbances were not overwhelmingly racial in character. Rather, the major cause was the bombardment of words, both written and spoken" during the election campaign. As a final note, it added "that we do not think Communism played any part in the disturbances."

Quite clearly, it was the racial content of the "bombardment of words" that had been largely responsible for raising tensions to the breaking point. Though they had never before erupted into violence on a mass scale, these tensions had existed for a good many years. After the June riots, there were indications of a new pattern of serious crime in Zanzibar, in which criminal activities instead of being confined to individuals tended to be carried out by gangs and in which violence for the first

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*One of the best examples of the way British policy in Zanzibar favored the Arabs was their gerrymandering of voting districts in favor of the ZNP.
time became a usual feature. It is worth examining the charge that this new element of violence was in some way tied to the introduction of Communism into Zanzibar.

B. External Influences

There is no doubt that there was interest and encouragement from outside Zanzibar for both of the major parties in the 1961 elections.

1. Free World Contacts

As noted earlier, the Afro-Shirazi "alliance," which was formed in February 1957 and later converted into the ASP, was brought about partly by the intervention of Nyerere, whose political advice had been sought by the African Association. During 1958-60 Karume continued to make frequent visits to Dar es Salaam for talks with Nyerere. Although Nyerere himself has been normally circumspect in his dabbling in Zanzibar affairs, other of his supporters have been much more open. The Tanganyikan African National Union (TANU) took an active interest in the 1961 elections. Bibi Titi, a leading TANU supporter, toured Zanzibar immediately before the elections; and her campaign on behalf of the ASP unquestionably did much to enflame anti-Arab feelings on the island. In a private interview in November 1961, Ali Muhsin, the leader of the ZNP, spoke of her role in the campaign:

There is no question that TANU has intervened in Zanzibar politics, sending agents here, allocating money, and aiding in the propaganda of the ASP. The most outrageous example was the TANU Women's Representative, Bibi Titi, who came here on behalf of the ASP and made an appeal to racialism that was as bad as Fascism. Even the government was moved to investigate and consider
indictment, but of course, before action could be taken she was back in Tanganyika.

Other TANU leaders reportedly gave money and advice to the ASP for the elections. Canoe-loads of men were sent from Tanganyika to take part in the election disturbances. Following the arrest of many ASP supporters for their alleged part in the rioting, TANU was first to offer help with their defense.

After the electoral reverse of the ASP in 1961 and the alliance of the ZNP and the ZPPP, Tanganyikan and Pan-African support was given unreservedly to the ASP. The latter's policy statements were often issued under the subscription "with the advice of TANU." In March 1961, an ASP office was opened in Dar es Salaam, and all during 1961-62 the ASP Executive Committee sent delegations to visit TANU leaders, in most instances in an attempt to obtain financial assistance. TANU reportedly had a "security fund" controlled solely by the two TANU leaders Nyerere and Kambona, which was used primarily to assist friendly politicians in other countries. The ASP leader Othman Shariff learned of the fund when he received about 1,000 shillings (about $150) from Nyerere prior to the January 1961 elections; apparently he was given much larger sums over the next two years. Hanga and Karume, and other ASP leaders are also known to have received money from TANU and PAFMECA sources.

The continuing liaison between the ASP and TANU caused much resentment in ZNP circles. In particular, the ZNP was irritated by the presence of the leader of the Opposition, Othman Shariff, at the gathering of East and Central African leaders which took place in Dar es Salaam from 14-15 October 1961. The ZNP did not receive an invitation to the meeting, and this considerably worsened the already strained relations between TANU and the ZNP and between the Zanzibar and Tanganyikan governments. On occasion, Government of Tanganyika officials are known to have taken direct anti-ZNP initiatives. In particular, Tanganyikan pressure was exerted on both the Chinese Communists and the Egyptians to cease their
support for the ZNP.* In late 1963 Mohammed Shamte, the leader of the ZPPP and the Chief Minister of Zanzibar's coalition government, stated privately that Nyerere and Kambona were basically unfriendly to the present government of Zanzibar "including Zanzibar Africans like myself." He expressed bafflement, saying he could not figure out what "I or any Zanzibar Shirazi had ever done to the Tanganyikans." TANU leaders themselves usually advanced two basic reasons for their support of the ASP; first, their close feeling of kinship with the African element in Zanzibar and, second, their fear of Communism or proto-Communism in the ZNP, especially in people like Babu. Although there was no talk of alliance or annexation, it no doubt was even then the view of the Tanganyikan leaders that Zanzibar ought to be associated closely with Tanganyika.

Three other non-bloc countries, besides Tanganyika, are known to have supported the ASP before the revolution in 1964. Ghana was, perhaps, rather slower than Tanganyika in coming out openly in favor of the ASP, but by at least 1961 the die was cast. In that year, the Ghana Bureau of African Affairs sent over $15,000 to assist the ASP in the election; later that year, Ghanaian legal assistance was afforded the ASP in defense of individual Africans accused of offenses committed during the election riots; at the end of 1962 the ASP opened an office in Accra; and in early 1963 the High Commissioner of Ghana in Uganda held private discussions with ASP leaders on the subject of financial assistance for the ASP. Prior to the independence of Zanzibar, the Ethiopian Government also provided financial assistance to the ASP, on the grounds that it represented the majority and was the

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*In early 1963 Oscar Kambona, Tanganyikan Minister of Home Affairs, reportedly made strong representations to the Chinese Communist Ambassador in Dar es Salaam about China's aid to the ZNP, asking the ambassador in unambiguous terms to take steps to terminate his governments' support for a party which represented an Arab minority.
only predominately African political party. Haile Selassie, who was under considerable pressure from Egypt, was particularly sympathetic to the ASP's concern about Arab influence in Zanzibar. He was reportedly delighted when the coup ousted the Arab-dominated government in January 1964, and the Ethiopian Government was among the first to recognize the new regime.

While the ASP maintained liaison with these several ruling African parties and with Israel, the ZNP found its major international ally in Egypt. Beginning in about 1956, Nasser began wooing Zanzibar's Arabs for inclusion in his Greater Arab Union. Since it was inexpedient blatantly to pursue the purely Arab cause in Zanzibar, Cairo always publicly represented and supported the ZNP as the foremost nationalist party, not as a party dominated by Arabs, and hailed Ali Muhsin as the truly representative nationalist leader. As early as 1956, the Swahili announcer on Radio Cairo was a Zanzibari, who served as a useful contact for the numerous Zanzibari students who took advantage of Egyptian educational facilities. Nasser was, at this time, a very popular figure in Zanzibar; his photograph appeared in homes and many girls carried handkerchiefs with his picture imprinted on them.

With a keen eye to the advantage that such a powerful friend could be to him at home, Ali Muhsin was very agreeable to Nasser's attentions. His associations with Cairo had always been close, and he represented himself as a personal friend of Nasser. In the late 1950's he opened the ZNP's first overseas office in Cairo. Apart from moral support and a considerable number of student scholarships, however, the ZNP is not known to have obtained much material assistance from Egypt, at least prior to 1963. In early 1963, the UAR reportedly made a donation of cars, motorcycles, bicycles, and other goods which were sold to augment ZNP party funds. Following the London Constitutional Conference in September 1963, Zanzibar's Prime Minister and other ZNP ministers stopped
in Cairo in the hope of receiving greater financial assistance, but apparently nothing more than an expression of sympathy from the Egyptians was forthcoming.

2. The Sino-Soviet Offensive

Zanzibaris were first introduced to Communism in England, where some 200 Zanzibaris were enrolled in various courses of study each year. The Soviets, working through the Communist Party of Great Britian (CPGB), were the first to make contact with these overseas Zanzibar students.*

*Babu, Ali Sultan Issa, Ali Mahfudh, Salim Rashid, and Hanga all studied in the UK in the mid and late 1950's. In every case, their sojourn in England was more distinguished by their leftist student and political activity than by their academic pursuits. Although it cannot be confirmed that Babu was a member of the CPGB (he has publicly denied it); he may have joined the Party sometime around 1955. Card-carrier or not, he was close enough to the Party to become chairman of the East African Committee of the Communist penetrated Movement for Colonial Freedom (MCF). Ali Sultan Issa is known to have joined the CPGB in 1954; whether his claim that his education in Britain was paid for by the CPGB is true or not, some of his closest associations which have had a lasting influence on him were with Communists. A year after he went to England in May 1958, while working in the Portsmouth dockyards, Ali Mahfudh applied for membership in the CPGB (there is no information whether his application was ever acted upon). While a student at the University of London, Salim Rashid established contact with the Communist front International Union of Students (IUS); in 1960 he appeared to be functioning as a coordinator for Zanzibar students in the Soviet Bloc countries. After he dropped out of the London School of Economics, apparently because he failed to obtain a degree, Hanga travelled to the USSR in 1960; at the end of a year's study, he was awarded a doctorate in international law and economics.
The Chinese entered the picture in the late 1950's, initially, at least, supporting individuals already chosen by the CPGB and the Soviets.*

As late as 1959-60, Communism was still virtually unknown on the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba. There were no more than a dozen or so individuals--who had returned to Zanzibar from England--who were at all familiar with the teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, or Mao. There were no official contacts between the protectorate's colonial government and any of the Bloc countries, and there was no Communist program of cultural or political exchanges. In the four years before the revolution, however, the growth in Communist influence and activity was

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*In an interview that appeared in The Observer on 8 March 1964, Babu gave the following account of how he was contacted by the Chinese:

At a party in London once I met a man from the New China News Agency who told me he wanted a stringer in East Africa. So on my return to Zanzibar, I started sending him news from about 1959 onwards....I was at the time the unsalaried secretary of the Nationalist Party and the money came in useful.

Babu arranged for Ali Sultan Issa to meet the Chinese. Both travelled (separately) to Peking in 1960. From that time they have both maintained a close association with the Chinese. Although his earlier contacts were also with the Soviets (his work for the World Federation of Trade Unions qualified him for labor union training in East Germany), Ahmed A. Qullatein is another example of a Zanzibari who switched his allegiance to China. In August 1961, he travelled to Peking and since then he has clearly been more favorably inclined toward China than toward the USSR.

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remarkable. In a short period of time, Bloc contacts with Zanzibar nationals multiplied rapidly beyond the few leaders first contacted abroad.

Beginning around 1959, large quantities of Communist ideological material were imported into Zanzibar. There was no prohibition by the Government against such material coming into the country; book stalls openly sold or gave away free-of-charge large quantities of books, papers, and pamphlets published in the USSR or China.

The first Communist radio programs especially for Africa were broadcast by Moscow, in English and French, in April 1958. Peking followed in September 1959 with broadcasts in English and Cantonese to Zanzibar, Madagascar, Mauritius, and South Africa. In February 1960 Moscow inaugurated its first regular African-language program in Swahili. In response, Peking in June 1960 quadrupled its daily half-hour program beamed at Zanzibar and in August 1961 began broadcasting a Swahili program of its own to Zanzibar. During the next three years, the radio barrage broadcast to Zanzibar grew steadily more intense. All of the programs were tailored for Zanzibar audiences. As their major propaganda theme, they championed the anti-colonial movement and portrayed the U.S. as the new colonial power in Africa. They also condemned racialism in the West and offered support for the revival of African culture. Moscow, in particular stressed its own successes in eliminating illiteracy and in achieving great technological progress. Both Moscow and Peking—but Moscow to a greater extent—emphasized African events in their newscasts to the area. There can be no doubt of the impact of these bloc broadcasts. As of January 1960, there were an estimated 46 short-wave receivers per thousand Tanzanians; only the Union of South Africa and Mauritius among the countries south of the Sahara had more sets per thousand people. With an average of 5 listeners per set, Zanzibar's total radio audience was nearly one fourth of its total population of 300,000.

Around 1959-60, the Bloc began formal training of Africans at schools and universities in the various Bloc countries. During the next four years, the Communists
pushed this scholarship program of study abroad as their most potent weapon for penetrating Zanzibar's power structure. With little regard to the academic qualification of the students and with minimal administrative delay, they took increasingly large numbers of Zanzibaris --with or without passports. Whereas in October 1959 there were reportedly two Zanzibaris studying in Eastern Europe, in November 1960 there were 25 in all the Bloc countries (including 8 in Communist China), in December 1961 there were 64 (including 18 in China), in November 1962 a total of 141 (including 6 in China and 25 in Cuba) and in September 1963 about 110 (including 4 in China).* These figures may include only a portion of the actual number, as most scholarships and visits were arranged directly with nongovernmental organizations, such as the youth organizations and labor federations, and govern- ment officials did not know exactly how many had gone abroad. Moreover, some visits, especially those to China, were made under conditions approaching secrecy.**

There is no doubt that a large part of the training in Bloc countries consisted of Communist indoctrination; and, at least in Cuba and China, Zanzibaris are

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*For comparative purposes, there were about 200 Zanzibar students in Great Britain, another 70 in Egypt, and roughly 40-50 in other non-Bloc countries in 1963.

**The Chinese may have made a greater effort in 1962-63 to keep secret the participation of Zanzibaris in training courses in China, especially military training courses; that might account, in part, for the striking drop in the number of Zanzibaris reported to have been studying in Peking in 1962 and 1963. However, there would still seem to have been an absolute drop in the number of Zanzibaris in China after 1961. Apparently, the departure of a number of disillusioned students from Peking in the spring of 1962 caused contacts with the CPR to become less popular than contacts with the other Communist countries.

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known to have been trained in military tactics and in the art of revolution. "A large contingent" of Zanzibaris was reported to have been undergoing secret training at a "sabotage school" near Peking in June 1963.* The first time that Zanzibaris are known to have gone to Cuba specifically for "military training" was in August 1962. About 25 of them apparently received training there in sabotage, street fighting, manufacture of explosives, and security methods during 1962-63.

The principal fields for Communist operations in Zanzibar were the trade union and youth movements. After they first made contacts with trade union leaders in 1959, both the Soviets and Chinese gave disproportionate emphasis to labor leaders in their scholarship and visit exchange programs. The opening class of a school for trade unionists from Africa, Asia, and Latin America held in Moscow from October 1961 to June 1962 was attended by 5 Zanzibaris, out of a total of some 50 African students. By 1963, most Zanzibar labor leaders had had a tour of the Communist nations. Trade union development, which had been slow, was greatly encouraged by these individuals, returning from study and travels in the Bloc. Cells were organized, along lines which closely paralleled trade union development in Communist countries. If anything, the Communists were even more successful with Zanzibar's youth groups than with the leaders of the labor movement. By the time of the revolution, the leaders of the youth movement, almost without exception, were either Communist or pro-Communist, had either visited or studied in one or more Communist country, and were aggressive in their opposition to the U.S.

It is impossible to give reliable figures for the total cost of the Communist effort in Zanzibar during these years. The principal items were the travel and

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*Musa Massara, leftist brother-in-law of Karume, was one of the Zanzibaris who attended the guerrilla-warfare training course in China in 1963.
study grants, for which the fares alone were estimated at $70,000 in 1962. The value of the books and other propaganda material shipped to Zanzibar, the expenses of Zanzibar students in the Bloc, and the covert funds given to individuals in Zanzibar probably amounted to another $30,000. The total investment may have been somewhere in the neighborhood of $100,000 yearly.

It was not a coordinated investment, however, and not a united effort on the part of the Communist world. There were definite differences in approach and in emphasis between the Soviet and Chinese offensives. For example, the overriding concern of the Soviets in Zanzibar was the recruiting of Zanzibaris for training and indoctrination in the USSR; at one time, as many as 46 young men were reported to be studying in Moscow. The Chinese program was never of competitive proportions; after a record high of 18 in the fall of 1961, there were apparently only 4-6 Zanzibaris in China for training in 1962 and 1963.

The Chinese effort in Zanzibar centered on propaganda activities, and in this field Chinese activities may have been even more ambitious and more effective than those of the Soviets. During the three years before the revolution, Peking certainly invested a greater amount in printing and distributing Chinese Communist literature in Zanzibar. Among the future leaders of Zanzibar's revolutionary government, Babu, Hanga, Ali Sultan Issa, Twala, R. Salim, and Ahmed Diria Hassan were regular recipients of correspondence emanating from NCNA. Part of the ZNP's income was provided by the sale of Chinese publications, which were supplied at subsidized rates that enabled them to be sold cheaply but still at a profit to the distributors. The ZNP maintained a mobile bookshop which was always well stocked with Chinese materials. A large volume of Chinese literature was also fed into private bookshops, with instructions to give the literature away should sales lag. Babu's newspaper--Zanews--which was not published for sale but was distributed on a private basis to a selected list of recipients, consisted almost entirely of propaganda handouts received from NCNA in Peking. In mid-1960 the ZNP received as a "gift" from the people of China several duplicating machines and typewriters and a new printing
press on which the weekly, viciously anti-American newspaper Ada1 Insaf (Liberty) was printed. (This organ and its editor Bultla Bulsara became the chief voices of the Chinese locally.) Although the Soviets too furnished considerable propaganda material to the Zanzibar press all during 1960-63, they are not known to have made a direct investment in printing presses, duplicating machines, etc.

More important than the differences in the character of Soviet and Chinese penetration in Zanzibar were the differences between the individuals and the various organizations that received Chinese and Soviet guidance and encouragement. Without the assets of an organized Communist party,* the Soviets and Chinese both worked

*No proper Communist Party has ever existed in Zanzibar. In June 1962 an individual named Abdulrehman Mohamed (alias Guy) founded a party which openly claimed to be a Communist Party. (A former Swahili announcer for Radio Peking, Abdulrehman Mohamed had an unstable mental past which prompted his departure from China in April 1961. After several months in a mental hospital in the UK, he was repatriated to Zanzibar "in the interest of his health" in September 1961.) So far as is known, Abdulrehman's party had no contact with any other Communist party. According to the Russian Embassy in Dar es Salaam, it had been formed prematurely and Soviet infiltration was still to be channeled through trade union and other front organizations in Zanzibar. In a lecture to a group of foreign Communists in Moscow, a member of the CC/CPSU reportedly cited Zanzibar as an example of a country in which "false CPs have been formed, created by our enemies. These so-called CPs are not a part of the International Movement." In the interests of proving that the Chinese were engaged in a world-wide effort to split the international Communist movement, the Soviets were using Zanzibar as an example of a local Communist party founded by the CCP where there had been no established CP that could either be subverted or split into competing pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese factions. Despite (footnote continued on page 18)
through Zanzibar's leading political parties and its trade union and other organizations. However, they would seem to have been working without reference to one another's efforts. Moreover, they were cultivating different individuals and organizations. More often than not, these individuals and organizations were in active opposition to one another on the local scene. Thus, Moscow and Peking were actually in competition, in subsidizing rival Zanzibar groups.

The degree to which the Russians were concentrating their efforts on the African-led ASP and the Chinese on the Arab-led ZNP during 1959-63 was not generally appreciated at the time. Few observers of the Communist offensive in Zanzibar noted any special interest on the part of the Soviets or the Chinese in either party. The division between "moderates" and "radicals" among Zanzibaris was emphasized, and Communist contacts in both the ASP and ZNP were generally lumped together as the extreme, leftist element on the Zanzibar political scene. Yet, a review of Soviet and Chinese contacts with Zanzibaris during these years reveals a definite Soviet identification with the leftist element in the Afro-Shirazi party and a Chinese commitment to the ZNP.

Russian support of the leftist ASP leaders is well-documented. The Soviet Embassy in Dar es Salaam is known to have provided funds to Hanga and Moyo, and probably to others as well. Some of these same leaders and a number of lower-level ASP party members had received scholarships for study in the USSR; many more had been given a

(Footnote continued from page 17)

the Soviet charges, however, and Abdulrehman Mohamed's earlier connections with the Chinese, there is no evidence of any Chinese involvement with the so-called Zanzibar Communist Party. Completely ignored by the outside Communist world, it soon disintegrated. President Abdulrehman Mohamed was officially expelled from the party in September 1962 for "using party funds for his personal comforts."

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tour of the Soviet Union. On one such trip, R. Saleh Salim, an important party leader and a one-time Swahili announcer on Radio Moscow, opened an ASP office in Moscow. One of the main responsibilities of this bureau in Moscow was the selection of Zanzibaris for study in the USSR; it would seem to have been almost a prerequisite that the student be an ASP supporter.

To a much greater extent than was true for the Soviets, the Chinese position in Zanzibar was dependent on one man—Babu. As the general secretary of the ZNP and editor of the Zanews newsheet, he was in a position to further Chinese interests not only within the ZNP but on the Zanzibar political scene in general. From 1957 until June 1962, when he was sentenced to prison for seditious activities, he unquestionably did more than any other Zanzibari to further Communist influence in his homeland. During most of this period, he was the paid agent of NCNA in Zanzibar. Even in prison, he continued to receive Chinese funds.

With Babu as their opening wedge, the Chinese sought to strengthen their ties with the ZNP during 1960-63. As a reward for their demonstration against the U.S. Project Mercury in Zanzibar on 10 July 1960, the Chinese offered 25 top officials of the ZNP a free trip to China. About 23 of them actually went. By mid-1962, virtually every ZNP government minister had been invited to China, if he had not already gone, or had received gifts from Peking. Most of the people on the staff of Zanews were reported to be drawing their salaries and expenses from the Chinese Consulate in Dar es Salaam.

The African-Arab split on the political level into the ASP and the ZNP was mirrored in the youth movements, and here again Soviet and Chinese ties were overwhelmingly with one or the other of the opposing party-affiliated organizations. Both the general secretary (Hassan Nassor Moyo) and the Publicity Secretary (Adam C.J. Mwakanjuki) of the ASP-supported Zanzibar and Pemba Federation of Labor (ZPFL) were frequent visitors to Moscow; and it was their labor organization that arranged for the attendance of Zanzibaris at the trade
unionism school in Moscow, which opened in the fall of 1961. In July 1962, at a meeting of the ZPFL, Moyo stated that the organization would never send members for study to the UK, the U.S. or China; Russia and East Germany, he said, were "the best countries from which to obtain scholarships." The major rival of the ZPFL on the local labor scene—the ZNP-affiliated Federation of Progressive Trade Unions (FPTU)—was even then receiving funds from the Chinese, through their embassy in Dar es Salaam; and its co-founders—Babu, Ali Sultan Issa, and Qullatein—were being entertained in Peking as guests of the Chinese.

One of the most interesting results of a review of Zanzibar connections with the Communist front organizations has been its confirmation of the Soviet concentration on the African element in Zanzibar and the Chinese identification with the Arab minority. As early as March 1960, General Secretary Moyo of the ZPFL made contact with the Soviet-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions, with which the ZPFL thereafter maintained a close liaison. Similarly, the Afro-Shirazi Youth League was an affiliated member of the World Federation of Democratic Youth, and Zanzibar representatives at meetings of this Soviet-dominated international youth organization were regularly ASYL members. On the other hand, it was the ZNP that was represented at the Chinese-controlled World Conference Against Nuclear and Hydrogen Bombs, held annually in Japan; the Zanzibar delegates always had their expenses paid by the Chinese and they could be counted on to advocate a pro-Chinese "hard line" at the meetings.* Pro-Chinese labor organizations, like the Federation of Trade Unions of (North) Korea, also dealt with the ZNP-affiliated FPTU, rather than the ZPFL.

*In their campaign to unmask Chinese tactics inside Communist front organizations, the Russians have made a special point of denouncing Peking's Zanzibar stooges. An Izvestiya article of 17 August 1963 denounced "imposters from Zanzibar" whom the Chinese try to represent as leaders of the ZNP but who are actually Zanzibaris resident in Peking.
There was not, of course, a complete separation of efforts, with the Soviets working only with the ASP and its affiliated organizations and the Chinese only with the ZNP and its affiliated organizations. Zanzibar's two rival labor organizations were both represented at May Day celebrations in Moscow, for example; and Babu, Ali Sultan Issa, Qullatein, and other leaders of the FPTU had other occasional contacts with the Soviets or their front organizations. Furthermore, the World Federation of Trade Unions is known to have provided funds to the FPTU, as well as the ZPFL, although in considerably smaller amounts. The Chinese were apparently less concerned than the Soviets to establish an opening with both political parties as a useful form of insurance for them in Zanzibar. There is an unconfirmed report that in April 1961 their Embassy in Cairo offered ASP party leader Othman Shariff a trip to Peking; as well as financial support for his party, but that he turned the offers down. Since Shariff himself made these claims to Western officials from whom he was obviously hoping to extract concessions by threatening to turn to the East and since it was he who had taken the initiative in contacting the Chinese Embassy in the first place, he may be suspected of exaggerating Chinese interest in the ASP. The only other report of any Chinese contact with an ASP-affiliated organization is a report of Chinese sponsorship of the President of the ZPFL on a trip to North Vietnam.

In summary, if there was some overlapping of Soviet and Chinese dealings with both the Africans and Arabs, it is clear that most Soviet efforts in Zanzibar were channeled through the ASP whereas most, if not all, Chinese activity centered on the ZNP. Especially in the earlier years, the Soviets may have tried to avoid exclusive association with or commitment to any cause or party, since no one had emerged with prospects of decisive success in the near future. Their increasing concentration on the ASP in the years just before the revolution may indicate a growing recognition on their part of the long-run disadvantage in being associated with an Arab minority which was as unpopular on the East African mainland as it was on Zanzibar, or a re-evaluation of the more immediate prospects of the ASP in Zanzibar. In their almost
total commitment to the ZNP, the Chinese apparently accepted the advantage of securing an East African base at the cost of alienating pan-African goodwill. In Zanzibar, the first African country in which they had attempted to play a really active role in Africa, they had actually succeeded in attaining a competitive position with the Russians; each had infiltrated one major political party and rival trade union and youth federation. In deciding to give their support to the ZNP, however, the Chinese had seriously misjudged the power balance on Zanzibar.* With the overthrow of the Arab government in January 1964, their position on the island was soon to be in jeopardy.

The case of Zanzibar is interesting in that it is an example of a country in which the Chinese and Cubans were working together, in opposition to the Soviets. As noted earlier, about 25 Zanzibaris, all members of the ZNP, had gone to Cuba in 1962, under the auspices of the ZNP. One year earlier, the ZNP had opened an office in Cuba,** under the charge of Ali Mahfoudh Mohamed, a close friend of Babu who had applied for membership in the Communist party of Great Britain while he was in London in 1959-61. As far as is known, the ZNP was the only African organization operating an office in Havana; reportedly, it received generous subsidies from the Cuban Government. Like the Chinese, the Cubans apparently never had any contacts of any significance with the ASP.

*In a private conversation in mid-November 1964, Chinese Ambassador to Tanganyika Ho Ying reportedly admitted that the Chinese had been mistaken in their assessment of the power balance in Zanzibar before the revolution. He said that the CCP had thought at the time that the ZNP represented the will of the people.

**The ZNP office was generally preoccupied with publicizing events in Zanzibar (its publication Zanzibar Awakening had a virulent anti-British bias), but it was also involved in administering the Zanzibar student program in Cuba.
As for the over-all impact of the Sino-Soviet offensive in Zanzibar during 1959-63, there can be no doubt that the Communists had--through a vigorous and varied program of propaganda, scholarship and visitor exchanges, international front activity, and direct attempts (with offers of financial assistance) at subversion--successfully indoctrinated many of the young men who were to hold key positions under the new revolutionary regime. Probably only a few of them--notably Babu, Ali Sultan Issa, Hanga, Salim Rashid, and Twala--were Communists out of any real sense of conviction. A good many others, however, had been influenced to see the world in much the same terms as the Communists. They talked in terms of "dying capitalism" and "triumphant socialism," and they expressed general admiration for the Bloc and hatred of the colonialist powers--especially the UK and the U.S., which they regarded as the "imperialist" exploiters of Zanzibar. In all of this, they undoubtedly served Communist foreign policy interests. Some, who were not genuinely ideologically motivated, were opportunistic; and it was easy to see the financial and educational benefits to be derived from contact with the Bloc.

In any case, it was a mistake, as many Western analysts did, to regard these radicals and pro-Communists as "prisoners" of the Bloc. As the Zanzibar revolution and subsequent events were to prove, they still had the upper hand in their dealings with the Bloc.
II. The Road to Revolution: 1963

While Zanzibar's moderate political leaders were working with the UK towards peaceful independence, a minority of extremists in both parties was insisting on the need for "violent revolution." In the spring of 1963, the agitation of radical leaders like Ali Sultan Issa and Qullatein of the ZNP and Hanga, Moyo, Twala, and Hassan Diria of the ASP was boosted considerably by the reappearance of Babu, who had been in jail since June 1962, on a charge of sedition.* Upon his release, Babu promptly called for an intensification of the struggle.

Since late 1961, Ali Muhsin had become increasingly disenchanted with the extremist, pro-Communist element of the ZNP. In October of that year, he had officially disclaimed any association between the ZNP and Babu's pro-Communist newspaper Zanews. In another effort to counter Babu's influence in the party, he had attempted to strengthen the ZNP's relations with the UAR. When Babu emerged from prison in April 1963 to find his position in the party considerably weakened by his long absence in jail, his first move was to demand of Ali Muhsin and the ZNP leadership seven safe seats in the forthcoming

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*Babu's arrest followed months of unrest. After extensive investigations, Zanzibar authorities were convinced that he had planned and initiated the arson attack on the U.S. consulate on 29 August 1961 and had also been the mainspring behind the attempt to burn down the city post office on the night of 3 May 1962. In June 1962 he was sentenced to 15 months in prison for publishing seditious material in the ZNP newsheet Zanews. During his year in jail, his wife and family were reported to have been supported by Peking.

There is no evidence that the ZNP as an organization was involved in any of these violent incidents. Ali Muhsin appeared genuinely upset over the attack on the U.S. consulate.
elections for candidates of his own choosing. When Ali Muhsin rejected his demands, Babu resigned his post as secretary-general of the party. From that time on, Ali Muhsin was to show more concern over the activities of the well-financed and ideologically indoctrinated splinter faction that broke off from the ZNP than he was over the larger, more amorphous ASP.

With the support of some 300 persons who had followed him out of the ZNP, Babu, on 17 June, announced his intention of forming a new political party called the Umma Party.* At private meetings of the party during the fall of 1963, its members (mainly Communist-trained youths) advocated the violent overthrow of the government and the nationalization of all land and industry.** The formation of the Umma Party meant that these extremists were no longer under the restraint of the more moderate leadership of the ZNP. Travel to and from the Bloc increased; subversive literature arrived in ever-greater quantities; and financial aid was supplemented by sabotage and subversive training of activists, particularly in Cuba.

The Umma Party was not the only center for radicals who talked of revolution, however. In the months before

*Ali Sultan Issa, Ali Mahfudh, Salim Rashid and Ahmed Qullatein quickly fell in line behind Babu and his new party. Although the Umma Party was much smaller than the longer-established parties, its leaders had sympathizers who remained in the ZNP, and others in the ASP.

**A private Umma Party meeting in October 1963 discussed violent action to be taken after the departure of the British authorities; Abdulrazak Musa Simai told another closed Umma gathering that the Arab regime of Zanzibar would be overthrown in Cuban style; at another party meeting in December 1963, Qullatein advocated the violent overthrow of the regime after independence.
independence, there were open threats from the ASP that the political domination of the Arab minority would be overthrown by the African majority. Zanzibar's June 1963 elections returned the ruling ZNP-ZPPP coalition to power, on a minority vote; once again, though the ASP had polled over 50% of the total votes, it had not won a majority of the seats in the legislature. The outstanding feature of the elections had been the jubilation and confidence of ASP supporters right up to the final count. Their subsequent bewilderment, disappointment, and bitterness created an explosive situation. While moderate leaders of the ASP like O. Shariff and Karume tried to persuade their followers that an arrangement could be made that would give "the majority" a share in the government, Hanga and other radical Afro-Shirazi labor and youth leaders were arguing that the majority would, in the last resort, have to rely on violence; they consistently pressed Karume to adopt a more militant stand.

In the six-month period before the revolution, there were the first tentative efforts at some coordination between the Umma Party members and the radicals in the ASP. In July 1963, Hassan Nasser Moyo, the Moscow-trained leader of the ASP labor union, publicly announced that he had held informal discussions with Babu on trade union matters and that they had agreed that after independence Zanzibar's two labor unions--the FPTU and the ZPFL--should be merged. There is other evidence that Babu was interested in forming some kind of an alliance with the radical African element.* During the summer of 1963 he

* Babu rode the Arab bandwagon (the ZNP) as long as he could. When he realized that his chances of gaining control of the party were being successfully thwarted by Ali Muhsin, he quit the party and founded the Umma Party, with the ultimate design of overthrowing the government. Aware of the weakness of his position as a leader of a minority Arab party, he may have recognized the advantages of a united front with the African leftists, who were also in favor of a revolutionary seizure of power.
The Umma Bookshop
(Note Chinese and Cuban literature for sale)
apparently broached the subject in several conversations with ASP party leaders. In effect, there was a working alliance between the two groups on certain issues during this period. On one occasion, a joint committee was formed to oppose a bill requiring the registration of societies and newspapers; Karume was the committee president and Babu its secretary general. This represented a significant development in Zanzibar politics. For the first time, the radicals among the Africans and the radical Arabs were coming together, in a common opposition to the government.

Given the delicate situation on Zanzibar, Ali Muhsein was particularly indiscreet in visiting Cairo with maximum publicity twice within a short period of his close election victory—once just before and once just after independence on 12 December 1963. The trips were linked with a rumor that the government was importing arms from Egypt, for a planned mass arrest of ASP leaders on 13 January. This only served to reinforce African suspicions of the pro-Arab intentions of a government which seemed, to them, to be accelerating its program of Arabization of the police, civil service, and other institutions.*

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*In late 1963, Ali Muhsein decided to eliminate the traditionally heavy mainland African element in the Zanzibar police, with the intention of replacing them with native Zanzibaris. Sometime in November, he informed Police Commissioner Sullivan that all non-Zanzibaris were to be phased out by June 1964. Many ASP supporters saw this as a move to replace Africans with Arabs. The discharged police officials represented a particularly serious security problem. Some of them approached Karume and other leaders of the ASP, indicating their severe disappointment at their treatment by Ali Muhsein and offering to combine with the ASP in a seizure of power.

The policy had one other effect on the security situation. It removed about 240 of the 800-man police force, and mainly men who had had long service and held relatively senior rank; it left the force with less than one-ninth of its strength with over 5 years service. With (footnote continued on page 28)
Anti-government feeling was further heightened by a police raid on the headquarters of Babu's Umma Party, shortly after the party had been declared unlawful on 4 January. The radicals in both the Umma and ASP parties saw this as an indication that the hitherto complacent government was preparing to crack down on the extensive growth of revolutionary activity on the island. It lent credence to the rumor that the government was preparing a similar raid on the ASP, after receipt of the Egyptian arms.

(footnote continued from page 27)

the departure of British troops at the time of Zanzibar's independence in December 1963, the police were the only force immediately available to support the government in the event of a coup.
A. Who Started It?

Because it was so unexpected, because it happened so quickly and was over so fast, there was general confusion and uncertainty at the time— as to 'why?' and 'by whom?' and even 'how?' the revolution was made. In most cases, the many conflicting reports are the honest reports of persons in possession of only a few of the facts; but there have also been deliberate distortions of fact by persons who have sought, for one reason or another, to enhance or disparage the role of an individual in the coup. Zanzibar's leaders themselves have been unusually reluctant to discuss the revolution.* And the only official government account—The Zanzibar Revolution, published by the Zanzibar Department of Information and

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*Since the revolution, the reluctance of Zanzibar's leaders to discuss the actual making of the revolution has been quite striking. But it is not at all surprising that many of these leaders, such as Babu and Karume, whose credentials as the revolution's leaders are suspect, should be very sensitive on the subject. They have all been at pains to justify their role in the coup. Without exception, they have tended to exaggerate their own contribution, and their supporters have gone to even greater lengths to present their role in the most favorable light. Babu, on one occasion, reportedly claimed exclusive credit for the removal of Arab rule. After his fall from power, Okello and his lieutenants were definitely guilty of distorting the facts to fit their exalted picture of Okello as the mystic savior of Zanzibar. To enhance their power position in the new government, all of Zanzibar's leaders have had a vested interest in glorifying their role in the revolution.
Broadcasting in February 1965--has given absolutely no details on the actual making of the revolt.*

1. The Various Theories

Reporting on the revolution has identified three main groups as plotting the overthrow of the Arab regime, and each has been put forward by different sources as the one group responsible for taking action. One theory is that the revolution was the work of the Umma Party led by Babu; another, that extremist elements in the ASP played the major role in starting the revolt; and the third, that it was the revolutionary John Okello, who took the initiative in organizing an armed attack. Finally, some reports have suggested that Karume, Babu, and other Zanzibari nationalists were working together "without regard to nominal party affiliations."

Almost without exception, the first reports of the revolution emphasized the central role of Babu in planning the coup. The Western press must certainly have left this lasting impression with the general public; typical of its analyses were the following:

Who engineered the coup? The most likely answer is Babu, leader of the Umma Party, which has no seats in Parliament but has close connections with the trade unions. Since Babu was out of the country at the time--his party having been suppressed by the government--one should probably attribute the actual execution of Babu's plans to younger trade unions leaders.


*The fact that the Zanzibar Department of Information and Broadcasting has published no details on the revolution is probably due to the reluctance of Qullatein, the Minister of Information, to admit the limited role of the Umma Party in the revolt.
It is unlikely that the ASP, even in the explosive situation in Zanzibar, would have taken a revolutionary initiative. It was waiting for the 1966 elections. But in the meantime, Mohammed Babu, with the prestige of 15 months in prison for sedition, had quarreled with the ZNP, which he had helped to organize. He had formed his own Umma Party. He took the leading role in stiffening the opposition to the government and in exploiting the rising discontent. He and his associate in the ASP, Hanga, appear to have been the leading political figures behind the revolution.

New Statesman, 17 January 1964

It was also the conclusion of British and American intelligence agencies that
The prime movers of the revolution were Babu's followers. However they do not represent the majority of Africans.


The Umma Party has been plotting a revolt, and the spark which set it off was probably a raid in early January by the Zanzibar police on Umma headquarters. The man most responsible for the revolution was Babu.

CIA Memo, 5 February 1964.

As the leading Zanzibar nationalist, who had served time in jail for "seditious activities," and the most outspoken critic of the West, who was known to have Chinese Communist contacts, Babu was the obvious suspect in a plot to overthrow the government. In mid-December, just one month before the revolution, he had returned to Zanzibar after more than three months in Peking. During that time he is suspected of having participated in a course in military tactics; when his Umma Party headquarters were searched in early January, the police seized large quantities of documents including a diary written in Peking that contained a full description of the methods for the overthrow of a government by violence.* It was presumed that Babu had acted in accordance with the

* Babu's diary described in detail the methods of attack, the targets to be attacked, and, in general, how a successful seizure of power could be accomplished. His notes are very similar to those of other Africans who have undergone military training in China, in that they present the standard Chinese line on revolutionary tactics and guerrilla warfare.
instructions in his diary in executing the revolution in Zanzibar—although there was actually nothing about the Zanzibar revolution that was typical of the Chinese revolution. Another report that the Umma Party had brought a supply of arms and ammunition to Zanzibar over a three-month period from October to December contributed to the conclusion that Babu had been responsible for the revolution.

There were other reports, though, that Hanga and his group of radical trade union leaders in the ASP had planned the coup. As noted earlier, this group had been maintaining the right of the "majority" to overthrow the government, by force if necessary. Their actual planning for a revolution, which had been underway for some months, was not the subject of any reporting, however, until after the revolution. Yet, as early as the middle of 1963, a group of ASP leaders, including Hanga, went to Tanganyika to ask for money and arms in support of their revolutionary plan.

Tanganyikan complicity with the ASP leaders who were planning a revolution has been well established. Hanga and Tanganyikan Minister of Foreign Affairs and Defense Minister Kambona were old friends, having been roommates in London. Sympathetic to the desire of the Africans to wrest power from the Arab minority, Kambona was apparently privy to the coup planning all along; he supported the undertaking with Tanganyikan arms and money,*

*In mid-1963 Kambona reportedly gave Hanga and his followers two machine guns and ten rifles on a clandestine basis. Part of another arms shipment from Algeria to Tanganyika, which was arranged by Kambona, may have found its way into the hands of the Zanzibar revolutionaries, although the majority of the arms were probably intended for the Mozambique nationalists. Even at the time of the revolution, Kambona was engaged in another attempt to secure arms for the Zanzibar revolutionaries. As noted earlier, two Tanganyikans arrived in London in early January to inspect an order for military equipment which was reported to have come from Kambona. When the revolution started, they left suddenly, cancelling the order for the arms.
and was even prepared to infiltrate substantial numbers of paramilitary-trained Tanganyikans into Zanzibar had the revolution not been precipitated by events. Nyerere's role in the affair is less clear. In mid-1963, when Hanga and several other ASP leaders first approached him for arms and financial support, the Tanganyikan President reportedly turned the group down mainly on the grounds that he did not think their revolutionary plan could succeed. Behind the scenes, Nyerere was working to effect a coalition of the ASP with the ZPPP, which would secure a place for the ASP in the government. Since the long-standing mutual dislike between Karume and Shamte, the leader of the ZPPP, militated against any such reconciliation of the two parties, Hanga believed that the lack of an alternative to the use of force would eventually compel Nyerere to give his approval to his plan. This is apparently just what happened. Although Nyerere obviously knew and apparently approved of the general plan for the revolution, Kambona may have kept the details from the President. There is reason to believe that he was never told about the military supplies that Kambona gave to the ASP.

There have been reports that Kenya Home Affairs Minister Oginga Odinga was also in concert with Hanga and Kambona in planning the Zanzibar revolution; has stated that he was in fact as deeply involved as Kambona. As with Kambona, Hanga had a personal relationship with Odinga, who had assisted him in studying abroad. (Because of this, Hanga has often publicly credited Odinga with his success in education and politics.) Thus, there is a general feeling that Odinga probably had a hand in events in Zanzibar, though his actual involvement in the coup has never been established.*

*After the revolution, Odinga is reported to have had several contacts with Okello, whom he tried to help after the latter's removal from power in Zanzibar. The nature of their relationship, in particular the reason for Odinga's interest in Okello, is unclear; it may stem from the fact that Okello lived and worked in Kenya from December 1954 until September 1959. There is no evidence that there was any contact between the two men before the revolution, however. Thus, there is no reason to believe that Okello was part of any planning for the revolution, in which Odinga may or may not have been involved.

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According to one report, President Kenyatta was informed of the planning for the revolution but was given no definite date as to when it would take place. He is supposed to have agreed not to send in the Kenyan army should the Zanzibar government request outside support against the rebels.

The most important figure in ASP planning for a revolution appears to have been Hanga,* who was helped by members of the extreme wing of the ASP, especially by a number of persons from the trade unions. In particular, Hassan Nassor Moyo, the general secretary of the Zanzibar and Pemba Federation of Labor and a leader in the ASP, was in on the planning. Karume personally was never involved; O. Shariff and Aboud Jumbo Mwinyi of the ASP were also probably not aware of the plan.

Apparently, the original plan called for a coup in March or April 1964. In December 1963 Moyo visited Kenya, and while there he stated privately that prospects were good for him and the ASP; he predicted confidently that elements which he represented would win out soon. Viewed in retrospect, he seems to have been referring to the coup, which was then planned for early spring. In early January 1964, two Tanganyikans arrived in London to inspect an order for military equipment which was reported to have come from Kambona. When the Zanzibar revolution started, they left suddenly, saying the coup had happened sooner than they expected.

While many reports have identified either Babu or Hanga as the man behind the revolution, a few have put forward a claim for John Okello, the curious figure who emerged from obscurity to national leadership as the military hero of the revolution. A Ugandan by birth,

*According to one unconfirmed report, Hanga assembled a small company of men in the bush for about two months before the revolution. According to the same report, John Okello was among the group that was trained.
Okello is reported to have come to Zanzibar in September 1959 and to have worked as a bricklayer on Pemba Island. At the same time that the Umma and ASP groups were advocating the violent overthrow of the government, he is reported to have attracted a following of some 200 to 600 persons with his talk of revolution (by this time, he had moved to Zanzibar Island). From somewhere he managed to obtain firearms, including some automatic weapons. Then, according to one unconfirmed report, he met with both Babu and Hanga and demanded action, claiming that if they did not bring in their followers, he would "go it alone."

2. The Revolutionaries

From the mass of reporting on the revolution and the events leading up to it, one thing is clear: that there was multiple planning for a revolution. At least two, and possibly three, plans for the violent overthrow of the regime were hatched more or less independently, at almost the same time.* The case for Okello's having had his own plans for a coup is much less convincing.

The main question is: Which of these groups actually took the initiative in starting the revolution of 12 January. Considering the contradictions and inconsistencies in the reporting, one cannot be absolutely sure of the answer. There is still disagreement, even

*Although there was clearly multiple planning for a revolution and though the various leaders may have known of the actions envisaged by their opposite numbers, there is no evidence that there was ever any consultation between the Umma and ASP groups in their revolutionary planning. Press reports (like the Newsweek article of 27 January 1964) which lumped Karume, Babu, and Hanga together in a plot to overthrow the government were completely unfounded.
among informed observers. Nonetheless, it does seem that the evidence will support a judgment.

The great majority of the reports on the revolution trace the events of the revolution from the same starting point: the ASP fete that was held at ASP Party headquarters on the night of Saturday, 11 January 1964. Around 2 a.m., the Africans at the fete are reported to have proceeded to the Seamen's Union Club, where they were addressed by Karume and Hanga and other leaders of the ASP. There they were told to go "to a secret rendezvous where an important plan would be explained to them." Within an hour, the first attack of the revolution was underway.

Apparently, the revolution started as the spontaneous action of the Africans at the fete. It was triggered by a rumor that the government planned mass arrests of ASP leaders the following day (13 January). A number of disgruntled ex-members of the Zanzibar police force are known to have been at the fete. They probably played the major role in inciting the crowd to the point of action against the government. As former police officers, they knew where the police arms were stored and they knew how best to gain access to the armories. (Their familiarity with the security procedures of the police armories contributed in large measure to the success of the coup.) They appear to have gotten the crowd to follow them--right then--in an attack on the government's strongholds.

It is possible that Okello was at the African fete and somehow contributed to the timing of the attack with his wild talk of revolution.* However, not one report of the fete mentions Okello's having been there. Nor is he included by name in the list of ASP leaders who are reported to have addressed the crowd at the Seamen's Union

*This possibility is suggested by the several reports that mention Okello's having "attracted a following (which could refer to the Africans at the fete) with his talk of revolution."
Club, where the Africans went after the fete. Okello does not appear on the scene—on the night of the revolution—until he emerges as the hero of the attack on the Ziwani police armory.

It seems fairly well established that Hanga and Karume and other ASP leaders did address the crowd on the night of the revolution.* They could easily have learned of the excited state of the Africans at the fete and must have decided right then to seize the opportunity to proceed with their plan for a revolution.

As for the role of Babu in the coup—there is no convincing evidence that he played any significant part in the revolution at all. Although he may have known of ASP planning for a revolution, he apparently had no advance knowledge of the coup that materialized on 12 January. He was in Dar es Salaam at the time. The businessman, who owned and operated the boat which brought him back to the island on the evening of 12 January, reported that Babu was completely uninformed about events in Zanzibar. Mr. K.S. Talati, the Zanzibar attorney who was employed by Babu to defend him against charges of illegal possession of weapons, was also convinced that he had no previous knowledge of the coup. During the day, some of his followers joined the ranks of the rebels, wearing special ribbons so they could be distinguished from the other Arabs on the island; but they do not seem to have played any part in the initial

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*As noted earlier, Karume does not appear to have been involved in ASP planning for a revolution. But he apparently played a part in the revolution of 12 January, which was precipitated by events outside the control of the ASP leaders who were planning a revolution for later in the spring. Apparently, Hanga and Karume and other ASP leaders got word that the Africans at the fete were creating a disturbance and they went down to ASP headquarters to see what was happening.
ASP Headquarters

Interior of ASP Headquarters
attacks in the early morning hours. Moreover, the supplies of arms and ammunition which the Umma Party had brought to Zanzibar and concealed in different spots on the island were not used in the attack; most Umma weapons reportedly are still concealed and Umma Party members have refused to disclose the caches to their Afro-Shirazi comrades in the new Zanzibar government.

Not only was Babu apparently not directly involved in the revolution of 12 January, but there is some question as to whether he would have approved the timing of the revolt. After his return from China in December, it was noticeable that speeches at the various private meetings of the Umma Party no longer advocated the overthrow of the government. Babu himself is reported to have told his followers to give up their talk of violence, that the methods to be used for gaining power were to be his. He urged the formation of a united front with all opposition parties, including the ASP; in such a front, the Umma Party would have the predominant influence. It is not known whether the Chinese advised Babu along these lines or not.* In any case, he seems not to have considered the time opportune for a revolution.**

*It is possible that the Chinese became nervous at the prospect of Babu's staging a revolution that would have been primarily the work of an Arab minority. They may have been anxious to ensure African support for a Babu-led revolution. Thus, they may have advised Babu to form a united front with other opposition parties (with Babu and the Umma Party as the leading party) and to postpone the revolution until he was assured of broader popular support.

**This is not to say that Babu is not basically a revolutionary, but that he, like the Chinese, can make tactical adjustments in his line. The thing that distinguishes him from other Zanzibar Marxists (like Hanga) is precisely his dedication to world revolution, or more particularly the African Revolution. Whereas, Karume and Hanga and other national leaders have been more interested in developing Zanzibar than in spreading revolution to Mozambique, South Africa, and other countries, Babu has devoted his greatest energies to the African national liberation movement.
Okello's role in the revolution is probably the most clearly identified. One of the rank-and-file rebels, he rose to a command position while the coup action was taking place. In the first raid of the revolution, when most of the 200 ASP attackers held back from actual combat, he and a group of 25 disaffected ASP ex-members of the police pressed on; in this and other attacks on the various police posts, he demonstrated courage and natural abilities as a street fighter. By the end of the day, he was regarded by the rebels as their hero and commander.* A powerful figure after the revolution--because of his support from the armed forces--he was unknown and unimportant before the revolution. The leaders of Zanzibar's new government seemed to know as little about him as the rest of the world; their accounts of his background differed markedly. Tanganyikan Minister for External Affairs and Defense Kambona, who was in close touch with the Zanzibar revolutionaries, claimed to know nothing about Okello. Apparently, his only previous experience in politics had been as a branch secretary of the ASP in Pemba during 1960-62. Contrary to many published reports, he had not travelled extensively; indeed, he had never left East Africa. A simple and ignorant man who had earned his living as a bricklayer, Okello appeared incapable of planning a revolution.** (His performance as a national leader after the revolution was to bear out this judgment.

* It is quite understandable that they would regard Okello as a great military hero and their new leader after the revolution.

** One has only to read "Field Marshal John Okello's Story," written by Okello himself in late 1964, to realize the limitations of the uneducated young man (b. 1937) who had grown up on his own, after having been orphaned at the age of 10, and had worked at a number of odd jobs in Uganda, Kenya, and Zanzibar from 1951 on.

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In summary, the Zanzibar revolution was the reaction of radicals in the Afro-Shirazi trade union and youth movements to the Arabist policy of the previous government. It was triggered by a rumor that the government planned mass arrests of the ASP leaders on 13 January. The notion that the banning of the Umma Party led Babu and his followers into armed revolt is probably the main misconception of the revolution; government action against the Umma Party was a contributing factor only in that it lent credence to the rumor that the government was preparing a similar raid on the ASP. Although certain leaders of the ASP, notably Hanga, were actively planning a revolution, they do not seem to have taken the initiative on the night of 11-12 January. Apparently, a group of disgruntled ex-members of the Zanzibar police at an African fete that evening were primarily responsible for inciting a crowd of some 200 persons to the point of action against the government. Hanga, Karume, and other ASP leaders, learning of the excited state of the Africans at the fete, decided to seize the opportunity to overthrow the government. Babu and his followers jumped on the bandwagon the next day. By then, Okello had emerged from obscurity, the military hero of the day.

B. The Armed Attack

1. The Rebels' Offensive

The actual events of the revolution are well known. Shortly before 3 a.m., on the morning of Sunday, 12 January 1964, the Ziwani police armory was attacked by a small band of Africans led by Okello. After less than two hours of fighting, it and the Mtoni police arsenal were taken over and the weapons distributed to the rebels. An attack was then mounted on Malindi police headquarters, the nerve center of the remaining police forces; towards dawn, it was reported occupied by the rebels. The next day, the cable office, the airstrip, and the radio station were seized, in that order. By late afternoon, the government machinery was paralyzed.
The actual fighting was done by some 600 members of the youth wing of the ASP and some 200 Umma Party members who joined the ranks of the rebels the next morning. These latter groups were generally better equipped than the rank-and-file ASP rebels; some were armed with automatic weapons, as well as rifles and pistols. Until the first armory fell, the ASP forces had practically no guns; most of the insurgents fought with pangas or sticks only.

The Umma Party members trained in the use of automatic weapons are thought to have received that training in Communist China and Cuba. As noted previously, "a large contingent" of Zanzibaris had attended a guerrilla-warfare training course in China in 1963.* Another 25 Zanzibaris, all Arabs, had received "military training" in Cuba in 1962. Both groups are known to have received training in the use of automatic weapons and grenades.** In press reports, their numbers were grossly exaggerated; they were incorrectly assumed to have been the leaders of the coup; and John Okello was erroneously included among their number.*** Moreover, journalists to whom U.S. and British refugees reported they had seen Spanish-speaking

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*After the revolution, China boasted that Chinese-trained Zanzibaris had been able to use their training in the revolt.

**It is impossible to determine the number of foreign-trained (trained in military tactics) Zanzibaris who participated in the Zanzibar coup. Musa Massara, the leftist brother-in-law of Karume who attended the guerrilla-warfare training course in China in 1963, claimed there were about 100. Only about 25 Zanzibaris are known to have received training in Cuba, which would leave 75. It is doubtful that there were ever that many Zanzibari military trainees in China.

***Many press reports claimed that John Okello was one of the insurgents who had been trained in Cuba. There is absolutely no basis for such a statement, but it has often been made, even in recent reporting on Zanzibar.
soldiers wearing Cuban-type uniforms in the ranks of the rebels, immediately jumped to the conclusion that a number of Cubans were involved in the coup.* One refugee was quoted widely as having seen a Chinese among the rebels. There is no evidence, however, that any foreign national participated in the revolution on the side of the rebels. (The senior police officials in charge of the Zanzibar police armories were British officers; they commanded the forces defending the government.)

2. The Government's Defense

Although rumors of a coup had been rife for months, government police and security officials were unprepared for the revolt on 12 January. Police intelligence was poor, and the precautions that were taken were quite inadequate.

At Zanzibar's independence ceremonies in December, UAR Minister for Foreign Affairs Mahmud Fawzi had warned both the Sultan and Prime Minister Shamte that Zanzibar's Africans were seething with discontent and might cause trouble after independence; he had suggested that the government "Africanize" the civil service and the police in a move to prevent a coup that was rumored to be in the planning stage. But the Sultan and Prime Minister did not share the Foreign Minister's sense of urgency. In early January, the government received other reports that there was a plot afoot to overthrow the regime. Again, Minister for Home Affairs Ali Muhsin laughed them off, saying he had heard 50 such reports in the past 18 months. On the night of 11 January, the police received information

--- *Apparently, one individual, a Pakistani, was wandering around Zanzibar at the time of the revolution in a Cuban outfit, sporting a Castro-type beard; no one else. His behavior was responsible for the rumor that Cubans were involved in the coup. There is absolutely no truth to the story.---
from an informer that a disturbance was to be created by Africans after the fete; the informer mentioned he had heard that the rebels would obtain arms from the police armory. As a result of this information, the police force was alerted and the guards at the armories doubled.

After the withdrawal of British troops following independence, the police were the sole security force in Zanzibar; there was no army, air force, or navy. Despite the mounting of additional patrols on the night of 11 January, they were deficient in quantity and quality for their task. Of a total strength of 800, about 250 were mainlanders, who were disaffected by the government's policy of "Zanzibarization;" they put up almost no resistance and, in some cases, joined the revolutionary mob.

In the early morning hours, just after the second police armory had fallen, Prime Minister Shamte telephoned Kenyatta and Nyerere and asked that Kenyan and Tanganyikan troops be airlifted immediately, before the airfield could be taken. The British High Commissioner also contacted London with a request for British troops. It was late afternoon, however, before Kenyatta held a cabinet meeting. By then, the former Zanzibar Government had fallen and the Sultan had fled. Therefore, there was no question of committing Kenya troops.

Within less than 24 hours, the People's Republic of Zanzibar had been firmly established.

3. The Death Toll

Press reports on the Zanzibar revolution, which were generally sensational and often misleading, if not altogether wrong, grossly exaggerated the casualties of the revolt. They may have been based on Okello's fantastic
claim that "11,995 people lost their lives in the coup."* Witnesses have advanced the figure of 5,000; Karume and the Director of Zanzibar's Medical Services have admitted to 500 dead, of whom 300 were Arabs; but the Revolutionary Council has officially announced that only 50-60 persons died, 13 of them in the hospital.

Karume and the Revolutionary Council are probably referring to the number of persons killed during the day's fighting before the government fell. While it may be that fewer than 500 died in the actual revolt of 12 January, many more Zanzibaris, mostly Arabs, were killed in the bloodbath that followed the revolution. Competent authorities put the figure at approximately 4,000.**

C. Sino-Soviet Involvement

Within less than a week of the Zanzibar revolution, mutinies broke out in the neighboring East African states of Tanganyika, Uganda, and Kenya. There was a general suspicion that these events were somehow interrelated, and this view contributed to speculation that they might be part of a coordinated Communist plot to take over the area.

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*After the revolution, there is every indication that Okello was exalted to the point of insanity. His boast about the number of dead was only one of a number of wild public statements he made over the Zanzibar radio.

**Karume was deeply embarrassed by the wild killing and looting of Arabs by Africans in the days after the revolution; but he was not in a position to do much about it. His security forces were no match for the armed bands—who claimed to be Okello's followers—who roamed the countryside, killing and plundering.
Despite the speculation, there does not appear to have been any direct link between the Zanzibar coup and the mutinies. Whereas the revolution in Zanzibar was organized with a precise political end in mind, the East African mutinies appear to have been spontaneous moves by disgruntled soldiers who sought more pay and a way to get rid of their British officers. That the Tanganyikan mutineers did not have political aims was obvious when they reached agreement with the government on promotion in the army and removal of their British officers, and that ended their ambitions. They did not speak of overthrowing the government, even when they held Dar es Salaam at their mercy on 19 and 20 January. Like the Tanganyikan mutiny, the Ugandan and Kenyan army mutinies were not planned as coups d'état, in contrast to the Zanzibar revolution. Kenyatta is almost certainly right in saying that the only link between the Zanzibar revolt and the uprisings in East Africa was "emotional." The success of the Zanzibar coup no doubt suggested to the Tanganyikan soldiers an easy means for forcing concessions from the government. In this sense, the revolution may have provided the inspiration for the mutinies. In the same way, Okello's visit to the Colito Barracks just 24 hours before the Tanganyikan army coup probably heartened the rebellious soldiers on the verge of mutiny; but there is no evidence that Okello helped plan the uprising or, indeed, that he even expected a

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*In Tanganyika, the mutiny came within two days of a decision by Nyerere to send 300 Tanganyikan police to Zanzibar. Almost certainly, planning for the mutiny did not antedate this decision. With the example of the Zanzibar revolution fresh in their minds, the soldiers of the Tanganyikan Rifles immediately seized the opportunity which Nyerere's decision gave them for forcing concessions from the government. It was quite natural that one successful pay claim in Tanganyika should lead to another in Uganda and Kenya.
mutiny the next day. His presence in Dar es Salaam would seem to have been a pure coincidence.*

If the army mutinies in Tanganyika, Uganda, and Kenya were quite clearly not part of a coordinated Communist plot to seize power in East Africa, there is still the question of the degree of Communist involvement in the Zanzibar revolution. If the question refers to the Zanzibar political elements that participated in the coup, the answer must be that Communist and pro-Communist elements were involved to a significant degree. Hanga and many other radical members of the African trade union and youth movements who participated in the coup had been trained in the USSR and were Communist sympathizers. However, the great majority of the ASP rebels who actually did the fighting were probably neither pro-Communist nor anti-Communist; they were simply anti-Arab and anti-government. The Umma Party members, who joined their ranks, probably considered themselves Communists; many had been trained in Communist China or Cuba.

Having said that Communist and pro-Communist elements played an important part, it should be emphasized that the coup was the result of the combined efforts of these pro-Communists and other non-Communist African nationalists, with whom they shared one overriding concern—a determination that Africans, rather than Arabs, should be in control of Zanzibar. First and foremost, the revolutionaries were African and anti-Arab, rather than pro-Communist or anti-Communist. The revolution was essentially an African revolution against an Arab minority, not a Communist revolution against non-Communists.

*Okello's visit to Dar es Salaam, just two days before the Tanganyikan mutiny, was reportedly arranged by Nyerere, who was curious to see what kind of a man he was. The President was apparently also motivated by a desire to strengthen Karume's position in Zanzibar; he believed that Okello's absence would give Karume a breathing space in which to establish his own authority.
The key point to be established is whether the pro-Communists in Zanzibar who were involved in the coup were acting on the orders or advice of foreign Communists. The role of the Soviet Union, Communist China, and Cuba in the Zanzibar revolution has been the subject of considerable reporting, much of it speculative in nature. Probably the most persistent of the reports has been one that Kao Liang, the NCNA representative in Dar es Salaam and a known Chinese intelligence agent, played a prominent role in events in Zanzibar. Before the revolution, Kao was known to be in frequent contact with Babu; as the NCNA correspondent in Zanzibar, the latter would quite naturally have had regular business with the chief NCNA representative in East Africa. The case for Chinese involvement in the Zanzibar revolution is largely based on the circumstantial evidence that Kao Liang went to Zanzibar two days before the revolution and was reportedly there at the time of the coup. There is another report that Tu Pei-lin, the NCNA correspondent in Somalia, also visited Zanzibar just prior to the revolution. Finally, it has been suggested that the omission of Zanzibar from the itinerary of Chou En-lai's African trip, which was originally planned to include visits to Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika in January 1964, indicated Chinese foreknowledge of the coup.*

Certain evidence of Cuban influence in the Zanzibar revolution has also been reported. The fact that a number of the insurgents had been trained in Cuba has been cited as evidence of Cuban support of the revolution. As noted previously, erroneous reports that Cuban nationals participated in the fighting suggested that plans for the January coup were known in advance in Havana. Finally, the Cuban Embassy in Dar es Salaam was reportedly maintaining close contact with principal Zanzibar leaders on the morning of 12 January.

*Following the army mutinies, the governments of Tanganyika, Kenya, and Uganda cancelled the projected visit of Chou to the three countries. It was the most serious reverse of his African tour.
Mainly it was because of Hanga’s known connections with the USSR that the Russians were suspected of having been involved in the revolution.* One report that the USSR engineered the coup claimed that the Soviet Embassy in Dar es Salaam was in contact with Okello.

The theory of Chinese Communist sponsorship of the coup stumbles over some very awkward obstacles. It supposes that Peking had reason to want the overthrow of the previous Arab regime at that time. Although most of China’s contacts in the ZNP had followed Babu out of the party when he founded the Umma Party in June 1963. Ali Muhsein and other ZNP leaders in the government were friendly towards China. They had invited the CPR to Zanzibar’s independence celebrations and, as soon as an independent Zanzibar was able to do so, had established diplomatic relations with Peking.* Chinese officials at the independence ceremonies were reported to have held

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*After he abandoned his earlier studies in London, Hanga attended school in the USSR. While a student at Lumumba University—apparently one of the first arrivals there—he met and married a Soviet citizen, Liya O. Golden, the daughter of an American Negro father and an American Jewish mother who emigrated to the Soviet Union in the early 1930’s and subsequently obtained citizenship there. (Before the revolution, Hanga’s wife had been denied permission to enter Zanzibar; she and the Hanga’s daughter were living in Moscow.) After he left the USSR to return to Zanzibar, Hanga made at least two trips to Moscow, both times in 1962. He was known to be receiving funds from the Soviet Embassy in Dar es Salaam all during this period.

**The arrival of Chinese diplomats on the island immediately after the coup, which some observers thought to be significant, arose from the policy of the government that had been overthrown. The Peking mission had been due to arrive the day after the coup. The only effect of the revolution was to postpone its arrival by a few days.
discussions with the government on the subject of Chinese economic assistance to Zanzibar; these discussions were to have been continued as soon as China's diplomatic representatives arrived on the island. Just before the coup, two Chinese trade representatives were in Zanzibar, where they were reported to have contracted for the purchase of $14,000 worth of cloves, their objective being to establish friendly relations with the government of Ali Muhsin. Chinese propaganda had never showed the slightest dissatisfaction with the ZNP government so long as it was in office. Indeed, with no other government in Africa had Peking secured so strong a position relative to that of Moscow as it had with the Zanzibar government. In short, the Chinese had no reason to be unhappy with the ZNP government.

Nevertheless, there is evidence that Babu was planning a revolution for the long term. This does not mean that the Chinese wanted the revolution to take place soon. The fact that Babu's base was so narrow made it advisable to wait—until he could be assured of broader popular support. To that end, the Chinese appear to have advised Babu to give up his talk of an immediate overthrow of the government and to concentrate instead on the development of a united front.

The Chinese have, of course, publicly disclaimed any foreknowledge of the coup. Chou En-lai said that he read about the Zanzibar revolution in the newspapers. In this case, the Chinese are likely to be telling the truth, for China could hardly have been the power behind the revolt. With the ASP revolutionaries who made the coup, it had no influence whatever; the rebels would not have been acting on orders from Peking. And the Umma Party elements, which might have been responsive to its will, were not actively involved in planning the revolution.

The Cubans were in a position similar to that of the Chinese. They had channelled all their efforts in Zanzibar through the ZNP; so far as is known, no member of the ASP had ever received training in Cuba. Cuban support of the ZNP was apparently limited to the
financing of the ZNP office in Havana and the offer of training in Cuba to some 25 ZNP supporters; there is no indication that Castro ever offered arms to the ZNP. There is absolutely no reason to think that Havana had advance knowledge of the coup, and there is no basis to the reports that Cuban nationals participated in the fighting.

The one Bloc country in a position to influence the ASP revolutionaries, the USSR had the most to gain from the overthrow of the Arab regime and the establishment of a new government in the hands of the Africans. But there is no evidence to substantiate any belief that the insurrection was planned or organized by the Soviets. The emphasis of Soviet policy in Africa at the time was on caution. In Zanzibar, as in most African countries, the CPSU was apparently willing to work through the nationalist regime. The Soviet propaganda response to the revolution in January suggested that the USSR was as surprised as everyone else by events in Zanzibar; in private, Soviet officials have on several occasions denied that the CPSU played any part in the coup.

In summary, there is no evidence that the USSR, Communist China, Cuba, or any otherBloc country engineered the revolution or was in a position to control the course of events in Zanzibar. For the African revolutionaries, the really important feature of the coup was that it was done by Africans alone, without any outside help whatsoever. They have made a special point of this fact, and they would seem to be quite right in making the claim.
IV. The People's Republic of Zanzibar; January-April 1964

Within a day of the revolution on 12 January, the rebel leaders announced the formation of a new government formed of members of both the ASP and Umma parties. Karume was made President of the new republic; and Hanga and Babu were given key posts in the cabinet, as Vice President and Foreign Minister, respectively.* The chief spokesman of the regime in announcing these appointments and in promulgating the first orders of the revolutionary government was a hitherto unknown individual named Okello.

A. Internal Politics

The leaders of the new revolutionary government were strange bedfellows. Hanga and Okello had a reputation for rabid racism; they had expressed strong anti-white and anti-Arab feelings. Babu's greatest liability was that he was Arab, as were most of the other members of the Umma Party. Despite the fact that they were both pro-Communists who advocated government ownership and control of the economy, there had never been any basis for a close working relationship between men like Hanga and Babu. In addition, there were the differences of opinion and interest between the more moderate leaders of the ASP like Kasume and the radical, pro-Communist elements like Hanga. Okello was a special case; none of Zanzibar's government leaders had had any contact with him before the revolution.

*Except for Babu, the cabinet was the same as the one the ASP had proposed before the 1963 elections. Outside of the cabinet, the Umma Party was represented at high levels—in the Revolutionary Council, in the executive department (as in the Ministry of Communications), and in ambassadorial appointments.
The obvious question is 'how was it that these diverse elements were associated together in the Zanzibar government?' Perhaps in the interests of consolidating the revolution, the ASP leaders would have decided to include Babu in the cabinet. After the revolution, they might have found it difficult, if not impossible, to exclude him from the government after his followers had assured the success of the revolt by joining forces with the ASP rebels. Karume, for one, is known to have been in favor of giving every Zanzibari a chance to prove his loyalty to the revolution. In the case of Okello, circumstances outside the control of Hanga and the ASP leaders were obviously responsible for his emergence as a powerful political figure. It may be significant that it was Okello who announced the formation of the new government. The military hero of the day, he had emerged from the revolution with a large popular following which made him, at least temporarily, the most powerful figure in Zanzibar. He claims to have immediately exercised that power by taking it upon himself to appoint the new government leaders. In this case, there may be some truth to his statement that he "arranged to put in the new heads of government." He is reported to have informed the leaders of the ASP and the Umma Party that they were part of the government on the afternoon of 13 January; almost immediately, he began to broadcast their names over the radio.

With such an uneasy consortium of interests, it was almost inevitable that there would be conflicts between the rival factions within the government. The struggle for power between the various leaders began almost immediately.
1. The Rise and Fall of Okello

The emergence of Okello to a position of prominence was the most curious and the most confusing aspect of the Zanzibar revolution. For almost two months, the entire civilian structure of the government operated in the shadow of this enigmatic figure who held no formal position in the government but acted in the name of the government under the title of Field Marshal.

Early in the morning of 13 January Okello began what was to become a daily feature of the Zanzibar political scene--his radio broadcast to the Zanzibar people. In his first appearance, he announced that he had been the strong man behind the revolution and that the government was now "run by us, the army."

We, the army have the strength of 99 million, 99 thousand....Should anyone be stubborn and disobey orders, then I will take very strong measures, 88 times stronger than at present.

I, the field marshal, want peace. There is no need to waste human lives. There is no benefit in doing this. Benefit only comes from a living person. Therefore, if you want to be of benefit, then it is better for you to be alive. To be alive, you must obey orders. If there is anyone who hesitates, then I am ready with my machine gun to lift up his face and let loose bullets.... The government which was brought to an end the day before yesterday was a government of hypocrites, robbers, cursed and wicked people who do not respect humanity. We are a people who protect gods, human beings, animals, and other creatures who live to be protected.
For days, the flow of Okello's inflammatory words issued forth constantly from the Zanzibar radio station. Even in the face of a denial by Karume that members and supporters of the overthrown regime would be executed, the Field Marshal kept repeating his frightful threats that he would "cut up into pieces" all the Asians who did not surrender their weapons—or else "throw them into the sea" or "burn them alive after having sprinkled them with gasoline" or "transform them into living targets for shooting practice." His stern warning against any foreign interference in the internal affairs of the new republic was in the same extremist vein:

You have just heard fabricated and hypocritical news from BBC, London. This news is from foolish, infidel, savage people who live lies like their father, Satan.... As from today, the BBC is banned for one month, and we might ban it later until the end of the world.... From this moment, British and American press correspondents are banned in Zanzibar... because it has been seen that these are hypocrites and liars. I am ready to sever any relations with such hypocritical countries.

As the days passed, Okello's boasts about his role in the revolution and his power in the government grew even more fantastic. In an interview on 16 January, he claimed to have conceived the idea of the revolution without consulting the other leaders. His own powers were, he said, "equal to that of the whole government."*

I was a very high ranking person in Kenya in the Mau Mau army which knows how to make weapons. I can easily make not less

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*On one occasion, Okello told a British official "I am above the government and cannot die."
than 500 guns per day. Undoubtedly, I can make a bomb that can destroy an area of 3 square miles. I can make about 100 grenades in an hour.

Okello's radio broadcasts, more than anything else, marked the Zanzibar revolution and the new revolutionary government as extremist and unstable—even fanatic. It was assumed that Okello spoke with the authority and approval of the other government leaders; it was thought that he must have played a major role in the revolution; and it was supposed that he had had foreign backing in the undertaking. (His remark that he wanted to meet the "bravest man in the world, Mr. Khrushchev" was taken as an indication of his ties with the Soviet Union.) As it turned out, the situation was not what it first seemed.

The realities of Zanzibar's early post-revolutionary politics, which were all but obscured at the time, have become much clearer during the past year. For one thing, the true facts of Okello's life have finally been established. It is now clear that Hanga, Karume, Babu, and the other leaders had had only chance contacts with Okello before the revolution. They knew virtually nothing about the man, as they were to reveal in their answers to questions about Okello after the revolution. (In an interview on 13 January, Babu told a journalist that the field marshal was a Kenya-born member of the Zanzibar police, which was totally incorrect.) They had certainly not foreseen that Okello would emerge from the revolution with a large popular following and claim a share equal to their own in running the government. At first uncertain how to judge the man, they were for some time unsure of how to deal with him.

Without doubt, Okello was an embarrassment to the new government. In addition to his fantastic public utterances made without the consent of the Revolutionary Council, there was the fact that he was liable to do anything that struck his fancy. In early February, he forced the government to purchase cloves which he had his men harvest; he then kept the money himself. At meetings of the cabinet, he often came in unannounced, pistol in
hand and sten gun underarm, and "carried on like a buffoon." At all such official functions, he apparently delighted in posing interminably for photographs.

It is safe to say that Oekklo's meteoric rise from obscurity and hardship to a position of power and prominence, in which he was the object of many men's adulation, had exalted him to the point of insanity. By mid-February, most of his colleagues had concluded that he was "crazy;" they described him variously as an outright thug, a "maniac," and a "megalomaniac." Determined to divest him of power as soon as it was possible, they were unable to devise any way of dealing with him without sparking a counter-revolution from his devoted followers.* These men, numbering about 500, possessed large quantities of small arms. The Tanganyikan Police Force on Zanzibar, numbering about 130, was in no position to cope with them.

By late February, feeling against Okello was so strong that Babu's group reportedly considered assassinating him. By then, several opening moves had already been taken against the field marshal. It had been ordered that no photographs be taken of Okello, and the Zanzibar radio had been forbidden to mention his name. Zanzibar's leaders had begun to exclude him from all important deliberations, and they had refused to acknowledge his claim to be chief of the army. On several occasions, they had called on him to account for his extreme public statements; at one such encounter, Babu had reminded Okello that he was not a Zanzibari and, strictly speaking, the revolution was never any of his business.

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*Okello commanded the support of a large crowd of youthful Africans, whom he had armed on the night of the revolution and during the days that followed. These people were grateful to him because their weapons had enabled them to extort money and property from non-Africans. A favorite game of these so-called "freedom fighters" was to enter Asian shops at the end of the day and demand to see the cash book and then to extort a percentage of the day's sales from the proprietor.
Okello was apparently not aware of the danger to his position. To visiting foreigners he complained that he was being "given the cold shoulder" and that instead of being shown gratitude, he was being left out of discussions. When, during his absence in Pemba, the Revolutionary Council made some decision of which he did not approve, he gave a remarkable radio performance in which he shared his sense of rejection at the hands of the men he put in power.* The strained relations between Okello and the other leaders may have prompted his secretive visit to Kenya on 20 February. Although he claimed he was simply on his way to visit his family in Uganda,** he is thought to have sought the help and advice of Odinga, a fellow member of the Luo tribe.***

*Okello did this to such effect that sympathy for his unhappiness and support for his cause were expressed in many quarters. A government minister said later: "No Minister slept much that night."

**In an apparent attempt to buy off Okello, the government reportedly gave the field marshal 300,000 East African shillings as a reward for his part in the revolution. One reason for his trip to Uganda may have been his reported desire to buy land there, though, so far as is known, he did not buy any. If the government did make such a payment, Okello must have spent all or most of it on his visit to Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika from 20 February until 8 March; two days later, when he fled from Zanzibar, he was penniless. Among his more bizarre activities in Tanganyika, he was reported to have ordered 10,000 glossy prints of a recent studio portrait, making one-third of the payment in cash.

***Although he was later to befriend the exiled field marshal (he supplied Okello with money and a car, while professing complete ignorance of his whereabouts), Odinga was apparently unable or unwilling to help Okello in a struggle for power in Zanzibar.
The final decision to get rid of Okello was apparently taken in early March, while he was still in Uganda. It seems to have been agreed upon by all the powerful elements in Zanzibar, and there are indications that it might even have been a joint East African decision. The actual removal of the field marshal was made easy by the fact that Okello was out of the country. When he sought to return to Zanzibar on 8 March, he was met at the airport by Karume and Babu and their armed guards.* Within five minutes, Okello and Karume were aboard another plane bound for Dar es Salaam, ostensibly "for talks with Nyerere." The next morning, the field marshal did not accompany Karume on the latter's return trip to Zanzibar.

Viewed in retrospect, the government handled its first major problem—the problem posed by Okello—with adroitness and reasonable dispatch, though, at the time, it may have seemed that it moved slowly to check the excesses of the field marshal and his armed ruffians who terrorized the countryside, virtually unchecked, for a period of two months. As early as 19 January, Karume was insisting that Okello's insurgents be disarmed or, at least, brought under discipline.** But Karume was not in a position to force the issue; to do so would have provoked a counter-revolution, and Okello and his band of loyal followers possessed superior firepower. Until mid-February, Karume had to bide his time; by then, he had

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*Okello was reportedly very bitter about the treatment accorded him and his aides at the Zanzibar airport. Apparently, he was first promised, then refused permission to reenter Zanzibar Town for his personal effects. He was told that such property which was not confiscated would be sent to him. During his absence, both his house and office had been searched and seized by the government.

**Apparently, it was Karume who took the lead against Okello. In one instance, he telephoned President Kenyatta and told him Okello was not wanted in Zanzibar; he begged Kenyatta to keep him in Kenya, when Okello was there on a visit on 20 February.
the support of the other leaders and the government could begin to take concrete steps against the field marshal. By the time of his expulsion, the groundwork had been well laid. The legend of Okello had already been seriously tarnished.

Since then, it has been all but destroyed. Soon after his expulsion, the government began a public campaign to disparage the role of the field marshal in the revolution. In one of the earliest statements by a government official, Babu on 23 March denied that Okello had organized or led the January revolution. On 16 April, in another press conference, he stated that Okello had not been the supreme chief of the revolution, only one of its leaders; he claimed that the field marshal had used, for his own profit, his role as spokesman of the government on the radio.* By this time in April, the supporters of Okello had more or less disappeared. Most had been disarmed by persuasion, not by force, and had returned to their former occupations. The rest had regrouped around their former headquarters and were being reorganized in the new Zanzibar People's Liberation Army.

As for the fortunes of Okello since his rise and fall from power in Zanzibar: When he arrived in Dar es Salaam in mid-March, he claimed that he was penniless and planned to return to his home in Lira, Uganda, to make a living as a bricklayer. Though stripped of his power, his dreams of grandeur remained. He was quoted as saying: "God gave me the title of Field Marshal. I shall remain a Field Marshal dead or alive." Though he has said that

*It is interesting that Babu, alone, of all the Zanzibar leaders, referred to Okello as a "brave man" in private in March 1964. According to \underline{[\text{ underline}]} he appeared to regard Okello as a friend while the others felt him to be a mercenary. Since the revolution, Babu and Karume and Hanga and the other leaders have all downgraded Okello's role in the revolt, both in public and private.
he hopes to travel throughout Africa and the Bloc, particularly the USSR and China, he has not to date left East Africa. He has offered his services in the liberation of Portuguese Guinea, Angola, Mozambique, Southwest Africa, and South Africa (provided his expenses are met), but, in his own words, "there is no hope of obtaining a job because most foreign employers will not hire me." Banned from Tanganyika, Okello has spent the past year in Uganda and Kenya, where he was last reported to be writing a book on the Zanzibar revolution.

2. The Struggle for Power: Karume, Hanga, and Babu

With the removal of Okello, the lines of authority within the Zanzibar Government, which had been blurred so long as the field marshal occupied the stage as the chief spokesman of the regime, became much more discernible. It was clear that no single element exercised exclusive control. Rather, there appeared to be three main centers of authority—Karume, Hanga, and Babu. Reportedly, each was trying to run everything.

As the recognized leader of the majority ASP party and unquestionably the most popular man in Zanzibar, Karume was the obvious choice as figurehead of the new government. If Okello had not on his own appointed him President of the Republic, Karume would still, by all odds, have been selected for the job, had the choice been Hanga's, or that of the ASP group that plotted the revolution, or that of the majority of the population. His position seemed secure in the fact that other elements could not function without him; even the radicals would have wanted to maintain him as the symbolic head of the government, since their power base with the masses remained constricted while Karume enjoyed wide popular support. Thus, it was immediately recognized that Karume was likely to remain in power, nominally at any rate, for some time to come.
There was considerable disagreement in the West, however, as to whether Karume would prove to be more than a mere figurehead for the new regime. The general feeling was that he lacked the experience, the education and intellectual ability, and the toughness of a strong leader; they predicted that the real power would ultimately fall into the hands of Hanga or Babu.* But the reverse has proved true. Karume's stature has grown steadily since the revolution.

The President had one major advantage, besides his own personal popularity, in the struggle for power in Zanzibar—advice and support from Nyerere and the Tanganyikan African National Union Party (TANU). Harue Mtambwe, a close confidant of Nyerere has been quoted as saying: "(The Zanzibar revolution) is an Afro-Shirazi party revolution; we will not let anyone destroy it. People must have faith in Karume, because no one can separate Julius (Nyerere) and Karume. Julius knows that Karume has shortcomings and therefore needs someone near him constantly to counter Babu, who is very clever."

Within less than a week of the Zanzibar revolution, Nyerere acted to strengthen Karume's position on the island. His invitation to Okello to visit Tanganyika on 18 January was intended to give Karume a breathing space in which to establish his own authority. Two months later, Nyerere was an active participant in the actual events of Okello's expulsion. He sent the plane which took Okello and Karume to Dar es Salaam on 8 March. Okello has written:

There at the (Dar es Salaam) airport, we met Nyerere waiting for us. Karume and Nyerere went in the same Presidential car.

*It should be noted that this evaluation was made before there was any consideration of a union between Zanzibar and Tanganyika. If it hadn't been for the union, Karume would probably not have been able to consolidate his position as the most powerful leader in Zanzibar.
with a flag on it. (For me) they brought a very old Land Rover which (was used) for carrying stones. I remained completely out of sight of them.

The next morning at the airport

I met Karume who was ready to get in the plane to leave for Zanzibar. Neither Karume nor Nyerere spoke to me. From the airport, I left with Nyerere, going round (the city) to see every part of it.

During March and April Nyerere frequently invited Karume to Dar es Salaam for private talks, where he would be away from the influence of Babu and Hanga. Reportedly, the Tanganyikan President was very worried about what was happening in Zanzibar and was anxious to bolster Karume. In their talks, Nyerere first broached the subject of a Tanganyika-Zanzibar merger to Karume. Although it was not his sole reason for the union, he definitely believed that a merger would strengthen Karume's power position in Zanzibar. His feeling of urgency about the matter was probably due to his concern to ensure Karume's dominance as soon as possible.

Before the union, the main thing that kept Karume in power was the Tanganyikan police force contingent,* which Nyerere sent to the island as a measure of protection for Karume against Okello and his armed followers. After Okello's departure, Karume kept the police as protection against Babu and the pro-Communist elements that were attempting to secure position of power in the government. Although they were nominally under the control of Karume, they took their orders from Nyerere. Without

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*The U.S. and West Germany equipped the Tanganyikan police contingent in Zanzibar with arms and ammunition.
such concrete support from Nyerere, Karume would probably not have been able to stay in power in Zanzibar.

Besides Nyerere, Hanga seems to have had the confidence of Karume. The President was known to accept, even to seek, the advice of his Vice President. Hanga, for his part, appeared loyal to the President and followed his orders; no doubt he recognized his dependence on Karume, as the popular figurehead for his African revolution. Hanga has been described as a "very able but humble man" who may actually prefer to be a power behind the scenes. From the beginning, he found the President generally receptive to a good many of his ideas on "African socialism." With Karume's approval, Hanga was given a free rein in removing Asians from governmental posts after the revolution. He has also been the real architect of socialism in Zanzibar; reportedly, he personally planned the nationalization measures and had the major hand in developing the country's three-year plan.

If the Soviets ever discussed the matter with Hanga, they probably had no objections to his cooperating with Karume against Babu. There is other evidence to suggest an alliance between the pro-Communists with Soviet ties and the Zanzibar nationalists aimed at combating the activities of the pro-Chinese Communists. Whether this was the case or not, there appeared to be little possibility of a struggle for power developing between Karume and Hanga; they seemed very much dependent on one another.

Able, aggressive, extremely opportunistic, and charming--Babu was by all odds the most gifted of the Zanzibar government leaders. Moreover, he had powerful foreign contacts. His great liability was that he was Arab. He and his Umma Party followers were always vulnerable on that account. On the whole, he was considered, by most observers, to be the man most likely to emerge as the real power in Zanzibar.

In a move that reflected his keen political instinct and opportunism, Babu disbanded the Umma Party
almost immediately after the revolution and took his followers into the ASP.* Africans were already beginning to grumble that non-Africans were still in control of the country, and Babu was anxious to get rid of the Umma Party label which marked him and his followers as Arab. The dissolution of the party and its absorption into the ASP was a show of Arab unity with the African revolution that was calculated to minimize his greatest political liability--his Arab background.

It may be that Babu was acting on Chinese advice. With all of its previous contacts having been with the ZNP, Peking was no doubt anxious to establish new ties with the ruling ASP group. Under the circumstances, the Chinese are quite likely to have advised Babu to cut his losses with the Umma Party and establish himself with the new in-group. The move to disband the Umma Party was probably taken with this thought in mind. From the beginning, however, there was no real warmth between Babu and the African leaders in the government.

Besides their personal differences, there were also serious policy disagreements between Karume and Hang'a on the one hand and Babu and his Umma clique on the other. It was Babu who took the lead in opening Zanzibar to Communist penetration in negotiating the military and economic assistance agreements with the Bloc.** The

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*After they joined the ASP, the former Umma Party supporters continued to maintain a separate identity by referring to themselves as "the comrades."

**Babu has said that despite the fact that he is closely involved with the Chinese Communists, he does not object to dealing with the Russians when it is only a question of Bloc aid to Zanzibar. He has served Soviet Bloc interests in establishing diplomatic relations between Zanzibar and the Soviet Bloc and in negotiating aid agreements with the USSR and its East European satellites.
Government of Zanzibar's decision to recognize East Germany, which no other non-Communist state had done, was directly attributable to Babu, who engineered a reversal of Karume's earlier decision to establish diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic. With regard to domestic policy, Babu took exception to many of Karume's and Hanga's "Africanization policies"—such as the decision to remove or demote Asians in the government in order to appoint Africans to the civil service and the decision to revise the list of children who had passed the secondary school entrance exam in favor of children of African parents. (The revised list contained fewer than 20 percent of the names on the original list published in December 1964.)

Perhaps the greatest source of dispute between the "comrades," the followers of Babu, and the Afro-Shirazis in the government was the reluctance of the former to share their military equipment with their colleagues. As noted previously, the Umma Party had brought a supply of arms and ammunition to Zanzibar during the fall of 1964 which it had reportedly concealed in different places on the island. After the revolution, the "comrades" refused to disclose these caches to the Afro-Shirazis; moreover, they contested the distribution of newly-arrived Soviet military equipment. Karume wanted the weapons taken to the Mtoni police arsenal which he controlled; Babu wanted them taken to the army camps where the "comrades" were undergoing military training under the direction of Ali Mahfudh. As a result of the dispute over possession of the weapons, the equipment remained in the port area for several weeks. Finally, in late April, when Karume had asserted his influence over the army,* he ordered the weapons moved to the training camps.

*In late April, Karume removed Ali Mahfudh, the Arab Commander of the army who owed his allegiance to Babu, from his command position and gave him and his Cuban-trained followers in the army the job of supervising the dismantling of the U.S. Project Mercury station instead of training the army. The new Commander of the Army, Yusuf Himidi, was reported to know nothing about commanding an army; a former public works truck driver who had driven (footnote continued on page 67)
Whether the "comrades" ever seriously considered using their weapons in a coup against the government is unclear. There were persistent rumors to this effect. But the possibility for success of such a counter-revolution was remote, and there is no good evidence that Babu ever contemplated it. The only reason for thinking that the "comrades" may have drawn up a plan for a coup and then decided against implementing it is a report of a series of meetings of leading "comrades" in late May. Between 27-29 May, Ahmed Maulidi and Abubakar Qullatein appeared at work "looking tired and in ill humor;" on 30 May, Maulidi reportedly said: "There can be no question of force now. (Assistant Police Commissioner) Pundugu knows about our meetings and is keeping an eye on us. We know that the Government of Tanganyika is sending more police to Zanzibar, and they think we will object, but it does not matter now. Let them come."

Short of the use of force, Babu made every effort to consolidate his position within the government. He was successful in having several of his loyal adherents appointed to key civil service positions, among them Ahmed Qullatein as Chief Information Officer and Director of the Government Press Office, Ahmed Maulidi as Chief of Protocol, Ahmed Rashid as Secretary to the Ministry of Agriculture and Salem Rashid as Jr. Minister in the Vice President's office and General Secretary of the Revolutionary Council. He insisted that these men share bungalows with the leading Afro-Shirazi government figures. (Ahmed Qullatein shared one with Twala, a Karume-supporter.) With his own men in the government, his own

(footnote continued from page 67)

arms from the Mtoni police arsenal to the revolutionary headquarters during the Zanzibar coup, he was obviously given command of the army because he was loyal to Karume. (While loyal to Karume, Himidi also is known to have pro-Communist leanings. He has travelled to the USSR and Cuba since the revolution, and both times he has come back extremely enthusiastic about Communism.)

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security force (the army), even his own men at the Customs House, and his Umma Party clique within the ASP, Babu was by mid-March well on the way to developing his own apparatus, separate from the government—in the classical Communist pattern.

There was considerable concern expressed at this time that Karume was either poorly informed or indifferent to Babu's independent course. Actually, there is good evidence that the President was fully alerted to his pro-Communist maneuvers and very much perturbed by his disregard of presidential decisions. It was significant that Hanga always accompanied Babu on the latter's missions to the mainland in February, when he went to the OAU Foreign Ministers Conference in Dar es Salaam on 12-14 February, for instance. By March, Karume's suspicions of Babu's motives were sufficiently aroused that one of Hanga's men, usually Twala, was regularly attached to Babu on all the latter's trips away from Zanzibar. (Twala accompanied Babu to the Lagos Conference of Foreign Ministers in early March.) About this time, Karume is reported to have told a close confidant that he had lost confidence in Babu; he was convinced though that he could control Babu and the other pro-Communists in the government and claimed that "they are afraid of me."*

In mid-April, several sources reported that African members of the government had decided to move against their Arab colleagues. In the first such report, Minister

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*In recent months, Karume has been more outspoken in his criticism of Babu. In December 1964, Karume reportedly called Babu a "traitor." He said Babu had attempted to stab him in the back but had failed. It was now Babu's turn; he would be tortured with "broken pieces of glass." Karume went on to say that he had disregarded Kenyatta's and Obote's and Nyerere's advice not to associate with Babu and had given him every opportunity to demonstrate his loyalty and gratitude but now he realized that Babu was not trustworthy and was despicable.

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of Agriculture Saleh Saadalla was reported to have said on 19 April that Karume, Hanga, and Twala would take action "within the next ten days;" he was not specific about what kind of action. Other reports referred to the week-end of 25 April. As that proved to be the very time that the announcement of Zanzibar's merger with Tanganyika was made, it seems clear that the anti-Arab move referred to in these various reports was the Zanzibar-Tanganyika union. It is possible, of course, that the reports of an imminent move against the Arabs also referred to Karume's move against the Arab element in the army. It was during the third week of April that Ali Mahfudh was relieved of his command position.

Babu was apparently sensitive to events in the offing. He was reportedly disinclined to remain away too long on his trip to Indonesia and Pakistan, though he professed to be confident of his power position in Zanzibar. Pakistani Foreign Ministry officials said he was extremely "nervous" and "high strung" during his visit to Pakistan; "he seemed aware that he faced major difficulties but did not seem to know quite what these were." It was a very astute observation. Just before Babu left Pakistan, Karume made the official, public announcement of Zanzibar's union with Tanganyika. Babu was obviously caught by surprise by the news.*

In public, Babu appeared confident and unperturbed. Before leaving Pakistan, he told reporters that he approved Zanzibar's union with Tanganyika "in principle." In talks in Nairobi, en route to Zanzibar, he said it was "nonsense to pretend that he was not in favor of the union", which had been planned for weeks prior to his Asian trip;" he

*Just as he was about to leave Pakistan, Babu heard the news of the union at the airport from the Chinese Communist Consul in Rawalpindi. He was reportedly shocked by this news and unable to sleep that night. He commented that he had been let down by Ali Mahfudh and Salim Rashid, his two trusted Arab followers.
asserted that he had been kept well informed and indicated that he would accept a post in the union government. Obviously, Babu was trying to put the best face on a bad situation. He had always been opposed to any federation with mainland East African countries (in private, he has admitted that he never liked the idea of the union but his African colleagues wanted it) and he had certainly not been kept informed of the union negotiations.

Almost immediately after his return to Zanzibar, Babu flew to Dar es Salaam for private discussions with Nyerere on 26 April. After the talks, Babu confided that he had a long struggle ahead of him but that he had been greatly encouraged by his meeting with Nyerere. According to Babu, Nyerere told him that he had leaned too far to the East and Nyerere too far to the West; "with both of us in the same union, we should be able to strike a balance."

Although Babu appeared outwardly to accept the union, Karume was prepared for trouble. Zanzibar police commander Kisassi was ordered to keep a strict watch on Babu's supporters; for at least two months after the union, Karume returned to Zanzibar every evening regardless of his daily schedule in Tanganyika, because he feared a coup from Babu and his men.* The evidence for thinking that the "comrades" may have drawn up a plan for such a coup and then decided against it has already been cited. If some of his militant followers wanted to resist the union with force, Babu seems never to have considered this seriously. Realizing that he had been out-maneuvered by his African colleagues, he acted to restrain his Arab

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*Karume expressed his fears that the Arabs were planning to kill him in a remarkable speech on 16 May. He warned the approximately 200 Arabs who were assembled on the lawn of the state house that if he or any other African were murdered, all the remaining Arabs in Zanzibar would be killed. Karume then turned to the units of the Zanzibar army that were present and cried "Is that true?" --to which the soldiers shouted affirmative replies.
follows.* In public, he has said that he accepted the union because he feared an "imperialist counter-revolution."

In their negotiations on the union, Nyerere and Karume had agreed to remove Babu and his two principal lieutenants (Ali Muhfudh and Rashid) from their power positions in Zanzibar. Babu was to be transferred to Dar es Salaam as one of three Ministers of State for Development and Planning directly under Nyerere. It was an assignment that was calculated to keep him under the careful watch of Tanganyika's African leaders.

Despite Babu's rationalization that "it was worth losing Zanzibar's 300,000 people for the sake of Tanganyika's ten million," it is clear that the union was a significant victory for Karume and a defeat for Babu. During the past year, he has been given a ministry--the Ministry of Commerce and Cooperatives--in the union government; in that post, he has proved able and effective, and he has had some influence with Nyerere.** However,

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*Babu knew that no African country would support him if he fought the union. As one Zanzibar official close to Babu put it: "Babu assessed the situation and decided a coup in Zanzibar was hopeless; so he decided to support the union and try to subvert Tanganyika. He never acts precipitously."

**Apparently Babu was influential in getting Nyerere to accept the Chinese Communist invitation to visit Peking in February 1965. He served as Nyerere's advance man on that trip, arriving in Peking on 6 February, 11 days before Nyerere. Babu had earlier accompanied Tanzanian Vice President Kawawa on his trip to China in June 1964.

It seemed at first that Nyerere liked Babu; more recently, there has apparently not been so close a relationship between the two. Certainly Babu is not in the inner political circle. Nyerere has said that he values Babu's intelligence but realizes that he must "keep an eye on him at all times." At a cabinet meeting in May 1965, he (footnote continued on page 72)
there have been reports that he is unhappy in Dar es Salaam and misses his former position as Zanzibar's foreign minister. On the island itself, Babu is no longer a powerful figure.* Many, if not most, of Zanzibar's Africans still regard the Arabs as their bitter enemies. Because of his background, Babu was never able to develop any substantial backing either in the Revolutionary Council or among Zanzibaris at large; a year after the revolution, he had

(Footnote continued from page 71)

directly accused Babu of trying to maintain a separate power group. Babu was reported to have been upset by the incident.

Babu was also reportedly upset to discover that he did not have enough influence in Dar es Salaam to get a job for a close friend. Whereas before he has always assured his friends that he could get them good jobs on the mainland, now he is suggesting that they see other ministers for help.

*There is considerable disagreement as to Babu's power position in Zanzibar today. His strength should not be underestimated, in that he has men in key positions; Zanzibar's Protocol Officer, the Chief of the Immigration Office, and Zanzibar's representative at the UN are all Babu men. He also has support in the army. On the other hand, he has no popular following compared, say, to Karume, who is immensely popular. On the whole, it does not seem (at least, to this writer) that he is a powerful figure in Zanzibar politics today. It might be different if he were to return to the island. Several persons have commented that Babu seems out of touch with the situation in Zanzibar. He has said that he is unhappy about what is going on there but has implied that he could not do much about improving the lot of his followers there. As the most recent indication of his loss of influence in Zanzibar, Babu's newssheet Zanews has been ordered closed, effective 12 January 1966.
virtually no influence with the general public.* Although he has tried to remain the leader and spokesmen of the "comrades", many of them blame Babu for the fall in their fortunes; specifically, they cannot understand why he advised them not to fight against the union.

B. Domestic Policies

Even while Okello's armed followers were terrorizing the country, having taken the law unto themselves, the government of Zanzibar announced its intention of re-establishing constitutional government and the rule of law. And with business at a virtual standstill after the revolution, it revealed its plans for the socialist transformation of the economy in a series of presidential decrees and public statements by government leaders.

Within a month of the revolution, Thomas Franck, a Canadian Professor of Constitutional Law at New York University and a legal advisor to the ASP before the revolution, was invited to Zanzibar to serve as the constitutional advisor of the government. Reportedly, Karume was personally responsible for his appointment. All but one of the decrees which he drafted on the organization of the government were approved by the Cabinet.** These

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*Babu stated on 31 December 1964 that he no longer cared about Zanzibar; the people were blaming him for all Zanzibar's ills, which Babu felt were the results of poor administration by uneducated African leaders.

**Franck advised against drafting a new constitution immediately; instead, he counseled the government leaders to rule by decree until the situation was more stable; he said that well-devised decrees could always be incorporated into a future constitution. He planned to work on a constitution which he would present to the government in April, when he expected to return to Zanzibar. The citizenship decree giving special privileges to Commonwealth citizens was the one decree that was not approved by the Cabinet. Babu, in particular, objected to the pro-Commonwealth line taken by Franck.
decrees establishing separate executive, legislative, and judiciary branches within the government and pro-
claiming certain policies—such as that of no racial
discrimination and that of non-intervention in the af-
fairs of other nations—were both moderate and enlight-
ened, in keeping with Western constitutional law. Al-
though he did not discount the effects of the violence
that had occurred nor minimize the lack of administra-
tive organization, Franck was impressed at the govern-
ment's efforts to overcome its problems and its moderate
approach in solving them. He was also of the opinion
that Karume was firmly in control.

When Franck left Zanzibar, it was anticipated that
he would return in April. It was indicative of the gen-
eral turn toward the left in Zanzibar's domestic policies
that the government finally did not invite him back. By
April, a series of radical political and economic reforms
had been announced which set a whole new tone to the
government.

In its major political reform after the revolu-
tion, Zanzibar became a one-party state on 29 January.
In announcing the absorption of all other parties by the
ASP, Karume explained that "this is the way of African
Democracy." Babu pledged the support of the Umma Party:

We have established a new government
which wants all citizens to become one
entity. It is not possible to achieve
that if there are two or three parties,
and as there were a number of people who
had joined the ASP, it is the duty of
all of us to follow the wishes of the
majority.

Within a few weeks, all of Zanzibar's trade unions were
amalgamated into one national labor federation (The Fed-
eration of Revolutionary Trade Unions) and all its students
organizations into one students' union (The Zanzibar
Revolutionary Students' Union). During the past year,
a major feature of Zanzibar's political life has been
the strengthening of ASP control over these and other
organizations such as the civil service, the police, and the army.* With the growth of the party's influence over all other organized activity in Zanzibar, Karume has improved his power position vis-a-vis Babu and other pro-Communist elements, whose organizational strength was based in the student and trade union organizations and the army.

There was probably more agreement within the government on the subject of economic reforms than on any other. Immediately after the revolution, the one point on which all members of the Revolutionary Council were united was that there must be drastic land reform. Different groups had different reasons for wanting it: the step was popular with the African majority because most of the land was Arab-owned; it was advocated by the pro-Communists, Arab as well as African, on Marxist grounds. However, the final decision of the government to nationalize all land in Zanzibar—which was announced by Karume on 8 March—may actually have been a more extreme measure than that proposed by Babu and other of his Arab followers. Only a few days before the announcement, Babu was interviewed in Lagos, where he was attending the OAU Foreign Ministers' Conference:

We need land reform and agricultural diversification. We shall grow cocoa and coffee as well as cloves. But we

*In late 1964, Karume ordered the dissolution of the Federation of Revolutionary Trade Unions and the Revolutionary Students' Union. He was reportedly annoyed at the pro-Communist elements in the organizations who were attacking the Revolutionary Council for not being "progressive" enough and were criticizing the union of Zanzibar with Tanganyika. Karume justified the move on the grounds that the organizations were no longer required since the ASP represented all Zanzibaris, including trade unionists and students. Reportedly, Karume now intends to absorb all mass organizations into the ASP.
are not planning to nationalize the land because peasants do not work at their best without a sense of ownership. *

The decision to nationalize the land may have been taken while Babu was away from Zanzibar; if not, it must have been made just a day or two before Karume's announcement, after Babu had returned home. **

Soon after its first declaration nationalizing "the whole land of Zanzibar," the government announced

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*Babu is a practical economist. He obviously recognizes the importance of material incentives in the economy. He was not in favor of nationalizing the land because he thought the peasants would not work without the incentive of private ownership of the land; he has opposed the nationalization of certain enterprises because he has feared that it would lower production. Recently, Babu has observed that the people of Zanzibar are still oriented toward capitalism, despite government efforts to introduce socialist practices. "Instead of showing a spirit of self-discipline and sacrifice during these early stages of socialist development, the workers think only of money."

In a recent unguarded conversation with trusted followers, Babu stated that Communism would not work effectively in Tanzania at the present time. If the state were to assume control of business, he admitted that chaos would result. He expected that it would take at least 10-15 years before Communism would have a chance of success.

**Under a land-redistribution plan, the government has distributed 25-acre plots to individual Africans. The program has not been very successful because of lack of administrative follow-through by the Government and the Africans' unwillingness to work in the manner expected of them. A number of individuals who received 25-acre plots and 500 East African Shillings have spent the money and not done any work on their "farms."
a series of "socialist-communist" measures, including the confiscation of immovable property (without compensation) the nationalization of certain enterprises, such as electric power, and the banning of private social clubs. At first, the GOZ moved slowly in implementing these decrees; in recent months, however, the chief focus of all its effort has been on the building of socialism and "the complete elimination of capitalism." For the most part, it has been houses, and, in almost every instance, houses owned by Asians that have been nationalized. Until recently, Asian businessmen have merely been harassed; now, the regime has made clear its intention of nationalizing all privately-owned enterprises.*

Without doubt, the inspiration for many of Zanzibar's domestic policies has come from the Communists. Hanga and Babu have publicly admitted their debt to the Cubans, whose one-party state has been the model for their own.

The single party formed from the merger of the ASP and Umma Parties will be organized on the same basis as the united party of Socialist Cuba.

(Babu, 13 February 1964)

Cuba is our example. We will use Cuba's methods to construct the party. We will also use mass methods as in Cuba.

(Hanga, 13 February 1964)

The government's campaign to get everyone to accept the duty and dignity of work, the promise of employment to

*In April 1965, Karume ordered the confiscation of 237 clove plantations and all 25 of Zanzibar's soft drink, sugar, and other processing plants. Almost all of its foreign trade had already been brought under government control.
all the people of Zanzibar, the communal work schemes, the mass literacy campaign led by upper-form pupils with a three-month release from class to undertake the scheme, the political education program,* the economic development plan, the replacement of Arab shops by village cooperatives, the old age homes and the housing development projects—all these and other features of the Zanzibar domestic scene are characteristic of Communist countries, although some of these same features can be found in non-Communist countries as well. The organization of a "Young Pioneers" movement similar to those found in the Bloc countries is only the latest, and perhaps the most obvious, of Zanzibar's Communist-inspired programs.

But though Zanzibar's domestic policies have been unmistakably influenced by the Communists, they are essentially the policies of African socialists like Karume. Karume's intense distrust of capitalism and private enterprise is an outgrowth of his personal experiences in Zanzibar, where Arab landowners and Asian merchants long monopolized power and wealth and relegated the African to an inferior status. His feelings about capitalism are inseparably bound up in his anti-Arab racism; the one reinforces the other. Had all the land and wealth of Zanzibar not been in the hands of the Arab and Asian minority, Karume would probably not have become the convinced socialist that he is. In some instances, as noted earlier, Karume has advocated even more extreme socialist measures than Babu.

Thus, it would be a mistake to think that Zanzibar's "socialist-communist" domestic policies necessarily reflect pro-Communist Bloc sympathies on the part of the dominant

*Like many Communist political education programs, the one in Zanzibar has included practical, utilitarian measures; the people have been exhorted to "avoid filth in their neighborhoods," "eradicate theft," "avoid drinking" and "stop once and for all the practice of making children do household jobs."
Government-sponsored, voluntary-labor rice planting project, June 1964
group in the leadership. Zanzibar is an interesting case study in that certain of its leaders who have been the most radical in their domestic policies have not taken a position hostile to the West in foreign affairs, whereas others have furthered Communist Bloc interests at the sacrifice of Western interests though they have been slightly more moderate in domestic policy. Though they would both have taken Zanzibar along much the same road in domestic policy, it has mattered a great deal in terms of Zanzibar's international orientation that Karume, not Babu, has been in control.

C. Foreign Relations

In the first official statement on the foreign policy of the new revolutionary government of Zanzibar, Hanga announced on 14 January that his regime had "no policy of friends and enemies. Our policy is to have relations with all countries of the world. We want to cooperate with everyone. Naturally, we support all African liberation movements." Other than that, the revolutionary leaders indicated only that they wanted Zanzibar to remain in the Commonwealth.

Under the surface of their agreement on a policy of non-alignment, there were basic differences in the orientation and commitments of the Zanzibar leaders in foreign affairs. Thus, the outcome of the internal struggle for power would have a profound effect on Zanzibar's international relations--much more so than it would have on her domestic policies, on most points of which Karume, Hanga, and Babu were in essential agreement. It was almost inevitable that the major world powers, with a vested interest in assuring the dominance of one or another of these leaders, would be brought into the power play.
1. With the West

In the opinion of Thomas Franck, the Canadian legal adviser to the new Zanzibar government, the potentially strong element in the government favored good relations with the West. These were said to include Karume, Wakil, Makame, Saleh Saadalla and O. Shariff (whom Franck considered something of a liability).* This was the group that had been chiefly responsible for asking Franck to help establish the legal framework for the GOZ.

*In prerevolutionary days, Shariff was Karume's chief rival for power within the ASP; on 4 January 1964, only a week before the revolution, he quit the party in protest against Karume's leadership of the ASP. As a way of getting him off the island, Karume appointed Shariff High Commissioner to London; after Zanzibar's merger with Tanganyika, he became Tanzania's first ambassador to the U.S. When Tanzania withdrew its ambassador from Washington in February 1965, Shariff returned to Zanzibar--only to be arrested on a charge of collaborating with "counter-revolutionaries." (In private, Shariff may have been accused of pocketing money from Nkrumah for the ASP prior to the 1961 elections.) The basic reason for Shariff's arrest was that Karume wanted him out of the way; no doubt, the President had a hand in the arrest. At a secret trial by the Revolutionary Council, Shariff received the death sentence, but certain Tanganyikan officials, including Kambona, intervened to secure his release. Nyerere was obviously embarrassed by the whole affair. Not only did he feel that the arrest, imprisonment, and near execution of Shariff was unjust, but he abhors violence. In speaking to Western officials, he has tried to give the impression that Karume was not involved in the matter.

Shariff has since been allowed to leave Zanzibar and is now living in England.
Although Karume apparently did not altogether trust the UK and U.S., his inclinations were pro-West; he had virtually no contact with the Bloc before the revolution. Much ill will towards the West was bred, however, during what Karume regarded as an unnecessarily long period of non-recognition of the new regime. The delay made him think that the U.S. and UK preferred an Arab government under the Sultan; for a while, he may really have feared that the West might lead a counter-revolution to restore the Sultan.

An earlier British and American decision to recognize Zanzibar would have encouraged Karume and probably helped to bolster him against the pressure from pro-Communists such as Hanga and Babu. British recognition, in particular, would have been seen as a personal triumph for him.* Certainly, the delay caused the maximum loss

*On several occasions, Karume tried to pressure the UK into recognizing his government. Sometime before 17 February, he called in the UK High Commissioner to protest the delay. He said that only Nyerere's assurance that recognition would be forthcoming in two or three days had kept him from asking the British to leave Zanzibar several days before; he warned that he could not allow the situation to continue much longer. On 19 February, he carried out his threat. In informing the British High Commissioner and the U.S. Consul of his government's decision to break relations with the U.S. and UK--pending recognition--he said:

We have been waiting a long time. It is not proper for the British and American Governments to have kept quiet until now....We are very disappointed because in view of our friendly relations with your two governments, we expected recognition soon. And in fact we have endured this long wait because of our trust for you. Our friendship will always remain but our diplomatic relations must cease. Whenever you recognize us, we will re-establish our relationship....Governments (footnote continued on page 82)

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of influence and goodwill by Britain and the U.S. Karume's bitterness persisted for a long while; he has said that it strengthened his ties with the Soviets, East Germans, and Chinese Communists.

U.S.-Zanzibar relations were further strained by what Karume considered to be a serious distortion by the Western press of the Zanzibar revolution. In late January, the government was moved to issue a communique on the subject. It accused the press of distorting not only the motives of the revolutionaries but their life histories and the situation of the country.

(The press) has even said that the revolution was organized from Cuba. There was not a single man either from Cuba or Mars.... The motives behind the revolution were simply the motives of an oppressed people rising against their oppressors and were entirely disconnected from any international motives....There was no indiscriminate

(Footnote continued from page 81)

that were not even in our thoughts have recognized us, and they have come and gained the confidence of our people. Your governments should have done this. We are sorry you have not. Our people have told us that the British and Americans have shown they do not like us. The misunderstanding has been caused by your delay in recognition. Within one month of the revolution, the situation has become normal in our country.

Four days later, on 23 February, the U.S. and UK announced they would recognize Zanzibar.
march of civilians; all civilians were given full protection. The wild stories of hanging and burning alive are entirely unfounded.*

*A survey of American press reports on the Zanzibar revolution has tended to confirm Karume's accusations. At the minimum, press accounts were sensational, like the following:

A revolution with ties to Russia, Cuba, China, and black Africa toppled the Government. From the first, the rebel regime showed leanings towards Communism and comic opera.

U.S. News and World Report, 24 January 1964

Once-torpid Zanzibar has become an island of fear. Bands of tough government cops, armed with Russian-supplied burp guns, prowl the land in search of 'enemies of state!'...The governing Revolutionary Council has been laying the foundation for a Communist dictatorship...The island's slide into the Communist camp is being watched with dismay.

Time, 17 April 1964

In many cases, they were distorted or utterly wrong.

In the revolution, on 12 January, Cuban-trained guerrillas led the African opposition which overthrew the regime. (emphasis added)

New York Times, 9 March 1964

Karume, Babu, and other African nationalists began blue-printing their revolution last month. /Note indiscriminate lumping together of Karume and Babu in plotting the revolution.7

Newsweek, 27 January 1964

(footnote continued on page 84)

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2. With the Bloc

While the West stalled on recognition and further alienated Karume and the other pro-Western Zanzibaris by interpreting the revolution as Communist, the Soviets and Chinese moved quickly to win Zanzibar's favor; they applauded the revolution, hastened to extend recognition to the new government, and offered to support it with arms and economic assistance. At the same time, they acted quickly to strengthen the radical, pro-Communist elements in the government.

(Tootnote continued from page 83)

Everywhere on the island there were signs of Chinese and Cuban influence. Newsmen from Peking—and there were many of them—were conducted about by information officers.

Newsweek, 27 January 1964

Karume, a labor leader who leans to Moscow, became President.

Time, 24 January 1964

/This was one of two issues of Time magazine carrying stories about the revolution that were banned in Zanzibar./

The dangers and tensions in Zanzibar were real. But they were certainly exaggerated in sensational press reports in the U.S and UK. The Zanzibar revolution provides an interesting example of how the press can help to fan fears, deform public opinion, and narrow the options open to diplomats. In this case, it played an important role in precipitantly assigning Zanzibar to the Communist camp.
a. The Sino-Soviet Propaganda Response

The Communist press hailed the Zanzibar revolution. Both Moscow and Peking described the new regime as stable, popular, and progressive and emphasized the calm and order that prevailed. On the whole, the Bloc ignored the African-vs-Arab aspect of the coup and emphasized instead the "class" aspect of the revolution. Although a few articles admitted the existence of racial strife between the Arabs and Africans, Communist propaganda was at pains to demonstrate that the division in Zanzibar was basically a class division, with the Arabs representing the feudal landlords and the Africans the working population.*

This is the first African revolution that has arisen on a class basis. A certain anti-African propaganda has tried to present the Zanzibar revolution as a race war. But that is untrue. Zanzibar proves, on the contrary, that

*In this regard, both Moscow and Peking quoted Babu, who said that the revolution was "anti-feudal and pursues social aims," that the "dirty slander" that the revolution has "an anti-Arab tendency," perpetrated by the "imperialist" press, had no more basis than to say that the overthrow of Egypt's King Farouk was anti-Arab. An Arab and a pro-Communist, Babu would naturally explain the revolution in Marxist terms of class struggle, rather than as an African revolution against the Arabs. Since the African leaders in the Zanzibar government were stressing the racial aspects of the coup, the Communist press completely ignored their statements. It is interesting that TASS was willing to quote Babu when it served its purpose but otherwise ignored him and his Umma Party (because of their pro-Chinese sympathies) and concentrated on the African leaders, with whom Moscow had established ties before the revolution.
in Africa it is not Arabs on one side and Blacks on the other, but only Africans united in a common anti-imperialist struggle.

Revolution, Paris, July 1964

A pro-Chinese journal, but pro-Soviet journals did not differ on this point.7

Although the "class" aspect of the revolution was emphasized and the racial aspect de-emphasized mainly on Marxist grounds, Soviet treatment of the Zanzibar revolution may have indicated some Soviet concern regarding the Arab countries' reaction to the fate of the Zanzibar Arabs.*

In stressing the anti-colonial nature of the new regime, rather than the pro-Communist leanings of some of its leaders, Moscow was obviously anxious to dispel the image of a Communist "Cuba" in Africa. The CPSU--and the CCP as well--were apparently sensitive to Western charges of Communist influence on the island. Both the Chinese and Soviets scoffed at "press reports of Communist penetration" of the revolution; Radio Havana called the reports of Cuban participation in the coup a "ridiculous Yankee lie."

Besides these features that were characteristic of both Moscow's and Peking's propaganda response to the Zanzibar revolution, there were certain differences in the Soviet and Chinese reporting on the coup. For Peking, the most important thing about the Zanzibar revolution was that it had been an armed revolt, which the Chinese could point to in support of their contention that "armed struggle" is indispensable to the fight for national

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*Syria, Iraq, and Jordan called the Zanzibar revolution a "bloody massacre" and called for various forms of international action.
liberation.* Thus, Chinese propaganda stressed this aspect of the revolution. For instance, an NCNA report on 21 January emphasized that the people of Zanzibar "had to liberate themselves through armed struggle."

The victory of the January 12, 1964 armed uprising is a great event in the development of Zanzibar history. It manifested the strong determination and great militancy of the Zanzibar people fighting against imperialism and for national independence.

(emphasis added)

In a cable from the All-China Youth Federation to the Zanzibar and Pemba Afro-Shirazi Youth League, Peking attributed to the Zanzibar revolution a world-wide significance as an example of successful armed revolution.

The victory of Zanzibar's armed revolution is an important event inspiring all oppressed people in Africa and the whole world to struggle for national liberation. The triumph of the Zanzibar people shows once again that confronted with an enemy armed to the teeth oppressed nations can surely defeat imperialism and win liberation if they take up arms and wage a resolute struggle.

*Since 1959, the Russians have shown a declining enthusiasm for armed struggle as a means for colonial peoples to attain national independence while the Chinese have placed increasing emphasis on the need for armed revolution. Their propaganda has repeatedly mentioned armed uprisings—in Cuba, Venezuela, Algeria, Angola, the Cameroon Republic, and South Vietnam.
D.N. Aidit, the pro-Chinese chairman of the Indonesian Communist Party, went even further in his speech at a mass meeting in Djakarta on 2 May 1964; he referred to Zanzibar as one of the most outstanding "revolutionary situations" in the world and held up the Zanzibar revolution as a model for the African revolution:

The revolutionary situation is continuously developing. In Latin America there is Cuba and Venezuela...In Africa there is Zanzibar, Algeria, and Angola. In Asia there is Indonesia and South Vietnam.

The revolution by the people of Zanzibar encourages the revolutionary spirit and is a wonderful model for the people of the African nations. Just like the struggle against imperialism by the people of other African and Asian countries, the revolution in Zanzibar should be strengthened and developed.

As a means of identifying the Zanzibar revolution with their own revolution, the Chinese stressed the one feature that the two revolutions had in common—the resort to armed force. They found it impossible to argue that the method used for armed revolt in Zanzibar was similar to "Mao's road" to power in China* (as they did in the case of Cuba and Algeria), but they nevertheless tried

---*Mao's prescription for winning national liberation in underdeveloped areas calls for an armed struggle fought by guerrilla units (under Communist direction) from rural power centers. Although the Zanzibari revolutionaries had resorted to armed force, theirs was a city-centered coup of short duration which had none of the ingredients of the Chinese revolutionary model.

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to identify the violent aspects of the Zanzibar revolution with the Chinese revolution.*

The militancy that was so typical of Chinese comment on the Zanzibar revolution was not a feature of Soviet propaganda. Although Moscow had initially ascribed the coup to "armed rebels," it later played the theme down, in keeping with its preference for the peaceful road to national liberation.** In the case of Zanzibar, however, as in the case of Cuba and Algeria, the CPSU had to give some ground in its argument against armed struggle. Thus, Pravda on 11 March said that the Zanzibar revolution had demonstrated the propriety of all measures--"including armed action by the masses"--when conditions are right. Although the CPSU was willing to sanction the use of armed tactics in Zanzibar, as it had done in the case of Algeria and Cuba, it still retained the view that armed struggles generally were becoming less and less important.

*More recently, the Chinese have used a new formulation--the "do it yourself" revolution--which they have used to describe the Zanzibar revolution in holding it up as a model for the African revolution. At a dinner in Peking in September 1965 for visiting Kenyan journalists, the secretary-general of the All-China Journalists Association suggested to his guests that they follow the Zanzibar pattern of a "do it yourself" revolution; i.e. first raid their own police barracks for arms, and then after having staged an uprising, apply to China for help. This formula was repeated by other Chinese Communist officials during the visit of the Kenyan journalists to China.

**The Russian position is that armed struggle is neither the inevitable nor the desirable road to national independence; however, it is not altogether ruled out as a possibility in certain circumstances."
Soviet and Chinese propaganda reflected their respective preferences among Zanzibar's political factions. Moscow never mentioned the Umma Party representation in the new government, although it pointedly identified the new President of Zanzibar as Chairman of the ASP. Peking mentioned both parties, but it emphasized the latter. In a complete distortion of the truth, the pro-Chinese monthly magazine Revolution* went so far as to give the entire credit for the Zanzibar revolution to the leaders of the Umma Party, which it also credited with having shown "considerable tactical flexibility" in broadening the "anti-imperialist front" through an alliance with the ASP. The Chinese, in contrast to the Soviets, depicted Babu as the most important person in the government. NCNA quoted him as saying: "Chinese recognition is a blow to all the imperialists headed by the U.S." Babu was also reported by the Chinese and Free World press (but not by the Soviet press) to have said that the people of Zanzibar "had learned much from Mao's works."

It is interesting to note that the Chinese, who had much less reason than the Soviets to want the overthrow of the former Zanzibar government by the Africans, were more fulsome in their praise of the revolution than the Russians, who had closer ties with the ASP than they had with the former ruling party, the ZNP. This is a good illustration of the overriding Chinese interest in fomenting revolutions in Africa and elsewhere, so as to exert maximum pressure on the U.S. everywhere in the world and to expose the USSR before the "revolutionaries" of the world. In the same way, the Soviets' more subdued treatment of the revolution in Zanzibar was a reflection of

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*The Zanzibarins have been represented on the staff of Revolution by Babu, who is on the Editorial Board of the pro-Chinese magazine. Apparently, the Board has been totally inactive; it seems to be mainly a showcase piece. Babu himself has never written an article for the magazine, but it has espoused his cause and that of the Umma Party in articles on Zanzibar.
Khrushchev's concern not to aggravate U.S.-USSR relations; at the time, the emphasis of Soviet policy in Africa was on caution. Thus, Moscow carefully refrained from issuing a warning against "imperialist" intervention in Zanzibar until it was clear that the British and Americans had no intention of intervening.* Then and only then, when it was safe and also meaningless from anything but a propaganda point of view, the Soviet Ministry issued a statement on 26 January warning the Western powers against any attempt to invade Zanzibar under the "absurd" pretext of ensuring the safety of British subjects. The statement was notable primarily for its caution in not threatening Soviet countermeasures; it merely warned that the "violent action" that the UK was planning would have "dangerous consequences" and reiterated Khrushchev's general expression of support for "the peoples fighting for liberation." In issuing this statement, Moscow hoped to be able to take the credit for deterring British intervention (which, by then, was out of the question) and sought to give the appearance of being the defender of African independence, in light of the challenge posed to Soviet interests by Chinese rivalry in the area.** The statement was also intended to strengthen Soviet-Zanzibar relations.

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*The time to intervene would have been within the first few days of the revolution. By 26 January it was already too late. A few days earlier, the British had sent troops to quell the army mutinies in Tanganyika, Kenya, and Uganda, at the request of the governments of those countries. But no representative political element in Zanzibar had issued an appeal for help.

**The Soviets have cited Zanzibar as an example of China's failure to defend the interests of countries threatened by the "imperialists." A 1 July Radio Moscow broadcast charged that when the "imperialists" organized "military demonstrations" against Zanzibar, the Chinese "preferred to remain impartial observers, limiting themselves to newspaper descriptions of the events." The Soviet action in issuing an "ultimatum" to the UK and U.S. imperialists" is held up in contrast to the Chinese "do-nothing" attitude.
There is evidence that the Soviets and Chinese were uncertain about the orientation of Zanzibar's new government. They may have felt that the revolution could go either way, that the outcome would depend on Communist efforts. This estimate was reflected in Bloc propaganda during the first months of the new Republic's existence. Although Moscow and Peking hailed the overthrow of the old regime as another defeat for U.S. and UK "imperialism," they reserved their judgment of the new government and its "socialist" reforms. In the meantime, they made the most determined effort to strengthen their position on the island.

b. Bloc Diplomatic Activities

The Communist world moved quickly to establish diplomatic relations with Zanzibar; within a week of the revolution, all of the Bloc countries had recognized the new People's Republic. The Chinese, invited by the former Arab government, were the first Bloc mission to arrive.* The five-man delegation, headed by chargé d'affaires Liu Kan, that arrived on 23 January moved into a building near the Zanzibar State House. Liu served as chargé d'affairs ad interim of the embassy until the arrival of the Chinese Ambassador--Meng Ying--on 4 April. The Soviet Ambassador to Zanzibar--Dmitriy Chuvakhin--had arrived two weeks before Meng. It was an indication of the importance which the Soviets attributed to Zanzibar that they sent a senior ambassador who had previously served in the U.S., Canada, Yugoslavia, and Albania. In mid-March, East Germany had the largest diplomatic establishment in Zanzibar; Ambassador Guenther Fritschi headed an eleven-man staff at the embassy. Among with the other Bloc countries, Cuba recognized the PRZ within a few days.

*It was noted earlier that a Chinese diplomatic mission was en route to Zanzibar at the time of the revolution. Its arrival was delayed a few days by the revolution.
of the revolution. However, it did not open an embassy on the island; the Cuban Embassy in Tanganyika has always handled matters concerning Zanzibar.

Thomas Franck described the "incessant" Communist propaganda that "surrounded and submerged the unsophisticated and inexperienced GOZ leadership," as one of his most striking impressions on his visit to Zanzibar in February 1965. Chinese, Soviet, and East German representatives were reported to be bearing gifts to government officials, with whom they kept in close touch, relating tales of British and American preparations for a counter-revolution. The Bloc representatives were otherwise kept busy holding press conferences, issuing public statements, and granting radio interviews. An "incredible" amount of Communist propaganda was reportedly circulating on the island, including material from abroad,* local hand-outs from the Bloc embassies, and pro-Communist comment in the Zanzibar newspapers.** Communist materials were also being used by the Zanzibar radio station. Sixty to seventy percent of all Zanzibari broadcasting materials were reported to

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*The Chinese were in the forefront in this aspect of the Bloc propaganda campaign. Chinese propaganda was evident everywhere—in hospitals, in the schools, in government offices. Some of the Chinese Communist publications that circulated freely were China Pictorial, China's Sports, Peking Review, China Reconstructs, and Women of China.

**The influence of the East German Information mission was particularly manifest in the pro-Communist articles which appeared regularly in Kweupe, the Government newspaper. Adal Insaf, one of the three non-politically oriented newspapers in Zanzibar, began printing pro-Communist articles in March. About this time, Zanews, the mouthpiece of the Umma Party which had been proscribed when the former government declared the Umma Party illegal, was once again printed and circulated in Zanzibar; most of its contents were supplied by NCNA.
be supplied by the East Germans; although direct anti-American propaganda was not employed, Cuban and Chinese "news" articles hostile to the U.S. were used. Within a month or so of the revolution, Communist China, the USSR, and East Germany each produced one or more films on Zanzibar which also propagated the Communist line locally.

c. The Bloc Aid Program

In another attempt to increase their influence with the new government, the Bloc powers offered to help Zanzibar with both military and economic assistance. The USSR moved quickly to fill the security void. A military agreement with Zanzibar must have been negotiated soon after the revolution; probably in early February; the first shipment (by sea) of Soviet military aid arrived in Zanzibar in early March. The materiel was impressive and included both field and anti-aircraft guns, mortars, automatic weapons, ammunition, vehicles, radios, and personal equipment; in addition, 13 Soviet military advisers were on board. A military camp was soon functioning at Chukwani, near Zanzibar Town, where the Soviets were engaged in training a small, motorized combat force which numbered about 350 men. President Nyerere, whose own security forces were a shambles as a result of the army mutiny in January, was probably surprised and impressed by the PLA parade in his honor in mid-April.*

---*The military forces on parade consisted of about 300 men, all carrying Russian submachine guns and wearing new olive drab uniforms. After a detachment of 60 marching troops, 18 trucks were driven past carrying about 12 men. Heavy machine guns were mounted on 6 of the trucks. The remainder towed 4 heavy mortars, 4 light anti-aircraft guns and 4 field guns of approximately 75mm. calibre. At the rehearsal on the previous day, Soviet personnel were supervising the parade. In June 1965, when Chou En-lai was in Zanzibar on a 6-hour visit, he saw a display of military might remarkable by the standards of East Africa. Two-hundred and fifty soldiers of the Zanzibar army, equipped with Russian rifles and fixed bayonets, were lined up in front of the airport building.
Additional deliveries of Soviet materiel were made in April, June, October and November 1964 and in January and February 1965. Smaller than the initial shipment, these later shipments were intended to build up supply stockpiles.* The Soviet military training group was expanded concurrently with the supply build-up and numbered 33 by August 1964.** In early October, the group had at its disposal an 11-passenger AN-2/COLT aircraft for support activities and for communications with the mainland, primarily the Soviet Embassy in Dar es Salaam. The aircraft and crew had been provided ostensibly for President Karume’s personal use. (It was quite ancient and widely considered to be unsafe.)

Although Chinese arms and military advisers did not begin to arrive in Zanzibar until May, a month after the union with Tanganyika, the Chinese were implementing a military aid agreement negotiated before the union, possibly as early as February 1964. The first shipment

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*Reserves on hand probably now include a six-month combat supply of ammunition plus spare parts for several years.

**The Soviets have concentrated their efforts on training a small, motorized, combat support force, which now numbers some 26 officers and about 320 men. The large size of the Soviet military mission in relation to the number of Zanzibaris trained indicates a priority program is involved. However, a large group was required, considering the nature of the instruction, the inexperience of the recruits, and the presumed aim of creating quickly a Communist-dominated security force.

In March of last year, 13 of the Soviet advisers returned to Moscow after a year on the island; another 9 left in August 1965. The remaining 11 advisers probably represent the minimum personnel required to keep the motorized force operational and continue more advanced instruction.
of Chinese aid in May included automatic and semi-automatic weapons, ammunition and field equipment, and 6 Chinese military advisers; additional equipment and 3 more advisers arrived in November; and another small delivery of military supplies was received in early May 1965. The Chinese have concentrated their efforts on dismounted infantry training at a separate training camp at Mtoni, several miles from Zanzibar Town.*

With the exception of one 50-foot patrol boat and some small arms which were a gift from East Germany, all the equipment held by the 650-man Zanzibar army has come from Russia or Communist China. Other than the USSR and China, only Indonesia has provided military training support.** Babu negotiated a military agreement with the Indonesians when he was in Djakarta in April for economic discussions. About the same time, two Zanzibaris, one of them a member of the Zanzibar Revolutionary Council, went to Cuba to survey military training facilities there. According to them, the GOZ was thinking of sending 80 men to Cuba; so far as is known, however, none was ever sent. More recently, the Revolutionary Council is thought to have sent Havana the names of 25 soldiers recommended for six months of guerrilla warfare training; the list was apparently drawn up in response to an offer of military support extended by "Che" Guevara when he attended "Revolution Day" ceremonies in Zanzibar in February 1965. There is no evidence that Castro has ever offered arms to Zanzibar.

Having concentrated their efforts on the vital security field as their main sphere of influence in Zanzibar,

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*The Chinese have trained five dismounted rifle companies of about 3 officers and 50 men each and a supply and maintenance section of about 30 personnel. One of the companies is garrisoned on Pemba Island.

**Some 15 Zanzibaris are currently enrolled in an 18-month officer training course in Djakarta.
Mtoni Headquarters of the Peoples Liberation Army
the Soviets were much less noticeable on the economic scene. The first Soviet technicians did not actually arrive on the island until June, more than a month after the union, though the USSR had obviously agreed to send technicians to Zanzibar before the union. Soviet technicians who have served in Zanzibar have worked in the military-related communications and public utilities fields. The services they have provided come under the general category of advisory and administrative services; in other words, they have not been technical services associated with specific development projects. Four or five Soviet engineers have served with the State Fuel and Power Corporation, formerly the Zanzibar Electricity Board, and the telephone company; eleven Soviet naval officers have been in charge of the Port of Zanzibar and have served as officers on the two Zanzibar Government ships; and several other Soviet experts have completed a survey of the airport with a view to extending the runway. The GOZ has presumably paid all the expenses of the technicians (their salaries, room and board, insurance, etc.) except their transportation costs, which the USSR reportedly assumed.

The Soviets have never concluded an economic aid agreement with Zanzibar, either before or after the union.* There is no evidence that the Zanzibaris were negotiating an aid agreement with the Soviets (as they were with the

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*In August 1964, the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania was reported to be negotiating an economic aid agreement with Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the USSR. Vice-president Kawaya was in Moscow at the time for discussions on the subject. Apparently, some projects in Zanzibar were included in the list of proposed aid projects in Tanzania. The agreement was never concluded, however, because the Tanzanians objected to certain of the conditions of the Soviet aid offer. Among other things, there was disagreement over the paying of the local costs for the aid projects and the terms of the credit, which the Tanzanians regarded as very unfavorable.
Chinese and East Germans) before the union and that the talks were terminated in the changed conditions of the union. Having already attained a position of influence in Zanzibar through their military aid program, the Soviets may have been disinclined to become involved in an economic aid program there.* As the best evidence for thinking that it was they, and not the Zanzibaris, who were dragging their feet, we know that Babu tried to pressure the USSR into giving Zanzibar economic aid—by holding up Chinese aid to Zanzibar as an inducement.** The Soviets may have expressed a general interest in providing some

*There have been several indications since 1962 that the Soviet leadership has decided, for a number of pressing reasons, to go slow in expanding foreign aid and to concentrate instead on selected targets. The experience of the Tanzanian "economic good-will mission" in Moscow in August 1964 provides first-hand evidence of some current Soviet attitudes on foreign aid which the West had previously suspected but which had never been fully confirmed. The Tanzanian mission was told, inter alia, that the very meager extent of Tanzania's financial resources and the fact that some Tanzanian products were "not needed" in the USSR made the arrangement of aid financing very difficult. (This would apply even more strongly to the Zanzibar economy. About the only thing Zanzibar has to offer is cloves, which the USSR can not use and which it finds difficult to re-sell at any reasonable profit.) The Tanzanian mission was also reminded that machinery and equipment sent from the USSR to less-developed countries was a sacrifice for the Soviet people, who needed these items for their own economy.

**When Babu first broke the news of the Chinese loan of $14,000,000 to Soviet Ambassador Chuvakin in June, shortly before the loan was made public, he is reported to have immediately asked Chuvakin what the Soviets would do to match it. Chuvakin promised to ask Moscow for instructions.

Babu and other Zanzibaris obviously believed that they could profit from the Sino-Soviet competition in Zanzibar in getting more aid.
form of economic assistance—without being very concrete about amounts or projects. At least some of Zanzibar's leaders seem to have believed that the Soviets were prepared to give Zanzibar economic assistance.

Although they were not forthcoming with a firm offer of economic assistance to Zanzibar prior to April, the time before the announcement of the union was too short for us to conclude that the Soviets would not have extended economic aid at a later date, particularly after the Chinese extension of economic aid to Zanzibar—had it not been for the union. With the exception of the Congo-Brazzaville and the Central African Republic, Zanzibar is the only African country to which the Russians have not given more, usually considerably more, economic aid than the Chinese.

Of all the Bloc powers, the East Germans have been in the forefront in the economic aid field in Zanzibar. They were the first to arrive on the scene. Visitors to the island in February, March, and April reported that East Germans were very much in evidence, apparently in larger numbers than either the Soviets or Chinese. They were particularly active in the information and broadcasting media. The three-man East German information mission, which was established to advise the PRZ on the organization of a government information office and the improvement of radio broadcasting services, worked very closely with GOZ Information Chief Qullatein, a Babu supporter.**

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**The steady decline in new Soviet bloc foreign aid credit extensions in 1962-63 was reversed during 1964 by the need to counter an unexpected extension of foreign aid from Peking, especially in Africa.**

**The fact that the East Germans were working with a pro-Chinese Arab Zanzibari as chief of the government Information Office explains the unusual mixture of East German and Chinese influence in Zanzibar's information service. Thus, Chinese "news" reports were read over the radio, though the East Germans supplied 60-70% of all radio broadcast materials.
Wolfgang Meyer, the head of the mission, was reportedly telling Zanzibar government officials that "money was no object;" East German plans for the expansion of broadcasting studio facilities, the construction of new film-processing facilities, and the installation of teletype receiving and radio transmitting equipment represented an investment of some $280,000. Apparently, it was the East Germans who sparked the government's move to get rid of the British civil servants in Zanzibar; the GDR promised generous assistance in supplying new personnel. In March, an East German, Martin Gentsch, was appointed deputy chief of Zanzibar's Ministry of Finance, replacing the British permanent secretary of Finance. Although it was feared that this portended a general deployment of Bloc personnel in key government positions, Gentsch is the only foreign national who has ever held an important post in the Zanzibar government. Some of the East Germans who were in Zanzibar in March claimed to be working on a low-cost housing scheme. When an aid agreement between East Germany and Zanzibar was first announced in May,* construction on the housing project had already begun. Apparently, the GDR commitment was to build 50 blocks of apartments per month for 10 months, each block containing 10 to 18 apartments; the average cost per apartment was estimated to be $5,600. The East Germans proposed to import everything needed for the housing project—the cement, the skilled labor force, even the furniture for the apartments. They confidently proclaimed that their housing scheme in Zanzibar would become "the envy of all Africa," and the Zanzibaris too obviously had high hopes for the project.

*Although the aid agreement was not signed or announced until May, the credit was actually extended to Zanzibar prior to the union. We have very little information on the agreement. For instance, it is not known whether the aid was extended in the form of grants or credits, though we think $5 million of the total $6.5 million may have been a grant; the rest is apparently an interest-free credit. It is being expended in Zanzibar for housing, schools, hospitals, and other small projects.
Because the USSR did not rush in with offers of economic assistance, while the East Germans were in active competition with the Chinese in the economic aid field, the hypothesis has been advanced that Moscow was using East Germany as its "front man" in Zanzibar. There may have been some coordination between the Soviets and the East Germans. There is evidence of cooperation between the USSR and the East European countries in their aid programs in other underdeveloped countries. In the case of Zanzibar, the East Germans took over a fisheries project that the Soviets abandoned after an initial survey of the fishing industry. No doubt, the Soviets were quite content to have the East Germans take the lead in the economic field, while they concentrated on Zanzibar's security services. This is not to suggest, however, that the East Germans were acting at the Soviet's direction. It is clear that the East Germans had their own reasons for playing an active role in Zanzibar affairs; their aid program there was part of an intense new drive for international recognition. At the end of 1963, only Bulgaria, the least developed of the Moscow-oriented states, had a smaller foreign aid program than East Germany; in the subsequent 18-month period, East Germany was first among all the East European countries in the foreign aid field. Credits extended during 1964 and the first half of 1965 totaled $257 million, or almost 5 times the commitments of the previous 9 years. The aid was directed to four key nonaligned countries--Egypt, Indonesia, Ceylon, and Zanzibar--that seemed to offer the best hope of granting diplomatic recognition. A less developed country like Zanzibar, for whom the German problem had no moral connotations whatsoever, was very likely to recognize East Germany for whatever token assistance it might receive. In this case, the fast pace of the GDR's international activity brought East Germany its only embassy outside the Communist Bloc.

In a move that greatly impressed the Zanzibaris, including the moderate leaders such as Karume as well as the Communist sympathizers, the Chinese extended a grant of $500,000 to the new Zanzibar government in February. It was an outright gift, in hard currency, which could be used for any purposes which the Zanzibaris decided;
in other words, it was not tied to the import of Chinese goods and services. Moreover, it was given within a few weeks of the Zanzibar revolution when the government's finances were very shaky, to say the least. At the OAU foreign ministers conference in Lagos in early March, Zanzibar Foreign Minister Babu said of the Chinese: "They came to us at the right time—in providing $500,000 cash aid, with a promise of further credit."

The credit which the Chinese promised at the time was made official in a loan agreement announced in June 1964. Although the agreement was not signed until June, after Zanzibar's union with Tanganyika, it was negotiated before the union. Under the terms of the agreement, the credit was to be used exclusively in support of Zanzibar's economic development, not Tanganyika's.* The loan to Zanzibar is a no-interest credit of $14,000,000 to be repaid over a 10-year period beginning in 1975. Approximately $2,800,000 is to be extended in cash (the only stipulation being that the money be used for development purposes) and the rest will be used to finance imports of Chinese machinery and equipment and Chinese technical aid for a rice irrigation scheme, housing construction, and yet-unannounced projects. As of June 1965, an estimated $2,200,000 in cash had been drawn on the credit; none of the projects had yet been started.

Although visitors to Zanzibar in March and April reported seeing Cubans at the Zanzibar Hotel, along with East Germans and Soviets, we have no other information on Cuban activities in Zanzibar before the union. When the Cuban ambassador to Algeria visited the island in

*Since the union, Communist China has extended Tanzania a $28 million interest-free credit and a $3 million grant, which apparently are to be used to finance economic development projects on the mainland. The credit is to be made available over the next five years in the form of goods and technical assistance and will be repaid in exports over a ten-year period beginning in 1975.
early April, he took the propaganda line that the Cuban revolution had been the model for the Zanzibar revolution. The Chinese had never pushed the analogy between their own revolution and the Zanzibar revolution so far as to claim that the Zanzibar revolution was a "peasant uprising;" the Cuban Ambassador made this point explicitly. Although Cuban influence in Zanzibar has been reflected in such things as the naming of the Fidel Castro School on Pemba Island, Zanzibari contacts with Cuba would seem to have been quite limited. The only Zanzibaris who are known to have been in Cuba between the time of the revolution and Zanzibar's union with Tanganyika were the two who went to survey military training facilities and Haji Machane, an official of the Afro-Shirazi Youth League, who stopped in Cuba on his way home from Chile, where he attended the Second Congress of Latin American Youth. The communiqué which he signed with the Union of Young Communists of Cuba (UJC) included an offer by the UJC to help in the "formation of technical groups in different branches," presumably technical cadres to work in Zanzibar. After the union, the wife of Ali Sultan Issa, High Commissioner of Zanzibar to London, visited Cuba in early June as an official guest of the Cuban Government. A month later, Babu received an official invitation to attend the 26 July celebration in Havana; while there, he reportedly met with Che Guevara. It is noteworthy that the Cuban government was continuing its contacts with the minority Arab element in the Zanzibar government. The military personnel in Babu's party apparently included many of those trained in Cuba in 1962 along with other Babu sympathizers and former Umma Party members. Any influence that Castro might have had on the Zanzibar government was exercised through the pro-Chinese and pro-Cuban, Arab members of the government (like Babu and Ali Sultan) and the pro-Chinese and pro-Cuban elements in the military.

d. Subversive Activities

While the Communist world sought to increase its influence with the new Zanzibar government through diplomatic
channels, through propaganda, and through offers of military and economic assistance, it also worked to strengthen certain elements in the regime against certain others. We have information that the Soviets were in contact with Hanga and other pro-Soviet members of the ASP. The Soviet chargé, a suspect KGB officer, regularly conferred privately with Hanga—though never at Hanga's government office. Besides Hanga, two other Zanzibaris—Yusuf Himidi and Ali Mahfudh—are known to have received money on a sub rosa basis from the Soviets. A. A. Qullatein, the Chief of the Zanzibar Government Information Office, was reported to have received a supplement to his regular salary from the East Germans.

In the days and weeks that followed the revolution, the Chinese Communists kept in touch with developments in Zanzibar through Babu. On 16 January, 4 days after the coup, Babu went to Dar es Salaam where he met with the Chinese chargé there. After a Chinese diplomatic mission was established in Zanzibar, Babu dealt directly with the Chinese representatives on the island. In early April, he moved into the house next door to the Chinese Embassy; his private meetings with Chinese Ambassador Meng Ying usually took place in his home. When he was away from Zanzibar, on his trip to Indonesia and Pakistan, Babu was constantly surrounded by Chinese Communist officials. It was the Chinese consul in Rawalpindi who gave him the news of Zanzibar's union with Tanganyika. The Chinese reportedly paid Babu over $20,000 per month; although part of this covered the operating costs of Zanews, it included a large personal retainer for Babu.

Of the dozen or so Zanzibari leftists who are known to have obtained personal funds from the Bloc (and no doubt there were others), the great majority were in the pay of Peking. Besides Babu, who was acknowledged by all to receive the largest sums of Bloc money of any Zanzibari, Ali Sultan Issa, Salim Rashid, Hassan Nassor Moyo, Yusuf Himidi, and Ali Mahfudh were on the Chinese payroll. By and large, the Chinese were supporting the same individuals whom they had cultivated before the revolution. However, there were a few new names on the Chinese list; and, of greatest significance, they were Africans—like
Hassan Nassor Moyo and Yusuf Himidi—who had had no previous contact with the Chinese and, on the other hand, had had continuing dealings (both before and after the revolution) with the Soviets.* The Chinese had obviously decided to maintain their contacts with the leading Arab leftists, some of whom were in important government positions, even at the risk of alienating some Africans, who were now the dominant political power in Zanzibar and strongly anti-Arab. But they were no longer concentrating all their efforts on the Arabs.** In an effort to establish themselves with the new ruling party, they had made new contacts among the Africans, whom they had

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*The phenomenon of double-financing (by both the Soviets and Chinese) of the same individuals in Zanzibar is quite typical of the African scene. It has become a notable feature of the Zanzibar scene since the revolution, when the Chinese realized they could no longer afford to concentrate all their efforts on the minority Arab element in Zanzibar. Some Africans who have long been on the Soviet payroll have accepted Chinese funds since the revolution, to the point where they now appear to be more under Chinese than Soviet influence.

This is, of course, what happened to Babu and other Zanzibari Arabs, who were also originally developed by the Soviets or their representatives (such as the Communist Party of Great Britain) and later switched their allegiance to the Chinese. By 1959 or 1960, however, when the Chinese first began to make contact with individual Zanzibaris, the Soviets were concentrating most, if not all, of their efforts on the ASP. Thus, you do not see the concurrent subsidizing by the Soviets and Chinese of the same individuals that you find after the revolution.

**Chinese Ambassador to Tanzania Ho Ying's comments have already been cited. In November 1964, he admitted privately that the Chinese had made a mistake in supporting the ZNP but that it had seemed at the time that the ZNP represented the will of the people.
virtually ignored in their earlier efforts in Zanzibar.* In their attempt to subvert various individuals within the ASP, they had obviously been quite free with their offers of personal financial assistance.

Whether Babu and Hanga and the other government officials whom the Bloc was supporting with money, propaganda, and displays of friendship were dedicated Communists or not did not really matter much; they were clearly working in the foreign Communist interest. Reportedly, Babu was the hardest-working member of the Revolutionary Council; there was a constant stream of foreign Communist visitors to his office. As Minister of Foreign Affairs, he was in a good position to promote Communist influence in Zanzibar, and he used his position to good advantage.

In his first public statements after the revolution, Babu acknowledged and thanked the "socialist" countries for their recognition of Zanzibar. Although he termed the Soviet recognition "of exceptional importance," he was even more fulsome in his praise of the Chinese. Having said that China's recognition was enthusiastically acclaimed by the people of Zanzibar and that it had dealt a blow at the U.S., he went on to advocate stronger economic and cultural ties with China and he sent greetings to Chairman Mao, "from whose doctrines and writings the Zanzibar people have learned a great deal." In the context of the Sino-Soviet dispute, Babu's statement was strongly pro-Chinese, in that it paid tribute to Mao personally; the implication was clear that it was Mao's revolutionary strategy to which Babu was referring. Without being specific, Babu was implicitly crediting Chinese revolutionary strategy with relevance to Zanzibar, a claim

*Because of their success in making new contacts among the Africans, the Chinese have been able to survive the fall of Babu, after Zanzibar's union with Tanganyika. If anything, the Chinese have more influence than the Soviets in Zanzibar today, though their main agent--Babu--is no longer a powerful figure on the island.
which the Chinese themselves have never made. In suggesting that the inspiration for the Zanzibar revolution had come from the Chinese, Babu may have hoped to convey the impression that he and his pro-Chinese Umma Party followers had played a major role in the revolution. He was obviously making a bid for Chinese support of the new regime—and, perhaps, hoping to frighten off early UK and U.S. recognition.

More than anyone else, Babu was responsible for opening Zanzibar to Communist penetration via economic and military assistance. Repeatedly rebuffing U.S and UK approaches for economic aid, he actively solicited assistance from the Communist countries. Although Karume was reportedly alarmed by the large number of Chinese coming to Zanzibar, the foreign ministry under the charge of Babu imposed no limit on the size of the Bloc diplomatic missions (as did Tanganyika after the army mutinies in January). Between January and March, there was a startling increase in the number of Bloc diplomatic and aid personnel.

The GOZ decision to recognize East Germany (which no other non-Communist state had done) was directly attributable to Babu, who engineered a reversal of an earlier decision by Karume. Apparently, the President had decided to recognize West Germany and hold in abeyance establishing diplomatic ties with East Germany; he had made the decision himself and had not consulted Babu. When the latter found out that Karume’s diplomatic exchange with West Germany had involved an agreement not to recognize East Germany, he was reportedly furious. He went to Karume and told him that representatives of East Germany were arriving and the GOZ should deal with them, if Zanzibar were to remain truly neutral in the cold war. Apparently, Babu and Hanga made arrangements to meet with the GDR representatives and, without Karume’s knowledge, they issued a statement recognizing East Germany. The FRG reacted immediately, by sending a special envoy from Bonn. Subsequently, Babu "worked on" Karume alone. He argued that since the GOZ recognized both the U.S. and the USSR, the proper procedure was to recognize "both Germanies." Apparently, Karume was convinced; he
finally approved the establishment of a GDR diplomatic mission in Zanzibar—under the impression that Zanzibar could have diplomatic relations with both Germanies. When Karume discovered the ruse, he was furious. But it was too late; the West German government had already issued a public statement that it would not recognize Zanzibar under the circumstances.

Zanzibar's recognition of East Germany and, later, of North Vietnam and North Korea were probably Babu's greatest coups on behalf of the Communists. In the latter two cases, his methods were even more deceptive than in the case of East Germany. North Vietnamese and North Korean officials in Zanzibar for May Day celebrations were reported to have met regularly with Babu, in the company of Chinese Communists, to explore the possibility of establishing diplomatic relations with the GOZ. Some time between 10-14 May, false, back-dated correspondence announcing the establishment of relations between Zanzibar and North Vietnam and Zanzibar and North Korea were introduced into the GOZ Foreign Ministry files; in the case of North Vietnam, there was a letter signed by North Vietnamese Ambassador to Algeria Tran Van So, dated early April (Tran Van So was a delegate to the May Day ceremonies and the letter was probably actually written at that time) and a reply signed by Babu, dated 15 April; in the case of North Korea, there was a letter from Foreign Minister Pak Sung Chui, dated late March (Pak was also a delegate to the May Day ceremonies) and a reply from Babu, dated 10 April. These dates were obviously false.

Pak came in and said: "As the Chinese Ambassador has already mentioned, we are most anxious to establish diplomatic relations with you." Babu is reported to have asked his other guests to leave and to have spent the evening with Pak. The significance of back-dating the correspondence is that it established the exchange of letters as having occurred before the union with Tanzania (26 April) rather than afterwards, when Babu did not have responsibility for the conduct of Tanzanian foreign affairs. The North Vietnamese and North Koreans could argue that since full diplomatic relations had been established with Zanzibar prior to the union, it was
logical to expect North Vietnam and North Korea to have embassies in Dar es Salaam. It is unclear whether Tanganyikan officials were aware of the forgeries; in any case, they agreed to establish relations with North Vietnam and North Korea "since Zanzibar had already done so."

The impression should not be given that Babu had a completely free rein in the conduct of Zanzibar's foreign relations or that he was solely responsible for the Bloc gains in Zanzibar in the early period after the revolution. Although he tried to act independently of Karume, there is evidence that Karume was alerted to his pro-Communist maneuvers and very much perturbed by his disregard of presidential decisions. Karume's moves to limit Babu's freedom of action, climaxed by his transfer of Babu from his position of power in Zanzibar to a new post in the united government in Dar es Salaam, have already been discussed. The point to be made here is that Karume and Hanga went along with, if they did not themselves make, most of the major foreign policy decisions. Although it is probably accurate to describe Karume as "basically pro-West," he was certainly disenchanted with the West—if only temporarily—during the early months of his Presidency. In his own words, his bitterness against the U.S. and the UK (for their delay in recognizing Zanzibar) "helped strengthen Zanzibar's ties with the Soviets, East Germans, and Chinese Communists." Karume was obviously prepared, indeed quite anxious, to accept the foreign aid of these countries as being consistent with the announced policy of the GOZ of non-alignment; he had opened the door to Communist penetration when he first announced that his government would welcome "aid from any and every source." Clearly, he was quite impressed and pleased with the offers of help Zanzibar received from the Bloc, particularly the cash grant from the Chinese, the East German housing scheme, and the Soviet military aid. In mid-March, he arranged for a group of Tanganyikan government officials, including Kambona and Home Minister Lusinde, to visit Zanzibar, apparently for the express purpose of presenting to the GOT his reasons for accepting Bloc aid. On that occasion, as on others in this period, he spoke of his general satisfaction with the Communist aid program, in particular with the Soviet military assistance, and
he said he hoped that more would be forthcoming. "You see," he explained, "they are with us while the British and Americans are against us." When the first Soviet shipment of arms had arrived in Zanzibar several weeks earlier, Karume had watched the unloading of the ship, which was done at night in strictest secrecy. Later, when the Chinese shipment of arms was delivered, he entertained the captain of the ship at luncheon. Although he was one of the more moderate elements in the Zanzibar leadership and was apparently conscious of the Communist penetration efforts, he acceded to many Communist desires. After assuring the U.S. Consul in Zanzibar that he did not intend to allow young Zanzibaris to study in Communist countries because "all the Communists want to do is to indoctrinate them," Karume approved a list of 25 students selected to receive academic study in East Germany.

While the Bloc representatives in Zanzibar kept in close touch with select government officials, they also promoted broader Bloc contacts with leftist elements outside the government. For one thing, they pushed Zanzibari participation in the Communist front organizations. The secretary-general of the International Organization of Journalists was one of the first high-level representatives of the Soviet-controlled fronts to visit Zanzibar, in April, to have discussions with the Zanzibar Journalist Association about its joining his organization. The Chairman of the Soviet Afro-Asian Committee followed soon afterwards. In the first half of 1964, the CPSU ensured Zanzibari attendance at international front meetings by underwriting the expenses of the Zanzibar delegates.*

*The case of the World Youth Forum in September 1964 affords an interesting example of Soviet pressure tactics. Apparently, the Afro-Shirazi Youth League did not answer the first invitation of the Youth Forum Secretariat. In August 1964, the Secretariat in Moscow sent another cable to Ali Mwinyigogo, re-inviting his organization to the Forum. It said that the Forum would pay the travel expenses of one Zanzibari and one Tanganyikan representative. The USSR's Central Committee of Youth Organizations (footnote continued on page 111)
Those delegates who had their expenses paid by the USSR could be counted on to support Soviet policies; their statements at the various front meetings were given the widest publicity by the Soviet press. For example, a member of the Afro-Shirazi Youth League delegation at the preparatory committee meeting of the World Youth Forum was quoted as saying that he was very happy to have the opportunity to speak:

    to his Soviet friends, the very people who have always stood firm with Zanzibar in her effort to fight imperialism, colonialism, and neocolonialism. (emphasis added)

In concluding, he predicted that "a greater friendship will undoubtedly develop between the youths and all the peoples of Zanzibar and the Soviet Union." There was no mention of Communist China. Moreover, it is significant that the speaker mentioned only one of Zanzibar's government leaders by name--the pro-Soviet Hanga, whom he credited with having instituted Zanzibar's socialist reforms:

    We believe in Socialism and world peace as taught by our Vice-President Hanga, and we will not claim to be neutralist either, for as long as we believe in Socialism, we will be more inclined to lean toward Socialist countries than toward capitalist nations.

(footnote continued from page 110)

for the Forum had already invited 8 Zanzibaris to the Forum (with no offer to pay the travel expenses). This other invitation was a special one from the Forum Secretariat, which offered to pay the expenses of one Zanzibar representative, in order to ensure Zanzibar's attendance at the Forum.
The Communist Chinese were in active competition with the Soviets for the allegiance of Zanzibar's mass organizations. The departure of a five-member Zanzibar youth delegation to China on 6 April, at the invitation of the All-China Youth Federation, was timed to coincide with the preparatory meeting of the World Youth Forum in Moscow, where another Zanzibar youth delegation was in attendance. The Chinese press highlighted the visit to China, which tended to neutralize the significance of the pro-Soviet statements coming out of Moscow in the name of the Afro-Shirazi Youth League. Later, in September, when the plenary session of the Forum convened in Moscow, the Chinese invited a second Zanzibar youth delegation to Peking; their propaganda tactics to detract from the Forum included a highly-publicized visit of the Zanzibar delegation with Liu Shao-chi on 13 September.

Pro-Chinese front organizations like the Afro-Asian Journalists' Association (AAJA) were particularly active in Zanzibar. In August 1964, Lionel Morrison, Secretariat member of the AAJA, which had its headquarters in Djakarta, said that the setting up of a press in Zanzibar had been one of the AAJA's two major accomplishments since the founding of the Secretariat in early 1964. The Chinese made their strongest play in the trade union movement; they were reported to be providing money and guidance to the Zanzibar Federation of Progressive Trade Unions. Arab trade union leaders Ibu Abdi and Ibu Bawuay, who were instrumental in several of the nationalization campaigns, were the main Chinese instruments in this field. They and other pro-Chinese Zanzibaris were given all-expenses-paid trips to attend meetings of the pro-Chinese front organizations, such as the 2nd Asian Economic Seminar held in Pyongyang in June and the meeting for International Solidarity with (South) Vietnam held in Hanoi in December 1964. On the latter occasion, the Zanzibar delegate (Ibrahim Issa) parroted the Chinese line in praising the South Vietnamese people in their "armed struggle against the U.S. aggressors and Vietnamese traitors." As far as can be ascertained, mainly on the basis of their names, the Zanzibar delegates to the Chinese front meetings were Arabs, rather than Africans. Whenever they were identified in the press, it was usually as members of the Umma Party.
In addition to the front activities of the Bloc, there was a steady stream of Communist goodwill missions to the new Republic of Zanzibar. Typically, a Chinese delegation would follow soon after the corresponding Soviet delegation, or vice versa, as in the case of the delegation of Soviet women which visited Zanzibar shortly after the delegation of Chinese women in June 1964.

In scarcely three months time, from mid-January until mid-April, the Bloc had--by an energetic and varied program of diplomatic pressure, propaganda, aid and trade, and subversion--made most impressive gains in Zanzibar. Having discussed the various elements in the Communist offensive and its impact on the new republic and its leaders, there is one final observation to be made on the relations between the various Bloc powers on the scene in Zanzibar.

e. Sino-Soviet Rivalry.

The Zanzibaris were not unaware of the fact that there was considerable competition and ill-will between the various Communist representatives in Zanzibar. Hanga was reported to have said that he "regretted the noticeable animosity" between the Chinese on the one side and the Soviets and East Germans on the other; he expressed disapproval of the aggressive attitude of the Chinese. In an interview with Karume in July, a U.S. visitor to the island commented on Sino-Soviet relations in Zanzibar; one of Karume's aides remarked that his observation of competition was correct but he said there would be no trouble between the Communists powers because his government "would not countenance any." Karume added: "the Soviets, Chinese and East Germans are all welcome in Zanzibar because they were the first to accord diplomatic recognition and to provide assistance."

There is good evidence that the Chinese and the Soviet Bloc countries were not on good terms, that they were actually working at cross purposes in Zanzibar. After the revolution, there was officially only one political
the ASP—and so there was no question of the Chinese supporting one party and the Soviets another, as had been the case before the revolution. But they were still actively competing for the allegiance of the Zanzibar leaders. On the whole, the Chinese continued to support the leftist Arab elements and the Soviets the radical African elements.

There was one direct confrontation between the Chinese and the Soviets over economic policy. The Chinese advisers suggested that all private businesses should be nationalized immediately, in February*; the Soviets and East Germans objected. The opinion of the chief East German financial adviser, Martin Gentsch—that the nationalization program should be phased over a period of a year or two—finally prevailed. The State shops, which were operating at a loss, were another bone of contention between the Chinese and the East Germans. The latter are known to have advised the Zanzibaris that it would be more efficient as well as cheaper to import goods for the State shops, which were then stocking mainly Chinese Communist goods, from the Soviet Union and East Europe. The Chinese reportedly told the government that Gentsch was "trying to tie Zanzibar economically to the GDR." The East German foreign trade adviser complained that he was getting no cooperation from Ahmed Rashid and other Zanzibar trade officials because they were being "advised

*There is an apparent discrepancy between the Chinese position urging immediate nationalization of Zanzibari private businesses and Babu's well-documented position in favor of a more moderate socialization program. This may be one instance in which Babu differed with the Chinese, with Babu being more concerned to protect the interests of his fellow Arabs, who would be the losers in any nationalization scheme, and the Chinese more interested in pushing nationalization. Just why the Chinese would push the point over the objections of Babu is unclear; there would seem to have been a lack of coordination between the two on the subject.
by the Chinese Communists." He also claimed that the Chinese had attacked the East German housing project in an unsigned leaflet distributed throughout Zanzibar in early April. The Soviets responded to this and other Chinese attacks on Soviet Bloc policies; on 21 July, Moscow Radio domestic service cited a Pravda article in quoting Hanga as saying that the implementation of Zanzibar's three-year economic development plan was being postponed as a result of "substantial shortcomings in the plan caused by specialists from the CPR."

In the military sphere, the Soviets and Chinese advisers in Zanzibar kept to their respective camps in different parts of the island. So far as is known, there was no contact between the two Bloc training missions. According to one report, the reason for Karume's refusal to allow Cuban military advisers to come to Zanzibar was that there was already too much friction in the army, because Soviet and Chinese military advisers "treat each other as rivals. Besides demanding to be in separate camps, they try to undermine each other."

As part of their propaganda battle on the local scene, the Soviet and Chinese embassies issued several propaganda booklets which were openly critical of one another. Their respective sympathizers among the Zanzibaris were no less direct in attacking the USSR and China by name. Hanga's statement disapproving of the "aggressive attitude of the Chinese" and his public criticism of the Chinese role in planning Zanzibar's three-year plan have already been mentioned. Peking's chief supporter, Babu, was equally critical of the Russians. At a diplomatic reception in mid-June, Babu attacked TASS correspondent Nikolai Tourkatenko, adding:

The USSR has sacrificed its principles, as evidenced by its backing down in Cuba. The Soviets were once revolutionary but now they have reached the top and become soft. Only the Chicom have the proper revolutionary spirit and are qualified to lead the Africans.
Behind the scenes, Babu and his Umma Party supporters may have been working against Soviet interests. Reportedly, the Russians in Zanzibar were angry when they discovered that a local Umma Party bookstore was "hiding" Soviet literature and selling only Chinese Communist books and magazines.

The Soviets and Chinese were obviously uninformed about each other's negotiations with the Zanzibaris and one another's activities on the island, except to the extent that the Zanzibaris may have kept them informed or their activities could be observed by an outsider. Although the Soviet ambassador in Zanzibar always showed a willingness to discuss Chinese activities in Zanzibar with U.S. officials, he professed not to have any detailed knowledge of what the Chinese were doing. Apparently, it was GOZ Foreign Minister Babu who first broke the news of the Chinese loan of $14,000,000 to Soviet Ambassador Chuvakhin, shortly before the loan was made public; there had obviously been no communication between the Chinese and the Soviets on the subject. Reportedly, Babu laughed when he later recounted how upset Chuvakhin had become upon hearing the news. There is other evidence that the Soviets were seriously concerned by the speed and extent of the Chinese penetration of Zanzibar. In a private conversation in late June, Chuvakhin confirmed that his government was apprehensive about the Chinese inroads in Zanzibar and was particularly upset by the interest-free loan, which he termed a typical Chinese propaganda move. The Soviet ambassador in Dar es Salaam reportedly cautioned Nyerere, as Chuvakhin had cautioned Karume, about the dangers of allowing the Chinese to train Tanganyikan army units. Moscow's concern over the Chinese offensive was illustrated by the statements in the Soviet press such as the one quoting Hanga's complaint about the Chinese on economic matters, and it was also reflected in the upsurge in Soviet activity to counter Chinese activity in Zanzibar.

However, aside from issuing propaganda critical of one another, the Soviets and Chinese did not allow their world-wide dispute to be reflected in public hostility in Zanzibar, despite the unmistakable evidence of the strained relations between the two. Soviet and Chinese diplomats
on the island exchanged polite greetings at public functions and sometimes attended one another's parties. The Soviets and Chinese apparently both recognized the need for an outward show of courtesy in a small, isolated community like Zanzibar, where open feuding would damage both parties and might weaken their hold on local pro-Communist officials, many of whom would prefer to sweep the Sino-Soviet split under the rug.
V. Union with Tanganyika: April 1964

Even before the revolution, the affiliation of Zanzibar with Tanganyika had been under discussion in the context of a larger East African Federation. Nyerere, Karume, and Hanga were on the record as favoring the Federation; Babu was opposed. It had never been a question of a union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar alone, however; that possibility arose as a direct result of the revolution.

As noted earlier, it was Nyerere who initiated the negotiations leading to the union. Much has been written about his reasons for wanting a Tanganyika-Zanzibar union. Press comment in the U.S. and other Western countries has tended to emphasize the cold war aspects of the situation.* Typical of such analyses are the following:

During the weeks since the revolution, no one has kept a closer eye on events in Zanzibar than Nyerere. And what Nyerere saw made him more and more jittery. With each passing week, the number of Communist bloc technicians and advisers on the island mounted....

*The tendency of the U.S. and other Western press to emphasize the cold war aspects of Tanganyikan-Zanzibar relations complicated Nyerere's efforts to work out a solution within the framework of non-alignment. He has said on a number of occasions that he was personally furious with the way the American and British press treated the union; apparently, he was embarrassed in his efforts to absorb Zanzibar and contain the Communist threat by the praise he got in the West. There may be some truth to the thesis: that he felt he had to show that he wasn't pro-West, especially inasmuch as he wanted to begin to "put people like the East Germans in their place."
Three weeks ago, Nyerere’s fears that the Communist infection in Zanzibar might spread to his own country finally grew acute. Bluntly, he warned Karume that unless the People’s Republic of Zanzibar became a non-aligned nation, Tanganyika would recall the 400 policemen it had sent to the island. But along with his threat, Nyerere presented an attractive alternative: full political union between Zanzibar and Tanganyika.

Nyerere sent Foreign Minister Oscar Kambona winging across the channel to Zanzibar with an ultimatum: unless Zanzibar halted its leftward slither, Tanganyika would withdraw the policemen who have been on loan there since the coup to keep order.

There is evidence that Nyerere was indeed concerned about the excessive degree of Communist influence in Zanzibar. The [redacted] reported on 5 April that never before, not even at the time of the Tanganyikan mutiny, had he seen Nyerere so worried. The latter, emphasizing the threat to Tanganyikan security of Soviet manning of the Zanzibar air force, had confided to the ambassador that he was seriously thinking of intervening if things did not change. While he was obviously confident of his own ability to balance aid from the East and West in what he thought was the practice of true non-alignment, Nyerere seems to have felt that the Government of Zanzibar had gone beyond acceptable limits in relying almost exclusively on Bloc economic and military assistance. In his discussions with Karume Nyerere warned the Zanzibar President that he was making a mistake in becoming involved with the Communist powers, to the extent that he was allowing himself to be pressured into making attacks on the U.S. In the long run, Nyerere may have feared that Karume and the other Zanzibar leaders would lose control to the Bloc.
He had always looked on Zanzibar as a potential threat for that very reason. For years, he had been distrustful of Zanzibar's Arab-based government which he thought might come under foreign influence. Even then, he had had the conception that if he could bring about a federation of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, this threat would be eliminated. What he seems to have feared most was outside control of Zanzibar.

Even if he was, as he has said, aware of the danger to Tanganyika of a Communist Zanzibar (a Zanzibar controlled by foreign powers), it seems that Nyerere deliberately exaggerated his fears that Zanzibar was falling under Communist control. It was an argument that he could use most convincingly in the West to win support for his move to absorb Zanzibar into Tanganyika. It is interesting to note that in private conversations with Westerners, Nyerere has always emphasized the anti-Communist line as the main rationale for the union, whereas in public he has taken the position that the union was simply a natural step toward African unity.

On the question of the "African revolution" Nyerere is deeply emotional. The possibility that Babu and his Arab followers might come to dominate the Government of Zanzibar was an anathema; to Nyerere, it would have been a repudiation of the Zanzibar revolution. By late March or early April, Babu had consolidated his position to the point where a take-over by the Arabs appeared imminent. Nyerere could have been expected to do anything and everything in his power to prevent such an eventuality. His solution was the union.* As the best way to guarantee the

*Concerning the union, Nyerere has said confidentially; "I faced the dilemma of acting with force or, better, of following a peaceful path. Forceful intervention after the Addis Ababa meeting would have called forth very serious and highly undesirable counter forces in many other African countries. At Addis Ababa it was decided that there would be no intervention in the internal affairs of other African countries. Thus, I chose another solution and (footnote continued on page 121)
integrity of the Zanzibar African revolution, he decided on a union of the two countries in which the Zanzibar Arabs would be absorbed by an overwhelming African majority.

In the case of Zanzibar, Nyerere's natural concern to safeguard the "African revolution" everywhere in Africa was closely bound up with Tanganyikan national interests. For years, Tanganyikans, including Nyerere, had held the idea that Zanzibar was really a part of Tanganyika. They had looked forward to the time when an African government would come to power in Zanzibar, at which time they planned to merge the two countries. It may well have been his interest in a Tanganyika-Zanzibar union that prompted Nyerere

(Tootnote continued from page 120)

was willing to pay for it. I have done that with five ministerial posts and Karume as Vice-President. There is already discontent in Tanganyika about this. For example, the Moshi district (of Tanganyika) has more inhabitants than Zanzibar and Pemba together and it cannot understand why the latter should have so many posts in the cabinet." Since the union cabinet was not enlarged in numbers compared to the Tanganyikan cabinet, Nyerere's acceptance of Karume as one of two vice-presidents of the union and five other Zanzibaris as cabinet ministers required dropping a corresponding number of Tanganyikan ministers. The fact that Nyerere gave the Zanzibaris such heavy over-representation in the government showed how anxious he was to effect the union of the two countries. Of the five Zanzibaris in the cabinet, however, only Hanga received a relatively influential post.

*Besides Nyerere, Defense Minister Kambona is reported to have long believed that Tanganyika should absorb Zanzibar. Although the union was reportedly a Nyerere initiative and Nyerere remained in full control of the negotiations, this is one instance in which Kambona worked in complete harmony with the President.
to become involved in Zanzibar politics in the first place, beginning in 1956. Although he would never admit that his designs on Zanzibar were essentially imperialistic, this may well have been his basic motivation in wanting the union.* It is very clear now, if not so much so at the time, that the union which Nyerere had in mind was one that he and the Tanganyikans would dominate. For obvious reasons, he was vague with Karume on these details before the union. Karume had no clear concept of the type of relationship involved and certainly did not foresee as tight a union as Nyerere.

As mentioned earlier, Nyerere’s feeling of urgency about the union was probably a reflection of his concern that Babu was well on the way to consolidating his position in Zanzibar and his belief that only decisive action taken in time could save Zanzibar’s African revolution from Arab control. However, there may have been another reason for his insistence on immediate action that he never mentioned to the Zanzibaris. Nyerere’s handling of the Tanganyikan mutiny in January, especially his call for help from the British, had done nothing for his prestige.

*Nyerere and the Tanganyikans have been sensitive to the fact that the Zanzibaris have been suspicious that Tanganyika had aggressive designs on Zanzibar. In December 1964, Tambwe, one of the few Tanganyikan officials to be stationed in Zanzibar after the union and one of the most enthusiastic supporters of the union, told the U.S. Consul that Tanganyikans were finally meeting with success in convincing the Zanzibaris that Tanganyika had no such “aggressive designs.” Tambwe himself probably did not believe what he told Carlucci; in his official position, he could see better than most people all the problems that the Tanganyikans were having with the union. Thoroughly disappointed and frustrated by Zanzibar’s resistance to Tanganyikan efforts to integrate the two countries, Tambwe has recently resigned his position and returned to Dar es Salaam.
or that of his country on the mainland. The union with Zanzibar was a spectacular success which he needed to re-establish himself.∗

Just when and how Nyerere first approached Karume on the subject of the union is unclear, but apparently Karume's response was not enthusiastic. Reportedly he was skeptical of his own future in a united government. Persuaded that the union would lower his prestige, he was unmoved by arguments that his position was much more seriously threatened by Babu and his followers.** Among Zanzibar leaders, Hanga was probably the most receptive to the Tanganyikan initiative. He has stated privately that he and Kambona agreed that Tanganyika and Zanzibar should unite when they were students together in London. Nyerere has also commented that Hanga favored the union even more than Karume. In July, URTZ Foreign Affairs parliamentary secretary Tambwe said that Nyerere was "particularly pleased with Hanga because he is, above all, an African nationalist who really supports the union."

In mid-April, the Government of Tanganyika stepped up its campaign of personal contact with Zanzibar officials. Nyerere spent 18 and 19 April trying to persuade Karume of the dangers of Communist influence, personified by Babu's group and by the Chinese and Soviet Bloc personnel on the island. Nyerere told Karume that he was losing control of Zanzibar to Babu, emphasizing that the GOZ was not African but was dominated by Arabs and thus had

∗On the subject of the Tanganyika-Zanzibar union, President Kenyatta of Kenya has observed: "Nyerere was trying to make up for his cowardly behavior over the Tanganyikan army mutiny."

**Karume was apparently convinced that he could control Babu and the other pro-Communists in the Zanzibar government; he claimed they were afraid of him because they knew he could turn the Zanzibar population against them because of their Arab background.
already lost the avowed purpose of the Zanzibar revolution. For the first time, he mentioned what was to prove to be his trump card—the Tanganyikan police contingent in Zanzibar. He told Karume that he was considering the immediate recall of the police, since he did not want Tanganyikans killed in defense of a government which he did not favor. Karume insisted that he needed the police; Nyerere agreed to postpone their recall.

Kambona is known to have exerted similar pressure on other Zanzibar leaders. On 21 April, he talked at length in Dar es Salaam with Hanga and Twala, using the same arguments as had Nyerere. Apparently, he succeeded in convincing the two officials that it was in their and Zanzibar's best interest to follow the Tanganyikan guidance. Kambona urged Hanga and Twala to try to persuade Karume.

Capitalizing on the fact that Babu was temporarily out of the country on diplomatic business, Nyerere flew to Zanzibar on 22 April to press his case with Karume once again. This time his threat to recall the Tanganyikan police had the force of an ultimatum. Faced with the prospect of being deprived of the support he needed against Babu, Karume agreed to the union. On 23 April, the Tanganyikan Radio broadcast the news that the two Presidents had signed the "articles of union."

Karume's true feelings about the union have probably been greatly misunderstood. Having taken his country into the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, he felt the necessity of justifying that decision and responsibility for winning approval of it. As the main spokesman for the union, he was assumed to have been strongly in favor of it from the beginning, especially since it appeared that he and Nyerere had worked together, in secret, to negotiate the agreement behind the backs of other Zanzibar leaders such as Babu. But this does not seem to have been the case. Although the union was in his interests—in that it got Babu off the island—Karume apparently always had misgivings about the union. Reluctant to subordinate himself and his country to Tanganyika, he was forced to accept it as the best of several unfavorable alternatives. Unlike Nyerere, he did not see the union as a close fusion of the two countries.
In Zanzibar, the union was not popular. Even within Karume's own Afro-Shirazi Party, leaders of the youth league and the principal trade union were strongly opposed to it; they are reported to have privately protested to Karume and to have had at least one secret meeting with Babu. It was a reflection of Karume's power position that he was able to obtain Zanzibar's ratification of the agreement even though only one third of the Revolutionary Council voted in favor of it. According to [blank] he had to raise the threat of intervention by Kenya, Uganda, and the UK; even so, 10 of the 20 Revolutionary Council members present reportedly abstained.

The news of the union appears to have caught all the major world powers by surprise. Although the UK and the U.S. and many African countries avoided making a public statement of approval, because they did not want to embarrass Nyerere or risk having the union represented

*There is no evidence that the Soviets were informed of the union negotiations, though Hanga was in on the planning. A few hours before the surprise announcement of the union, the Soviet, British, and American embassies in Dar es Salaam were given advance diplomatic notice. (Presumably, the Chinese embassy was also so informed, though we have no information to that effect.) The U.S. Government did not have any earlier indication that a union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar was being negotiated.

The idea of a union between the two countries had occurred to many Western officials as the obvious solution to the Zanzibar problem. However, the subject was never discussed with any Tanganyikan official (between the time of the Zanzibar revolution and the union). The move to form a union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar appears to have been strictly African in origin, without any sort of British or American inspiration.
as an "imperialist plot,"* the Western press was enthusiastic in its praise of Nyerere for "having pulled off a diplomatic master stroke that would slow, if not halt, Communist penetration of Zanzibar." The Bloc's concern at the turn of events in Tanganyika-Zanzibar was evident in both its public reaction to the announced union and its maneuvering behind the scenes.

Tanganyikan Foreign Minister Kambona summoned Soviet charge Ustinov in Dar es Salaam in the early morning hours of 23 April to tell him of the union agreement, a few hours ahead of the public announcement. Ustinov is reported to have received the news glumly, for the most part, in silence; he was obviously displeased. His only comments of substance were an oblique reference to Tanganyika's interference in the internal affairs of Zanzibar and a reminder that the Bloc countries were giving considerable material assistance to Zanzibar. He did not press either point, but the implication was clear that Tanganyika should think twice before jeopardizing the continuance of Bloc aid. Kambona answered that since Tanganyika was a non-aligned nation, the union would be also, and that assistance would be received gratefully from any quarter as long as that nonalignment was not disturbed. The Soviet ambassador in Zanzibar is also known to have tried to convince Karume that the union was not in Zanzibar's interests. Hanga was present at

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*The U.S. sent a message to Nyerere and Karume wishes them success in their united efforts as the leaders of the new republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar. At a NATO meeting it was reported that the U.S. believed it would be useful if the other member nations did likewise but that it would be better to avoid public comment. The NATO meeting agreed that it was of the highest importance that there be no outward sign of concerted NATO approval or support.
the meeting and he reportedly answered the ambassador: "Better to be exploited by our own brothers than by the East or West."*

The Soviets, who were on record as favoring an East African Federation, were obviously hesitant to denounce a unity move that presumably would be popular in Africa. Soviet comment at the time of the union adopted a wait-and-see attitude, and the USSR avoided making any policy statement. No doubt, the Russians were awaiting developments that would allow them to assess the solidarity of the union before they took a public position. The union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar was initially acknowledged in a noncommittal account by TASS on the 24th. Following up the TASS announcement, Radio Moscow on the same day observed cautiously that only time would tell whether or not the union would benefit the two peoples. A Moscow domestic service commentator on the 26th called the announcement of the union "one of the most unexpected surprises." Noting that Western press accounts alleged that Nyerere had taken this step to extinguish the fire caused by the Zanzibar Revolution which threatened to spread throughout Africa, the commentator tentatively ascribed the union to the "quite understandable objective desire" for African unity. He added that it should soon become apparent what road the two states would take. On 28 April, Pravda carried an interview with Hanga which quoted him as saying that the union was "above all an act of African union" and that the new nation would pursue a policy of fighting colonialism and of strengthening friendly relations with the USSR and other socialist countries. Hanga was also quoted as saying that the Western press was engaged in "wishful thinking" in expecting the new government to turn to the right.

*The incident is interesting in that it was the pro-Soviet Hanga, and not Karume, who was the more forceful in resisting Soviet pressure. It is good evidence that Hanga is, first and foremost, an African nationalist—a Communist and a Soviet sympathizer, to be sure, but not a mere instrument of the Soviets in Zanzibar.
Aside from a few broadcasts which referred to such subjects as May Day in Zanzibar and East German aid to Zanzibar, there was no other Soviet comment on the new republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar until a 13 May broadcast in Swahili speculated on the policy to be followed by the new government. Its reference to the Addis Ababa conference as having not been concerned with the "internal political unity or the unification of all (African) countries to become one" but rather with "the unification of efforts by African countries against imperialism and colonialism," and the comment that "not any form of unity...has proved to be a step forward" were only thinly-veiled slaps at the Tanganyika-Zanzibar union. The fact of the union explains nothing, the Soviet commentary argued; only the settlement of certain problems will give an indication of the direction in which the new government is heading. "If the social and economic changes wrought in Zanzibar cross to the mainland, then the revolutionary national liberation movement will be making another step forward."

In their cautious treatment of the union, the Soviets revealed a readiness to live with the new union, provided the united government did not swing too far to the right. They were obviously reluctant to push the conflict between Nyerere and the Zanzibaris to the point of jeopardizing Soviet relations with Tanganyika. Their propaganda response was an obvious attempt to make the best of a bad situation--by emphasizing the "revolutionary" potential in the new situation of a united republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar rather than the loss of a favorable situation in an independent Zanzibar.

The Soviets may have had one consolation about the union. Without doubt, it was a far more serious blow to Chinese subversive efforts in Africa than to those of the Soviet Union. The Yugoslav chargé in Kenya is reported to have said that he believed the Russians were "not at all displeased" about the union, which had been "a sharp and timely setback for the Chinese." The Yugoslavs would naturally play down Soviet policy reversals and exaggerate Chinese defeats, as part of their world-wide anti-China effort. We know that the Soviets were upset about the union and that they had protested to both the Tanganyikans and the Zanzibaris.
Peking's concern over developments in Tanganyika-Zanzibar was almost certainly the reason that "practically the whole Chinese embassy in Dar es Salaam went over to Zanzibar the day after the union. No doubt, the Chinese were anxious to talk to Zanzibar officials to get a first-hand reading of just how the Zanzibaris interpreted the union agreement. If there was no hope of restoring the status quo ante, the Chinese were obviously going to do everything they could to frustrate the implementation of the agreement. In talks with Zanzibar officials, they could have been expected to try to stimulate opposition to the union.

Peking neither commented on nor even reported the Karume-Nyerere accord until 28 April, when NCNA cited the Tanganyikan press as saying that the agreement had been reached during a "secret talk" between the Tanganyikan and Zanzibar presidents. Two days later NCNA reported a message from Liu Shao-chi to Nyerere extending "sincere congratulations" on the founding of the united republic. Except for one other brief report on the new cabinet, Peking was absolutely silent on the subject of the new union until the CPR welcomed a Tanzanian government goodwill mission led by URTZ second vice-president Kawawa in June 1964. On 25 April NCNA had reported an interview two days earlier with Zanzibar's Foreign Minister Babu, then in Karachi, in which he had said Zanzibar would promote Afro-Asian-Latin American solidarity against imperialism. However, the NCNA report took no notice of the fact that Zanzibar had officially become part of the new United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar since the interview with Babu and that Babu was technically no longer foreign minister of Zanzibar.
Although developments in the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, or Tanzania, as it is now called are beyond the scope of this paper, there are a few general observations to be made on the course of events in Zanzibar since its union with Tanganyika in April 1964.

Although Karume has been unswerving in his public support of the union, he and the other Zanzibari leaders have not been altogether happy with the union.* Karume has commented confidentially that the Tanganyikans' interpretation of the union was not what he had in mind. He and the other Zanzibari leaders have made it clear that they are determined that they and their country will not be subordinate to Tanganyika. Even Hanga, the most pro-union of the Zanzibaris, who claims to have plotted the union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar with Kambona when they were students together in London, has said that the Tanganyikans were foolish if they thought they were going to dominate the union; "they are wasting their time coming to Zanzibar to try to tell us what to do; Karume will never take orders from them."

After more than a year under the union government, the government of Zanzibar still continues to function very much as an independent regime, even in the field of

*The most recent instance of Zanzibari dissatisfaction with Nyerere's conduct of union affairs concerns the appointment of the new Tanzanian cabinet following the national elections this fall. Without consulting anyone, Nyerere made all the decisions on the cabinet. As the first Vice-President of Tanzania, Karume felt that he should have been consulted, especially since some of the cabinet ministers are Zanzibaris. Other Zanzibari leaders were also reported to be dissatisfied with the composition of the cabinet.
foreign affairs. The Zanzibaris still control their own entry and exit procedures and have separate trade relations with foreign countries and keep their own tariff rates. The Zanzibar army has not been integrated with the mainland forces;* and Zanzibar has its own three-year development plan, completely separate from Tanganyika's five-year plan.** Zanzibar government personnel still do not undertake discussions of vital problems with their counterparts in the mainland ministries. The GOZ has refused to merge its budget with that of the mainland (although it is dependent on a substantial budgetary contribution from the mainland). Recently, it has set up its own State Bank of Zanzibar independent of the Tanzanian State Bank. In a move to prevent the union government from falling heir to Zanzibar assets, the GOZ is reported to have sold all its stocks in London in May 1964.

The Bloc has very much aided and abetted the Zanzibaris in their opposition to Tanganyikan efforts to integrate the two countries. Although they pay lip service to the union and otherwise try to give the appearance of supporting it (as when the Soviets and Chinese promptly complied with the order to downgrade foreign embassies in Zanzibar to consulates), the Communists have

*The two armies have not been integrated, but some Zanzibar units have been rotated on assignment to the mainland. At the same time, a Tanganyikan unit has been assigned to Pemba, again as a separate unit. Although Nyerere wants to bring the Zanzibar army under Tanganyikan control, he has been hesitant to introduce such an unruly element into his own unstable army.

**The two economic plans are so different that there would be no way to combine them. Tanganyika's plan is based on private investment, whereas in Zanzibar all the land and most enterprises are in the government's hands.
been working behind the scenes to disrupt the union.* Karume and Mwana have been besieged by Bloc diplomats who play on Zanzibari fears of "imperialist domination" in urging the Zanzibaris to resist Tanganyikan efforts at integration; the Communists have used the theme that Bloc aid to Zanzibar is in jeopardy. The pro-Communist Zanzibaris, who have been the most violent in their opposition to the union, have obviously been responsive to Soviet and Chinese urging. The GOZ move to sell all its stocks in London was just one of several moves inspired by the East Germans to guarantee Zanzibar's independence from Tanganyika. Another was the decision to establish the Zanzibar State Bank. When speaking to Western officials, Nyerere claims to dislike the Soviets and East Germans,** whom he blames for Zanzibar intransigence. Certainly the Tanganyikans were very much annoyed last year when Moscow sent about 25 military advisers to Zanzibar without even notifying Dar es Salaam. The Chinese may have been somewhat more subtle in their dealings with the Zanzibaris, though they did, along with the East Germans, formalize an aid agreement with Zanzibar after the union, when Zanzibar technically had no authority for the conduct of foreign affairs.

Nyerere's tactics has been to approach Zanzibari problems gradually, to establish a common bond of confidence, to seek a consensus in the traditional African

*An East European official who visited Zanzibar for May Day 1964 was reported to have said: "Our comrades will progressively destroy the union." This would seem to be a main objective of Bloc policy in Tanzania.

**The East Germans have been particularly opposed to the union because they know that their favored position on the island will be eclipsed as the union is further consolidated.
manner,* and to avoid conflict with any of the elements on the island.** Nyerere apparently believes that his strategy is sound and that the union is gradually taking hold; he plans to continue his present tactics. His uphill struggle to make the union effective in Zanzibar has been a source of personal frustration to him and certainly has had a disproportionate effect on his conduct of domestic and foreign policy. In his desire to avoid a direct confrontation with the islanders he has sometimes compromised his position; each surrender has resulted in a further diminution of his authority. Quite understandably, he has been very sensitive on the subject of the consolidation of the union. He has particularly resented stories in the Western press that have ridiculed the union for not working smoothly and for the administrative anomalies that persist.

The prime example of Nyerere's inability to make his influence felt in Zanzibar was the case of the East German Embassy in Zanzibar.*** Nyerere's best efforts to

*The African process of obtaining a consensus involves endless maneuvering, some of it on a trial and error basis, and interminable "palaver". When the "palaver" stops, progress stops; so long as it continues, progress is being made.

**The only time Nyerere has stood up to the Revolutionary Council was on the matter of Shariff's arrest by the Revolutionary Council. Because of Nyerere's intervention, Shariff was finally released, and allowed to leave Zanzibar.

***After the founding of URTZ, it was announced that all foreign embassies in Zanzibar should be converted to consulates by 30 June 1964. With the departure of the Chinese ambassador on 11 July, East Germany was the only country to maintain an Embassy on the island. It was 8 months before a solution to the East German representation issue was finally achieved and the East Germans down-graded their embassy to a consulate.
get the Embassy removed, or at least downgraded, were unavailing. As one line of attack, he apparently tried to enlist the support of the Soviets; their refusal to help persuade the East Germans to give up their Embassy in Zanzibar was a main factor contributing to the cool state of Soviet-Tanzanian relations.* Despite the pressure from Dar es Salaam to force the GDR into reducing its representation on the island, Karume and the Zanzibaris remained adamant that relations established between Zanzibar and East Germany would continue, intimating that if the GDR was not recognized the union would be dissolved. The East

*Following the creation of the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, the Soviets initiated a dual policy designed to preserve their separate relationship with Zanzibar without jeopardizing relations with Tanganyika. Their cautious approach to the new situation in East Africa was particularly apparent in their handling of the East German recognition issue. As the GDR struggled to maintain its embassy in Zanzibar—the only one it had outside the Bloc—it soon became apparent that Moscow preferred to let the East Germans work out a solution for themselves rather than run the risk of antagonizing the Tanganyikans. Moscow gave no public backing to the GDR's presence in Zanzibar (though at no time did it question the legitimacy of the East German position). On the other hand, Moscow provided no support whatever to Nyerere's effort to downgrade the GDR embassy.

Later, when it became clear, around September or October, that Nyerere was unwilling or unable to move energetically against the GDR presence in Zanzibar, Moscow became less reticent in supporting Pankow's position. Two Soviet broadcasts defended GDR aid to Zanzibar and quoted Babu's remarks that Zanzibar would be forced to act independently of the union on a number of matters. Although the Tanganyikans pressed the Soviets for assistance in solving the recognition problem, asking for a formal statement of the Soviet position on the status of the GDR "embassy," Moscow refused to take a formal stand on the question. In effect, by their inaction, the Soviets discreetly backed East Germany against Tanganyika.
Germans were conducting a campaign of unremitting pressure on Zanzibari leaders, especially Karume, with attractive offers of aid. The Zanzibari insistence on GDR recognition reflected their fear of losing this aid; then too, Karume apparently felt that he owed the East Germans his support after their early support of his government.

For months, feelings for and against the union polarized around this one issue. In the interests of solving the problem, which was having such a divisive effect on the union, Nyerere finally compromised his position. In February 1965, he announced that Tanzania would accept the Cairo formula for an East German Consulate General with a statement of non-recognition; as the quid pro quo for permission to establish a Consulate General in Dar es Salaam, the East Germans agreed to downgrade their embassy in Zanzibar to a Consulate.* It was probably

*The West German position had been that East Germany should be represented by nothing higher than a trade mission. Concerned to preserve good relations with West Germany, from whom Tanganyika was getting considerable economic and military aid, Nyerere had promised the West Germans that East Germany would never be admitted to Tanganyika though he had said that the reduction of the East German Embassy in Zanzibar to a consulate was all he could hope to achieve there. Although he claims to have been badly advised on the question of whether West Germany would withdraw its aid if Tanzania decided to accept an East German Consulate in Dar es Salaam, by the time Nyerere agreed to do just that, he was no doubt prepared to accept a deterioration in West German-Tanganyikan relations as the price for settling differences with the Zanzibaris over the German question. In retaliation for the Tanzanian decision to allow the East Germans to establish a Consulate-General in Dar es Salaam, the West Germans withdrew their air force mission and suspended all new economic assistance to Tanzania—but diplomatic relations were maintained. In October 1965, Nyerere invited the West Germans to establish a Consulate on Zanzibar.
more of a victory for the Zanzibaris than for anyone else; they had resisted Tanganyikan pressure long enough to extract a compromise from Nyerere that was acceptable to the East Germans.

In considering the defects of the union, it is probably well to remember that only a relatively small investment of time has been made since April 1964. Moreover, if the pace of effecting a true union has been slow, it has also been steady. Although important union matters still remain in fact outside the Union Government's control, significant accomplishments have been made. For one, the integration of the police forces has been a signal accomplishment. Recently, there have been tentative moves toward amalgamating the armies and the judiciary of the two countries. Possibly the most important cohesive element of the union has been the budgetary support the Union Government provides the GCZ.

By all reports, Karume and Nyerere are determined to see the union through. Nyerere and Kambona and other Tanganyikan officials have said that they will never, under any circumstances, accept its dissolution, that they are prepared to maintain it at all costs—even to the point of armed intervention. So far, they have avoided anything resembling a showdown with the Zanzibaris, but apparently they are prepared to do everything, including intervene with force, before they see the union crumble. All indications are that the union is here to stay.

On the local political scene, Karume's stature has grown steadily since the revolution. With the help and support of Nyerere, Karume has effectively disposed of his most serious rivals for power by sending those whom he does not trust to Dar es Salaam and keeping in Zanzibar those whom he does. Babu, Salim Rashid, Moyo, and Ali Mahfudh are no longer powers to be reckoned with.*

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*The controversial subject of Babu's power position in Zanzibar today has been discussed earlier, on page 72.
There are still some rabid radicals, however—many of them Communist-trained—and some undisciplined "gun-slingers" on the 30-man Revolutionary Council, who continue to present a problem for Karume.* For some time after the revolution there was little cause for friction between the Revolutionary Council and Karume. At that time the Council had not coalesced into a body capable of making its own decisions, independent of the cabinet. Moreover, Karume's policies largely satisfied the pro-Communists. More recently, as Karume's more moderate views have been evident, the gulf between him and the extremists on the Revolutionary Council has widened. Meanwhile, the Council has become confident enough of its power to defy Karume; during the past year, it has on many occasions acted contrary to his wishes, sometimes even against his orders. Needless to say, the East Germans, Soviets and Chinese have each separately encouraged the Council in its opposition to Karume; to this end, they have skillfully wooed most of the radical council members with flattery and gifts.

Although the pro-Communists have the backing of the Afro-Shirazi Youth League and the Federation of the Revolutionary Trade Unions and considerable influence in the People's Liberation Army, they have not been able to mobilize enough popular support or sufficient following in the police to present a serious threat to Karume's position.** To Zanzibar's Africans, Karume is still "baba wa taifa" (father of the country) and his popularity

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*Although there is fairly general agreement between Karume and the Revolutionary Council members on the application of socialism, there are differences on the question of non-alignment, which Karume basically favors.

**The Revolutionary Council is firmly against the holding of an election in Zanzibar. Most Revolutionary Council members are unpopular and would lose their jobs if an election were held. Their greatest support comes from the army.
continues to be his strongest card. Probably for the same reason that Nyerere has chosen not to force the issue of the union, Karume has never come to grips with the long-term problem of what to do with the Council, even though he is probably in a strong enough position to win in a test of strength.* In his relations with the Council, Karume has followed a policy much like Nyerere's toward him—-one of proceeding slowly and avoiding trouble at almost any cost.** It may be that he has found the Council a useful defense against the "imperialist" ambitions of the mainland Africans; the pro-Communists on the Council have been among the most ardent opponents of the union.*** However, if the pro-Communists continue the tactic of presenting Karume with a fait accompli—a practice which clearly annoys him more and more—-they may provoke him into using his popular support and his backing from the mainland to move against the Revolutionary Council extremists.**** Nyerere has urged

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*The only steps Karume has taken to weaken the power of the Revolutionary Council has been the subordination of the Council to the Central Committee of the ASP; its effect appears to have been negligible.

**Karume's order to remove the U.S. tracking station, his role in the Carlucci affair (the U.S. Consul who was expelled from Zanzibar), and his complicity in breaking open U.S. Government property crates—-these and other actions have probably resulted from his belief that he must give in to the Revolutionary Council on certain points.

***The Revolutionary Council members are dependent on the PLA to maintain the power they have. They know that their position will be weakened as the union is consolidated.

****It would simply be a matter of removing the 10-15 radical members of the Revolutionary Council from the local political scene. If these men were arrested, Karume would be in complete control.
this course on Karume repeatedly, no doubt because it would help solve his problem of how to deal with the Zanzibaris. Nyerere would doubtlessly find it easier to control Karume if the latter were not subject to the pressure of the radical Revolutionary Council members who are working to disrupt the union. Thus, Nyerere's motivation in urging Karume to move against the Council may not necessarily be solely or even primarily anti-Communist in nature.

While Karume has pushed his domestic socialist reforms with ever greater intensity, his early enthusiasm for the Bloc has waned considerably. A number of factors have contributed to his shift away from the Bloc and his change from a violently anti-U.S. attitude to one of relative friendliness to the U.S. For one thing, the U.S. consul in Zanzibar apparently had a marked influence on the President:* he can certainly claim some credit for the improvement in Zanzibar-U.S. relations. Karume's naiveté was apparently further dispelled by his exposure to the Communists and pro-Communists with whom he was associated in the Zanzibar government. Although Kenyatta, Obote, and Nyerere had all warned him not to associate with Babu and his pro-Communist "comrades," Karume had wanted to give every Zanzibari the opportunity to demonstrate his loyalty to the Zanzibar revolution. In the process, his early suspicions of Babu, Salim Rashid and their friends hardened into deep distrust and dislike. Karume has described both Babu and Salim Rashid as traitors. In December 1964 he said that he now realized that Babu was not trustworthy and was despicable, and he described Rashid as a hateful "snake in the grass." (Both Babu and Salim Rashid are Arabs.) Karume does not seem to worry as much about the pro-Communists in his government who are African; he believes they are loyal to him and that most of them are merely paying lip service to the foreign Communists.

*The U.S. Consul was the only senior diplomatic representative in Zanzibar who could speak to Karume in Swahili. None of the Bloc diplomats knew the language.
Another factor in Karume's shift from a one-sided dependence on the Bloc and open hostility to the West to a more truly non-aligned attitude has been a growing dissatisfaction on his part with the Bloc economic aid program in Zanzibar. His disappointment has been all the more acute because of his initial high hopes for the program. As noted earlier, Karume had been extremely impressed by the Bloc's "generous" offers of aid to the new regime. He had furthered the Communist cause in Zanzibar, particularly the East German cause, by publicly praising Bloc projects such as the East German housing scheme. By the end of 1964, however, he and other Zanzibaris were beginning to realize that the Communist technicians were not what they had been advertised to be; even Zanzibari leftists, including Babu, Hanga, Twala and Moyo, were beginning to blame their Bloc friends for letting them down. Among those against whom complaints were beginning to be heard were the East German and Chinese doctors, the Soviet crews on the government ships, and the East German financial adviser Martin Gentsch.* The Zanzibaris were reportedly very worried.

*The medical treatment at the Zanzibar hospital was reported to have deteriorated alarmingly since the departure of the British doctors. Some of the Chinese doctors were not fully trained and had been sent to Zanzibar to gain experience. Their "traditional" medicines and medical care apparently frightened their Zanzibar patients. The Soviet crews for the two government ships were resented by the African seamen who had managed to run the vessels themselves between the departure of the British officers and the arrival of the Soviets, who delegated even less responsibility to the Africans than the British had. That the Soviets were not perfect sailors was demonstrated during Nyerere's visit to Pemba when the Jamhuri temporarily lodged on a sandbar. The criticism Martin Gentsch received when he insisted on 15 days more leave than the British expatriates used to receive was mild compared to the reaction when it was learned that he had purchased large quantities of shirts and transistor radios prior to his departure, charging them to the GOZ.
about the large number of Soviet Bloc advisers, whose high salaries had to be met by the GOZ.* The Bloc was accused of not fulfilling its promises on time and Bloc goods were often second-rate; this was apparently particularly true of Chinese goods. In January 1965, Karume was reported to be "disgusted" with the East Germans over the housing project, which was far behind schedule.** He kept contrasting the progress on this project with the progress on the American secondary school, putting the latter in a very favorable light. He also criticized the East Germans for importing so many building materials, pointing out that the American school project was being

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*The Soviet and East German advisers apparently expected the GOZ to provide free individual houses supplied with furniture, linens, utensils, and individual cars where possible. They also expected to receive high salaries (3,000 EAS per month, about $430.00). In July 1965, nine Soviet technicians, six of whom had been employed by the Port and Marine Department and included the Port Officer and the officers of the two Zanzibar government ships, left Zanzibar to return to the USSR. The reason their contracts were not renewed was that the GOZ no longer wished to bear the expense of paying their salaries and providing their housing and, in some cases, transportation.

There were also complaints about the Soviet plane that had been given to Karume. It was providing to be a very expensive present; operating expenses, including the salaries of the crew and maintenance team, cost the GOZ nearly 50,000 EAS per month.

**After the merger of Zanzibar with Tanganyika and the exchange of the East German Embassy in Zanzibar for an East German Consulate-General in Dar es Salaam, the East Germans seemed less interested in Zanzibar; their enthusiasm for the housing project cooled noticeably. Construction proceeded slowly; there were difficulties with the laborers, who did not like working for the East Germans; and there were delays in the arrival of building materials.
built from local materials.* According to [_____] Karume was avoiding contact with the Bloc representatives in Zanzibar; reportedly, he refused to see the Chinese Communists altogether. Two months earlier, in November 1964, the Soviets had received their most severe jolt since the union with Karume, who was obviously expected, failed to show up at the official Soviet November 7 celebration; a government minister left little doubt that the slight was intended.

Although the Bloc has tried to overcome the bad impression created by some of its advisers—for instance, the Chinese medical team at the Zanzibar hospital has apparently made significant progress in overcoming the bad impression created by the doctor who practiced "traditional medicine"—there is no doubt that the Zanzibaris have been disappointed with many aspects of the Bloc aid program, the economic aid program apparently more than the military. In the military field, Karume has been upset mainly by the bad relations existing between the Chinese and Soviet advisers, which have led to frictions within the Zanzibar army. It may be significant that the first group of Soviet military advisers, whose tour of duty in Zanzibar was up in September 1965, have not been replaced.

Disillusioned with what the Bloc has to offer Zanzibar, Karume has turned cautiously to the West. As an earnest of his goodwill, he has promised to control press and radio attacks upon the West.** Because of

*In response to Karume's criticisms, the GDR sent their Deputy Foreign Minister as a special emissary to Zanzibar; he apparently succeeded in overhauling procedures at the apartment project.

**In August 1964, Karume called in Information Officer Quellattn and upbraided him for presenting a one-sided picture of the U.S.; he told Quellattn that Zanzibar was nonaligned and so must the Government Information Services be; henceforth, the GOZ newspaper and radio station were not to use foreign news services, be they Russian, American, Chinese, or British, and were to concern themselves primarily with Zanzibar affairs.
Karume's efforts, Zanzibar was one of the few African capitals that had no anti-U.S. demonstrations after the Stanleyville air drop in November 1964. Later, Karume was to make pointedly nonaligned speeches after the anti-American blasts of visiting Chou En-lai in June 1965.

Still, it must be recognized that Western influence in Zanzibar is very limited now. Although the U.S. has repeatedly offered economic aid, Karume has approved only one U.S. aid project in the past two years—the secondary school.* He has not accepted a U.S. offer to supply teachers for the school. Compared to a Bloc presence of some 200 diplomatic and advisory personnel, there are only 5-6 Americans on the island at the present time. Measured against the traditional situation in the area, this state of affairs can only be considered a real setback for the West.

But it is still a long way from Bloc domination.

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*The school project started as a secondary school, was changed to a teacher training college, and is now back to its original conception as a secondary school. Only one wing of the proposed building has been completed; it will house the class-rooms.